



**UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
INTEGRATED  
CIVILIAN – MILITARY CAMPAIGN PLAN  
FOR SUPPORT TO  
AFGHANISTAN**



**Revision 1**

**FEBRUARY 2011**

**INTRODUCTORY LETTER**  
**FROM**  
**AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY AND GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS**


Kabul, February 2011

Enclosed is the new Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan, which we are issuing to provide updated guidance to all Americans serving in Afghanistan. Building upon the August 2009 edition, a civil-military team has worked for several months to revise the Plan, gathering input from fifteen national-level working groups, each of the five regional headquarters, and several international partners, as well as from Afghan colleagues who contributed to the October 2010 Rehearsal of Concept drill. This Plan reflects a tremendous effort to conceptualize and articulate the range of U.S. goals in Afghanistan, to outline a method for gauging progress, and to chart a course forward.

The original Plan has been of great value to our campaign over the past eighteen months. It directed us to unify civilian and military efforts in comprehensive and creative ways, and outlined guiding principles that formed the basis for significant improvements in Kabul and in the field. Throughout Afghanistan, we have established parallel and partnered chains of command – from the U.S. Embassy and ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, we have implemented several practical innovations down through the regional, provincial, and district levels. For example, in Kabul, we set up civil-military teams to address corruption, handle detention operations, improve contracting practices, and develop a joint communications plan. In the field, we set priorities by targeting Key Terrain Districts, and created a common framework through which to analyze and mitigate local sources of instability.

President Obama's recently completed review of our policies in Afghanistan identified important areas of progress, but also found that progress to be fragile and reversible. We believe this updated Plan will help keep us on track in the midst of a constantly changing environment. While the strategy it describes remains largely consistent (this version includes separate campaign objectives addressing corruption and gender issues), it features several notable refinements. First, the Plan is more closely aligned with the Afghan Government's National Development Strategy. Second, the objectives within the Plan are oriented toward 2014, to reflect the timeline endorsed at the NATO Lisbon Summit for transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan Government. To highlight our near-term focus areas, the sub-objectives are prioritized for the next 12-18 months. Finally, the Plan offers helpful, practical guidance to carry out U.S. strategy in the field.

As you continue to turn this Plan into reality on the ground, keep in mind the key principles each of us has laid out in separate guidance. In particular, as we enter the era of Transition, remember that our driving purpose is to help Afghanistan secure and govern itself. To realize that goal, we must enable our Afghan colleagues to move front and center, and then follow their lead. Forging a more cohesive U.S. civilian-military team is not an end in itself; it is the means by which we will most effectively assist the Afghan people and their government, and, in doing so, most successfully execute the mission given to us by the President and people of the United States.

  
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....	<b>i</b>
<b>PURPOSE OF INTEGRATED USG EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>STRATEGIC SITUATION</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>NATIONAL APPROACH</b> .....	<b>4</b>
Campaign Statement .....	<b>4</b>
Campaign Objectives Overview .....	<b>4</b>
Transition Process.....	<b>7</b>
<b>CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES</b> .....	<b>8</b>
Secure the Population .....	<b>8</b>
Action Against Irreconcilables.....	<b>9</b>
Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance .....	<b>11</b>
Access to Justice .....	<b>12</b>
Expansion of Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance .....	<b>14</b>
Countering Corruption.....	<b>15</b>
Electoral Reform and Continuity of Governance.....	<b>17</b>
Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access .....	<b>19</b>
Advancing Livelihoods and Sustainable Jobs.....	<b>20</b>
Cross-Border Access for Commerce Not Insurgents .....	<b>22</b>
Reconciling And Reintegrating Ex-Combatants and Achieving a Sustainable Peace .....	<b>24</b>
Claiming the Information Initiative .....	<b>26</b>
Improving The Status of Women.....	<b>28</b>
<b>SUB-NATIONAL APPROACH</b> .....	<b>30</b>
Linking Campaign Objectives to Sub-National Operations.....	<b>30</b>
Sub-National Implementation.....	<b>31</b>
South .....	<b>32</b>
Southwest.....	<b>34</b>
East.....	<b>36</b>
West .....	<b>38</b>
North .....	<b>40</b>
Capital.....	<b>42</b>

National-Level Strategic Coordination .....	43
National-Level Operational Coordination .....	44
Sub-National Coordination .....	45
<b>Measuring Progress .....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Planning Methodology and Future Direction.....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Glossary .....</b>	<b>48</b>

**Annexes** *(to be added later)*

- A. Organizational Structures and Roles**
- B. Transition Process**
- C. Metrics Framework**
- D. Campaign Objectives Crosswalk with PMP, National Level Working Groups, and Mission Operational Plan**
- E. Abridged Campaign Objective Strategies (i.e. sector strategies)**
- F. Foreign Assistance Priorities and Guidance**
- G. Civilian-Military Field Guidance**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As outlined by the President of the United States of America, the United States' broad strategic goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.<sup>1</sup> The Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan provides strategic guidance from the United States (U.S.) Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to American personnel in Afghanistan, both civilian and military, on the focus and execution of the mission through 2014, with specific priorities for the next 12-18 months. The vision toward which all United States Government (USG) efforts are applied is: *The U.S. Mission and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, in partnership with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the international community, enable the Afghan Government and its people to: counter the insurgency and prevent the use of Afghan territory by international terrorists, build a state that is accountable and responsive to its people, and establish a foundation for longer-term development.* Through the Kabul Process and Afghan National Priority Programs and other sector strategies, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) has articulated its priorities. The U.S. efforts in Afghanistan support those priorities, which are reflected throughout this document. The Plan, which incorporates Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and other U.S. agencies' priorities and strategies, integrates joint and interagency elements under one umbrella, oriented towards a common mission. The plan is also intended to communicate USG priorities to the international community and the Afghan Government.

The U.S. strives to work with the Afghan Government to assure that the population of Afghanistan is safeguarded from violence, coercion, intimidation, and predation. Together, we will ensure that conditions are set for transfer of leadership in security matters and for good governance and sustainable development through 2014. USG efforts focus on key terrain, which are areas of strategic importance due to population density, key transportation networks, and economic opportunity. Security initiatives aim to protect the population from insurgent activity, to neutralize irreconcilable insurgents, and to disrupt the criminal patronage networks that feed them. Simultaneously, targeted measures in rural districts aim to deny freedom of movement to insurgents in their base areas and along lines of communication, areas which can threaten ISAF advances in key terrain. The USG supports GIROA's efforts to solidify effective, representative, and accountable governance, to counter corruption, and to provide justice and dispute resolution. The U.S. aims to increase economic opportunity and improve livelihoods through support to Afghan health and education services, agricultural production and markets, private sector development, and improved security and trade across the borders. In USG efforts across security, governance, and development, actions should be taken to limit corruption, increase communications impact, and improve the status of women. Reconciliation, reintegration, and the achievement of sustainable peace are facilitated and supported by nearly all of the other objectives. These USG priorities are encapsulated in 13 Campaign Objectives that reflect what the USG aims to achieve through 2014. The sub-objectives within the Campaign Objectives reflect priorities for the next 12-18 months (*see Graphic 1*).

The campaign's strength will be measured in large part by its success at the sub-national level. The multi-layered, dynamic, and complex environment in Afghanistan requires a nuanced implementation of objectives and an understanding of the operating environment in distinct regions. As this is a strategic document, it sets priorities only down to the regional level; provinces and districts determine priorities and operations under direction from regional headquarters. In the South and Southwest, USG priorities are to work with the Afghan Government and people as well as international partners to neutralize the insurgency and criminal networks, combat abuse of power, enable transition to a licit agriculture-based economy, and

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<sup>1</sup> Remarks by President Barack Obama in his *Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, December 1, 2009.

support job creation and improved livelihoods. In the East, the USG conducts and supports population-centric counterinsurgency operations to neutralize the insurgency in insecure areas as well as work with Afghan institutions to facilitate improved governance and development. In the North and West, the USG seeks to build the Afghan Government's capacity, to transform stabilization efforts into sustainable development and broad-based economic growth as well as to highlight America's long-term commitment to Afghanistan through the establishment of consulates in Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat.

At the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, partner nations reaffirmed their commitment to support GIRoA's goal of fully transferring lead security responsibility by the end of 2014. In this document, transition is defined in its broadest sense: from international to GIRoA-led security operations; from short-term stability programming to sustainable development; from Provincial Reconstruction Teams to an evolution toward standard development structures; and from donor-driven programs to jointly developed programs and on-budget donor assistance directed by GIRoA toward its priorities. Transition is not an objective in and of itself, but a conditions-driven process and a necessary step for a successful campaign.

The Campaign Plan is implemented through civilian-military working groups in Kabul and through its incorporation into sub-national planning and activities. The Executive Working Group and the Principals' Group coordinate and make decisions at the highest level. Civilian-military elements should coordinate both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, the full spectrum of USG agencies and military forces should synchronize their efforts internally as well as coordinate with international actors and the whole range of Afghan partners operating in a specific geographic area. Vertically, planners at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels should ensure a consistency of goals and a flow of information, priorities, and assessments both upward and downward. In addition, the Field Guidance Annex contains guidance and standard operating procedures for major civilian field activities in support of the Campaign Objectives.

Assessments of campaign progress at the strategic level serve to determine the effectiveness of the USG strategy. The primary purpose of the assessment process is to provide USG leadership in Afghanistan with the necessary analysis to prioritize and, subsequently, readjust allocation of resources and efforts strategically. Assessments also serve to inform Washington decision-makers of changes in the environment. The U.S. Mission, in coordination with ISAF, assesses campaign progress regularly. The quarterly civilian-military assessment for the National Security Council (NSC) in Washington is supplemented by national-level working group briefs to Kabul-based leadership on progress toward the Campaign Objectives. In addition, a capstone piece will assess overall progress toward the Campaign Statement, drawing on existing reporting such as the NSC assessment, ISAF's quarterly reports, and the Mission's Performance Management Plan.

The first USG Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan was signed in August 2009. As the President's 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review concluded, we have made notable progress with our strategy, but the challenge is to ensure that this progress is durable. As such, this revision seeks to build off of the strong base articulated in the original plan with added emphasis on the priorities of the Afghan Government; prioritization of USG objectives; increased utility to field personnel; and increased emphasis on supporting Afghan women and countering corruption. Ultimately, the unity of purpose and combined efforts among the GIRoA, ISAF, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, the international community, and the USG are essential to the success of the campaign.

**Graphic 1: USG Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan, Revision 1**

<b>Campaign Statement:</b> The US Mission and USFOR-A, in partnership with ISAF and the International Community, enable the Afghan government and its people to: counter the insurgency and prevent the use of Afghan territory by international terrorists, build a state that is accountable and responsive to its people, and establish the foundation for longer-term development.									
Countering Corruption	Cross-border Access for Commerce not Insurgents	Advancing Livelihoods and Sustainable Jobs	Access to Justice	Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance	Action Against Irreconcilables	Expansion of Effective, Representative and Accountable Governance	Electoral Reform and Continuity of Governance	Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access	Secure the Population
Improved transparency and accountability, and regulatory mechanisms to combat a culture of impunity and improve the government's legitimacy.	GIRoA develops its border management capacities, promotes economic development and trade, deters illicit transactions, and improves security in border areas.	Improvements in the business-enabling environment and support for small and medium enterprises create jobs in population centers and economic corridors while social sector development enhances human capital.	Traditional and formal justice sectors are increasingly available, accessible, and seen as legitimate by Afghans.	Key nodes within the nexus of criminals, narcotics, and illicit finance are identified and disrupted, depriving the insurgency of funding, and bolstering GIRoA legitimacy.	Irreconcilable insurgent leaders and networks are neutralized to a level manageable for the ANSF and rejected by the Afghan population, limited in their destabilizing influence, and denied safe haven in Afghanistan.	Strengthened institutions of governance are durable, inclusive, and responsive to the Afghan people.	GIRoA manages an electoral process that is inclusive, transparent, and legitimate, and evolves in ways suited to Afghanistan's political maturation.	Viable agricultural employment and strengthened markets provide alternatives to poppy cultivation and insurgent-related activities.	Afghan National Security Forces provide security for the population, reducing violence and coercion by insurgents and criminals, and increasing popular trust in the security forces and, in turn, GIRoA.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Strengthen GIRoA's capacity to improve transparency and accountability</li> <li>•Strengthen GIRoA institutions to improve financial oversight</li> <li>•Help GIRoA build capacity to investigate, prosecute, punish, or remove corrupt officials</li> <li>•Strengthen the capacity of GIRoA &amp; civil society to educate &amp; empower the public to counter the culture of impunity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Assist GIRoA in implementation of comprehensive border strategy</li> <li>•Improve operations at, and between, major border crossing points, international airports, and inland customs depots</li> <li>•Promote GIRoA's cooperation with its neighbors on cross-border management and trade facilitation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Increase small and medium enterprise productivity</li> <li>•Improve the legal and regulatory framework for private sector growth</li> <li>•Promote domestic and foreign private investment...</li> <li>•Expand health and education services to increase human capital and improve livelihoods</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Expand access to state justice sector and increase capacity</li> <li>•Improve detention and corrections practices</li> <li>•Increased security and space for traditional dispute resolution</li> <li>•Strengthen leadership capacity in justice sector</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Improve identification and action against criminal patronage networks</li> <li>•Increase capacity of GIRoA's counter-narcotics capabilities and illicit finance capabilities</li> <li>•Increased incentives and alternatives to cultivating poppy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Build GIRoA capacity to counter irreconcilables</li> <li>•Separate insurgents from the population</li> <li>•Prevent or impede elements that enable insurgent action</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Improve national-level government performance</li> <li>•Strengthen governance and service delivery at the sub-national levels</li> <li>•Increase development of civic participation in governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Ability of GIRoA to effectively administer elections strengthened</li> <li>•Institutional and oversight capacity of elected bodies strengthened</li> <li>•Increase civic education and popular participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Increase confidence of Afghans in their government</li> <li>•Improve agricultural productivity and income</li> <li>•Improve natural resource management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Prevent intimidation and violence against the population</li> <li>•Increase Afghans' incentives to oppose the insurgency and support GIRoA</li> <li>•Support GIRoA-led insurgent reintegration</li> </ul>
<b>Reconciling and Reintegrating Ex-Combatants and Achieving a Sustainable Peace:</b> Political and legal conditions for peace and reconciliation encourage combatants and commanders to live within the laws of Afghanistan, and create incentives for their constructive reintegration into society.									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•To communicate and build confidence with Afghans, combatants, and communities ...around peace reconciliation, and reintegration policy</li> <li>•Develop Government and non-state capacity in assessment, demobilization, recovery, peace-building and conflict resolution methods, leadership and ability for delivery</li> <li>•Deliver local security and freedom of movement guarantees both for communities and those who join the peace process</li> </ul>									
<b>Claiming Information Initiatives:</b> Government and community leadership communicate a common vision of hope and progress to the Afghan people, decreasing misinformation and increasing resistance to insurgent influence.									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Counter extremist voices; Strengthen people-to-people ties to promote a shared vision of Afghanistan's future; Build Afghan communication capacity; Expand media outreach</li> </ul>									
<b>Improving the Status of Women:</b> Afghan women have improved access to health care, education, economic opportunity, the political system, and justice.									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Health; Education; Economic Development; Access to Justice; Communication; Protection; Security; Political Empowerment</li> </ul>									

- Campaign Statement
- 48 Month (2014) Campaign Objectives
- 12-18 Month (2012) Priority Objectives
- Cross-Cutting Campaign Objectives

# UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTEGRATED CIVILIAN-MILITARY CAMPAIGN PLAN

## PURPOSE OF INTEGRATED USG EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN

As outlined by the President of the United States of America, the United States' broad strategic goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

The following Plan provides strategic guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S. personnel in Afghanistan on how to focus and execute this mission through 2014, in line with the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration affirming the coalition's commitment to transition lead security responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces by that time. It emphasizes priorities for the next 12-18 months to demonstrate measurable progress to the Afghan people, to the international community, and to the American public.

This plan directs the prioritization of USG efforts and identifies areas for significant cooperation with the GIRoA, ISAF, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), NATO, and other members of the international community. While ISAF forces are referenced, this Plan does not presume to direct ISAF forces, non-U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or other donors. Rather, the Plan's objectives and approach are synchronized with the ISAF OPLAN 38302, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) OPORD OMID 1390, USG regional plans and orders, and the plans of international counterparts. In addition, the plan draws on GIRoA's Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and other GIRoA strategies, the Afghan Compact, the Department of State's Regional Stabilization Strategy, the U.S. Mission's FY2010 Operational Plan, the Mission's Performance Management Plan (PMP) (*see Annex D* for cross-walk), and President Obama's Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ultimately, the unity of purpose and combined efforts among GIRoA, ISAF, NATO nations, the international community and the USG are essential to the success of the campaign.

## PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

The following are the key planning assumptions underlying the Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan (ICMCP). If any of these assumptions prove false, the strategy would need to be re-examined.

- GIRoA's interests remain broadly congruent with USG objectives
- Pakistan remains stable and conducts operations against extremist networks focused on destabilizing Pakistan
- The international community continues to support GIRoA and the campaign with the required resources
- Sufficient GIRoA human and institutional capacity exist to absorb resources and increasingly take the lead
- No catastrophic natural disasters take place in Afghanistan
- Sufficient space exists for insurgent commanders to negotiate a reconciled settlement and reintegrate into society
- Afghan tolerance level for corruption does not significantly decline
- Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continue to grow and improve
- GIRoA continues to improve revenue collection abilities, leading to greater self-sufficiency

## STRATEGIC SITUATION

The major dynamics within and outside of Afghanistan create challenges and opportunities in achieving U.S. strategic objectives. The multi-layered, dynamic, and complex environment in Afghanistan requires a nuanced implementation of objectives and an understanding of the operating environment in distinct regions. While each region is different, the critical dynamics below apply to the country as a whole (*see Graphic 2*):

***Insurgency:***<sup>2</sup> Since 2009, insurgents have increasingly attacked ISAF forces, GIROA officials, and USG implementing partners, likely in reaction to the increased levels of forces and kinetic activity. The coalition has made some progress in arresting the insurgency's advance in some areas while decreasing its impacts in others, but such progress remains fragile. Insurgent groups still derive some legitimacy by appealing to ideological affinities and fears of "foreign occupation," but their influence is largely won through fear and coercion. The Taliban gains some support through the rapid provision of local dispute resolution, especially in areas where other forms of governance are absent. Insurgent groups also wage an effective strategic communications campaign, taking advantage of missteps, especially involving civilian casualties, and perpetuating a narrative of GIROA illegitimacy. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) has potential to bring mid- and low-level fighters off of the battlefield, but implementation remains a challenge.

***GIROA Legitimacy:*** Despite improvements, some of the Afghan population, particularly in rural areas, does not recognize the central government or perceives that it does not represent its interests. Afghans report that low-level corruption, such as bribery, affects their daily lives. While substantial improvements have been made in the development of the ANSF, the perception in some areas remains that the Afghan Government is not able or willing to protect its people or prosecute those inclined to prey on them. Service delivery has improved in population centers, but public perception lags in many areas, perhaps reflecting the gap between the expectations of Afghan citizens and GIROA's capacity to satisfy their needs.

***Traditional Governance Structures:*** Thirty years of war have damaged but not destroyed the Afghan tradition of local rule through traditional governance structures such as tribal jirgas. Across Afghanistan, the population is often confronted with what is perceived as a choice between supporting corrupt officials or insurgents. Traditional governance structures offer viable alternatives. Recognizing this, insurgents commonly attempt to co-opt or coerce local elders and community members to provide governance on their behalf. Failing this, village leaders are targeted. Given the absence of GIROA presence below the district level and lack of presence and capacity in district centers, Afghanistan's traditional governance structures, where functioning, continue to be feasible options.

***Investment in the Future of Afghanistan:*** Years of violence have devastated Afghanistan, leaving it the fifth poorest country in the world. The high infant and maternal mortality rates, short life expectancy, and low literacy levels constrain Afghanistan's development. GIROA is demonstrating increasing capacity in providing for the basic needs of its people, and has made progress in rebuilding and improving essential services across the broad spectrum of its people's needs. Despite these improvements in much of the country, insecurity, economic disparity, injustice, and concern that the international community's commitment is time-bound all limit popular commitment to invest in the future.

***Human Security:*** Afghans, in more violent areas, struggle with a lack of basic security and services, including freedom of movement. Afghans in most areas have a low standard of living and few stable, licit

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<sup>2</sup> For a nuanced description of the different insurgency groups currently active in Afghanistan, see the ISAF OPLAN 38302 rev 5.

employment opportunities. At the same time, some communities suffer from a breakdown of communal and tribal structures that have traditionally provided communal support, dispute resolution, and protection during hard times. In these areas, Taliban justice, money, and imposition of security, albeit brutal, have some appeal to people suffering from three decades of conflict.

***Corruption and Criminality:*** A lack of capacity and oversight hinder governmental institutions, such as the police and justice system, fostering the kinds of corruption, such as bribery, that affect Afghans' daily lives. The lack of regulation and enforcement has failed to prevent fraud and widespread criminal activity, such as the Kabul Bank crisis. Thus, despite some successes, the perception among the population that corruption goes unpunished remains. The current level of corruption acts as an enabler for the country's illicit narcotics trade. Criminal patronage networks, organized around corruption as well as narcotics and other forms of smuggling benefit from local insecurity and minimal border controls. The line between criminals and insurgents is sometimes blurred. Poppy cultivation remains stable, but opium production has decreased due to a number of factors, including strong interdiction efforts as well as the recent blight. The number of poppy-free provinces has remained the same, but trends are positive for future gains. Nonetheless, narco-criminals and insurgents continue to profit from narcotics production, and farmers are still left with few attractive alternatives in times of economic hardship. Few narco-traffickers and other criminals are held liable for their actions.

***Impact of Human and Physical Terrain:*** Islam is an important element of Afghan culture and religious leaders have a great deal of influence. Still, factors such as strong tribal and ethnic identities and an historical aversion to foreign powers tend to feed power struggles and engender resistance to central government intervention. The physical geography also promotes isolated and remote communities removed from central government structures and mainstream information sources, increasing susceptibility to insurgent influence. Afghanistan's inhospitable mountainous and arid desert topography gives rise to porous borders susceptible to smuggling and insurgent movements. In addition, harsh climates and rural communities' susceptibility to natural disasters make basic economic development a challenge. Water remains a scarce commodity in much of the country, increasing the likelihood of conflict over access and grazing lands.

***Regional Dynamics:*** Afghanistan's future success or failure is linked to regional stability. Addressing the violent external drivers of Afghanistan's insecurity, while concurrently facilitating regional economic growth, is central to increasing Afghan and regional stability. Many members of the Afghan insurgents' leadership are based, or frequently return to, the Pakistani border region. On the other hand, economic relations have improved between the two countries as evidenced by the signing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement.<sup>3</sup> India has strengthened its influence in Afghanistan through diplomacy and development aid. Iran continues to contribute significant development aid and seek political influence in the country with an eye toward trade corridors, shared water resources, narcotics inflows, and the threat of Sunni Islamic fundamentalism. China has taken a major interest in increasing its influence in Afghanistan through foreign direct investment, notably investment in the Aynak copper mine. Like China, other regional actors, such as the Central Asian states and Russia, have significant interests in Afghanistan – economic, political, and security – and must be a part of any regional effort for stability.


***International Support:*** In the past year, the international community has substantially increased troop commitments and civilian resources. Since fall of 2009, U.S. troop numbers rose by nearly 30,000 to a total of 98,000. The U.S. civilian uplift has nearly doubled the number of American civilians in Afghanistan, including a significant increase in governance, development, and agriculture experts at the sub-national level. Since July of 2009, international partners have committed an additional 6,675 troops to a total of 41,315. Simultaneously, some ISAF troop-contributing nations have withdrawn or announced

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<sup>3</sup> The Agreement has not yet been ratified by the Afghan President and Parliament.

future reductions of troops. Donor funding continues to increase, and the Kabul Conference demonstrated a renewed commitment in donor coordination to support GIROA's national priority programs. At the same time, the risk of donor and troop-contribution fatigue is high as domestic patience is tested and demonstrable results take time.

**Graphic 2: Strategic Situation in Afghanistan**



## NATIONAL APPROACH

### CAMPAIGN STATEMENT

The U.S. Mission and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, in partnership with ISAF and the international community, enable the Afghan Government and its people to: counter the insurgency and prevent the use of Afghan territory by international terrorists, build a state that is accountable and responsive to its people, and establish the foundation for longer-term development.

### CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES OVERVIEW

The full range of USG diplomatic, defense, and development tools are necessary to achieve this goal, and they must be applied toward specific, bounded, and measurable objectives. The U.S. strives to assure that by the end of 2014, the population of Afghanistan is safeguarded from violence, coercion, intimidation, and predation, and also that the conditions are set for good governance and sustainable development. The following 13 Campaign Objectives (derived from the 2009 Transformative Effects) are necessary to transform the environment and achieve the Campaign Statement. Each Campaign Objective page includes: the desired state of the objective by the end of 2014, a graphic showing ties to cross-cutting objectives, an assessment of the current situation, a set of sub-objectives that reflect USG priority efforts for the next 12 to 18 months,<sup>4</sup> and a theory of change. The theory of change reflects a series of “if-then” relationships explaining how the sub-objectives will alter the current situation to achieve the campaign

<sup>4</sup> In some cases, the sub-objectives will be achieved in the 12-18 month window, while in others, the USG will work toward a given objective but may not achieve it until the 18-48 month window.

objective. The page also contains outcome measures that indicate progress toward the objective. A text box highlights the linkages to relevant GIRoA strategies and national priority programs. Lastly, references to more detailed guidance are listed at the bottom of the page (for more information on strategies to achieve each Campaign Objective and more detailed metrics, see *Annex E: Abridged Campaign Objective Strategies*).

Campaign Objectives are divided among the major issue areas of security, governance, and development because these divisions reflect common parlance for American military and civilians in Afghanistan (see *Graphics 3 and 4*). While all objectives are inter-connected and thus applicable to more than one major issue area, they are grouped according to their primary issue area. The plan does not attempt to prioritize among these areas because different regions and sequencing require different prioritization. Within the areas of security, governance, and development, the objectives are ranked to reflect USG priorities as articulated in Ambassador Eikenberry’s Mission Guidance and General Petraeus’ Counter-Insurgency Guidance.

The three cross-cutting objectives are applicable to all three major issue areas - security, governance, and development – and are integral to a significant number of the Campaign Objectives. For example, gender-specific programming should be included in the execution of most objectives and improving the status of women is essential to the mission. Information initiatives must be a key component of all Campaign Objectives to counter extremist voices and capitalize on GIRoA and international community successes by providing the Afghan populace with an accurate and valid accounting of the situation. Finally, reconciliation and reintegration advance a strategic vision for peace that will only be achieved through successes in security, governance, and development alike. The graphic within each Campaign Objective page illustrates the other objectives within the same overall issue area as well as the cross-cutting issues that are relevant to the objective.

**Graphic 3: Categorized and Prioritized Campaign Objectives**

SECURITY	GOVERNANCE	DEVELOPMENT
<b>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) Clusters</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agriculture &amp; Rural Dev</li> <li>• Human Resource Development</li> <li>• Economic &amp; Infrastructure Dev</li> <li>• Private Sector Development</li> </ul>
<b>ISAF Lines of Operation</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the Population</li> <li>• Support Development of ANSF</li> <li>• Neutralize Insurgent Networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support Legitimate Governance</li> <li>• Neutralize Criminal Patronage Networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support Socio-Economic Development</li> </ul>
<b>ICMCP Campaign Objectives</b>		
<b>Cross-cutting Objectives:</b> Claiming the Information Initiative, Improving the Status of Women, Reconciliation & Reintegration		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Secure the Population</li> <li>2) Action Against Irreconcilables</li> <li>3) Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Access to Justice</li> <li>2) Expansion of Effective, Representative and Accountable Governance</li> <li>3) Countering Corruption</li> <li>4) Electoral Reform and Continuity of Governance</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access</li> <li>2) Advancing Livelihoods and Sustainable Jobs</li> <li>3) Border Access for Commerce not Insurgents</li> </ol>

*Graphic 4: 2014 Campaign Statement and Objectives*

### CAMPAIGN STATEMENT

The U.S. Mission and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, in partnership with ISAF and the international community, enable the Afghan government and its people to: counter the insurgency and prevent the use of Afghan territory by international terrorists, build a state that is accountable and responsive to its people, and establish a foundation for longer-term development.

### 2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES

#### Security:

- 1) **Secure the Population** – Afghan National Security Forces provide security for the population, reducing violence and coercion by insurgents and criminals, and increasing popular trust in the security forces and, in turn, GIRoA.
- 2) **Action Against Irreconcilables** – Irreconcilable insurgent leaders and networks are neutralized to a level manageable for the ANSF and rejected by the Afghan population, limited in their destabilizing influence, and denied safe havens in Afghanistan.
- 3) **Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance** – Key nodes within the nexus of criminals, narcotics, and illicit finance are identified and disrupted, depriving the insurgency of funding, and bolstering GIRoA legitimacy.

#### Governance:

- 1) **Access to Justice** – Traditional and formal justice sectors are increasingly available, accessible, and seen as legitimate by Afghans.
- 2) **Expansion of Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance** - Strengthened institutions of governance are durable, inclusive, and responsive to the Afghan people.
- 3) **Countering Corruption** – Improved transparency, accountability, and regulatory mechanisms to combat a culture of impunity and improve the government’s legitimacy.
- 4) **Electoral Reform and Continuity of Governance** – GIRoA manages an electoral process that is inclusive, transparent, and legitimate, and evolves in ways suited to Afghanistan’s political maturation.

#### Development:

- 1) **Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access** – Viable agricultural employment and strengthened markets provide alternatives to poppy cultivation and insurgent-related activities.
- 2) **Advancing Livelihoods and Sustainable Jobs** – Improvements in the business-enabling environment and support for small and medium enterprises create jobs in population centers and economic corridors while social sector development enhances human capital.
- 3) **Cross-border Access for Commerce Not Insurgents** – GIRoA develops its border management capacities, promotes economic development and trade, deters illicit transactions, and improves security in border areas.

#### Cross-cutting:

- **Reconciling and Reintegrating Ex-Combatants and Achieving a Sustainable Peace** – Political and legal conditions for peace and reconciliation encourage combatants and commanders to live within the laws of Afghanistan and create incentives for their constructive reintegration into society.
- **Claiming the Information Initiative** – Government and community leadership communicate a common vision of hope and progress to the Afghan people, decreasing misinformation and increasing resistance to insurgent influence.
- **Improving the Status of Women** – Afghan women have improved access to health care, education, economic opportunity, the political system, and justice.

## TRANSITION PROCESS

For Afghans, transition is a “journey to self-reliance.”<sup>5</sup> The ANDS describes a process whereby Afghanistan, incrementally and conditionally, will assume the lead over security, governance, and development activities. In this document, transition is defined in its broadest sense: from international to GIRoA-led security operations including detentions as well as the gradual reduction of private security contractors; from short-term stability programming to sustainable development; from PRTs to an evolution toward standard development structures; and from donor-driven programs to on-budget donor assistance directed by GIRoA toward its priorities. Transition is not an objective in and of itself, but a conditions-driven process and a necessary step on the way to a successful campaign.

Transition is carried out through both a GIRoA-NATO led political process as well as on-going operational efforts, including many of the elements listed above. The political process of *Inteqal* or Transition (with a capital “T”) led by the Joint Afghan NATO *Inteqal* Board (JANIB), has two phases: assessment of conditions in a province for Transition to begin; and implementation of Transition, requiring achievement of certain milestones in security, governance, and development. As expressed by President Karzai, the Afghan Government’s goal is to take the lead *security* role by the end of 2014. At the November 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, NATO partner nations reaffirmed their commitment to supporting President Karzai’s timeframe for transition of lead security responsibility. NATO has also stated that “...the [transition] *process* must be conditions based.” The conditions necessary for transition will be based largely on the security status of the individual provinces and the capacity of the ANSF to maintain that security. Still, the development and governance institutions will be crucial underpinnings as security roles shift from being ISAF-led to ANSF-led. In short, in order for Transition to occur, the area must be secure and the mechanisms for transition must be in place. Decisions on provincial transition will be made by the JANIB and based on criteria that must reflect the different characteristics of each province and its operational environment. Leaving a cadre of military trainers in place, ISAF will reposition and partner with ANSF in other areas to continue the process of expanding and connecting secure areas across provinces. The evolution of PRTs is still being determined, and may take many forms including increased civilian roles, the formation of consulates, provincial joint donor offices, and increasingly GIRoA-led development structures.

The operational process of transition (with a small “t”) is already ongoing. Districts and other geographic areas are transferred to Afghan security lead as capacity and conditions permit. Preparations for the transfer of detentions authority are in progress. On-budget assistance is increasing and on track to meet the London Conference commitments. In general, the international community’s role will gradually shift from direct delivery of public services to technical assistance to relevant Afghan institutions, and from short-term stabilization to sustainable development programs.<sup>6</sup> Currently, the USG employs a two-part stabilization and development approach - providing services that the government is unable to provide, while building the capacity of ministries to eventually provide those services. In this vein, cash-for-work programs can be transitioned to GIRoA-led development programs, and international community support to provincial and district governments will gradually be phased out as GIRoA civil servants become fully capable of fulfilling their roles.

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
<sup>5</sup> Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak, *Rehearsal of Concept*, October 2010.

<sup>6</sup> While stabilization activities are intended to first and foremost address immediate and critical sources of instability, when linked to longer term development programs these activities can also support sustainable development objectives and GIRoA initiatives.

## CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES

### SECURE THE POPULATION

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Afghan National Security Forces provide security for the population, reducing violence and coercion by insurgents and criminals, and increasing popular trust in the security forces and, in turn, GIRoA.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** With increased ANSF and ISAF/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) partnered operations since 2009, the ANSF is increasingly capable of clearing population centers of insurgents with coalition support. In order to hold those centers and permit good governance, infrastructure, and the rule of law to build within them, the USG will continue to build ANSF capacity to the point that they are capable of independent action. The creation of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-

A) in late 2009 has greatly improved the development of a capable, legitimate, and responsive ANSF, an essential aspect to the security sector. Development of the security sector requires more than just the training of security forces; the development of ministerial capability and inter-ministerial coordination are also critical to a sustainable security force that will maintain Afghan public confidence. The emergence of local defense initiatives, partnered closely with ISAF and ANSF and in a manner supportive of GIRoA’s legitimacy, has helped communities to protect themselves. Since 2009, ISAF’s successful efforts to reduce civilian casualties and the Embassy’s efforts to improve governance and service delivery promise to reduce incentives for participation in the insurgency. GIRoA’s development of a national program for insurgent reintegration in 2010 affords new opportunities to draw fighters from the battlefield by non-kinetic means.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** To protect the population, the USG will support GIRoA to address the sub-objectives below. Threats to population security beyond the insurgency include criminality, ethnic and tribal disputes, predatory security forces, and civilian casualty incidents and inappropriate coalition force behavior. As reductions in insurgent intimidation campaigns are almost as important as reductions in actual insurgent attacks, the ANSF and GIRoA partners will work to reduce such incidents. The population’s physical and mental confidence and resilience in resisting threats will be improved through an effective ANSF, responsible ISAF/OEF presence, local defense initiatives, successful reintegration of insurgents into their communities, increased popular participation in public life enabled by improved governance, rule of law, and economic opportunity.

**SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 months):**  
**Prevent intimidation and violence against the population**

- Enable the ANSF to increasingly lead on security

**LINKAGES TO GIRoA**

**National Military Strategy:** Continue MoD reform so as to establish a strong defense sector in accordance with the national interests and security goals, and to permit the MoD to assume primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s security, enabling gradual withdrawal of international security forces.

**National Police Strategy:** Very rarely does an average citizen interact with a government representative other than a police officer. Therefore, it is crucial to increase the public’s confidence and improve public perception of the police.

- Support GIRoA’s development of its security ministries
- Support GIRoA interagency coordination on security
- Enable communities to protect themselves in a manner supportive of GIRoA legitimacy

**Increase Afghans’ incentives to oppose the insurgency and support GIRoA**

- Reduce activities likely to inflame cultural resistance
- Improve perception of GIRoA (this is a goal of the other Campaign Objectives)
- Increase popular acceptance of police
- Maintain popular acceptance of the army

**Support GIRoA-led insurgent reintegration** (See *Reconciling and Reintegrating Ex-Combatants and Achieving a Sustainable Peace* Campaign Objective)

**METRICS:**

- Percent decrease in the number of civilians killed/wounded
- Assessment of ANSF capacity
- Qualitative assessment of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior capacity
- Percent of respondents rating the ANSF positively (disaggregated by force)
- Percent of respondents who perceive children are safe when they go to school

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

GIRoA, [Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program](#)

GIRoA, [National Military Strategy](#)


GIRoA, [National Police Strategy](#)

CFSOCC-A, [If You’ve Seen One VSP, You’ve Seen One VSP: Understanding Best Practices in Village Stability Operations](#), September 2010.

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Population Security Working Group Strategy and Assessment Brief, October 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

**ACTION AGAINST IRRECONCILABLES**

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Irreconcilable insurgent leaders and networks are neutralized to a level manageable for the ANSF and rejected by the Afghan population, limited in their destabilizing influence, and denied safe havens in Afghanistan.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** While there are many types of insurgents in Afghanistan, the most extreme or irreconcilable - those who cannot be encouraged to become productive members of Afghan society - must be defeated. These extremists endeavor to counter progress by intimidating and attacking the Afghan population. Success requires a comprehensive effort to marginalize and separate these irreconcilables from the population as well as direct action against the irreconcilables.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** Separating insurgents from the population, primarily during the shaping and clearing phases, enables GIRoA (with international community support) to successfully hold and build.

This aim requires improved performance of ANSF Commando and Special Operations Forces, improved intelligence capabilities, the trust and confidence of the people through a momentum shift away from the insurgency, and disrupting illicit funding networks. Strategic messaging and strategic communications are a primary component of this effort. To this end, the U.S. strives to disseminate information in a clear, truthful, timely manner that resonates with Afghans. It aims to counter extremist ideology and disinformation as well as to preempt insurgent messages by predicting potential second- and third-order effects of actions against irreconcilables.

**SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

**Build GIRoA capacity to counter irreconcilables**

- Capacity and coordination within Afghan intelligence bodies and the Afghan National Directorate for Security (NDS) is improved (see *Secure the Population* for other security-related ministries and organizations)
- ANSF increasingly capable of planning and conducting independent and coordinated operations against irreconcilable elements

**LINKAGES TO GIRoA**

The National Police Strategy emphasizes foreign and external “terrorism” as the greatest threat to the Afghan state.

**Separate insurgents from the population**

- Target enemy networks, leaders, and key nodes with connections to illicit finance and counternarcotics (See *Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance Campaign Objective*)
- The population is increasingly willing to resist and inform on irreconcilable activities
- Strategic communications is emphasized, working through local and community structures, leveraging social pressures, norms, and national sentiments

**Prevent or impede elements that enable insurgent action**

- Radicalization during detention and incarceration is prevented or diminished
- Insurgent funding, command-control structures, safe havens, and supply networks are disrupted

**METRICS:**

- Number of total kinetic events disaggregated by type
- Qualitative assessment of NDS performance
- Qualitative assessment of ANSF capability to plan and conduct operations against irreconcilables
- Number of districts in which the ANSF has lead security responsibility

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**


GIRoA, Afghan National Military Strategy

GIRoA, National Police Strategy

Department of State, Secretary of State’s Counterterrorism Strategy

# COUNTERING NARCOTICS AND ILLICIT FINANCE

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Key nodes within the nexus of criminals, narcotics, and illicit finance are identified and disrupted, depriving the insurgency of funding and bolstering GIROA legitimacy.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** The insurgency is funded by a number of enabling factors, such as a thriving narcotics industry, illicit finance (including bulk cash transfers), and a variety of other criminal enterprises (e.g. kidnapping, extortion). These factors form a nexus that undercuts population security, legitimate governance, rule of law, licit agriculture, and sustainable development. The narcotics industry dominates southern Afghanistan's economy and inhibits the country's licit agricultural production. Narcotics

are a significant source of funding for the insurgency and driver of corruption in the government. Funds flowing to the insurgency provide material support to terrorism and foster insurgent training and operations in the Af-Pak frontier zones directed against the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and international security forces.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** Identifying and targeting key nodes in the nexus of insurgency, narcotics, corruption, and criminality will weaken the insurgency's material support. Tackling that nexus through improved Afghan investigation, prosecution, and law enforcement will hinder corruption and restrict insurgent capability, enabling Afghans to increasingly reject insurgent coercion and influence. To this end, the USG must work with GIROA to continue to create an informed common operating picture of the nexus.

**LINKAGES TO GIROA**

**Afghan's National Drug Control Strategy:**

- Disrupting the drugs trade by targeting traffickers and their backers
- Strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihoods, particularly through re-development of the agricultural sector with an emphasis on higher value crops and value-added processing
- Reducing the demand for illicit drugs and treatment of problem users
- Developing state institutions at the central and provincial level vital to delivery of the counternarcotics strategy

**SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**  
**Improve identification and action against criminal patronage networks**

- Criminal patronage networks and individual targets are identified and prioritized for investigation, prosecution, and interdiction

**Increase capacity of government of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics and illicit finance capabilities**

- Increased capability and number of investigators, prosecutors, and judges in counter-narcotics investigations and terrorism investigations
- Increased size and capability of the Ministry of Interior National Interdiction Unit (NIU), Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and Air Interdiction Unit (AIU), Counter Narcotics Kandak, Counter Narcotics Police and the Ministry of Interior's (MoI) general aviation unit
- Increased investigation and prosecution of high-profile corruption and illicit finance cases

**Increase incentives and alternatives to cultivating poppy** (See also *Agriculture Opportunity and Market Access Campaign Objective*)

- Agricultural development programs in newly secure environments facilitate farming of licit crops

- Governors to take strong action against narcotics cultivation, supported by incentives programs

**METRICS:**

- Number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) processed by FinTRACA
- Qualitative assessment of GIROA’s capacity to counter money-laundering and terrorist financing
- Net poppy cultivation (hectares), opium production, and total farm gate value
- Quantity of narcotic and precursors seized
- Qualitative assessment of interdiction, arrest, and prosecution of high-level traffickers

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

- U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan (March 2010)
- GIROA, National Drug Control Strategy
- Mission Kabul-ISAF, Illicit Finance Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, November 2010 (PowerPoint slides)
- Mission Kabul-ISAF, Counternarcotics Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, November 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

**ACCESS TO JUSTICE**

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Traditional and formal justice sectors are increasingly available, accessible, and seen as legitimate by Afghans.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** In urban and rural areas, the formal justice system is not sufficiently robust and Afghan access to the system is limited. Even with improved access to justice, the population remains skeptical about the quality and speed of the justice. The sector remains severely understaffed in critical areas, and insufficient efforts have been made thus far to recruit talented Afghans to serve as judges, government lawyers, and defense counsel. In rural areas where the formal sector has no

reach and traditional justice is available, the Taliban have worked to undermine the system. As a core insurgent strategy, the insurgents capitalize on the narrative of a corrupt formal justice sector and an ineffective traditional justice system, and establish their own system of dispute resolution. Some communities have been enticed to accept “Taliban justice” to restore order or avoid violence and intimidation. The Taliban has specifically targeted functioning traditional dispute mechanisms, killing the conduits to justice – community elders – thereby eviscerating the community’s only access to justice. Communities require respite from predatory corruption, ineffective policing, and increasing criminality. Women face even more daunting challenges in accessing formal justice; traditionally women turn to relatives to resolve grievances.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** Justice is a central tenet of Afghan culture. Lack of efficient justice is a key driver of conflict. Public perception is that the government allows a culture of impunity to thrive. Improving the government’s capacity to render justice equitably and incarcerate those in violation of laws will improve the legitimacy of the state. In areas where the formal justice sector is not present, reinvigorating an informal justice system and linking it to the formal structure will provide Afghans with access to a necessary service and fill a justice vacuum that the Taliban then cannot exploit. Building Afghan leadership and competence in the justice sector, including by the recruitment of talented new

judges, attorneys, and defense counsel, as well as deliberate efforts to make the public aware and demonstrate positive action, can collectively bolster Afghans' faith in their government.

**SUB OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

**Expand access to state justice sector and increase capacity**

- Improved justice sector institutional capacity – human and infrastructure
- Improved access to legal system
- Reform of curriculum at law schools promoted
- Improved legal protections for women
- Support increased pay for justice sector employees
- Improved security for court officials and judges

**Improve detention and corrections practices**

- Improved implementation of Case Management system
- Increased GIRoA responsibility for detention operations
- Prisoner classification system implemented
- Programs for rehabilitation strengthened
- Development of probation practices or other sentencing alternatives
- Support GIRoA-led plan for prison security
- Improved quality and sustainability of new prison renovations and construction

**Increased security and space for traditional dispute resolution**

- Increase support to local communities' understanding of dispute resolution needs
- Support local communities toward reestablishing and/or strengthening traditional mechanisms
- Increase awareness of basic legal basis for jirga members
- Improve linkages between formal and informal justice systems

**Strengthen leadership capacity in justice sector**

- Encourage GIRoA to hire and promote qualified vetted leaders
- Increase dissemination of successful initiatives and legislation
- Support Afghan-led initiatives to hold public trials
- Support Afghan legal organizations

**METRICS:**

- Percent of Afghans reporting access to state courts and jirgas
- Percent of Afghans reporting state courts and jirgas as effective
- Percent of detention facilities transferred to GIRoA control
- Percent of district centers with prosecutors and judges

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

Embassy Kabul, Rule of Law Strategy

GIRoA, Afghan National Development Strategy, National Program of Justice for All

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Rule of Law Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, September 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

**LINKAGES TO GIRA**

**ANDS Governance Cluster:**

National Program for Law and Justice for All: National Program for Law and Justice for All provides for legal aid as well as aims to revise laws, simplify the operations of State Courts, and facilitate linkages between informal and formal justice systems.

# EXPANSION OF EFFECTIVE, REPRESENTATIVE, AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Strengthened institutions of governance are durable, inclusive, and responsive to the Afghan people.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** Over the past year, GIROA capacity has increased at the national level<sup>7</sup> and to a more limited extent at the provincial level; however, key district and provincial positions remain vacant or filled by unqualified individuals recruiting is difficult amid perceptions of poor security in certain areas. Reformed salary structures and more active recruiting may partially alleviate this need. Also, line ministry capacity at the sub-national level is expanding, but slowly, and money often does not flow to GIROA budgets beyond Kabul. While Afghan

perceptions of their government and service delivery have generally improved, perceptions of police and GIROA efforts to fight corruption remain poor. In addition, lack of resources from the central government, physical isolation, and alternative power structures run by warlords, criminals, and insurgent leaders distance the Afghan people from their government. Informal governance structures have been degraded and are weak in many districts and villages; however, where these structures are responsive and representative, they help to counter the insurgency.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** In many underserved and less stable areas, even a minimal government presence that is visible, perceived as serving the people, and responsive to local needs will help win the people’s support. Informal structures are important to providing governance and stability. Linking informal structures to resources and formal institutions that are perceived as legitimate can help to increase popular support for the government. When people feel that their needs are met and their lives improving, they are less likely to support the insurgency. Lastly, active citizen participation can hold leadership accountable, reducing the abuse of power.

**SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

**Improved national-level government performance**

- GIROA manages majority of national programs
- Key structural and procedural reforms completed in ministries
- Improve GIROA human resource pool
- Civil servants have competencies in core skills
- Improved capacity for budget prioritization and execution

**Strengthened governance and service delivery at the sub-national levels**

- Sub-national government made more effective and visible
- Municipalities better able to provide services
- Increased citizen participation in local decision-making
- Support prioritized implementation of GIROA’s Sub-National Governance Policy
- Improved utilization of sub-national finance systems

<sup>7</sup> For example, the Ministerial clustering system and prioritization of the ANDS through the National Priority Programs and their Action Plans, the APRP, continued success with the National Solidarity Program, and the publication of the Sub-National Governance Policy.

**Increased development of civic participation in governance**

- Citizen mobilization and civil society advocacy increased
- Increased access to media and objective sources of information
- Increased citizen participation in government decision-making
- Increased participation of women in civil society

**METRICS:**

- Percent who approve of government performance overall
- Number of districts in which GIRoA reports it delivers basic services
- Percent approve of/neutral toward provincial governor performance
- Qualitative assessment of appointments based on merit
- Qualitative assessment of civil society capability and contribution to good governance

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

U.S. Department of State, Improving Governance in Afghanistan, September 17, 2010 (Classified)

GIRoA, Sub-National Governance Policy

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Governance Sector Strategy and Assessment, October 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

**LINKAGES TO GIRoA**

**ANDS Governance Cluster National Priority Programs:**

Afghanistan Program for Efficient and Effective Government aims to improve civil service management by: (i) Introducing and implementing broad-based policy, legal, and structural reforms in public administration; (ii) Improving public service delivery through a simplification of procedures; and (iii) Developing comprehensive training and improving working conditions of the civil service.

In bringing government closer to the people by ensuring that local government is both empowered and accountable, the National Program for Local Governance will focus on implementing the Sub-National Governance Policy, as well as strengthening institutional development and democratic representation at the sub-national level.

**COUNTERING CORRUPTION**

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Improved transparency, accountability, and regulatory mechanisms to combat a culture of impunity and improve the government’s legitimacy.*

**CURRENT SITUATION:**



law, the Afghan Government, and acts as an enabler for the country’s illicit narcotics trade. The narcotics trade and corruption often generate money that flows to the insurgency. Corrupt officials add to popular frustrations with government, feeding insurgent-led anti-government information campaigns. As assistance dollars are increasingly channeled through the government, the opportunity for siphoning off funds directly or encouraging nepotism through awards increases at all levels of government. These practices propagate a culture of impunity within the government. Average Afghans are forced to pay increasingly higher bribes from everything from police citations to accessing public services.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** Countering corruption in Afghanistan first requires a clear understanding of the corruption problem and what types of corruption are of greatest concern to Afghans, followed by action at multiple levels. Strategic communication and engagement at all levels of the government are required to best help focus political efforts on achieving concrete results. Public and civil society involvement in combating corruption must also be fostered. Strengthening and improving GIRoA’s ability to combat corruption through human capacity building, internal oversight, and improved practices will help improve its credibility. Improving financial oversight and practicing greater control and monitoring of donor money, including contracting, will reduce graft, giving donors greater confidence in direct budgetary support, thus increasing GIRoA’s ability to deliver services to the people. Improving the capacity of the ANSF and increasing investigatory, prosecutorial, and judicial capacity to combat high-level corruption through the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), and Anti-Corruption Tribunal (ACT) will enable GIRoA to demonstrate to the people that it will not tolerate a culture of impunity.

**SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

**Strengthen GIRoA’s capacity to improve transparency and accountability**

- Improve GIRoA appointments on the basis of merit
- Improve capabilities of Afghan National Police (ANP) to reduce corruption
- Increase GIRoA’s ability to reduce corruption in customs and tariffs collection
- Reinstigate vetting of justice sector employees
- Improve independence and strengthen authorities for the High Office of Oversight (HOO) and other anti-corruption bodies
- Decrease opportunities for corruption in contracting practices

**Strengthen GIRoA institutions to improve financial oversight**

- Strengthen internal controls, internal audit, financial management, and procurement procedures in public institutions
- Improve legal framework for audits
- Strengthen oversight of formal and informal financial sectors

**Help GIRoA build capacity to investigate, prosecute, punish, or remove corrupt officials**

- Support GIRoA’s ACU to successfully prosecute high profile cases
- Continue to support the Kabul-based ACT
- Encourage GIRoA to recall, reassign, suspend, or remove corrupt officials
- Strengthen the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF)

**Strengthen the capacity of GIRoA and civil society to educate and empower the public to counter the culture of impunity**

- Encourage and enable GIRoA to publicize successful cases
- Support Afghan non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media to engage in educating the public on rights and responsibilities
- Support GIRoA to develop strategic communication plans to inform the public of anti-corruption successes

**LINKAGES TO GIRoA**

**ANDS Governance Cluster:**

National Transparency and Accountability Program: National Transparency and Accountability Program will build effective and independent oversight institutions for monitoring and evaluating the performance of Government institutions and officials.

**METRICS:**

- Qualitative assessment of performance of the HOO
- Percent of Afghans satisfied with the job the government is doing with reducing corruption in the government
- Status and implementation of contracting reform
- Effectiveness of regulators and monitors to investigate, prosecute, and try instances of fraud and graft
- Transparency International Corruption Index Score (rather than ranking)

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

USG, U.S. Anti-Corruption Strategy (classified)

Shafafiyat Annex to ISAF OPLAN 38302 (classified)

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Anti-Corruption Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, September 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

COMISAF, Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance, September 2010

Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission Contracting Guidance

<b>ELECTORAL REFORM AND CONTINUITY OF GOVERNANCE</b>
----------------------------------------------------------

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *GIRoA manages an electoral process that is inclusive, transparent, and legitimate, and evolves in ways suited to Afghanistan’s political maturation.*

**CURRENT SITUATION:** The electoral process is relatively new to Afghanistan, with its long tradition of consensus-driven, locally-based decision making. In addition, a high degree of illiteracy, a lack of resources from the central government, physical isolation, alternative power structures, and intimidation from insurgents are challenges to the electoral process. While there were some minor improvements in management of the electoral process for the 2010 Wolesi Jirga election, the process continues to need substantial support to be inclusive, transparent, and fully capable of producing credible electoral outcomes.



**THEORY OF CHANGE:** An Afghan-run electoral process that is considered credible and inclusive by the Afghan people increases the legitimacy of elected officials and the accountability of the government. It provides the population, especially the opposition, with a voice in their governance. Security and logistical capabilities are essential to supporting the Independent Election Commission’s (IEC) logistical operations and enabling a peaceful security environment whereby eligible voters will participate in increased numbers. IEC efforts at the national, district, and community levels will work to limit fraud, abuse of power, and help to maintain a legitimate connection between the people and GIRoA. Fostering inclusive representative bodies at the local level supports the emergence of constituencies that will increase accountability and transparency.

**SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

**Ability of GIRoA to effectively administer elections strengthened**

- Support ANSF capability to provide elections logistics, mitigate violence before and during elections so that the Afghan people feel they can vote with minimal disruptions

- IEC prepares for the next elections cycle, and is increasingly capable of running elections process
- Transparency of elections administration improves with support to international and Afghan observation
- A national identification or civil registry from which a valid voter registry can be derived and maintained
- Support Afghan-led efforts on electoral reform consistent with Kabul Conference commitments

**Institutional and oversight capacity of elected bodies strengthened**

- Improve Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and supporting partners’ ability to fairly and effectively audit election-related investments
- The ECC and IEC partner to devise enhanced fraud mitigation measures

**Increase civic education and popular participation**

- Increased participation of women in political processes
- Civic and voter education is built into the Ministry of Education’s national curriculum plan so that youth learn about their electoral rights and responsibilities at an early age
- Afghan media promotes open and issue-focused elections-related public discussions

**METRICS:**

- Qualitative assessment of IEC performance
- Qualitative assessment of ECC performance
- Qualitative assessment of voter registration process
- Percent who view the electoral process and results as legitimate
- Qualitative assessment of women’s participation in political processes

**LINKAGES TO GIRoA**

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: The state shall take effective measures to enable citizens to use their constitutional rights and carry out their constitutional duties.


ANDS Governance Cluster National Program for Local Governance aims to ensure democratic representation by rationalizing political representation at the sub-national level, strengthening the organization of sub-national elections, and increasing public participation in decision-making (including through the budgeting process).

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

U.S Department of State, Improving Governance in Afghanistan, September 17, 2010 (Classified)  
 Mission Kabul-ISAF, Governance Strategy and Assessment brief, October 2010 (PowerPoint slides)  
 USG, Elections Field Guidance

## AGRICULTURAL OPPORTUNITY AND MARKET ACCESS

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Viable agricultural employment and strengthened markets provide alternatives to poppy cultivation and insurgent-related activities.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** Agriculture is the major source of income and livelihood for approximately 65 percent of the Afghan population. However, for many Afghans, agriculture does not provide much opportunity beyond a subsistence level. It constitutes only a partial source of household income for most families. They must rely on other sources, particularly off-farm earnings, to sustain their families. Farmers have limited access to quality inputs and credit, suffer from pre- and

post-harvest loss, and struggle to transport their products to markets that often provide only limited returns. In addition, lack of strong public services to farmers inhibit agriculture-sector growth. Furthermore, poppy's higher profit margins and wages lure many farmers into activities that feed instability, support the insurgency, and undermine the government.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** For Afghans in rural areas, expanded agricultural opportunities and market access reduce the economic benefits of poppy cultivation, working with the insurgency, and criminal activities. An Afghan Government and private sector that delivers services and facilitates agribusiness will result in more agricultural sector jobs and income, increased support for the Afghan Government, and a marked reduction in the insurgency's influence in key districts and communities.

### **SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

#### **Increase confidence of Afghans in their government**

- Capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) is strengthened to effectively deliver services to farmers

#### **Improve agricultural productivity and income**

- Farmers in target areas begin to access quality inputs
- Research and extension services are increasingly available to farmers for their crops and livestock
- Improved market linkages result in improved economic livelihoods
- Farmers, small businesses, and associations have access to credit (including vouchers when necessary) and opportunities for earning off-farm income
- Farmers and small businesses along main trade corridors improve the production, processing, and marketing of agricultural products

#### LINKAGES TO GIRoA

The National Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development Program provides research and extension services, agriculture infrastructure development, rural credit, improved agricultural production methods, and market development to strengthen the value chains between production, the factory, and the domestic and export markets.

**Improve natural resource management**

- Labor-intensive local watershed rehabilitation underway in target districts with special emphasis on key interventions that maximize the long-term impact in insurgent-prone areas
- Better on-farm water management through irrigation canals repaired and maintained
- Water user associations established in insurgent-prone areas
- Improve sustained access to water

**METRICS:**

- Percentage change in annual production of key crops
- Net increase in agribusiness employment
- Percentage change in disbursement of MAIL’s program and operating budget to provincial and district levels
- Percentage change of hectares under improved irrigation
- Number of farmers accessing public sector extension services
- Number of Afghans receiving food assistance

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**


USG, Agriculture Assistance Strategy

GIRoA, National Agricultural Development Framework

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Agriculture Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, September 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

**ADVANCING LIVELIHOODS AND SUSTAINABLE JOBS**

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Improvements in the business-enabling environment and support for small and medium enterprises create jobs in population centers and economic corridors while social sector development enhances human capital.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** Degrading poverty, increasing wealth disparity, and widespread unemployment are currently exploited by insurgent and criminal elements for recruitment. Unemployment is a key concern of the population. While Afghanistan is rich in minerals and has potential for much greater levels of agricultural production, insecurity here (as well as a lack of regulation and infrastructure) has limited private sector growth, foreign investment, and trade. Afghanistan dropped two spots in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” ranking from 165 to 167 out of 183 countries. Human capital is the lowest in the region.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** A significant growth in jobs can provide a viable alternative to violence and criminality, bolster efforts to ‘outbid’ the Taliban in many regions, and promote a sense of progress through counter-insurgent propaganda. As business opportunities and access to credit become more widely available in population centers, an increasingly skilled workforce will be in demand. Adequate health and education are pre-requisites to economic growth. Initial investment projects will take advantage of economies of scale and local comparative advantage to increase job options. Power, credit, and legal improvements lower the cost and risk of investment to investors, generating employment. A growing

revenue base, if captured by GIROA, can subsidize infrastructure and services in critical areas and eventually allow GIROA to cover its operating costs.

#### **SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

##### **Increase small and medium enterprise productivity**

- Credit access is expanded through improved banks that offer diversified loan products and risk mitigation techniques
- The regulatory framework is improved
- Business/trade associations develop
- Public and private workforce development entities are strengthened

##### **Improve the legal and regulatory framework for private sector growth**

- Basic legal framework for commerce and finance are enacted with government oversight
- Barriers to investment are reduced through legal and tax reform and implementation
- Infrastructure and services (customs, power, water, land use) are improved
- Leakages to the black market are reduced by improving contracting processes
- Contracting increasingly benefits Afghans

##### **Promote domestic and foreign private investment to create jobs and catalyze economic growth**

- Reduced power costs for businesses
- Improved international trade environment (e.g. the South Asia Free Trade Agreement and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement)

##### **Expand health and education services to increase human capital and improve livelihoods**

- Expanded availability and improved quality of technical and vocational education
- Basic health services expanded
- Partner with GIROA to increase access to essential health and education services

#### **METRICS:**

- Percent of respondents reporting an improvement in economic situation
- World Bank *Doing Business* rankings (especially starting a business, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, trading across borders, and enforcing contracts)
- Number of new businesses registered in the Central Business Registry
- Primary school enrollment and completion rates
- Percent of population with access to health services within a two-hour walk

#### **RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

USG, Promoting Economic Growth in Afghanistan FY 2009-2011

#### **LINKAGES TO GIROA**

The overall objective of the **Economic and Infrastructure Cluster** is to "support Afghanistan's transition to financial independence and developing a business climate that enables private investment."

The six supporting National Priority Program objectives are:


- Connecting Afghanistan to the region, and the rest of the world
- Progressing Afghanistan's financial independence through strategic partnerships with extractive industries
- Delivering cost-effective energy to industries/communities
- Improving urban livelihoods
- Facilitating private sector-led inclusive growth including increasing employment and trading opportunities
- Fostering an open information society

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Economic and Financial Policy Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, August 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Health and Education Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, November 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

## CROSS-BORDER ACCESS FOR COMMERCE NOT INSURGENTS

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *GIRoA develops its border management capacities, promotes economic development and trade, deters illicit transactions, and improves security in border areas.*



**CURRENT SITUATION:** GIRoA and border communities struggle to reduce the movement of illicit goods, narcotics, and insurgents, all of which contribute to instability. Endemic corruption, burdensome regulatory requirements and procedures, and inadequate facilities at border crossings inhibit rather than facilitate trade, result in the loss of millions of dollars of revenue daily. Border communities represent the key to security, cross-border

trade, and reliable customs revenue collection. Increased Pakistani military operations in that country's western provinces affect vulnerable communities on the Afghan border. The Dubai Process framework seeks to improve cross-border coordination and regional trade agreements, such as the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and the South Asia Free Trade Agreement, and may help to position Afghanistan as "the Asian Roundabout" for trade on "the new Silk Road," as President Karzai has said. GIRoA's border management relies on coordination of the seventeen Afghan ministries and various international partners involved in border issues.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** The foundation of security, trade, and revenue generation at the borders is an integrated border management model. The elements of improved border management include: inter-ANSF cooperation, the local population's confidence in the integrity and efficacy of customs and border authorities, and cross-border information exchanges. Border Coordination Centers help to achieve these goals. Streamlining customs processes reduces opportunities for corruption and enables small and medium firms to export products and import raw materials and intermediate and capital goods more easily. Expanding capable Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Customs officials at key border areas improves both the security and efficiency of processes at crossing points. Better infrastructure facilitates these processes and provides a symbol of Afghan legitimate authority over its territory. Increased trade opportunities and enhanced services to border communities start to provide alternatives to smuggling and insurgent collaboration. Development projects are implemented in communities to provide economic alternatives to local illicit activities. Cross-border messaging and *jirgas* reach into tribal agencies to highlight local development and engagement. Coordination between "economic corridors" and chambers of commerce on both sides of the border generate economic growth and trade opportunities. Through the Dubai Process, GIRoA and the Government of Pakistan are connecting their respective military and civilian agencies that focus on serving local communities and managing border crossings.

### **SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

#### **Assist GIRoA in implementation of comprehensive border strategy**

- Improve legal structure for border strategy
- Aid GIRoA with development of implementation plan
- Assist GIRoA with launch of border strategy

**Improve operations at, and between, major border crossing points, international airports, and inland customs depots**

- Increase border police capacity to manage green border
- Increase efficiency and effectiveness of customs procedures
- Improve border police and customs cooperation
- Work with Afghanistan Customs to adopt a risk management approach that will allow Customs to strategically apply resources to prioritized enforcement objectives and threats

**Promote GIRoA's cooperation with its neighbors on cross border management and trade facilitation**

- Promote trade corridor development
- Control transit of weapons of mass destruction, biological, and nuclear items
- Improve cross-border information sharing

**METRICS:**

- Total customs revenues collected
- Number of steps needed to import/export goods
- Wait time at major border crossings

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

International Monetary Fund Benchmarks for March 31, 2011

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Borders Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, November 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

**LINKAGES TO GIRoA**

**GIRoA ANDS Prioritization and Implementation Plan:**

- **Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program**
- **Expanding Regional Cooperation**
  - Security - Greater inter-security agency coordination and intelligence sharing, including for identifying and eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and support bases
  - Counter-narcotics - Combating narcotics in the framework of the Paris Pact and Rainbow Strategy, including increased responsibility by transit countries to prevent the trafficking of chemical precursors to Afghanistan and by drug consumer countries to curb demand
  - Regional Economic Cooperation - strengthen border management cooperation
  - Expedite the conclusion of APTTA

## RECONCILING AND REINTEGRATING EX-COMBATANTS AND ACHIEVING A SUSTAINABLE PEACE

پروگرام ملی صلح، آشتی ملی و استقرار مجدد

The National Peace Program, National Reconciliation and Renewed Settlement

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Political and legal conditions for peace and reconciliation encourage combatants and commanders to live within the laws of Afghanistan and create incentives for their constructive reintegration into society.*

### CROSS-CUTTING LINKAGES to OTHER OBJECTIVES:

Reconciliation, reintegration and the achievement of sustainable peace are facilitated and supported by all of the other Campaign Objectives. If insurgent leaders are convinced that GIRoA can provide a just peace, protect them, and that insurgency is not in their interest, they will be more likely to reconcile. If communities feel secure and if jobs and basic services are available, communities will be more apt to embrace insurgent reintegration. Thus, a sustainable peace depends on GIRoA's efforts toward reconciliation and reintegration as well building the capability and capacity of GIRoA across all sectors.

**CURRENT SITUATION:** For three decades, Afghanistan has been mired in conflict. Two generations have been raised with no context for peaceful existence, and without exception, every Afghan has been affected. Based on the recommendations of the Afghan delegates to the June 2010 National Consultative Peace Jirga (CPJ), the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) was developed to promote peace through a political approach. The program aims to remove reconcilable combatants from the battlefield and return them to their communities with the aim of stabilizing communities. The APRP is supported by a presidential decree establishing a High Peace Council responsible for the program's strategic oversight and direction, and a Joint Secretariat responsible for program

implementation. GIRoA's intent is that the APRP will be available to all individuals and communities who are willing to renounce terrorism and violence, live in peace, and follow the laws and Constitution of Afghanistan. USG efforts for this Campaign Objective support the APRP.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** The APRP is an Afghan approach, supported by the USG, among others, to address the challenges of numerous reconcilable insurgents. Strengthening Afghan security and civilian institutions of governance to promote peace and reconciliation is its first aim. In addition to institutional challenges, the Afghan people need to be supported by setting the political conditions necessary to establish an enduring and just peace. Lastly, national, regional, and international consensus must be fostered for the APRP. Political efforts, in partnership with regional and international partners, are required to address the problems of insurgent sanctuaries, the removal of reconcilable ex-combatants from the UN sanction list, and severing insurgent links with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Operational efforts, the main focus in Afghanistan, center on foot soldiers, small groups, and local leaders who form the bulk of the insurgency. Through "Social Outreach, Confidence Building, and Negotiation," "Demobilization," and "Activities to Consolidate Peace and Support Community Recovery," insurgent foot soldiers and their commanders will renounce violence and terrorism and join a constructive process of reintegration and peace. President Karzai's peace, reconciliation, and reintegration policy aims to set the political and judicial conditions—at the international, regional, national, and local levels—for a sustainable peace.

**GIRoA FIVE-YEAR OBJECTIVE:<sup>8</sup>**

**To communicate and build confidence with Afghans, combatants, and communities around President Karzai’s peace, reconciliation, and reintegration policy, and to set the international, regional, national, and local political and judicial conditions for a sustainable peace**

**Sub-Objectives (6- 18 Months):**

- Create and continuously improve social outreach and communications through a national and sub-national campaign
- Increase public awareness of the Peace, Reconciliation, and Reintegration (PRR) process

**GIRoA FIVE-YEAR OBJECTIVE:<sup>9</sup>**

**Develop government and non-state (civil society and NGO) capacity in assessment, demobilization, recovery, peace-building, and conflict resolution methods, leadership, and ability for delivery**

**Sub-Objectives (6-18 Months):**

- Increase inclusive deliberating bodies (shuras and peace and reintegration committees) operational in key provinces
- Increase the knowledge of key government representatives concerning APRP at the provincial and district levels
- Develop provincial financial accounts for priority provinces to be used in support of APRP
- Develop Special Detainee Release Committee and systems and procedures
- Establish fiduciary and planning cells in key participating ministries

**LINKAGES TO GIRoA:**

“Securing peace and an end to fighting are the most significant demands of our people. For the last thirty years, our people have offered continuous sacrifices to achieve peace. It is a recognized fact that security and peace cannot be achieved through fighting and violence. This is why the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has placed national reconciliation at the top of its peace-building policy. We welcome and will provide necessary help to all disenchanted compatriots who are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the Constitution.” - *President Karzai, Inaugural Address, 2009*

**GIRoA FIVE-YEAR OBJECTIVE:<sup>10</sup>**

**Deliver local security and freedom of movement guarantees, both for communities and those individuals who join the peace process**

**Sub-Objectives (6-18 Months):**

- Create and continuously improve mobile, quick response teams’ capabilities and capacities

**GIRoA FIVE-YEAR OBJECTIVE:<sup>11</sup>**

**The Community Recovery objective of the program is to consolidate peace for all Afghans by assisting the transition of society from conflict to peace, and to provide access to services (education, health, etc.), employment, and justice**

<sup>8</sup> Denotes 5-year program objectives as set forth by the Government of Afghanistan in the APRP.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

**Sub-Objectives (6- 18 Months):**

- Develop procedures and systems for demobilization and launch the processes
- Create and improve vocational training opportunities in conjunction with the private sector
- Begin and increase the spread of the National Community Recovery Program
- Increase the capacity of the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs and Ministry of Education general literacy and civic education modules in districts in areas where APRP is being implemented
- Increase the capacity of MAIL and Ministry of Public Works so they can create and sustain the Agricultural Conservation Corps and the Public Works Corps

**METRICS:**

- GIRoA structures are established and functional
- Outreach and education programs inform GIRoA and ISAF on how to implement APRP
- Number of high- and mid-level commanders reconciled and reintegrated
- Qualitative assessment of community stability in communities where fighters have reintegrated

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS**

President Karzai, Inaugural Address, November 2009: <<http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2009/11/president-karzai%E2%80%99s-inauguration-speech/>>

GIRoA, Resolution of the National Consultative Peace Jirga, June 2010

GIRoA, Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program, July 2010

GIRoA, National Security Council Joint Order on Implementation of the APRP, September 2010

USG, Chief of Mission Guidance on Support to the APRP, Oct 2010:

<[https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Afghanistan\\_Peace\\_and\\_Reintegration\\_Program](https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Afghanistan_Peace_and_Reintegration_Program)>

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Population Security Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, October 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325, October 31, 2000

## CLAIMING THE INFORMATION INITIATIVE

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Government and community leadership communicate a common vision of hope and progress to the Afghan people, decreasing misinformation and increasing resistance to insurgent influence.*

**CURRENT SITUATION:** A diverse population comprised of seven main ethnic groups, each speaking a number of languages, geographically dispersed throughout the country makes for a challenging communications environment. The extremely high rate of illiteracy directly impacts the common methods of communication, with radio being the most prominent source in rural areas and television in urban areas. The Afghan Government and the insurgency are in a struggle to decisively influence the Afghan population in rural communities, major population centers, and Kabul. To this end, the typical insurgent message is that GIRoA is a puppet of foreign invaders who are an “apostate” regime dominated by infidels, that ISAF Forces are in Afghanistan to dominate and control the Afghan people, and that these forces are wholly responsible for violence. Insurgents have destroyed cell phone towers and have forced others to shut down at night, disrupting the flow of information.

## **CROSS-CUTTING LINKAGES to OTHER OBJECTIVES:**

Claiming the Information Initiative must be an aspect of all other Campaign Objectives as well as a goal in itself. Communication of progress made in all sectors is essential to secure popular support both in Afghanistan and in coalition countries. Actions against irreconcilables, major programs and mistakes, should they occur, need to be strategically communicated, and disinformation must be countered. Communications access can help Afghans educate the population, make informed decisions, and hold their leaders accountable.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** Every actor and action communicates something positive or negative to the population, and steps must be taken to reinforce positive actions while mitigating negative ones. Rapid improvement in important communication areas over the next year will show demonstrable and lasting progress in the coming year. The following require coordinated civilian and military effort with increasing support to the Afghan people and communications structures.

### **SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):**

#### **Counter extremist voices**

- Credible voices advocate against extremism and for GIRoA and its partnership with the international community
- GIRoA and international community actions and statements that contribute to negative perceptions are decreased

#### **Strengthen people-to-people ties to promote a shared vision of Afghanistan's future**

- More Afghans receive communication prompting security, good governance, and development goals

#### **Build Afghan communication capacity**

- Cell phone service is regularized in priority districts
- Expand independent Pashto and Dari media footprint
- Regionally-based facilities established to ensure comprehensive training for GIRoA communicators and journalist at all levels

#### **Expand media outreach**

- GIRoA and the international community build relationships with traditional communicators
- Afghan media is increasingly able to gather information at the sub-national level
- Media from donor and troop contributing nations have increasing mobility and access within Afghanistan

#### **METRICS:**

- Qualitative assessment of percent of insurgent messages countered, marginalized, and/or supplanted by positive and credible portrayals of Afghan, GIRoA, and international community partnerships and progress
- Qualitative assessment of the degree to which traditional and religious leaders promote community responsibility for security, stability, and development
- Percent of Afghans with access to a) radio b) TV c) mobile phone d) computer
- Percent of Dari/Pashto media coverage

#### **RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

USG, 2010 Integrated Civilian-Military Afghanistan Communication Plan

ISAF, Strategic Communication Plan

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Information Initiatives Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, September 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

## IMPROVING THE STATUS OF WOMEN

**2014 CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE:** *Afghan women have improved access to health care, education, economic opportunity, the political system, and justice.*

### CROSS-CUTTING LINKAGES to OTHER OBJECTIVES:

Improving the status of women must be incorporated into strategies for achievement of all other Campaign Objectives as well as an Objective in itself. Programs need to be tailored to benefit women specifically and gender programming should be mainstreamed throughout USG assistance. Improving women's health, education, economic advancement, security, political participation and access to justice will collectively increase the ability of women to play essential parts in Afghan society. Further, women are amongst the strongest advocates for the fight against extremism. Constitutional guarantees of women's rights and women's role in society are symbols of change in Afghanistan.

**CURRENT SITUATION:** After thirty years of conflict, five years of Taliban rule, and life as refugees, the women of Afghanistan often find themselves disconnected from one another, lacking opportunities to participate in the economic life of the nation, and without access to health facilities, access to education, or a political voice. Since the fall of the Taliban, significant progress has been made. School attendance for girls has risen significantly, and infant and child mortality has dropped rapidly since 2002. While these results are encouraging, more is needed. Women's literacy remains very low and opportunities for advancement are limited.

**THEORY OF CHANGE:** The U.S. strategy for assistance to Afghan women reflects the diverse circumstances of women from Kabul to isolated, rural areas. For Afghan women concerned with the survival of themselves and their families on a daily basis, USG programs focus on support for services such as health, education, and security. Where possible, the USG seeks to improve women's access to justice and justice-sector institutions, as well as support women's participation in the political process and the development of female leaders. Through this two-pronged approach, U.S.

programming seeks to improve the security, economic, and social well-being of Afghan women and girls, as well as their civic participation and political status. Women's engagement is essential to overall development goals and will continue to be an integral part of the revitalization of the nation.

### SUB-OBJECTIVES (12-18 month priorities):

- **Health:** Healthcare services, especially female care givers, and essential hospital services are increasingly available to Afghan women
- **Education:** Women's literacy improved through basic and secondary education to Afghan women and girls
- **Economic Development:** Women's businesses supported through vocational training, access to credit, and business services
- **Access to Justice:** Working with and through the Ministry of Justice and other Afghan institutions, security and judicial officials are increasingly aware of what Afghan law and Islamic law specifically say with respect to the rights of women, their role in society, and how women should be treated
- **Communications:** In coordination with the National Ulema Shura, the Government Media and Information Center, and the Ministry of Information and Culture produce messages for distribution through traditional and modern media on women's rights from a credible Islamic perspective
- **Security:** Provide women greater opportunities to join the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the ANP

- **Protection:** Women are increasingly able to access legal aid and shelter
- **Political Empowerment:** Women's participation in political processes and opportunities for leadership are increased

**METRICS:**

- Maternal mortality rate
- Infant mortality rate
- Percent increase of girls in primary and secondary education
- Number of women-owned businesses registered with GIROA
- Qualitative assessment of women's involvement in the political system
- Number of women in the ANSF

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS**

Kabul International Conference, Afghanistan Communiqué, July 2010

GIROA, National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan

USG Civilian Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan (2010-2013), September 6, 2010

Mission Kabul-ISAF, Gender Working Group Strategy and Assessment brief, October 2010 (PowerPoint slides)

CARE, Looking for Leadership: Women's empowerment and Canada's new role in Afghanistan, October 2010

UN Security Council Resolution 1325, October 31, 2000

## SUB-NATIONAL APPROACH

The campaign is only as strong as its success at the sub-national level. Our national approach must work to increase GIRoA's financial capacity at the national-level to improve budget delivery at the provincial and district levels. At the sub-national level, we must empower existing governance structures to program and expend funds, thus building governance capacity. Furthermore, we need to continue to work to increase the representativeness of government at the sub-national level. The District Delivery Program, the structure of which is explained below, a model adopted by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), helps to ensure that the appropriate officials assume positions at the district level to help move forward on these efforts.

The multi-layered, dynamic, and complex environment in Afghanistan requires an understanding of the operating environment and a nuanced implementation of objectives in distinct regions. As this is a strategic document, it sets priorities only down to the regional level; provinces and districts determine priorities and operations under direction from regional headquarters. This plan, in combination with IJC OPOD OMID, provides guidance to Regional Commanders, Senior Development Advisors, and Senior Civilian Representatives and their staff at each region. Regional Commands and Regional Platforms will draw on this guidance to collaborate to revise or create a regional civ-mil campaign plan. In addition to this section, the Field Guidance Annex provides further guidance and standard operating procedures for field activities in support of the ICMCP (see *Annex G: Field Guidance*).

### LINKING CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES TO SUB-NATIONAL OPERATIONS

The sub-national pages below translate the national approach to the sub-national level. Further instructions for sub-national planning can be found in *Annex G: Field Guidance*. The U.S. Embassy Interagency Provincial Affairs Office (IPA), which is responsible for issuing guidance to Senior Civilian Representatives and USG civilian field staff, will coordinate with the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), ISAF's operational headquarters and IPA's military counterpart, on any additional guidance. The regions are divided according to the ISAF regional structure (South, Southwest, East, North, West, and Capital) for clarity.<sup>12</sup> To facilitate unity of effort, the sub-national sections below provide broad regional priorities based on the Campaign Objectives and linked to ISAF's Lines of Operations (LOOs) (see *Graphic 3*) as well as IJC LOOs. Each regional page contains an analysis of the current situation in the region. The text box highlights the approximately five national-level Campaign Objectives that will be the region's top priorities over the next 12 to 18 months with a short description of how they apply specifically to the region. The regional approach paragraph explains how the civilian-military integrated regional command will change the current situation to achieve their objectives. The geographic information and maps depict a broad overview of relevant geographic information for the region, including major economic corridors, border crossings, and security focus areas. They show the location of regional structures, such as PRTs and District Support Teams (DSTs), as well as districts deemed as key terrain, both with and without USG resident presence (i.e. PRT or DST presence), and areas of influence.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> GIRoA does not use these divisions and the provinces are the highest level official Afghan sub-national structure.

<sup>13</sup> For more information on key terrain and areas of influence, see IJC's OPOD OMID 1390.

## **SUB-NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION**

Priorities for the sub-national level include areas of key terrain, which are of strategic importance due to population density, key transportation networks, and economic opportunity. IJC and IPA selected these areas through a civ-mil review and nomination process. For both military and civilians, key terrain is the geographic focus for security, governance, and development in Afghanistan. In 2010-2011, civ-mil efforts at the regional level and below will focus on shaping operations and stabilization programs in key terrain, while efforts at the provincial level nationwide will continue. Along the clear-hold-build-transfer continuum, USG military elements carry the main effort during the clear phase, with civ-mil cooperation during hold phase, civilian lead during build phase, and GIRoA lead during the transfer phase. In key terrain areas, the USG must prioritize counterinsurgency objectives while building the foundations for an enduring political and diplomatic settlement.


IJC engages in an assessment process that focuses on security, governance, and development in districts, utilizing both civilian and military input. At the district level, IJC assessment data can be used by the USAID-developed District Stabilization Framework (DSF) to design programmatic action plans for a given district, based on root causes of instability and current assessments of the environment. *Annex G: Field Guidance* will provide additional guidance to Regional Platforms for assessing progress on their priorities and work plans. Other data, such as polling data gathered for the National Security Council, can also inform the assessment process.

## SOUTH

**SITUATION ANALYSIS:** In the south over the past year, growth in the insurgency's capability and scope in Kandahar and surrounding districts has been curbed, and its general momentum slowed. The Taliban have sought a psychological hold on the population through intimidation of Afghan civilians who support the Government or ISAF as well as through the targeted killings of key GIROA officials and police in training. The Taliban's strategy results in negative influence, criminality, and intimidation rather than control of territory. The people's support for the government has been limited by insecurity, low capacity levels, and corruption, but generally the people are not sympathetic to the Taliban. Through the Hamkari Baraye Kandahar campaign, the Afghan Government has attempted to engage the population; however, increasing the number of government workers in and around Kandahar remains a challenge.

**REGIONAL APPROACH:** The stabilization of Kandahar City and its surrounding districts (Operation Hamkari Baraye Kandahar) represents the main effort for U.S. civilians and military forces. In the south, the USG will work with GIROA, as well as NATO and other international partners, to reverse insurgency and narcotics-driven security trends, combat abuse of power by building GIROA community engagement, and enable transition to a licit agricultural economy in defined areas. The campaign will ultimately be decided by the ability of the Afghan Government and the international community to win a physical and psychological battle with the insurgency for the support of the Afghan people. Success in providing representative and inclusive governance able to provide for the basic needs of the people is fundamental to winning this argument. Regional Command (RC) and Platform South will continue to support GIROA in the Hamkari campaign to connect Afghans to a legitimate government.

### RC (S) 12 KTD 5 AOI



**GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:** The map on the previous page depicts a broad overview of relevant geographic information for the RC-South region, including major economic corridors, border crossings, and security focus areas. RC-South headquarters is located at Kandahar Airfield. RC-South has three PRTs (Uruzgan, Zabul, and Kandahar), six DSTs and 12 Key Terrain Districts (KTDs), marked in dark green or light green to reflect current and proposed resident coverage with a DST. The purple and pink outlines indicate future District Development Program (DDP) sites.

**PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** *The following are the priority USG Campaign Objectives for southern Afghanistan for the next 12-18 months (2010-2012)*

#### **Security**

- **Secure the Population:** Reverse security trends by enabling ANSF security for the population in Kandahar City through a focus on surrounding districts.
- **Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance:** Target key individuals at the nexus of insurgency, narcotics, and criminality through appropriate means, and expand GIRoA capacity to fight criminality and narcotics.

#### **Governance**

- **Access to Justice:** Support the Afghan Government in facilitating linkages between informal and formal justice institutions to provide effective justice.
- **Expand Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance:** Support the Afghan Government in providing basic services to populations with a focus on provincial institutions, Kandahar City, KTDs and building district governance.

#### **Development**

- **Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access:** Continue supporting the transition to a licit agricultural (including horticulture and tree crops) economy that improves household incomes and increases jobs.
- **Border Access for Commerce not Insurgents:** Build the capacity of the Afghan Border Police, establishing infrastructure and facilitating inter-operability between Afghan and Pakistani forces to work toward a layered defence of GIRoA's borders, a regional intelligence network, and a functioning Border Coordination Center in order to facilitate economic growth opportunities in this area while countering the flow of illicit goods and insurgents.
- **Advancing Livelihoods and Sustainable Jobs:** Support improved livelihoods and economic growth, driven by an overarching GIRoA regional economic strategy and electricity provision that meets the population's expectations. Work in cooperation with RC-Southwest to support an economic corridor from central Helmand and Kajaki to Kandahar City and Arghandab Valley, and on to Spin Boldak.

#### **RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

Regional Platform South, Southern Afghanistan Regional Stabilisation Framework 2010, February 2010

Kandahar PRT, Kandahar City Stabilization Plan, March 2010

< <https://www.harmonieweb.org/sites/harmoniewebprivate/EventSiteDirectory/kprt/> >

GIRoA, Provincial Development Plans

Government of Canada, Promoting Economic Growth in Kandahar Implementation Strategy


## SOUTHWEST

**SITUATION ANALYSIS:** Separated from RC-South, RC-Southwest (RC-SW) began operations in July 2010. Major district centers of the Central Helmand River Valley (CHRV) enjoy adequate governance, improved economic development, and some security. Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, Garmser, Nawa, Nad e' Ali, and Gereshk provide examples of community development when given the benefits of protection, space, time, and support. Marjah remains the outlier in CHRV. Frequent violence and slow improvement in GIROA governance limit development, although the situation has improved since early 2010. Helmand continues to be one of the most kinetic areas of the country. Aside from CHRV, the Upper Helmand River Valley (UHRV), around Sangin and north to Musa Qalah and Kajaki, is riddled with the insurgency and narco-businesses. Insurgents intimidate local populations, offering quick (but often violent) law enforcement and dispute resolution in areas where the government does not reach. Disputes over land and water rights remain key drivers for localized conflict. Helmand Province cultivates more opium than anywhere in the country by a significant margin; drug profits fund insurgency and criminal networks. Poor infrastructure and limited technology inhibit development of efficient agricultural value chains (from farm to market) limiting the revitalization of what was once the "breadbasket" of Afghanistan. Kajaki Dam improvements may offer hope for increased electricity delivery throughout the province, but such benefits need to be weighed against the effect this could have on population centers in Musa Qala and Sangin, which currently benefit from illegal diversion of electricity. Two neighboring countries also directly affect this region: Pakistan, with a porous border to the south, and Iran, which borders Nimroz to the west and receives water from the Helmand River.

**REGIONAL APPROACH:** As gains in CHRV are consolidated, RC-SW will apply civil-military operations to key insurgent strongholds and population centers. Insurgents will be urged to reintegrate and join productive activities with civic-minded Afghans. Economic development and governance programs will continue in Garmser, Nawa, Nad e' Ali, Gereshk and Marjah. Interdiction, eradication, and alternative crop production incentives will reduce funding for insurgents and make the cost of narco-business activities prohibitively expensive. Concurrent with drying up illicit and violent activities, the economic corridor between Lashkar Gah-Sangin and Sangin-Kajaki will be cleared, opened, and enhanced. The South East Power System (SEPS) will be improved. Power, freedom of movement, agribusiness opportunity and productivity will enable the agrarian based economy to improve livelihoods. Lastly, governance and justice will expand from key population centers to more rural areas as insurgent options in those areas diminish, and the provincial government gains legitimacy.

**GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:** The map below depicts a broad overview of relevant geographic information for the RC-Southwest Region, including major economic corridors, border crossings, and security focus areas. RC-Southwest headquarters is located at Camp Leatherneck in Nad e Ali, Helmand. RC-Southwest has one PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand, seven DSTs and 12 KTDs, marked in dark green or light green to reflect current and proposed resident coverage with a DST. DDP has rolled out in Nad Ali under UK lead. In 2010-2011, DDP will roll out in Nar-e-Saraj, Nawa, and Marjah, and is under consideration for Garmsir and Musa Qala, all in Helmand.

## RC (SW) 12 KTD 3 AOI



**PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** *The following are the priority USG Campaign Objectives for southwestern Afghanistan for the next 12-18 months (2010-2012)*

### Security

- **Action Against Irreconcilables:** Continue to capture and kill those committed to violence and destruction to counter GIRoA. Prevent insurgent return to key population centers that are held by coalition forces. Ensure insurgents do not resurge in Marjah.
- **Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance:** Support GIRoA Governor-Led Eradication efforts. Increase interdiction efforts in the Helmand River Valley and on key transit routes. Disrupt criminal patronage networks.

### Governance

- **Access to Justice:** Work to increase GIRoA judicial sector capacity in the provincial centers. Improve understanding of proper boundaries and exchanges between formal and informal justice dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly for disputes over land tenure and water rights.
- **Expand Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance:** Improve capacity of GIRoA at provincial and district centers. Support licit local governance structures in areas where GIRoA's reach is limited, including in villages through Village Stability Operations (VSO).

### Development

- **Agriculture Opportunity and Market Access:** Establish economic corridors and improve farmers' access to markets through improved roads. Increase use of improved storage methods for crops. Increase power to population centers in the Helmand River Valley.

### Cross-Cutting

- **Claiming the Information Initiative:** Counter Taliban propaganda with narratives of coalition and GIRoA advances in security, governance, and development. Develop narrative of positive U.S. development programs in Helmand (current and past).
- **Reconciling and Reintegrating Ex-Combatants and Achieving a Sustainable Peace:** Apply pressure to insurgents, forcing them to lay down arms and continue to work with GIRoA to improve messaging and incentives for reintegration.

### RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:


GIRoA, [Provincial Development plans](#)

IJC, [Operation Omid Plan](#) sections on "Southwest" (Classification: NATO ISAF Secret Rel GIRoA)

## EAST

**SITUATION ANALYSIS:** RC-East is a challenging and complex operating environment. Although comprised of a mixed urban and rural area with competing and complimentary interests, agriculture remains the basis of 80 percent of the population's income. The Pashtun influence in RC-East is significant, but there are also significant Tajik, Nuristani, and Hazara populations, often requiring tailored solutions to the issues that face the population in each district, valley, or tribe. The security, governance, and development situation in the area is extremely diverse, ranging from the relatively stable and secure provinces of Bamyan, Panjshir, and Parwan, as well as emerging areas in Laghman and Nangahar, to the highly kinetic areas of Kunar, Ghazni, and Paktika. In the provinces surrounding Kabul, the situation is steadily improving and the population is beginning to identify with GIROA at the district level. In the more unstable areas, lack of ability to protect the people from insurgents, lack of ability to provide or support traditional dispute resolution, and lack of employment opportunity are the main reasons for the population to support the insurgency versus GIROA. In these same areas the population perceives GIROA as corrupt, ineffective, and catering to the coalition and Western desires. Anti-GIROA forces consist of a complex network of groups with complementary and competing agendas, who are able to fill the void where GIROA is absent. RC-East shares a long border with Pakistan, facilitating insurgent freedom of movement and sanctuary; moreover the flow of support for the insurgency from within Pakistan has not stopped.

**REGIONAL APPROACH:** The USG, as a unified team, works with GIROA and other partners to conduct population-centric, comprehensive counterinsurgency operations focused on key terrain to neutralize the insurgency, increase the competency and credibility of Afghan institutions, and facilitate development that will set the security and stability conditions for GIROA to take the lead. The campaign will ultimately be decided when the insurgency is sufficiently neutralized and unable to separate the population from a government that is perceived as legitimate by the people. That will require governance that earns the people's trust at the district level in key terrain areas. The district center is the most visible manifestation of GIROA for much of the population. To this end, RC-East will support the IJC main effort by focusing resources on key terrain through the concept of district reinforcement and shaping operations.



**GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:** The map above depicts a broad overview of relevant geographic information for the RC-East region, including major economic corridors, border crossings, and security

focus areas. RC-East headquarters is located at Bagram Airfield. RC-East is unique in having civilian presence at seven Task Forces and has 14 PRTs and one U.S. Civilian Stabilization Team (CST) in Parwan, as well as 22 DSTs: TF Patriot – U.S. (PRTs Wardak, Logar); TF Red Bulls – U.S. (Bamyan, Parwan, Panjshir); TF Lafayette – France (Kapisa); TF Bastogne – U.S. (PRTs Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman); TF Rakkasan (Paktya, Khost); TF Curahee – U.S. (PRT Paktika); TF White Eagle – Poland (Ghazni). RC-East oversees 46 KTDs, marked in dark green or light green to reflect IPA current/proposed resident coverage with a DST. In 2010-2011, DDP will roll out in Baraki Barak, Sayedabad (both Wardak), Qarghah’I (Laghman), Behsud and Surkh Rod (both Nangarhar) and is under consideration for Shinwar, Khus Kunar, Nurgal in Nangarhar and Khas Kunar in Kunar.

**PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** *The following are the priority USG Campaign Objectives for eastern Afghanistan for the next 12-18 months (2010-2012)*

### **Security**

- **Secure the Population:** Protect the population by, with, and through Afghan institutions to separate the insurgency from the population in KTDs. The insurgency is neutralized, increasing GIRoA’s legitimacy in the KTDs as it provides for their security and protection, with institutions capable of providing rule of law and essential services.

### **Governance**

- **Access to Justice:** Focus on increasing Afghan access to both the community justice system and the formal justice system.
- **Expansion of Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance:** Bolster capacity and credibility of Afghan Government institutions, with a focus on provincial level institutions and facilitating GIRoA’s engagement with tribal and local leaders, which is a key inroad for GIRoA to serve the population.

### **Development**

- **Border Access for Commerce not Insurgents:** Improve security and customs capacity at Border Control Points, Torkham Gate and Gulam Khan to interdict contraband and facilitate licit economic traffic.
- **Advancing Livelihoods and Sustainable Jobs:** Focus on job creation in the Jalalabad corridor, building off investments coming on-line. Exploit the agribusiness and natural resource potential of key valleys (Kunar River, Bermal, Zormat) and the trade potential of Highway 1 as major sites for Afghan-based jobs.
- **Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access:** Connect rural communities to the main economic corridors along the Khost-Gardez-Ghazni road, Highway 1, and Jalalabad Corridor to Kabul. Support and facilitate GIRoA efforts to create stability with increased agri-business growth in Afghanistan.

### **Cross-Cutting**

- **Claiming the Information Initiative:** Act first to decisively inform the population via ANSF, GIRoA officials, and local leaders, and influence the population to disassociate from the insurgency. Afghans in RC-East believe that supporting their government, local institutions, and the ANSF leads to economic development, security, and an improved quality of life resulting in a commitment to resist insurgent influence.

### **RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

RC-East, Operation Order OQAB-10-01

RC-East, Subordinate Task Force Operation Orders

GIRoA, Provincial Development Plans AND District Development Plan


IJC, Operation Omid Plan sections on “East” (Classification: NATO ISAF Secret Rel GIRoA)

## WEST

**SITUATION ANALYSIS:** The west is a widely varied region, ranging from the economic prosperity of Herat to the extreme underdevelopment of Ghor and Badghis provinces. Even within the increasingly stable and prosperous province of Herat, districts such as Shindand remain a security concern, although the security there has improved significantly over the past two years. While security has increased in some districts of Badghis and Farah over the past year, it has decreased in other districts of Herat and Ghor, a formerly sleepy province, where a spike in anti-government and anti-coalition activity recently caused several USAID implementing partners to curtail operations. Farah remains a major poppy producing province. Much of its population is subsistence farmers; still, the agriculture sector (through exports to the Gulf) is generating jobs. Herat is the engine of economic development, especially in the marble sector, small to medium business growth, and in its role as a transportation hub for trade to Iran. The Herat border crossing point at Islam Qalah remains one of Afghanistan's most profitable. However, private sector growth is limited by fears of kidnapping. Insecurity is largely driven by narco-traffickers and other criminals aligned with the Taliban and exacerbated by the absence of the ANA (as in Ghor), or the presence of ANP that are corrupt or unable to secure the area, reflecting poorly on the provincial government in the eyes of the people. That said, ANSF presence has increased slightly over the past year, as have development funds from the international community, U.S. Military Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, as well as the number of ISAF forces—all of which contribute to increased stability and economic growth.

**REGIONAL APPROACH:** In the west over the next year, coalition forces will continue shaping operations, and balance shorter-term stabilization efforts (especially in KTDs) with longer-term development while building the capacity of GIRoA's sub-national institutions. Economic growth and job creation are priorities as Herat's prosperity has the potential to drive economic growth in the region, entice foreign investment, and generate revenue for GIRoA. The completion of the ring road in Badghis Province is central to this goal, as it will connect Badghis Province to Herat and, in turn, to export markets. Other 'strategic infrastructure' includes building up Herat's airport for direct international flights and paving the east-west highway connecting Herat to Kabul via the strategic Salma Dam, which will help to reverse the downward spiral of deteriorating security in Ghor Province. In addition, programs will focus on improving the agricultural value chain. Central to growth will be improved ANP training with an increased ANSF presence and the disruption of criminal networks, as well as a reduction of Taliban infiltration and intimidation from the south. The U.S. will continue to work with GIRoA and other international partners to coordinate increasing investment in the west. The Herat Consulate, scheduled to open in March 2011, is a symbol of America's long-term commitment to Afghanistan and hope for the future.

**GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:** The map below depicts a broad overview of relevant geographic information for the RC-West region, including major economic corridors, border crossings, and security focus areas. RC-West headquarters is located near the Herat airport at Camp Arena. A U.S. Consulate in Herat City is planned to open in March 2011. RC-West has four PRTs (Herat, Farah, Badghis, Ghor), one DST (Shindand) and 12 KTDs, marked in dark green or light green to reflect IPA current/proposed resident coverage with a DST. DDP is approved for Murghab (Badghis) in 2011.



**PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** *The following are the priority USG Campaign Objectives for western Afghanistan for the next 12-18 months (2010-2012)*

**Security**

- **Secure the Population:** Improved ANP performance and increased ANSF presence improves security in key population centers, commerce nodes, and major transportation routes, increasing freedom of movement and confidence in the government.
- **Countering Narcotics and Illicit Finance:** Success in Farah reduces the narcotics trade in the adjoining provinces of Helmand and Nimroz in the southwest.

**Governance**

- **Access to Justice:** In conjunction with the two priorities above, criminal patronage networks and links to the insurgency are neutralized through the justice sector.
- **Expansion of Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance:** Increase civil service capacity, improve financial linkages to Kabul, and strengthen sustainable governance at the province, district, and municipal levels, allowing for improved service delivery and strengthened institutions.

**Development**

- **Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access:** The agricultural value chain is strengthened, generating employment. The completion of the ring road and other strategic infrastructure results in increased border capacity and private-sector growth.

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**


IJC, Operation Omid Plan sections on “West” (Classification: NATO ISAF Secret Rel GIRoA)  
 GIRoA, Provincial Development Plans, annual

# NORTH

**SITUATION ANALYSIS:** In the north over the past year, improved ANSF and ISAF numbers and capabilities have been matched by an insurgency that has continued to expand in reach and impact. Human security remains variable due to the insurgency, ethnic politics and international influences, limiting freedom of movement in areas that were previously secure. ISAF implementing partners and Afghan officials have come under attack, threatening the achievement of ISAF and GIROA objectives. Six of the region's nine provincial governors were replaced in 2010, along with numerous district-level governors and police chiefs. Additionally, in early October 2010, the Kunduz provincial governor was assassinated by insurgents. It is too early to tell how these changes will impact the Afghan Government's capability and, in turn, legitimacy. The implementation of APRP already appears promising, with reintegration teams providing training and support to the provincial and district officials. The completion of a major regional transportation initiative, the ADB-funded Hairaton-to-Mazar rail link, reflects continued positive economic growth prospects in Mazar-e-Sharif, the region's commercial capital and largest population center.

**REGIONAL APPROACH:** Over the next year, the USG, along with international development partners, will continue its work with GIROA to address shorter-term stability efforts (especially in KTDs concentrated in the Kunduz/Baghlan corridor), while advancing longer-term governance and development efforts. The Mazar-e-Sharif Consulate, scheduled to open in March 2011, is a symbol of this normalization, highlighting America's long-term commitment to Afghanistan. The USG will work with GIROA and other partners to mitigate instability, improve national unity, and expand business opportunities, particularly along key economic corridors.

## RC (N) 12 KTD 6 AOI



**GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:** The map above depicts a broad overview of relevant geographic information for the RC-North region, including major economic corridors, border crossings, and security focus areas. RC-North headquarters is located in Mazar-e-Sharif at Camp Marmal. A U.S. Consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif is planned to open in March 2011. RC-North has six PRTs (Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, and Kunduz) and 12 KTDs, marked in dark green or light green to reflect current/proposed resident coverage with a DST. In October 2010, DDP was approved for Baghlan-i-Jadid (Baghlan).

**PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** *The following are the priority USG Campaign Objectives for northern Afghanistan for the next 12-18 months (2010-2012)*

**Security**

- **Secure the Population:** Protect populations in KTDs and areas of influence with partnered Afghan security forces and institutions. Neutralize the insurgency, enhancing GIRoA legitimacy and capacity to deliver key security, governance, and development services.

**Governance**

- **Access to Justice:** Strengthen all components of formal justice sector to build popular confidence in – and legitimacy of – GIRoA rule of law institutions.
- **Expansion of Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance:** Enhance sub-national governance capacity at the provincial and district levels in order to improve GIRoA legitimacy capacity.

**Development**

- **Border Access for Commerce not Insurgents:** Enhanced security, transit capacity, and customs revenue generation at key RC-N border-crossing points boosts economic development and job creation.
- **Advancing Livelihoods and Sustainable Jobs:** Improved livelihoods and economic growth will be driven by a regional development strategy that focuses on facilitating the development and consolidation of economic corridors.
- **Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access:** Strengthen the agricultural value chain, generating employment. Generate private-sector growth through activities such as completing the ring road in Herat and Badghis provinces, increasing border capacity, transforming Herat airport into an international airport, and completing the east-west highway from Herat to Salma Dam and on to Chaghcharan.

**RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:**

RC-North, Op OMID 1390 Preview

RC/P-North, September 2010 Command Brief to NATO SCR

GIRoA, Provincial Development plans

## CAPITAL

**SITUATION ANALYSIS:** RC-Capital includes all of Kabul Province except Sarobi district. Kabul City is a rapidly expanding metropolis with a population that has tripled in eight years to an estimated 4.5 million. Located on the ring road and featuring Afghanistan's busiest international airport, it is a hub of commerce and private sector development. Due in part to Kabul University and other educational and governmental institutions, human capital here is the highest in Afghanistan. As the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul is the seat of government and the home of national-level institutions, such as the Presidential Palace, Parliament, Supreme Court, and other specialized bodies such as the High Peace Council.

**REGIONAL APPROACH:** Kabul is a strategic priority in the overall USG mission. As the capital and largest city in Afghanistan, Kabul is strategically important in terms of diplomatic engagement, economic growth, and national-level capacity, which due to the architecture of the Afghan Constitution is essential to governance, security, and development at all levels. The Civil Service Commission is essential to effective governance throughout Afghanistan. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance and Line Ministries can only facilitate sub-national service delivery if effective and efficient programmatic and financial management systems and sufficient human capital are in place in Kabul. National-level justice bodies are pivotal to making gains against corruption, criminal patronage networks, and high-level crimes. The Parliament is central to making laws and administering oversight of the Executive. The Office of the President and the National Security Council are the prime policy-making bodies. For these reasons, the USG will continue to commit substantial resources toward building the capacity of governmental institutions in Kabul. In addition, the Capital team works to support effective links between the national-level government and the municipal and provincial governments in order to support the populace in Kabul Province.

**PRIORITY OBJECTIVES:** *The following are the priority USG Campaign Objectives for central Afghanistan for the next 12-18 months (2010-2012)*

### Security

- **Secure the Population:** ANSF continues to provide security that secures freedom of movement for the population. The MOD and MOI are increasingly capable of independent action and with command and control of the ANSF for all of Afghanistan.

### Governance

- **Access to Justice:** The national-level court system, including the Supreme Court, Anti-Corruption Tribunal and Counter-Narcotics Tribunal, is improved with investigators, prosecutors, and judges capable of prosecuting high-level crimes and increased capacity in Afghan-run detention facilities that are able to hold inmates at international standards. The capacity and transparency of the High Office of Oversight is improved.
- **Expansion of Effective, Representative, and Accountable Governance:** The capacity of the Parliament and Ministries is improved. Increased civil service capacity and improved financial linkages to Kabul lead to sustainable governance at the district, municipal, and provincial levels, allowing for improved service delivery and strengthened institutions.

### Development

- **Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access:** The agricultural value chain is strengthened through the completion of secondary roads and refrigerated storage facilities.

### RELATED STRATEGIES AND PLANS:

IJC, OPORD OMID, section on "Kabul" (Classification: NATO ISAF Secret Rel GIRoA)

## CIV-MIL INTEGRATING INSTRUCTIONS

The implementation and achievement of the USG campaign goals are dependent on the integration of all USG resources; the work of the military, diplomats, and development experts is interdependent. Ambassador Eikenberry expressed the following division of labor for effective coordination and cooperation: “As a general rule, we civilians will lead at the national level in working with the Afghan Government, while we will play a supporting role to the military at the provincial and district levels, until security in these areas improves. As our troops conduct operations to clear and hold more and more of the country, we will follow behind them to help Afghans re-establish governance.”<sup>14</sup>

The following section outlines the organizational and management framework through which the U.S. Mission and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan coordinate the implementation and execution of the Campaign Plan. The structure described below applies to USG civilian elements, U.S. military forces under ISAF control, and U.S. OEF forces. Still, since the majority of U.S. military forces are allocated to ISAF for operations, ISAF is an essential partner. Thus, the structures can be expanded to include ISAF and the wider international community as appropriate.

The U.S. Mission and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan should coordinate both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, civ-mil entities conducting activities in the same area will coordinate and develop plans, assessments, and coordination mechanisms that synchronize their efforts and align them to those of international partners, the UN, NGOs, GIRoA, and Afghan partners operating in the area. Vertically, planners and implementers at the national, regional, task force, provincial, and district levels should ensure a consistency of goals and a flow of priorities, information, and assessments both upward and downward. Given the unique structure of each regional and sub-regional command, Regional Commands and Regional Platforms will identify how to adopt the following principles to their needs. ISAF issues additional guidance on the implementation and assessment of the Campaign Plan to U.S. military forces and the U.S. Embassy does the same for USG civilians at the sub-national level.

### NATIONAL-LEVEL STRATEGIC COORDINATION

**PRINCIPALS’ GROUP (PG)** - The Chief of Mission and Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan are responsible for the highest level of coordination, problem solving, and decision making. As co-chairs of the Principals’ Group, they set USG priorities, consult with high-level GIRoA officials, work with the NATO SCR’s office, international partners, and allocate resources.

**EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP (EWG)** - The EWG is a deputies-level body co-chaired by the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs (CDDEA) at the U.S. Embassy and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability Operations at ISAF. This decision-making body meets on a weekly basis to discuss issues identified by the national-level working groups and other issues requiring civ-mil decisions and coordination. The EWG has the ability to task the national level working groups, make decisions, and raise issues to the Principal’s level for further review.

**NATIONAL-LEVEL WORKING GROUPS (NLWG)** – The national-level working groups are responsible for further development, monitoring, and assessment of their respective Campaign Objectives (*see Annex D for the alignment of NLWGs to the Campaign Objectives*). The 15 working groups are civ-mil entities comprised of USG civilian and military personnel and include representatives from the U.S. Mission, ISAF (including IJC and NTM-A), USFOR-A, as well as, when appropriate, GIRoA and the international

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<sup>14</sup> Ambassador Eikenberry, Ambassador’s Guidance, August 30, 2010

community. These groups perform a range of tasks including sharing information, coordinating efforts, providing subject matter expertise to the field, and solving problems as identified at the national and sub-national levels. The working groups are overseen by CDDEA. The Political-Military Section's Civilian-Military Planning and Assessment Sub-Section (CMPASS), which provides a planner to each of the groups, shares information between groups and advises on planning and assessment processes.

**AFGHANISTAN CIV-MIL PLANNING GROUP** – The civ-mil planning group, chaired by ISAF's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability, is a forum to integrate civilian and military planning with participation from across the international community.

## **NATIONAL-LEVEL OPERATIONAL COORDINATION**

**OPERATIONAL CIV-MIL COORDINATION** - The U.S. Mission, with IPA designated as the lead office, and IJC coordinate regularly on sub-national planning, implementation, and assessment. The U.S. Mission's policy is to align personnel and programs to support operations in the key terrain in order to fully synchronize and coordinate with military field activities. Effective synchronization and coordination of effort among field staff is essential and, to this end, personnel assigned to the field "belong" not to one agency, but rather to an inter-agency unified field team coordinated by IPA. To ensure this level of cooperation, IPA routinely attends key IJC coordination and synchronization meetings, conducts key leader engagements, and supports dedicated liaison activities.

**OPERATIONAL REGIONAL COMMAND BOARD (RCB)** - The RCB is chaired by the NATO SCR and DCOMISAF and takes place roughly every 6-8 weeks. It provides each of the five Regional Commands with a forum to speak directly to a wide Kabul audience – including the SCR, IJC and coalition embassies – on security, governance, development, and other issues. The forum is intended to facilitate a dialogue and allows the Kabul audience to hear directly from the Regional Command about resources and support it might require. The aim of the Board is to ensure unity of effort in support of the ISAF campaign plan at the political level. Relevant Embassy sections, led by IPA, attend as required.

**ACTIVITIES SYNCHRONIZATION BOARD (ASB)** - The ASB is led by the Commander of IJC and NTM-A. The purpose of the ASB is to fully coordinate and synchronize field operations with the Regional Commands. IPA participates as a lead member of this board.

**DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAM (DDP) PLANNERS BOARD** - Since the program's inception, IJC and IPA, in conjunction with USAID's Stabilization Unit, have met weekly to discuss and coordinate DDP activities.

**HAMKARI COORDINATION** - IPA and NATO Senior Civilian Representative office chair a weekly Hamkari civ-mil coordination meeting. The meeting is the single weekly forum for the civ-mil Kabul community to engage via video teleconference with Regional Command South and Kandahar PRT on civ-mil initiatives relevant to the stabilization of Kandahar Province and City.

**GOVERNANCE COORDINATION** - IPA and USAID co-chair the weekly Governance and Sub-National Governance Consultative Group (Gov/SNG CG) and Governance Policy Working Group (GPWG) meetings. Regular participants in the meetings include all relevant Embassy sections, the Regional Platforms, and ISAF. The Gov/SNG CG meetings are an opportunity for the policy community of interest to receive information on key governance and sub-national governance topics and initiatives from relevant Afghan and international actors, including implementing partners. The GPWG meetings are one of the major platforms for policy discussions of these issues by Kabul and the field. This coordination focuses on improving communication from the district through the provincial to the national level.

## **SUB-NATIONAL COORDINATION**

**INTEGRATED REGIONAL COMMAND TEAM** - The integrated Regional Command includes both the Regional Command and Regional Platform. The Regional Command team constitutes the regional-level leadership that includes the RC Commander (CDR), the respective commanders of Special Operations forces (SOF) components and the USG RC Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) (supported by the regional civilian interagency team) and, often, a Senior Development Officer. The role of the SCR is to coordinate the activities of civilians operating under Chief of Mission authority, execute U.S. policy and guidance, and serve as the civilian counterpart to the military commander in the region. The Command Team is supported by the interagency personnel based at the command and the military forces in the field. The regional-level is responsible for providing support and guidance to its subordinate levels, establishing coordination mechanisms developing and maintaining a Regional Integrated Civ-Mil Plan, assessing progress in their region, allocating resources jointly, raising key issues to IPA, the ISAF chain of command, NTM-A/CSTC-A, NLWGs, and the EWG, as appropriate, as well as engaging with key international partners.

Each regional-level command will have a Civ-Mil Fusion Cell where the various civilian, international, and military elements are represented. The Fusion Cells are responsible for developing a civ-mil common operating picture for the geographic area and executing other tasks directed by the Regional Command Team. Embedded in the Fusion Cells will be assessment teams to analyze, assess, and inform their respective organizations.

**INTEGRATED TASK FORCE COMMAND TEAM (TF):** - The TF Team is the collective sub-regional level leadership which includes the commanders of respective SOF components and the brigade combat team (or equivalent) commander, with the USG Senior Civilian Representative (supported by their sub-regional civilian interagency team) and, often, a Senior Development Officer. This civilian team synchronizes all USG civilian efforts in the sub-regional area of responsibility. The sub-regional level is responsible for formulating an integrated civ-mil plan for their area, working with existing coordination mechanisms, providing support and guidance to its subordinate levels, assessing progress in their area, allocating resources jointly raising key issues to the regional-level as required, and engaging with key international community partners.

**PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT)** – The PRT team is the collective international provincial-level leadership, which includes the commanders of the PRT, the Agri-business Development Team, the battalion equivalent, the respective SOF elements, the ANSF mentor and partner teams, and the provincial USG SCR. The provincial civilian lead is supported by the Provincial Reconstruction Team’s USAID, DOS and USDA representatives as well as any other USG civilians and implementing partners operating in the province. The combined military and civilian elements in the province form the “provincial team.” The PRT is primarily implementation-focused; however, it is also responsible for providing support and guidance to the district level, for formulating a provincial civ-mil plan, assessing progress and stability in the province, allocating resources jointly, raising key issues to the sub-regional or regional-level as required, and engaging key international community and GIRoA partners.

**DISTRICT SUPPORT TEAM (DST)** - The DST is a combined civilian and military action group which is responsible for integrating the activities of all elements in an assigned district. The DST is comprised of all USG civilian elements plus ISAF and OEF military forces operating in the district. The team is led by the USG civilian lead, the commanders of the primary military elements, and the ANSF mentor and partner team. The district level is primarily execution-focused; however, it is responsible for jointly formulating a civ-mil plan for district support, assessing progress and stability in the area, allocating

resources jointly, raising key issues to the provincial level as required, and engaging key international community and GIRoA partners.

## MEASURING PROGRESS

The Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan will continue to be reviewed annually and revised as necessary. Regular strategic assessments of progress toward the plan help to shape the revision of the strategy by identifying areas of success as well as those of stagnation or backsliding. The primary purpose of the assessment process is to provide USG leadership in Afghanistan with the analysis necessary to prioritize and readjust the allocation of resources and efforts strategically. It also serves to inform Washington decision-makers of changes in the environment.

The U.S. Mission, in coordination with ISAF's Afghan Assessments Group (AAG), assesses campaign progress regularly. The quarterly civ-mil assessment for the National Security Council (NSC) in Washington is supplemented by national-level, civ-mil working group briefs to Kabul-based leadership on progress toward the Campaign Objectives. Collectively, these assessment processes draw on qualitative and quantitative metrics from the Department of State's Afghanistan-Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, ISAF documents, the Mission's Performance Management Plan, as well as the over 100 metrics used for the NSC Assessment. These assessment processes will be augmented by a capstone piece to assess overall progress toward the Campaign Statement, drawing on existing reporting. This overarching assessment will be briefed to the Executive Working Group (and Principals Working Group as desired) for decision on recommended changes. The CMPASS team, in conjunction with AAG, is responsible for writing and facilitating these assessments. For more information, see *Annex C, Metrics Framework*.

In addition to national-level strategic assessment, program planning and assessment is coordinated by CDDEA and conducted by USAID, USDA, INL, and other USG entities with program funds, specifically through the Mission's PMP. For the sub-national level, IPA coordinates sub-national reporting on specific issues, such as elections or reintegration. The IPA Office, supported by CMPASS and USAID, advises Regional Commands and Platforms on assessing the state of progress toward the national-level Campaign Objectives as well as regional plans. In addition, IJC conducts a six-week cycle of assessments of district stability, through commander and senior civilian leadership evaluations of security, governance and development.<sup>15</sup>

## PLANNING METHODOLOGY AND FUTURE DIRECTION

In April 2010, the USG leadership in Afghanistan requested that a USG planning team composed of both civilian and military personnel revise the ICMCP. The Plan revision process, facilitated and coordinated by CMPASS, consisted of a core planning team from IPA, USAID's Stabilization Unit, and USFOR-A planners seconded to CDDEA, drawing on the NLWGs as well as planning experts from ISAF headquarters, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), NTM-A, and IJC. The core planning team provided planning and assessment expertise, taking as its guidance the President's Strategic Review, Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus' guidance, the Department of State's Regional Stabilization Strategy, the ISAF Campaign Plan, IJC's OPLAN 1390, the ANDS, and existing NATO and NSC direction.

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<sup>15</sup> These assessments are available on IJC's ISAF Secret web portal.

Facilitated by the core planning team, the NLWGs developed the 13 Campaign Objectives as represented in the pages here. They also developed or revised USG campaign strategies, which align closely with the Campaign Objective and provide more detailed tasks and metrics (*see Annex E: Abridged Campaign Objective Strategies*). The working group participation included civilians and military from the USG, ISAF, IJC, NTM-A, USFOR-A, CFSOCC-A, as well as members from the international community. The core planning team traveled to, and corresponded with, each Regional Command and Platform to develop the regional pages. IPA wrote much of the sub-national sections and designed the maps. Plan development included a series of in-progress reviews with Embassy, USFOR-A, and ISAF leadership. The final document was approved by Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus in February 2011.

The ICMCP represents a cohesive strategy for USG efforts to stabilize Afghanistan while supporting GIRoA priorities and improving the livelihoods of Afghans. This plan is meant to serve as a living document, which will be subject to course corrections based on regular assessments and changes in the operating environment. It attempts to achieve unity of effort for USG activities at the national level and ensure appropriate nesting of strategies and actions and the sub-national level.

## GLOSSARY

**Campaign Objective** – (Formerly Transformative Effect) The elements of the plan that are necessary and sufficient to achieve the overarching Campaign Statement. The objectives are based on the situation analysis, cut across sectors, are stated as outcomes, and are clearly defined, measurable, and decisive.

**Critical Dynamics** – The key factors in the environment and the description of how they interact to create challenges and opportunities for progress toward campaign objectives.

**Campaign Statement** – The task, together with the purpose, that indicates the actors responsible to carry out the mission, the method of coordination, the set of actions to be taken, and the intended outcome.

**Combined** – Coordinated action between two or more different nations in military efforts. Also referred to as international or multinational in the civilian community.

**Concept** – Describes how actors responsible to carry out the mission will work together and with partners to achieve the Campaign Statement, Campaign Objectives and/or sub-objectives.

**Effect** – The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action or a set of actions. (JP 3-0)

**End State** – The set of required conditions that defines achievement of objectives. (JP 3-0)

**Executive Working Group (EWG)** – The deputies-level senior decision-making body that makes policy and decisions regarding the Campaign Plan based on input from the civ-mil National-level Working Groups, Regional Civ-Mil Cells and the Plans and Assessment staff.

**Joint** – Coordinated and/or integrated action of two or more branches of the military services within one nation.

**Line of Operations (LOO)** – A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). (JP 3-0)

**Metric** – Quantities or qualitative measures

- **Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)** – A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)
- **Measure of Performance** – A criterion used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

**National Level** – The national level is used to refer to activities that occur in Kabul and that relate to the country as a whole (see *Sub-national Level*).

**National Level Working Groups (NLWGs)** – Working-level civ-mil groups responsible for further development, monitoring and assessment of their respective Campaign Objective strategy in the Campaign Plan. Each group has designated senior civilian and military also leads and a Pol-Mil planner to support. These groups identify key decisions and proposals for the EWG; oversee implementation of the Campaign Plan and assessments of progress.

**Objective** – The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. (JP 5-0)

**Operations** – The performance of actions (to include tasks and activities) required to carry out a plan or accomplish a mission. This includes oversight of implementation of the Civ-Mil Campaign Plan at subordinate levels of operation, mobilization of resources, and oversight of execution.

**Principals' Group (PG)** – The Chief of Mission and COMISAF/CDRUSFOR-A and other senior USG and Military leaders that are responsible for final coordination and decision making. They provide civ-mil direction, set priorities, consult on priorities with the Government of Afghanistan, work with other nation partners to address common challenges, and allocate resources to USG elements.

**Situation Analysis** – A comprehensive analysis of the environment and the critical dynamics of the problem which the mission is intended to address. The purpose is to understand how the environment might be affected to achieve desired policy, strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. A situation analysis includes five main components: the environment, key actors (friendly, enemy and host nation/population), windows of opportunity, windows of vulnerability, and the critical assumptions that must be made to develop the action plan. (Note: Products of a situation analysis in the Civ-Mil Campaign Plan are the “Strategic Situation” section of the plan, as well as the “Current Situation” sub-sections of individual Campaign Objectives and regional portions of the plan.

**Sub-Objective** – The elements of the plan that are necessary and sufficient to achieve the overarching Campaign Objectives. The sub-objectives are based on the situation analysis, cut across sectors, are stated as outcomes, and are clearly defined, measurable, and decisive.

**Sub-National Level** – The sub-national level refers to activities that occur outside of the national-level, i.e. at the regional platform, brigade, task force, and in provinces and districts (see *National Level*).

**Task** – The assigned responsibility of a specific act or function that contributes to achieving an effect or a given sub-objective of the Civ-Mil Campaign Plan.

**Theory of Change** – A theory that lays out how the critical dynamics identified in the Situation Analysis can be affected to bring about the effects or end states described in a given Campaign Objective or sub-objective.

**Unified** – The synchronization, coordination and/or integration of civilian interagency and joint military operations with the operations of the international community, host nation, non-governmental organizations, international organizations (IOs, e.g. UN) and private sector to achieve unity of effort.

**Unity of Effort** – All efforts of national, coalition and host nation power are directed in the pursuit of a unified purpose. In contrast to unity of command (where all assets are controlled by one responsible authority), unity of effort involves coordinating institutions and processes to achieve the unified mission.

## **LEVELS OF PLANNING, ASSESSMENT AND ACTION**

**Policy Level** – The level of planning, assessment and action which reports to and carries out the intent of the head(s) of state(s). Usually located in Washington or national capitals, the policy level sets overarching policy objectives and provides guidance on the strategic approach to the strategic level and all subordinate levels of action.

**Strategic Level** – The level of planning, assessment and action subordinate to the policy level. Policy goals or objectives are the strategic level's tasks; the strategic level is responsible to determine the ways and means to achieve policy objectives. Actors responsible to execute the ICMCP at the strategic level are required to monitor how subordinate/operational level entities assigned responsibilities in the plan are achieving their assigned outcomes, and report to the policy level whether those outcomes are achieving the policy objectives.

**Operational Level** – The level of planning, assessment and action subordinate to the strategic level. Strategic objectives are the operational level's tasks; the operational level is responsible for determining the ways, means and objectives/sub-objectives to achieve strategic objectives. Actors responsible to execute the ICMCP at the operational level are required to monitor how subordinate/tactical level entities assigned responsibilities in the plan are achieving their assigned outcomes, and report to the strategic level whether those outcomes are achieving the Campaign Objectives and Campaign Statement.

**Tactical Level** – The level of planning, assessment and action subordinate to the operational level. Operational objectives are the tactical level's tasks; the tactical level is responsible for determining the ways, means and activities to achieve operational objectives. Actors responsible to execute the ICMCP at the tactical level are required to monitor how tactical entities assigned responsibilities in the plan are achieving their assigned outcomes, and report to the operational level whether those outcomes are achieving the operational objectives or plan.