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The Need for Interagency Reform:

Congressional Perspective and Efforts

by Geoffrey C. Davis and John F. Tierney

The dynamic and unpredictable nature of national security in the twenty-first century involves a broad array of challenges that defy traditional tactics.

An overhaul of our interagency operations is critical for our country’s national security. Interagency operations are operations conducted by two or more federal departments or agencies in support of our nation’s national security mission.

To improve interagency coordination and eliminate barriers that impede improved operations, we introduced the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011.

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-CT), Ranking Member Susan Collins (R-ME), and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management Daniel Akaka (D-HI) introduced a companion bill in the Senate.

The State of Interagency Operations Today

The reality is that our country’s national security interagency process is hamstrung and broken. There are regulatory, budgetary, legislative, bureaucratic, and cultural impediments to effective interagency operations.

These problems are independent of personalities, party affiliation, and presidential administrations. Our contemporary interagency system was devised over sixty years ago for a different era when national security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by the Department of Defense in overseas missions. At the time, major combat operations and nuclear deterrence were the principal areas of focus of U.S. national security strategy. This approach

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enshrined the belief that national security was almost exclusively a function of the Departments of Defense and State and the intelligence community.

The historical development of our approach to executing our national security objectives has created a mismatch of authorities, capabilities, and focus. These challenges have impeded a synchronized, whole-of-government effort in dealing with the full range of contemporary, national security problems.

A specific example of these interrelated problems occurred during the early days of U.S. military operations in Iraq. The fact that U.S. military forces in Iraq learned of the unilateral disbandment of the Iraqi Army—the cornerstone of all U.S. security planning—through a cable news report is indicative of the disconnect between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the U.S. military command. The contentious relationship between the senior civilian official (Paul Bremer) and the senior U.S. military commander (Lieutenant General Sanchez) added to the lack of unity.

Also contributing to the problem is the dearth of widespread, effective training and education programs that would enable government personnel (civilian and military) to break out of agency stovepipes and seek better coordinated and more cost-effective interagency solutions.

Agency Collaboration and Soft Power to Address New Challenges

Since the end of the Cold War, national security challenges have included global interdependence, weakened Cold War alliances, influential sub-state and non-state actors, increasing resistance to diplomatic pressure, and new biological and cyber threats.

Addressing the expanded scope of constantly evolving national security issues requires a correspondingly wider range of highly integrated and carefully calibrated operations that not one individual agency can provide. Doing so effectively requires the application of non-military or “soft” power.

Executive departments, such as Agriculture, Commerce, Education, and Transportation, have not been viewed as necessary contributors to national security or interagency operations in the past. Non-security agencies themselves may not be conscious of or prepared to act in their national security roles, and the cultures of these organizations provide little incentives for staff to participate in national security missions. Further, even if they have the desire to assist, they can be prevented from doing so by a lack of resources or education and training. For example, when departments and agencies were reluctant to contribute personnel to the CPA, the CPA was forced to operate throughout its tenure with approximately two-thirds of its required personnel.

In order for our country to confront the wide array of complex national security threats and issues, agencies and departments must act in a more highly-synchronized and collaborative manner at all stages from initial planning through implementation and ongoing operations.

Executing our national security strategy can be dangerous and produce erratic outcomes when agencies and departments fail to collaborate. For example, the head of the CPA in Iraq Paul Bremer did not want to be
slowed by the interagency process. CPA staff was instructed not to respond to requests for information from other departments or agencies. State Department employees detailed to the CPA had to operate via Hotmail e-mail accounts to receive backchannel communications, and National Security Advisor senior deputies learned of Bremer’s orders via the CPA website.

Another example of how ineffective agency collaboration can slow or even detrimentally impact our national security operations is illustrated in the early days of our military operations in Iraq. Ensuring that the Iraqi Army had the required number of personnel for combat operations was a high priority for U.S. forces advising and assisting the Iraqis. Unfortunately, because there was no modern banking system in Iraq, Iraqi soldiers could only be paid in cash, which required them to spend days away from their units while taking money home to their families.

During this period, the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicated that, if given the go-ahead, he was prepared to help Iraq establish a modern banking system which would have, among other things, enabled Iraqi soldiers to send pay home without having to leave their units and on-going combat operations. The Deputy Secretary’s proposal was not implemented because the Department of the Treasury was not tapped to conduct overseas national security operations with other agencies of the federal government. Over the years, this problem has been largely solved. However, if the Department of the Treasury had been properly involved early-on, the problem could have been solved sooner, thereby contributing to increased Iraqi combat power and lightening the burden on U.S. forces during one of the most difficult periods of our military presence in Iraq.

The State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) released in 2010 recognized the potential contributions of many different agencies to meet foreign policy objectives but observed that their efforts “can be more unified, more focused, and more efficient.” While it is important that agencies acknowledge this need, Congress must also act to ensure departments and agencies take needed steps much like it did in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 takes needed steps to satisfy some of GAO’s important recommendations and to reform our stove-piped interagency operations.

The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act

In 2009, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a comprehensive report on the actions required to enhance interagency collaboration for national security activities. The GAO report included the following key recommendations: the development and implementation of overarching strategies; the creation of collaborative organizations; the development of a well-trained workforce; and the sharing and integrating of national security information across agencies.

The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (the “Rotation Act”) (H.R. 2314 in the House and S. 1268 in the Senate) takes needed steps to satisfy some of GAO’s important recommendations and to reform our stove-piped interagency operations. This legislation would accomplish three primary objectives to facilitate greater collaboration and professional development of federal agency personnel.
involved in national security.

First, the Rotation Act establishes a rotational program for federal agency employees with roles in national security. The bill provides for the creation of a framework of “interagency communities of interest” (ICIs). The ICIs span multiple agencies within which the Executive Branch should operate on a more integrated basis. By establishing a rotational program that includes “soft power” agencies with more traditional national security agencies, the Rotations Act takes the important first steps necessary to remove the cultural barriers to successful interagency operations.

To facilitate the establishment of this rotation program, the bill creates a Committee on National Security Personnel (the “Committee”) within the Executive Office of the President. The Committee is under the chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, includes the National Security Advisor and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management and is supported by a board including senior-level officials from participating agencies. The Committee will issue directives and set standards for implementation of the interagency rotation system.

The Committee would also designate the substantive ICI categories—functional or regional—while individual agencies would determine which of their positions belongs to each ICI. The use of communities as distinct subsets of a broader program derives from a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review recommendation. By narrowing the scope into these subsets, we seek to ensure relevant personnel rotate to like positions. For example, positions relating to information technology and engineering may be included, such as within an ICI covering cybersecurity.

Second, the Rotation Act also requires employees serving in ICI positions to participate in training and education in an effort to further break down the cultural hurdles interagency operations face. The training and education component will allow individuals in ICI positions to further develop an understanding of national security and homeland security strategy; the importance of interagency integration for accomplishing national security and homeland security objectives; the roles, functions, authorities, cultures, and resources of agencies involved in the applicable ICI; and practical skills and strategies for ensuring maximum interagency cohesion.

Lastly, the Rotation Act is designed to address the lack of incentives available to national security personnel to participate in interagency operations. The Rotation Act mandates that when hiring Senior Executive Service or equivalent positions with national security responsibilities agencies give strong preference to personnel who have completed interagency rotations. Additionally, the legislation requires agencies to identify additional incentives for participants.

Implementation of the Rotation Act would provide the opportunity for all agency employees with a role in executing our national security strategy the incentives, education and training, and ability to participate in an effective rotation program. Through this legislation, these personnel will be able to more effectively participate in the planning and execution of national security interagency operations when the need arises.
**Conclusion**

A successfully integrated interagency process will empower the U.S. to more effectively deploy our non-military instruments of power abroad. This ability will allow the U.S. to more successfully fulfill its interests while reserving the use of lethal military force as a last resort.

The Rotation Act is an important first step, but, it is only a first step. Further action by Congress and the Administration is needed to achieve effective interagency operations and develop a comprehensive cadre of national security professionals.
Implementing the QDDR

by Edward Marks and Christopher Lamb

The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) was an attempt to do for the Department of State what the Quadrennial Defense Review was supposed to do for the Department of Defense (DoD): provide a comprehensive plan to “improve the efficiency and effectiveness of State and USAID [United States Agency for International Development] in delivering results for the American taxpayer, by modernizing their capabilities and aligning their efforts as core pillars of America’s civilian power.” The phrase “aligning their efforts as core pillars of America’s civilian power” is particularly important because the QDDR begins with the flat statement that to advance American interests and values in the twenty-first century, “we must lead through civilian power.”

Although clearly a strategic policy document, the QDDR includes significant content related to organizational questions that have important implications for operational matters and specifically for inter-agency cooperation. As the report emphasizes, the international environment in the twenty-first century requires that “diplomacy and development must be mutually reinforcing,” since responding to global challenges requires, among other things, “embracing the contributions of all U.S. agencies operating overseas and coordinating their efforts in-country.” Although not mentioned specifically, the clear implication is that the DoD and military programs are included in this overall, strategic vision.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched the QDDR in mid-2010, and it covers reforms already underway at State as well as new recommendations. Implementation will obviously take time, and the QDDR is viewed as an ongoing commitment to “review, right-size and institutionalize
In other words, it will be a quadrennial exercise at State and USAID. The current atmosphere in Washington and in the country appears unreceptive to reform—at least reform that requires any increased expenditures. As American Foreign Service Association President Susan Johnson noted in a recent report: “Prospects for growth, either in personnel or pay, are virtually nil, retarding implementation of Diplomacy 3.0 and the QDDR.” The current mood in Congress probably precludes, at least for the moment, organizational changes that require legislative action as well, even if additional resources are not required.

Still, the reorganization proposed in the QDDR is not massive and appears to be designed to create minimal disruptions. Surely some of the changes can be implemented without making changes to statutory organizations and positions. The new organization chart in the QDDR, for instance, shows no changes to the formal relationship between State and USAID. Several organizations have been renamed and some reshuffling has occurred. The recently re-empowered Under Secretary (U/S) of Global Affairs is renamed the U/S for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and regains oversight of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. In addition the U/S gains oversight of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS). This move may represent a demotion in the reporting chain; the Coordinator has never really had the advantages of an “S” or Secretary-level office designation, so this could provide greater integration with the Department through more consistent oversight at the U/S level. S/CRS was designed to address interagency collaboration issues on behalf of the Secretary; however, unlike other coordination offices (e.g., counterterrorism), it is now buried where its mandate will not be as clear.

Therefore, despite the unwelcome environment into which the QDDR was delivered, some implementation is possible and the doable is being pursued. The Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources and the USAID Administrator were specifically directed to oversee implementation and were provided with additional staff to do so. They see reform and reorganization as ongoing processes. Some reforms are already complete and others are underway. The QDDR specifically notes the long-term character of reform and states that the Department will ask Congress to mandate a review every four years, as it has done for the Department of Defense.

Of the proposed reforms, we were most interested in those touching on the role of the Chief of Mission (COM). Our recently published study on the same subject, “Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration” is unconstrained by the need for consensus, is more free-wheeling, and offers more radical recommendations than those in the QDDR. Nevertheless, we believe the research may be useful now for implementing some elements of the QDDR and for providing thoughts on future reforms when the environment is more favorable.

The QDDR notes the need to “empower and hold accountable Chiefs of Mission as Chief Executive Officers of interagency missions.” This item is interesting in that it does not really propose anything new either in organization or authority. After all, since the days of President Truman, COMs have always been empowered to serve as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
mission to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander).” The President’s representative, the COM, commonly an ambassador, is supposed to direct and supervise all activities in country and coordinate the resources and programs of the U.S. government through the country team, with the exception of employees under the command of a United States area military commander and other exceptions consistent with existing statutes and authorities.

Another way of putting it is that, under this authority, an ambassador is supposed to perform the role of the CEO of a multi-agency mission. As the QDDR points out, “the best ambassadors play that role effectively.” However, it is no secret that the executive authority of ambassadors as COMs has often been challenged and restricted in the interplay of bureaucratic competition and policy debate; hence the perceived need to recommend in the QDDR and elsewhere that COMs should be “empowered”. The clear objective of the QDDR reforms in this area, therefore, is to turn sometime effectiveness into something more robust and persistent. Too often reorganization in bureaucracies is dismissed as mere relabeling and rearranging organizational boxes. In this case, given the central role of ambassadors and embassies in the conduct of foreign affairs, a better analogy might be strengthening the lines of authority between the boxes.

With respect to this interest in enhancing this leadership and management function in the State Department, we see three “levels” of reform that offer promise:

1. Reinvigorating the existing authority of COMs.
2. Exporting the COM authority in the crisis management area.
3. Exporting the COM authority into the headquarters operations of the State Department itself.

The first reform option is not mentioned specifically in the QDDR but is implied:

To build an effective partnership with their host country and advance America’s interests and values, these U.S. civilians on the ground will often have to work as a seamless team, bringing their unique strengths to bear and adapting together to fast-changing circumstances on the ground….We can work smarter and better by setting clear priorities, managing for results, holding ourselves accountable, and unifying our efforts….That is only possible if the Chief of Mission is empowered to direct and supervise these efforts.

While the statutory authority for COMs would appear to be clear, practice has shown that it is not. Empowering COMs in the way called for in the QDDR will require expanded
support from the National Security Council and other agencies to ensure that U.S. government personnel understand and internalize their accountability to the COM and clarify the reporting structures for all U.S. civilians in-country. Numerous studies of American embassies, such as Ambassador Robert Oakley’s classic study, discuss these and other largely management initiatives that would strengthen an ambassador’s effective managerial authority.

The QDDR also calls for COMs to engage directly in high-level policymaking in Washington, DC. This is a bit more “radical”; although, it reflects what has always been the mark of successful ambassadors in the past. The QDDR’s discussion of this subject is worth repeating:

In order for our Chiefs of Mission to direct and coordinate the interagency in the field, they must not only drive the Country Team on the ground, but also be more effectively engaged in interagency decision-making in Washington. By participating in this process, Chiefs of Mission can more effectively understand, support, and balance the goals and objectives of all agencies represented at post. Moreover, our Chiefs of Mission in the field have an invaluable wealth of information and deep understanding of their countries that can inform and assist interagency decision-making in Washington. To give Chiefs of Mission the voice they need in Washington and to draw on their knowledge and perspective, Chiefs of Mission will be invited to participate via secure telecommunications in Deputies Committee Meetings in Washington at the discretion of the National Security Staff.

This proposal in the QDDR not only describes an expanded role for ambassadors, but discusses some of the necessary technical communication improvements needed to achieve the objective.

While admirable, this proposed change could be even more dramatic in response to the contemporary world. Serving ambassadors are generally the most senior U.S. government officials occupied full-time on the portfolio of problems and programs associated with their country of assignment. They are the only U. S. government officials with standing interagency executive authority (albeit limited to in-country personnel and operations), based on statute as well as specific Presidential designation.

Utilizing modern communication technology, the QDDR is already proposing an expanded role for ambassadors in the Washington arena. Modern technology can diminish, if not eliminate, the organizational and geographic distinctions between headquarters and the field. Why not go all the way and eliminate the organizational distinction between headquarters and the field and allow ambassadors/COMs to serve as their own “country directors?” Ambassadors/COMs who also serve as country directors could then participate directly in Washington decision-making. In an unofficial and informal manner, this approach has often been practiced in the past and, no doubt, is being practiced by some ambassadors today. However, we wonder whether this occasional practice should not be made the standard operational mode of the new State Department.

The second category of reform is more ambitious and may require legislative action.
Involving COMs more directly in Washington decision-making, as just proposed, should strengthen interagency cooperation on a day-to-day bilateral basis. However, the regional character of a particular contingency or the introduction of large numbers of military personnel and resources from the regional combatant command presents challenges that sometime exceed the management capability of the resident ambassador. According to a Center for Strategic & International Studies report on smart power, there is a need to reorganize and re-equip the Executive Branch to implement multi-faceted tasks, such as economic development, contingency planning, and post-conflict reconstruction as the civilian agencies, as currently constituted, lack the resources and expertise to undertake these tasks. As a result, the recourse is to turn to the military services by default, if not by Presidential decision. Therefore, the State Department should give some thought to filling this authority/management gap.

One possible remedy would be to extend the authority to permit mission-specific, COM appointments. These appointments might include emergency situations where the problem involves more than one country, a country with no assigned COM, or a resident COM who just does not have the special skills or credentials required to respond to the situation. In some cases, this mission-specific COM might or could work under the existing country COM (e.g., response to Japanese earthquake and nuclear crisis). The augmenting COM would handle the special circumstances under the supervision of the existing COM, but with authority for integrating interagency efforts for that particular emergency. In other cases, particularly where problems transcend one country’s boundaries, the augmenting COM would report directly to the State Department (e.g., matters involving piracy in the Arabian Sea). In all such cases, the key would be to carefully define the scope of the mission and reporting chain.

Implementing this type of broad, cross-agency executive authority might require new Congressional authority. However, staying strictly within the bureaucratic boundaries of the State Department and USAID outlined in the QDDR, it might be feasible to invoke the [Chief of Mission] concept and implement it in missions conducted within those boundaries. Even military personnel and resources could conceivably be included under this “mission-specific COM” arrangement if those resources were assigned – or “chopped” in military speech – to the mission in much the same way as defense attaches and military assistance personnel are assigned.

The third category of reform is much more radical and moves way out beyond the boundaries of the QDDR. Still, it involves a concept and perspective that follows the logic of the QDDR and might be usefully mentioned, if only for future consideration. This approach would be to “export” the COM authority back into the headquarters organization of the Department of State and specifically grant it to the key management levels: the secretary and the regional assistant secretaries. With this authority, the State Department could provide for integrated management and direction of all U.S. government civilian and political-military international operations. Thus empowered,
regional assistant secretaries would provide a middle level to the chain of command to ensure that policy and resources are integrated and coordinated at the policy level and then flow down to country teams, rather than going directly through discrete bureaucratic and authority stovepipes. This arrangement would alleviate, if not eliminate, the current organizational competition at the country level.  

A regional assistant secretary’s COM authority would not extend to combatant commanders or their assigned forces in combat operations or other Title 10 missions assigned by the National Command Authority, the same limitation that ambassadors/COM have with respect to their country of assignment. However, while the combatant commands would continue to prepare and review war plans through the existing military chain of command, the regional assistant secretaries would assist the combatant commanders in developing the pre- and post-conflict phases (Phase 0 and Phase IV) of their war plans and theater security cooperation plans. Thus, the regional assistant secretaries would fulfill the long expressed desire of the DoD for an effective counterpart to their geographic commanders. Having a close relationship between the relevant combatant commander and the regional assistant secretaries would ensure a strong relationship between peacetime engagement and the deterrence and preservation of a stable, steady-state situation in the regions.  

An operational chain of command to manage field operations would therefore extend from the secretary, through regional assistant secretaries, to COMs. This clear chain of command—President, secretary, and regional assistant secretaries—would replicate at each level the authority and role that Chiefs of Mission are responsible for exercising in their country teams. During crisis responses to countries where no U.S. mission presence exists, the head of the deployed U.S. government team (whether civilian or military) will be equipped with COM authority and would therefore be able to operate as a single “mission manager,” unlike the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq which was deployed only under DoD authority.  

The regional under/assistant secretaries (actual level of title to be determined as part of the restructuring) would have primary responsibility for integrating all federal operations and implementation within their areas of responsibility, with the exception of military forces engaged in active operations. As the designated head of a designated interagency team of responsible department and agency officials—a Washington-based, virtual interagency team—they would be responsible for producing integrated regional strategies and review and approve all department and agency plans that drive activity and resource allocations. Country team plans (strategic mission plans), DoD security cooperation plans, and foreign assistance plans would be prepared and submitted to these regional “COMs” and the virtual regional team for approval and integration. This would provide a clear line of communications and command during crisis response as well as normal, steady-state operations, from the top field commanders (military and civilian) up through the operational and strategic levels in Washington.  

In sum, the whole Department of State would be organized as a “national team” where in addition to informal coordination at all levels, policy and resource integration would take place at three formally-designated levels: secretarial or cabinet level; regional assistant secretary level; and country team level (also, for emergencies, in special mission teams).  

Obviously not all of these proposed reforms can be implemented rapidly, even if there were the requisite political and congressional interest and approval. However, they do constitute a spectrum of possible reform, with each point on the spectrum worthwhile on its own account, while at the same time opening the way to
further reform in the future. If the QDDR is to avoid the usual fate of blue-ribbon organizational reviews—filed away for the interest of historians—then some movement is required. As the QDDR states: “Ultimately, however the reforms and recommendations presented in the QDDR are only as good as their implementation.”

Notes


A few months ago I was able to sit down with ex-President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe. We discussed how his Democratic Security plan had vastly improved citizen security and, in the process, become a model (or at least a menu) for other countries confronted with a plethora of violent and armed non-state actors. His was a citizen-centric, top-down model that had at its core an interagency-oriented, whole-of-government strategy. Both military and civilian officials were held directly accountable for results. While there were proven abuses (and prosecutions in the courts) of a few in his government, his most ardent critics concede that these excesses should not take away from his accomplishments on providing basic security to his fellow Colombians.

After eight years as President, Alvaro Uribe was still the most popular politician in Colombia, leaving office in August of 2010 with an approval rating of 72 percent. There is little debate that during his two terms he did more to improve the lives of Colombians than any President that preceded him. He made Colombians believe in themselves and re-defined how government serves the people. He put the Colombian people at the center of an effective security plan and transformed the security forces into the most effective fighting force in Latin America. His chief of police was named the top cop in the world, his Minister of Defense became the next President, others from his team have gone on to head the Inter-American Development Bank, occupy the top ranks of international organizations, and become highly-sought-after experts on the new holistic approach to security and development. His successes prompted counterinsurgency experts from around the world to examine how his Democratic Security plan could be applied in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere.

With his frenetic governing style and an obsession to personally touch all Colombians, he dominated the airwaves for the greater part of a decade. Throughout his presidency, he was everywhere, leading grass-roots meetings in hundreds of towns and villages, engaging business
As much as [Uribe] was beloved, he made enemies. He would publicly challenge anybody who disagreed or even questioned his policies. He angered political elites, while delighting the common man.

As much as he was beloved, he made enemies. He would publicly challenge anybody who disagreed or even questioned his policies. He angered political elites, while delighting the common man. Many still regard these public displays as indicative of a callousness and low regard for dissident voices, but the vast majority of Colombians came to see him as their singular advocate. He reduced the size of government and drove those bureaucrats that remained relentlessly. Typically working 20-hour days, he expected the same from all others in government. Those working in close proximity to him seemed to always have that glazed-over look of the sleep-deprived.

When he told me that he felt “anguish, pain, and impotence when I do not achieve results,” I wanted to know why. He deflected introspective questions as “too deep” or not relevant to what remained to be done for Colombians. He did open up about his family. Some of his earliest memories from the late 1950s are of accompanying his mother, a women’s rights activist, to rallies. At home, his father combined a strong sense of patriotism and civic responsibility with hard work and high standards for his sons. “When I lost my father it was very tough for me; I cried. Now that I have lived longer than he, I think about the other hundreds of thousands of Colombian families that had to bury a loved one murdered in that senseless violence.”

His father Alberto Uribe Sierra was a highly-respected cattle and horse breeder. An outgoing and generous man, he was also known as a tough dealmaker. His kids revered him. His pronouncements were never open for discussion. He said, “We are not going back to the Guacharacas” (a family ranch), and that was final. Because of this, his son Santiago thought it strange that not more than three weeks later his father called to say that he was going back to the ranch and wanted Santiago to go with him. The shooting started shortly after the helicopter landed. Alberto spotted some of the dozen or so armed, fatigue-clad fighters moving toward the house. He immediately leapt to his feet, drew his pistol, and fired. With bullets flying, he fled into the house and returned fire from the kitchen.

The police communiqué was terse, “Alberto Uribe Sierra was assassinated by the Fifth Front of the FARC on June 14, 1983 while resisting a kidnapping attempt.” The family was devastated but not surprised. Their father had always said, “I will die before ever being kidnapped.”

Alberto’s oldest son Alvaro had already entered politics. Named by President Betancur to head the Department of Antioquia Peace Commission, Alvaro had been directing efforts to achieve peace with the guerrilla groups in the region when his father was killed. “My father was never an exploitive landowner. He was a generous man. He never had run-ins with peasants or landowners. In fact, he turned over
land to squatters when he bought Guacharacas.”

The family nightmare did not end there. Over the next twelve years, workers were killed and cattle stolen. Then in 1995 when Alvaro became Governor of Antioquia, the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) guerrilla group burned Guacharacas to the ground.

The 1980s was a lawless period in the departmental capital Medellin. Guerrilla groups were rampaging through the countryside, and violence was spreading throughout the country. It was the Medellin Cartel whose influence was much greater than the departmental government. The Cartel’s social programs built housing for the poor and lit soccer fields for night play. It ran an airline of 55 planes. The Cartel was at its peak of power and influence. The Cartel supplied about 80 percent of the cocaine reaching the U.S. with an estimated eight billion dollars in annual revenue. The “Cocaine Wars” in South Florida were in full-swing. In 1983, kingpin Pablo Escobar’s net worth was calculated at two billion dollars.

By the early 1980s, the Cartel had killed over 30 Colombian judges, a cabinet minister, the director of the second-largest newspaper in the country, and hundreds of police agents and informants. It was enough for the Cartel to send miniature coffins to judges, investigators, and prosecutors to have them recuse themselves and hand the cases to others. In 1982, a group calling itself MAS (“Death to Kidnappers” in Spanish) appeared. Boasting of substantial resources and having already “contracted” ten gunmen to go after kidnappers, MAS was a creation of the cartels. Importantly, historians trace the beginnings of the private armies (the paramilitaries) to MAS. Since landowners could not rely on the police, they were going to take matters into their own hands. This was the “neighborhood” in which Alvaro spent his early professional years.

In August 2002, Alvaro was sworn in as President of the Republic. The security issues had been the axis around which he won the election. He promised to get tough with FARC, ELN, the paramilitaries, and all the armed groups plaguing the country, employing a strategy first used in Antioquia called “Democratic Security.” The strategy had shown modest gains in the Department, but what appealed to the electorate most was the promise of reversing the losses of large swatches of the country that had fallen under the control of the guerrillas; an erosion that had only accelerated during the fours years of the previous President. Literally, two-thirds of the country was outside of government control.

To embarrass the President-elect in front of the nation and the international community and to show what it thought of “Democratic Security,” FARC launched a series of attacks around the country to coincide with his inauguration. While 20,000 soldiers and police stood by guarding the presidential ceremony, mortar rounds rained down in an adjacent poor neighborhood, killing 26 people.

Uribe acted decisively. Within minutes of taking office, he convened his Security Council literally on the steps of the presidential palace. He directed the police and military to launch Plan Meteor to take control of the country’s major transportation arteries. Looking back, Uribe told me that he was indeed surprised by the timing and audacity of the attack; however, he had to do everything he could at that moment to

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By the early 1980s, the Cartel had killed over 30 Colombian judges, a cabinet minister, the director of the second-largest newspaper in the country, and hundreds of police agents and informants.
show Colombians he would not be intimidated. The country would mourn its losses but never surrender. It was payback time; a response that would be repeated with each FARC provocation, like its bombing of the popular Club El Nogal in Bogota and the assassination of the Governor of Antioquia.

The country was in a sorry state. President Pastrana had spent the previous four years in failed attempts to negotiate with the guerrillas, even giving them a safe haven the size of Connecticut in a good-faith effort to get peace talks started. All the while FARC forcibly recruited (increasing its size by about 50 percent to 20,000 fighters) and built a war chest. Armed groups (FARC, ELN, AUC, paramilitary armies, and Cartel gunmen) roamed freely in two thirds of the country. Surface traffic between cities all but ceased; 190 municipal buildings had been destroyed. Massing over 1,000 fighters, FARC had overrun three military bases in the southeastern part of the country. In one such battle, Colombian soldiers were forced to flee into Brazil. Homicides reached almost 30,000 and reported kidnapping over 3,000 per year. The Colombian State was failing.

Proud Colombians were leaving the country. The daily line at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota for visas out of the country wound around the block; this with a six-month wait for an appointment. There was no relief in sight. At the end of 2001, FARC income from kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking was estimated to be in the $260–$290 million-per-year range.

However, an even more onerous problem loomed just over the horizon. The annual coca “crop report” of Colombia conducted by U.S. intelligence agencies detected a huge 300 percent increase in areas under cultivation. The new plantings would soon start to yield, and FARC alone would have an annual budget of close to one billion dollars, well in excess of the combined budget for the police and military. This had been the unforeseen turn of events (balloon effect) of successful U.S. efforts with Peru and Bolivia that substantially reduced coca cultivation in those countries. The U.S. and its partners had squeezed the balloon there and it popped out in southeastern Colombia.

If Pastrana had been the “Peace President,” Uribe was elected to wage war, to pull the country back from the precipice of state failure. Few politicians in Colombia could speak as authoritatively about security as he. His Plan Meteor was directed at securing the nation’s roadways and going after the money. Roadways had become the sites for guerrilla shakedowns, kidnappings, and carjacking. Besides patrolling along the highways, the military and police would rapidly deploy to target areas, largely based on cell phone calls from motorists. Once on the scene, they would attack and pursue the guerrillas into the countryside. Uribe directed each operational detail.

Over the longer term, Uribe knew the only way security would be sustainable was to convince those living in guerrilla and paramilitary-infested regions that the government cared about their welfare, was there to stay, and could be trusted.

Over the longer term, Uribe knew the only way security would be sustainable was to convince those living in guerrilla and paramilitary-infested regions that the government cared about their welfare, was there to stay, and could be trusted. Success or failure would revolve around developing this trust between the local population and government security and civilian officials. The common practice of previous governments and security forces in Colombia had been to treat...
Uribe’s Democratic Security policy would become the central pillar around which Colombia would secure its national territory. Its central premise was that armed groups do not make the government weak; state weakness enabled these groups to grow and prosper. It was not enough to chase bad actors; there had to be no place to hide, and this is where the locals came in. The essential elements of Democratic Security were not unique to Colombia. They were: 1) sustain the protection of local populations; 2) reconstitute basic services and make local delivery systems more efficient; 3) vigorously target revenue from the drug trade, which was the source of terrorism, corruption, and crime, and; 4) consolidate state control and thereby deny sanctuary to perpetrators of violence. These elements were straight out of the 40-year counterinsurgency playbook. What was unique was not the “what,” but the “how.” Uribe directed that Colombia’s strategic locales be identified and that a whole-of-government approach (civilian agencies working together with the police and military) surge efforts to win these strategic villages and towns back. From these footholds, the government would drill further down to consolidate the region and create a network of informants in every corner of the country.

Uribe conducted televised, open, town hall meetings in each strategic village. As he explained, “Security requires that the President maintain a macro perspective but operate at the micro level. The people must see sincere, committed, and persistent leadership. The President makes this easier.”

The first sessions would last for the better part of a day. People feared reprisals for speaking out. Eventually they would speak but mostly to vent: “Where was the government when my son/daughter was kidnapped?” “My husband was taken away and tortured by soldiers.” “Army officers were colluding with paramilitaries.” “Where was the government then, and why should we believe you now?” Uribe would accept responsibility for past abuse and abandonment, explaining that rather than placing any blame on guerrillas, paramilitaries, and assorted bad actors in their midst, it was the government who had failed them. It was the government’s responsibility to provide security, and it had not done so. He was here now primarily to listen, to construct a common agenda, and to provide services the people wanted and deserved.

Uribe wanted to know what the government could do in partnership with the local community to make it safer, healthier, better educated, and employed. For those that doubted his sincerity, he urged them to judge him on what will be done, not just on his words. As Uribe explained, “It’s all about developing trust with these communities.” Subsequent sessions would start and end with a review of the local
By 2011 U.S. funding of Plan Colombia had reached $11 billion. While appreciative, Uribe believed that village beneficiaries of this assistance should see their own government behind it. He directed that the logos and markings from the U.S. (and other donors) be removed from crates and boxes before being turned over to beneficiaries.

progress on the action plan, or complain about a lack of interagency cooperation. The official in question would be called on the spot to address the discrepancy on national television to both the President and the community. This was a powerful incentive for security and social services personnel to coordinate their actions, stay in close touch with locals, and work through problems together. It had the added benefit of demonstrating to each person in attendance and every Colombian watching on TV that the President meant what he said, and that every member of his team was accountable to him and the community in which they served.

Every Saturday, Sunday, and Monday were dedicated to such visits. Uribe would even give his personal telephone number out to local leaders, and they called him. He explained, “The officer either got with the program or was replaced.” His private dressing downs of officials afterward left no doubt that he wanted crystal-clear assessments of progress.

During his two terms, Uribe was assisted by U.S. Plan Colombia funds. In the initial years, these monies were heavily weighted toward military equipment and training, but subsequently more and more were directed toward generating employment through public works projects, food and shelter for displaced persons, crop substitution, training of judges and prosecutors, construction of court houses, human rights training, protection of labor union leaders, and so called “soft” elements of Democratic Security. By 2011 U.S. funding of Plan Colombia had reached $11 billion. While appreciative, Uribe believed that village beneficiaries of this assistance should see their own government behind it. He directed that the logos and markings from the U.S. (and other donors) be removed from crates and boxes before being turned over to beneficiaries. He increased taxes on the wealthy and sold war bonds to pay for his Democratic Security plan. In addition to regular tax revenue, the country’s mayors established funds from businesses in their cities as discretionary accounts for security upgrades to be managed by a steering committee appointed by the mayor.

After eight years and almost a thousand trips to towns and villages, the results were remarkable. Now over 75 percent of the country is under the control of government. Driving between cities is no longer life threatening. FARC leadership has been eviscerated. Over 28,000 ex-combatants from armed groups have been killed, jailed, granted amnesty, or deserted. Over 1,149 drug kingpins/traffickers, paramilitaries, and guerrilla chiefs have been extradited to the U.S. to stand trial. Homicides are down by 60 percent. Kidnappings were only 8 percent of their 2002 high, and persons displaced by the conflict in 2010 were about 61,000 compared to 457,000 in 2002. The poverty rate dropped by over 8 percent. After almost 50 years, most Colombians were living in peace.

Uribe frequently returned to the issue of
trust. The key to defeating guerrillas, drug kingpins/traffickers, and common criminals is to develop trust with those in the communities where these bad actors operate, and ultimately, developing reliable sources of intelligence. He told me with considerable pride that at the end of his second administration, the military and police could count on over four million intelligence sources throughout the country. About 8 percent of the total population was reporting on bad guys and their movements to local military and police.

Intelligence was also strengthened in the areas just outside Colombia’s borders. In 2009, intelligence showed that the second-ranking commander of FARC was encamped just over the border in Ecuador. Uribe ordered an attack. Fourteen people were killed, including the commander Raul Reyes and two non-Colombians (a Mexican and an Ecuadorean). Ecuador broke diplomatic relations, and President Chavez, either out of sympathy or not to be upstaged, announced Venezuela would do the same.

Relations between Uribe and his Andean neighbors continued stormy from then until he stepped down from the presidency. To most Colombians, there was no question that the raid was worth it. A treasure trove of invaluable intelligence was gleaned from laptops confiscated from the scene. What criticism there was towards Uribe for his attack on a neighbor’s sovereign territory became muted when this information was used to take down guerrilla bases in the country and was responsible for one of the most daringly successful hostage releases in history.

No shots were fired and fifteen hostages were released unharmed, including three Americans and an ex-presidential candidate. As then Minister of Defense Santos later explained, “It was the guerrilla codes and ciphers taken from the Reyes laptops which enabled the armed forces to penetrate and trick the FARC into turning over the hostages.” Subsequent reporting from these same laptops detailed support and complicity to FARC by Chavez and his government and by the then-Minister of Government of Ecuador.

Uribe’s detractors do not generally quibble with the success of Democratic Security, but they do point to needless excesses. His pressure on the military and police to more effectively prosecute the war contributed to the killing of innocent campesinos to inflate guerrilla body counts. Uribe’s initial callous reaction was that these soldiers “were not out there picking coffee.” In the end, the infamous case of the “falsos positivos” resulted in the firing and prosecution of 27 officers. He had opposed the so-called “victim’s law” which would have paid reparations to surviving family members of innocent people killed by the security forces. He felt, “the law costs too much...The best reparation is to end the violence.” There are also those that believe he permitted the intelligence service (DAS) to spy on suspected opponents of his government. A court is investigating the charges against him, but current President Santos did not await the investigatory results in disbanding the DAS at the end of 2011. Critics also point to leniency in dealing with some of the demobilized paramilitary chiefs, but as he explained, “It is important to first achieve
peace.”

His public spat with the country’s judiciary and human rights activists too frequently resulted in unfounded accusations and name-calling. When asked, many Colombians will say the biggest difference between Uribe and current President Santos is that Santos is more “composed.” Uribe believes that the justice systems, as well as all public institutions, are there to serve the people. “Justice is at the service of public order. Criminals should get what they deserve,” he told me. After having spent thousands of hours in town meetings, he clearly believes that he knows best the wishes and expectations of the common man and woman. Those in or out of government must either get with the program or get out of the way.

His successor, President Santos, has stepped out of Uribe’s shadow and re-made himself, steering his government toward a less confrontational style, making friends with Chavez and lowering tension with Ecuador. He has reached out to and made peace with the country’s judiciary and signaled his intention to support the “victim’s law.” He is capitalizing on Uribe’s security gains and placing greater emphasis on the country’s urban centers. His government has gotten exceedingly high marks for dealing with recent unprecedented flooding that left a million Colombians homeless.

Uribe’s Democratic Security is not a one-size-fits-all security strategy. It is less a model than a template. Cultural and religious differences, ethnic makeup, and historical narratives should be factored into any successful security strategy. However, the success of his “process” is unmistakable:

• Treat those living in the affected areas as victims, not the enemy.
• Engage directly to build trust by making the locals a critical part of establishing the project agenda.
• Use the local workforce to the fullest extent and monitor progress locally.
• Employ a whole-of-government approach and hold government officials accountable for advancing the project agenda.
• Make the private sector elite pay its fair share to achieve a safer environment.
• Create stakeholders (and critical sources of intelligence) willing to defend these gains.
• Be laser-focused if not obsessed in maintaining the political will to accomplish all of the above.

Perhaps the greatest lesson from “Uribismo” is that it is possible to defeat well-armed, organized, and dedicated forces of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug kingpins/traffickers by building trust with the civilian population and leaving bad actors no place to hide. For that the whole government has to be involved with a unity of purpose provided by strong leadership. IAJ
Navigating

Civil-Military Relations
in Kabul

by Maria J. Stephan

In Afghanistan, civil-military (civ-mil) cooperation is both a strategic imperative and a formidable challenge. Ensuring that security, governance, and development are synchronized and directed toward a stable, secure, and sovereign Afghanistan requires that soldiers, diplomats, and development experts from Afghanistan and the international community are working from the same script. At U.S. Embassy Kabul, a small interagency team of planners, assessors, and trouble-shooters in the Political-Military Affairs (Pol-Mil) section has helped orient civ-mil relations toward the main goal of helping the Afghan government and people build the institutions and capabilities that will enable them to stand on their own against the extremists who threaten their future. As the only office within any U.S. embassy around the world composed of full-time planners, the Civ-Mil Plans and Assessments Sub-Section, or CMPASS, plays a unique role within a most unique Embassy.¹ The CMPASS experience with civ-mil planning in Afghanistan offers lessons for diplomatic posts in cooler climates as well.

The CMPASS team is charged with coordinating among the Embassy, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and providing planning and assessment support throughout the U.S. Mission. The seven-member team, grown from an original team of five, includes four State Department planning officers from the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, two additional State Department planners, and a U.S. Army field grade officer (a graduate of Fort Leavenworth’s prestigious School of Advanced Military Studies). As its name suggests, CMPASS (which reports through the Pol-Mil structure within the Embassy²) helps navigate the complex civ-mil waters in Afghanistan—mainly by ensuring that different perspectives and approaches of those in boots and those in suits are mutually reinforcing. That is not always an easy task, but given the high stakes in Afghanistan, where neither military nor civilian tools alone are sufficient to guarantee success, it is essential.

To set theater guidance for U.S. personnel—both those under Chief of Mission authority and those under military command—and maximize the alignment of U.S., Afghan, and coalition

Maria J. Stephan was a member of CMPASS detailed to Embassy Kabul from November 2009 to May 2011. She was on assignment from the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which has since been integrated into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, where she is now a strategic planner.
activities, CMPASS works from the Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan. The first iteration of this document, developed by CMPASS’s predecessor, the Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group, was signed in August 2009 by both former Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and former ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal.3

Since that plan was signed, the Embassy and ISAF have developed a number of mechanisms to partner and harmonize their respective civ-mil efforts. They also review and revise the plan annually and adjust their efforts accordingly.

To support civ-mil coordination in the field, CMPASS works closely with the Embassy’s Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) office, whose primary responsibility is to coordinate between Kabul and the field.4 IPA pioneered the regional platforms concept, where civilians serve as equals with military commanders and adopt parallel and integrating structures with the military. The State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations has supported IPA’s efforts by detailing civ-mil planners to IPA and the regional platforms and providing subject matter experts on topics such as sub-national governance. The office work has intensified as a result of the civilian uplift, which saw the number of civilians deployed to Kabul and the field grow from 320 before the surge to over 1,200 today. CMPASS members work closely with IPA’s Tiger Team, a small mobile team that deploys to assist with sub-national planning, and with IPA’s four regional coordinators, who serve as the Embassy’s primary interlocutors with the senior civilian representatives and their field staff.

In addition, CMPASS frequently collaborates with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), notably its Stabilization Unit in Kabul, which contains civilian development experts and military liaisons from Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command and the ISAF Joint Command (IJC). USAID’s plans and assessments experts have played a critical role in promoting civ-mil integration in Kabul and in the field, where USAID governance and development programs are helping anchor security gains.

The Civ-Mil Landscape in Kabul

U.S. Embassy Kabul has surpassed Baghdad as the largest in the world. It is not your typical diplomatic post. Five ambassadors, with Ambassador Ryan Crocker at the helm, are responsible for recommending and executing U.S. policy and managing the day-to-day affairs of a heavily fortified embassy and field facilities in the midst of a war zone. As with any large, complicated organization, bureaucracy sometimes obfuscates the mission. In the case of Kabul, nine U.S. departments5 are represented in the Embassy. These diplomats, agronomists, water management experts, investigators, interdiction experts, financial institution advisors, and border control specialists work alongside military counterparts from USFOR-A and ISAF. ISAF, a multinational four-star military command currently led by General John Allen and located across the street from the Embassy, focuses on high-level policy and strategy. The IJC, whose headquarters are located just north of the Kabul

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International Airport, is charged with subnational and operational issues. On any given day, civilians from the Embassy trek to ISAF or IJC headquarters (or vice-versa) to collaborate on civ-mil issues ranging from alliance relations to stabilization initiatives.

Of course, the Embassy and ISAF are only a part of the larger civ-mil tapestry in Kabul. Both actors work closely with the military and civilian institutions of the Afghan government to build its capacity to serve and protect the Afghan people. Corruption, predatory government practices, and international aid that unintentionally bolster malign actors are a few major obstacles to this ultimate goal. Still, both remain committed to supporting governance in Afghanistan that is both participatory and representative. The Presidential Palace, where President Karzai lives and works, is located within a few hundred meters of the Embassy in a highly secured area, alongside a few key Afghan ministries. Other ministries, allied embassies, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Program, and a number of other international and non-governmental organizations are concentrated within a 10-mile radius of the Embassy. In Kabul, civ-mil planning often demands communication and coordination between all of these diverse Afghan and international actors.

**The Embassy’s J5 Shop**

In 2009, the U.S. Embassy Kabul decided to move from the Integrated Civil-Military Action Group (ICMAG) model and establish CMPASS as the new J5 (Plans) shop alongside the existing Pol-Mil Operations team (J3). The then-new Pol-Mil Counselor, Philip Kosnett, became the civilian equivalent of the military’s J3/5 Director. Fresh from Iraq, Kosnett was not sure what he was getting into. “I saw in Iraq how critical the Plans shop is in a military context, but it was breaking new ground to build an enduring planning and assessment capacity at an embassy—although we got a big boost from the work…the Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group had done earlier in the year.”

Since then, CMPASS has grown into a robust and respected force within the Embassy. Based on their involvement with CMPASS, now former Pol-Mil Counselor Kosnett and his deputy, JoAnne Wagner, strongly support greater planning capacity at other embassies and within the Foreign Service generally. As Wagner put it:

“I’m a believer. No matter what your job, in the crush of daily work it can be difficult to find adequate time to focus on long-range planning. I think every embassy should have someone—either at post or, for small missions, maybe regionally—whose job it is to wake up in the morning and advise the front office on what the mission should be doing today to achieve goals a year or two out— not just dealing with the crisis of the week.”

**Planning, the half-art, half-science of setting goals and aligning strategies and resources to meet those goals, is not as sharply honed within the State Department as it is within the U.S. military, where designing courses of action for multiple contingencies is a core function.**

**The Art of Civ-Mil Planning**

Planning, the half-art, half-science of setting goals and aligning strategies and resources to meet those goals, is not as sharply honed within the State Department as it is within the U.S. military, where designing courses of action for multiple contingencies is a core function.
multiple contingencies is a core function. Plans tend to energize military officers and enervate foreign service officers, who often point out that the art of diplomacy and building relationships does not neatly align with structured ends-means planning. While that is certainly true, every U.S. embassy around the world is required to prepare an annual Mission Strategic Resource Plan that describes what it is doing, planning to do, and why—and how it will measure progress against mission goals.

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Operationalizing Civ-Mil

CMPASS helps operationalize civ-mil integration first and foremost through its participation in the national level working groups (NLWGs), which are civ-mil problem-solving teams that are structured around subject areas to implement the Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan. The Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Assistance (CDEA) oversees these working groups and includes representatives from the U.S. Embassy Kabul, other embassies, ISAF, IJC, and USFOR-A. The various working groups meet regularly to identify problems and come up with solutions related to governance, elections, rule of law, anti-corruption, population security, reintegration, agriculture, infrastructure, borders, economic development, counter-narcotics, illicit finance, gender policy, and information initiatives.

The NLWGs often tackle issues emerging from the field, where civilians work alongside troops down to company level. CMPASS serves as the Embassy’s coordinating body for the working groups and helps prepare agenda items for the Executive Working Group and for meetings between the Chief of Mission and ISAF commander. Its members help identify cross-cutting issues that require special consideration or may not fall neatly within an existing section or working group’s terms of reference.

For example, NLWGs stepped in following insurgent attacks on the contracting company responsible for building the Khost-Gardez Road in 2010. In response, the civ-mil Infrastructure Working Group developed ways for the military to help provide security, work with the local communities, and assist by providing explosives for rock blasting, so that work on the road connecting two provincial capitals could continue.

Concurrently, the civ-mil members of the Information Initiatives Working Group engaged in several days of interagency planning to develop an operational communication plan designed to align funding with key communications goals, which was approved by the Embassy and ISAF.
Measuring Progress in Afghanistan

CMPASS is also the Embassy lead for preparing assessments that help define and measure progress in Afghanistan. Working with the entire U.S. Mission, ISAF, and certain Afghan ministries, CMPASS spearheads data collection and analysis to evaluate the status of governance, development, and other policy issues. In conjunction with State and USAID officials in Washington, CMPASS prepares the quarterly assessment for the National Security Council, which the national security staff uses to evaluate the impact of its strategy and to prepare briefings for Congress. The assessments, which include metrics ranging from Afghan budget execution, to specific anti-corruption and counter-narcotics measures, to progress on sub-national governance, private investment, and international donor coordination are intended to highlight both positive and negative issues and trends that may in time necessitate policy adjustments.

In this effort, CMPASS works closely with the Afghan Assessments Group at ISAF headquarters, along with the assessments group at IJC. ISAF, which is responsible for producing monthly and quarterly reports on progress in the three legs of counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, seeks input from across the mission, particularly in governance and development. The IJC prepares regular assessments of the 121 “key terrain districts” and “areas of interest,” which are parts of Afghanistan where stabilization is considered critical for mission success.

CMPASS works closely with Afghan Assessments Group, the Commander’s Initiative Group, ISAF’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability, and others to ensure civ-mil plans and perceptions are shared mutually. This is a key issue for transition to Afghan lead in 2015, which will significantly change the relationship between the Afghan government and the international community (including the United States). For example, CMPASS has worked with IPA to promote greater civilian input into its assessments. To support setting appropriate expectations and timelines, civilians in the field can provide critical input and give perspectives on both drivers of conflict, such as corruption and unrepresentative political bodies, and mitigating factors, such as local dispute resolution mechanisms and community development councils. This, in turn, can improve the quality of the assessments and better inform policy, strategy, and operations, including, for example, decisions on which Afghan provinces are ready for security transition.

In addition to measuring progress or success, these assessments also contain a strategic narrative for longer-term U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and highlight negative as well as positive developments so that policy shifts can occur as necessary. U.S. diplomats and development workers will be in Afghanistan long after the troops have left—and deeply rooted progress in this war-ravaged country will not occur overnight.

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The Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill: A Culminating Civ-Mil Event

Civ-Mil planning is an abstract concept until military personnel and civilians sit down at the same table to align their operations, programs, and activities and then act on the plan in a systematic and synchronized way. Some of
The importance of a robust civilian planning capability does not only apply to U.S. Embassy Kabul or to war-time exigencies.

The most important such exercises to date have been intense interagency reviews of U.S. civil-mil efforts in Afghanistan. These “rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills” were held in Kabul in April and again in October of 2010. The central goal of these drills was to synchronize civil-military planning and resource requirements along key lines of effort, including security, governance, agriculture, justice, economic development, anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, and border issues.

The civil-military ROC drills were co-hosted by U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command, and the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Senior U.S. officials participated, as did Afghan and international leaders. Preparing for and executing the drills were a major undertaking that required extensive civil-military coordination in Kabul. CMPASS directed the interagency coordination at the Embassy in partnership with the ISAF CJ-5 office. Sector leads from the Embassy, USAID, and ISAF gathered three to four times a week to discuss their programmatic and regional focuses, along with the expected outcomes and impacts of their efforts. It was then up to the civilian and military leads to work together to prepare presentations for their principals to describe who was doing what, where, with whom, and to what purpose/effect and to identify any gaps in synchronizing governance, development, and security efforts.

Describing the actual day of the ROC drill, former Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew said, “We spent the day with our partners listening to their advice as to what we need to do with them in order to be effective. It already has changed our thinking and it will continue to.” The April and October ROC drills led to successive mini-ROC drills on specific topics such as the rule of law, counter-narcotics, and issues concerning Kandahar. These periodic civil-military planning encounters build relationships and encourage unprecedented civil-military problem-solving at the national level.

Civ-Mil 101: Lessons Learned

The ROC drill highlighted a number of key lessons about civil-military relations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, which CMPASS members have tried to incorporate in the Embassy’s daily work.

First, planning really is important. As Major Jen Munro, a former member of the CMPASS team, put it, “It’s not because the plan itself will be the blueprint for winning in Afghanistan, but because the relationships and trust that develop from the planning process will allow us to succeed together.”

On a related note, civilians do know how to plan. From the mission strategic resource plan, to Congressional visits, to the planning for infrastructure, interagency officers outline goals, set priorities, and assess outcomes. What makes Afghanistan different is the sheer volume of activities and the urgent need for results. The need to synchronize these disparate planning exercises so they complement rather than contradict or duplicate each other makes it all the more complicated.

The importance of a robust civilian planning capability does not only apply to U.S. Embassy Kabul or to war-time exigencies. Within a “normal” embassy, a planning team could be empowered to focus on ensuring that the yearly State and USAID mission strategic plan is not just stuck up on a shelf, but rather informs the activities of the mission. Embassy planners could help bring together relevant sections (with host government ministries and international
agencies, where necessary) to work through problems requiring cross-sector approaches—whether that would be supporting elections, planning an international investment conference, or engaging with civil society. As at our embassy in Kabul, planners at other U.S. embassies could help facilitate periodic assessments with the ambassador to measure progress on the goals in their mission strategic plan and propose courses of action to address gaps or deficiencies.

Second, the cultural and operational differences between civilians at the embassy and their military counterparts cannot be ignored, but they should not be exaggerated nor seen as barriers to progress. The remarkably diverse civilian expertise across the interagency community is a force multiplier that both complements and, when necessary, applies a healthy check on the military. There are obvious differences in size and speed between civilians and the military in Afghanistan. U.S. civilians are outnumbered 1 to 100 by their military counterparts, and the disparity increases when you add coalition forces to the mix. During the preparatory meetings for a ROC drill, it was clear that the military team had a much deeper bench. ISAF could assign dozens of military personnel to work on planning products and attend lengthy meetings; for the Embassy, where only two or three people comprise certain sections, sending even a single member to a two-hour meeting at ISAF or IJC came with tremendous opportunity costs. However, it was also clear to the military that civilians brought critical expertise and relationships that the military could not match. Civilians should leverage the military planning teams with their greater capacity and robust data collection. In addition, they should identify the times during the military planning cycle that require critical civilian expertise and be there consistently and with the right people.

The U.S. military takes great pride in its speed and efficient mobilization of personnel to work toward a common end. In Afghanistan, while speed is important, so too is strategic patience and moving from “quick fixes” to sustainable solutions that are devised and owned by Afghans. Enduring security must be anchored by accountable governance and economic development, and the failure to pay close attention to things such as tribal dynamics and local drivers of conflict can end up fueling the insurgency. While it is critical to show short-term gains, particularly in stabilization efforts in areas that have recently been “cleared” following military operations, haste can make waste in the long-term effort to empower Afghans to take responsibility for their country.

More than anything else, the ROC experience emphasized the critical importance of building personal relationships. It is remarkable how working relations improve and problems are solved when civilians and service men and women take time to get to know each other, understand the constraints the other is working under, and learn what is motivating them to serve their country in Afghanistan. Once a certain comfort level is reached and people from the Embassy feel at ease picking up the phone and calling their ISAF counterparts (and vice versa), potentially explosive conflicts can be averted—or at least the temperature can be turned down so that real problem-solving can take place.

As a direct by-product of the civ-mil relationships that the ROC drills catalyzed, a wider, international civ-mil planners’ meeting involving representatives from about 10 embassies and the United Nations began meeting every Sunday at ISAF to collaborate and work through complicated civ-mil problem sets, such as planning the stabilization campaign in Kandahar and supporting the District Delivery Program, an Afghan-led initiative focused on education, health, agriculture, and justice at the local level.

CMPASS team members have had the privilege of serving their country in one of the most dynamic, fast-paced embassies in the world. In their roles as civ-mil planners and problem-solvers,
the seven members of CMPASS have helped advance unity of effort and invigorate U.S. Embassy Kabul’s central slogan: One Team, One Mission. As former Pol-Mil Counselor Phil Kosnett stated: “I knew CMPASS was working when military commands started begging for our tiny team to join in with their hordes of planners to ensure the ‘civ’ part in civ-mil got the appropriate attention.” It is in this way that CMPASS team members with their support for civ-mil planning have made their contributions to the success of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. IAJ

The author extends special thanks to Brett Doyle, an interagency lessons learned contractor who serves in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

Notes

1 This article draws upon the experiences of the CMPASS staff and covers the periods of 2010 to mid-2011. Dr. Kurt Müller (assigned to CMPASS from S/CRS in 2011) and Ciara Knudsen and Jason Ladnier (assigned to Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group from S/CRS in 2008-09) provided additional input.

2 Pol-Mil section has three sub-elements within the office: CMPASS; the Alliance Relations and Removal of Weapons (ARROW) section; and the Security Cooperation and Operational Unity Team (SCOUT).

3 The ICMAG, established in late 2008, oversaw the development of the first Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan, civ-mil plans in regional commands East and South, and provincial planning that led to the proposals for regional civilian platforms. ICMAG was composed of three U.S. military officers, two USAID staff members, and four Department of State officers and reported to both the Embassy and the Commander of US Forces-Afghanistan.

4 In Afghanistan, the field is composed of six regional commands and five task forces along with 27 provincial reconstruction teams, 35 district support teams, and 9 agribusiness development teams.

5 Including State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and Treasury.

6 At the time of this writing the NLWGs are expected to be restructured and reduced in number from 14 to 7.

7 Within the Embassy, the CDDEA is responsible for overseeing the national-level civ-mil framework. CMPASS works very closely with the CDDEA, whose head co-chairs the Executive Working Group with ISAF’s deputy chief of staff for stability operations.

8 The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations provides support to Embassy Kabul in many of these areas, such as subject matter expertise in rule of law, agricultural development, communications, and others.

9 While the first formal ROC drill began in 2010, Ambassador Holbrooke and then-CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus held an earlier version in May 2009, which formed the guidance for the Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan later that summer.

10 Including Ambassador Holbrooke, then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy; and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah.

11 Including 11 Afghan ministries and the Afghan Supreme Court, the military and civilian leadership of NATO-ISAF, then-NATO-ISAF Commander General Petraeus, and ambassadors and senior officials from 11 embassies, the European Union, and the United Nations.
Departments of State and Defense Relations:

Are Perceptions Important?

by William Joseph Davis, Jr. and Christopher R. Paparone

As far back as the authors can remember, colleagues from both the Department of State (State) and Department of Defense (DoD) have taken every opportunity to highlight what they see as the significant differences between their organizational cultures. Many are quick to quote the title of a popular article entitled “Defense is from Mars, and State is from Venus.” However, despite the perceptions of cultural incongruence between the organizations, the authors found scant organizational survey research published on the subject. We therefore designed a study to explore the efficacy of a valid and reliable survey instrument (the Organization Culture Assessment Instrument [OCAI]) as an initial foray into data collection to detect interagency cultural differences, particularly at the working-group level.

In order to add an element of practicality to this research—so the results could be used to actually improve relations between DoD and the State Department—we determined that not only would an intra-cultural assessment be insightful (how one views one’s own organization), but also that an inter-cultural assessment (how one views the other’s culture) would also be fruitful. To those ends, we used OCAI and additional survey questions to measure the following: (1) What do mid-grade members of the two departments identify as similarities and differences in organizational values, attitudes, and perceptions and, (2) What do mid-grade members of one department identify as similarities and differences in the organizational values, attitudes, and perceptions of members of the other department?

This study has several important limitations. The authors conducted this study in their spare time.
Eighty-three percent of State Department respondents report at least steady contact with DoD, while only thirty-six percent of military respondents report steady contact with the State Department...

Time and at their personal expense while faculty members of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), so we used convenience sampling rather than the more desirable random sampling. Individuals surveyed included military student officers attending CGSC, Foreign Service officers (FSO), and other civilian employees working in the State Department, who were contacted through the political-military officers of the regional bureaus in Washington, DC. However, because the study samples those individuals most likely to engage in a joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) or on a provincial reconstruction team (PRT), the data has some external validity as an indicator of the cultural perceptions of participants who will likely serve in the DoD, State Department, or both. For this study, organizational culture is narrowly defined and measured in terms of the instrument, based on “taken for granted values” members of the organization use to evaluate organizational effectiveness. Eighty-three percent of State Department respondents report at least steady contact with DoD, while only thirty-six percent of military respondents report steady contact with the State Department, so most of the DoD respondents’ view of the State Department’s culture may be based on something other than experience.

Theory of Culture

The OCAI measures the relative importance among the four organizational value groupings defined as follows:

- A rational “market” culture is identified by a “mission first” attitude. The organization does not want to hear how you “don’t do windows,” or “don’t have enough resources,” it wants the mission accomplished. An objectives-based plan is indicative of an organization who values the “market.”

- A bureaucratic “hierarchical” culture is identified by strict adherence to orders from above. The mission is important, but you must also do what you are told. If there is a conflict, then adherence to orders takes precedence. If the mission dictates that aircraft maintenance should be conducted today, but orders come down that sexual harassment training must be completed today, the harassment training is accomplished.

- A consensual or “clan” culture is identified by the organization’s commitment to its people. Personnel up and down the chain of command are consulted before a decision is made. Orders are followed because of respect for the person giving them, not because of positional authority.

- A developmental or “adhocracy” culture is identified by appreciation of innovation. “Thinking out of the box” could be the slogan of this culture. New ways to approach old business is the norm. Regulations or orders do not inhibit accomplishments.

The results of the ipsative-scaled (a specific type of measure in which respondents compare two or more desirable options and pick the one that is most preferred [sometimes called
a “forced choice” scale) OCAI are plotted in kite-like patterns on a four-square diagram, determined by the relative weights assigned to values by the respondents. Our thesis is that through examining the resultant value patterns—computed by the aggregate DoD and State Department respondents’ answers on the OCAI—we can reveal potential sources of integration, differentiation, or fragmentation in cultural relations between the respondent groups sampled.

Professor Joanne Martin developed a typology to diagnose organizational cultures which we adapt in this study to speak to interagency relations:

- **Integration**—some interpretations of effectiveness are shared by all participants.

- **Differentiation**—mixed interpretations exist among organizational participants, creating cross-cultures that may overlap and nest in terms of harmony, independence, or sometimes conflict.

- **Fragmentation**—Individuals and groups may see others interpreting things incoherently; hence, irreconcilable tensions may ensue among factions.

If a leader of an interagency group detects continuing problems with cultural fragmentation (i.e., an “under-lap” in values), he/she may find reason to investigate further the seemingly important differences in the representatives’ prevailing home-organization value patterns. If the cultural differences seem differentiated but moderately so, the leader can develop alternative frames of reference (e.g., intercultural relations may be compatible, so managerial focus on organizational issues such as assigning the right tasks to the right people may be easier) to help the coalition of agencies work better together. If the leader sees too much integration (e.g., suspects “groupthink” associated with “overlapping” values), he/she may find reason to purposefully bring others into the group from outside organizations with more differentiated cultural values. In both differentiated and integrated situations, he/she may find ways to spur more pluralistic debate using these dimensions afforded by the OCAI: the differing preferences for flexibility with respect to control; similarity of different conceptualizations of internal environment with respect to externality in structuring the problem setting; and, fanning competing judgments about the number and appropriateness of the strategy options available that address the problem situation.

**Results and Discussion**

We used a convenience sample of 62 Army majors and lieutenant colonels in attendance at the CGSC and a convenience sample of 90 State Department FSOs and government service (GS) staff. Of the military officers, we experienced a 58 percent response rate (36 useable surveys) and with the 90 surveyed FSO/GS employees, a 60 percent response rate (54 useable surveys). With the permission of the copyright holders, we constructed a modified OCAI that included asking respondents to rate their own and each other’s organization.
the OCAI results (Figure 1). When respondents rated their home organizations, only moderately differentiated patterns can be detected between the DoD and State Department. More State than DoD respondents saw their own organization as more hierarchical (the dominating value) and clannish (secondarily). Those surveyed in DoD rated market-like cultural values most dominant in their home organization. Both saw their home organizations as having least emphasis on adhocracy values—which include adaptation and flexibility.

We also asked the respondents to rate each other on the same scale. The resulting patterns were negligibly different from each other (Figure 2). These data suggest DoD and State Department respondents see each other in much the same way as they see themselves. DoD sees State as having dominant hierarchy and clan values and State sees DoD as having both dominant market and, to a lesser degree, hierarchical values. Both saw values associated with flexibility (clan and adhocracy) as least applicable to either organization.

Here, we must remind the reader that because of our convenience in sampling the respondents, these results cannot be generalized. However, we can imaginatively comment as if these respondents were going to work together on some sort of interagency team. First, we see more similarity in value patterns than potential for value conflict. Both respondent groups see themselves and each other as habituated to the idea of hierarchical forms of control. We would speculate, then, that we can count on their shared sensitivity toward formalized and structured procedures and compliance with their efficiency-minded bosses, who pride
themselves on being successful coordinators and organizers. Both acknowledge that effectiveness in addressing a project at hand can be defined in terms of the dependable delivery of the established core contributions routinely expected by their home department.

On the surface of these data, we also see some moderate evidence of differentiation between cultures. The DoD respondents perceive their organization expects them to be hard drivers, producers, and competitors. They are more used to tough and demanding leaders than are the State respondents. DoD respondents also identify that their home organization expects well-planned actions that achieve measurable goals and targets; whereas, the State Department expects their participants to see things a bit differently, more along the lines of clan values. Respondents from State distinguish it as being a bit more sensitive than DoD to social situations and as placing a premium on inclusion, participation, and consensus-building. Department of Defense members seem to sense these propensities about the State Department as well. Although State members appear to acknowledge their military counterparts’ propensities toward hard-charging, “get ‘er’ done” values, they see their own leaders as more like mentors and perhaps even parental figures. State respondents see their organization as more strongly held together by an unspoken loyalty, similar to that which might be given to a wise clan elder. In comparison, DoD’s sense is that its source of authority is more bureaucratic, linked to positional power and perquisites of rank.

The most striking data that might be some cause for concern with both of these respondent...
groups reveal the lack of cross-cultural expectations for adhocracy values, including entrepreneurial spirit and rewards for creativity. We should not expect representatives from either agency to “stick their necks out” and take risks, as they see their bosses as something other than innovators and risk takers. In this case, the glue that holds interagency relations together will hardly be a commitment to experimentation and innovation. Success with these interagency groups will not be defined as developing unique and fresh ways to frame problem situations. Both groups know their relatively, conservative home organizations will likely not tolerate such risk and demand strategies that focus on the core competencies that routinely make up their approaches to national security issues. In the face of highly complex situations, this may be the single most important aspect of the combined cultures—such situations usually merit organizational deviance when the established ways are apparently inadequate.

In addition, this opposition to adhocracy values may well be the basis for the perceived significant differences between the DoD and State cultures—cultural intransigence toward “out-of-the-box” thinking and acting may be mistaken for inter-cultural differentiation. This confluence on conservative thinking and acting may indicate a need to call upon “outsiders” to join the group, perhaps those known to come from organizational cultures that emphasize adhocracy values.

Following the OCAI, the authors also asked the respondents specific survey questions concerning expectations about (1) interagency communications, (2) integration, (3) “out-of-the-box” thinking, and (4) compliance. Answers ranged from not confident, not very confident, somewhat confident, confident, very confident, or extremely confident. In response to the question “How confident are you that you can clearly communicate with members of the Department of Defense (for State respondents) or Department of State (for DoD respondents),” 38.9 percent of DoD respondents were less than confident, while 41.5 percent of State respondents were less than confident. Although there was no statistically significant difference between the answers of the two groups, it is disheartening to note that although the research sample from both departments were officers, over one-third of the respondents felt they could not communicate effectively across cultures. In addition, no DoD and only two (3.8 percent) of State respondents were extremely confident.

We utilized the same range of responses as above (from not confident to extremely confident) in gathering responses to the question “How confident are you that you can integrate DoD/State Department capabilities and limitations for mission accomplishment?” Even though State Department respondents reported more interaction with DoD than vice versa, both groups felt about the same in their ability to communicate across cultures (no statistical difference). Fifteen percent of DoD respondents felt more confident about their ability to integrate State Department capabilities to accomplish the mission. Also notable is that no respondent answered “extremely confident” when answering this question.

The next survey question asked respondents to strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: “My organization values officers who are “out of...
Although there was a statistically significant difference between the responses of the two organizations—45.5 percent of State respondents agree and 25 percent of DoD respondents agree—it is interesting and potentially more insightful to note that not one respondent from either organization answered that he/she strongly agreed with the statement.

The final survey question asked respondents to strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: “If given an order by my superior, I must follow it, if it is lawful, even though it may be completely contrary to my personal values or those values of the organization.” Once again the survey results found no statistically significant difference in how the respondents from the two organizations answered. Of note, though, are the arguably low cumulative numbers for both groups indicating disagree or strongly disagree: 25 percent for DoD and 36 percent for State.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Responding to the first research question “What do mid-grade members of the two departments identify as similarities and differences in organizational values, attitudes, and perceptions?” this study finds that if these respondents worked as members of an interagency group in the future, they would share the core organizational values of long-established government bureaucracies that do not reward risk-takers. Values conflicts between these members, as measured by the OCAI, would be expected to be negligible.

Responding to the second research question “What do mid-grade members of the two departments identify as similarities and differences in organizational values, attitudes, and perceptions?” the aggregate answers indicate both groups would be somewhat uneasy communicating and integrating capabilities with each other if placed in a group project. In addition, respondent groups seem to share the same basic value toward mission accomplishment. Insofar as compliance with following lawful orders, low percentages from both respondent groups—DoD 25 percent and State 36 percent—who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement indicate that not only is innovation not perceived to be rewarded, but that even morally justifiable deviance may be intolerable to both parties.

This study was exploratory in nature, and the results cannot be generalized to both organizations. The authors recommend that DoD and the State Department conduct further studies on intra- and inter-organizational cultural values differences. Competence and confidence in cross-cultural communication and understanding of each other’s values should be the least common denominator in attempting to work together. The use of the OCAI in further studies is recommended.

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in their respective organizations versus focusing on values differences.

We hope this exploratory study will not only become a catalyst for further research, but also begin a long overdue conversation between members of the DoD and State. This study represents a very narrow view of culture based on a convenience sampling of members from both departments that measures their competing beliefs about what makes their organizations effective. Nevertheless, this snapshot of competing value patterns, afforded by the OCAI and other questions, may provide important insights as to how DoD and State Department members may design interagency approaches together. There seemed to be considerable overlap in shared values with this population, which reflects more integration than differentiation. In addition, there was a collective dearth of adhocracy-values, which would include an appreciation for improvisation, innovation, and creativity. When faced with complex and unique issues of policy, strategy, and operational activities, these adhocracy values may be vital in approaching their design, yet these seem to be underrepresented in the cultural fabrics of both agencies.

We suggest the following additional studies would offer important insights with respect to inter-organizational relations as applied to national security:

• A more comprehensive study of the cultural relationship between the two departments. Using more sophisticated statistical sampling techniques may confirm the lack of adhocracy values and hence spur more comprehensive research into finding creative designs of policy, strategy, and operational activities.

• A study that explores how other national security agencies (e.g., Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security) rate themselves and other agencies.

• A study to investigate important sub-cultures within agencies (e.g., the Service cultures of DoD, Joint Staff, special operations, other State bureaus, the U.S. Coast Guard, and so forth) that may be important sources of countervailing value perspectives in the pursuit of reframing policy, strategy, and operational designs.

• A study as to how organizations in multinational settings rate themselves and others.

• A study as to how important non-governmental organizations see themselves with respect to governmental agencies.

• A study to discover how results of surveys, such as these, help national security agencies understand inter-governmental approaches to complex issues (at local, state, and federal levels).

Notes


2 Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture Based on the Competing Values Framework, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1999.

4 Robert E. Quinn and John Rohrbaugh, “A Competing Values Approach to Organizational Effectiveness,” *Public Productivity Review*, Vol. 5, No.2, 1981, pp. 122-140. (This was the original study that set the theory for development of the OCAI).

5 Cameron and Quinn, summarized from pp. 33-40.


7 Cameron and Quinn.

8 Ibid.
Achieving
Unity of Effort

by Matthew K. Wilder

When agencies cooperate, one defines the problem and seeks help with it. When they act jointly, the problem and options for action are defined differently from the start. Individuals from different backgrounds come together in analyzing a case and planning how to manage it. Since 9/11, those issues have not been resolved.

The 9/11 Commission Report, 22 July 2004

It has been well established by the nation’s leadership and current experience that military conflict has evolved in response to the increasingly complex realities of the global war on terrorism. Part of this reality is the introduction of a whole-of-government strategy as a key enabler to operations that were once the exclusive purview of military units. An example of this strategy is the introduction of interagency civilian intelligence and cultural advisors at all levels of military command, from joint task force to battalion. An examination of future threats and potential areas of operation, such as other nations in the Middle East and Africa, indicate that this trend toward greater interagency integration will not only continue, but will likely increase.¹

Despite a strong commitment from both military and civilian leadership and significant efforts on the part of their agencies to make these partnerships meaningful and productive, the integration of military and civilian professionals into cross-functional interagency teams could be made much more effective. An effective interagency team achieves unity of effort in its activities irrespective of unity of command. From the interagency perspective, achieving unity of command is relatively easy for interagency teams led by a member of the military and incorporated into a military organization because the rank structure is more rigid and transparent. However, true unity of effort as expressed as horizontal (inclusive of all team members and agencies) instead of vertical (along stove-piped chains of command) integration has proven much more elusive, regardless of

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The use of provincial reconstruction teams throughout Afghanistan has been the quintessential case study of the necessity for interagency cooperation and the conduct of blended civilian-military teams. The purpose of this article is to highlight the role of the mid- to senior-level leader (either civilian or military) tasked with leading an interagency team comprised of both military and civilian members in achieving unity of effort. To address some of the challenges and opportunities posed in the leadership of such a team, it is useful to explore an interagency case study involving provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) and then expand on the common problems of integration and the education, training, and selection of successful interagency team leaders and members.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan**

The use of PRTs throughout Afghanistan has been the quintessential case study of the necessity for interagency cooperation and the conduct of blended civilian-military teams. PRTs were established in late 2002 to improve security, assist the Afghan government in administering tribal areas, and facilitate reconstruction. Each PRT was comprised of members of the Department of Defense (DoD), tasked with military matters and protection of the team; members of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which led reconstruction efforts; and members of the Department of State, responsible for political advisory and reporting. Occasionally other members, such as an agricultural advisor from the Department of Agriculture, would be added to the team. In 2006, after four years of operation, the USAID sponsored a study that examined why interagency teams sometimes fail to achieve optimum performance. Specifically, PRTs failed to fully achieve the desired results in Afghanistan because of a combination factors that are common challenges to many interagency teams:

- Lack of clear guidance from the convening authority regarding each member’s role and responsibility within the team.
- Failure of the team leadership to solicit and incorporate ideas from team members and their representative organizations.
- Lack of combined team training to became fully operational prior to deployment.
- Lack of clear understanding of the organization, role, and mission of the team and each organization’s contribution to the overall goal.
- Issues affecting unity of effort, such as the successful transition of responsibility, interactions among team members, and the interrelationships between leadership and team members.

Experienced interagency team members and leaders will quickly recognize that these challenges are not unique to PRTs. The first step to overcoming these factors is to understand the challenges posed by integrating individuals from disparate organizations into a cohesive team to achieve unity of effort.

**The Integration Challenge**

Interagency teams and especially those found in government service have existed since the Revolutionary War. Regardless of this long history of interagency integration, often neither
Interagency team leaders nor team members are effectively trained or educated to operate in an interagency setting. The exceptions are certain rotational assignments and training opportunities that will be explored later. Although integration challenges exist in any interagency setting, one of the most prevalent is assigning civilian professionals to military teams without regard to prior military experience or familiarization with the military culture or its planning processes. Similarly, military professionals who are chosen to lead interagency teams without regard for their experience leading civilians may soon find they lack the necessary fundamental knowledge and understanding of their interagency partners to provide direction and integrate available interagency capabilities. All too often, interagency team leaders make decisions without fully understanding how each organization’s culture impacts the team. Several different leadership styles may be necessary to maximize performance and efficiency. Interagency team leaders who do not comprehend how different cultures interact within an interagency team may miss an opportunity to lead the team to its full potential, such as the PRTs referenced above.

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is, arguably, an example of an interagency organization that successfully recognized the challenges of integration and is performing at an effective level. Upon its inception in 2007, the command realized that not only was interagency coordination vital, it was absolutely necessary for command success. Although faced with several challenges that included differing amounts of interagency participation, limited resources, and numerous chains of command, AFRICOM leadership adeptly managed the integration of interagency civilians into a traditionally military and DoD dominant environment. The primary mechanism for this success was understanding each individual organization’s contributions and challenges, combined with a concerted effort to fully integrate each organization into the command in “full partner” status instead of relegating them to an advisory or liaison role. In this manner, AFRICOM achieved unity of effort that transcended interagency lines. This experience identified three areas that are keys to achieving unity of effort: education, training, and selecting the right integrated team members.

The Education Challenge

One of the more effective methods of preparing individuals to serve as productive members of an interagency team is to build the skillsets necessary for success through education, especially education obtained outside the individual’s parent organization. These educational opportunities provide insights regarding roles, authorities, and capabilities of other organizations that are difficult to obtain while in one’s own comfort zone. To maximize the benefit both for the individual and his or her future interagency team, these educational opportunities should occur early in the individual’s career, but after he or she acquires the fundamental knowledge and skills of the parent agency.

There have been several initiatives that emphasize education as a key component to success in the interagency setting, notably the DoD Civilian National Security Professional
Development Implementation Plan and Presidential Executive Order 13434, both of which mandate training, education, and experience as cornerstones to interagency success. However, most federal agencies put little or no effort in education, preferring instead to send their professionals to shorter training courses or to depend on mentoring and on-the-job training for skill acquisition. Part of this de-emphasis on education is culture, but part is also driven by the lack of personnel management systems that allow for education without negatively impacting the career path of the individual or staffing requirements of the parent organization.

One of the most valuable and perhaps most overlooked opportunities for both military and civilians to gain a better understanding of how to be an effective part of an interagency team is attendance at one of the military career service schools. These schools include the intermediate-level education opportunities afforded by the Army Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, KS; the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; the College of Naval Command and Staff at Newport, RI; and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA.

Each service also offers similar senior service schools that are available for civilians, often at the GS-14/15 level. A service-specific school is not the only opportunity for civilians to gain valuable experience with the military; the joint community also features the Joint Forces Staff College and the National War College. The National Defense University and Defense Acquisition University also offer programs to both military and interagency civilians. All of these opportunities are important for civilians, not only for their educational value, but also for the broadened perspectives vital to the success of interagency teams.

The Training Challenge

In effective interagency teams all members are familiar with the professional culture, background, operating procedures, and planning processes each member brings to the team based on the parent agency he or she represents. Integrated interagency training and rotational assignments are some of the most efficient and effective ways to ensure military and civilian leaders are fully prepared to become interagency team members. In much the same way as interagency education benefits all participants involved, joint and rotational assignments give both the participant and the gaining organization valuable insight into how to best integrate individuals into interagency teams.

For military leaders, there are numerous opportunities to pursue rotational assignments in civilian interagency organizations and collaborate with civilians in military organizations. For example, many DoD and intelligence agencies have billets and positions dedicated to the military on a rotational basis and have integrated senior military leaders into their organizational hierarchy. Unfortunately, civilians have far fewer opportunities for rotational assignments. Often, a culture of “out of sight, out of mind” prevails in civilian organizations, and those individuals
Too often, the interagency team is comprised of members that volunteer, or who are not otherwise employed. However, as demonstrated by both the PRTs in Afghanistan and the interagency teams at AFRICOM, the selection of interagency team members must be a deliberate process. While there are numerous books and articles written on how to successfully form interdisciplinary teams in the business world, several best practices developed by the consulting firm McKinsey and Company are the most applicable to interagency team formation. The McKinsey model is particularly appropriate because it involves sending specially-trained consultants to work with businesses that have an existing culture, structure, and set of norms. Despite the challenges inherent in these circumstances, McKinsey consultants consistently manage to build teams that transcend the pitfalls of unity of command and achieve unity of effort.

One best practice of the McKinsey team-building method is to compose a team that is competent and has the capacity and qualifications to work well together. In interagency teams, often the capacity to work well with others is as important as the individual’s expert knowledge and intelligence. As demonstrated by the best practices developed by PRTs and AFRICOM, this trait is further developed when interagency teams have the opportunity to train together frequently.

Another best practice of the McKinsey process is demonstrated when only one or two interagency civilians are assigned to augment a large team of predominately military members (a common occurrence). In this case, team leadership must carefully and consciously select those augmentees according to how well they can adapt and contribute to the combined outcome of the team. All too often, if the interagency civilians have not served previously with the military or have not attended one of the education or training courses described earlier, they will be unable to overcome their lack of experience and make substantial contributions...
to the team. Other best practices that work well for McKinsey include the following:

- Although teams are often comprised of members with diverse skillsets and rank within the organization, each team member has the right and obligation to dissent on any issue without fear of reprisal and shares the same values and principles of the parent organization.

- Teams are comprised of both subject matter experts and more junior team members that are assigned to the team for the broadening experience.

- Team members are given the opportunity to prepare for assignments to interdisciplinary teams through training and education.

- Throughout the process, team members are provided coaching and feedback on performance. The firm’s strong commitment to mentorship endures during the assignment, even if mentoring must be conducted virtually.

- While team members may work away from the parent organization and headquarters, they are still connected to the firm and its resources in the form of continuing research and administrative support. This support allows team members to be fully committed to the team mission and not be distracted by issues that can be addressed by support personnel.\(^9\)

A final McKinsey best practice is to adopt a relatively flat hierarchy among interagency civilians on an integrated team.\(^10\) Although the military members of the team have a very defined and necessary hierarchy, civilians on the team must try to avoid adopting that approach, regardless of rank or position at the civilian’s parent organization. A flat hierarchy allows their team’s leadership to incorporate their perspectives and inputs when forming decisions and direction.

The best practices of one organization are not an all-encompassing recipe for success in an interagency environment, but they do provide insight into a firm that has excelled at building teams since 1923. These practices also address and limit the challenges to achieving unity of effort, which led to the mixed track record of PRT effectiveness in Afghanistan.

**Conclusion**

As many interagency team leaders have discovered, forming and leading interagency teams that transcend unity of command and achieve unity of effort involve a concerted effort that begins long before the team is convened. There are several examples of organizations that achieve unity of effort in both the military and civilian settings and provide lessons learned that are universal when forming and leading interagency teams. As a whole, the successful interagency team is comprised of individuals that are properly integrated, well prepared through interagency education and training, and carefully selected for team membership through a deliberate process. In this manner, the team is postured for success and can reap all the benefits that are inherent in achieving unity of effort. **IAJ**
Notes


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 10.


8 Ibid., p. 60.


10 Rasiel, p. 65.
President Requests Reorganization Authority

The President asked Congress for the authority to reorganize the government in recognition of the inefficiencies and redundancies in government and as an effort to streamline the bureaucracy. Specifically, the President seeks the authority to submit government reorganization proposals to Congress which in turn would have the power to approve or disapprove them without modification. This request is essentially a reinstatement of the authorities presidents enjoyed for most of the period from 1932 through 1984.

In his request, the President proposes to consolidate six agencies into one more efficient department to promote competitiveness, exports, and business. The six agencies include the Department of Commerce’s core business and trade functions, the Small Business Administration, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.

This announcement acknowledges that there is interest at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue in improving interagency cooperation, coordination, and collaboration for a more effective and efficient government. The lead article in this issue of the *InterAgency Journal* represents a bipartisan congressional view of the need to improve interagency cooperation, particularly as it relates to national security. With the President’s proposal, interagency issues now have greater visibility and potential attention in Washington. *IAJ*

DoD Announces New Strategic Guidance

President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced new defense strategic guidance entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” on January 5, 2012. This new guidance is intended to reshape future Department of Defense priorities, activities, decision making, and budget requests as the department reduces spending by about $487 billion over the next decade. The guidance is intended as a blue print for the joint force in 2020 and emphasizes:

- Shifting overall focus from winning today’s wars to preparing for future challenges.
- Shifting geographical priorities toward the Asia Pacific region while retaining emphasis on the Middle East and deemphasizing Europe.
- Greater emphasis on projecting power and less emphasis on stabilization and counterinsurgency operations.
- Shifting force structure toward a smaller more agile force while reducing Army and Marine Corps endstrength.
• Increasing advanced capabilities in areas such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, unmanned systems, cyberspace capabilities, and special operations forces.

The guidance is the result of a ten-month review directed by the President to identify $400 billion in the defense budget of the next 12 years and explicitly lists 10 missions in “loose, not strict” priority order:

• Counterterrorism and irregular warfare.
• Deter and defeat aggression.
• Project power despite anti-access and area denial challenges.
• Counter weapons of mass destruction.
• Operate effectively in cyberspace and space.
• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
• Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities.
• Provide a stabilizing presence.
• Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations.
• Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

In the past, DoD has developed guidance and priorities using a force planning construct of the number and type of missions the force is expected to be able to accomplish simultaneously. The new guidance departs from that model choosing instead to describe a complex global security environment without stating what missions the force is expected to perform simultaneously. In the 1990’s that construct envisioned fighting two major contingency operations. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) introduced a different construct: defending the homeland; operate from four forward regions of the world; defeat adversaries in two overlapping major military campaigns; and conduct humanitarian operations. QDR’s in 2006 and 2010 described multiple possible combinations of simultaneous contingencies while preserving the ability to do more than one big thing at a time.

To support the reduction in funding and force structure – especially land forces – the new guidance calls for stronger diplomacy, development, and intelligence contributions to the overall national security effort. This shift towards interagency collaboration parallels the 2010 National Security Strategy and the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. This shift could prove challenging since U.S. government civilian agencies are currently under-resourced for the security roles they would appropriately play and face budget pressure of their own, which are forcing them to look for opportunities to scale back rather than ramp up.
New Book Looks Inside a U.S. Embassy

For anyone who has ever wanted to catch a glimpse of what goes on inside an embassy, but can’t get past the marine guards, *Inside a U.S. Embassy: Diplomacy at Work* provides a window into the lives of U.S. diplomats, Foreign Service Officers, and their families. The book’s firsthand accounts come from a variety of sources, from large embassies to small consulates, from Algiers to Zagreb. Whether helping stranded American’s return home or negotiating international agreements, the people who make up the Foreign Service are vitally important to America. *Inside a U.S. Embassy* proves that the answer to the question “What’s going on in there?” is “A heck of a lot.”  *IAJ*

Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) published in December 2011 *A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management* which presents a foundation for increasing individual preparedness and engaging with members of the community as vital partners in enhancing the resiliency and security of the nation through a “Whole Community” approach to emergency management. The booklet is intended to promote greater understanding of an approach that engages government at all levels with communities and individuals when responding to disaster and to provide a strategic framework to guide all members of the emergency management community as they determine how to integrate Whole Community concepts into their daily practices.

In preparing the document, FEMA is advancing the proposition that a community-centric approach for emergency management focused on strengthening and leveraging what works well in communities on a daily basis offers a more effective path to building societal security and resilience. By focusing on core elements of successful, connected, and committed communities, the agency believes emergency management can collectively achieve better outcomes in times of crisis, while enhancing the resilience of communities.

FEMA does not intend the document to be all-encompassing or focus on any specific phase of emergency management or level of government, nor offer specific, prescriptive actions that require communities or emergency managers to adopt certain protocols. Rather, it conveys an overview of core principles, key themes, and pathways for action that have been synthesized from a year-long national dialogue, led by FEMA, around practices already used in the field. While not a “how-to” document, it does provide a starting point for those learning about the approach or looking for ways to expand existing practices and to begin more operational-based discussions on further implementation of Whole Community principles.  *IAJ*

Survey Reveals Necessity of Interagency Cooperation

According to a survey conducted by the Government Business Council and Booz Allen Hamilton released in December 2011, sixty-five percent of federal managers say budget pressures will increase the importance of interagency collaboration. The survey is a follow-up to a similar report conducted in 2010 evaluating progress towards increased interagency collaboration and how budget pressures may change foreign policy. It also explores the idea of “smart power” – the
integrated application of defense, diplomacy, and development – to meet today’s most challenging national security issues.

However, the survey also revealed that though interagency collaboration is viewed as essential, there are still barriers to its application and many are skeptical as to whether interagency collaboration will lead to overall mission success. Such challenges include a lack of communication, lack of clear interagency policy, and presence of interagency politics.

The survey also found that federal agencies have shared mission priorities and goals, and respondents believe that agencies beyond the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development have the potential to help address geopolitical challenges. Respondents also cited humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, stabilization and reconstruction, and conflict prevention as target areas of smart power and interagency cooperation. 

**Interagency Legislation Update**

On October 19, 2011, The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Chaired by Senator Lieberman, marked up the “Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011” (S.1268) and reported it out of committee. In an attempt to expedite passage of the bill, Senator Lieberman agreed to have it introduced as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). By the end of November this amendment was packaged with 70 other amendments to be considered with the NDAA. Because of the objection of one Senator to only one of the 71 packaged amendments, the entire package of amendments, which included S.1268, failed to be included in the NDAA which was eventually approved by both the Senate and the House and signed into law by the President on December 31, 2011.

On December 22, 2011 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released the following cost estimate report for S.1268.

“S. 1268 would establish a Committee on National Security Personnel within the Executive Office of the President to improve the integration of national security and homeland security personnel. The committee would identify areas of interest for interagency cooperation among agencies responsible for national security and homeland security. CBO estimates that implementing S. 1268 would cost less than $1 million annually over the 2012-2016 period, assuming the availability of appropriated funds. Those costs would be incurred to implement new regulations, provide additional staff training, and to cover additional administrative expenses.

CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would affect direct spending; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. Enacting the bill would not affect revenues. S. 1268 contains two provisions that would have an insignificant effect on direct spending. The bill would rescind certain funds previously appropriated to the Department of Defense. In addition, S. 1268 would make it possible for a small number of Foreign Service officers to retire one year later than they would have otherwise. Postponing retirement would initially reduce retirement costs. However, that initial reduction would be largely offset in later years by a small increase in retirement benefits because the affected Foreign Service officers would have an additional year of service. CBO estimates that both of those provisions would have an insignificant net effect on direct spending over the next 10 years.”
The Counterinsurgency Center has begun the revision process of Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. First published in December 2006, it is perhaps one of the most widely read and followed field manuals in history. FM 3-24 has its critics and its apologists, but nevertheless, U.S. Army forces depend on it to guide planning and operations for on-going deployments worldwide. At the core of the manual are enduring principles and fundamentals based on history and lessons from contemporary operations. This revision will attempt to adapt applicable lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and other counterinsurgency and irregular conflicts globally to inform the writing team and contributing agencies and stakeholders. The Counterinsurgency Center conducted a webcast in November 2011 informing the counterinsurgency community of interest on the revision process, description of the analytical framework, and several key issues that require expert opinion and advice from the field. IAJ