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BOOK REVIEW

Radiological Nuclear Detection Task Force:
A Real World Solution for a Real World Problem

by Kevin L. Stafford

Introduction

President Barrack Obama’s signing of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), National Preparedness, in March 2011 marked an evolutionary step in the development of a “secure and resilient nation.” However, building core preparedness capabilities and establishing capability targets are of marginal value if the cumulative actions of federal, state, county, municipal, tribal, and territorial governments do not manifest themselves in the form of real world solutions. To meet the national preparedness goal, the U.S. must come to the realization that in all probability the mere issuance of guidance and conceptual frameworks to state and local agencies will not contribute to the development of core capabilities among the “whole-of-community” as outlined in PPD-8. If the nation is to make progress in accomplishing the President’s vision, the U.S. must recognize and take advantage of existing opportunities to move beyond the practices of the past. The core capability frameworks discussed in PPD-8 can be constructed using tools and techniques that exist today. Specifically, there are structures that effectively integrate federal, state, and local assets and provide both the methods and resources necessary to build cross-mission, multi-jurisdictional teams with the full range of core preparedness capabilities.

While this article does not address all the hazards and threats described in PPD-8, it offers an innovative approach to enhancing the probability of detecting radiological and nuclear materials that may pose a threat to the U.S. The U.S. can build an “all-of-nation” capability through the unique application of task force operations—a technique that has been repeatedly tested and
proven by both public agencies and private corporations for more than five decades. This task force concept would simultaneously provide radiological/nuclear detection assets to national and regional government core and surge operations to respond to events involving radioactive and/or nuclear materials.

“…[s]erve as the primary entity in the United States government to further develop, acquire, and support the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to detect and report on attempts to import, possess, store, transport, develop, or use an unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological material in the United States, and improve that system over time….”

In entrusting these considerable responsibilities to DNDO, Congress was careful to balance the states’ interests in protecting their citizens’ safety with an affirmative burden on the U.S. government to “…enhance and coordinate the nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response…. In so doing, the statute and supporting implementation policies did not provide the DNDO with the authority to mandate, fund, or otherwise compel state, county, municipal, or tribal agencies to participate in preventive detection initiatives or programs. Nor did they provide DNDO with either the personnel or the equipment necessary to independently conduct preventive radiation/nuclear detection activities.

Through a number of Homeland Security Grant Programs (State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative grants), the U.S. provides significant financial assistance to develop homeland security programs at the state and local levels. Based on the strategies developed and implemented by DHS, the U.S. government apparently believes that a combination of grant funding and strategic guidance will simultaneously empower and motivate state and local governments to build capabilities that will prevent acts of terrorism. In providing these and other financial resources, DHS enables state, county, municipal, and tribal agencies to identify, prioritize, and address their own unique planning, organization, equipment, training, and operational exercise needs. While
these funds can be used to build radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, it is important to note that none of these grants sets aside funds that specifically encourage state, county, municipal, and tribal partners to develop a radiological/nuclear detection program.

As the U.S. continues to develop and improve national preparedness goals and objectives, it must assess and understand the real world needs and capabilities of these partners. The federal government has overestimated the resources and capabilities of state, county, municipal, and tribal agencies to develop and deploy preventive and protective capabilities. The U.S. government should provide substantive operational, intelligence, and financial support, as opposed to merely providing counsel, advice, and guidance.

Historically, state, county, municipal, and tribal law enforcement agencies have not been responsible for detecting radiological/nuclear materials outside of regulatory control. As a result, few, if any, law enforcement agencies have developed a staff with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to effectively engage in radiological/nuclear detection activities. Further, most law enforcement agencies see marginal value in using scarce personnel and financial resources to address what they may view as a low risk threat to their communities, especially when the threat is not supported by credible information. While state and local agencies may view the threat of a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack as an issue more appropriately addressed by federal agencies, the allocation of assets to engage in purely preventive search activities for radiological/nuclear material, in the absence of a credible threat, is outside their scope of responsibilities.

**Current State**

In December 2011, the DHS issued the Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) based on a concerted effort by federal law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence community agencies, which identified the potentially catastrophic events that posed the greatest risk to the security of the nation. Included in the SNRA were two terrorist scenarios that involve adversaries engaged in separate and distinct acts of terrorism, one involving nuclear weapons and the other radiological materials. The first concerned a hostile, non-state actor acquiring fissile material and constructing an improvised nuclear device (IND) and then detonating the IND within a major, population center. The second scenario involved a hostile non-state actor acquiring radiological materials and dispersing them through explosives or other means (radiological dispersal device [RDD] or a radiological exposure device [RED]). The findings of SNRA addressing the potential risks to the U.S., stand in stark contrast to the nominal level of preparedness devoted to the prevention of a terrorist attack using radiological/nuclear materials.

In view of the documented risks associated with INDs, RDDs and REDs, has the U.S. done all it can to decrease the probability that an adversary could successfully possess, store, and/or transport a radiological/nuclear device or material in the U.S.? Are current strategies implemented by law enforcement agencies sufficient to detect, prevent, or deter a terrorist from using a radiological or nuclear device as described in either of the two SNRA scenarios?
Radiological Nuclear Detection Task Force (RNDTF)

The threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism are real and will require the U.S. to build the core capabilities described in PPD-8 and the National Preparedness Goal. And while the National Preparedness Goal recognizes the need to develop core capabilities, it relies heavily on individual state and local agencies to use grant funds to address regional priorities and develop a global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The capabilities to address what are essentially national security issues will not spontaneously evolve from the existing federal policies and practices. Any expectations that the perpetuation of such strategies will yield the capabilities to detect radiological or nuclear materials required in PPD-8 are inconsistent with past experiences in the distribution of DHS grant funding. It is neither necessary nor practicable to require state and local agencies to bear the burden of building and deploying detection capabilities necessary to prevent such attacks. In the same instance, it is not reasonable for state and local agencies to assume that the risk of a terrorist attack involving the use of an IND, RED, or RND is so low that they do not need at least a basic detection capability. The solution, at least in part, is to establish a standing task force focused on radiological and nuclear detection.

There are few, if any, state, county, municipal, or tribal agencies capable of building and sustaining preventive RND capabilities without financial support from the federal government. Current preventive RND efforts focus on developing federal capabilities in border areas and do not recognize the mutually dependent nature of these activities, nor the need to integrate support from federal, state, and local components to develop an “all-of-nation” capability. The RNDTF concept would provide a platform to build and sustain these capabilities. Regions would be able to undertake the activities necessary to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise task forces to prevent nuclear and radiological attacks. The National Advisory Board (NAB), Regional Executive Board (REB), and the RNDTF would coordinate and collaborate with federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to ensure the development and deployment of these “all-of-nation,” core capabilities. This structure would also facilitate the transition of deployed assets from prevention to response activities if an event develops.

To develop detection capabilities within state and local law enforcement, fire services, and other public safety and health agencies, the U.S. government must set aside funds that focus on developing and operating RNDTFs.

RNDTF Organizational Structure

The primary mechanism for developing policies, setting goals and objectives, coordinating resources, and obtaining funding for regional preventive RND activities would be the program manager for the principal federal agency, supported by a NAB. National program management responsibilities would be addressed based on existing agency statutory responsibilities. NAB assistance would come from a multi-agency executive board, composed of key stakeholders from within the
federal government and select members of RNDTF REBs. A REB would consist of representatives from state and local agencies and key regional representatives of federal agencies that comprise the NAB. Based on the policies and guidance issued by the NAB, REBs would make strategic decisions regarding the expenditure of funds allotted to them by DHS. The REBs would maintain significant flexibility in allocating assets to their respective RNDTF to maintain regional priorities, address the unique concerns of their communities, and meet the National Preparedness Goal. With the advice and counsel of the NAB and input from the REBs, the program manager would set policy and issue guidance to form the basis for national performance metrics.

Organizational Structure of the Radiological/Nuclear Detection Task Force Concept

**Operational Activities**

While national policy and guidance would come from the principal federal agency, operational activities would be conducted by regional RNDTF members, detailed from federal, state, and local law enforcement, fire departments, and other public health and safety agencies. The specific composition of the RNDTF would vary based on the availability and expertise of existing resources and would be at the discretion of the REBs. The REBs would serve as advocates for and provide strategic guidance to the RNDTFs.

The REBs would use the list of target capabilities developed by DHS as a guide to determine if regions develop and maintain organic detection capabilities or build a cadre of part-time task force members. In either case, RNDTFs would draw on existing personnel and share equipment resources to address preventive activities.
The multi-mission, multi-jurisdictional nature of the RNDTF provides a unique opportunity to integrate the whole-of-community (law enforcement, fire departments, intelligence and operation centers, academic institutions, private sector businesses, and other public safety and health organizations) concept in addressing a national security risk. In addition to providing a structure for the development of prevention and protection frameworks, the RNDTF can also be integrated into activities to mitigate, respond, and recover should protection and prevention efforts fail.

In issuing national policy, the program manager, in consultation with the NAB and REBs, should establish and ensure the RNDTF adheres to a common set of operating procedures. In an area as complex as radiological and nuclear detection, consistency in the integrity of the adjudication process is critical. A lack of common operating procedures may leave adjudication decisions to agencies that lack the operational experience and legal training to understand the subtleties involved in handling radiological and nuclear detection events.

One of the most significant benefits of the RNDTF concept is its ability to be deployed to other jurisdictions. To ensure RNDTF assets serve as both regional and national detection assets, members would be cross-designated to enable the program manager, in coordination with NAC, REB, and the agencies participating in the RNDTF, to relocate and surge assets to other regions as needed. Accordingly, RNDTFs simultaneously provide regional stand-alone radiological/nuclear detection capabilities and can be integrated into a national surge asset.

The organizational structure of the RNDTF provides the means and resources necessary to develop the whole-of-community strategic vision envisioned in PPD-8. In addition, the RNDTF provides a support infrastructure that strengthens national and regional relationships and enhances cooperation, which leads to the development of capabilities that would not otherwise be possible. By having access to information concerning the nature and scope of the activities being conducted by federal, state, and local agencies, the U.S. would be in a better position to make informed decisions on the future development of a GNDA.

Based on the part-time, cross-mission, and multi-jurisdictional nature of task forces, developing a focused, training program that meets the needs of federal, state, and local agencies is critical. Providing federally funded train-the-trainer and web-based training curriculums could facilitate the effectiveness and efficiency of this required training. The RNDTF setting provides a solid platform to share “best practices” and “lessons learned” among national detection assets, while enhancing the expertise of federal training resources such as DNDO, Department of Energy, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The success of the RNDTF concept depends on the DHS to provide specific budget allocations for the operation of the regional task force efforts, as opposed to the current, homeland security grant programs. In creating the funding, it is critical for the federal agency with statutory responsibility for program management to also have the authority to allocate funding in support of task force initiatives. Under this concept, the DHS would prepare a national RNDTF budget based on comparative threat assessments and performance metrics established by program managers. In coordination with the REB,
regional RNDTFs would be required to justify the need to develop or sustain the task force, and in so doing, build a consensus regarding the cost of task force operations across the region. On an annual basis, based in part on the region’s performance, regional executive committees would be allotted funding to develop and/or sustain preventive RND-related operations. Resource allocations, based on a combination of risk assessments and performance metrics, would assist in the development of both the regional and national aspects of a GNDA. The RNDTF would provide a reliable, long-term funding source to encourage regions to develop critical, national security, core capabilities.

Situational Awareness

In addition to the operational benefits, an RNDTF would facilitate the collection, analyses, documentation, and dissemination of the data/information obtained from deployed detection assets by developing recommended information and data collection and reporting guidelines. These guidelines would provide uniformity in developing requirements and establishing tasks for collecting data and information. Issuing and adhering to these guidelines would significantly increase consistency in collection efforts among domestic agencies and significantly increase the accuracy of the information collected in support of the development of a GNDA. Enhanced accuracy in the information collected in the development of a GNDA would permit the U.S. to make more informed decisions regarding the allocation of personnel, equipment, and funding resources among RNDTFs. Most importantly, the timely and uniform reporting of detection events generated by the RNDTFs would assist in providing regional and national decision-makers with near, real-time, situational awareness regarding potential radiological/nuclear threats.

Legal/Constitutional Issues

A successful radiological/nuclear detection program must result in a thorough and timely adjudication of the event, and the RNDTF must conduct actions in a thorough, consistent, and timely manner. To ensure an appropriate adjudication of detection events, the RNDTF must have a basic understanding of the science behind preventive RND activities and how these activities may raise constitutional and civil liability issues. Integrating prosecutorial assets into the RNDTF would be critical to facilitate the development of procedures and protocols necessary to address potential legal issues at both the state and federal levels. Potential legal issues include the following:

- Do agencies involved have the statutory authority to engage in activities to detect illicit radioactive/nuclear material?
- Does the radiation detection equipment used for law enforcement purposes meet the relevancy and scientific reliability standards for admissibility under federal law?
- Does an individual law enforcement officer’s testimony regarding his/her interpretation of the results from detection equipment and the subsequent adjudication of that event meet judicial standards...
established for relevancy and reliability of expert testimony?

As federal and state governments wrestle with the development of operational frameworks to meet preparedness goals, RNDTFs would permit agencies to evaluate the adequacy of existing statutes and regulations in facilitating investigative activities.

Conclusion

The development of the RNDTF would provide a structure that integrates the existing resources of federal, state, county, municipal, tribal, and territorial law enforcement, fire services, homeland preparedness, public safety, public health, and intelligence/information resources into real world capabilities that would greatly enhance the probability of detecting and preventing two of the most significant threats to national security. As the U.S. continues planning and drafting efforts to meet the requirements outlined in PPD-8 and the National Preparedness Goal, the RNDTF concept would enable federal, state, and local government to simultaneously develop the structures necessary to meet these requirements, while deploying real capabilities to the “whole-of-community”/“all-of-nation” to protect against threats involving INDs, RDDs, and REDs. To have resources available that would enhance the probability of interdicting and preventing a terrorist attack utilizing radiological or nuclear materials and not deploy them is not a lesson that we have to relearn. IAJ
The U.S. Interagency Role in Future Conflict Prevention:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams
for Select Partner Nations

by Kevin D. Stringer and Katie M. Sizemore

Introduction

The international strategic environment has shifted to a situation where peace is more threatened by weak states, whose instability is a breeding ground for violent conflict, than by the world’s most powerful actors.¹ For this reason, it is important to develop U.S. interagency conflict-prevention capabilities in selected partner nations. To date, several civil-military initiatives, such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, and counter-extremism projects in the Horn of Africa, have strengthened target-state capacity across multiple, conflict-prevention dimensions including security sector reform, institutional capacity building, and economic development.²

Yet, amazingly after a decade of expeditionary wars and despite these efforts, the U.S. government still needs a serious, mature effort to build a truly effective civilian-military assistance and capacity-building program.³ Notwithstanding endless panels, commissions, studies, conferences, and hand-wringing over the past decade about developing a whole-of-government capability, it has not happened. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) do not have the resources to undertake large-scale, protracted operations. No civil part of the U.S. government has a robust, expeditionary capability to help build legal, governance, and intelligence systems in alien cultures that lack a tradition of rule by law.⁴ Hence a deficit remains in the whole-of-government force structure for dealing specifically with partner

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nations in the conflict-prevention phase.

The key to future success in American interagency conflict prevention in weak or failing states depends on a proactive rather than a reactive approach. The current focus on developing expeditionary civilian capabilities to match the military’s prowess implies an ad-hoc reaction to crises in troubled lands. An alternative method is to pre-designate weak states that merit American national security attention and create standing interagency constructs at the partner-nation level to address the root causes of instability before these countries ignite into actual and debilitating conflict. A modified and permanent PRT structure provides an interagency model for tackling selected weak states through capacity-building at the local and operational levels. This proposal contrasts with the State Department’s current methodology of centralizing the coordination of civilian conflict response within the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, which in turn deploys its experts worldwide.

This proposed future PRT would be a permanent organization, based locally in identified countries, within the respective domain of the U.S. embassy country team. This organization would not focus on responding, stabilizing, or even mitigating ongoing conflict, but rather on preventing the escalation of violence before it occurs using a tailored, rather than overarching, method. This organizational recommendation also reinforces the concept that nation building in both pre- and post-conflict environments is primarily a civilian and not a military task. Nation building should not even be a de facto military mission. If the essence of building a nation is governance and economic matters, then the State Department should assume the interagency leadership role. State Department officers should lead a future interagency unit of action and integrate it into an existing national or regional organizational structure, such as the U.S. embassy country team.

This article elaborates on the concept of this future PRT by defining weak states, highlighting the importance of anticipation in conflict prevention in such states, and discussing the origins of the PRTs and their use in both Afghanistan and Iraq. It subsequently proposes how a modified, future PRT placed in priority countries could proactively address causes of conflict and strengthen the foundations of allied, but weak states before real conflict explodes. The article then describes a functionally-oriented PRT structure, while underlining the prerequisites for organizational success in terms of funding, personnel resourcing, and security for these new units.

**Weak States and Prioritization**

While there is no universal definition, a weak state can be characterized by decreased physical control over sovereign territory, a lack of a monopoly on the use of force, declining legitimacy to make authoritative decisions for the majority of the community, and an inability to provide security or social services to its people. Such states usually witness civil unrest, a slow or nonexistent economy, unaccountable governance, weak institutions, and a wide range of other factors, such as the presence of extremist organizations. Addressing conflict in weak states will remain a top priority for the U.S., but understanding their real threat remains somewhat elusive. Although reasons for state weakness or failure are complex, they are not unpredictable.

Conventional wisdom asserts that failed states constitute a dominant, national security threat that demands urgent efforts to stabilize them. In 2004, Francis Fukuyama stated that weak and failed states constituted “the single most critical threat to U.S. national security.” Less than a decade later, this assertion is questionable. Some failed states merely fail, with no particular danger to anyone. In many
cases, the reasons for state failure may be embedded in the political culture of the society, immune to outside help. In others, the efforts needed to stabilize such states are often so Herculean as to defy the attempt. Given the realities, policymakers must cast off the entire concept of state failure and evaluate potential threats to U.S. national security from weak states with a much more critical eye. With a more stringent risk assessment optic, only a limited selection of weak states will warrant the long-term attention of American national security decision makers.

Once identified, these weak states will pose a mix of security, development, and governance issues that can be addressed preemptively through the smart employment of U.S. administration resources to develop national capabilities. No single U.S. government agency has the expertise or resources to independently accomplish the wide range of activities needed to prevent and resolve conflict in weak and failing states. To date, U.S. initiatives to address weak states are limited by a lack of interagency cohesion. The U.S. does not have an official strategy or interagency guideline to follow when dealing with weak or failing states. Therefore, a window of opportunity still remains to integrate civilian and military activities in a proper organizational structure, at a reasonable cost, and at the local or tactical levels.

Preventive vs. Reactionary Approaches

Any new policy toward weak states should focus on prevention rather than on reacting to an already established conflict. Addressing the sources and causes of low-intensity conflict in weak states before they reach the high-intensity level is critical to the effectiveness of a new model. Preventive action means being proactive and having a civil-military force that is ready to help and understands the unique needs and issues that may be ongoing in a country at the national and local levels. Political, economic, and social programs are usually more valuable than military operations in addressing root causes of conflict. In addition, an interagency approach should focus on helping those that have invited assistance and can be helped, such as countries like Liberia, Mali, and Haiti. Therefore, formulating a new approach to weak states would require identifying four to five states that have a national security priority for the U.S., and subsequently piloting an effective conflict-prevention program within their territories. In this way, limited resources could be allocated for effectiveness as well as for mutually beneficial programs to take place. PRT-like units offer a path to achieving these goals.

Short History of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Provincial reconstruction teams are a part of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s response to the challenges of nation building in post-conflict intervention zones. The U.S. leads 12 of the 27 PRTs in Afghanistan and had 22 of the 31 teams in Iraq. PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq differed in both their compositions and missions, which will be highlighted in the following sections. Generically, PRTs are civil-military or interagency organizations designed to work in areas that have recently witnessed open hostilities. They were intended to create a transitional structural atmosphere to provide
security and facilitate reconstruction and economic development. First implemented by the U.S. in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, over time they became an integral part of peacekeeping efforts and stabilization and reconstruction operations in the wider, Central Command theater of operations.\footnote{14}

Initially, PRTs were characterized as an ad-hoc approach to security and development. Although composition depended on location and local circumstances in a province, the standard model first initiated in Afghanistan was military heavy. Their mandate stressed governance, force protection, and quick-impact development projects to win the population’s “hearts and minds” as a part of an overall counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. The emphasis on governance led to supporting Afghan provincial governors during public education campaigns for national assembly elections, providing a security presence during those elections, and educating people on alternative livelihood programs which, for example, led to an 83 percent reduction in opium production in Nangahar province.\footnote{15}

The security role of PRTs was limited to self-protection while providing a security presence and assisting Afghan forces. For development, earlier PRTs established relations with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and nongovernmental organizations that were already in Afghanistan. Despite the limitations of a restrictive mandate and their small size, PRTs provided technical assistance and training to Afghan police. One initial success was the key role PRTs played in the UN disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation of armed rebel groups.\footnote{16} In secure areas, PRTs were able to turn their attention to village improvement projects such as schools, clinics, wells, roads, and bridges.\footnote{17} PRTs were also able to act as the “eyes and ears” for policymakers by providing information on political, economic, and social trends at the local level. PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan supplied a steady stream of insights to brigade and division commanders on neighborhood conditions. They furnished operational foundations for COIN efforts by building ties with local populations, gaining knowledge of local politics and society, and developing governance and basic justice systems.\footnote{18}

Depending on where they were employed, PRTs faced a number of challenges because of their limited mandate and small size. Relations between PRTs and combat units relied heavily on personalities and individual circumstances, and these personal interactions are often cited as one of the strongest variables affecting the degree of success of PRT missions. Critics faulted PRTs for their mixed effectiveness and for lacking a clear method to evaluate their efforts. Although there are naysayers, PRTs contributed to the decentralization of power in Afghanistan with the strategic benefit of bringing decision making closer to the populations that should be served by the government. Finally, while not cheap to operate, they are less expensive than large combat units.\footnote{19}

PRTs in Afghanistan

The International Security Assistance Force Handbook described a PRT as “a civil-military institution that is able to penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because...
As President Karzai stated in February of 2011, “All the governors I speak to say that without the PRTs, nothing would happen in their provinces.”

**PRTs in Iraq**

In 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq decided to replicate the PRT program in Afghanistan and design a similar initiative for Iraq. The PRTs in Iraq were amended based on experiences in Afghanistan and were considered to be more interagency in their composition. Their mission statement agreed upon by both the State Department and the military was:

To assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

Unlike PRTs in Afghanistan, Iraq-based PRTs were led by a State Department official and were composed primarily of civilian personnel. They were initially envisioned to consist of six to eight core members. In addition to the State Department officer who headed the team, additional members included a military deputy, a USAID representative, a unit combat engineer, a unit civil affairs officer, and a representative from the Army major military command responsible for the security of the province, which usually meant a brigade.
While the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan were geared toward a conflict and post-conflict response, an adapted process for the future should focus on pre-conflict activities that take place on a larger scale and over a more fixed and longer period of time to ensure sustainable results. A modified PRT set-up, integrated within the State Department’s respective country team, would mean having a countrywide presence in selected weak states vulnerable to instability. A recent report published by the Center for New American Security highlighted this trend of civilian operations moving away from small, project-oriented programs in virtually every developing country to focusing on conducting fewer, yet better-scaled projects in targeted developing countries where progress is possible.25

As a first step the U.S. government would identify four or five states with national security relevance as pilots for a PRT conflict-prevention program. With current federal budget constraints and limited interagency resources, the U.S. government must forecast which weak states are relevant for future national security interests and invest there. This prioritization of effort finds precedent in the European Union’s Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, which limits its scope to only three priority countries in the region—Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—while recognizing the inextricable link between security and development.26 With partner states defined, the respective U.S. country team, working with the host government, would establish the number of PRTs needed for the country based on a provincial or regional basis, while identifying the type of development and stabilization projects required. Since different loci of power exist in many countries, and the emergence of economic regions as well as the rise of local nationalism for ethnic minorities heightens this diffusion of power, countrywide emplacement of a number of PRTs is a way to establish footprints in remote regions and go...
to the root causes of instability. A case in point for this approach would be a state such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, a vast country roughly one-quarter the size of the United States. Given its size, immense mineral wealth, strong regional autonomy, and ethnic conflicts, a number of power nodes and influence points exist far beyond the capital city of Kinshasa. Multiple PRTs are one way to establish a footprint in these other nodes of power and mitigate drivers of conflict. Another example would be a country like Mali, where the Malian national strategy focuses on insecurity issues in the northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.27 Here only a single PRT might be required for initial efforts.

The personnel composition of this future PRT should address the functional areas of governance, development, foreign internal defense, and law enforcement. For governance, the conflict prevention PRT would have two State Department Foreign Service officers, one as team head and one as the deputy team head. These officers would be either political or economic experts with requisite regional expertise. For development, the team would have one USAID representative and a single USDA officer. The former would manage classic development projects and funds, while the latter would address the extreme importance of agriculture and husbandry in many developing countries, as evidenced in Afghanistan.28

The internal defense function would be covered by a military officer with a civil affairs, foreign area officer, or Special Forces background. Foreign internal defense is defined as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The focus of U.S. efforts is to support the host nation’s internal defense and development, which can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from security threats.29

The assigned U.S. foreign internal defense lieutenant colonel or major would be supported by a senior non-commissioned officer. Lastly, the team requires a law enforcement component for developing local law enforcement agencies and addressing threats such as illicit trafficking, corruption, or illicit finance. This requirement is supported from historical feedback that noted the need for not only more development-focused and capacity-building projects, but also rule-of-law civilian expertise.30 This latter area would be covered by an appropriate generalist from the Department of Justice or Treasury. Other functional areas could be added based upon country requirements. Total PRT team size would be seven to ten individuals.

To ramp-up these PRTs, the U.S. government should address four fundamental areas: organizational funding, personnel staffing, PRT security, and governance. Assured funding for the teams and their projects is critical for survival. Optimally, Congress should mandate this financing on a multi-year basis to prevent money being reallocated by individual agencies, rushed project planning and design, and the development of a “use it or lose it” attitude. The funding should be administered by the State Department, with sufficient amounts available at the PRT commander’s discretion to initiate development, agricultural, and other projects. This practice would mirror the military’s ability in Iraq and Afghanistan to fund local projects. In
fact, small amounts of funding for seed projects seem to offer better prospects for development than larger sums. Small amounts also mitigate issues of corruption.

For staffing, these postings would be fixed, longer-term, and placed on the respective departmental personnel bidding lists. In Afghanistan, PRTs were successful in meeting with provincial officials, involving local communities, hiring locals, and sometimes incorporating training programs, but short deployments made it difficult for members to understand and engage with local politics. Any future model should address this personnel dilemma as an important component of long-term success. For the future PRT, personnel would be rotated from the various agencies through these fixed organizations on 18-month to 3-year assignments. For example, the State Department could assign an economic officer to the relevant embassy for 18 months and then rotate the person to one of the PRTs in the field for the remaining 18 months. Team members would report to and be evaluated by the U.S. ambassador or deputy chief of mission. Military team members would be granted joint service credit for these postings.

PRT security will demand a country-specific approach. Since these units are not operating in conflict zones, the security element could be smaller and adapted to local conditions. This calibration would be best determined by the embassy regional security officer in cooperation with the host government. Depending on the threat spectrum, security could be managed in three possible ways. One option would be for the host nation to provide security with the PRT military representative as the liaison officer or advisor to the national security force. A second option would be to use contract security, with the team’s senior military officer responsible for oversight. Lastly, U.S. soldiers from the Army National Guard or Reserve could be used in six-month rotational tours. For the latter variant, Citizen-Soldiers are preferred in order to capitalize on usable civilian skills given the local focus of the PRTs.

Lastly, the PRTs would be integrated into the local ambassador’s country team construct and report directly to him, and not to Washington-based bureaus. Unlike consulates, these PRTs would provide a balanced, interagency entity at the local level to address issues of security, development, and capacity building. They would strengthen presence and influence in important localities with a smaller footprint, while symbolically coming out from behind the embassy walls to address causes of instability and conflict. These direct PRT inroads into localities could create leverage opportunities for other embassy departments in areas such as trade, investment, information, public diplomacy, and business.

**Conclusion**

Conflict prevention is a challenging area for the U.S. interagency since it requires foresight, national security prioritization, and a willingness to work on the ground at the local level. Current Washington-based initiatives take on an expeditionary character, which implies reactions to crises rather than prevention. These expeditionary measures are also undertaken by agencies that do not have a tradition of organizing, planning, and executing such missions. This paper proposes a future PRT organization to be used in priority weak states with U.S. national security relevance. These civilian-led, modified PRTs would address governance, institution-building, development, and stability measures at the local level (province or sub-state). Strategically placed in critical regions in certain countries, multiple PRTs could provide direct local access to decision makers and populations while symbolically moving beyond the embassy walls. In this way, PRT personnel would “swim with the fish” of the population to premeditate causes of conflict.
The advantages of this modified PRT model are a fixed rather than ad-hoc organization, stabilized personnel tours, and a longer-term focus on capacity-building projects. With appropriate funding and staffing, such an entity could be piloted in one or two states to test the proof of concept. In this fashion, the U.S. interagency effort could move from the reactive back to the anticipatory front half of the conflict spectrum curve. IAJ

Notes

13 Traub, pp. 51-54.
14 See Nina Abbaszadeh et al., “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations,”


17 Also see Michael J. McNerney “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters, Winter 2005–2006, pp. 32–46.

18 Kemp, pp. 30–35.


30 McNerney, pp. 36 and 44–46.

31 Kuypers and Anderson, p. 6.

32 McNerney, pp. 36, 44–46.
**Interagency Collaboration By Design**

**by Alex J. Ryan**

**When Interagency Collaboration Goes Wrong**

Over the course of nine meetings of the National Security Council between September 13 and November 23, 2009, President Obama conducted a painstaking strategy review for Afghanistan. President Obama set the guidelines to encourage open inquiry. “We have no good options here,” Obama said. “We need to come to this with a spirit of challenging our assumptions.” The guidance for the second meeting reinforced this message. “We’re going to begin with interests … and then figure out what it is we want to accomplish, how we’re going to do it and eventually get to resources. We don’t want to talk about troops initially.” Yet at the eighth strategy-review meeting, they were still wrestling with the same basic questions raised in the first meeting. The President was presented with four strategic options. Two were infeasible; the remaining two were not distinguishable and came with a decade commitment and $889 billion price tag. Obama was increasingly frustrated. “So what’s my option? You have essentially given me one option.” What went wrong? Why did a team comprised of the most powerful and capable security professionals fail to generate credible options for the President?

Bob Woodward’s book, *Obama’s Wars*, offers some insights into the dynamics that undermined Obama’s intentions for free and open discourse. One issue was the factions that formed within the team. Coalitions are counterproductive to critical and creative thinking because they collapse the discussion into a tug of war between two poles and encourage participants to view “the other” as either ignorant, stupid, or evil. The first fault line separated Obama’s campaign team—the “water bugs”—from subsequent additions to the team. The second faction crystallized around the military chain of command, which put up a consistent and strong united front. Some perceived the
The very existence of an interagency team is an admission of the limitations of the organizations that have supplied its members. and often essential sharing of information, as evidenced by systemic over-classification of data and Office of the Secretary of Defense bans on sharing plans with other interagency partners until it has approved them and set them in stone.2

More disturbing was the lack of evidence that participants were learning and changing their perspectives or positions as a result of listening to one another. “People have to stop telling me what I already know,” Obama complained at one meeting. The camps were already in fixed positions by the first meeting. The military camp was firm on a 40,000 U.S. troop increase to implement a COIN strategy to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The opposing camp advocated limiting the increase to 20,000 troops for counterterrorism and training to defeat Al Qaeda and disrupt the Taliban. Yet the logic of both camps, which ran from means, to ways, to ends, was exactly the reverse of the debate Obama had initially envisioned. This is evident because even as the objective was clarified and narrowed over the course of the review, the size of the troop request advocated by each camp remained the same. The proposed approach for the review—working from national interests, to ends, to ways, and finally means—would have opened the door to learning. The actual approach encouraged confirmatory, information collection to validate predetermined means and drove an obsession with the size of the troop increase.

The issues that plagued Obama’s review of strategy at the highest level of government are by no means unique. The same underlying phenomena are present in almost any interagency team, regardless of level. Team members who have been promoted and rewarded for paying attention to their survival needs and those of their organizations assemble with stakeholders who compete for a limited pool of policy direction, influence, and resources. The very existence of an interagency team is an admission of the limitations of the organizations that have supplied its members. The enduring nature of the home institution contrasted with the temporary nature of an interagency project team means that it is irrational for a self-interested team member to place the interests of the interagency

“COINistas” to be wed to the counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine successfully developed and implemented by Petraeus in Iraq. The application of COIN theory to Afghanistan was evident in McChrystal’s leaked assessment. In opposition to the “COINistas,” a faction of six dissenters, led by “contrarian” Vice President Biden, met separately on half a dozen occasions to promote Biden’s “counterterrorism plus” option. Other rifts were evident between the military chain of command and its civilian equivalents in theatre, as well as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

A major source of tension arose from information flows that circumvented the chain of command. Most famous was the Rolling Stone article that resulted in General McChrystal’s resignation, but leaks and breaches of protocol also led to the removal of NSC Chief of Staff Mark Lippert, numerous reprimands, and rescinded reports. Having options aired publicly made the President feel boxed in. Leaks also encouraged a hollow debate. If reports of genuine fighting got out, it would create the impression that the President had lost control. The cumulative effect of leaks is to institute policies to control information that inhibit valid
team before the interests of his/her home organization. Add to this the universal human instincts to protect perceptions of competence and authorities, and defensive routines and turf wars become an inevitable part of interagency team dynamics.3

Fortunately, not all teams are predestined to spiral into dysfunction. Small teams are, in fact, a pivotal tool for coping with complexity, given effective regulation of group dynamics. Checkland and Poulter observe that “typical discussions among professionals are characterized by a remarkable lack of clarity... different voices will be addressing different issues; different levels, from the short-term tactical to the long-term strategic, will be addressed; different speakers will assume different timescales. The resulting confusion will then provide splendid cover for personal and private agendas to be advanced.”4 To avoid this, they advocate mapping out models of purposeful human activity from multiple perspectives and using these models as a source of questions to help focus group discussion.

This paper will address whether there is a way to add some structure to interagency collaboration to better leverage the latent experience and multiple perspectives that are present in any interagency planning team but often not tapped because of differences in values, priorities, culture, language, and expectations. A methodology for interagency collaboration must be:

• Inclusive of diverse perspectives.
• Integrative of the contributions of individual agencies.
• Flexible to the scale and range of interagency challenges.
• Robust against power dynamics.

The following section will briefly review existing tools and approaches to interagency collaboration, identify a needs gap not met by the existing approaches, and propose a new approach to conceptual planning called design recently adopted by the U.S. Army and the Joint Force. Subsequent sections will illustrate how design addresses some of the limitations and complements existing approaches to interagency collaboration.

**Recently, there have been a number of notable efforts to improve interagency collaboration. They include scenario-based planning, conflict assessment frameworks, multilayered assessment, and operational planning systems.**

**Current Approaches to Interagency Collaboration**

Recently, there have been a number of notable efforts to improve interagency collaboration. They include scenario-based planning, conflict assessment frameworks, multilayered assessment, and operational planning systems. This section will briefly assess each of these contributions.

Scenario-based planning involves generating a range of alternative future scenarios, which allows planners to assess the robustness of contingency plans by cross-testing the plan developed for one scenario against the full suite of scenarios. An example of interagency scenario-based strategic planning was Project Horizon—an effort to explore and improve interagency coordination using scenario-based, strategic planning—which included the participation of nine U.S. government departments and six U.S. government agencies or organizations.5 One of the most enduring outcomes from Project Horizon was the
network of relationships formed between the participating agencies’ strategic planning cells. A second resource, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), diagnoses conflict situations for the purpose of conflict prevention, crisis-response planning, or post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. A successor to the U.S Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Conflict Assessment Framework, the ICAF was developed in 2007 by an interagency committee co-chaired by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) and the Agency for International Development’s Office of Conflict Management, with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other agencies. (In November 2011, the S/CRS became integrated into the State Department’s newly formed Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations [CSO].)

The ICAF is an iterative process that starts by exploring the context of the conflict situation. Next, it inquires into the core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience. The third step studies key actor motivations and means as a way to identify drivers of conflict. Step four looks for windows of vulnerability and opportunity. The ICAF does not produce a plan, but it can inform planning. Irmer recognizes the need for a planning process that is consistent with the philosophy of complexity theory underpinning the ICAF. “Untested, as of yet, is the enormous potential for employing the results of an ICAF in a planning process also predicated on a complex, adaptive system approach.”

A third resource for interagency collaboration is the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program. Prioritized by the Joint Staff and executed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Rapid Fielding, SMA provides planning support to commands with complex, operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not within core service or agency competency. Beginning in 2007, the annual SMA conference brings together planners from across the U.S. government with analysts and researchers from academia, government, and industry to focus multiple perspectives on complex, operational themes. In addition to the annual conference, several multilayered assessments are conducted on regional issues each year.

A fourth resource is an operational planning system. In 2007, the Interagency Management System (IMS) was developed as the official vehicle for coordinated planning among interagency stakeholders. If the IMS were triggered, the S/CRS planning and operations division would provide the core team. However, the IMS has never been triggered and has been de-emphasized as an operational concept since 2010. Further, when S/CRS was transformed into the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the scope of its mandate was reduced from an interagency leadership/coordination role to a supporting role for analysis and strategic planning for conflict prevention and crisis mitigation.

Although the IMS may never be executed in its entirety, the basic structure is still of interest as a potential model for interagency collaboration. The IMS utilizes a four-stage planning framework consisting of situation analysis, policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation planning. Ideally, situation analysis is ongoing and includes a comprehensive assessment using the ICAF. Policy formulation provides clear policy options, which outline the assumptions, risks, benefits, overarching policy goal, and strategic objectives (major mission elements) in a policy advisory memo. Separate planning teams are established for each major mission element, which produce the element concepts. The strategic plan must address resource requirements and availability for each major
mission element. Implementation planning then refines the strategic plan, maps donor inputs to identify gaps, establishes short-term and long-term targets, and determines the mechanisms for executing and assessing the strategy.

**The Gap in Interagency Collaboration**

The purpose of scenario-based planning is to anticipate a range of future threats and opportunities in order to inform investment decisions in future capabilities. For example, Project Horizon conducted strategic, interagency, investment planning using a 20-year planning horizon. Scenario-based planning can help to coordinate interagency capability development. However, it is not intended to inform strategies and operational plans for present-day operations.

The ICAF provides an accessible starting point for developing shared understanding of the drivers of conflict for current operations. However, it does not directly link this understanding with a strategy for intervention within the conflict situation. The framework recognizes the need for a component called “segue into planning,” but planning itself is not a part of the ICAF. The ICAF is designed for conflict situations, but this is only a subset of interagency issues, which may involve issues such as energy security, food security, epidemics, and natural disasters.

The SMA methodology provides a science-based approach to analyzing a complex strategic situation from multiple perspectives. SMA provides a deep, rigorous, and broad survey of existing knowledge on a particular region or theme. The quality of the SMA product depends on access to international experts and a sufficiently stable problem to perform and publish in-depth analysis. Because it would be difficult to dramatically scale up the number of concurrent SMA studies or scale down the length of time required for an SMA without diluting the quality of the analysis, SMA can only be performed on several strategic issues per year. The SMA feeds into military or interagency planning during the course of action development phase.

Scenario-based planning is future focused, while the ICAF and SMA provide support to interagency planning and decision making, but do not by themselves produce a strategy or operational approach. Most of these approaches have struggled to maintain traction. There is no successor to Project Horizon, the transformation of S/CRS into a State Department bureau has left DoD as the primary champion of the ICAF, SMA has been shifted between agencies several times, and the IMS has never been activated. Most importantly, none have addressed steady-state planning, which is the most frequent and continuing need. Interagency planning for current operations therefore must use an operational planning system, such as the IMS or Joint Operational Planning Process. But these types of rational decision making models assume that:

- Participants agree on the rules of decision making.
- Participants share a common language.
- Organizational and cultural contexts do not significantly influence decision making.
- The problem or goal can be clearly identified and agreed on by all participants.
- The problem can be solved by an
instrumental rationality of allocating means to ends.

- The basic required means are known and will be available.
- Information required to make a decision is available or can be acquired.
- Consistent choice criteria are agreed on by participants.
- The environment is relatively stable during the decision-making process.
- Sufficient time is available to generate, consider, and evaluate alternatives.
- When planning occurs at multiple levels, decision making is nested and proceeds from the top-down.

Unfortunately, as Obama’s Afghanistan strategy review illustrates, in strategic and operational interagency planning situations, few if any of these assumptions hold. The real world of politics; egos; private agendas; group dynamics; and annual, agency-specific, congressionally-earmarked budgets, all embedded in a rich cultural and historical context, bears little resemblance to the doctrinal convenience of rational actors logically deciding on the basis of course of action comparison. To be effective, interagency collaboration under real world conditions requires a planning approach that relaxes these restrictive assumptions.

Figure 1 illustrates the contribution of design for interagency collaboration. Like the SMA approach, design emphasizes the importance of multiple perspectives for appreciating a complex, operational environment. However, whereas SMA layers the various perspectives, design synthesizes different perspectives to construct a systemic explanation and a single, coherent logic. Design integrates art and science—creative and critical thinking—to reframe the environment from new perspectives. It also integrates sense-making with decision-making to connect new ways of seeing innovative forms of intervention. Whereas rational planning procedures view current operations, emerging threats, and future contingency operations through the framework of the prevailing paradigm (the taken-for-given assumptions that bound the scope and direction of inquiry), design constructs new frameworks capable of recognizing new potential that is not obvious within the current paradigm. In this way, design expands the space of the possible.

**Using Design to Structure Interagency Collaboration**

The U.S. Army recently updated its doctrine for operations to include a new methodology for design. According to Major General Edward Cardon, “Design represents the most significant change to [U.S. Army] planning methodology in more than a generation.”13 The change is significant because it recognizes the incompleteness of planning founded on the rational decision model as a basis for organizational problem solving.14 Instead, as the name suggests, design draws on an alternative intellectual tradition associated with professions that often cross disciplines, such as architecture, industrial design, urban planning, and engineering, to solve real-world problems. After World War II, professionals within these disciplines began to reflect on the knowledge and skills required for professional mastery. They began to write about design.

Different domains of design exhibit...
significant variation in the medium of expression, the degree of external constraint, and the possibilities for quantification. Yet in spite of these differences, these fields share a common ethos that is often called “design thinking.” Design thinking enables the application of this approach in other professions. For example, Roger Martin contends: “The most successful businesses in the years to come will balance analytical mastery and intuitive originality in a dynamic interplay that I call design thinking.” For Martin, “design thinking for business broke down into three essential components: (1) deep and holistic user understanding; (2) visualization of new possibilities, prototyping, and refining; and (3) the creation of a new activity system to bring the nascent idea to reality and profitable operation.” A similar adaptation of design thinking for U.S. Army operational planning is evident in Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, The Operations Process. Design is also broken into three activities to “understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them.” The three activities are framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing an operational approach.

There are several characteristics of design that render it particularly suitable to interagency collaboration. First, design has been described as a meta-perspective, which means design does not commit to a single theory of learning. Instead, the first question a design team asks is how will it learn about its unique situation? This learning process requires considering alternative perspectives to the current institutional paradigm. From the very start of the design process, it is inclusive of the variety of experiences and perspectives brought to the design team by its participants.

Second, design inquiry is centered on egalitarian discourse. Design’s discursive structure facilitates holistic understanding, in contrast to traditional, rational, decision-making approaches that decompose problems into functional areas, which are then parceled out to subject-matter experts. While the latter approach may be more efficient for detailed planning, it is less effective in resolving interlocking issues because solutions to sub-problems have unintended consequences that often defy simple deconfliction. Achieving deep, shared understanding and reaching a shared vision is essential to the principle of unity of effort for interagency collaboration.

A further benefit of design discourse is that it is relatively robust to power differences among team members. Before a team can reach shared understanding, it must develop a shared frame of
This process involves surfacing assumptions, challenging definitions, and negotiating boundaries for inquiry, which prevents the team from adopting a dominant frame of reference unquestioningly. Having a shared, public frame limits the influence of private agendas.

Fourth, design inquiry is loosely structured and iterative. There are no checklists or rules specifying the steps in which design activities must be completed and no templates for design products. Instead, there is a governing logic that relates design activities into a coherent whole, which means design is inherently flexible and scalable. The design methodology can be tailored to the time available, the unique nature of the situation, and the scale of the interagency response. In a crisis-response situation at the tactical level, design can simply be a facilitated discussion with a couple of whiteboards, guided by questions such as: What seems to be the story here? Why are we being asked to intervene? What has changed? Where is the potential for improvement? What opposes and what supports our vision for improvement? What pattern of actions can transform the situation for the better? How will we continue to learn about the situation? At the other end of the spectrum, design efforts have continued productively for over three years of steady-state planning.

Fifth, even though the U.S. Army has pioneered the operational application of design thinking, the design methodology is hardly limited to military operations. Indeed, the original intellectual development of design thinking arose largely in a commercial context. The methodology does not rely on military-specific concepts, such as enemy, target lists, wargaming, or the battlefield. The broader concepts within design, such as the system of opposition and system of support, fit naturally in the context of interagency collaboration.

Conclusion

President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy review illustrated the difficulties of interagency collaboration and demonstrated the need for a disciplined approach. This review of scenario-based planning, conflict assessment frameworks, multilayered assessments, and operational planning systems concludes that these tools, while useful, still leave an important needs gap for a robust and effective approach to interagency collaboration.

Designing does not replace scenario-based planning, conflict assessment frameworks, multilayered assessments, or operational planning systems, all of which make important contributions to interagency collaboration. However, it can usefully complement these tools under certain conditions. When rapid changes in the world render old patterns of thinking irrelevant, designing can help to reframe the situation. When politics, individual biases, and group dynamics threaten to undermine rational decision processes, designing can help to generate shared frames of reference to make sense of complexity. When faced with a unique situation and a perceived need to act, designing can enable innovative strategy development and organizational learning. So long as change, politics, and unique action situations are present in interagency teams, design can be of value.
Notes


2 Jane Miller Floyd, Project Horizon participant, personal communication.


6 Floyd.


11 Oscar De Soto, a former S/CRS Director of Plans, personal communication.


Whole of Government is Half an Answer

by Michael R. Eastman

Stability and reconstruction operations have garnered a great deal of negative attention over the past decade. Both supporters and opponents of these missions acknowledge the vast array of inefficiencies, bureaucratic squabbles, and economic waste associated with reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly, there have been genuine difficulties associated with stability and reconstruction operations in our recent experiences. Some are due to the enormous complexity of rebuilding a war-torn society. However, the preponderance of responsibility is properly laid at the feet of those government organizations charged with executing these missions. Having assigned blame, there is also no shortage of solutions offered to fix the problem. Proposed reforms generally involve adding to bureaucratic overhead, shifting and consolidating governmental responsibilities, or simply lamenting what could be done if only this department or that agency pulled its share of the load.

A different approach is necessary. An objective look at government-centric reforms highlights the inevitable shortcomings of fixing stability and reconstruction operations by tinkering on the bureaucratic margins. Organizational resistance to these missions will not be overcome by adding a bureau here or an assistant secretary there. This is not necessarily bad news. In a post-conflict environment, the primary governmental agencies charged with executing stability and reconstruction work face significant, understandable limitations on their abilities to perform these sets of tasks.

However, political objections and organizational culture notwithstanding, the requirement for some stability and reconstruction capacity is likely to be with us for the foreseeable future. Despite recent official statements indicating a reluctance to commit to further long-term reconstruction efforts, history has shown that rebuilding societies to preserve the hard-fought gains of war has been as persistent as war itself. Not only has the U.S. been involved in more than a dozen stabilization and reconstruction operations in the past two decades in places such as Haiti and Afghanistan, the United Nations has also conducted sixty missions under its auspices since 1948. Failing to
improve on our current approach only ensures that future stability and reconstruction efforts remain hampered by the lack of preparedness and capability that marked our initial efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

To prevent a repetition of these shortcomings, reforms should focus on redefining those tasks best suited to our existing governmental structure and institutionalizing them to the exclusion of others. An enduring solution leverages the strengths of our agencies as currently structured while recognizing their weaknesses. The military, for example, has a clear role in reestablishing basic services in the aftermath of a conflict. Expanding its role into long-term reconstruction projects ignores serious shortcomings in the Department of Defense (DoD) for this type of work. Similarly, the State Department must retain the lead in foreign diplomacy efforts but is ill-suited to coordinate the entire spectrum of local development projects. No amount of interagency cooperation will create efficiencies on the scale needed for this particular approach to be effective. At the same time, it is critical to acknowledge the vast, untapped potential in private and nongovernmental organizations.

To achieve a lasting solution, we first need a redefinition of terms. Stability and reconstruction have come to mean different things to different agencies and are often used interchangeably. Semantic clarity should be followed by a clear division of labor. Select interagency structures must be responsible for developing and monitoring long-term strategic plans. The military should be tasked with the immediate reestablishment of essential services while the State Department coordinates the transition to civilian oversight of longer-term programs. To the extent possible, the private and nongovernmental sector should provide the expertise and services necessary to carry out these and other missions. This approach leverages capabilities present in our current government structure while avoiding the tendency to pursue expansive, duplicative transformation plans that run counter to organizational realities.

**Redefining Fundamental Terms**

Interestingly, the State Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) does not define stability operations. Stability as used in this blueprint document is a descriptive term connoting the absence of disruptive elements or forces in a state. It is a condition to be achieved or preserved, rather than a discrete set of tasks to be pursued. This presents real problems for practitioners attempting to prioritize between short-term actions intended to address immediate needs and longer-term programs that focus on achieving enduring change. Often, the two are in direct conflict. For example, short-term employment projects common in Iraq and Afghanistan have immediate benefits but inherently distort private labor markets and local expectations in the long run. Absent a clear definition of tasks and purposes, both short- and long-term projects can and have been used in the pursuit of stability.

As currently employed the term reconstruction is also problematic. A common sense definition of the word implies simply rebuilding what existed before. In practice, however, that is seldom the case. Reconstruction over the past decade has come to mean replacing systems, infrastructure, and practices with more modern, often Western versions of what existed before—in short, nation building. Too often this is done with little thought to the sustainability...
of the end product. Even less deliberation is given to whether or not a practice, institution, or system is culturally appropriate. Countless examples exist of modern water distribution systems, power plants, and schools that begin to fail as soon as the ribbons are cut due to a lack of maintenance, insufficient skilled labor, or insensitivity to local political dynamics.

This practice is not intentionally malicious or wasteful. It is frequently the result of well-intentioned, Western experts applying their technical knowledge within the constraints of U.S. governmental construction and contracting standards. Setting aside the propriety of this approach, it certainly begs the definition of reconstruction.

Current Army doctrine does little to clarify the situation by including a broad range of activities under the umbrella term of stability and reconstruction operations. Specifically, “Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development,” while “Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development.” On the one hand, there is clear recognition that the military role is one of supporting interagency actions in a broad sense, with the emphasis in stability operations on the short term. However, the manual goes on to add that “in the event civilians are not prepared to perform (their assigned) tasks, military forces will assume that responsibility.” These additional tasks include rebuilding national institutions, reviving the private sector, and developing representative government, a list that blurs the line between stability and reconstruction by requiring the same organization do both short- and long-term work simultaneously.

Clarifying basic terms is a necessary first step toward improving effectiveness. From a military perspective, stability operations have their conceptual basis in the tactical. Their goal

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Countless examples exist of modern water distribution systems, power plants, and schools that begin to fail as soon as the ribbons are cut due to a lack of maintenance, insufficient skilled labor, or insensitivity to local political dynamics.
With a distinction between critical and sustainable stability as a starting point, we can then assign roles and responsibilities across existing government agencies...
operations over the past several decades: the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DoD, predominantly in the form of the U.S. Army. Each of these three organizations possesses varying levels of capacity to carry out this mission and differing levels of expertise related to the myriad tasks involved.

The obstacles to post-conflict operations are well known. In general terms, the Army alone possesses the capacity in manpower, equipment, and funds, to execute the bulk of stability and reconstruction operations. However, post-conflict reconstruction has never truly been accepted as a core task in Army culture. If it were, directives intended to elevate stability and reconstruction operations as co-equal to major combat operations would be unnecessary. Consequently, institutional expertise and doctrine in this type of mission are lacking. The State Department, while ostensibly possessing the requisite expertise in good governance and rule of law, suffers from a lack of deployable civilian capacity and an inability to perform large-scale missions without significant military support, as evidenced in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It also possesses a long-standing culture that emphasizes the central role of the embassy as a coordinating arm, further limiting its ability to synchronize countrywide, reconstruction efforts. USAID, while the most experienced arm of government in the area of long-term economic development, increasingly relies on contracted organizations, often with mixed results and frequently without an integrated, overarching strategy that aligns with its foreign service or military counterparts.

These organizational shortcomings necessarily result in a hybrid, frequently ad-hoc approach to stability and reconstruction operations, with the military in the lead in some cases, the State Department in others, and the role of USAID generally ill-defined in both. This trial-and-error approach to post-conflict reconstruction is exacerbated by differences in operating emphasis, organizational timelines, and agency cultures. The resulting friction is marked by missed opportunities, a lack of coordination, and far too little to show for our national investment of blood and treasure.

Historically, efforts to correct these shortfalls focused almost exclusively on either expanding existing governmental agencies to perform reconstruction tasks or creating synchronizing agencies to improve interagency coordination. For example, DoD 3000.05 directed the military to elevate stability and reconstruction operations “to the same level as major combat operations,” a daunting task in the current fiscal environment. This effort included a significant investment in education and training, development of a directorate of stability operations, numerous working groups, and additional flag officer oversight. Conversely, recent statements from senior defense leaders indicate a decision to minimize future commitments to long-term military reconstruction missions. Although driven by understandable budgetary concerns, it remains unclear how organizational desires will align with political realities in the coming years.

The recently released QDDR offers another example of governmentally-focused
reforms. The document opens by declaring the Department of State the lead agency for “responding to political and security crises” and identifies several steps intended to bolster critical civilian skills, empower USAID, and improve the cost-effectiveness of development initiatives, all unquestionably vital for future stability and reconstruction missions. Such initiatives, though well intended, underestimate the challenge of overcoming organizational culture and bureaucratic inertia.

The State Department is the logical choice to represent the nation in stability and reconstruction efforts. Unfortunately, the State Department’s culture is one of government-to-government diplomacy and “lacks…expertise in relief, reconstruction, and development, as well as the operational capacity” to perform this complex mission. Efforts to address these shortcomings are praiseworthy, and improving the capabilities of USAID is an important step forward. Problems arise when theoretical concepts meet with reality on the ground. Aside from the difficulties already experienced in building a deployable corps of civilian experts, State Department plans to utilize the chief of mission as the integrator of potentially hundreds of different organizations, contracts, and programs face significant hurdles. With minimal staffing, difficulties operating in a conflict environment without military support, and a culture that favors high-level diplomacy over grassroots execution, it is unclear how centralizing control under the embassy will improve effectiveness.

Reenergizing USAID enjoys the greatest consensus as a positive step. With a long history of development work and a cadre of deployable experts, returning USAID to the forefront of post-conflict reconstruction efforts makes good sense. Yet even this initiative faces serious obstacles. While nominally the implementing arm of State Department policies, differences in organizational culture, budget authorities, and outlook between USAID and State remain significant. Put simply, diplomacy and development are not the same. Organizational culture clashes between USAID and the State Department impede consensus on the development of strategy. This problem is only magnified when development funding allocations frequently reflect transitory, legislative branch interests rather than prioritized, strategic decisions. Even the addition of a coordinating agency like the recently inaugurated State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations is likely to fall short in attempts to bridge the gap when strategic planning remains a joint effort between two organizations lacking a shared organizational culture. This is no new revelation; numerous scholars and practitioners have identified the limitations of this endeavor. Options already offered to bridge the divide range from elevating USAID to Cabinet status to creating a new, independent agency focused strictly on development and reconstruction.

Such approaches overlook the vast potential in synchronizing government oversight with private, civil, and nongovernmental organizations already performing a great deal of work in post-conflict environments. By focusing strictly on improving interagency cooperation, reformers assume that stability and reconstruction work demands a purely governmental solution. This is not necessarily

By focusing strictly on improving interagency cooperation, reformers assume that stability and reconstruction work demands a purely governmental solution. This is not necessarily the case.

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the case. Limited recommendations to expand civilian capacity and increase funding as the only feasible ways to improve effectiveness are similarly flawed. Organizational realities and the lessons of the past decade would seem to argue against both. A more appropriate way ahead breaks from this well-worn path.

Government certainly has a role in developing a strategic vision, funding stability and reconstruction operations, and monitoring implementation. Success in this effort requires greater interagency cooperation, which necessarily includes making better use of the regional combatant commands and gathering a corps of deployable civilian experts. Improving strategic coordination among key governmental agencies in existing structures and focusing the military on the immediate tactical mission of critical stability allow each organization to play to its strengths. At the same time, we should avoid the chimera of a wholly governmental solution.

**Guideposts for Future Reform**

Reforming our national approach to stability operations is an exceptionally complicated task and one well beyond the scope of this article. However, if the revised definitions for critical and sustainable stability are accepted, they do lend themselves to a set of proposed principles that can guide this effort.

The first principle: **The government owns the role of strategic stability planning.** While the State Department’s chief of mission retains overarching responsibility for U.S. activities in a given country, neither the embassy nor a bureau located in Washington, DC, is the optimal setting for long-term strategic planning. Instead, we must continue to mature interagency representation and cooperation at the combatant commands. These commands are regionally focused by design; possess significant staff, planning, and intelligence gathering capacity; and have a vested interest in maintaining stability in their areas of responsibility. This is not an attempt to militarize development work, and measures may be necessary to ensure that planning is not narrowly focused on security concerns at the expense of other aspects of sustainable stability. Stability plans would clearly require joint approval from both the State Department and DoD. However, migrating day-to-day stability planning to the combatant commands ensures that existing regional interagency capabilities are maximized in times of peace as well as war.

The second principle: **It is an inherently governmental responsibility to monitor the implementation of stability-oriented projects and programs.** Not only does this ensure that American funds are spent responsibly, but centralized oversight serves to synchronize efforts with strategic intent. Even allowing for wide variations in local requirements, a uniform approach to contracting, inspections, and labor practices ensures that implementing partners and local populations across a country receive equal treatment. A revitalized USAID assisted by a growing corps of deployable civilian experts is, in principle, the most appropriate agency to perform this role. Tasks especially suited to the agency’s mission would include refining national-level plans for local conditions, identifying appropriate local and nongovernmental partners, and monitoring implementation.

The third principle: **The armed forces are responsible for implementing immediate post-conflict critical stability tasks.** Training and doctrine should focus on those skills necessary to address humanitarian, economic, and security needs in the short term, which is a subset of the much more expansive list of tasks currently under consideration. Additional focus will be necessary to better define the transition from critical to sustainable stability. However, this avoids the pitfalls of young Soldiers and Marines acting as heroic amateurs, dabbling
in long-term development projects they are rarely suited to perform. Despite a much narrower definition of critical stability, the list of tasks and skills necessary for success remains significant but manageable for a military under increasing fiscal pressure.

The fourth and final principle is aimed at leveraging the potential in nongovernmental partners: **Look to civic, private, and nongovernmental partners for the implementation of sustainable stability tasks whenever possible.** This simply acknowledges that the structure of development aid has evolved over time. As depicted in the 2010 Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances, “government aid accounted for only 25 percent of the developed world’s total economic engagement with the developing world,” trailing remittances, global philanthropy, and private investment.16 Trying to solve the entire problem with one quarter of the funds makes little fiscal sense, particularly in the current economic climate.

Partnering with nongovernmental entities also taps into their hard-earned expertise and frequently their familiarity with the country in question in ways that cannot be achieved by a purely governmental approach. Local groups have the best sense of local conditions, and while vetting would certainly be needed to prevent abuses, an engaged USAID could certainly undertake this role. Of course, there are sure to be occasions when local conditions prevent the entry of volunteer, private, or civic organizations. In such instances, our recent experiences with the rapid growth of private security companies in Iraq and Afghanistan would seem to indicate that a market-based, contracting approach to stability operations could attract sufficient business interest to fill the gaps. Tasking the military to perform long-term projects well outside its professional expertise is hardly the best option, for reasons previously mentioned.

Political rhetoric opposing all forms of nation building notwithstanding, stability operations will be with us for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, budgetary pressures, political weariness with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and organizational cultures will all gravitate away from preserving the hard-fought lessons of the past decade. The American people and their leaders must understand that engaging in effective, sustainable stabilization is extremely cost-effective in the long run. Rather than capitulate to short-term, political considerations, governmental reforms should be undertaken now in order to optimize our existing structure for future operations and institutionalize what we have learned. This is best achieved by a clearer allocation of roles and responsibilities, underpinned by a common understanding of the meaning of critical and sustainable stability. By relying more on nongovernmental and civic organizations for implementation under the strategic guidance and monitoring of government, the U.S. can position itself to more effectively perform these critical missions in the future. **IAJ**
Notes


9. Ibid., pp. 4–27.


The Role of the Military Chaplain in the “3D” Process

by Jon E. Cutler

As an African tribal chief said to me, “One must be willing to sit under the same tree and talk; that is the most important and most difficult step.”

Military chaplains within the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) are the main religious representatives of the U.S. government on the continent who routinely engage religious leaders. They play an important role in collaborating with African religious leaders to nurture working relationships and strengthen partnerships regarding conflict resolution and peace building. I was privileged to be the first Jewish chaplain to hold the position of Director of Religious Affairs and become a part of this effort.

A striking example of the possibilities of peace building was a project to bring Muslim and Christian youth together to address grassroots issues. I, along with an official from the U.S. embassy, met with Jaffer Senganda, President of the Muslim Centre for Justice and brainstormed ways to get Muslim and Christian youth to work collaboratively. The result was a clean-up day in Kampala, Uganda, on October 7, 2011. The event attracted 5,000 Christian and Muslim youth between the ages of 18 and 35. Because of recent tensions between Muslims and Christians as a result of the rise of religious extremism in both communities, this was the first-ever collaborative program between Muslims and Christians and, according to Senganda, a great success. Because of that success, there is now potential for future projects and the beginnings of an inter-faith youth organization.

Unlike the U.S., where Constitutional boundaries between government and religion abound,
African societies fully integrate religion into the public sphere, and it is an anathema for Africans to live otherwise. Given that the mission of CJTF-HOA is to build partnerships with African nations, religion had to be brought into public discourse and doing so has reaped significant rewards in fulfilling the CJTF-HOA mission. This article examines: (1) the underlying tension between the secular and sacred within national and international affairs; (2) the changing role of chaplaincy in the U.S. military and its influence on international affairs; (3) how this changing role has resulted in sustaining achievements; (4) challenges within the changing roles; and (5) ground work for the future.

The Debate between the Secular and the Sacred

One of the hallmarks of Western modernity is the demarcation between secular affairs and religious practices. By its very nature, secularism limits private expression of religious faith in public settings. This bifurcation has become institutionalized within government, law, commerce, science and technology, foreign affairs, the military, and various dimensions of social life. Secular institutions are not by definition anti-religious. They are non-religious. Secular institutions focus on matters for all citizens, regardless of faith. The military, like other institutions of public life, reflects and reinforces this.

As such, most Americans wear cultural and religious blinders as they engage the world. In his introduction to Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, Douglas Johnston states U.S. government “…the rigorous separation of church and state in the United States has desensitized many citizens to the fact that much of the rest of the world does not operate on a similar basis.”

Religion’s narrative tells of the human condition, especially life and death. It is how most people define themselves, and it shapes the culture, mores, and norms that drive decisions as witnessed on 9/11. When President George W. Bush used the term “crusade” in reference to the 9/11 attacks, there was an immediate backlash from the Muslim world because of its historical religious connotation.

In a post 9/11 world, secular institutions need to adjust their understanding of how religious identity shapes human interactions and the global experience. As a society, we need to foster self-reflection and know our own religious sensibilities before we try to engage other societies. We need to comprehend the depth to which religion and politics interact in shaping the perceptions and motivations of individuals and societies.

Even though religious, extremist violence is a backdrop, it is the countless mundane ways that people live their lives and demonstrate their faith that is not noticed.

Religion is a force in today’s world. Religions structure meaning and purpose for billions of people. Religions can foster both ill, as a catalyst to violent conflicts, and good, as a potent force for brokering reconciliation and sustaining peace. Even though religious, extremist violence is a backdrop, it is the countless mundane ways that people live their lives and demonstrate their faith that is not noticed. For example, Africans demonstrate their religious practices and commitment in the public realm every day. In their world, religion does not operate on the margins of society. They live in a world that recognizes no clear distinction between private individual faith and secular public life.

We are beginning to understand that we
cannot hold a sacred-secular divide and be effective in building bridges to other cultures. With U.S. military engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa, Americans have witnessed that religion is one of the most potent forces shaping societies and individual attitudes and perceptions. “Sustainable security cannot be achieved without engaging societies’ own internal ethics. This in turn requires a deep understanding of the local context—a context that is suffused with religion.” Without understanding the spiritual-religious dimension of a culture, the ability to “win the hearts and minds of a people” is lost. Chaplains are the only resource at the disposal of the command to engage religion and society in the areas critical to the U.S. military.

**U.S. Military Chaplaincy**

The military needs to increase religious awareness to leverage its strategic value. Secular approaches to religion and the military relegate the responsibilities of the chaplain to personal and private dimensions of faith. The chaplains’ essential focus is intended to be on the spiritual life and pastoral care for the warriors and their families.

But within the past ten years, the military chaplain’s role has evolved and expanded to actively engage with religious leaders to establish trust relationships. The end state and purpose for such engagements is to promote regional stability and to advise military commanders on the religious implications of command decisions and their effects on conflict or peace in the region. The new role challenges the secular definitions and expectations of military policy.

While the chaplain’s fundamental adherence is to the traditional responsibilities, the circumstances of post 9/11 brought about evolution and expansion. Military chaplains are at the cutting edge of a significant new ministry that includes encouraging traditional religious leaders to stand up against violent extremism.

By the very nature of being religious, military chaplains understand the significance that religion plays in the life of an individual, society, or nation. As a person of deep faith, a chaplain has gained legitimacy, public respect, and credibility with religious leaders that the combatant necessarily has not. Chaplains understand and respect religious teachings, rituals, and practices, which creates an affinity with other religious leaders that can bridge the spiritual divide.

Working cooperatively in a multi-faith and multi-cultural environment, chaplains understand that there can be respectful cooperation without compromising individual faith. With one foot in the religious world as a chaplain and the other in the secular world as a military office, chaplains are well suited to act as intermediaries in areas of conflict and instability. “Senior military chaplains bring to the table all these factors: high credibility joined to a wide range of professional expertise and experience in working across religious divisions.”

The presence of a U.S. government religious professional sends a positive message to those countries where religion has a significant role in policy and diplomacy, and where religious leaders play an important role in governance. Chaplains, as well as other religious leaders, are potentially a valuable resource for preventing conflict and mediating differences because of...
the religious legitimacy they bring to the table. Military chaplains have been engaging with religious leaders from the Spanish-American War to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. “There is significant precedent for chaplains to conduct religious leader liaison, and they have unique qualifications to make it effective.”

Interaction with religious leaders and institutions in Afghanistan had been inconsistently addressed by military, diplomatic, and development officials. Beginning in October 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Carroll, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), began to develop a religious leader engagement program for the II Marine Expeditionary Brigade that addressed the tendency for religious leaders to be ignored in military and diplomatic engagement. Carroll observed that “the most credible voices to counter the Taliban’s rhetoric were moderate mullahs themselves,” so Carroll requested a U.S. Navy Muslim chaplain “to extend the reach of the religious engagement program.”

This development makes it clear that a sustained, consistent, well-thought-out, religious leader engagement program supports and advances systematic engagement of religious leaders at the provisional, district, village, and farm levels and creates another line of communication whereby coalition forces can promote their mission of stability, and Afghans can voice their needs and commitment to a stable future. However, due to a lack of maturity, personal beliefs, education, and interpersonal skills, not all chaplains are qualified to engage with religious leaders. Within the Chaplain Corps, some question whether using chaplains for religious engagement outside the military community is the most effective and productive use of a chaplain, especially as they decrease in number.

To address the issues of this debate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, in November 2009, to provide guidance and direction on these new responsibilities. Chaplains at CJTF-HOA actively engaged with not only partner nation chaplains (Kenya, Uganda), but also prominent religious leaders in East Africa. JP 1-05 defines chaplain’s support of engagement as “any command directed contact or interaction where the chaplain, as the command’s religious representative, meets with a leader on matters of religion to build relationships based on trust and understanding, to ameliorate suffering, promote peace, and the benevolent expression of religion.” In addition, “religious affairs in joint military operations will require a variety of actions supporting different types and phases of operations.”

CJTF-HOA’s mission seeks to strengthen partnerships with Horn of African nations (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan) working through individual country teams, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. embassy officials. This is a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to support African partner nations to build and maintain stable and effective governments and societies. Long-term stability in Africa is a vital interest to the U.S. As a result, the Office of Religious Affairs, CJTF-HOA, added a new standard to the traditional role of a chaplain to meet the end goals of the mission.

With the mission to bring stability and security to the region of East Africa, chaplains...
have become instrumental in meeting these objectives by engaging East African civilian and military religious leaders. Because conflicts have torn the social fabric of the African societies, displaced millions of people, traumatized communities, and drained the continent of material and human resources resulting in destabilized governments and communities, it is religious leaders throughout Africa that have consistently shown the most promise for improving the quality of life of people and making positive changes in socioeconomic conditions. As such, they are highly influential and trusted in African society and are in key positions to play crucial roles in promoting peace and security.

The end state is simple, but achieving it is quite difficult. The common goal shared by the peoples of the two major African religions, Christianity and Islam, is for individuals to live in peace and security and to live a life that allows them to raise children who will become healthy, productive adults and heads of their own families.

Challenges within the Changing Roles

One of the greatest challenges was that the religious affairs mission was not integrated into the broader operational and tactical mission of CJFT-HOA—engaging with African military and civilian officials, training African militaries, and being involved with humanitarian efforts, civil affairs, and engineering projects. CJFT-HOA had a definite objective for the mission of religious affairs: the chaplain takes care of the spiritual and emotional well-being of military personnel especially “down range” in Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania. When it came to the chaplain engaging with military and civilian religious leaders, the objective was to counter violent, religious extremism without further instructions. Due to the traditional understanding of the role of the chaplain, it was difficult for the command to shift its thinking on how to use the chaplain to engage with religious leaders, especially civilians.

Since the mission of religious affairs was never integrated into the long-term or short-term planning process, the previous chaplains who held the position of director were challenged to create their own directions and objectives, which were not necessarily always in alignment with the CJTF-HOA mission and end state. With each new director, the program was driven more by personal style. The chaplain became “a lone ranger.” It is essential, therefore, that the mission of religious affairs be integral to an overarching strategic plan. Unity of purpose and singleness of objective are essential to ensure that the individual pieces contribute to a strategic whole.

In order to strengthen CJTF-HOA’s mission, it was important to find a means to integrate religious affairs by creating an operational order (OPORD), an executable plan that directs a command to conduct an operation. An OPORD describes the situation, the mission, and what activities will be conducted to achieve the mission’s goals. In December 2011 in conjunction with J3 (short-term planning section), an OPORD for religious affairs was generated and signed. The mission of religious affairs has now become integrated and institutionalized into the overall mission of CJTF-HOA.¹⁰

The unique status of being a Jewish chaplain (rabbi) brings several challenges. Before my first engagement, the command leadership of CJTF-HOA raised concerns. The Director of Religious Affairs represents CJTF-HOA, as

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It is essential...that the mission of religious affairs be integral to an overarching strategic plan.
well as AFRICOM. As a rabbi, my presence could provoke a negative and even a hostile reaction from Muslim and Christian leaders and compromise the mission of CJTF-HOA. Another fear was that Muslim leaders would not be able to separate me, a Jewish American military chaplain, from the politics of Israel. A final concern was that there would be no common ground for us to further a relationship.

In my entire tenure, I found the opposite to be true. This challenge turned into a great opportunity, because none of the religious leaders had ever met a Jew before, much less a rabbi. I took the opportunity to educate them on Judaism and the common ground that we share as adherents to the tradition of Abraham. I found the vast majority of religious leaders were quite open and respectful. In the long term, this could have positive effects on shaping religious discourse between Muslims and Christians.

For example, I met with the Supreme Judge of the Islamic Council of Ethiopia, Sheik Ahmed Chello, several times. Because of my relationship with him, I was able to help resolve an issue with a water project for a mosque which was built by CJTF-HOA. The Sheik made me promise that on my next visit I would teach him about Judaism. He wanted to learn about Judaism so he could teach it to his people.

Another interesting outcome of being a rabbi was that I found myself in a unique situation. Being neither Christian nor Muslim, I was a “neutral party,” and some Muslim leaders were able to talk to me about their issues with Christians, and some Christian leaders were able to express their concerns about Muslims. For example, Ugandan Evangelical Protestant ministers expressed their fear that the parliament of Uganda will enact Sharia (Islamic law) as part of the new constitution. With the fear came anxiety about their own security in Uganda and strong negative views toward Muslims. It became clear that my eventual goal was to address the concerns to lessen the tension points, leading to the interfaith clean-up day mentioned previously. Therefore, I was able to identify the fault lines between Christian and Muslims groups and take action to mitigate them.

However, my ability to discern tensions by no means reduces the complexity of religious life in East Africa, another. Not only does mistrust exist among religious groups, but there are also fault lines with exclusively Christian groups and exclusively Muslim groups. Within each nation are numerous tribes with diverse cultures and languages. Then religion is added with its distinct set of difficulties. Even though Christians and Muslims are present within each nation, the percentage of Christians and Muslims varies from nation to nation. For example, Djibouti is 99 percent Muslim, and Ethiopia is 80 percent Christian. Christianity has its own internal dynamic, and it varies from nation to nation, such as in Ethiopia where the dominant form of Christianity is Ethiopian Orthodox with a growing Evangelical Protestant presence. In Kenya, the dominant denomination is Anglican, but along the coast the dominant religion is Islam (80 percent).

The same holds true for Islam. Even though the majority of Muslims are Sunni in East Africa, there is a significant presence of Sufi (Ethiopia), Aga Khan (Uganda), and Salafists (Tanzania Coast and Zanzibar). Adding to the complexity is the extremist elements within...
Christianity and Islam. The extremist, Islamic group, Al Shabah, based in Somali, is a direct threat along the Swahili Coast of Kenya and Tanzania and actively seeks Muslim youth to fight in Mogadishu. Extremist Protestants groups build their churches in exclusively Muslim villages to actively seek converts. There is even a small Jewish presence in Uganda.

In addition, there is another layer of complexity with direct engagement, and that is who is the chaplain engaging with, the local imam or the Mufti for all of Uganda, the parish priest or Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the local Assemblies of God pastor in a remote Tanzanian village or the Security General for all Evangelical Independent Churches of Africa? Each encounter will have a different dynamic, agenda, and end state. Each stakeholder has a distinct personality style as well. And there are times that the chaplain engages with religious organizations, which mean the engagement is with a small to large number of people—councils, boards, elders, etc. Each encounter comes with its own internal dynamic and politics. These organizations can be local, national, regional, continental, or international.

For example, I engaged with the Kenyan Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA), a national organization, on several projects and worked with 14 of its board members. I also engaged with the All African Conference of Churches, an international organization that represents 130 million people and 173 different Christian denominations in over 47 African nations. I also met with a local, county board of five Muslim leaders in Mbale, Uganda. A chaplain needs to be mindful of the level and scope of each interaction.

The final challenge was trying to explain the role of the military chaplain and Director of Religious Affairs for CJTF-HOA to the religious leaders. Since there is no context that they can relate to, I explained in terms of representing the U.S. military as a religious leader wanting to partner with them to help bring peace and stability to the region.

**Sustainable Achievements**

It took five months visiting East African religious leaders and religious organizations to establish a direction and to put in place a plan with clear end states for sustainability and continuity. The result was a CJTF-HOA chaplain who was an ambassador, facilitator, and bridge builder between U.S. military chaplains and African military chaplains.

“Religion is an integral part of the lives of the people of East Africa. It has the potential to foster increased social tolerance and respect aiding the suppression of instability and conflict...The CJTF-HOA chaplain is often viewed by Key Religious Leaders as an ambassador that can facilitate engagements which unite populations in cooperative activities and aid the construction of counter-Violent Extreme Organization narratives. Aiding key religious leaders and religious organizations that oppose violent extremist ideologies ultimately constricts the space in which those organizations operate and render their ideologies irrelevant.”

Religious, violent extremism is a threat to American interests and stability within East Africa and a direct threat to East African nations and the entire continent. One of the more effective means to meet the threat is to make religious, violent, extremist organizations
irrelevant by helping to build African capacity and capabilities.

The cause for instability and the lack of peace in East Africa is found at the grassroots—lack of opportunities for African youth, poverty, HIV, etc. Religious organizations are one of the few institutions in Africa that have earned trust among the people and can effect change. The CJTF-HOA chaplain can bring together Christian and Muslim organizations and leaders who share the values of peace and stability and their willingness to work together in order to resolve grassroots issues. Working cooperatively sends a clear message that transcends the negative differences and sets examples for others to work together. The role of the CJTF-HOA chaplain is that of the “honest broker.”

As a facilitator, I brought religious organizations together and supported them as they worked to find solutions. By being a broker I engaged the “3D” (defense, diplomacy, and development) process working with officials from the U.S. embassies who introduced me to the religious leaders and organizations. In turn, the embassy officials accompanied me to meetings with religious leaders and contacted U.S. funding sources.

It is the youth of East Africa who are the most vulnerable to be recruited by violent, extremist organizations because of the lack of opportunities and very few prospects for a future. It is the youth who are at risk and, at the same time, have a stake in resolving this. Therefore, one of my objectives was to engage with religious youth organizations and to bring them together to start working on how to resolve daunting problems within their respective countries.

There were two objectives. The first task was to identify youth organizations that shared the values of peace and security and connecting them to funding sources through the U.S. embassy. Such an organization is the KMYA, which has a strong infrastructure and an extensive, positive track record in combating Muslim extremism. They have established a speaker’s series to educate the Muslim youth about the dangers of extremism and have educational and job training programs. The second task was to connect youth organizations with each other to build strength through cooperation. My agenda was to connect KMYA with other youth organizations both Christian and Muslim throughout East Africa. The KMYA connected with the Muslim Centre for Justice and Law in Kampala, Uganda, and the Active Youth Christian organization in Mombasa, Kenya, which in turn connected with the Muslim Centre for Justice and Law. Because of these connections, Christian and Muslim youth organizations in Mombasa, Kenya, replicated what was done in Kampala, where 2,500 Christian and Muslim youth participated.

Through this process of engagement, Christian and Muslim youth leaders came together to share their values of peace and stability. A goal is to bring together more such leaders to address African challenges to peace and security, form enduring partnerships with East African Muslim and Christian communities, and develop educational programs and community projects to promote peace. This process has broader ramifications because it demonstrates to the world that Muslims and Christians can live next to each other and work together, thereby, making religious, violent
Another CJTF-HOA objective was to build enduring relationships between East African partner nation militaries and the U.S. military to share best practices. The only nation that has a military chaplaincy in East Africa is Kenya. Kenya has three principal chaplains who are in charge of the chaplaincy and approximately 100 chaplains serving the army, air force, and navy. Each principal chaplain represents one of the three official religions of Kenya—Roman Catholic, Islam, and Protestant. The purpose was to develop a supportive and cooperative relationship and to share best practices between U.S. military chaplains and the Kenya military chaplains, specifically at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.

I met with the three principal chaplains in Nairobi and invited them to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti to engage with the U.S. military chaplains to learn about U.S. chaplaincy, and for American chaplains to learn about Kenyan military chaplaincy. The principal chaplains learned about the organizational structure of U.S. military chaplaincy and professional chaplaincy and met with counselors from the Fleet and Family Service Center to learn about family and military separation and deployment, post traumatic stress syndrome, alcohol abuse, etc. American chaplains interacted with the principals and learned about the structure of Kenyan chaplaincy and the role of the chaplain within the Kenyan military.

Subsequently, three junior-grade Kenyan chaplains were invited to Camp Lemonier for a three-week program to accomplish the same goals. The idea was for the Kenyan chaplains to be fully integrated into the base activities such as preaching, counseling, and space visitation. The program covered 26 hours of familiarization lectures and 10 hours of personnel visitation with three participating U.S. chaplain mentors. The Kenyan chaplains preached at worship services, attended different worship services, received an orientation to the Chaplain Assistant program from Army, Navy, and Air Force enlisted personnel, and presented a Kenyan cultural briefing to the U.S. chaplains and their assistants.

One Kenyan chaplain was particularly appreciative of the training section on advisement and developing non-sectarian prayers. At first, he did not see the value of the non-sectarian way of praying, since it is unnecessary in his context. However, after discussion with an American chaplain, he said it gave him much to consider.

Besides the role of facilitator and relationship builder, the role of the chaplain is to be an ambassador, not only for the U.S. military, but also for the U.S. government. In coordination with four U.S. embassies (Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia), CJTF-HOA, and AFRICOM’s Office of Religious Affairs, we were able to bring an American Imam, Shakur Abdul Ali, to visit Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda during the observance of Ramadan. The purposes were for Imam Shakur to interact specifically with Muslim leaders and organizations and to develop positive relationships, to put a positive face on the U.S. government’s respect and tolerance for all religions, especially Islam, worldwide and in America; to counter any negative views toward America and Islam; and to demonstrate in action the cooperation and friendship among clergy from different faiths.
Imam Shakur explained to Christian ministers and leaders about how Jesus is revered in the Quran. Shakur quoted passages from the Quran referring to Jesus (Issa in Arabic). None of the Christian ministers that we spoke to knew about Jesus being revered in Islam. One minister said “he will have to study Islam and the Quran.” Imam Shakur and I were on two radio programs in Mombasa, Kenya and in Mbale, Uganda. There were over one million listeners. Since it was a call-in program, the result was positive feedback and appreciation that the U.S. government respects Islam.

One of our visits was with a Christian youth group in Mombasa, Kenya. The director of the youth group was so motivated by our visit and program he wrote to me: “I was a participant in a workshop on peace and conflict resolution organized by the U.S. Embassy. I represented a local organization...as we strive to make ourselves and the youth at large more responsible part of the citizenry, if not the MOST responsible.”

The general consensus was that Muslim, Jewish, and Christian chaplains traveling together and speaking on panels and to individuals put a positive light on America as integrating Muslims into society and dispelled the myths that the U.S. government is anti-Islam. This program also showed the cooperation among Muslim, Jews, and Christians and how American society fully integrates all religions. The four U.S. embassies were so positive about the program and the rewards it gained that they requested the same program for next Ramadan. This is another example of interagency cooperation between the U.S. embassies and the U.S. military.

The Way Forward

The complexities of the persistent world conflicts have generated new interest in the role and work of chaplains. This has been incorporated within military strategic planning as evidenced by the publication of JP 1-05. However, there is continued debate within some military circles especially with the Chief of Chaplains for Army, Navy, and Air Force on how to mitigate risks that may be associated with an expanded chaplaincy mission. With the reduction of forces even within the Chaplain Corps, chaplains are stretched thin to provide even the traditional types of services. Can the Chaplain Corps afford to redirect a resource to engage with religious leaders without jeopardizing its essential mission? Can a chaplain perform both of these services given the amount of time each takes? Are chaplains educated and trained for this secondary role?

We live in an interconnected and interdependent world in which human rights, political democracy, and particular religious loyalties matter profoundly. Winning the hearts and minds of local people by respecting their diverse religious beliefs and cultural orientations is more critical than ever. Thus, it is important to understand that underlying religious dynamic can sometimes make the difference between success and failure.

Clearly, if one hopes to gain the full benefits of a broadened mandate to transform nations and societies, U.S. government agencies—State, military, and USAID—must have a basic familiarity with the religious imperatives at play within their areas of responsibility.

Even when chaplains liaison with civilian religious leaders, there is consternation with some State Department officials that chaplains are overstepping their bounds and stepping

...there is continued debate within some military circles ...on how to mitigate risks that may be associated with an expanded chaplaincy mission.
into diplomacy. Even with those debates and concerns, military chaplains stand at the cusp of an exciting and immensely significant, new era of ministry. Because military chaplains are the only ones trained to effectively communicate across religious boundaries, they are the best choice to interact with indigenous religious leaders. The presence of a religious professional sends a strong message to these countries that the U.S. government recognizes, affirms, and values their public discourse, and that religion has a legitimate place as a tool of diplomacy in mutual relations. Religion cannot be ignored; it is a force in today’s world. IAJ

Notes


5 Ibid., p. 96.

6 Ibid., p. 98.

7 Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 13, 2009, p. III-5. As the preface spells out: “This publication provides doctrine for religious affairs in joint operations…provides information on the chaplain’s role as the principal advisor to the joint force commander on religious affairs and a key advisor on the impact of religion on military operations….It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities…provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for the US military involvement in multinational operations.”

8 Ibid., p. III-1.

9 Operation Order 12-008, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn Of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Religious Engagement (Unclassified), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, December 16, 2011. The mission of strategic religious engagement was incorporated via Operations Order 12-008 into the overall mission of CJTF-HOA. This is one of the first Religious Affairs OPORD to be incorporated into a Combined Joint Task Force Mission.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.
A Forum for Interagency Collaboration:

The

National Counterterrorism Center

and the

Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series

by Greg Keeney

On December 6, 2011, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) celebrated its seventh year as the primary United States government organization for integrating and analyzing terrorist-related intelligence. The center was established in 2004 by Presidential Executive Order 13354 and codified by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that effectively amended the United States National Security Act of 1947. The establishment of the NCTC was a watershed moment in America’s history, as it was charged with the mission to bridge the gap between America’s international and domestic counterterrorism capabilities. It was the first step in the U.S. government’s effort to consolidate its counterterrorism resources into a joint operational planning and joint intelligence enterprise that incorporates the capacities of 16 departments and agencies. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, proved the nation required a comprehensive, holistic approach to safeguard the homeland and protect American citizens. NCTC was established in response to this need.

Over the past decade, NCTC’s capabilities, along with those of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have matured. Although, the Director of NCTC does not have the authority to direct or execute counterterrorism missions, he reports both to the President of the United States and the Director of National Intelligence on issues related to counterterrorism intelligence and readiness. Through the National Security Staff, NCTC is accountable to the President on specific counterterrorism issues that relate to planning, policy, strategy, and preparedness. NCTC is also responsible for reporting to the Director of National Intelligence on intelligence and information-sharing agreements that influence counterterrorism planning, policy, strategy, and preparedness internationally and domestically. The scope of responsibility of the Director of NCTC is vast, but it is an important aspect of the nation’s counterterrorism architecture if the nation is to move forward.
in its ability to thwart, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks against interests at home and overseas.

One specific program, the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS), is a component of the nation’s counterterrorism apparatus that addresses national preparedness, as well as intelligence and information-sharing aspects of the NCTC mission. The program was introduced in 2010 during a conference in Monterey, CA, and is organized in collaboration with the DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a means for state, local, and city officials and private sector entities to identify gaps in their response capabilities to a complex, multi-incident, domestic terrorist attack within their jurisdictions. The workshop is a one-day tabletop exercise that allows them to address regional preparedness to respond to a domestic terrorist attack.

At the core of the workshop is an attack scenario that is developed for a particular city within the U.S. The scenario is geographically focused using the particular tactics and techniques employed by terrorist organizations (open-source documents, Internet, and other means to obtain information about a specific target of interest). Workshop participants are provided with a set of tools and the scenario in advance to allow each federal, regional, state, and local entity sufficient time to digest the situation and provide insightful comments during the workshop. The realistic scenario is researched and validated by an NCTC team of planners. Providing the scenario and supporting matrices to the workshop participants helps level the playing field for all participants. These realistic sets of circumstances enhance the participants’ ability to identify capabilities gaps within their respective jurisdictions.

The workshop series and its scenario are based on the November 26, 2008, Mumbai, India, terrorist attacks, during which members of Lashkar-e-Taiba conducted near simultaneous attacks that led to 174 killed and multiple people injured. The attacks specifically targeted Mumbai’s Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels, the Cama hospital, the Nariman House business and residential building that contained a Jewish outreach center, a railway station, and a local café. During the attacks, ten terrorists were successful in keeping security forces at a distance for more than three days; nine were eventually killed and one taken prisoner. The attacks began within minutes of each other and quickly overwhelmed local law enforcement, fire and rescue, emergency medical, and public transportation systems that were not adequately equipped to deal with a catastrophe of this magnitude. The event was eye-opening for the international community, because a terrorist attack of this magnitude had not occurred since 9/11 when the terrorists employed only one method of attack—commercial aircraft. Mumbai demonstrated a terrorist organization’s capacity and will to conduct multiple attacks over a short period of time by employing numerous tactics. Although a Mumbai-style attack is the foundation of the JCTAWS scenario, the NCTC scenario developers take into account past, current, and recently-developed terrorist tactics and techniques and incorporate them into their scenarios when appropriate.

During 2011, JCTAWS working group members from NCTC, DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the FBI, commonly
referred to as an interagency planning group (IPG), conducted six workshops. Five more workshops are planned for 2012, and more are projected in 2013. It is during these workshops that state, local, and city entities and private sector participants identify regional capabilities, self-identify their capability gaps, and discuss emergency response planning as it pertains to administration, intelligence, information, operations, logistics, training, communication, equipment, emergency services, and authorities related to a complex, multi-incident, domestic terrorist attack in their respective jurisdictions.

Initially, the IPG conducts a planning meeting with the prospective city and performs an area assessment of potential targets, which it incorporates into the framework of the workshop’s scenario. All related research is conducted physically in the city or through the use of open source methods and Internet—the technique utilized by Lashkar-e-Taiba prior to the Mumbai attacks. Then the IPG works closely with the host city to provide invitations, set up a registration site, and develop a specific, geographic scenario and relevant federal, regional, state, and local response matrixes for use during the workshop itself. During the workshop, an initial plenary session is conducted to walk through the events, followed by break-out sessions that talk through specific actions related to operational response, senior command, and community coordination.

An important and unique aspect of the workshop series is that NCTC follows up after the event and provides the city with a summary report. This report provides a quick reference of the workshop scenario, the detailed response matrices, capabilities gaps, and other points of interests. These documents are presented to the city during a post-workshop meeting with city law enforcement officials. NCTC and other members of the IPG continue to engage with the city leadership after the workshop to assist in its efforts to address capability gaps, share best practices, and check on the status of progress over time. The JCTAWS host cities continue to engage with the IPG and other agencies throughout the process and beyond their participation in the workshop. The JCTAWS program is a continual process that hopes to expand its efforts to assist cities with developing their unified response plans and implementing resources to mitigate their capabilities gaps.

The participants in a JCTAWS workshop represent a vast spectrum of government and public sector entities to include government officials, law enforcement, fire and rescue, emergency medical, emergency management, public works, public health, mental health, and Department of Defense (DoD), as well as private sector entities to include telecommunications, tourism, commercial industry, commerce, transportation, railways, maritime, and other geographically-focused commercial entities. The level of participation is representative of a whole-of-government approach many communities have established within their existing emergency response plans and emergency response institutions.

Typically, the complexity of the exercise scenario challenges even the most well-rehearsed, comprehensive, response plan, which can potentially be overwhelmed even with the most robust, emergency response, preparedness architecture. The objective of the workshop is to discover, in a collaborative environment, capability gaps and apply best practices and
available resources to mitigate a complex, multi-incident, terrorist attack. To this end, the workshop enables a community to better prepare itself to respond more effectively through understanding, insight, and specific knowledge of their particular geographical operational environments and available resources.

NCTC in collaboration with other U.S. government interagency partners has exported a complementary JCTAWS effort internationally. Using the framework of the domestic JCTAWS workshop scenarios, the international JCTAWS program provides the host nation a scenario based on its strategic objectives and geographically-focused on the host nation’s national, provincial, local, and city infrastructure. The focus of the international program is to build communal understanding, develop international partnerships, mentor a capabilities assessment process, and provide lessons learned from America’s perspective countering terrorism in the international community and expands upon America’s efforts to build counterterrorism partner capacity and international cooperation. The challenges to thwart and respond to terrorist attacks are not specific to the U.S. The U.S. can also learn from its international counterterrorism partners.

The domestic JCTAWS program is an effective forum to build an environment of collective understanding across the spectrum of city, local, state, regional, and federal entities as well as with important private sector entities. Internationally, these workshops forge bonds and strengthen relationships between the U.S. and its counterterrorism allies around the world. The formal structure established by laws, policy, strategy, and authorities are supplemented by informal relationships built prior to a domestic emergency response effort. It is important to build these partnerships, both internationally and domestically, before a crisis occurs.

America maintains a high level of preparedness, response, and resiliency through strong partnerships across the U.S. government with cooperation from private sector entities.

for the host nation. NCTC’s insights into the lessons learned, best practices, and challenges to America’s domestic counterterrorism response essentially enhance the workshop experience for the host nation.

NCTC’s international JCTAWS outreach program is an important component of the U.S.’s counterterrorism strategy to build international counterterrorism partner relationships and greater international security cooperation to defeat terrorism. The international JCTAWS program is a multinational approach to

America maintains a high level of preparedness, response, and resiliency through strong partnerships across the U.S. government with cooperation from private sector entities.
in a response. Internationally, DoD continues to train host-nation military and security forces, specifically aligned with the Department of State regional and country objectives and synchronized with America’s national security interests. Furthermore, the use of America’s military capacity to support United States Code Title 50 (War and National Defense) operations overseas is enhanced by these types of outreach programs that build relationships and increase understanding and open communication with state leaders within the international community. The JCTAWS program provides an environment that greatly enhances international understanding of America’s counterterrorism components and advocates security cooperation in its domestic and international, strategic approach to defeat terrorism.

The role of the DHS, a partner in the JCTAWS IPG, in managing domestic response to domestic incidents is defined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5. The DHS was established, in the same manner as NCTC, to protect America from terrorism through its multiple departments and agencies. DHS’s efforts are focused on protecting infrastructure, cyberspace, and communication networks, and public and commercial transportation systems and building partnerships with state and local law enforcement to mitigate the threat of domestic terrorism. Its vast scope include areas such as aviation; chemical and nuclear; identification security, fraud, and counterfeiting; information sharing; protecting critical infrastructure; and law enforcement. It is important for state, local, and city entities to understand the DHS’s capacity to thwart when possible and respond when needed to a complex, multi-incident, domestic terrorist attack, as well as the resources DHS can bring to assist during the recovery phase.

It is important for JCTAWS participants to understand the workings of the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, which is responsible for monitoring security for the U.S. This office connects government officials at the state, local, and city levels through coordination with state governors, homeland security advisors, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure operators across all 50 states and within major metropolitan areas through the local emergency response centers and fusion centers. During a domestic, complex, multi-incident act of terrorism, people within the national response network have the ability to communicate across the spectrum of government to monitor, inform, advise, and assist counterterrorism response efforts conducted by city, local, and state entities. The management of the city, local, and state response is emphasized as much as the tactical response, which makes DHS’s role in the IPG vital to the JCTAWS program and enhances the whole-of-government counterterrorism approach.

The JCTAWS program provides an environment that greatly enhances international understanding of America’s counterterrorism components and advocates security cooperation... to defeat terrorism.

In addition to DoD and DHS, the FBI, as the lead domestic terrorism agency, has specific domestic counterterrorism capabilities, such as the Hostage Rescue Team, the Crisis Negotiations Unit, and the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center in Quantico, VA, that can assist state, city, and local entities with additional federal capacity. By law, the FBI has specific capabilities and authorities to conduct counterterrorism operations within the U.S. The FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team provides a non-DoD, full-time, counterterrorist tactical team
that is trained, equipped, and resourced to operate within the U.S. The FBI’s Crisis Negotiations Unit deploys domestically with the Hostage Rescue Team to manage negotiation assets at the scene of major sieges, crises, and critical incidents. The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center capability, although not specifically a participant in the JCTAWS workshops, provides scientific and technical exploitation of improvised explosive devices, an important component to the investigation and prosecution aspects of a terrorist attack. The counterterrorism capacity of the FBI brings into play experienced professionals to respond and investigate acts of domestic terrorism.

The FBI counterterrorism capabilities are well suited to augment state, local, and city law enforcement and fire and rescue resources to deal with a domestic terrorism incident. More importantly, the FBI helps to leverage federal resources specifically developed for the sole purpose of counterterrorism operations. Since the FBI is the lead federal agency responsible for responding to domestic acts of terrorism, local and state authorities need to understand and integrate the FBI’s counterterrorism response capabilities. As the nation’s premier domestic counterterrorism agency, the FBI’s participation in the JCTAWS program ensures that its capabilities are better understood by city, local, and state entities as a means to enhance the response to a domestic terrorist attack. This fact gives credence to a fully integrated, whole-of-government, interagency response for the U.S. to respond effectively to a complex, multi-incident, domestic terrorist attack in an American city.

In summary, NCTC’s JCTAWS program is a forum that informs the Director of NCTC, policy makers, and government officials on the nation’s preparedness to respond to a complex, multi-incident, domestic terrorist attack. More importantly, the JCTAWS workshops provide an environment for federal, regional, state, city, and local entities to collaborate and communicate on the ends, ways, and means available to respond to a domestic terrorist incident in a unified manner. Internationally, the JCAWS workshops are a small component of U.S. international security cooperation efforts. The workshops create a forum for direct dialogue with counterterrorism partners and minimize perceptions that the U.S. has all the answers and resources to combat terrorism in a unilateral manner.

Understanding the complexity of a multi-incident, domestic terrorist attack is one component of the JCTAWS program. More importantly, however, is America’s need to continue to prepare and reinforce its emergency response planning for such an incident through training and allocating resources in order to be prepared, responsive, and resilient. NCTC’s JCTAWS program provides a forum, domestically and internationally, to address counterterrorism preparedness. It is truly an interagency program that employs the whole-of-government and multinational approaches to better enable the U.S. and its international counterterrorism partners to strategically defeat terrorism in the future. Responding to terrorism effectively takes people, communications, relationships, willingness, and understanding—not to mention resources, security cooperation, and institutions designed to meet the demands of counterterrorism. IAJ
Risk Culture

Similarities & Differences between State and DoD

by Bryan Groves

Background

It is difficult to compare what the Department of Defense does with what the State Department does. The missions of the two departments are very different, and while DoD concentrates its forces in a few areas during periods of conflict, State maintains a continuous presence in almost every country in the world. State has been in countries before, and as they become conflict environments, including Europe, Korea, Viet Nam, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—to name a few. Occasionally embassies are forced to evacuate, but eventually American diplomats return. They engage and negotiate, sometimes with unwilling counterparts and those who allow a permissive environment for our enemies. The State operating environment is more global, is at best defensive, and is routinely reactive. State is also comparatively resource poor. Not every post has Marines, a Regional Security Office, or a medical unit. Foreign Service officers (FSO) go to places with endemic disease, absent civil infrastructure, with no health care, where there is no DoD presence, and where tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, and severe environmental hazards occur.

DoD has vastly superior resources in personnel, equipment, and budget, and it does a much better job of personnel support when its people are serving in austere environments. A portion of DoD, the combat troops, have traditionally signed on for taking the fight to the adversary; to seek, engage, and destroy at deadly risk to themselves. Their superior firepower, training, situational awareness, combat and logistics support, and the ability of each individual to protect themselves mitigates this risk, but troops have and continue to perform their duty with willing sacrifice. In today’s conflict environment, even combat support troops can expect to regularly be on the frontlines. In fact, they sometimes face greater dangers than elite units due to the amount of time

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they are exposed to the enemy as they travel between military camps, due to the appealing target their large supply convoys present to insurgents, and because they are not resourced as well and receive less tactical training than do conventional combat or special operations forces.

Hence, many factors contribute to different levels of risk acceptance between the Department of Defense and the State Department. The primary causal factor is a difference between the two agencies’ missions and the corresponding discrepancy between the military’s willingness to accept casualties to accomplish the mission and State’s aversion to doing so. “The military is willing to take casualties because it may be necessary to do so to accomplish the mission. The nature of State’s mission usually makes it unnecessary, and in many cases counterproductive, to take casualties.” The underlying reasons for these differences have multiple facets, including the departments’ missions, presence overseas, personnel profiles, and deployability. The intelligence each organization gathers, though an important determinant of force protection measures and tactical directives, is not a causal variable.

**Missions**

State, like DoD, is focused on mission accomplishment. Its mission, however, is diplomacy, not conducting raids or patrols. Because diplomacy requires relationship building and takes more time, the timeline for mission accomplishment is prolonged for the diplomats of the State Department. Therefore, the State Department does not share Defense’s same sense of urgency for mission accomplishment—get it done now! This cultural difference means that State can often wait to accomplish a task if faced with credible threat information. On the other hand, it is DoD’s responsibility to eliminate threats, not distance itself from them.

The contextual timing of each organization’s involvement during the war-peace continuum of overseas missions has also reinforced each agency’s risk culture. Defense has traditionally viewed its role to involve entering war torn countries, fighting the battles, and then leaving—turning over responsibility for long term and peacetime engagement to its State Department colleagues. However, State’s robust involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade has significantly altered this paradigm, rightly causing DoD to increase its interagency collaboration, and increasing the exposure of more FSOs to conflict environments.

Third, the military prides itself on being offensive minded and taking the fight to the enemy. Much of its investment in time and money is dedicated to outfitting and training its people with equipment and vehicles to conduct offensive operations, while placing relatively less emphasis on defensively reinforcing its headquarters or barracks with thicker walls, better overhead cover, and shatter resistant Mylar. State places a higher importance on presenting themselves to the host nation in a manner that is neither provocative nor menacing, preferring to “move among the people and blend in.” Diplomats do have a need to visit various locations around their respective countries, but nothing in the mission of embassies can be construed as similar to DoD’s offensive
operations. Besides different missions, the frequency and size of vehicle movements that leave embassies are much smaller than on a typical military operation. As a result, State’s force protection efforts during movement are primarily ‘defensive’ in nature and more narrowly focused. In terms of hardening fixed sites, State is aided in that effort by the Office of Overseas Building Operations (OBO), a bureau dedicated to constructing buildings that State determines it needs. The closest thing the military has to this force structure is the Army’s Corps of Engineers and the Navy’s Seabees, but their relative capacity to meet the Defense Departments’ needs is less than that of OBO’s to meet State’s needs. Further, OBO’s construction requirements are specified to meet blast resistance standards, which is often not the case with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Seabees.

Permanent versus Temporary Presence

Apart from exceptional circumstances in the United States’ bilateral relationships with select countries, or in crisis scenarios, American diplomatic posts abroad are permanent fixtures. This affords them the opportunity to wait out unique surges in the threat environment. The military cannot do this. Senior leaders in DoD and civilian executive and legislative leaders expect results in a timely, if not immediate manner. Moreover, the American people expect it, and want their troops to return home as soon as possible. Despite the extensive global posture that the American military has held for a number of decades, the U.S. does not view its motivation for overseas endeavors as traditional imperialism, or colonialism. Hence, Americans expect the military to come home—albeit successfully—sooner rather than later.

On the other hand, the expectation for the Foreign Service is one of permanent presence abroad. As a result, Diplomatic Security can require diplomats, for instance, to curtail movement when a credible kidnapping threat in Iraq permeates their intelligence circles. The military cannot. The results would be far more adverse were the military to implement such force protection measures than for State to do so. Were the military to halt its patrols or offensive operations, it would embolden the enemy, further contributing to a deterioration of the security situation. The same is not true when the State Department takes such actions. State’s patience, however, stems from the fundamental desire to demonstrate that the American diplomatic presence is there to stay, rather than risk aversion or an inability to take offensive action.

As a result of these dynamics, DoD is less likely to invest in permanent facilities than is the State Department because it does not anticipate maintaining a permanent presence in many of the places it goes. There are obvious exceptions like Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Even in those countries, though, the military has the advantage of a larger size and of being able to build and live on bases that inherently provide adequate setback and standoff distances.

Intelligence

Differences in risk aversion levels are not attributable to differences in intelligence; both DoD and the State Department receive reasonably equivalent intelligence feeds. This is certainly true in the post 9/11 world where...
For all situations and across both organizations, it is the U.S. government’s attempts to provide sufficient protections for its people...that drives the decision making process, not differences in risk cultures.

Certain offices of USAID, for instance, have a mandate to work beyond the capital and consulate cities on development projects and humanitarian missions. And, if Congress requires them to brand those activities as “sponsored by America,” it puts them and their implementing partners at greater risk in areas where that label is not perceived in a positive light. Yet, despite intelligence sometimes indicating a high level of risk, the Office of Transition Initiatives and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance missions provide their members with a compelling reason to move around the country.

Administrative & Medical Considerations and the Blackwater Factor

When in foreign countries, diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities determine the legal status of diplomats, while a Status of Forces Agreement typically governs military forces. The former is worldwide and reciprocal, while the latter is usually negotiated on a bilateral basis and may not be reciprocal. Both arrangements often afford American diplomats and service members comparable liberties and protections. This is a generality, however, as the point of comparison varies between those who work at the embassy and those at consulates, as well as between those permanently assigned and those on temporary duty. Those on temporary duty are generally not declared to the host government and therefore may have no coverage at all. For all situations and across both organizations, it is the U.S. government’s attempts to provide sufficient protections for its people, while using the appropriate conventions, that drives the decision making process, not differences in risk cultures.

Medical services can vary tremendously between State Department and DoD overseas facilities. Differing missions is again the prime driver. The State Department pursues a flexible arrangement based upon its needs, financial resources, and the number of personnel at a given post. When operating in an environment like Iraq with a large military presence, the State Department will usually share DOD’s medical facilities. In more austere environments, or with a smaller number of personnel to support, State may set up its own facility with a Foreign Service national nurse practitioner heading an operation that may also serve as a regional medical provider for several posts, some of which may have no U.S. government health facilities of their own. State medical facilities are generally less well equipped to handle mass casualty evacuations, bullet wounds, or traumatic injury, but may be more attune to treating rare foreign diseases. In both departments, the mission—rather than a difference in risk culture—drives the need, which then drives the medical solution.
implemented.

Regarding private security contractors, the Blackwater incident at Nisoor Square in Baghdad on September 16, 2007 shaped the different supervisory approaches taken by the two organizations since that time. State took action immediately to increase oversight of its security contractors, requiring each movement to be supervised by a participating (on site) direct hire American. DoD’s security contractors did not suffer from an incident of similar scope and negativity, so they did not feel pressured to adopt similar procedures and continue to allow third country nationals to serve on mobile personnel security detachments for DoD operations.

**Personnel Profiles**

The expectation of each organization’s new recruits—and the type of person that each attracts—reinforces the differences in risk culture. New members joining the military, and those entering the Foreign Service, share a desire for public service, wanting to contribute to a cause greater than themselves. Both categories tend to enjoy travel and are seek adventure. However, part of the decision calculus for some military recruits involves a willingness to do dangerous tasks and to prove themselves in combat. This is not the expectation of a Foreign Service officer. They expect to do significant and meaningful work that impacts the policy of the United States in countries around the world, even in austere environments. Accepting a lifestyle that may occasionally require living in an underdeveloped and sometimes volatile, third world country, however, is different from signing up to be shot at.

Whether they join the military simply to serve the nation, for dangerous adventure, for the GI Bill, or because they lack other viable employment options, Soldiers know cognitively from the day they consider military service—and are made experientially aware from boot camp onward—of the very real hazards of their chosen profession. This backdrop underlies everything the military does, even in its peacetime training and the development of its standard operating procedures and field manuals. Yet, unlike diplomats, servicemen and women traditionally do not take their families with them when they operate in unstable areas. This dimension adds a completely different (and greater) level of personal risk analysis for Foreign Service officers. The explosion of unaccompanied assignments for FSOs since 9/11 is an exception to this paradigm and is an area of increased common ground between the two departments in the last decade.

**Culture and Physical Security**

Within DoD, the culture accepts that casualties will happen. They will be a natural—albeit unfortunate—consequence of completing its mission in a high risk environment. Senior military and DoD officials, consequently, do not require the same level of force protection/anti-terrorism standards as does the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The cultural acceptance of casualties is partially due to the military’s mission, but also to the fact that servicemen and women go to volatile places very heavily armed. Every service member can defend themselves against hostile fire with their individual weapon and call in support from tanks, artillery, or air and naval support. These factors mitigate the risk for DoD
and are protections that FSOs do not have. Hence, the difference in scale between the organizations reinforces cultural and mission differences, significantly impacting what each can risk, and the degree to which each must prioritize allocated resources.

The physical proximity of buildings or camps to potential threats is a second distinguishing feature that alters the organizations’ requisite force protection standards. Embassies and consulates are often more exposed than military bases. Many diplomatic posts do not share the luxury of space and physical separation from threats that are common for overseas military bases. On the contrary, posts—such as the one in Damascus—are often right on the street, in a heavily trafficked portion of the capital city. The importance of State Department security standards and its risk mitigating measures is revealed when these types of facilities are targeted by terrorists or rioters, especially if waivers are obtained based on mission, political, or logistical variables. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the posts’ building complexes are not on the street. Yet, the daily access that embassies afford locally engaged staff and third country national personnel, and that their consular sections offer to the broader public, is greater than is true of military camps, thus require greater force protection measures. Even in places where the access by non-Americans may not be greater than for the military installations, diplomatic posts represent a more strategic, higher visibility target for groups who target U.S. interests, requiring more stringent security measures. This is especially true because State cannot go to the enemy; rather, the enemy comes to them in its own time and in a matter of its own choosing. Finally, in places where the State Department takes over from DoD (like in Kirkuk), a time and resource intensive effort may be necessary to bring facilities up to State standards. Political and logistical considerations may render this infeasible, however.

A third difference is that State Department accepts a higher level of hardship at many of its posts and when operating in conflict zones overseas. With the exception of fire bases and combat outposts, DoD provides vastly superior support services and creature comforts than the State Department routinely provides at its posts. When on its own, State has no shopping stores, no post office, no dining facilities, no laundry, no free internet, no fast food, no barbers, usually only a one or two-person community liaison office, and no free “space-available” flights. This is not to diminish the episodic risk/danger to military personnel, which is significantly higher in certain situations, but the steady-state hardship levels are often greater for State.

The Deployment Factor

A final cause of differences between the two departments involves the deployment of personnel to war zones. DoD’s ability to deploy its people involuntarily provides leverage over its assignment cycle to a degree that the State Department does not enjoy. In spite of this, State has done a good job to date of filling its personnel requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, given the voluntary bidding cycle the State Department employs, a mass casualty event at one of these diplomatic posts may hinder their ability to fill future positions, as was the case in Beirut and Mogadishu after incidents there. Beyond the considerations already mentioned, this dynamic may buttress tendencies by ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, regional security officers, and emergency action committees to “play it safe” or “wait it out” in response to specific, credible, and high threat information.
Conclusion

The risks that Foreign Service officers take are completely different than those that servicemen and women take. Both professions and the risks inherent in each are honorable, but simply different. The State Department and DoD’s varied approaches arise from different missions, goals and cultures. Neither is inherently right or wrong. It would be incorrect for members of either organization to levy value judgments against the other. The appropriate response is to recognize and appreciate the differences for what they are while also embracing the many similarities: mission focus, competent people, love of travel, and the desire to contribute to a cause greater than oneself despite real risks. IAJ

Notes

1 DoD has approximately 1.4 million active duty soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, plus more than 850,000 in the Reserves and National Guard and an active duty civilian work force of nearly 700,000, for a grand total of 2.9 million. On the other hand, State has approximately 13,000 personnel, which totals both Foreign Service Officers and Foreign Service Specialists. Even when adding in the Foreign Service Officers of other agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID – 1,700), the Foreign Commercial Service (250), the Foreign Agriculture Service (175), and the International Broadcasting Bureau (25), the total only comes to around 15,150.

2 DoD’s base budget in 2012 was $530 billion, more than ten times State’s approximately $47 billion. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget was $115.5 billion for DoD, more than 14 times the approximately $8 billion for the State Department. DoD certainly needs more funding, partially because of its larger size and the equipment necessary to its mission. However, as former Secretary of Defense Gates indicated, diplomacy and development endeavors by State and USAID need greater funding given America’s substantial overseas commitments and foreign policy goals.

3 Major General Walter Givhan, a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Political-Military Bureau of the State Department, provided this perspective in correspondence with the author, Tuesday, March 27, 2012.

4 Time is a double edged sword, however, as greater time also allows insurgents and terrorists greater time to plan, while waiting for the opportune time to carry out an attack. If the U.S. military is not present in the country and the local nation’s security forces do not counter the threat, time can provide hostile elements with tactical and strategic advantages.

5 An additional factor may be that Diplomatic Security requirements only allow security contractors with appropriate security clearances to use secure communications and counter-measure equipment, thereby narrowing personal security details to American applicants.

6 These standards are codified in places such as 12 FAM: Diplomatic Security, including 12 FAM 312: Program Management Responsibilities and 12 FAM 314: OSPB Security Standards.
Interagency Coordination to Employ Veterans: Roles of the Department of Labor and Department of Defense

by Joseph Mullins

In today’s fiscally-constrained environment, it is critical that federal agencies synchronize efforts and provide more efficient and effective operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Labor are working toward that objective in support of our nation’s transitioning military service members and veterans who are searching for meaningful employment.

While the unemployment rate for veterans has dropped from over 9 percent in 2011 to 7.4 percent in 2012, thanks largely to new and aggressive campaigns among the public and private sectors,¹ unemployment among veterans 18–24 years old remains at an alarmingly high rate of 29.1 percent, almost 12 percent higher than non-veterans of the same age.² The promise of a significant drawdown in military force structure which will result in the separation of over one million service members during the next five years,³ combined with the 806,000 currently unemployed veterans in the workforce⁴ and the nation’s struggling economy, makes the mission of finding meaningful employment for veterans a daunting task. Another disturbing trend is the steady increase of reemployment rights claims filed under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, which protects the jobs of service members (especially those in the National Guard and Reserve) when they are called to federal service.⁵ These struggles highlight why interagency coordination of DoD and the Labor Department is vital to the success of this task, as is the participation of other key partners to include the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Office of Personnel Management, the White House, and state workforce agencies.

Combining resources from federal agencies should help veterans like Maria Canales, whose story President Obama highlighted during a veteran’s employment speech in Washington, DC. Canales’s skills in financial and business management proved successful in overseeing millions

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of dollars in Iraq, but she was struggling to find work in the private sector upon her return to the United States. Similarly, technically skilled Soldiers, such as medics who have saved lives during deployments, lack the critical documentation required for public service on American soil. The creation of these strategic partnerships within the federal government, state governments, and the private sector are critical to resolving the high rate of unemployment among our nation’s veterans.

Labor’s Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS)

One of the best kept secrets throughout DoD is its relationship with the Department of Labor, and the role it plays in supporting service members as they transition out of the military. Labor’s Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) is an organization congressionally mandated to support transitioning service members and veterans in finding and retaining meaningful employment after their military service.

VETS is a small agency within the Labor Department consisting of approximately 245 personnel located around the country, including Guam and Puerto Rico. Its mission is to provide resources and expertise to assist transitioning service members and veterans in obtaining meaningful careers and maximizing employment opportunities, while protecting the veterans’ employment rights. The agency consists of three core programs and numerous other priority efforts to ensure veterans find employment upon separation from the military: the Transition Assistance Program, the Jobs for Veterans’ State Grant program, and enforcement of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. Through grants, programs, and key partnerships, VETS is able to serve our nation’s veterans in communities across the country.

One of the most critical relationships for VETS is with the state workforce agencies, which are the state equivalents of the Labor Department. VETS funds over 2,000 state employees via the Jobs for Veterans State Grant program to ensure veterans have access to employment assistance close to home. These state employees work in more than 3,000 local workforce centers called “One-Stop Career Centers” and provide one-on-one job placement services to veterans seeking quality employment. The ability for these state employees to connect veterans with employers in their local community provides a crucial link to the employment of veterans as they separate from the military.

The “Gold Card” program

A new initiative launched by President Obama in November 2011 and executed by the Labor Department through state workforce agency employees, is the “Gold Card” program. This program affords all post-9/11 veterans the ability to obtain intensive services from the local veteran employment specialists in their communities. Intensive services include a case manager who follows a veteran for six months after he/she separates from the military, enters the program, or finds employment. Additionally, this case manager provides mentoring, career advice, and job readiness training and helps veterans develop an individual development plan to support personal and professional growth, while improving their likelihood for...
employment. This type of case management increases the skills and confidence of veterans along with the likelihood they will find a job.

**Transition Assistance Program (TAP)**

In addition to federally-funded veterans’ state grants, a second core VETS program is the Transition Assistance Program, also known as TAP. DoD and the Labor Department have worked closely together on this program since its inception over 20 years ago.

The Transition Assistance Program is a five-day course that helps prepare service members for their transition into the civilian workforce. The program consists of instruction on benefits taught by the VA, an employment workshop taught by the Labor Department, and Service-specific material taught by DoD transition facilitators. The material within this program has recently been updated to address today’s challenging economic environment and includes information on recruiting and hiring best practices from the human resources community, improved resume techniques, the use of resiliency training, the benefits of social media and networking, and improved interview skills. Participants in the program leave with a strong resume reflecting their skills and an ability to sell themselves more effectively to hiring managers during job interviews. VETS works closely with the Office of Wounded Warrior Care and Transition Policy and the Office of Military Community and Family Policy, as well as each service’s personnel office to ensure transitioning service members and their spouses receive the best preparatory training available. The Army is also working closely with the Labor Department to incorporate some of the employment workshop’s best practices in its recently revised Army Career Alumni Program. With the nation embarking on arguably the largest veterans’ hiring initiative since World War II; support from a newly-revised, transition program; and a government-wide focus on hiring veterans, DoD and the Labor Department must continually improve to provide relevant, quality employment support to veterans and their spouses.

**Enforcement of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act**

The third core program within VETS is its enforcement of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. This law ensures protection of service members’ jobs during mobilization or call to active duty.

Working closely with DoD’s Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, VETS educates service members and employers on the law, investigates potential violations by employers, and assists service members in regaining their previous positions. Through considerable outreach in their communities, VETS and Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve personnel are able to prevent many potential violations through education and investigation. The vast majority of cases filed result from a lack of understanding of the law by either an employer or veteran.

VETS’ Reemployment Rights Act enforcement efforts are primarily focused on supporting National Guard and Reserve service members and has been critical to maintaining the force structure during the past ten years...
of conflict with the unprecedented number of mobilizations and federal call ups. This law is essential to the Guard and Reserve if they hope to maintain a quality force during periods of high operational tempos. Without such protection, many members of the force would be unable to support their nation when called upon.

Other VETS programs

While VETS has numerous other programs and initiatives that benefit our nation’s veterans, they also coordinate with other agencies within the Labor Department, as well as with interagency partners including the White House staff, Veterans Administration, Office of Personnel Management, and the Small Business Administration (SBA).

One relatively new project is the “Joining Forces Campaign” initiated by the White House and promoted by First Lady Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden, wife of Vice President Joe Biden. The “Joining Forces Campaign” works with VETS and numerous public and private partners to ensure military families, service members, and spouses retain a high quality of life, which includes the ability to find meaningful employment. VETS also has representatives serving on the President’s Task Force on Small Business chaired by the SBA. This task force encourages veterans to seek entrepreneurial work, while reducing access barriers to available grants and loans.

VETS continues to work closely with the VA on numerous programs, to include the reduction of homelessness among veterans in America. The government estimates that more than 75,000 veterans sleep on the street every night throughout America. Coordination among the Labor Department, VA, and others partners who seek to reduce this phenomenon is essential. Finally, VETS serves on the Interagency Presidential Council Subcommittee on Veterans Employment, which meets monthly to focus attention on coordinating interagency veterans’ employment efforts across the federal government. The leadership within this subcommittee often develops new programs and initiatives that encourage all public and private organizations to hire veterans. Although VETS has limited budget and staffing resources, they are able to support these efforts through strong leadership, a dedicated workforce, and assistance from elsewhere within the Labor Department. In fact, one of the reasons VETS is so successful stems from its ability to coordinate within the Department of Labor and utilize resources within the $13 billion national workforce employment, training, and placement services available through the department. This network of services enables VETS to connect transitioning service members, veterans, and installation transition managers with an enormous infrastructure of support programs to enhance veterans’ employment opportunities.

The government estimates that more than 75,000 veterans sleep on the street every night throughout America.

The Way Ahead

New and previous partnerships continue to grow throughout VETS; however, VETS is continually striving to improve performance throughout the interagency community. Despite the close work with DoD and the military services, VETS needs to improve the education of its partners on the strengths of both the agency and the Department of Labor as a whole. VETS will never compete with the larger agencies on a budgetary level; however, VETS programs, state and local support, and its large workforce support network could supplement DoD and VA initiatives. Additionally, through proper coordination and proper planning, the
interagency community could launch more beneficial programs for a lower price tag, while retaining scarce monetary resources for other projects. For this to happen, senior leaders in these respective agencies must work to coordinate operations while still providing support to their customers and minimizing the influence of personal and agency agendas.

In addition to improving the education of its partners, the Labor Department and VETS need to effectively market their many valuable resources. Unfortunately, very few people within DoD are aware of the Labor Department’s vast resources and how to pass them on to those who need them the most. Finally, VETS and the Labor Department should more effectively leverage private sector partnerships. Whether participating in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Hiring Our Heroes job fairs across the country or participating in the American Legion’s efforts to provide the proper licensing and credentialing required for veterans to transfer their military skills to the civilian sector, VETS and the Labor Department should ensure the maximum utilization of both federal and private sector resources.

In President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy, he states that “(t)he most valuable component of our national defense is the men and women who make up America’s all-volunteer force.”\(^{10}\) During fiscal year 2011, the Army’s unemployment compensation to veterans was over $515 million and expected to rise significantly in the coming years. However, in January 2011 the overall veteran unemployment rate was 9.3 percent; 0.4 percent above the national average. One year later, the February 2012 rate dropped to 7.0 percent; 1.6 percent below the national average.\(^{11}\) While this is very good news, the impending budget constraints, significant downsizing in military force structure, and a struggling economy increase the challenges to the more than one million veterans expected to enter the workforce during the next five years. Thanks to new programs, increased awareness, and the hard work of dedicated people in agencies such as VETS, there is progress and support available to help veterans find meaningful careers. However, the Department of Labor, DoD, VA, and other agencies can provide even greater support through true interagency cooperation.

As President George Washington once said, “The willingness with which our young people are likely to serve in any war, no matter how justified, shall be directly proportional to how they perceive the veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation.” If America fails to support today’s veterans after the longest sustained conflict in our history, the likelihood of attracting quality personnel to serve in the armed forces diminishes, reducing the security of our nation.\(^{IAJ}\)

Notes


5 U.S. Department of Labor, Veterans’ Employment and Training Service data.


Validating a Whole-of-Government Approach and Redefining the Civil-Military Operations Cell

by Matthew K. Wilder

A whole-of-government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations

The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and host nation government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency. COIN participants come from many backgrounds. They may include military personnel, diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must make decisions and solve problems in a complex and extremely challenging environment.

Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

The validity of the whole-of-government approach in dealing with the full range of homeland and national security threats at the operational and tactical levels would seem to be obvious given the complexities of today’s threats. By allowing division of labor and maximum use of subject matter expertise, leveraging this approach allows all agencies involved in homeland and national security planning to address crises from a position of strength. The federal government has embraced the advantages offered by the whole-of-government approach and has taken broad steps to build it into the national and strategic framework. Regardless of the precedent and policies in place to mandate leveraging the whole-of-government approach, challenges and criticisms still abound, especially the difficulty in integrating diverse agencies to achieve unity of effort and the
resulting bureaucracies. Despite the challenges, the validity of the whole-of-government approach is apparent and can be profound in stabilizing failing states that pose a threat to the U.S. However, the U.S. government should fully exploit the positive effects of a whole-of-government approach by refining training and making the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) a tactical entity. These changes may also have the corollary effect of minimizing some of the deterring factors of implementing the whole-of-government approach in homeland and national security situations.

**Strategic Level National Policy**

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “valid” as: 1) having legal efficacy or force; 2) well-grounded or justifiable; 3) logically correct; and 4) appropriate to the end in view. Given these definitions and the descriptions of the whole-of-government approach in Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, the Department of Defense (DoD) certainly considers the whole-of-government approach to be valid. This view is echoed in the Strengthening National Capacity section of the 2010 National Security Strategy where the whole-of-government approach and national defense are mentioned as complementary ways to achieve the end state of national security. The Obama Administration’s organizational changes, such as combining the staffs of the National Security and the Homeland Security Councils, also demonstrate the importance of the whole-of-government approach to be valid. This view is echoed in the Strengthening National Capacity section of the 2010 National Security Strategy where the whole-of-government approach and national defense are mentioned as complementary ways to achieve the end state of national security. The Obama Administration’s organizational changes, such as combining the staffs of the National Security and the Homeland Security Councils, also demonstrate the importance of the whole-of-government approach to be valid. This view is echoed in the Strengthening National Capacity section of the 2010 National Security Strategy where the whole-of-government approach and national defense are mentioned as complementary ways to achieve the end state of national security.

Despite the challenges, the validity of the whole-of-government approach is apparent and can be profound in stabilizing failing states that pose a threat to the U.S.

**Validating Whole-of-Government at the Operational and Tactical Levels**

Early in 2006, DoD recognized the deficiencies in interagency cooperation at the combatant command level where the majority of interagency coordination and operational planning and execution takes place. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy tasked the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command to present a plan of action to the Secretary of Defense to improve interagency planning within combatant commands. This validity of the approach has been established with regard to national and homeland security. At the national and strategic levels, the whole-of-government approach is validated by strategic documents that direct the government with legal force, using justifiable and logical reasons appropriate to achieve the end state of national and homeland security.
followed a Government Accountability Office report that revealed major failures and fiscal mismanagement at the operational and tactical levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. What resulted at the operational level was the creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), designed to facilitate coordination between the geographic combatant command staff and the staffs of the respective interagency members.\(^3\) Joint doctrine for DoD formalizes the concept of the JIACGs assigned to the headquarters of each combatant command. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, defines the JIACG as:

An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of U.S. government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other U.S. government civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS [National Security Council Staff].\(^4\)

Although the JIACG at each individual combatant command is structured differently and has experienced varied degrees of success in implementing the whole-of-government approach, it was also the first important step in building unity of effort at all levels. In a 2005 *Joint Force Quarterly* article, Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos describes how the JIACG should be structured. He states that an effective JIACG should be formalized within the military command structure and organized to achieve both unity of effort and unity of command. He proposed that each JIACG should report directly to the Chief of Staff or Deputy Commander to ensure equal representation among other combatant command staff elements, as well as to provide a nucleus of active duty officers with augmentees from the interagency as the situation dictates. Bogdanos further asserted that the JIACG should be adequately resourced at the national level by mandating funding and participation by the interagency in the JIACG and gaining approval to implement a streamlined information-sharing process. He also called for the National Security Council to approve a joint interagency career designation similar to the joint service designation that is currently an important component to career advancement for both the military and the interagencies.\(^5\)

In addition to the interagency and whole-of-government coordination provided by the JIACG, the 2009 U.S. Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan was drafted with the goal of providing unity of effort to the diverse agencies operating within the Afghan region. The plan dictated specific interagency objectives for military and interagency involvement and prioritized efforts at the national, provincial, and local levels.\(^6\) At the tactical level, the whole-of-government approach has assumed the form of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) that interact with U.S. forces at the brigade and battalion level, as do nongovernmental and other governmental organizations. The use of PRTs throughout
Afghanistan demonstrated the necessity for interagency cooperation and the effective use of the whole-of-government approach. PRTs were established in late 2002 to improve security, assist the Afghan government in administering tribal areas, and facilitate reconstruction. Each PRT was comprised of members from DoD tasked with protecting the team and conducting military matters; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which led reconstruction efforts; and the Department of State, responsible for political advisory and reporting. While the effectiveness of the PRTs as an integral part of the whole-of-government approach has been debated, it has also been one of the few organizational teams that has proved flexible enough to adapt to a fluid, tactical situation with some success. At the operational and tactical levels, the whole-of-government approach proves valid by definition, albeit with some challenges regarding optimum performance. Much the same can be said of the whole-of-government approach to diplomacy.

Whole-of-Government in Diplomacy

Many of the details of the whole-of-government approach with regard to diplomacy were outlined by National Security Presidential Directive 44, which tasked the Secretary of State and the Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to:

1. Develop strategies for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) activities; provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for R&S operations; ensure program and policy coordination among U.S. departments and agencies; lead coordination of R&S activities and preventative strategies with bilateral partners, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector entities.

2. Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. R&S, and provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for an integrated U.S. response.

3. Lead U.S. development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate and recommend authorities, mechanisms and resources for civilian responses in coordination with key interagency implementers such as aid; coordinate R&S budgets among departments and agencies; identify lessons learned and integrate them into operational planning by responsible agencies.

At the operational and tactical levels, the whole-of-government approach proves valid by definition, albeit with some challenges regarding optimum performance.
Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States

The USAID defines “fragile states” as those lacking the capacity and legitimacy to deliver public goods in the political, economic, security, and social spheres. Although fragile states have long been identified as threats to national security because of their attractiveness as bases of support to enemies of the U.S., only USAID has a comprehensive whole-of-government strategy with respect to these states. Within the State Department, the CSO has the primary responsibility to address and coordinate the whole-of-government approach, but it has been negatively impacted by the profound differences between the civilian and military planning and coordination processes. Studies conducted by the U.S. Institute of Peace conclude:

A central lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is that civilian agencies must also develop new ways of planning, as well as integrated mechanisms for joint civil-military planning.

These reports indicate that a series of challenges exist to the whole-of-government approach, and that a comprehensive solution is required to address these challenges.

Challenges and Criticisms of the Whole-of-Government Approach

Despite the clear advantages of leveraging the whole-of-government approach, there are obvious challenges and criticisms regarding the efficiency of the approach. Many of these originate with issues surrounding the difficulty of achieving unity of effort or unity of command. “Unity of effort” is defined by the military in FM 3-07 as the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives,
even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. This is not to be confused with “unity of command,” which refers to differing participants serving under the authority and responsibility of one command or responsible agency. From the interagency perspective, unity of command is relatively easy to achieve for interagency teams led by a member of the military because the rank structure is more rigid and transparent. However, true unity of effort when expressed as horizontal (inclusive of all team members and agencies) instead of vertical (along stove-piped chains of command) integration has proven much more elusive regardless of the composition of the interagency team.\textsuperscript{12}

Todd Moss from the Center for Global Development describes some of these common challenges at the strategic level. He draws a parallel between how other nations successfully use the whole-of-government approach and can leverage multiple entities toward a common purpose (unity of effort) because in comparison they have smaller budgets and governments and fewer issues to address. Moss believes a whole-of-government approach requires making decisions collectively, which often leads to deadlock because each party involved in a particular decision has its own agenda. He advocates for a clear line of authority in situations utilizing the whole-of-government approach and one responsible individual or agency that will resolve conflicts and ultimately make decisions.\textsuperscript{13} In effect, Moss is addressing the principle of unity of command.

Another criticism of the whole-of-government approach is the potential for a lack of both unity of command and unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels. This often leads to challenges in communication, security, and prioritizing resources.\textsuperscript{14} JIACG faced a number of these challenges. A number of studies indicate that the JIACG failed to reach its full potential at the combatant-command level because commanders often limited its access to key decision makers. The studies also found that the nonstandard organization and culture of the JIACG led to a lack of acceptance in the overall organization, which limited its level of effective collaboration.\textsuperscript{15} In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted a multi-layer assessment to evaluate collaboration among agencies in support of the counterterrorism and counter-weapons of mass destruction effort. Assessment participants identified six key imperatives that must be present to increase collaboration: perception of mission criticality, mutual benefit among agencies, mutual trust, access and agility in intelligence, incentives, and common understanding.\textsuperscript{16}

Virginia Egli concluded that collaboration within the intelligence community is a factor of organizational culture. Egli examined collaboration between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) using noted psychologist Edgar Schein’s organizational culture model and concluded that collaboration could be increased by rewarding collaborative behavior.\textsuperscript{17} Organizational culture is defined as “the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization.”\textsuperscript{18} Egli identified several shortfalls in the organizational culture of both the DHS and the FBI. Specifically, DHS was not yet sufficiently mature to develop an organizational culture separate
from its composite agencies, and the FBI was opposed to intelligence collaboration because of outdated legislation and attitudes.¹⁹ The FBI was also hindered by a lack of common training programs for intelligence analysts. Perhaps most interesting is how Egli links an effective organizational culture with a stable membership in the culture and shared history. She states:

The primary organizational culture difference between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security is stable membership and shared history. Stability in organizational culture means that its members are firmly established. Shared history in organizational culture means that its members have gone through the social learning and/or socialization process while overcoming challenging events.²⁰

In summary, Egli’s research clearly links collaborative behavior with an effective collaborative culture that is established with a common training program, a rigid sense of membership, and socialization to cultural norms through shared hardship.

A Harvard Business School case study used the collaboration challenges resident within the interagency to propose ways to overcome collaborative issues. The Harvard research indicates that barriers to collaboration are primarily a result of interpersonal and organizational bias and territoriality.²¹ Likewise, a recent Congressional Research Service report indicates that the U.S. Congress and national security leaders have long realized that collaboration was a more complicated issue than many believe, and one that may be addressed through reforms and mandates concerning the education, training, and experience for national security officers. The report’s analysis of recent Congressional actions with regard to the National Security Professional Development System advocate for sweeping changes in the way collaboration is encouraged, as well as the changes to human resources, funding, and incentives necessary to sustain change.²²

**Potential Solutions: Common Training and a Tactical CMOC**

A common excuse for the lack of success in the whole-of-government approach is the lack of interagency understanding, culture, and planning processes. One possible solution is a training course for those likely to be involved in key areas of interagency coordination and operations where a successful whole-of-government approach will significantly contribute to mission success. This course would need to be of sufficient duration and substance to inculcate participants with the need for collaboration, appropriate collaborative behavior, and a shared whole-of-government culture to complement their own existing organizational cultures. In conjunction, changes to the organizational level in which the CMOC is found will also advance the whole-of-government approach, especially with regard to unity of effort and unity of command.

The CMOC is designed to facilitate the whole-of-government approach and encourage interagency coordination at all levels, which includes participation from intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other governmental organizations. By doctrine, the establishment of a CMOC is a standing capability for military civil affairs units at all levels.²³ However, since this capability is often found at the operational and strategic levels, there is little current capacity for a CMOC-like capability at the tactical level. Although changes to the CMOC do not represent the ultimate solution to some of the difficulties concerning the whole-of-government approach, it may help to resolve some of the most common contemporary issues at the lowest tactical level.
A standing CMOC maintained at the brigade and division levels of military forces that are likely to be involved in operations requiring a whole-of-government approach would be a step forward. This concept offers the advantages of a standing nucleus of personnel that are trained to integrate and collaborate with interagency teams, who would also be available to train others, develop enduring relationships with counterparts in the interagency, and offer a framework that is scalable to fit the needs of the organization and operational environment. This concept would involve a civil affairs (or complementary career branch) major (or equivalent) as the CMOC chief, with a captain and senior noncommissioned officer as the standing CMOC cell. Despite the initial strain this construct may present to military staffing, the cost-benefit analysis would undoubtedly be favorable given a more efficient whole-of-government approach in any operation.

**Conclusion**

The whole-of-government approach has proven valid by definition and by practice at the national/strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as through the advantages it can offer to diplomacy and fragile states. With some changes, it can continue to add value to future operations.  

**Notes**

11 Ibid., p. 45.


19 Egli, pp. 28–38.

20 Ibid., p. 41.


CRS Reviews Unified Command Plan

In mid-July, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report about the Armed Forces’ Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). The report details the history, mission, and operational considerations of the nine COCOMs, which include:

- U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM),
- U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
- U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM),
- U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM),
- U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),
- U.S. European Command (USEUCOM),
- U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM),
- U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM),
- U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).

The report also includes a brief discussion of current issues associated with the UCP and these commands, as well as potential issues for Congress, such as the implications of a strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region and the need for greater interagency involvement in the UCP. Other potential issues include whether the Geographical COCOMs military engagement activities have made U.S. foreign policy “too militarized,” and whether the current nine COCOMs should be realigned or expanded to address emerging alignments and threats, including cyber warfare. CRS also proposes alternative organizational structures, should Congress find the present COCOM construct does not meet contemporary and future needs. IAJ

Proposed Legislation to Reform SES

New legislation has been introduced to Congress that is aimed at reforming the Senior Executive Service (SES). The legislation was introduced by Representative Jim Moran (D-VA), and is co-sponsored by Representatives Gerry Connolly (D-VA) and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD).

The Senior Executive Service Act of 2012 includes reforms that address compensation, professional development, and the SES ratings system, all reforms that are meant to improve working conditions for the SES. Supporters of the bill believe that several concerns, including work/life balance, pay compression, and change in geographic relocation, have deterred individuals from remaining in the SES. The bill’s supporters also believe that the reforms outlined in the Senior Executive Service Act would ensure that agencies and departments are able to develop talented individuals within government as well as attract talent from outside government.

The Senior Executive Service Act of 2012 would improve work/life balance for SES employees, as well as enable the SES to recruit the best and brightest candidates to high-level civil service. The proposed legislation would improve SES career management and compensation, reform SES hiring processes, and increase diversity within the SES. IAJ
DHS Releases Northern Border Strategy

In June the Department of Homeland Security released the 2012 Northern Border Strategy (NBS). The NBS, which is based on the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, is the first unified strategy for DHS operations along the U.S.-Canada border, and addresses many concerns that include trade, illegal trafficking, and security issues, such as terrorism.

The U.S.-Canada border is the world’s longest common border. Because the U.S. and Canada have a strong relationship, the NBS focused on securing the U.S. northern border while expediting the flow of lawful travel, trade, and immigration.

The NBS identifies three main goals for the U.S.-Canada border: deterring and preventing terrorism, trafficking, and illegal immigration; safeguarding and encouraging lawful trade, travel, and immigration; and ensuring community resiliency before, during, and after a terrorist attack or other disaster.

The NBS proposes that these goals can be met through partnerships between U.S. and Canadian law enforcement and security agencies as well as other organized groups, information and intelligence sharing, along with enhanced technology and infrastructure. 

State-SOCOM Cyberterrorism Mission

The State Department and United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have undertaken a new counterterrorism mission that focuses on the relationships between organized crime, political or ideological extremism, and terrorism, and includes counter-cyberterrorism efforts.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton discussed the State/SOCOM partnership at a special operations conference in May, where she alluded to the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications’ (CSCC) operations in Yemen and Central Africa. The CSCC’s Digital Outreach Team had recently countered al-Qaida propaganda on tribal Yemeni websites, posting pictures of coffins wrapped with the Yemen flag to counter the images of coffins covered by the U.S. flag. The CSCC’s images were accompanied by Arabic messages regarding the human toll inflicted on Yemen by al-Qaida. The CSCC’s team also responded to pictures posted by al-Qaida supporters on Yemeni discussion forums.

The CSCC’s Digital Outreach Team is housed at the State Department, and is staffed by experts from the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and special operations forces. The CSCC focuses on various forms of counterterrorism communications, and its Digital Outreach Team specializes in counter-cyberterrorism.
Mass Atrocity Prevention Workshop

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum will host a mass atrocity and genocide prevention training workshop on 19 September, 2012. The workshop will take place at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial and Museum, and is co-hosted by U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

The workshop will focus on mass atrocity and genocide prevention; training and educating for and responding to mass atrocities; and interagency opportunities in preventing and responding to mass atrocities. IAJ

EUCOM Countertrafficking Task Force

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has established a new task force to aid U.S. government agencies in counteracting Europe’s growing problem with trafficking in illicit goods and services. The growth of trafficking in Europe is believed to be major national security threat to both Europe and the U.S.

EUCOM’s countertrafficking task force is modeled after U.S. Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South in Florida, and is staffed by representatives from the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, and other U.S. government agencies.

Trafficking in illicit goods and services—including the trafficking in drugs, weapons, and persons—is on the rise in Europe. Army BG Mark Scraba, director of EUCOM’s recently established Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center, believes that Europe’s central location and the challenges facing traffickers at the southern U.S. border have contributed to Europe becoming “the illicit trafficking intersection of the world.” Scraba also notes that traffickers are aligning their efforts with other traffickers and with terror networks, describing the traffickers as a “network of networks.” IAJ
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by Michael B. Kraft and Edward Marks.  

In *U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What*, authors Michael B. Kraft and Edward Marks present a comprehensive look at how the U.S. government is organized to protect its citizens and fight terrorism. It is absolutely the definitive volume on the often confusing and complex government agencies with acronyms that confuse us all. The authors present a well-researched and understandable review of the roles, responsibilities, and regulatory guidance of all U.S. institutions that are involved with our ongoing struggle to provide a safe and secure environment for all citizens. This book is not only a review of the last ten years, but also provides great historical perspective as federal institutions adjusted to their expanded roles since the September 11th attacks.

A great example of this expertise is found in chapter seven, titled “Counterterrorism Research and Development Programs.” The authors clearly outline the various funding mechanisms used throughout our government to expend tax dollars allocated for research and development programs—a topic many might find daunting to undertake. Kraft and Marks dig right in, concisely explaining and detailing how resources are allocated across the U.S. government. Their discussion of one of the primary venues for funding, the “Technical Support Working Group,” demonstrates the common sense approach the authors use to bring depth and understanding to complex organizations and terminology.

Organized with two main sections and twenty self-contained chapters, the book allows a reader to delve quickly into a specific program or organization for a detailed review. Providing historical background along with the modern changes and appropriate legislation allows the reader to gain rapid insight and reduce confusion when faced with understanding how our government is organized to combat both foreign and domestic terrorism. While this approach is helpful, I suggest readers take the time to digest the entire book. Authors Kraft and Marks combine their extensive government and counterterrorism expertise to provide a resource that is rich with information for all of us. They do this devoid of any self-serving motive or intent to favor a specific group or project—just to allow the rest of us to raise our collective knowledge of the organization of the U.S. government and counterterrorism. U.S. Government Counterterrorism is a must read for anyone involved in the fight against terrorism, those studying national security, and those who want to understand how our nation is organized for that fight.