


concept was the personal attention both leaders poured into it. They issued joint mission statements, collocated their offices, traveled together, and consulted regularly in a visible manner to ensure that members of both organizations witnessed their joint effort. In all, Casey concedes that he and Negroponte spent a lot of personal time integrating the efforts of the Embassy and MNF-I with the interim Iraqi government.

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom significantly changed how agents of the U.S. government, both civilian and military, think about executing wars. Casey reflects on his actions and the actions of his headquarters in executing modern war. For those interested in studying the interagency at the operational level, *Strategic Reflections* provides insight on how to make interagency happen. Toward that perspective, Casey advises that creating unity of effort among diverse organizations that fall outside a leader's control is and will continue to be one of the key tasks of senior leaders in twenty-first century warfare."⁴ *Strategic Reflections* provides advice for executing strategy in modern war. How Casey dealt with the modern dilemma of bureaucratic pathologies in interagency operations during his tour in Iraq is the primary take away for interagency scholars and practitioners. **IAJ**

NOTES

- 1 George Casey, *Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom July 2004–February 2007*, National Defense University Press, Washington, 2012, p. 6.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 157.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 157.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 159.



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The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in Public Diplomacy

Edited by William P. Kiehl

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196 pp., \$14.99 (paperback)

How hard can it be to communicate in foreign countries? This is America, the land that invented marketing, public relations, and survey research, right? After all, most Americans know from watching television advertising and political campaigns that there are just a few rules: develop a clear message, keep it simple, and say it often. In a foreign environment, forget translating from English. Just turn up the volume and repeat. Right? Sometimes public diplomacy practitioners slip into the language, if not the theory, of artillery.

They use terms like target audiences, OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, concentrating fires, and preparation of the battle space. Those who communicate in the real world know that messages are not cannon shots, civilian audiences are not targets, and what matters is not what they say, but what their audience hears.

That is why *The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in Public Diplomacy* is a welcome addition to the interagency library.

This book, published by the Public Diplomacy Council and edited by William Kiehl, is unique. Where else do you find current public diplomacy practitioners pulling back the curtain on their craft, explaining the judgments, and analyzing the factors that led them to take one path or another to accomplish something in a foreign context?

Take for example the excellent description of the effort to “recapture the narrative” in Turkey, a vital U.S. ally, NATO member, regional power, and example of a secular Muslim majority nation with democratic values. Yet, the embassy faced one of the world’s most hostile and erratic media environments. Public diplomacy chief Elizabeth McKay writes, “[they] recognized that if we addressed the problem from the sole perspective of what we wanted, our efforts would be less successful than if we approached things from the perspective of what our audiences wanted from us.”

McKay goes on to describe what the embassy did with Turkish youth, from entrepreneurship training to innovative film production. If there is a lesson in here for communicators, it is that they need “to approach the design of programs with the audience’s needs in mind” rather than merely their own.

Consistency over time is another lesson that comes through in many of the accounts.. Public diplomacy, like military information operations, takes time. This book makes it clear that success depends on four and five rotations of officers continuing with the same vision, the same commitment, and the same program activities. Newly arrived ambassadors eschew the impulse to invent a new program with their name on it and instead put their full enthusiasm to making a success of something started by predecessors once or twice removed.

With the current enthusiasm for digital diplomacy, many will want to examine closely the case study of @America, the innovative, high-tech approach to Indonesian youth chronicled in this book. In a logical but unprecedented step for the stodgy State Department, Embassy Jakarta moved its youth outreach efforts to a shopping mall. As Hillary Clinton told Time Magazine, we are taking “America’s message to where people actually live and work!” Why not a shopping mall? That’s where people are today, isn’t it?

Beyond the adventuresome leap to the mall, the diplomats struck deals with American companies like Apple and Google to provide an American experience to Indonesian visitors. Indeed, from the moment newcomers walk into @America and are greeted by young, English-speaking Indonesian “E-guides” they engage with an array of technology, videos and photos, interactive games, and myriad U.S. information sources. An educational advising service answers questions for free. Sounds vaguely like an Apple store, doesn’t it?

To be honest, not every chapter is as energizing and creative as the one from Indonesia. But each chapter opens a door on what really goes on in public diplomacy. The country case studies and political challenges as well as the responses are as varied as a day at the United Nations.

And, you can see the gaps. One could wish, for example, that public diplomacy officers spent more time measuring the impact of their programs in objective terms or at least measuring effects

and adjusting as they go. There are not a lot of OODA loops in State's version of public diplomacy. Nevertheless, the military officer will begin to appreciate the operational mindset as well as the challenges that confront the "diplomatic IO" folks. You know, the ones who talk about "public diplomacy."

The fact is, we need to learn from each other's experiences. **IAJ**