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Special Edition:
Southwest Border Security
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Enhancing North American Security –

A Military Perspective

by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV

I applaud the efforts of the students of the Command and General Staff College Southwest Border Scholars’ Seminar, and I want to thank the CGSC Foundation’s Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation for compiling their works in this special edition of the InterAgency Journal, focusing on Southwest Border Security. The potential threats to the U.S. are very real, and the solutions to the problems exceed the current capability of any one federal agency and, therefore, require a whole-of-government or community approach—one that is unified in its efforts.

The President’s July 25, 2011 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime” (TOC) states:

TOC presents sophisticated and multi-faceted threats that cannot be addressed through law enforcement action alone. Accordingly, we will establish an interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group to identify those TOC networks... The Working Group will ensure the coordination of all elements of national power to effectively protect our borders, people, economy, and financial system from the threats posed by the most dangerous and sophisticated of these transnational criminal networks.

We must develop a network to defeat a network. It cannot be solved by just looking at activities on our side of the border. Our approach to southwest border security should be seen through the lens of North American security, where we are building a viable and enduring security relationship with Mexico. The President reinforces this approach in his introduction to 2011 Strategy statement: “While this Strategy is intended to assist the United States Government in combating transnational crime, it also serves as an invitation for enhanced international cooperation.”

Joint Task Force North (JTF North) and U.S. Army North’s (ARNORTH) security cooperation activities with Mexico’s Army allow ARNORTH to see the southwest border from both sides. This unique perspective enables ARNORTH to further enhance coordination, collaboration, and
cooperation among those interagency partners responsible for securing the border and with the Mexican Army, which under President Calderon has carried the fight to the transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).

ARNORTH, U.S. Northern Command’s (NORTHCOM) Land Component Command and Army Service Component Command, partners to conduct homeland defense and civil support operations and theater security cooperation activities in order to protect the American people and our way of life. ARNORTH was established on October 16, 2006 to provide a dedicated Army headquarters to the homeland. As the Land Component Command, ARNORTH has operational control of JTF North. JTF North, formerly known as Joint Task Force Six, was established on November 13, 1989 in response to President George H.W. Bush’s re-dedication to the “war on drugs.” JTF North’s mission is to support drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA) in the conduct of counterdrug/counter narco-terrorism operations to disrupt TCOs and deter their freedom of action in order to protect the homeland. TCOs include drug trafficking organizations (DTO), alien smuggling organizations, and foreign terrorist organizations (FTO); however, JTF North’s support missions are required by policy to have a counterdrug nexus.

Environment

So what has changed in the past six years that has brought more attention to the southwest border? Since 1989 the U.S. has rededicated military support to DLEA with activities to reduce demand within our country and the global supply of illicit drugs entering our country. Some would even say we were too successful in the 1980s, the so called “Miami Vice” era, as we focused our efforts on supporting Colombia to defeat cocaine production, while literally denying the Caribbean air and sea approaches. These efforts forced the drug cartels to move inland and transport their products through Mexico, which already served as a major source of marijuana and heroin. It was this shift in cocaine routes that enabled the drug cartels in Mexico to increase their power bases and eventually take over from the South American DTOs.

Illicit drugs moving through Mexico largely disappeared from all the monitoring, detecting, and interdicting zones that U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) established in the sea and air domains. Drug cartels, such as the Gulf Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel, Arturo Beltran Leyva Organization, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization (Juarez Cartel), Tijuana Cartel/Arellano-Felix Organization, and Zeta Cartel, operated within their areas without much disruption or interference. The DTOs managed their plazas, and their “business plans” grew and were very profitable. Perhaps it was their efforts to expand their business portfolios by pushing into other cartels’ domains that ushered in a new era of heightened violence. Whatever the root cause, cartel-on-cartel violence achieved historic levels as rival cartels tried to expand and secure their areas of operation. This violence has resulted in 52,000 killed since 2006, about 2,000 of whom were members of the security and military forces. President Calderon responded by giving the military a greater role, albeit in support of the civilian police authorities, in the efforts to defeat these threats.
ARNORTH Efforts

Unless it had to do with civil support for natural or man-made disasters, ARNORTH’s efforts with interagency partners along the southwest border were for the most part non-existent until 2008. In 2008, the U.S. NORTHCOM commander made ARNORTH his Land Component Command and placed JTF North under its operational control. Prior to that, the efforts to support southwest border security had been a JTF North responsibility.

For 23 years, JTF North has routinely coordinated with interagency partners, including Customs and Border Protection, Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, and others, to fulfill their requests for support. These requests generally fit into four major categories: operational support, engineering support, intelligence support, and interagency integration. Because support to DLEA has not been a high priority for the allocation of Department of Defense (DoD) forces, JTF North plans these support missions with volunteer units that desire to train their mission essential task list (METL) tasks in a realistic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operational environment with tremendous DoD training value.

This was the extent of DoD support to the southwest border until 2007 when the U.S. and Mexico, as well as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and several Central American nations became signatories to the Merida Initiative—a multi-year plan with four stated objectives:

- Disrupt transnational criminal organizations.
- Strengthen institutions.
- Build a twenty-first century border.
- Build strong and resilient communities.

ARNORTH has played a key role in advancing these four objectives through an unprecedented program of military-to-military engagement with the Mexican Army. To put our efforts into perspective, in 2009, U.S. and Mexican armies took part in just three joint training events. During fiscal year 2012, however, they took part in nearly 100 joint training events, ranging from airmobile operations and intelligence analysis to medical treatment and evacuation. Our visits and engagements at the senior levels have also expanded significantly. I have personally visited each of the military regions along the southwest border, and throughout this year, we have alternated hosting several 3-star level forums to explore ways we can further our relationship and partnership. We patiently wait to see who will assume Mexico’s Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), and we truly believe these recent forums provide a great foundation to move forward and strengthen and intensify this partnership.

One area where ARNORTH has been able to enhance coordination and collaboration along the southwest border is through border contact meetings. In 2010, through an initiative proposed at the ARNORTH/SEDENA Border Commanders’ Conference, the Mexican Army in those military zones along the border received permission to routinely meet with ARNORTH and our partners, the Border Patrol Sector Chiefs, to discuss issues specific to their zone/sector and to look at ways to improve information sharing and operations both formally and informally to
disrupt TCO operations. Because these meetings showed a great deal of promise and contributed to positive operational results on both sides of the border, the Mexican Secretary of National Defense approved their continuation after the first trial year.

We have also established a monthly exchange of information at the senior level with the four southwest border state adjutants general. Sharing of operations between state military forces and federal military forces along the border needed improvement so the adjutants general could keep their governors informed of federal operations in support of interagency DLEA partners. This also helps us to synchronize the state and federal military effort and find efficiencies and synergy where possible.

JTF North has also focused on what it calls point-of-integration operations, where it coordinates with multiple DLEAs across multiple domains (land, air, sea) to create a larger, unified operation with the goal of achieving the objectives of each DLEA. These support operations have been conducted in the littorals off San Diego, CA, and Brownsville, TX, as well as in Arizona. JTF North has also successfully conducted coincidental operations with the Mexican Secretariat of the Navy to assist with detecting, monitoring, and interdicting illicit drug trafficking in the maritime domain.

Initiatives to Improve

Some of these thoughts and initiatives are intended to stimulate discussion rather propose solutions. No one agency will have “the solution,” but all solutions must involve a whole-of-government approach.

As we look to the future with respect to southwest border security, we must understand that Mexico is a vital partner in the overall security of North America. Our interactions with Mexico should be viewed as an opportunity not a challenge. After all, we are inextricably linked. For example, 30 million Americans are of Mexican descent, one million American citizens live in Mexico, Mexico is the second largest supplier of oil to the U.S. (one-third of U.S. imports), and Mexico is the third largest trade partner with the U.S. (after Canada and China). Mexico does matter.

As we assist Mexico to be successful in its fight against the transnational criminal organizations and increase our support to the interagency DLEAs along the southwest border, we must also understand that these TCOs are illegal businesses focused on profit. One of our biggest concerns is the potential of convergence among TCO threats. Specifically, a foreign terrorist organization may pay for the use of a drug trafficking organization’s infrastructure and lines of communication. This is not unique to the southwest border, and the indicators or warning signs may very well come from another region in the world. We must stay vigilant to these warning signs and work closely with the Department of Homeland Security in order to quickly respond to and defeat any threat.

Another initiative we need to address is our effort to disrupt and deny the flow of illegal weapons and money into Mexico. Every time I meet with Mexican military leaders, the first question they ask is what is the U.S. doing to stop the southbound flow of weapons into Mexico? According to Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), out of about 110,000 illegal weapons recovered by the government of Mexico during the past six years, 65,000 came from the U.S.—that is 59 percent of the weapons recovered. If this reporting is accurate, we should seriously look at what options are available that could directly assist the Mexican government in its fight against the TCOs.

The question often asked is whether the U.S. needs a JIATF along the southwest border. While we have seen the creation of JIATFs in the Caribbean and Pacific that have been very successful in the air and maritime domains, we have not determined how to form a JIATF for the land domain. Who would be the lead federal agency? Would its focus only be on counterdrug or would it expand to other areas? History has shown that our adversaries always try to exploit our seams and gaps, so how could we better interconnect efforts of JIATF South and JIATF West with efforts on the mainland to eliminate the seams and gaps and give our adversaries fewer options to exploit?

The Army is now implementing regionally aligned forces that will provide capabilities to combatant commanders for their theater security cooperation activities. In the homeland, we see this initiative as a way to not only provide training assistance to the Mexican Army, but also as a way to provide further assistance to DLEA partners, which would increase the number of METL-focused opportunities. We may even see some capability of the regionally aligned forces allocated to NORTHCOM in this fiscal year.

On the first of December, a newly elected Mexican President, Enrique Peña Nieto, will take office and lead Mexico for the next six years. He proposes to:

- Expand drug-war partnership with the U.S. by hosting U.S. military instructors but not combat troops or agents. He approves of continued use of surveillance drone missions, but they would be run by Mexicans.

- Create a single state police force and a rural gendarmerie while expanding the federal police.

- Change metrics from eliminating high value targets to reducing the level of violence.

He does not endorse the two countries pursuing the kind of joint armed counternarcotics operations carried out by U.S. forces in Colombia and Central America—“no boots on the ground.”

Given what the Peña Nieto administration has publically stated, we feel confident that we can build upon our recent work and further expand our growing military partnership. In the long term, we envision our relationship with the Mexican Army strengthening as a strategic partner so we can integrate our strategic plans in the cooperative defense of North America.

We will also reach out to our interagency partners and identify the homeland in an operational context to develop a southwest border campaign plan that identifies southwest border security issues for the next five to ten years. We do not want to take charge or be in the lead, but rather bring some of our expertise as planners and operators into the consortium to build a unified plan.

It is a strategic imperative to enhance North American security for the future. To do so, we need to continue to be open and find ways to improve interagency and international cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The more we institutionalize relationships with the Mexican Army and U.S. interagency partners, the greater the likelihood of having the long-term effects and whole-of-government solutions we strive to achieve in pursuit of our common goals against our common TCO threats. **IAJ**
Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations:

Sources of Hemispheric Instability

by Steve Brackin

Today Mexico is the reluctant host to the leadership and core infrastructures of several of the most powerful transnational criminal organizations (TCO) in the Western Hemisphere, if not the world.¹ Through a vast system of illicit, non-state commerce, these Mexican TCOS monopolize the illicit cross-border trafficking of drugs, people, weapons, and bulk cash between Mexico and its neighbors to the north and south.² Leveraging illicit profits and an arsenal of small arms to corrupt, co-opt, intimidate, and compel, Mexican TCOS have established zones of impunity to manage their illicit infrastructures.³ Despite a primary objective of maximizing profit from illicit activities, second- and third-order effects of TCO activities stimulate crime, violence, and instability, which together undermine the legitimacy of state institutions. By undermining the legitimacy of state institutions, Mexican-based TCOs constitute the center of gravity of a threat that is weakening states throughout the Western Hemisphere and thereby undermining the security of the U.S.

Mexican TCOS—A Brief Primer

Mexican TCOS can trace their history to prohibition era “Los Tequileros” and the poppy cultivators that produced morphine to replace the disrupted Asian supply for the U.S. during World War II (WWII). Reminiscent of today’s narco ballads, songs praised the heroic Los Tequileros, who, despite the shoot-on-site policy, supplied the demand for illicit alcohol in the U.S.⁴ It was during this period of prohibition that organized crime in Mexico consolidated control of the “plazas”—the smuggling infrastructure along Mexico’s northern border with the U.S.⁵

Despite official protest from the U.S., Mexican heroin and marijuana continued to flow north after the end of the WWII. While acknowledging these diplomatic protests and publicly pledging to suppress the illicit trade, Mexico’s entrenched Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)—
synonymous with the Mexican government itself—in fact, integrated the poppy and marijuana traffickers into its corporate system. In exchange for established tiers of contributions (bribes) to various state institutions, the drug cartels where allocated “plazas” in which to cultivate, manufacture, store, and transport illicit contraband to destinations within the U.S.⁶

This complicity is alleged to have continued until the early 1990s when the PRI’s hold on Mexico’s national politics began to collapse. However, the emergence of post-Cold War globalization coincided with the PRI’s decline and created enormous opportunities for Mexican TCOs. The cartels transitioned from members of a corporate political entity to independent non-state actors.⁷ Following the broader trends evolving within globalization, Mexican TCOs used the unprecedented integration and technological innovations in the fields of communications, finance, and transportation to transform their business models.

This transition coincided with the diminishing power of the state in relation to non-state actors as a result of globalization. Unlike the bipolar Cold War era, which was dominated by nation states, the cumulative decisions and actions of non-state actors now combine to govern, direct, or influence a significant proportion of the activities that affect global populations. Influential non-state actors include the largest, multinational corporations that together employ 72 million people worldwide, hold $119 trillion in assets, and influence a majority of the global media that influences popular and elite opinion. These non-state actors also include violent, terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates, which challenge the legitimacy of and seek to supplant globalization.⁸

In addition to reducing relative state power, globalization has contributed to the expansion of an illicit global economy. Using the World Trade Organization’s estimate of global trade (total of all exports) in 2009 of $18 trillion and the World Economic Forum’s estimated value of the illicit economy in that same year of $1.6 trillion, the illicit economy is roughly 13 percent the size of the global economy.⁹ With a growth rate estimated to be faster than the legitimate economy, some suggest the illicit economy has the potential to account for 30 percent of gross domestic product by 2020.¹⁰

Anticipating these trends, Mexican TCOs effectively exploited the unintended effects of U.S. Plan Colombia and the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement to expand their illicit operations and secure their places as some of the most powerful illicit non-state actors on the globe. In addition to heroin and marijuana, Mexican TCOs expanded their operations to include methamphetamines and cocaine and increased the sophistication of their smuggling operations to exploit increases in the legal flow of trade.

Within their established zones of impunity, Mexican TCOs built industrial-sized production facilities, where they synthesize precursor chemicals, purchased in bulk from China, to meet the methamphetamine demand in the U.S. As a result of the success of the U.S. Plan Colombia to dismantle and disrupt Colombian TCO smuggling operations, Mexican TCOs are now believed to smuggle 90 percent of South American cocaine into the U.S. With the enormous proceeds from these sales, Mexican TCOs have the resources to not only corrupt...
state agents and secure the acquiescence of entire communities by dominating their economies, but also to arm themselves with sufficient firepower to secure their operations against challengers—state or otherwise.

Exploiting over 2,000 miles of land border and annual legitimate trade exceeding $260 billion in 2011, Mexican TCOs increased the sophistication of their smuggling operations to increase the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. While TCOs still use traditional smuggling routes between the ports of entry, the Department of Justice estimates that they smuggle a majority of the drugs into the U.S. through legal ports as bulk cash through these same networks or laundered through TCO-owned or affiliated legitimate businesses.\(^\text{15}\)

Mexican TCOs have emerged as strong non-state actors that exploit the global economy to profit from their activities in the parallel, illegal global economy, which signifies a significant change in the operational environment. It is important to understand, however, that the “illegal economy” nexus of illicit trade, organized crime, and corruption combine to produce such a grave threat that the World Economic Forum places in its top three of threats to the global economy and global stability.\(^\text{14}\)

The nexus of the illegal economy is a chronic risk that is highly likely to persist and is of central importance considering its impact on global stability, in general, and fragile states, in particular. The danger of this nexus is the inherent feedback loop of illicit trade, organized crime, corruption, and economic disparity. This destructive cycle undermines economic development by raising the costs of legitimate business and increasing the wealth and power of the illicit or corrupt actors, which increases economic, social, and political inequalities both within and between countries.\(^\text{15}\) The relative size of the illegal economy and the fact that in many instances it constitutes the major source of income puts developing countries at greatest risk.

Steven Metz, John Sullivan, and Robert Bunker have articulated theories to describe the threats posed by organized crime within what the World Economic Forum calls the nexus of the illegal economy. These theories on “criminal insurgency” seem to describe the delegitimizing and destabilizing activities of Mexican TCOs and gangs in parts of Mexico and many Central and South America nations.

The first stage in these “criminal insurgencies” establishes zones of impunity within which criminal organizations establish

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**While TCOs still use traditional smuggling routes between the ports of entry, the Department of Justice estimates that they smuggle a majority of the drugs into the U.S. through legal ports of entry in commercial containers or vehicles that cross the border daily.**

of entry in commercial containers or vehicles that cross the border daily.\(^\text{11}\) Techniques to conceal illicit drugs within legitimate products continues to evolve, from cocaine packaged in cans of jalapenos to the manufacture of secret compartments in commercial and private vehicles.\(^\text{12}\)

Once in the U.S., Mexican TCOs control the wholesale movement of drugs along interstates and highways to a network of warehouses throughout the nation, where wholesale brokers distribute their supply to an array of retail supply networks, usually drug gangs that have established business, partnership, or franchise relationships with the TCO. Proceeds from the drugs are then returned to Mexico, smuggled
and control their illegal infrastructures and the commercial environments required to maximize illicit profits. With zones of impunity established, a conflict over control emerges between non-state criminal actors—an unconventional non-state conflict—and between these same non-state criminal actors and the state—an intrastate conflict. These sustained, unchecked conflicts combine with endemic corruption and co-optation to destabilize local areas; consume the attention of the state to the neglect of other essential services; and, ultimately, delegitimize the state and its institutions both internally and externally. What emerges from this dystopia is characterized as a criminal state where the nominal authority of the state may exist but only at the discretion and with the approval of criminal organizations.

Applying the concept of insurgency to the acts and activities of criminal organizations invokes a passionate response from many. Another important writer, Geoff Demarest, argues that nomenclature is less important than an appreciation of the implications of the ability of criminal organizations to grant impunity. The extent to which the state maintains a monopoly on the granting or withholding of impunity, he argues, is the most appropriate measure of state success. When the state loses the power to hold individuals accountable for committing immoral and illegal acts within its territories, it surrenders its sovereignty in that particular space. Demarest also describes the relationship between impunity and anonymity. Whereas a criminal organization may initially require anonymity to conduct its illicit activities, as it gains impunity, the requirement for anonymity is reduced.

Whether or not the activities of Mexican TCOs and gangs operating in the Western Hemisphere are captured by these models can be debated. It can be argued that the situation in Mexico and the northern triangle of Central America does indeed reflect the stages of criminal insurgency. It is clear that criminal organizations are producing, transporting, smuggling, and selling vast quantities of illicit drugs, a situation which requires something resembling the zones of impunity described by the criminal insurgency model. Moreover, the homicide rates in some Central American countries and Mexico appear to be the manifestation of the non-state and intrastate conflict described in the second phase of the criminal insurgency model. It may even be argued that Honduras and Guatemala are approaching the final stages of criminal insurgency where the government is subsumed by endemic corruption and co-optation and unable to challenge the impunity of criminal non-state elements. Nomenclature aside, it is clear that organized crime is the malicious driving force of the corruption-illicit trade-organized crime nexus that is destabilizing fragile states.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Mexican TCOs are the center of gravity of a larger threat to the interests of the U.S. As the largest and most organized drug traffickers, they are responsible for supplying, through the southwest border, the overwhelming majority of illicit drugs to the U.S. The illegal activity drives enormous social costs in terms of medical care, criminal justice system expenditures, and loss of productivity. The steady and, perhaps, increasing supply of illicit drugs facilitated by Mexican TCOs has established conditions for the expansion of sophisticated gangs throughout...
the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere that seek to profit from activity in the lucrative, illegal economy. The methods employed by Mexican TCOs and other illicit actors combine to corrupt and delegitimize state institutions and destabilize societies throughout the hemisphere as well, particularly among the fragile states in the northern triangle of Central America along Mexico’s southern border.

This threat to the U.S. and its hemispheric partners has evolved and matured over the course of the last two decades. Mexican TCOs have strategically leveraged the trends of globalization to increase the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. by successfully exploiting increased flows of legitimate trade through legal ports of entry. Moreover, they have benefited from the success of U.S. Plan Colombia to assert themselves as dominant hemispheric actors in the illegal economy.

To counter the threat posed by Mexican TCOs, the U.S. must develop a whole-of-government approach that establishes unity of effort to coordinate and synchronize all government efforts. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) offers the best solution to providing this unity of effort in the domestic domain. To extend the coordination and synchronization provided by OCDETF to the foreign policy domain, the U.S. government should expand its authorities to include the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Furthermore, it should expand its budget to scale-up its efforts to confront the enormity of the Mexican TCO threat.

NOTES


6 Ibid., p. 29.

7 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, Knopf Doubleday, New York, 2000. Thomas Friedman’s writings on globalization provide a general context for its emergence, as well as a systems understanding of how it operates and the diffusion of power that has taken place as a result.


15 Ibid., p. 22.


17 Ibid., p. 745.


19 Demarest, p. 479.
Transnational Criminal Organizations: 

It’s Not Personal... 
It’s Business!

by Joshua A. Taylor

Setting the Stage

In relation to issues along the southwest border, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are a volatile subject among politicians, academics, and the peoples of both Mexico and the U.S. The trouble with addressing the issue of TCOs begins with a failure to classify them as an organization and understand them as a threat to national security interests. First, it is necessary to understand that the strategic goal of TCOs is profit. Maximizing profit share within the constraints of the environment drives their behavior. Second, TCOs lack both the desire and the components of a broad-based political or ideological movement designed to seize control of a government in some revolutionary manner. The methods and scale of violence may be similar to certain terrorist and insurgent groups, but their strategic goals are not. Moreover, describing a TCO as “terrorist” or “insurgent” tends to create a frame that becomes overly focused on security. TCOs create security problems, but those issues are a byproduct of their business. If the intent is to dismantle them, the focus must be on targeting areas of competitive advantage that allow them to survive as a business. This view is crucial to detaching oneself from the emotional aspects that surround the violence and behavior of TCOs. After all, “It’s not personal. It’s business.”

The Business of TCOs and the Role of the State

Phil Williams, an expert analyst of TCOs, states, “The aim of TCOs is to derive as much profit as possible from their activities—within the limits of acceptable risk.”1 A TCO is a rational, self-interested, non-state actor within the international system. TCOs are capable of violent behavior; however, their perception of acceptable risk limits their actions. A TCO’s strategic vision, structure,
To mitigate risk and increase efficiency, TCOs seek to outsource certain parts of their logistical infrastructure.

and operational reach distinguish it from lower echelons of gangs.

In “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency,” Dr. Max Manwaring of the U.S. Strategic Studies Institute describes three generations of gangs. His model of gang evolution closely parallels the evolution of multinational companies (MNCs), which serves to reinforce the premise that TCOs follow a business model and should be thought of as such. First-generation MNCs were purely opportunistic and sought to exploit their host countries with no concern for the impact on the state or its inhabitants. Similarly, first-generation gangs fail to consider the second- and third-order effects of their actions. They are lower-level street gangs with a loose organizational structure, and they conduct their day-to-day operations with little concern for long-term planning. Their goal is purely to exploit opportunities when they exist. Second-generation MNCs looked to grow their investments in the state. In order to do this, they recognized that showing concern for worker’s rights and investing in infrastructure development solidified their positions in the host nation. Manwaring notes that second-generation gangs are more centrally organized in order to establish a small-business type of organization focused on improving financial gains. At this stage, they begin to integrate themselves into societal structures in both the licit and illicit economies as a means to strengthen their positions and grow their infrastructures. Third-generation MNCs are diverse and vertically integrated organizations that strive to maximize market efficiencies by exploiting the globalized market. They are integrated into all facets of international trade—“real movements (commerce of goods and services), financial movements, and virtual movements (informations technology and hypermedia).”

As third generation gangs, TCOs are marked by large territorial expansions and sophisticated infrastructures that maximize commercial gains through licit and illicit economies. These gangs have the capability to inhibit the state in the performance of its duties. Like third-generation MNCs, third-generation gangs have a degree of vertical integration in their supply chain infrastructures that allows different stages of production to occur in various parts of the world. To mitigate risk and increase efficiency, TCOs seek to outsource certain parts of their logistical infrastructure. This outsourcing creates complex infrastructures with only loose connections between the controlling authority, the production zone, the transit zone, and the distribution network. Similar to MNCs, this process allows sophisticated, criminal organizations the ability to move in and out of multiple markets quickly with minimal cost. This diversification affords the flexibility to shift efforts to more profitable zones if some link in the supply chain fails.

At this stage of criminal gang evolution, local law enforcement agencies can no longer effectively control TCOs. TCOs act as freeriders within the system; they enjoy the benefits of the state but do not conform to its rules. They seek to diversify their efforts between licit and illicit activities as a means to penetrate and exploit the international market systems and financial institutions. Their willingness to circumvent the rule of law in the conduct of their business creates an unfair competitive advantage that threatens the “stability and efficiency of the global economy.” The activities of TCOs add
chaos to the system and threaten the “social contract” of the state. The unrestrained growth and influence of TCOs in Mexico threaten both regional stability and the U.S. economic partnership with Mexico. As a result, TCOs are legitimate threats to the national security interests of both nations.

...a TCO may assume certain roles of the state by providing certain services to the local populace. However, this is not the desire of the strategic-minded, criminal, business organization.

Similar to the role of an MNC operating in a foreign nation, a TCO seeks to exploit seams in the rules and regulations of the host country to lower investment and increase its competitive advantage in the market by increasing the level of interdependence between its services and the needs of the host nation. In some instances, a TCO may assume certain roles of the state by providing certain services to the local populace. However, this is not the desire of the strategic-minded, criminal, business organization. It is only a means to an end. It is a calculated measure to gain leverage over the host nation to maximize profits. The behavior of MNCs or TCOs will often be dictated by the access the host nation allows or denies them within a given market.

TCOs utilize a combination of legitimate and illegitimate means to negotiate larger access to the market. To ensure maximum profit, a TCO will only conform to the rules of the game when it is strategically unsound to do otherwise. TCOs desire a weakened state that affords them the opportunity to maximize profits with relative impunity; however, they do not desire to push the state toward collapse, as it would, simply be bad for business. The TCO is capable of causing significant harm to the stability, structure, and overall prosperity of its host nation, but it is dependent on the survival of the host in order to ensure its own survival. In this way, the TCO is a parasite on the state.

The dynamics of this relationship establishes the limits of the TCO and helps define its perception of acceptable risk. However, miscalculations about the cumulative effects of all criminal activity on the state is a danger for both the economic prosperity of the TCO and the stability of the state. Each TCO may vary in its assessment of how far to push the limits of the state. As a result, the state could be closer to failure than the TCO desires. Furthermore, the weakened nature of state institutions creates opportunities for first- and second-generation gangs to exploit. The combination of all three generations of gangs acting upon a weakened state could force a state into failure. This is contrary to the intentions of the TCOs, but it is a real danger of the situation.

It is illogical to assume that a state could implement policies to eliminate the existence of criminal organizations. Criminal organizations will forever seek to exploit high-value, illegal goods as a means to maximize profit, which creates the potential for increased levels of violence and corruption as organizations seek to protect those interests. However, governments should seek to implement measures to reduce the prevalence and influence of potentially destabilizing, third-generation gangs, like TCOs. National strategy should be designed to reduce TCOs’ levels of impunity and force them to operate with higher degrees of anonymity in the conduct of their business. The goal should be to reduce the impact of TCOs to a level of criminal influence that local law enforcement agencies can successfully manage. To achieve this goal, states must design an operational approach to target TCOs’ areas of competitive advantage.
The Competitive Advantage of TCOs

Michael Porter, a leading expert in the competitiveness of nations and firms, developed the “Diamond Model” to demonstrate that modern economies can strengthen themselves by growing areas of competitive advantage. He believed that a focus on areas of comparative advantage failed to account for the complexities of the global economy. Therefore, his design emphasizes that economic success is not merely inherited due to location, population, or the presence of natural resources. Rather, it is a function of the interaction of the key determinants within his model coupled with the influence of the government and a firm’s willingness to accept risk. Porter’s original model was updated to incorporate variables that pertained to the success of multinational corporations. By thinking of TCOs as another industry similar to MNCs, one can apply their structure to the model in order to assess the critical requirements and vulnerabilities of the TCO business model.

The Four Determinants of Competitive Advantage within Porter’s Model

Factor conditions

The first determinant of competitive advantage represents the inputs required for production. Porter separates them into two categories: basic (traditional factors of production such as land, unskilled/semiskilled labor, etc.) and specialized (factors that were not inherited by the nation [firm] but were created). Specialized factors of production require the investment of both time and money and are represented by a skilled labor pool, which is defined by high levels of education and/or expertise and a sophisticated logistical infrastructure. Within the factor conditions, specialized factors of production are what
truly add to a nation’s (firm’s) ability to gain a competitive advantage.

Specialized factors of production for TCOs are their degrees of impunity, specialized labor, ability to move financial capital over international borders to support operations, and infrastructure (logistical and financial).

The model shows how both chance and the government act to increase/decrease areas of competitive advantage. TCOs operating from Mexico exploit seams in authorizations and jurisdictions both domestically and internationally as they seek to increase their degrees of impunity. Their behavior is directly related to the effectiveness of the rule of law. Institutions that are weak in areas of investigation, interdiction, and prosecution create wider seams along which TCOs can operate. At the international level, TCOs utilize established degrees of domestic impunity and international boundaries to attain safe havens, which prevent a stronger nation’s institutions from effectively dismantling their operations. The wider the seams in authorizations and jurisdictions, the more risk the TCO is willing to take: TCOs will seek to maximize profit “within the level of acceptable risk.” Effective strategies should focus on reducing the seams that make risk more acceptable and targeting the specialized factors of production to reduce their level of competitive advantage.

**Demand conditions**

The next determinant of competitive advantage represents the degree of consumer sophistication and desire to obtain the product. A firm’s goals are to maximize profit, satisfy the customer, and ensure the customer’s continued desire for the product. Porter asserts that sophisticated buyers of products in high demand will force firms to become more innovative and efficient in order to survive.

TCOs diversify their efforts to service the demands of both the licit and illicit markets in a manner that best enables them to maximize profits. In so doing, they often blur the lines between legitimate and illegitimate operations, which enable them to move illicit goods and capital under the guise of licit operations. This ability undermines the integrity of the system and serves as a significant, destabilizing factor to economic and financial markets. Governments can implement measures to reduce the demand for certain goods, but high-demand, illegal goods will always create a market for criminal organizations. Further, the elimination of certain illegal commodities does little to solve the problems associated with TCOs. TCOs already show the willingness and ability to operate in both the licit and illicit realms. If all drugs were legalized tomorrow, Mexican TCOs would be in the best position to become the primary suppliers to the legal economy based on their existing levels of expertise in the production and distribution of such commodities. In essence, the legalization of drugs may only serve to further empower TCOs; therefore, reducing the demand for drugs remains an effective tool to reduce the influence and power of TCOs. Drugs are the major money maker for TCOs, but it is not their lone activity. The same networks that move drugs illegally from Mexico to the U.S. also move illegal aliens, so high demand for either service provides a market for TCOs. An effective strategy to target TCOs must be comprehensive in nature to address all aspects that contribute to the competitive advantage of TCOs and focus on reducing the demand for all high-demand, illicit services that truly enable
TCO activities.

**Related and supported industries**

The third determinant of competitive advantage relates to the degree of interconnectivity among related and supported industries. If a nation (firm) enjoys comparative or even competitive advantages in one industry, it can increase its overall competitive advantage by also operating in a related or supported industry. These multiple operations allow them to take advantage of interconnected logistical lines, resources, and/or market conditions, which leads to lower costs overall and more efficiencies in operations. Porter developed the concept of “clusters” based on this determinant. Clusters are similar or supported industries that collocate in areas where such conditions exist. When certain areas of competitive advantage exist, clusters will begin to form in order to increase the competitiveness and efficiencies of the whole.

The transportation of drugs and illegal aliens represents different commodities; however, the infrastructure to source, transport, and distribute those commodities is similar. TCOs maximize their efficiencies by focusing on related and supportive industries in constructing their strategic visions and sophisticated infrastructures. This focus enables them to diversify and protect themselves in the event of changes to either the rate of demand or their ability to supply certain goods. For example, in the event of successful drug interdiction along one line of operation, supported and related industries enable their ability to alter lines of transportation and shipment along other routes that are having more success. Alternatively, they could choose to temporarily shift to other commodities that may have less demand but prevent crippling losses in profit during periods of successful governmental interdiction. High demand and acceptable levels of risk will drive TCOs to become more innovative to satisfy the demand and maximize profits. Constructing tunnels and using ultra-light aircraft to deliver illicit goods into the U.S. are current innovations TCOs use to circumvent effective border control operations.14

The persistent nature of criminal/gang violence in Mexico is linked to both the concept of clusters and competitive advantage. Primarily, the conditions of the operating environment in Mexico are permissive to the growth of organized, criminal activity because some of the government’s security and judicial institutions are relatively weak. Further, the socio-economic conditions create a steady pool of unskilled/semiskilled labor and high demand for assistance in gaining illegal entry into the U.S. These are factors the government must address if Mexico hopes to reduce the influence of TCOs. Effective strategies to combat TCOs should focus on reducing the factors that enable these clusters to form. This must be a bilateral solution between the U.S. and Mexico, as neither side can effectively do it alone.

TCOs maximize their efficiencies by focusing on related and supportive industries in constructing their strategic visions and sophisticated infrastructures.

**Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry**

The fourth determinant of competitive advantage relates to the strategic vision, structure, and degree of rivalry that exists among firms. Vision and structure can be heavily influenced by basic and specialized factors of production. Specifically, access to financial capital and skilled personnel capable of creating and implementing strategic goals strengthen a firm’s competitive advantage. In addition, Porter believes that rivalry is a critical factor
in developing the efficiencies in operations that truly maximize a firm’s competitive advantage. The rationale is that rivalry forces firms to avoid complacency and continually seek to improve their product, lower their costs, and maximize the potential of their operations.

Rivalry for Mexican TCOs comes in two forms: competition against other TCOs for larger profit share and competition against the state for survival. For these reasons, Mexico’s third-generation gangs must be strategic-minded, capable organizations to survive. The nature of this environment reinforces the severity of the problem that TCOs present local law enforcement, Mexican federal agencies, and U.S. state and federal agencies. Third-generation, criminal gangs in Mexico have become extremely efficient and are completely integrated into both the legitimate and illegitimate worlds, which makes the movement of their illicit goods and capital that much more difficult to observe and interdict. Further, the nature of their networks (infrastructures) is extremely sophisticated. Their ability to outsource to existing lower-level criminal organizations for stages of production and/or distribution prevents them from being tied directly to the activity. Additionally, outsourcing allows for greater entry into more markets at a lower cost because they do not have to develop their own infrastructures. They simply piggyback off existing infrastructures as long as it is convenient to meet their goals. TCOs are able to survive because of the sophistication of their designs. They stay ahead of the demand swings and continue to refine processes to maximize profit, which is a function of perfection through competition. Those that cannot adjust quickly enough to changes in the operational environment will either be destroyed through interdiction or absorbed by other players.

**Building a Strategy**

The power and influence of a TCO (third-generation gang) cannot be successfully reduced through efforts that lack a comprehensive approach. The nature of TCO operations in the global environment creates an uncertain network of players and a complex infrastructure that exploits both the licit and illicit economies. In addition, TCO operations are rife with “unknown unknowns” that have the potential to cause unforeseen, negative, second- and third-order effects. The complexity of the problem creates a myriad of disjointed policies that attack parts of the problem without attacking the whole. These policies create many duplications of effort and decrease the efficiencies necessary to reap the benefits of a truly, comprehensive approach. In the case of southwest border security and Mexican TCOs, polemic issues, such as the trade of illicit goods (weapons, narcotics, human trafficking, money, and intellectual property), illegal immigration, the disturbance of trade routes between the U.S. and Mexico, violence along the border, and the threat of terrorist infiltration into the U.S., are symptoms. These are the issues that make southwest border security a salient issue to Americans. However, TCOs have their hands on all of the aforementioned issues. TCOs are the center of gravity around which the U.S government should design all southwest border security strategies.

Military strategists and planners must understand the type of war they will fight before they develop any effective strategy. The same rationale applies to targeting TCOs. TCOs are strategic minded, rational actors who subscribe
to a self-help model that seeks to expand their degrees of influence and impunity to an optimal point that maximizes profit without causing their host nations to fail. Like other actors in a realist model of international relations, they are most likely to pursue violence as a matter of survival or to exploit an opportunity to grow their shares of the balance of power within the system. Their motives, actions, opportunities, and limitations are similar to those of an MNC. The end goal for both is to maximize profit while ensuring their survival within the system. For this, they seek to exploit and grow areas of competitive advantage.

If the U.S. truly desires to establish a “twenty-first century border,” it must synchronize efforts to attack the TCO network in a unified manner that effectively reduces its areas of competitive advantage. The U.S. should establish lines of effort to specifically target the specialized factors of production that enable TCO operations, specifically, degrees of impunity, specialized labor, ability to move financial capital over international borders to support operations, and infrastructure (logistical and financial). This goal can only be achieved through a coordinated and unified effort among federal agencies that specialize in interdictions, investigations, and prosecutions. Additionally, the strategy should work to enforce/establish policies that most effectively reduce demand for commodities that are most profitable for TCOs. Moreover, an effective policy must delineate a plan to strengthen governmental institutions and broaden existing jurisdictions/authorizations that will reduce the seams along which TCOs operate with relative impunity. Effective strategy cannot be a unilateral effort. The issues with Mexican TCOs are a shared concern for both the U.S. and Mexico, and diplomatic efforts should treat them as such.

However, a plan to build and prepare the friendly infrastructure to control instability and violence and successfully prosecute criminals must be in place before introducing any of these more aggressive strategies. TCOs are capable of using extreme measures of violence, especially when they see opportunities to expand and during periods when their survival is at stake. Reducing TCOs will disturb the balance of power within the criminal system. When power vacuums arise, all echelons of gangs will use force to expand their opportunities to fill the void and increase their profit share. Additionally, successful government interdiction that reduces the competitive advantages afforded to TCOs will force them to respond violently against authorities for their survival. This situation should be expected and fully included in the first phase of any strategy development.

The 2011 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime” does well to address many of these key issues. However, an effective counter-TCO program must establish a formalized, joint interagency task force or committee with the authority to direct and coordinate efforts among member agencies. Creating such an organization would make it possible to reduce the multitude of existing strategies designed to attack the symptoms of the problems that TCOs create and reduce governmental costs through greater efficiencies in operations and the elimination of duplicated efforts. Further, it would establish an oversight authority with both a “carrot and a stick,” which is an essential element to move such an endeavor toward a more unified end. The best efforts may only marginalize the influence of TCOs; however, the ability to reduce their influence to a manageable level for local law enforcement agencies is a realistic and attainable goal. A comprehensive and unified approach increases the possibility of reaching a goal that promotes stability and prosperity within Mexico and strengthens its relationship with U.S.
NOTES


9 Manwaring, p 1.


12 The description of the determinants of competitive advantage and their relationship with each other is based on notes from a lecture in 2009 by J. Gustavo Roger at the Universidad de Belgrano, Buenos Aires, as part of the graduate school curriculum in International Relations. I designed Figure 1 from a similar graphical representation of Porter’s model used during the course of instruction.

13 Obama, p 6.


16 Within the 2011 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” elements of specialized labor are identified as “facilitators” (accountants, attorneys, notaries, bankers, real estate agents) and “specialists.” I would agree with this assessment, but would add financiers and corrupt civil servants/elected officials and stress the need to target the “gatekeepers” who control access at border crossing points.
Two distinct cultures, economies, political systems, and ideas of what comprises the national security interests of the U.S. and Mexico intersect at the U.S. southwest border. Those security interests stem from a desire by both countries to prosper in the global economy while assuring the safety and security of their respective populations. Each nation understands that its individual prosperity and security depends, to an extent, on the prosperity and security of other. This interdependence introduces immense complexity to the situation, given the multiple and diverse facets that must intersect and work together.

Today’s global economy requires the safe and expeditious movement of capital, goods, and people to ensure the prosperity of its participants. While the expeditious flow of licit capital, goods, and people across the southwest border enhances the prosperity of the U.S. and Mexico, it introduces vulnerabilities to the national security and prosperity of both nations. The vulnerabilities at the border include illegal migration; illicit trafficking of arms, drugs, people, and black market goods; and drug-related impunity that permits illegal activities. Poor monitoring of sections of the border further exacerbates these issues.

These threats create a multitude of problems that require special attention from the federal agencies involved. The threats are interrelated; therefore, no agency can operate in a vacuum. In essence, the challenges related to the southwest border are “wicked” or complex problems. Dr. Jeff Conklin points out “wicked problems” evolve in a social context where there are multiple stakeholders who are unaware of the multiple functions and connections found in a complex

### Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them.

*Laurence J. Peter* ¹
The complexity of the security situation at the U.S. southwest border is significant from the perspective of a single U.S. government agency, and multiplies when considering the numbers of stakeholders from the national to the local level.

The complexity of the security situation at the U.S. southwest border is significant from the perspective of a single U.S. government agency, and multiplies when considering the numbers of stakeholders from the national to the local level. Partisan politics, immigration policy, North American Free Trade Agreement policy, security interests, environmental concerns, and treaty obligations under United Nations counternarcotics programs are just a few of the issues connected in complex ways with systemic implications when acted upon. There is arguably no right action to take, no clear alternative to adopt, and any approach that is adopted must operate in a system where security strategies and government programs are already established. This litany meets the conditions that Conklin and Rittel describe.

In light of the complexity, U.S. national-level strategies adopted to address the problems articulate ends that could improve security along the southwest border. However, there does not appear to be a bridge from the strategic to the tactical level nor unity of command to see the actions through. There are numerous U.S. governmental agencies with jurisdictional claims related to the southwest border. They promulgate policies and strategies to carry out their responsibilities. This article considers those that apply most directly to southwest border security.

In this article, I argue parties involved must take several steps to improve security along the southwest border. The first step is to develop a common understanding of what defines the security problem. The second step is to develop a single, overarching strategy with a single governing body to achieve what is known in military terms as unity of command. The governing body must be empowered to hold all participating and contributing agencies and departments accountable to ensure convergence on the problem and unity of effort.

Reaching a Common Understanding of Southwest Border Security

The Difficulty in Defining Security

Since there is no common language or book of terms used by all federal government agencies, each agency interprets security differently. The Merriam Webster online dictionary defines security as the quality of
being secure as in freedom from harm or danger, but security also means measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack, or escape. The Joint Chiefs of Staff define security as “measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness or a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.”

In practice, the definition of security will depend on its context in concert with the particular mission or charter of the department or agency. Adding to the complexity, federal agencies take their direction from multiple sources to include Presidential directives, Congressional legislation, and the National Security Strategy. This “evolving set of interlocking issues and constraints” illustrates that the security problem is ill structured.

**How the Different Strategies Define Security**

This analysis looks at the following U.S. strategies that deal directly with illegal migration, drug trafficking organizations, and organized crime organizations.

- “The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy,” 2011
- “2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan”

Four enduring national interests—security, prosperity, values, and international order—define the desired end state in the May 2010 “National Security Strategy.” For the sake of comparison, the Mexican 2009–2012 “National Security Strategy” has two overarching national interests underwritten by 13 objectives and 145 supporting components toward achieving the objectives. The overarching national interests are to reinforce the Mexican national security system and to address the threats that endanger the national security comprehensively. Both countries’ national security strategies describe a whole-of-government approach to achieve their desired objectives. Notably, both documents include secure borders to facilitate trade as the venue for economic prosperity.

The 2011 “National Drug Control Strategy” outlines two main goals with seven sub-measures for achieving the objectives. The two goals are to curtail illicit drug consumption in the U.S. and to improve the public health and public safety of the people by reducing of the consequences of drug abuse. The seven sub-measures are statistically measureable data points depicting at-risk populations with a propensity for drug use and subsequent abuse.

With respect to the southwest border, the 2011 “National Drug Control Strategy” provides specific focus areas. Establishing the Border Intelligence Fusion Center at the El Paso Intelligence Center is key to ensuring accurate, actionable, and timely information and intelligence sharing. The strategy alludes to the “importance of partnering with other nations” for disrupting drug trafficking and production.

In the case of the U.S. southwest border, the strategy recognizes the requirement to work with Mexico in the areas of intelligence gathering,
investigation, enforcement operations, and prosecutions.9 Building resilient communities along the southwest border through education and technical assistance is also addressed.10 All other specific goals for the southwest border are deferred to the separate “National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy.”11

The goal of the “National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy” is to “substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the southwest border.”12 These strategic objectives describe how to achieve the strategic goal: enhance information and intelligence sharing; interdict drugs, drugs proceeds, and associated instruments of violence along the entire southwest border; disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations along the southwest border; stem the flow of illicit proceeds and illegal weapons across the border into Mexico; improve counterdrug technologies for drug investigation and interdiction; develop strong resilient communities to resist criminal activity while promoting healthy lifestyles; and enhance cooperation with Mexican counterdrug efforts.

The “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan” (Fiscal Years 2008–2013) outlines five key missions... The first three missions are directly linked to actions taken along the southwest border. The strategic plan further subdivides the five missions into goals that include objectives and performance indicators for measuring success. Objectives for securing the country from terrorist threats and enhancing security focus on deterrence, early detection of all threats, and managing risks to critical infrastructure, key leaders, and events. To secure the borders, the plan calls for the prevention of illegal flow of immigrants and goods across any point on the border, “while expediting the secure flow of lawful travel and commerce.”14 Additionally, transnational criminal organizations are to be disrupted and dismantled. Lastly, to enforce immigration laws, the plan calls for the strengthening of the administration system and a comprehensive effort to prevent illegal immigration that includes addressing incentives that contribute to it.

The “2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan” has two goals. The first goal is to secure the border through a combination of “information, integration, and rapid response in a risk-based manner.”15 The second goal focuses on internal growth, maturing, and strengthening the border patrol force to exploit the new tools and approaches described by the first goal. The overall end state is to manage risk along the border to prevent terrorism, increase illegal immigrant certainty of arrests, and reduce smuggling and its associated crimes.16

The 2011 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime” has a single principle—to “build, balance and integrate” all the instruments of national power to “combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security and urge foreign partners to do the same.”17 The end state is to reduce the threat posed by transnational organized crime from a national security level threat to a manageable public safety problem.18 The five key objectives to achieving this end state are protecting the U.S. and partner’s
population, strengthening partner’s capacity for governance and transparency, breaking transnational criminal organizations’ economic power and ability to exploit financial markets and instruments, defeating the transnational criminal organizations that pose the greatest threat, and building consensus and multilateral cooperation across industry, finance, academia, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations at the national and international level.

To meet these key objectives, the “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime” 2011 sets out 56 specific priority actions. This strategy is the most complete description of both the threats to U.S. security interests and ways to address them. Specific to the security threats along the southwest border, the strategy seeks to sever the illicit flow of drugs, money, people, black market goods, and weapons across the border.

Is Current Strategy on the Right Course?

As Conklin tells us, complex problems do not have right or wrong solutions. At best, the solutions are good enough based on resource constraints, while at worse, solutions are not good enough. The most obvious problem with southwest border security is the lack of a single, comprehensive, security strategy. Further complicating matters is the lack of an overarching definition of what it means to achieve security along the southwest border. Each agency is left to its own definition of security in order to obtain objectives that best align with its individual charter or mission. This autonomy causes fragmentation because each agency internalizes its view of the problem of southwest border security. What is left is a complex system being probed from multiple, asynchronous directions. Actions taken by one agency have the potential for multiple second- and third-order effects on the system. The unintended consequences are exponentially greater when multiple agencies and departments act independently on the system. This phenomenon drives different agencies to focus on what are symptoms of the problem and reshape the problem in indiscernible ways.

What in the Current Strategies is Impeding the Achievement of Security?

What is a strategy? Strategy is broadly defined as “a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.” More specifically and likely more helpful when looking for precision, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations defines strategy as a “prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multi-national objectives.”

The most obvious problem with southwest border security is the lack of a single, comprehensive, security strategy. Further complicating matters is the lack of an overarching definition of what it means to achieve security along the southwest border.

As each agency develops its own criteria and goals, there is overlap in approaches, and it is not evident how or to what extent the integration of these approaches is occurring across agencies and departments.

All the strategies that relate to security along the southwest border focus on measures of performance (MOP) as opposed to more important measures of effectiveness (MOE). What is the difference and why does it matter?
The strategy that best delineates objectives that are most likely to reduce the multiple threats to security present at the southwest border is the 2011 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.”

The situation on the southwest border will change because it is a complex system. The current situation requires continual assessments to ensure the right tasks are accomplished and the tasks are being done right to achieve the desired security objective.

The strategy that best delineates objectives that are most likely to reduce the multiple threats to security present at the southwest border is the 2011 “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.” However, there is no executive lead agency to oversee the accomplishment of all the objectives listed in
the strategy. Without an executive agent to lead and be accountable for the effort, there is a potential for a lack of synchronization with multiple agencies and expending resources inefficiently and at cross purposes.

Those strategies that appear to reflect a common definition of security, or are best aligned, appear synchronized and on the right path. Such is the case of the “National Drug Control Strategy” 2011 and the “National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy” 2011, which both fall under the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Similarly the “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan” (Fiscal Years 2008–2013) and the “2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan,” which both fall under the Department of Homeland Security, appear synchronized and complementary.

**Conclusion**

The smuggling of drugs, people (illegal immigrants and potential terrorists), black market goods, and possibly weapons of mass destruction into the U.S. and the flow of weapons, ammunition, and illicit currency into Mexico are daily threats along the southwest border. These threats are compounded by the sophistication with which the drug trafficking and organized crime organizations challenge the authorities and jeopardize the integrity and well-being of the population on both sides of the border.

All these threats generate a multitude of security problems that require special attention by the governmental agencies and departments involved. The problems generated are interrelated, and actions taken to deal or remedy one aspect have an impact on the rest of the issues. By any measure, the security situation along the U.S. southwest border is a complex problem.

There are competing requirements that touch multiple aspects of society and, at times, are at odds with the agencies charged with the task of providing security. In order to get to a better state of common security, the first essential step is to develop a consensus and common understanding of the problem of security along the southwest border. To achieve consensus and common understanding, a single, overarching strategy is necessary. A single governing body with clear leadership must have the ability to hold all participating and contributing agencies and departments accountable.

The governing body must also be able to conduct periodic reviews of progress toward achieving the desired objectives, as well as the ability to reframe and adjust as the dynamics of this complex system shift and change. The focus must be on doing the right things to impact the system in the direction that best achieves security and not on doing the right things to secure funding for an agency or department to ensure its viability.

**NOTES**


5 A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.

6 Conklin, p. 7.


9 Ibid., p. 55.

10 Ibid., p. 15.

11 Ibid., p. 60.


14 Ibid., p. 7.


16 Ibid., p. 7.


18 Ibid., p. 1.


22 Ibid., p. 214.

The use of military capabilities to support federal, state, and local law enforcement is not a new concept. For years, domestic law enforcement agencies requested the help of military training, equipment, and personnel to help shape and refine policing tactics and fill shortfalls within an agency. The use of the military has proven vital to securing America’s borders, and it is imperative agencies use unique military capabilities to their fullest potential while operating within the confines of codified laws and on politically realistic terms. From the inception of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) in 1989, defense support for civil authorities (DSCA) has been seen as a “stopgap” measure when additional force was needed. However, the threats of increasing violence destabilizing Mexico and terrorists crossing America’s borders create situations that require domestic interdiction agencies to request additional military support. These agencies should not view Department of Defense (DoD) assets as brief enhancements to domestic operations but rather as a vital security tool that can provide a force multiplier for domestic law enforcement. The right combination of unique capabilities, authorities, and deployment flexibility can provide the force multiplier these agencies need to secure the borders.

**History of Military Use on Southwest Border**

The Immigration Act of 1924 established the United States Border Patrol (USBP) as the lead enforcement agency to patrol the sparsely populated areas between the legally-established points of entry into the U.S. Over the course of 90 years, the strategies and objectives changed, but the mission to secure the areas between the ports of entry along the border has remained constant.

Prior to the 1980s, drugs flowing north into the U.S. consisted mainly of marijuana and heroin;
Many believe the military is the wrong tool to use to secure the southwest border. The 1997 death of Esequiel Hernandez, an 18-year-old American citizen, is commonly used to argue against using DoD capabilities to help secure the southwest border.

Task Force North (JTF-N), and its mission was expanded to include providing homeland security support to the nation’s federal law enforcement agencies. To date JTF-N has completed over 600 missions in support of U.S. law enforcement and counterdrug task forces.

In 2005, JTF-N provided 400 Soldiers along the New Mexico-Mexico border in support of the USBP’s Operation Western Vigilance. In May 2006, Operation Jumpstart (OJS) began to deploy National Guard Soldiers to the southwest border. Between 2006 and 2008, 6,000 Soldiers deployed, making OJS the largest deployment of DoD personnel to the southwest border in recent history. OJS was structured to supplement enforcement operations along the southwest border in support of the USBP, while the agency recruited and hired additional border patrol agents. The federal government funded the operation; however, National Guard units remained under the control of the governors of the states in which they served.

As OJS National Guard units withdrew and the USBP increased its ranks, the need for more technology and military capabilities in a support role along the southwest border was evident, and Operation Phalanx was launched in July 2010. Operation Phalanx was based on an Executive Order authorizing up to 1,200 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen along the 1,933-mile southwest border in support of Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

Brewing Problems

Many believe the military is the wrong tool to use to secure the southwest border. The 1997 death of Esequiel Hernandez, an 18-year-old American citizen, is commonly used to argue against using DoD capabilities to help secure the southwest border. Hernandez was shot after he fired on a U.S. Marine patrol deployed in support of USBP operations near Redford, TX. Incidents such as these are regrettable and may occur regardless of the types of troops who patrol the border. However, these incidents heavily influence public opinion and add to the perception that the U.S. border is being militarized.
Critics of DCSA operations are quick to cite the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) to defend their objections to the use of the military on the southwest border.\textsuperscript{6} Motivated by resentment of military enforcement of the civil law during Reconstruction and specifically by the controversial stationing of the military at polling places in some southern states during the 1876 Presidential election, Congress enacted the PCA in 1878.\textsuperscript{7} The PCA places reasonable restrictions on the use of federal military forces to operate as lead domestic law enforcement entities.\textsuperscript{8} However, the PCA also restricts federal military personnel from conducting searches and seizures and affecting arrests of subjects in violation of U.S. civil laws, regardless if done in a supporting role. While the PCA does address legitimate concerns when limiting the power of the federal government, it is important to consider the environment and political pressures that existed when the PCA was created. In today’s environment, the PCA unnecessarily exposes the federal government to excessive scrutiny and frivolous claims of violation.

**JTF-N Authority**

Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 18, “Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies,” authorizes military support for civilian law enforcement agencies. JTF-N deploys Soldiers in support of civil authorities under this title. JTF-N has undertaken multiple engineering projects along the southwest border and deploys Soldiers for short-term operations. JTF-N recruits and employs units on a strictly voluntary basis; JTF-N has no assigned forces. These Title 10 deployments concentrate support on militarily unique skills and capabilities that domestic law enforcement agencies lack or cannot practically replicate. Title 10 counterdrug support (CDS) must also provide a training opportunity that contributes to combat readiness and cannot be used for continuing, on-going, long-term, operational support commitments at the same location.\textsuperscript{9} The use of Title 10 units is effective in large-scale fencing operations or for missions where JTF-N requires a unit’s mission essential task list and critical capabilities. However, the short rotation (30–60 days) coupled with the 180 days required for mission authorization through JTF-N limit the deployment potential for detection and monitoring missions. In addition, the limited maneuverability with combat vehicles due to environmental and right of entry concerns further degrades the monitoring and detection deployment potential.

From February to April 2012, a high-profile joint operation, dubbed Operation Nimbus II, was conducted in New Mexico and Arizona with CBP and JTF-N Title 10 Soldiers. These units were required to have USBP agents assigned to each team. This requirement precluded employing these agents in other areas where increased patrols could have been effective. This operation demonstrated the workforce and military technology that can be deployed in support of the USBP; however, it also highlighted its limitations. These types of operations are short in duration and leave capacity gaps when completed.\textsuperscript{10} In many instances, transnational criminal organizations simply pause operations or move until the Title 10 units have withdrawn.
National Guard Support to Counterdrug Program

National Guard members may be ordered to perform full-time duty under section 502(f) of Title 32, U.S. Code, to support the federally-mandated counterdrug program. National Guard units deployed during OJS and Operation Phalanx did so under this provision.11 OJS

National Guard units were divided into entry identification teams (EIT) and deployed at fixed interdiction sites specified by CBP. Similar to Title 10 forces, National Guard units serving under this provision deployed at prepositioned sites dictated by CBP. These sites were high visibility and served a deterrent function that assisted interdiction efforts. These units worked under the same guidelines as Title 10 Soldiers. This arrangement tied both the EITs and USBP agents to static, predetermined locations, regardless of the evolving tactical situation on the ground. Both OJS and Operation Phalanx were hindered by right of entry agreements.

Up to 4,000 National Guard members are authorized to perform drug interdiction or counterdrug activities in all 50 states and 6 territories.12 These Soldiers, deployed under Title 32 § 112 CDS, fall under the command of the State Governor and the Adjutant General (TAG). This federal exemption from PCA allows for a much more flexible use of military assets and abilities.13

Notwithstanding this exemption, the Secretary of Defense has imposed policy restrictions that mimic the PCA. These policies restrict the roles Title 32 § 112 units can assume while in support of drug law enforcement agencies, specifically, the ability to arrest.14 Regardless of these policy restraints, units deployed under Title 32 § 112 are legally exempt from PCA and the associated lawsuits, liabilities, and legal challenges that have plagued federal deployments.15 Units deployed under Title 32 § 112 would have the authority to conduct surveillance operations within the U.S. under the direction of federal agencies operating along the southwest border. These Soldiers are working in their home states and are able to fully integrate into the border patrol operational rhythm, as the length of their service both in time and location is extended far beyond those of their Title 10 & Title 32 § 502f counterparts.

USBP: Deming and Lordsburg Corridor

Lordsburg and Deming border patrol station’s operational environment extends from Columbus, NM, to the Arizona/New Mexico state line. This area is sparsely populated and includes many miles of mountainous terrain and multiple national parks. The border patrol must obtain rights of entry or pass-through rights on private property to deploy military units in support of the counterdrug mission. Under the Operation Phalanx memorandum of understanding, Title 32 § 502f OJS and Operation Phalanx units deployed in the Deming and Lordsburg operational environment worked at fixed sites using detection and monitoring equipment. Roving patrols were strictly prohibited.16 These fixed sites were limited, and the majority of these pre-approved sites were many miles from the international border and increased the distance a potential threat was able to travel within the U.S. before detection. Because of the relatively short deployment lengths under both Title 10 and Title 32 § 502f, Soldiers have little time for area orientation,
which proves to be an obstacle when threats are detected and they must redeploy to an alternate site. This requirement is made easier when National Guard and local stakeholders forge long-lasting relationships. The sustained deployment of Title 32 § 112 units maintains the continuity of relationships between the USBP and the Soldiers deployed to support them. This long-term sustained deployment is typical of Title 32 § 112 Guard units and maximized their potential.

Counter Drug Support to Law Enforcement Agencies on the Southwest Border

While OJS and Operation Phalanx deployments along the southwest border undoubtedly had a positive effect on border patrol apprehension rates in the short term, is this method the best use of highly-trained National Guard units? A recent Government Accountability Office study looked at OJS (2006–2008) and Operation Phalanx (2010–2011). OJS cost $1.2 billion over the course of two years, and Guard soldiers assisted in 11.7 percent of all illegal immigrant apprehensions and 9.4 percent of all marijuana seizures along the southwest border. Operation Phalanx cost $110 million, and the National Guard assisted in 5.9 percent of all illegal immigrant apprehensions and 2.6 percent of all marijuana seizures along the southwest border. While these numbers show significant support for the border patrol, they are paltry when compared with Title 32 § 112 CDS units. In 2011, with a budget of $203 million, CDS units in the four southern border states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas participated in over 19 percent of all apprehensions and 14.3 percent of all marijuana seizures.

The Path Forward

The use of U.S. military capability along the southwest border has reinforced and strengthened the border patrol, but it also left many in the law enforcement community questioning the effectiveness of their deployments. Local stakeholders routinely voice their concerns over what they consider a lack of enforcement personnel along the southwest border. The desire of the local citizens for “boots on the ground” to interdict groups of smugglers and illegal aliens is understandable; however, sporadic thickening of the enforcement line along the southern border is only treating a symptom of a much larger problem. The question remains as to how to deploy military units more effectively to secure the border and best utilize National Guard funding to achieve the greatest operational impact in controlling the ever increasing violence the USBP faces on America’s southwest border.

Helicopter support multiplies the effectiveness of USBP agents, as helicopters can navigate the difficult terrain. Focusing National Guard units to support these three capabilities will
When detection and monitoring missions are needed, Title 32 § 112 Counter Drug Support units are again better situated to assist interdiction agencies, as they are not restricted to predetermined locations.

When detection and monitoring missions are needed, Title 32 § 112 CDS units are again better situated to assist interdiction agencies, as they are not restricted to predetermined locations. Although they are still required to have an agent in close proximity, they are able to conduct roving patrols and move to locations typically off limits to Title 10 and 32 § 502f units. CDS units are capable of deploying rapidly in the event a changing operational environment requires military support, as opposed to the 180-day turn around required for support from JTF-N. Using Title 32 § 112 CDS units allows the USBP to integrate these Guardsmen into intelligence gathering and analysis work. In addition, their knowledge of the operational environment, facilitated by lengthy deployments, increases their effectiveness in the field. With the expected draw down of Title 32 § 502f Guard units serving under Operation Phalanx, it is essential that troops assigned to longer-term CDS operations in support of the USBP be increased and augmented with funding above and beyond the current levels typically allotted to Title 10 and Title 32 § 502f Guard units.

Recommendations

These recommendations would streamline DoD support of law enforcement agencies along the border:

- JTF-N should be responsible for infrastructure and intelligence analyst requests initiated from law enforcement agencies. JTF-N has taken the lead in many DHS requests for infrastructure fencing and road projects. JTF-N has relationships with military engineering units that routinely volunteer for training and deployment opportunities along the southwest border.

- The employment of DoD assets in DSCA operations should be divided and specifically assigned to units who can best fulfill the request through specific authorities: JTF-N should assume longer-term, air support missions that are not time sensitive, and Title 32 § 112 CDS units should assume detection and monitoring missions, intelligence gathering and analysis, and short-response, close air support.

- Title 32 § 112 units need uniform rules regarding the use of force along the entire border region. Currently rules for the use of force rules differ from state to state.

- The use of military personnel deployed at fixed-site, overwatch locations should be substantially reduced or eliminated. Military personnel should concentrate on intelligence analysis, signals intelligence, and aerial surveillance (i.e., close air support, unmanned aerial system, and fixed-wing aircraft). These are tasks that cannot be readily replicated by border patrol agents.
• Title 32 § 112 units should be fully integrated into the CBP/Office of Border Control strategic planning process. DoD should prepare for an enduring National Guard integration and prepare memorandums of understanding with California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to ensure a continuity of effort in a unified deployment strategy.

In this economic environment of shrinking budgets and the increased focus on integration and collaboration efforts, it is vital to maximize the capabilities of available resources. Some say the military is the wrong tool for the job; however, experience shows it is the right tool but too often used in the wrong way. To truly have a lasting impact, DoD must provide agencies with the knowledge, skills, and capabilities to fill the gaps. Simply conducting surveillance operations and replicating current border patrol agent tasks does not fulfill the DSCA mission. A more effective employment of military capabilities within legal authorities would be far better than the current approach to military support to law enforcement along the southwest border. IAJ

NOTES

1 Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker, (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas, North-South Center, University of Miami, Coral Gables, 1996, p. 98.


3 Bruce M. Bagley, Myths of Militarization: The Role of the Military in the War on Drugs in the Americas, North-South Center, University of Miami, Coral Gables, 1991, p. 87.


5 A full investigation of the incident was undertaken and the Marine patrol was ultimately cleared of any wrong doing.

6 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The phrase “posse comitatus” is translated from Latin as the “power of the county” and is defined in common law to refer to all those over the age of 15 upon whom a sheriff could call for assistance in preventing any type of civil disorder. See generally United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112, 114, n.3, 5th Circuit, 1986.


Ibid.


National Guard Regulation 500-2, *Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources, National Guard Counterdrug Support*, Department of the Army and Air Force, National Guard Bureau, paragraph 2-1e.

United States v. Bacon, 851 F.2d 1312, 1313, 11th Circuit, 1988, (per curiam). “Even if the participation by military personnel in this drug investigation is to be considered a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, it was not a willful violation of the spirit of the Act”; United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 376, 4th Circuit, 1974. “While the bulk of the evidence was obtained by violating the Instruction, there is totally lacking any evidence that there was a conscious, deliberate or willful intent on the part of the Marines or the Treasury Department’s Special Investigator to violate the Instruction or the spirit of the Posse Comitatus Act. From all that appears, the Special Investigator acted innocently albeit ill-advisedly.”

This was considered standing operating procedure when I worked with National Guard units that deployed in Lordsburg and Deming. This issue was also discussed and the practice affirmed during a discussion briefing at JTF-N on December 8, 2011.


Figures obtained from interviews with former CDS operators from the National Guard assigned to Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2012.

From February 2011–August 2011, I served as a field operation supervisor in command of two forward operating bases situated within the Chiriucua and Peloncillo mountain ranges near the AZ-NM state line. During this time, I routinely interacted with local ranches in the San Bernardino valley as I attended quarterly meetings with stakeholders from the Malpai Borderlands Conservation Group.

In discussion and briefings held at JTF-N at Fort Bliss, TX, December 2011.
Hemispheric Framework
for Counter-Narcotics Operations

by Wes Hester

Introduction

In June 1971, President Richard Nixon officially declared a “war on drugs,” claiming that drug abuse was “public enemy number one.” President Nixon recognized the impact of trafficking and the use of illicit narcotics on the health, security, and economy of the U.S. In 2007 alone, drug abuse cost the U.S. an estimated $193 billion. For four decades, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has served as the nation’s first line of maritime defense in the war on drugs. While its efforts are substantial and its interdiction record impressive, today’s operational environment demands a more comprehensive, cooperative approach.

In order to fight the war on drugs effectively, the U.S. government must encourage, develop, and support the growth of internal law enforcement capacity among its Central and South American partners. To do this, the U.S. must first identify the critical stakeholders. Once these critical partners are identified, diplomatic efforts must encourage and nurture lasting relationships. Finally, U.S. law enforcement experts must determine partner capabilities and limitations and assist them in filling ability gaps. This approach will help the U.S. develop a coalition of willing nations and set the stage for greater regional cooperation across political, social, economic, and security spheres.

The U.S. Maritime Footprint

Maritime interdiction near source-zone countries is more important than ever due to the intermodal tactics smugglers employ. USCG efforts are vital to accomplishing this interdiction. The USCG is the only branch of the U.S. military expressly afforded law enforcement authority. Title 14 U.S.Code, § 89(a) allows the USCG to “make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of the laws of the United States.” The “Naval Operations Concept 2010” clearly identifies the USCG’s role in interdiction operations when it describes law enforcement on the high seas. Under Title 14 authority, the USCG operates both independently and in conjunction with U.S. Navy and foreign navy vessels to conduct law enforcement operations (LEO) in both deep water and littoral environments. The USCG has the ability to assume tactical control of its Department of Defense (DoD) partners to extend its law enforcement authority. Currently, the USCG and its partners rely on intelligence and surveillance across the air, surface, and subsurface domains to establish vessels of interest. These vessels of interest are subject to more stringent monitoring throughout their voyages and increase the effectiveness of LEO.

The USCG is only a part of a larger interdiction effort coordinated by Joint Inter-Agency Task Force, South (JIATF-S) in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean Sea. JIATF-S provides a model of interagency cooperation that arguably exists nowhere else in the U.S. government. JIATF-S relies on effective cooperation among all partners in the intelligence and operational domain to cover an immense operating area. In a typical day, JIATF-S monitors over 1,000 targets of interest in an effort to direct operational assets to two to three high-payoff targets. In 2009, JIATF-S accounted for over 40 percent of cocaine interdictions worldwide, which totaled nearly 220 tons of cocaine. The rest of the U.S. government accounted for only 40 tons.

JIATF-S represents the whole-of-government approach to narcotics interdiction in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea. In the maritime domain, JIATF-S calls USCG aircraft and ships, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) aircraft, and DoD aircraft and ships to detect, monitor, track, and interdict smugglers at sea. These key resources are not solely dedicated to fighting the war on drugs; they are responsible for numerous other foreign and domestic missions. For example, drug interdiction is only one of eleven mandated missions overseen by the USCG. Narcotics operations, which fall under Homeland Defense and Civil Support for the DoD, is one of six core missions. Finally, drug interdiction is one of three key missions of CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Branch. These competing demands often lead these agencies to allot limited resources and take an economy-of-force approach.

**U.S. Assets are Not Enough**

The U.S. simply does not possess the resources required to move from interdiction management to interdiction success.

JIATF-S, the federal entity charged with managing maritime interdiction in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, uses an unclassified planning factor of four, long-range, patrol aircraft; four, airborne, use-of-force helicopters; and eight ships. These assets do not all operate at the same time, and some combination must cover a joint operating area (JOA) of over 42 million square miles. Simple math makes the true nature of this problem obvious. Ideally, all eight ships with their embarked helicopters and all four of the maritime patrol aircraft would operate around the clock to cover the JOA. This means each ship covers 5.2 million square nautical miles.
and each aircraft covers 10.5 million square nautical miles of patrol area. In order to increase interdiction effectiveness and solve the resource problem, the U.S. government must increase resources and/or decrease asset patrol areas without sacrificing overall area coverage.

In an age when military forces are facing significant reductions in funding, it is unlikely that the U.S. military, especially the USCG, will see a significant increase in resources in the Eastern Pacific Ocean or Caribbean Sea.

In fact, USCG Commandant Admiral Robert Papp recently lamented that both the USCG and the Navy will likely reduce their commitments to the drug war due to resource shortfalls and competing missions. This lack of resources makes it essential to leverage international partners.

### Effectiveness of U.S. Counter-Narcotics Strategy

The balanced-policy approach to both supply and demand reduction seems to have an impact on the drug trade. According to Drug Enforcement Agency estimates, the price of one gram of cocaine increased 69 percent from 2007 to 2010, while the purity decreased 30 percent over the same period (see the chart below). The “National Drug Threat Assessment 2011” also indicates that the number of first-time users of cocaine has decreased significantly, reaching its lowest level since 1973.

Several factors led to this decline. First, eradication and alternative crop efforts in source-zone countries made significant impacts on cocaine production. Second, interdiction in transit zone and ports of entry made it more effective.
difficult for drug trafficking organizations to get their drugs to market.

Finally, the concentrated efforts of the U.S. government to attack the demand side of the equation show signs of success. U.S. policy is effective and should be maintained. This recommendation does not address U.S. policy toward partner nations, as that will be discussed later.

Smuggling Trends and Their Effect on Interdiction

There are two distinct trends that currently exist in maritime smuggling. First, conventional-type vessels (“go-fasts,” panga, and lanchas) have more or less abandoned the offshore routes in favor of coastal routes. These routes provide freedom from U.S. interdiction when vessels are in the sovereign waters of other countries and feature ungoverned, often inaccessible coastal locations in which to hide during the day. This trend will likely continue until U.S. assets are consistently granted permission to access these waters, or partner nations demonstrate the will and the ability to counter the threat themselves.

Offload methods for these conventional vessels depend on the operational environment. In the Caribbean, the Central American coast is generally unpopulated, ungoverned, and extensively covered by mangrove swamps and inland waterways. These factors combine to make it easier to deliver narcotics directly to shore for overland transport. In the Pacific, coastlines are generally characterized by either sandy beaches or populated areas, making it more difficult for direct delivery. Smugglers tend to rely on commercial fishing vessels or other forms of legitimate traffic to make the final transport to land after transferring the shipment offshore.

The second, more difficult trend to counter is the self-propelled, semi-submersible threat. The construction of these vessels makes them difficult to detect. Their size and endurance makes them ideal for drug trafficking. Until very recently, these vessels operated exclusively in the Pacific, but recent activity shows they are present in the Caribbean as well. The use of these vessels will likely continue, and smugglers will continue to improve the technology to make fully submersible vessels more commonplace. This frightening trend makes it absolutely essential that the U.S. government set conditions for partner nations to take on a greater share of interdiction in the littoral environment, so the more advanced assets used by the U.S. can concentrate on this more sophisticated threat.

In order to effectively leverage joint and multinational assets and expertise, counter drug agencies must engage in comprehensive seizure analysis. Choropleth maps assist law enforcement by correlating spatial data and interdiction details, which leads to a probability model that can be used as a predictive tool.16 In the American Journal of Criminal Justice, Kim Rossmo states that choropleth analysis allows law enforcement personnel to “focus their activities, geographically prioritize suspects, and to concentrate saturation or direct patrolling efforts in those zones where the criminal is most likely to be active.”17 The geographic profile created by continuous choropleth mapping allows U.S. agencies to focus high-endurance assets in large JOAs. It also allows multinational partners to focus scarce financial resources and assets within their territories.

Choropleth mapping can facilitate asset placement. For example, by recording seizures of drugs that have occurred along the southern border between Panama and Costa Rica on
a map, analysts can easily begin to see which areas are most highly used and assist U.S. agencies in focusing their interdiction efforts. Analysis of this cluster data should assist U.S. agencies, particularly JIATF-S, in placing their limited tactical resources. As the sample size grows, the effectiveness of the model will grow along with it. The JOA is simply too large to randomly place interdiction assets.

The Importance of International Engagement

Regardless of the metrics used to determine success in the war on drugs, the U.S. cannot win without the help of the international community. Currently, partner nations provide their own interdiction assets, intelligence, territorial access, and basing rights for U.S. air and sea assets. Without them, interdiction operations would be ineffective.

Partner nations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific JOAs are ill-equipped to prosecute maritime interdiction operations. The detection, monitoring, and interdiction capabilities of the U.S. are second to none; however, U.S. assets often lack access to sovereign waters. Even when this access is granted, permission often fails to come in a timely manner, which allows smugglers to disappear into the dense foliage that characterizes the Central American coastal region. The lack of access is generally a diplomatic issue that could be solved with greater cooperation and trust among nations.

How Host Nation and Partner Nation Relationships Affect U.S. Efforts.

Host nation and partner nation relationships are the single, biggest factor in the success of U.S. interdiction efforts. Solid relationships provide access to intelligence, national resources, and state territory. Without dedicated partner nations, littoral movement of narcotics will continue. Initially, diplomatic efforts should focus on U.S. access in exchange for internal capacity building. When partner nations are capable of policing their own sovereign waters, the limited, high-endurance assets the U.S. provides are freed up to counter the self-propelled, semi-submersible threat that has invaded the offshore environment. Eventually, the technological, financial, and capability investment will enable partner nations to carry out interdiction without direct U.S. involvement.

Partner nations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific JOAs are ill-equipped to prosecute maritime interdiction operations.

Joint Doctrine as a Model

The war on drugs is a joint, multinational endeavor. Joint Publication 3-03, Joint Interdiction, lists five elements that provide a roadmap for international engagement and joint/multinational cooperation:

- Effective Resource Panning, Positioning, and Allocation
- Accurate, Reliable, and Timely Intelligence
- Sustained and Concentrated Pressure
- Synchronization with Maneuver
- Full-Spectrum Superiority

Each element provides an opportunity to build partner capacity and increase hemispheric interdiction effectiveness.

Effective Resource Panning, Positioning, and Allocation

The U.S. does not possess sufficient resources to effectively patrol the entire operating area. JIATF-S will likely have no control of resources allocated to them for
prosecution of the drug war; therefore, it must focus on positioning. Careful and continued analysis of smuggling trends will help fulfill the first-tier element of the maritime interdiction model.

The shift in favor of littoral transit is certainly a challenge to U.S. efforts, but it also presents an opportunity to advance partnerships. While none of the Central or South American maritime interdiction forces have a force structure that can compare to that of the U.S., they do have some capabilities. Many hands make light work, and in this case, using partner nation assets greatly multiplies forces available to fight drug-trafficking organizations. In summary, effective resource positioning in the maritime domain requires refined patrol areas and access to sovereign waters of partner nations. These assets do not necessarily need to be U.S. assets if the U.S. can successfully build partner capacity and trust.

**Trend analysis and choropleth mapping illuminate areas of interest, but refined intelligence is still required to place interdiction assets in the right place at the right time.**

Accurate, Reliable, and Timely Intelligence

The second required element for effective counter-narcotics operations is accurate, reliable, and timely intelligence. In this area, JIATF-S truly excels. In fact, Admiral Papp recently commented that there are simply not enough assets to respond to the vast amounts of refined intelligence provided by the U.S. intelligence system. While this is a ringing endorsement for the intelligence community, it may not be enough. Trend analysis and choropleth mapping illuminate areas of interest, but refined intelligence is still required to place interdiction assets in the right place at the right time. This concept also applies to partner nations. Many partner nations do not possess the resources to actively patrol; however, they are capable of executing interdiction operations when they are presented to them. In order to leverage the strengths of partner nations, U.S. agencies must share accurate and timely intelligence with them.

**Sustained and Concentrated Pressure**

The third essential element for effective interdiction is sustained and concentrated pressure. This has not been a salient issue for the U.S. in decades. Even as budgets and asset allocations decrease, intelligence-driven operations have enabled JIATF-S to concentrate forces and sustain pressure. The U.S. has been applying sustained, consistent pressure to this problem in one form or another since the 1970s. As a result, drug-trafficking organizations have moved into areas where they do not feel this pressure, specifically, littoral waters along the Central American transit zone. Currently, Central American partners do not possess the ability to apply consistent and sustained pressure. This, in effect, creates maritime zones of impunity where drug-trafficking organizations can operate without significant fear of interdiction. In order to eliminate these zones of impunity, the U.S. must assist partner nations in building internal law enforcement capacities.

Synchronization with Maneuver

Effective interdiction operations also require synchronized maneuver. Through years of practical experience, JIATF-S has grown efficient in synchronizing U.S. maritime patrol with U.S. and partner nation surface interdiction. In order to further improve operational efficiency, this capacity must be expanded. This expansion will require a significant...
commitment to building partner capacity and intelligence sharing. Synchronization requires that partner nations be a part of command, control, and communication networks. An expanded network of partner nation liaisons, especially at JIATF-S headquarters, can help achieve this. It is only through shared burden that shared success can be achieved.

**Full-Spectrum Superiority**

The final element of effective interdiction is full-spectrum superiority. In the case of the war on drugs, full-spectrum superiority requires control of the source zone, transit zone, and arrival zone. This simply cannot be achieved without enhanced partner capacity and resolve. U.S. Plan Colombia has been extremely effective in the source zone, and could be expanded to other source-zone states. The requirements to achieve superiority in the transit zone have been discussed extensively in this frame. Finally, although the arrival zone is important to attaining full-spectrum superiority, it is not the focus of this research. It goes without saying, however, that U.S. agencies must assess and refine current efforts in the arrival zone. Full-spectrum superiority is achievable despite the lack of resources if the U.S. addresses partner nation internal capabilities.

**Recommendations**

Maritime drug interdiction is not simply a law enforcement (or military) endeavor. The drug war is an unconventional war where state actors face non-state actors who largely operate outside the rule of law. Dr. Max Manwaring of the Strategic Studies Institute has summed up the requirements for winning an unconventional war. First, the state must dig out the leadership of the non-state groups. Second, the state must poison the non-state actor’s sources of support. Finally, the state must completely deprive the non-state actor’s source of support to include financial, political, and social. The actor who most effectively uses all aspects of power, wins. The way to improve interdiction efficiency is through a whole-of-government approach that includes diplomatic, economic, and military (law enforcement) aspects.

The way to improve interdiction efficiency is through a whole-of-government approach that includes diplomatic, economic, and military (law enforcement) aspects.

**Diplomatic and Economic Recommendations**

Susan Doman, a foreign service officer with the U.S. State Department on assignment to the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, sums up diplomacy by saying: “Figure out who you want to work with. Determine what they want, and dangle it in front of them.” Quite often, what other nations want is money or capabilities (which cost money). The U.S. does not supply economic aid without a favorable diplomatic relationship; therefore, diplomatic and economic efforts are often tied very closely together. For the purpose of these recommendations, they will be treated as a single line of effort.

- Continue to develop regional partnerships that grant U.S. access to forward operating locations. One example of this is the Defense Cooperation Agreement signed between the U.S. and Colombia. This agreement allows U.S. forces access to Colombian military bases until 2019. The U.S. should develop similar cooperation agreements with Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Belize, and Honduras.

- Continue to assist regional nations in their efforts to combat narcotics trafficking. For example, Police and Public Safety Minister
Douglas Singh believes that Belize has a chronic need for aerial support and radio detection equipment, capabilities the USCG provides to other partner nations. States that demonstrate willingness and an ability to benefit from this type of assistance include Belize, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama.

- Continue eradication efforts that currently exist as a part of U.S. Plan Colombia and attempt to expand them to Peru and Bolivia. When less cocaine is produced, less is trafficked through the maritime environment.

- Provide other incentives to transit-zone partners willing to spend time and treasure on the war on drugs to include beneficial trade agreements and other economic aid packages. These incentives will have a positive effect not only on the drug war, but also on hemispheric relationships.

**Military and Law Enforcement Recommendations**

It would certainly be desirable to conduct the drug war exclusively through partners or without the commitment of over-tasked U.S. interdiction agencies; however, this is simply not feasible. Effective, high-seas interdiction efforts are vital to the success of the U.S. counter-narcotics program. The recommendations that follow account for the abilities of both U.S. and partner nation assets to interdict drugs on the high seas:

- Continuously update and analyze seizure data in order to facilitate optimal placement of the limited assets dedicated to interdiction. Joint law enforcement analysis would include detailed data points such as location of seizure, size and type of seizure, type of vessel, date, time, and environmental factors. This analysis would develop geographic deployment models for surface and air assets. Additionally, consistent analysis by interdiction agencies would include classified interdictions and help enhance the reliability of the model. Use of this model also minimizes operational risk as it pertains to unpatrolled spaces in the operating area.

- Pursue new aircraft-basing locations based on diplomatic initiatives and geographic location. Continue to use El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Panama as basing locations and pursue basing rights in Ecuador and Peru.

- Expand the use of USCG law enforcement agents in conjunction with DoD assets. Recently, USCG Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) teams were appropriated funds to allow them to achieve full staffing. These teams are specifically designed to execute maritime law enforcement missions aboard U.S. Navy and foreign flagged warships, and they have been extremely successful. In fiscal year 2009 alone, LEDET teams accounted for 50 percent of total cocaine removals in the maritime domain.

- Whenever possible, ensure that deployed surface assets are supported by embarked helicopters and fixed-wing, patrol aircraft. The support provided by both aircraft types exponentially expands the detection capabilities of surface vessels. Allen G. McKee, long-time knowledge manager for JIATF-S, stated: “Detection rates skyrocketed when ships were augmented with helicopters, and both were supported by aircraft.”
Conclusions

In order to effectively execute narcotics interdiction operations on the high seas, the U.S. must strengthen partnerships with transit-zone countries, enhance partner-nation abilities, and concentrate efforts in high-payoff areas of interest. Strengthening partnerships builds trust among the U.S. and its partners and provides access to geographic areas of interest. Enhancing the abilities of partner nations serves to fill existing capacity gaps created by declining resources. Dedicating fewer U.S. assets to the operating area without the fear of compromising effectiveness also allows the U.S. to focus its technology to counter the evolving tactics of the drug-trafficking organizations. Finally, the U.S. must basically ignore a majority of the 42-million-mile operating area and concentrate forces exclusively in high-payoff areas, specifically coastal areas nearest the source zone and at transit-zone arrival points. Traffickers will adapt to this approach eventually, but the gains achieved by this strategy will likely have a lasting impact on drug trafficking organizations, while allowing partner nations time to build their capacities. If these geographic areas are exploited in combination with partner nations, the short-term successes will also have a legitimizing effect for partner nation efforts and set the long-term conditions that allow U.S. assets the opportunity to focus efforts offshore with confidence.

NOTES


4 Ibid., p. 41.


6 Ibid., p. 77.

7 Ibid., p. 3.


11 Munsing and Lamb, p. 69.


14 Ibid., p. 24

15 Ibid., p. 25.


17 Ibid., p. 1.


19 Freedberg.


21 Ibid.


26 Munsing and Lamb, p. 27.
Disrupting Transnational Criminal Organizations: Logical Methods for Target Identification

by Justin Cole

Introduction

In today’s dynamic and complex environment, as the nation’s focus is drawn to irregular and asymmetric threats, establishing joint and interagency task forces (JIATF) is becoming common. These JIATFs, established in various locations around the globe, often require individuals who have not worked together before to work as a team. The pressure to provide results in a timely manner is great. The intent of this article is to provide the individuals responsible for identifying the organizational network of these threats a different way to think about developing recommended targets.

In July of 2011, President Barack Obama released the “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.” In the strategy, President Obama highlighted transnational organized crime (TOC) as a threat to national and international security. The President’s strategic end state is “to reduce transnational organized crime from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem.” One of the ways listed to achieve this end state is to “defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security.”

Networks are “comprised of people, processes, places, and material components that are identifiable, targetable, and exploitable.” Governments must first understand the nature of the threat before they can develop effective options to defeat TOC networks. Once governments understand the TOC network’s economic, political, and social goals and its influence on society, government analysts can determine appropriate approaches to target the TOC network. Using center of gravity (COG) analysis and social network analysis (SNA) techniques, agencies can more efficiently operate to defeat and disrupt these networks.

TOC networks are often described as “dark networks,” or networks whose activities are illegal

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In reality, TCOs are comprised of a complex system of relationships that connect licit (white market) with illicit (black market) economies.

For the purposes of this article, a transnational criminal organization (TCO) is comprised of a network involved in transnational, organized crime. In some ways, TCOs are not much different from multinational corporations (MNC). MNCs and TCOs are constantly looking for growth opportunities, new markets, and ways to realign their structures and strategies to maximize profits. TCOs recruit the right employees, build coalitions and partnerships with other TCOs, conduct hostile takeovers if necessary, and operate within the legitimate economy if it serves their best interests. The aim of TCOs is to “derive as much profit as possible from their activities—within the limits of acceptable risk.” In some instances, they will accept higher risk for higher profits; in others, they will avoid risk and accept lower profits.

“There is no single structure under which transnational organized criminals operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, and may evolve to other structures.” The crimes they commit also vary from drug, weapons, and human organ trafficking, to human smuggling, illegal piracy, and intellectual property-rights crime. In the past, these criminal networks operated using a hierarchical structure. Today, criminal networks are fluid and involved in striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities. Labeling TCOs as gangs, groups, cartels, terrorist organizations, or even irregular forces is only putting a name to the most visible part of the network and may confuse the understanding of the organization. In reality, TCOs are comprised of a complex system of relationships that connect licit (white market) with illicit (black market) economies, which means TCOs often operate in the gray area between these two markets. Analysts must use a logical method to identify and target these networks effectively.

Targeting

Targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate
response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.”8  This article suggests additional ways analysts and staffs can select targets for future engagement. These targets may be an area, compound, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, individual, group, system, entity, or behavior identified for possible action.9 Critical in the understanding of the targeting definition is determining the “appropriate response.” Often agencies and organizations outside the Department of Defense relate targeting to lethal responses usually associated with the military. Targeting encompasses lethal and non-lethal responses to identified targets. The appropriate response may be to influence a key leader by attending a meeting, or it may be to engage the target with direct or indirect weapons with the purpose of destroying it. When working with interagency and multinational partners, it is important all participants understand this terminology and agree on a common language.

The joint targeting cycle seeks to continuously analyze, identify, develop, validate, assess, nominate, and prioritize targets.10 This article’s intent is to highlight ways to determine appropriate targets.11 COG analysis and the use of SNA techniques provide a logical approach to determining and selecting appropriate targets. Using these two approaches will, at a minimum, offer a structured procedure that (1) explains why a target was selected, (2) helps the analyst prioritize the target among others, and (3) describes the approach to engage it.

**Center of Gravity Analysis**

While there is no single structure under which the TCOs operate, there are similar functions or capabilities required to operate. The same functions required for running a business can be applied to the analysis of a TCO. These functions do not convey a hierarchical structure, but to be successful, a TCO must conduct some common functions. Conducting COG analysis using these required capabilities is a useful way to determine appropriate approaches to effectively target TCO networks.

The COG analysis described in this article is based on the work of retired, U.S. Army Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier and the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group’s (AWG) Understanding the Threat series.12 Eikmeier’s 2004 and 2007 Military Review articles offer a logical method to help analysts determine the COG of an entity. Eikmeier uses the ends, ways,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accounting/ Finance</td>
<td>Manage revenue, costs, and profit through legitimate and illegitimate means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel/ Staffing</td>
<td>Recruit for all required positions in network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Movement of product from development to retail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>Introduction of product into new areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Development</td>
<td>Search for growth opportunities; monitor and support growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Intelligence</td>
<td>Analyze market; understand competitors and consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Management</td>
<td>Minimize operational costs while maximizing profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications/ IT</td>
<td>Communicate with all segments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Secure employees and associated entities as well as product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Leadership</td>
<td>Develop and communicate vision for continued growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Business Functions and Description
and means strategic framework; a validation test; and clear terminology to logically determine the COG. This logical determination is depicted in Figure 1. The AWG’s Understanding the Threat series is based on the vulnerability assessment method, which involves conducting a complete COG analysis to determine friendly element actions (FEA) to engage threat critical vulnerabilities.

Eikmeier’s method provides a logical process to determine a COG, giving an analyst a starting point for the AWG’s vulnerability assessment method. Following these two methods will allow an analyst to determine a logical COG, complete with critical vulnerabilities available for targeting. As critical vulnerabilities (CV) are identified, they have the possibility to become decisive points or operational objectives to be achieved to reach a desired state. For the context of this article, that desired state is “to reduce transnational organized crime (TOC) from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem.”

By targeting the COG, either through direct means or indirectly through CVs, the strength of the TCO is challenged. Challenging the strength of the TCO and ultimately defeating it positively changes the operational environment toward the desired state. (See Figure 2)

Following Eikmeier’s logical method for COG determination and using the business functions previously described, the COG for TCOs can be identified as the “operations management” function of the organization that

Figure 1. Eikmeier’s Logical Center of Gravity Determination
Source: Modified by the author, original version is found in Dale C. Eikmeier, “A Logical Method for Center-Of-Gravity Analysis,” Military Review (September-October 2007): 63-64.
Vulnerability Assessment Steps

1. Identify adversary COG.

2. Identify those Critical Capabilities (CC) that enable the adversary’s COG.

3. Identify those Critical Requirements (CR) that enable each of the CCs to be realized.

4. Identify CRs or their components that are deficient or vulnerable to friendly neutralization, interdiction or attack. These are Critical Vulnerabilities (CV).

5. Develop Friendly Element Actions (FEA) for each CV, and devise a strategy, campaign plan, or plan of attack that takes maximum advantage of one or more enemy CVs.

conducts illicit trafficking, while minimizing loss. The operations management function of the organization, which acts as middle management, controls operations at the local and regional levels. (See Figure 3)

Once the COG is identified, the critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), and CVs can be determined. Using the COG determined through Eikmeier’s method, analysts can determine that a CC of maintaining security by using a CR of a decentralized command structure has the CV of the identification of key facilitators. They can now recommend further FEAs to identify these key facilitators, or, if they have already been identified, make recommendations for engagement. The proper application of SNA techniques can help identify key facilitators (CVs) and other relationships within the TCO network. (See Figure 4)

The COG determined in this example was identified using a theoretical model of a TCO in a vacuum. COGs will be different for each TCO based on its operational environment and the way it operates. Not all TCOs may require the functions used in the COG determination method above. To determine an accurate COG, analysts must conduct a thorough analysis and have a basic understanding of the TCO and its critical functions. Following the methods described will enable the analyst to explain the selection of CVs for further investigation or targeting.
Social Network Analysis

SNA is the scientific study of social networks. True SNA will go beyond the mathematical properties of the social network and analyze the human dimension of the social relationships. Humans tend to create social links based on influences from their culture and peer groups. The techniques highlighted in this article are based on the mathematical techniques used to measure an entity’s centrality in a social network or organization. SNA is more useful than traditional link analysis to determine subgroups, detect patterns of interaction, identify critical entities within the organization, and uncover a more realistic view of the organization and structure. Analysts who employ SNA can detect and highlight the connections between the visible parts of the TOC and legitimate businesses that may be operating as brokers or facilitators for the TCOs, which allows the analyst to continue to further develop an understanding of the organization.

Studies conducted by Shishir Nagaraja and Ross Anderson at Cambridge University concluded that the best organizational structure for criminal organizations to survive are cellular structures that displayed small-world properties. A network displays small-world properties when cliques or groups form. This structure results in an organization with few individuals who may have many connections. Upon further statistical analysis, these individuals may be determined to hold key facilitator positions within the larger
A common analytical technique used throughout the intelligence community is link analysis, which allows the analyst to visually depict the organization and present it for situational awareness. Analysts generally conduct link analysis by describing key relationships between organization members as information becomes available. These links generally resemble simple, hub-and-spoke network structures, with a leader at the top or center and key members added as they are determined. As more information is obtained, the resulting graphic can become difficult to read and analyze. Analysts using the link analysis method generally rely on visual analysis to determine nodes with high-degree centrality based on their placement within the network rather than on statistics. This issue is compounded as transnational groups and multiple subgroups are added to the overall network. Conducting a meaningful visual analysis of this type of graphic illustrated in Figure 5 is time consuming and can be a daunting challenge for most analysts.

In mathematical terms, a network is a graph in which the nodes and their links have associated values. Centrality is the primary mathematical measurement used in SNA. Centrality measurement generally highlights the
importance of a node within the network. The simplest way to measure centrality is to simply determine the number of other nodes connected to the node being analyzed. The node connected to the most additional nodes is deemed to be the most influential in terms of degree centrality. Generally targeting the nodes that are high in degree centrality causes significant network disruption. In Figure 6, node seven has the highest degree centrality as it has the most connections to other nodes.

Another measurement useful to the targeting process is that of “between-ness” centrality. “Between-ness” centrality measures the influence of a node on different cliques or subgroups within the larger network. This influence occurs when the node acts as a broker to control the flow of resources or information within the network. In Figure 6, node eight has the highest “between-ness” centrality, as it controls the flow between nodes nine and ten from the remainder of the organization.

Closeness centrality is another measure of influence within the network. This centrality measures the shortest average distance between all other nodes in the network. A higher closeness centrality score could signify that the node is able to receive information at a higher rate than most others in the network. This node might also be able to spread information quickly throughout the network. Analysts should keep this in mind for engagement options; high closeness centrality measures might signify a likely target for engagement with the intent to influence. Nodes four and five in Figure 6 have the highest closeness centrality.
The fourth and last centrality measure is the eigenvector centrality measure. This measure assigns more weight to links or edges between nodes with high-degree centrality than with those nodes on the periphery with fewer links. These nodes are able to influence the larger group by influencing the nodes with more links throughout the group. It is possible that these nodes will become the future leaders of the network, as they have close ties to the most influential nodes within the network. For targeting purposes, it may be beneficial to include nodes with high eigenvector centrality as follow-on targets to achieve maximum disruption of the network.

Centrality measures are not a panacea for determining an organization’s structure. These are tools that assist the JIATF in determining which nodes may warrant further investigation. One of the weaknesses of these measurements is that they give weight to the importance of nodes within a network irrespective of the actual relationships of the connections. Data may show connections between nodes but not any corresponding relationship data. Mathematical models assume all connections as positive, as opposed to reality, where some connections within social networks may be negative. For example, a node may be connected to another through attendance at the same school, but the nodes may have no actual interaction. Another weakness in using SNA techniques is that complete knowledge of the TCO network is not possible. While conducting measurements on the network, analysts must be aware that links may be missing, as not all nodes may have been identified. For example, a node may not be identified in the data because within the timeframe there may not have been a reported connection to other nodes within that organization. The absence of the reported data does not mean the connection does not exist. The analyst must be aware of the limitations of using SNA techniques before they use them to identify possible targets for further investigation and analysis within the TCO network.

There are a number of different, commercially-available, software programs to assist the analyst in conducting these measurements. Organization Risk Analyzer, or ORA, is a tool designed to specifically look for vulnerabilities within an organization’s design structure. It is free for download and has been used by organizations on secure networks.
UCINET is a software package designed for the social analysis of networks.19 This tool is available as a free download for the first 90 days and is available at cost afterwards. The R Project for Statistical Computing, commonly referred to as R, is a free software environment that can also be used to conduct SNA.20 Pajek is another free software download also commonly used to complete and display SNA centrality measures.21 Tutorials on conducting SNA measures are readily available for each of these software programs.

Conclusion

As analysts and staffs seek and recommend targets for engagement with the TCO networks, they need a logical method to determine critical targets for maximum network disruption. Techniques and methods will continue to be refined and developed to assist analysts in their job of analyzing the threat. Currently, determining CVs of the TCO network through COG analysis and further refinement of target identification using SNA techniques offer analysts a logical method of connecting the dots and assisting in the situational understanding of the TCO threat.  

NOTES


5 Obama, Preface.


7 Obama, Preface.


11 The Joint Targeting Cycle consists of six phases and can be found in JP 3-60, Chapter 2.


13 Dale C. Eikmeier, “A Logical Method for Center-Of-Gravity Analysis,” Military Review, September-
October 2007, p. 62.

14 Obama, p. 1.


17 Ibid.


Future Conflict, Open Borders, and the Need for Reform

by Robert P. Kozloski

As tensions rise in the global political environment and the use of military force remains a realistic possibility in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, national security policymakers, interagency practitioners, and American citizens must carefully consider threats to the U.S. homeland in deciding whether U.S. military intervention is a prudent option in the future.

Despite having been at war for over a decade, the American public appears ready and willing to commit the U.S. military to future conflicts where vital interests are involved. As the Foreign Policy Initiative recently found, “A majority of Americans (62 percent) favor preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons—even if this option means the use of military force—over the alternative of avoiding armed conflict and accepting the likelihood that Iran gets nuclear weapons.” It is unclear if the respondents are fully aware of the complex problems future military operations will pose, or if America has simply been lulled into a false sense of security during international conflict by the seemingly invincible U.S. military.

For the better part of the past century, American citizens have enjoyed the relative security of the American homeland during episodes of military conflict overseas. This is due to the so-called “American way of war” that delivers overwhelming U.S. military power to our enemy’s doorstep. Unfortunately, the U.S. will not be afforded the luxury of a secure homeland during any significant military operation in the future.

While examining future national security crises, the nation’s top military officer General Martin Dempsey recently noted, “In the future, our homeland will not be the sanctuary it has been.” Potential adversaries currently possess a variety of conventional and unconventional capabilities that could be used against U.S. interests overseas and even in the U.S. homeland.

Dempsey’s concerns were affirmed during recent testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Senior officials from the federal law enforcement
Several nation states currently possess a variety of military capabilities that could be used to target the U.S. homeland.

and intelligence communities expressed their concerns over the expanding threat posed by Iran. Kevin Perkins, Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified that, “Quds Force, Hezbollah, and others have shown they both have the capability and the willingness to extend beyond that [Middle East] region of the world and likely here into the homeland itself.”

Considering the comparatively large defense budget and the unrivaled conventional U.S. military power, the notion of foreign military forces operating on U.S. soil may seem unfathomable and simply another scare tactic to buttress defense spending. However, it is this military superiority and the willingness to use it that could actually put the security of homeland at risk.

In reviewing the recent strategic guidance for the Department of Defense, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans Dr. Janine Davidson explained that the last decade of military conflict has identified that adversaries will “go asymmetric and irregular against the U.S. military, because taking it on head to head conventionally would be just plain stupid.” This new reality implies the U.S. homeland would certainly be in play in the future.

Several nation states currently possess a variety of military capabilities that could be used to target the U.S. homeland. These capabilities include conventional attacks enabled by advanced technology, cyber attacks, or even attacks using financial or economic instruments to disrupt the U.S. economy. However, of particular concern are military operations executed by small units that may conduct Mumbai-type attacks using weapons and communications devices readily available in any small-town sporting goods store or groups who incorporate improvised explosive devices and/or weapons of mass destruction.

While these isolated or even coordinated attacks would not lead to a U.S. military defeat, they certainly could create fear, a sense of vulnerability, economic turmoil, and challenge support for the war effort among U.S. citizens. Attacks to the homeland would target America’s center of gravity—the will of the American people.

Changes in the global security environment further exacerbate this U.S. security dilemma. Globalization has enabled black markets trafficking in illicit goods to flourish to an estimated $10 trillion per year. The transnational criminal organizations that facilitate these markets are becoming more efficient, adaptive, and lethal. Illegal arms and legitimate dual-use technology once only available to superpowers to develop sophisticated weapons are readily available for sale to the highest bidder. This diffusion of dangerous goods makes small groups increasingly more dangerous. As Dr. Roy Godson of Georgetown University concludes, “Globalization has enabled micro groups the capability to cause macro damage.”

Of particular concern is the nexus between violent Middle Eastern extremist groups and drug traffickers in South America. Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) noted this worrisome issue in the Miami Herald, stating that because of Iran’s increasing international isolation as a result of its outlaw nuclear program, the regime has aggressively pursued closer diplomatic ties with anti-American despots in the Western Hemisphere. These new partnerships are mutually beneficial; new markets are opened up to the drug traffickers, while the extremists gain access to a
The scenario of foreign military forces operating within the U.S. is one that the interagency is not well prepared for.

motivated purely by profit, to move personnel and material into the U.S. and provide sustained logistical support once inside the porous U.S. borders.

Since the Vietnam War, U.S. Special Operations Forces have had great success in conducting small-unit operations deep behind enemy lines. The allure of special forces has permeated American culture from video games to fitness programs. However, interagency planners must be aware that other nations possess similar capabilities as well, and capabilities must never be “assumed away” simply because they have not been used in recent history.

It is certainly conceivable that in the future small military units could operate inside the U.S. homeland and effectively employ sabotage techniques using improvised explosive devices, a modern tactic developed by Iran and perfected by al Qaeda, or conduct coordinated Mumbai-style attacks on soft targets within the U.S. A company-sized unit of approximately 200 well-trained and equipped members operating in disbursed small units throughout the U.S. could inflict significant physical and psychological damage.

The reaction to such attacks would be difficult to predict. The security of American citizens and national interests would certainly be paramount, but would the public demand an immediate overwhelming retaliatory response to such attacks or would they demand that the U.S. military operations precipitating the homeland attacks to cease? This issue would be a major consideration if the conflict were intended to defend a traditional U.S. ally, say Israel, Taiwan or even Japan.

The scenario of foreign military forces operating within the U.S. is one that the interagency is not well prepared for. To ensure preparedness, a host of national policy and organizational issues must be resolved, particularly those issues that relate to protecting the civil liberties of U.S. citizens, particularly those affiliated with the nation or religion involved in the larger conflict. An effective response would require an unprecedented level of cross-agency and cross-government (federal, state, local) integration.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the 2002 “U.S. National Security Strategy” identified the need to transform U.S. national security institutions to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. After a decade, the U.S. has made some progress in achieving this goal, but bureaucratic inertia has been difficult to overcome. The issues noted in this 2002 clarion call were clearly evident in the operational shortcomings in Afghanistan, Iraq, and during the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, all of which demanded significantly more coordination and integration than previous interagency operations. However, it is likely that future threat scenarios will demand an even greater degree of capability integration to ensure an effective response.

Recently, Barry Watts, Senior Fellow at the influential Center for Strategic and Budgetary...
Assessments, remarked that while the goal of transforming the national security institutions was laudable, it was no more of a constituted and executable strategy than a business firm’s declaration to double its market share in the next three years.7

Over the past decade, efforts for institutional reform have been largely overshadowed by ongoing military conflicts, partisan gridlock, and the fiscal issues facing all elements of the national security enterprise. The recent political discourse has failed to identify and articulate a clear strategy of how to best cope with emerging national security concerns—many of which could potentially disrupt the livelihood of American citizens to a degree not experienced in a generation. Instead of meaningful debate on evolving the current system, the discourse has been mired in the traditional (and simplistic) issue of the size of future defense budgets.

Unfortunately, previous efforts to reform the national security institutions have been reactive and intended to resolve yesterday’s crises. Reform efforts heretofore have largely resulted in a significant increase in bureaucratic overhead. For example, the three most recent efforts to significantly reform the U.S. national security institutions, the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that created the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, all increased the size of headquarters’ staffs. These efforts have been questionably effective but unquestionably expensive.

Given the realities of U.S. fiscal problems, additional layers of expensive bureaucracy is not the optimal solution to these emerging threats, and the U.S. needs a new strategic approach for “reform without growth.” This approach will take innovative, strategic thinking and cooperation among all three branches of government. It will also require that governmental and nongovernmental organizations learn to operate more efficiently and effectively as interagency teams, both vertically and horizontally.

Recently, U.S. Army Major Jonathan P. Graebener, writing for the Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation, proposed the concept of “domestic security cooperation” between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security that may serve as a useful starting point to prepare for this complex interagency challenge.8 However, if the U.S. maintains the status quo, future enemies will exploit national policy gaps and ineffective organization.

An entire generation of U.S. military officers, policymakers, and citizens has waged war without regard to disrupting the American way of life at home. Given the emerging capabilities of nation states or affiliate groups, transnational criminal organizations, and the diffusion of technology available to anyone with a moderate level of financial resources, the U.S. will not have that luxury in the future. Our national leaders, particularly our newly elected officials, must consider how to defend the homeland should military action be realistically considered in the future. IAJ
NOTES


Simons Center announces 2013 Interagency Writing Competition

The Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation announces its Interagency Writing Competition for 2013. The competition is open to the public and recognizes papers that provide insight and fresh thinking in advancing the knowledge, understanding, and practice of interagency coordination, cooperation, and collaboration at the tactical or operational level of effort. Deadline for submissions is Friday, March 29, 2013.

Entries in the Simons Center writing competition must be focused on this topic:

Achieving civil-military unity of effort in conflict prevention
and/or humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations

How to enter:

• Submit an unclassified, original paper examining any aspect – broad or specific – of the topic. Papers should be between 4,000 and 8,000 words in length.

• Previously published papers, papers pending consideration elsewhere for publication, or papers submitted to other competitions still pending announced decisions are ineligible.

• Manuscripts should be single spaced in Microsoft Word format using Times, 12-point type. All graphs, charts, and tables should be submitted as separate files in the format they were created.

• Along with their manuscript, writers must complete and submit a copyright transfer agreement available online at www.TheSimonsCenter.org/competition.

• Manuscripts and copyright transfer agreements can be emailed to editor@TheSimonsCenter.org with the subject line “Interagency Writing Competition” by March 29, 2013.

A panel of Simons Center judges will evaluate entries on originality, substance of argument, style and contribution to advancing the understanding and practice of interagency cooperation at the operational and tactical levels of effort.

The first place entry will receive $2,000, an engraved plaque, a certificate of recognition and publication in one of the Simons Center publications series. Second place will receive a $1,000 award, a certificate of recognition and consideration for publication. Third place receives $500, a certificate and also consideration for publication by the Simons Center.

For more information contact the Simons Center at editor@TheSimonsCenter.org or by calling 913-682-7244. Information about the Simons Center’s mission, organization, and publications is available at www.TheSimonsCenter.org.
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