



Inter Agency Paper

No. 6/November 2011

Active Inaction: Interagency Security Assistance to Egypt

Nathan W. Toronto
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies

Col. Arthur D. Simons Center
for the Study of Interagency Cooperation

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

An Interagency Occasional Paper published
by the CGSC Foundation Press

**Active Inaction:
Interagency Security
Assistance to Egypt**

Nathan W. Toronto
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies

**The Col. Arthur D. Simons Center
for the Study of Interagency Cooperation**

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Interagency Paper No. 6, November 2011

Active Inaction: Interagency Security Assistance to Egypt

by Nathan W. Toronto
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies

Nathan W. Toronto is an assistant professor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He earned his doctorate degree in international politics from The Ohio State University. He studies and teaches civil-military relations, security assistance, military recruitment, and Middle East security. His essay *Active Inaction* won the Simons Center's Faculty Writing Competition for 2011 and is based in part on research conducted in Egypt, which was made possible by a grant from the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. The author can be reached at nathan.toronto@us.army.mil.

This paper represents the opinions of the author and does not reflect the official views of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States Government, the Simons Center, or the Command and General Staff College Foundation.

Publications released by the Simons Center are not copyrighted, however the Simons Center requests acknowledgment in the use of its materials in other works.

Questions about this paper and the Interagency Paper series should be directed to the Col. Arthur D. Simons Center, 655 Biddle Blvd., PO Box 3429, Fort Leavenworth KS 66027; email: office@TheSimonsCenter.org, or by phone at 913-682-7244.

Contents

Introduction	1
What Kind of Egyptian Military?	3
Increasing Access	5
Economic Development and Military Reform.....	6
The Positive Effects of U.S. Military Aid	10
Conclusion.....	13
Endnotes	14

Introduction

What to do about security assistance to Egypt? On one hand, since 1979 the U.S. has spent billions of dollars to support the Egyptian military, with little discernible effect on Egyptian military capabilities. When the Egyptian military trains—which does not appear to be often—its focus is on force-on-force conventional warfare instead of on the full spectrum of military operations, and there is little standardization of equipment and processes.¹ Despite this, Egyptian officers who have attended U.S. military schools over the years may have had a positive effect on the behavior of the Egyptian military during protests against the Mubarak regime in early 2011 and set the stage for future Egyptian military reform. Continuing security assistance to Egypt in its current form could reap great benefits in the future.

On the other hand, cooperation with the U.S. is even less popular in Egypt now than it was before the Mubarak regime fell, yet Egypt is the largest Arab country and one of the most influential in the region, and the U.S. can hardly afford to simply withdraw its influence. Furthermore, the fiscal position of the U.S. may not support the continuation of U.S. security assistance to Egypt at current levels. So security assistance to Egypt may be moving inexorably toward disengagement.

Neither continuing the current level of engagement nor disengaging from Egypt is very appealing. Simply reducing the amount of security assistance without making an effort to prepare the ground for future U.S. influence in Egypt risks losing the opportunity that the post-Mubarak transition provides. The opportunity to remake the U.S.–Egypt security relationship into an image suitable to the twenty-first century future as opposed to the Cold War past would be lost. Simply continuing security assistance in its current form risks an abrupt end if Congress deems the level of funding unacceptable, the Egyptian military continues to progress at its glacially slow pace, or a new Egyptian government becomes intolerant of U.S. security assistance.

A third option, “active inaction,” would involve actively preparing the ground for eventual U.S. influence when the time is right, while keeping direct, overt engagement to a minimum in the short term. Active inaction reduces the risk of either a negative Egyptian response or an abrupt withdrawal of funds by Congress. Active inaction might involve changes in the security assistance

Neither continuing the current level of engagement nor disengaging from Egypt is very appealing.

While [active inaction] would not be a radical departure from what the U.S. military mission is currently doing, it would require interagency cooperation to gather the expertise necessary to put active inaction into practice.

mission to Egypt, be it in response to reduced U.S. military aid or in a shift of emphasis from helping the Egyptian military counter conventional threats to helping the Egyptian military to develop civil-military relations and democratic governance. Such changes could also require further integration of the heretofore separate military- and civilian-diplomatic missions to Egypt, with civilian country experts serving in the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC).

In practice, what would active inaction look like? While it would not be a radical departure from what the U.S. military mission is currently doing, it would require interagency cooperation to gather the expertise necessary to put active inaction into practice. This interagency cooperation would be focused in a small number of “Egypt hands,” civilians with in-depth cultural and political knowledge of Egypt. These Egypt hands would serve longer terms than military diplomats in order to preserve the institutional memory necessary to continue active inaction while military members rotate in and out on a frequent basis. These Egypt hands would not constitute a separate organization but would be an integral part of the OMC commander’s staff, working in the military chain of command to accomplish OMC objectives, much as civilian advisors work on other military staffs.

Finally, the OMC could recruit its Egypt hands from all U.S. citizens, not necessarily federal government employees only. Any U.S. citizen who is able to maintain a security clearance and has the country-specific knowledge necessary to support OMC operations would be eligible. These individuals might be found in the Departments of State or Defense, but they could just as easily be found among academics in civilian universities. Recruiting would focus on translating the security assistance expertise already present in OMC into security assistance results that are both tenable in Egypt and tractable for U.S. policy. This approach would bide time while cultivating in-depth relationships with the Egyptian military. The Egypt hands would thus bring Egyptian expertise to bear on an important foreign policy problem. As such, interagency cooperation would look less like a “whole of government” approach and more like a “whole of nation” approach to security assistance to Egypt.

Would an active inaction approach work? There is evidence to suggest it would. First, despite spending over \$67 million since 1979 to send 1,200 Egyptian officers and 4,500 enlisted personnel to U.S. military schools, it is more difficult for U.S. officials to gain access to the Egyptian military today than it was during the 1980s. This is in part a function of Egyptian counterparts serving in their positions for years, while U.S. diplomats serve far shorter terms in-country. Egypt hands could help correct this imbalance by

maintaining a core of experience that can only be gained through month after month of learning-by-doing and developing in-country contacts. Second, the history of Egyptian military development suggests that military modernization efforts have generally failed in part because of a lack of economic development. Egypt's economic outlook may now be changing, suggesting that the time is right to begin encouraging a link between increasing material wealth and human capital in the civilian sector of the Egyptian economy and the development of Egypt's military. Third, evidence from Egypt's participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program suggests a possible link between Egyptian officers' attendance at U.S. military schools and the restraint that the Egyptian Army showed during popular protests against the Mubarak regime in early 2011, auguring an important shift in Egyptian civil-military relations. In short, increased access, continued economic development, and IMET participation could help the U.S. achieve its security assistance goal in Egypt.

What Kind of Egyptian Military?

What exactly is that goal? The post-Mubarak transition has brought with it a great deal of uncertainty about Egypt's future. At this point, a turn towards liberal, Western-style democracy seems just as unlikely as a reversion to the oppressive autocracy of the Mubarak era. A more realistic expectation is somewhere in the middle, but this would likely still not result in Egypt instituting liberal, civilian control of the military after the U.S. model. Rather, a benign form of semi-autocratic control seems a reasonable medium-range expectation for the Egyptian military. Benign, in this sense, means that semi-autocratic control would lead to less military involvement in the economy and politics, increased meritocracy in the officer corps, and less focus on Israel as a conventional military adversary.

This is no departure from past U.S. practice. In security assistance, there is tension between two ideals: the democratic ideal of creating security forces in which liberal, civilian control over the military is institutionalized and the security ideal of creating forces that are effective at suppressing challenges to state authority. In its doctrine, the U.S. military strikes a balance. For example, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, observes that a “[foreign military] partner’s end state [should include] legitimate, credible, competent, capable, committed, and confident security forces.”² Furthermore, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68 states that security force assistance should “directly increase the

In security assistance, there is tension between two ideals: the democratic ideal of creating security forces in which liberal, civilian control over the military is institutionalized and the security ideal of creating forces that are effective at suppressing challenges to state authority.

capacity or capability of a foreign security force or their supporting institutions.”³

The balance between these two ideals does not require civilian control of the military to be of a liberal, democratic nature. Civilian control can also be authoritarian or semi-authoritarian. Samuel Finer notes that in “despotisms or autocracies of a totalitarian type... the military are subordinated to the civilians as much as or even more than in the liberal-democratic régimes.”⁴ Sam Sarkesian points out that “each military profession is distinct in the way it serves its own state and society.”⁵ While in the U.S. this implies an unquestioning commitment to liberal democracy, the same may not result in post-Mubarak Egypt.

This does not mean that U.S. support to Egypt’s military should validate the oppressiveness of a future Egyptian regime. The U.S. government should continue to decry any future regime abuses. The U.S. can continue to develop Egyptian military capacity and capability, while encouraging it to become less beholden to whatever regime arises in Egypt, while still being controlled by it. By no means should the U.S. turn a blind eye to any future military regime’s excesses—there is no varnishing tyranny—but it is not too much to ask for an Egyptian military that does no harm to U.S. interests.

Egypt’s ability to secure its territory—and do so efficiently—can help undermine Islamic radicalism and enhance regional stability.

Helping Egypt build this kind of military is a frustrating and often thankless task but an important one for national security. Egypt’s ability to secure its territory—and do so efficiently—can help undermine Islamic radicalism and enhance regional stability. As the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* contends, developing partner military forces capable of securing state territory “is key to creating a global environment inhospitable to terrorists.”⁶

Furthermore, if current trends in Egypt favor lasting future military reform—and they may—it would be better to remain engaged to hedge against a militarily-capable but radicalized Egypt. This engagement effort could be considered successful if the Egyptian military becomes more effective and semi-authoritarian control takes on a more benign character. The success of this endeavor could depend, however, on the U.S. approach to security assistance in Egypt. There are three reasons active inaction should be that approach.

Increasing Access

The first reason is increased access. In the past twenty years, the U.S. mission's access to the Egyptian military has dwindled. Access is important because if the U.S. mission does not effectively cultivate its contacts with the Egyptian military, it may miss its opportunity to engage more deeply.

Given this, what could the U.S. mission do differently to develop and increase its contacts with the Egyptian military? One answer would be to use civilians who are cultural-linguistic experts on Egypt—Egypt hands—to help develop these links. One of the challenges facing the U.S. security assistance mission is at the Embassy level, where the staff is mainly uniformed service members. Typically, operational requirements prevent these individuals from serving in Egypt for more than two years, and while they are dedicated to the mission and very good at security assistance, most do not have a career background that lends itself to in-depth expertise in Egyptian language and culture.

Additionally, their Egyptian counterparts have often been in their posts for much longer, sometimes many years longer. This situation makes it more difficult for U.S. officers to develop relationships of trust with their Egyptian counterparts, endeavors that can take months in Arab culture. To overcome this challenge, the proposed cadre of Egypt hands would commit to being posted in Egypt for longer periods—perhaps five years or longer—in order to act as ongoing liaisons between U.S. and Egyptian military officers, as well as to bridge the transition between members of the U.S. mission.

In addition to being cultural-linguistic experts serving long tours, these Egypt hands should also be well-versed in military affairs in order to translate the differences between U.S. and Egyptian military culture. They would also be subordinate to the military chain of command, not only to prevent them from becoming a separate entity within the U.S. security assistance mission, but also to give them the legitimacy to accompany U.S. military officers as they liaise with Egyptian counterparts. These interagency Egypt hands would constitute an integral part of the active inaction approach to U.S. security assistance and could go a long way toward improving access to the Egyptian military.

Access is important because if the U.S. mission does not effectively cultivate its contacts with the Egyptian military, it may miss its opportunity to engage more deeply.

Economic Development and Military Reform

The second reason that the active inaction approach could work is the link between economic development and military development. Economies that develop human and material capital in the civilian work force are more likely to develop militarily. The history of Egyptian military reform shows why this link is important.

Egypt has launched significant military reform programs at two different times in its history: in the first half of the nineteenth century and after the 1967 Six Day War with Israel. The irrepressibly ambitious Egyptian leader Muhammad Ali Pasha—who ruled from 1805 to 1849—transformed the Egyptian army into one of the most feared in the Middle East; however, his reforms did not outlive him. The Egyptian economy could not support a modern army, and European powers prevented him from translating his military effectiveness into regional dominance.⁷ These reforms also did not emphasize the development of human capital in the Egyptian military. As Figure 1 depicts, few military periodicals were published in Egypt from 1800 to 1952, suggesting that the dissemination of military knowledge was not a priority.⁸ As a result, the Egyptian military languished until well into the twentieth century.

...few military periodicals were published in Egypt from 1800 to 1952, suggesting that the dissemination of military knowledge was not a priority.




Figure 1
Egyptian Military Expenditures and Periodicals, 1800–2000

The latter episode of Egyptian military reform, after its crushing military defeat by Israel in 1967, illustrates how the presence of a modern economy facilitated military development, even if reforms did not endure. After the Free Officers took power in July 1952, military expertise in the Egyptian military continued to languish. The Free Officers dismissed 400 of the army’s highest ranking

officers, replacing them with politically loyal candidates. Not only was investment in the military limited in the early years of Nasser's regime, but the regime also maintained the class-based conscription system from the Farouq era, a system that exempted more capable, college-educated Egyptian men from military service.⁹ Kenneth Pollack observes that by 1967 the Free Officers had "turned the Egyptian armed forces into their private fiefdom, systematically replacing all of the top military leaders with men loyal to themselves."¹⁰

This state of affairs changed with Egypt's disastrous 1967 defeat and loss of the Sinai Peninsula. The government began conscripting college graduates for the officer corps in 1968. In addition, Egypt increased the length of service to "an indefinite period of time, or until the Sinai was recaptured."¹¹ Historian John Lynn notes this change in the Egyptian approach: "The Egyptians... moved away from politicized patterns as a reaction to... humiliation in 1967."¹²

Training improved significantly, as well—some Egyptian army units practiced the Suez Canal crossing hundreds of times in preparation for the 1973 October War. The ability of soldiers to benefit from military training, as well as the direction of and attention to training itself, improved markedly after Egypt's 1967 defeat. Furthermore, Egyptian military expenditures per soldier increased sharply after 1967, as did the publication of military periodicals (see Figure 1).¹³

Again, however, these reforms did not last, despite considerable U.S. support after the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978. Egyptian military training is no longer regular or rigorous, and it is geared toward an unrealistic, conventional conflict against Israel in the open desert. Maintenance is also lax; Egyptian uniformed maintenance personnel have been observed performing their duties in open-toed sandals, as well as cleaning propeller bolts with gasoline. The success of the Egyptian Tank Plant—a joint Egypt–U.S. facility that produces the M1A1 Abrams tank—is overshadowed by the fact that of the 863 tanks produced so far, almost one-quarter have not been delivered to field units, much less used in training. The professionalism of commissioned and non-commissioned officers is also wanting, as a thoroughly-entrenched patronage system in the officer corps has resulted in less military capability today than in 1973. Perhaps most disturbing, the Egyptian military today seems to focus on making money. For example, acting and former military officers own water purification plants, toll roads, luxury hotel chains, and shopping centers.¹⁴

Still, the Egyptian military has shown itself capable of reform in the past, and it is worth asking if the post-Mubarak transition presages reform once again. Trends in Egyptian economic development

Egyptian military training is no longer regular or rigorous, and it is geared toward an unrealistic, conventional conflict against Israel in the open desert.

Because it generates extensive material and human capital and accustoms individuals to urban life, economic development is an important foundation for sustained military reform.

suggest that sustained military reform will become more likely in coming years, and if sustained military reform does occur in Egypt, it would behoove the U.S. to shape this reform as much as possible.

There are at least three reasons why economic development makes military reform more likely. First, a modern economy usually suggests a greater amount of wealth in society, wealth from which the state can draw to finance reforms.¹⁵ Second, as the economy develops, the level of urbanization also increases. Advancing urbanization makes military reform easier to institute. As one RAND study notes:

The general concomitants of urban industrial existence—the ability to work in organized teams with advanced equipment—outweigh the martially useful qualities generated in nomadic or rural societies—fierce loyalties, personal bravery.¹⁶

A third reason that economic development facilitates military reform is the accumulation of human capital. The modern battlefield requires educated officers and soldiers capable of solving complex problems, acting in conjunction with other arms, and working effectively on teams.¹⁷ Because it generates extensive material and human capital and accustoms individuals to urban life, economic development is an important foundation for sustained military reform.

Egypt did not have this foundation of economic modernism during its first attempt to reform the military under Muhammad Ali and had only just begun to modernize its economy by the time of the 1967 Six Day War. Egypt's nineteenth-century economy was saddled with an inefficient tax farming system and a dearth of investment in productive economic enterprises. Muhammad Ali's industrialization program drained the countryside of its inhabitants, instituted a wildly-inefficient system of monopolies, and increased taxes to the limit of the peasants' ability to pay. Egyptian factories also never ran at full capacity and suffered from a lack of mechanized power. An 1836–37 decline in world cotton prices sent Egypt's economic output tumbling, evidence that the economy relied too much on cotton and lacked a thorough division of labor. Egypt contracted so many international loans that in 1876 it declared bankruptcy. Urbanization in nineteenth-century Egypt also increased at nowhere near the rate it did in European cities. The Egyptian economy, in sum, could not support Muhammad Ali's ambitious reforms.¹⁸

By the time of the post-1967 military reforms, however, Egyptian economic modernization had gotten under way. From 1955 to 1967, agricultural production as a percentage of national output decreased from 32.3 percent to 27.5 percent, while industrial production increased from 17.6 percent to 28 percent. The percentage

of Egyptian workers employed in agriculture also decreased from 60 to 54 percent from 1950 to 1970, while in the same period the proportion of industrial workers increased from 12 to 19 percent. In 1966, Charles Issawi noted that since 1952 improvements in the transport system and reforms in land, monetary, fiscal, and tax policies had had a beneficial effect on the Egyptian economy. Furthermore, the middle class grew significantly from the 1920s on, and the number of manufacturing plants employing 10 or more persons increased from 95,000 in 1927 to 265,000 in 1954.¹⁹

Ultimately, however, this economic modernization was not enough to sustain continued reform in the Egyptian military. For example, capital investment in the military increased significantly only after the 1973 Yom Kippur War—Egypt spent \$2.2 billion on arms from 1955 to 1975, compared to \$6.6 billion from 1976 to 1981—due in part to U.S. military financing. On top of this, after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt reverted to the class-based conscription system that had been in place before the 1967 defeat, and military spending has not remained at a consistently high level. Much of this spending has also been focused on acquiring advanced weapons systems in what some observers call the “Jane’s Effect,” or the desire to make one’s military look good on paper.

Tremendous population growth has also diverted Egypt’s small economic surpluses away from the military to provide the most basic of services, and the Egyptian legal system does not favor small business development or the transfer of wealth from one generation to another. Egyptian economic modernization has not resulted in the accumulation of material capital necessary to underwrite sustained military reform, and if there has been an increase in aggregate human capital in Egyptian society, the military has not used it to implement reform.

However, there are some indications that this could change in coming years. The literacy rate in Egypt has increased from 57 to 72 percent in the last twenty years, and book sales have increased significantly. There has also been an increase in material capital—Egypt’s gross domestic product, share of world trade, and value of exports have gone up dramatically since the mid-1990s.²⁰ With a transition to a post-Mubarak regime in the offing, the next few years are a critical juncture and could provide the catalyst the military needs to reform the way it recruits and develops human capital, shifting spending from platform acquisitions to education and training. Egypt’s future economic development would provide the foundation for this effort. To withdraw security assistance from Egypt abruptly would deprive the U.S. of the opportunity to influence military reform in the future.

Egyptian economic modernization has not resulted in the accumulation of material capital necessary to underwrite sustained military reform...

The Positive Effects of U.S. Military Aid

American military aid to Egypt has already exerted a positive influence on Egyptian military development, which is the third reason to suggest that active inaction is a promising approach to security assistance in Egypt. While Egyptian military education and training do not appear to be rigorous and officer advancement depends more on personal connections than merit, an examination of IMET data provides three indications that the program is setting the stage for future military reform.

...IMET [International Military Education and Training] funding to Egypt has increased steadily over the years, especially since 1997.

The first indication is that IMET funding to Egypt has increased steadily over the years, especially since 1997 (see Figure 2). This suggests a U.S. commitment to education and training and a gradual increase in human capital in the Egyptian military, even if this capital has yet to be employed to its fullest extent. The support for reform is thus available for the Egyptian military to draw upon, if it chooses to do so.




Figure 2
Egyptian IMET Students by Program Type, 1979–2010

...Until 1998, only a fraction of Egyptian IMET students attended schools in the U.S. PME [Professional Military Education] system. Since then, about one-third of Egyptian IMET students have attended PME programs...

The second indication is a shift in emphasis towards professional military education (PME) beginning in 1998. This shift suggests that IMET program administrators have not sacrificed the professionalization of the Egyptian officer corps in order to train personnel on the billions of dollars' worth of U.S. equipment that Egypt acquires. This has been the case even as Egypt has had to use an increasing proportion of U.S. military aid to maintain the equipment it has already acquired. As Figure 2 indicates, until 1998 only a fraction of Egyptian IMET students attended schools in the U.S. PME system. Since then, about one-third of Egyptian

IMET students have attended PME programs as opposed to training programs. Since education tends to be more conducive to professionalization than training, this is a positive sign for the future professionalization of the Egyptian military.

The year 1998 marked another important shift in IMET funding to Egypt. Until 1998, no Egyptian officer sent to a U.S. PME program was from the Army, which makes up about three-fourths of the Egyptian Armed Forces. Since 1998, however, most of the increase in attendance at PME programs has been composed of Egyptian Army students (see Figure 3) who in 2010 outnumbered their Navy and Air Force counterparts by four to one. This shift began before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well, which suggests that it was not originally connected to concerns with terrorism.

Today, the proportion of IMET students from the Egyptian Army is commensurate with its size relative to the Egyptian Navy and Air Force. If the U.S. can translate this contact with students into future communication, then the prospects of influencing any future Egyptian military reform will be greater.

If the U.S. can translate [contact with Egyptian Army officers attending U.S. PME programs] into future communication, then the prospects of influencing any future Egyptian military reform will be greater.




Figure 3
Egyptian IMET Students by Service, 1979–2010

A third indication that the IMET program has had a positive effect on Egyptian military development is the increased time that Egyptian officers spend in U.S. PME programs (see Figure 4).

Until 2000, the average duration of PME programs for Egyptian IMET officers hovered around two or three weeks. Since then, however, this average has been four-and-a-half weeks or longer. Furthermore, this increase has come despite huge increases in the number of Egyptian officers attending basic- and junior-level PME courses, which tend to be of much shorter duration than senior-level courses, which typically last at least 42 weeks. In other words, enough Egyptian officers have attended senior-level PME courses since 2002 that the average course duration has increased. This

suggests that in the near future there may be substantially more Egyptian officers with whom U.S. officials can more easily interact.




Figure 4
Egyptian IMET Officers by Level,
with Average Course Duration, 1982-2010

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Egyptian officers' participation in the IMET program also contributed to the Egyptian Army's restraint during anti-Mubarak protests in early 2011.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Egyptian officers' participation in the IMET program also contributed to the Egyptian Army's restraint during anti-Mubarak protests in early 2011. Anti-regime protests began on a Tuesday and, apparently, the regime asked the regular Army to mobilize against the crowds the next day. However, it was not until the following Monday—five days after the regime made its mobilization request—that the regular Army deployed in Cairo. Until then, only Interior Ministry forces and Republican Guard units appear to have deployed to control the protesters. What is more, when ordered to fire on protesters, observers report that regular Army unit commanders refused, citing fears of mutiny. Egyptian military officers surely have not learned to refuse direct orders at U.S. military schools, but an environment of respect for human rights at these schools could have influenced the decision-making of Army officers at the time of the protests. The junior Egyptian Army officers that began attending U.S. military schools—such as the officer basic course—in 1998 would by early 2011 have been commanding battalions or serving on division and corps staffs, in positions to influence the decisions that led the regular Army to mobilize slowly and refuse to fire on anti-regime protesters. If Egyptian participation in the IMET program did indeed have such an effect, then sustaining this participation at a level that would avoid either a Congressional or an Egyptian backlash—as active inaction suggests—is an achievable goal.

Conclusion

Before deciding to reduce security assistance to Egypt or merely to continue it in its current form, U.S. policy makers should consider the active inaction approach. If current trends in Egypt—a perennial lack of access, a history of military reform, economic modernization, and Egyptian officer education in U.S. military schools—do result in military reform after the transition to a post-Mubarak Egypt, then a more fully-developed military-to-military relationship with Egypt could prove crucial to shaping the reform effort. A small cadre of interagency civilian Egypt hands to assist the staff of the U.S. military mission would facilitate this effort, but so would keeping security assistance at levels that would not draw the ire either of Congress or a new Egyptian government.

Developing the U.S.–Egypt military-to-military relationship is no guarantee of influence, but one thing is certain: if the U.S. drastically reduces its engagement with Egypt now, then its ability to influence future events will definitely be reduced, and the U.S. does not have very much influence in Egypt today. Now is the time to try a new idea, even if that idea—an interagency approach of active inaction—is only a subtle departure from current practice. **IAP**

Developing the U.S.–Egypt military-to-military relationship is no guarantee of influence, but one thing is certain: if the U.S. drastically reduces its engagement with Egypt now, then its ability to influence future events will definitely be reduced...

Endnotes

1. This research is based in part on interviews conducted in Egypt in June 2010; due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, these sources are not cited. See also Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, September 2, 2009; U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Egypt,” March 5, 2010, <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm>>, accessed on October 25, 2010; U.S. Department of Defense, Instruction 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance*, October 27, 2010, <<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500068p.pdf>>, accessed on November 2, 2010.
2. Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 2009, p. 2-2.
3. Field Manual 3-0.1, *Security Force Assistance*, p. 2.
4. Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962, p. 3.
5. Sam C. Sarkesian, “Professionalism, Military,” in Trevor N. Dupuy (ed.), *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia*, Brassey’s, Washington, 1993, p. 2196.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, Government Printing Office, Washington, 2006, Vol. 7, pp. 23–26. See also Thomas Dempsey, “Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform in Stability Operations: Lessons Learned and Best Practices,” U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center Webcast, January 8, 2010.
7. J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969; David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990; Khaled Fahmy, “The Nation and Its Deserters: Conscription in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt,” in Erik J. Zürcher (ed.), *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925*, I. B. Tauris, London, 1999. See also Hurewitz, pp. 30–31, who notes that Joseph Sève—a Frenchman who was known as Sulayman Aga in Egypt and who administered the Egyptian reform program—established a “staff college,” but its graduates were not nearly on a par with their European counterparts, nor is there other evidence of an Egyptian staff college before 1939, the year in which John Keegan, (ed.), *World Armies*, 2nd ed., Gale Research Company, Detroit, 1983, p.169, notes the establishment of an Army Staff College.
8. Charles Issawi, “The Economic Development of Egypt, 1800–1960,” in Charles Issawi (ed.) *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914: A Book of Readings*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966; Hurewitz; Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992. On the coding of military periodicals data, see Nathan W. Toronto, “Why War Is Not Enough: Military Defeat, the Division of Labor, and Military

Professionalization,” doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, 2007, pp. 29–54.

9. Eliezer Be’eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*, Frederick A. Praeger, London, 1969.

10. Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2004, p. 58. See also Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness,” doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1996.

11. Barnett, p. 125.

12. John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, Westview Press, Boulder, 2003, p. 313.

13. Barnett; Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness”; Lynn.

14. Max Rodenbeck, “After Mubarak,” *The Economist*, Vol. 396, No. 8691, July 17, 2010, pp. 15–16.

15. Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde, 1793–1939*, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1940; Daniel Lerner and L. W. Pevsner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, Free Press, New York, 1964; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992*, Blackwell, Cambridge, 1992; Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected Edition,” reprint, in Kathryn Sutherland (ed.), *Oxford World’s Classics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.

16. Anthony H. Pascal, Michael Kennedy, and Steven P. Rosen, “Men and Arms in the Middle East: The Human Factor in Military Modernization,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1979, p. 38. See also J. P. Gibbs and W. T. Martin, “Urbanization, Technology, and the Division of Labor: International Patterns,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 5, October 1962, pp. 667–677; Anthony H. Pascal, “Are Third World Armies Third Rate? Human Capital and Organizational Impediments to Military Effectiveness,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1980.

17. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, Free Press, New York, 1964; Max Weber, “The Three Types of Legitimate Domination,” in Richard Swedberg (ed.), *Essays in Economic Sociology*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999; Stephen D. Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004.

18. Charles Issawi, “Economic Development of Egypt” and “Economic Change and Urbanization in the Middle East,” in Ira M. Lepidus (ed.), *Middle Eastern Cities: A Symposium on Ancient, Islamic, and Contemporary Middle Eastern Urbanism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979; Hurewitz; Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914*, Methuen, London, 1981; Fahmy.

19. Charles Issawi, "Comment on 'Beginnings of Industrialization, 1916,' Commission for Commerce and Industry," in Charles Issawi (ed.) *Book of Readings*; Issawi, "Economic Development of Egypt"; Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982; Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1990; Barnett; Brian R. Mitchell (ed.), *International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750–2000*, 4th ed., Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003.
20. Max Rodenbeck, "A Favoured Spot," *The Economist*, Vol. 396, No. 8691, July 17, 2010, pp. 7–10.

InterAgency Paper Series

The *InterAgency Paper (IAP)* series is published by the Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation. A work selected for publication as an *IAP* represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the Simons Center editorial board, will contribute to a better understand of a particular national security issue involving the cooperation, collaboration, and coordination between governmental departments, agencies, and offices.

Publication of an occasional *InterAgency Paper* does not indicate that the Simons Center agrees with the content or position of the author, but does suggest that the Center believes the paper will stimulate the thinking and discourse concerning important interagency security issues.

Contributions: The Simons Center encourages the submission of original papers based on research from primary sources or which stem from lessons learned via personal experiences. For additional information see “Simons Center Writers Submission Guidelines” on the Simons Center website at www.TheSimonsCenter.org/publications.

About the Simons Center

The Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation is a major component of the Command and General Staff College Foundation. The Center’s mission is to foster and develop an interagency body of knowledge to enhance education at the U.S. Army CGSC while facilitating broader and more effective cooperation within the U.S. government at the operational and tactical levels through study, research, analysis, publication, and outreach.

About the CGSC Foundation

The Command and General Staff College Foundation, Inc., was established on December 28, 2005 as a tax-exempt, non-profit educational foundation that provides resources and support to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the development of tomorrow’s military leaders. The CGSC Foundation helps to advance the profession of military art and science by promoting the welfare and enhancing the prestigious educational programs of the CGSC. The CGSC Foundation supports the College’s many areas of focus by providing financial and research support for major programs such as the Simons Center, symposia, conferences, and lectures, as well as funding and organizing community outreach activities that help connect the American public to their Army. All Simons Center works are published by the “CGSC Foundation Press.”

Col. Arthur D. Simons Center
655 Biddle Blvd., PO Box 3429
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
ph: 913-682-7244
www.TheSimonsCenter.org



CGSC Foundation Press
100 Stimson Avenue, Suite 1149
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
ph: 913-651-0624
www.cgscfoundation.org