



The Simons Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

InterAgency Journal

**When Diplomacy Fails:
Consent, Risk and Modern Warfare**
M. Shane Riza

**Is it Time for an Interagency
Goldwater-Nichols Act?**
Sean M. Roche

**Social Capital in the
Interagency Environment of Iraq**
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**The Interagency Service Club:
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**The U.S. Government as an
Interagency Network**
Ryan Whalen

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When Diplomacy Fails:

Consent, Risk and Modern Warfare

by M. Shane Riza

***"...if war has changed, the underlying logic of settling political disputes by force of arms has not: war remains a costly last-resort means...when other means fail."*¹**

Michael Gross

***"...some critics are concerned about the moral implications of weapons that put civilians—but not the weapons' operators—at risk."*²**

Thomas J. Billitteri

***"...we're talking to them in a way they can understand."*³**

President George W. Bush

When Diplomacy Fails

I sat on troop seats in the back of a KC-135 Stratotanker crossing the Atlantic the week before Christmas 1998. My feet were experiencing negative temperatures, while my head felt like it was in the tropics. Such is the environmental control system in an aircraft whose very last design consideration is the comfort of passengers. I was assigned to a rapid deployment force to stand up an austere base somewhere in the Middle East. The intent was to commence combat operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the wake of Operation Desert Fox, the latest coercive measure from the remaining members of the coalition still attempting to keep Hussein in compliance with various United Nations demarches. We spent over forty-eight hours in the heart of England waiting on diplomacy to win the day. Would he or would he not let the UN inspectors back in? I pondered these questions, among others, in an English pub over many a Black and Tan. My merry band

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ended up returning home before the holidays on that jaunt, but I was back in that troubled part of the world just three weeks later when, alas, the man the world had pressured to do the right thing for more than eight years had simply refused again.

The military instrument of power often waits in the wings for the diplomatic instrument

The military instrument of power often waits in the wings for the diplomatic instrument to run its course. Ever hopeful we will not have to commit military force to an international situation, the past two decades show us such hopes are often dashed...

to run its course. Ever hopeful we will not have to commit military force to an international situation, the past two decades show us such hopes are often dashed, as the sea of international opinion crashes against the rocky shore of state self-interest. It is sometimes frustrating for military members waiting in the breach.

Often, as was the case during the run up to Desert Storm, military action simply waits on the expiration of an ultimatum. In these instances, the calculus for the use of military force has already been met. Whether in the vital national interests of the U.S., as in the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, or for humanitarian reasons under the recently advocated “responsibility to protect,” some legitimate authority has deemed a military response to be warranted. In others, there is still room for important questions and discussion on the possible use of military force. Just after President Bill Clinton’s inauguration, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell repeatedly said the U.S. should not commit military forces in Bosnia until there were clear political objectives.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright once exclaimed, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”⁴ Her question, though said in exasperation over the reluctance of the nation’s ranking officer to go to war, is instructive in many subtle ways.

We often only think in terms of so-called “doctrines” for committing to military force. In the run up to Desert Storm, General Powell modified the Weinberger doctrine and laid out a clear decision matrix for war. This kind of doctrine gives criteria before committing military force. The “responsibility to protect” outlines events that ought to drive consideration of military action. These are “should” and “when” arguments. Rarely do we consider how we should commit military force in these ad bellum discussions, yet Albright’s exasperation is in part due to what Stephen Wrage highlights in *When War Isn’t Hell: a Cautionary Tale*, when he says “...if there are unusually useable weapons in the arsenal, there will be unusual pressures to use them.”⁵

The U.S. military’s use of unmanned and robotic warfare has grown exponentially over the last decade. P. W. Singer notes that though not a single robot made the run from Kuwait to Baghdad in 2003, by 2010, 12,000 unmanned ground systems roamed battlefields and training grounds and were joined by over 7,000 unmanned aircraft.⁶ Unmanned aircraft seem now to be the weapon of choice in the fight against Al Qaeda strongmen in the lawless areas of the globe. According to *The Washington Post*, from November 2002 to the end of December 2012, the U.S. used drone strikes for targeted killings 386 times in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.⁷ These do not include the many armed unmanned aircraft strikes in conventional engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have “unusually useable” weapons, and how to use them must become integrally linked to “should” and “when” questions in ad bellum decisions,

because determining justice in warfare becomes much murkier when an entity can decide to take lives without committing to risking its own. The current trajectory of modern unmanned and robotic warfare leaves our deeply held “just war” tradition in jeopardy.

This article argues for a restoration of consent to harm and risk in warfare. It argues consent to be killed in battle is the defining act giving a combatant his legal status, and risk in battle must be shared by combatants in order to set the conditions for a just and lasting peace. How we fight is just as important as winning; in fact, sometimes how we fight is the whole of winning in this age of persistent conflict. These are issues senior leaders and policymakers must begin to confront before the next time, despite our best efforts, diplomacy fails.

The Morality of Consent

Once war begins, those responsible for conducting the war must seek moral justification in doing so, because they are engaged in a dark art. It is their job to achieve military objectives, and in doing so, they take human life. They seek justification “...in order to explain to themselves and others how the killing of human beings they do is distinguishable from the criminal act of murder.”⁸ The concept of *jus in bello* provides this moral justification.

In war, combatants consent to the possibility of being killed in combat. Because the act of killing in war is less restrictive than in civil/criminal law—allowed unless prohibited—the status of combatants and noncombatants gives rise to certain rights. Combatants’ consent in battle grants rights on how and when they may be killed and protections against being killed when they are *hors de combat*, either unable or unwilling to continue fighting. Noncombatants, those who do not consent to the killing, are immune, though their immunity is not absolute.

Because it is wrong to kill those who have not granted their consent to the possibility of

death, how we fight is exceedingly important during war. The concept of noncombatant immunity distills into the familiar *jus in bello* principles of distinction or discrimination and proportionality. It also leads to the doctrine of double effect from which we draw the concept of “acceptable collateral damage.” The doctrine of double effect comes from a “principle of moral

Once war begins, those responsible for conducting the war must seek moral justification...It is their job to achieve military objectives, and in doing so, they take human life.

reasoning that argues the pursuit of a good end tends to be less acceptable when a resulting harm is directly intended rather than merely foreseen.”⁹

The argument goes as such: performing an act likely to have evil consequences—in this case the killing of innocents—is justified as long as four conditions hold: 1) The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means, for our purposes, that it is a legitimate act of war; 2) The direct effect is morally acceptable—the destruction of military supplies, for example, or the killing of enemy soldiers; 3) The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends nor is it a means to his ends; and 4) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect [i.e., justifiable under proportionality].¹⁰ In military terms, this means the killing of innocents is sometimes justifiable assuming legitimacy of previously-held *jus in bello* requirements, as long as the bearer of military force does not intend the deaths, and the deaths do not serve to further his aims. It is the concept of double effect that requires combatants be subjected to some form of risk in warfare. If they are not, there are serious concerns about justice when innocents die.

The Morality of Risk

As they decide for war, the amount of risk legitimate authorities are willing to accept has moral implications for ad bellum criteria of probability of success and proportionality, the latter in a manner not usually discussed. In the conduct of war, the individual warrior's

As they decide for war, the amount of risk legitimate authorities are willing to accept has moral implications...

risk is integral to the rights of combatants. Much has been made in recent years about a perceived risk aversion in the U.S. military, its leaders, and the public they defend, especially following Operation Allied Force, the 78-day war in the Balkans. Its result was what Jeffery Record dubbed “force protection fetishism.”¹¹ In a venomous article over the impracticality of this perceived culture and its relationship to the desired end state, he said, “Effective use of force rests on recognition of the intimate relationship between military means and political ends. Obsession with keeping the former out of harm’s way, even at the expense of aborting attainment of the latter, violates war’s very essence as an act of policy.”¹²

The most common critique of risk aversion during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign against Serbia—that pilots were not allowed to fly low enough to increase the accuracy of their weapons¹³—is actually irrelevant. The risk issue was much more basic. The plan was not suited to the stated objectives, particularly the goal of ending the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. The moral issue surrounding the President’s decision not to entertain the idea of ground troops is that the

probability of air power alone stopping the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was virtually nil. More importantly, the converse was probable. Further and potentially morally incriminating, such a consequence was foreseeable.¹⁴ Much to the U.S. and NATO’s surprise, Milosevic lasted longer than the duration of the original plan and, knowing there would be no ground troops in Kosovo, used the aerial bombardment of Serbia as cover for redoubling his efforts at ousting Kosovar Albanians from what he saw as Serbian territory. Incidentally, sole aerial efforts at “controlling” (the word choice is important) populations or militaries on the ground have never worked. The British experience in Iraq in the 1920s and the U.S. and British experience again in Iraq from 1991–2003 are excellent examples.

Ethnic cleansing is a one-on-one, in-the-face, personal “conversation” between an oppressor and the oppressed. No fighter pilot—or unmanned aircraft operator for that matter—flying at any altitude has the means to stop or even enter that conversation unless he is willing to kill both. If it was avoidance of risk or aversion to casualties that kept ground forces out of the plan for Operation Allied Force, then it was the paradox Record speaks of—a military concept of force that has almost no chance of success. More subtlety, it is one “worth” doing, but not worth expending those who might have the only chance of achieving the goal. This leads to a concept of proportionality.

Proportionality in jus ad bellum requires the legitimate authority to ensure the cost to both sides is worth the objective. When an act of war is judged not to have met the proportionality requirement, it is often because too much force was used at too great a cost. Such a critique might lead one to question whether toppling a Middle Eastern dictator and throwing a country into chaos is worth the threat that dictator might pose. This is the too-much-force argument on proportionality, but it is not the only argument.

Assuming just cause and all other just war requirements are initially met, there is also an obligation under proportionality to use all necessary force to accomplish the mission. If risk aversion leads to ruling out certain military options to accomplish the task, then the problem is not committing enough force to meet the ends. Proportional force must be worth the cost, but the decision to use too little force and discounting the universal nature of proportionality cannot be justified either. In effect the decision to use too little force lessens the probability of success and blurs the line between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* if the rationale for such action is a reduction of risk to combatants at the expense of increased risk to noncombatants. And here we begin to understand why combatants' consent and risk ought to be deeply tied to decisions about resorting to war. The tension plays out when the U.S. government tries to explain "collateral damage" caused by airstrikes, in general, and drone strikes, in particular.

The most easily argued position for risk in the morality of war lies in the principle of double effect. If there is a way to prevent or mitigate the poor consequence of killing noncombatants, we are morally bound to do so, even if it requires greater risk to ourselves. Walzer puts it this way, "When it is our action that puts innocent people at risk, even if the action is justified, we are bound to do what we can to reduce those risks, even if this involves risks to our own soldiers."¹⁵ To return to Operation Allied Force, we placed others at risk while refusing to accept any for ourselves "even when that acceptance was necessary to help others."¹⁶ In concluding the thought Walzer says, "A fixed policy that their lives are expendable while ours are not can't, it seems to me, be justified."¹⁷ This is where perceived risk aversion, unmanned warfare, and justice collide.

If drone strikes are directed against legal targets, such strikes are likely to kill

noncombatants. If a sniper is just as effective at killing the intended target with less collateral damage, then it is likely incumbent on the executor of military force to use that method even if it entails greater risk. Here we walk a fine line, for we are bound to risk our forces only as required. It becomes a balancing act that increasingly chooses a bomb from 30,000 feet or a Hellfire missile from 7,000 miles away rather than a well-trained Marine or Ranger with a rifle. This is the commanders' quandary, and how history judges their decisions remains to be seen. Suffice it say placing innocents at risk while accepting none for yourself is, in the end, morally problematic.

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Risk and a Lasting Peace

In a discussion of the Kosovo war with a Serbian friend, Michael Ignatieff laments, "We weren't even prepared to risk the life of our own soldiers in battle." His friend then says, "They were ready to risk the life of my wife and my children but not their own soldiers' lives." Ignatieff finishes the thought with, "If we had really fought them, face to face, he was implying, and if we had faced death, as they had done, then we might have had his respect."¹⁸

There are those who will express dismay over the idea that such respect from adversaries is relevant in matters of war, but for a number of reasons, I think it most certainly is relevant. The equality of a combatant's consent to harm forms the foundation of justified killing in war; however, there is another reason that has

nothing to do with morality and ethics—the practical matter of someday finding peace. David Koplow suggests this “self-deterrence” is one of the main reasons combatants exercise restraint in warfare—for the purely practical matter of dealing with former enemies when hostilities cease. History, he says, is full of bitter enemies who do not remain so.¹⁹

Respect on the battlefield cannot be undervalued as a stepping-off point to solving the difficult issues surrounding a lasting peace. There is cause for concern in a world of persistent conflict, as a former Army Chief of

of the devil behind them.”²⁰

Singer goes on to say:

While we use such adjectives as “efficient” and “costless” and “cutting edge” to describe the Predator [unmanned aircraft] in our media, a vastly different story is being told in places like Lebanon, where the leading newspaper editor there called them “cruel and cowardly” or in Pakistan, where “drone” has become a colloquial word in Urdu and rock songs have lyrics that talk about America not fighting with honor.²¹

These accounts do not illuminate any grand concordance between our view of what we are doing with unmanned warfare and how it is received. It seems, in fact, our views could not be further apart.

We have allowed our technology and the disciplined way we go about our actions in war to obscure our view of how the enemy sees those same concepts and actions. We want to prosecute war humanely; it is why we place such a premium on avoiding collateral damage. Yet our enemies see weakness and dishonor. Christopher Coker says the U.S. military was demoralized in Mogadishu because “its technology did not always allow it to fight humanely.”²² Technology does not always raise the level of discourse in war. Sometimes superior technology does not allow us to “talk to them in a way they can understand.” The Western concept of “instrumentalizing” warfare is no guarantee of successful outcomes or even of setting the required conditions. It “may be a virtue in our own eyes, but it devalues war in the eyes of others.”²³

If we are to set the necessary conditions for whatever desired outcomes we may support, we have to consider how lethal unmanned and robotic systems support those interests. Fighting “without honor” or in “cruel and cowardly” ways or being backed by the “forces of evil” is not likely to be a successful strategy. This

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Staff has stated, where we are simply setting conditions for desired outcomes. How can we achieve *jus post bellum* if we refuse to confront the possibility that how we fight and how it is judged by those we fight has enormous implications for the desired end state. This is why former President George W. Bush’s statement that “we’re talking to them in a way they can understand” is so disconcerting. In no conceivable way is unmanned warfare speaking to those we are fighting in a way they understand.

Singer recounts the story told by a Special Forces officer of a visit to the tribal regions of Pakistan where the U.S. launched just shy of two hundred drone strikes. The officer said: “One of the elders...went on to tell how the Americans had to be working with forces of ‘evil,’ because of the way that their enemies were being killed from afar, in a way that was almost inexplicable. ‘They must have the power

is not to imply we cannot find effective ways of using advanced technology in these kinds of fights, only that what we have done so far does not seem to be having the desired effects. “Robots [and armed unmanned weapons] can never ‘win hearts and minds’ and would likely indicate to the protected population that the intervening nation does not view the mission as very important, certainly not important enough to risk its own peoples’ lives.”²⁴ The last clause is perhaps the most salient in arguments about the resort to war and consideration of the means with which we plan to execute it. How can combat and the destruction it will surely bring be “worth” doing if it is not worth risking greatly to achieve the end result? Walzer explains it this way, “...I fully accept the obligation of democratically elected leaders to safeguard the lives of their own people...But this is not a moral position. *You can’t kill unless you are prepared to die* [italics from Camus]. But they cannot claim, we cannot accept, that those lives are expendable, and these are not.”²⁵

Michael Gross, writing in the context of the Israeli Defense Force incursion in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008, is blatantly clear on the jus ad bellum consequences of a lack of willingness to risk. He says:

When a nation or group goes to war, it has to decide how much risk it is willing to shoulder to achieve its political aims. If a society is unwilling to risk the lives of its soldiers in armed conflict, then it must search for alternative means to realize its goals. While combating armies have an obligation to protect their soldiers to the greatest extent possible, no army can mitigate risk on the back of innocent noncombatants.²⁶

Conclusions

As much as we wish it were not so, we cannot escape the conclusion that armed conflicts are an inevitable part of the human

condition. And yet our “unusually useable” weapons have altered the calculus for the resort to war in a way that has made it far too easy to enter combat all across the globe. We have gone beyond inevitable into the realm of prevalent.

Recall the riveting picture of President Barack Obama’s national security team huddled around a small table getting near-real-time information during the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The tension, even in that two-dimensional view of the weight of Presidential decision making, is palpable. The stakes were incredibly high; it was worth sending in the nation’s best special operators. Who believes there is similar concern over the 386 reported drone killings? Unmanned and robotic warfare make us lose a sense of the gravity of taking human life. If we are to pull ourselves back up the slippery slope, we must begin to recognize that how we plan to fight is as important in ad bellum discussions as the “should” and “when.” We have to recapture the idea that consent to harm and risk in war ought to be inherent.

The moral equality of combatants is essential... to maintain war as a rule-governed activity.

The moral equality of combatants is essential, as Walzer explains, to maintain war as a rule-governed activity. Combatants are inextricably bound to each other in a shared fate. Their moral equality comes from the consent to face death together in the melee of combat. Their willingness to endure all war has to offer also gives them fundamental rights under the laws of war. As Ignatieff explains, “The tacit contract of combat throughout the ages has always assumed a basic equality of moral risk: kill or be killed...But this contract is void when one side begins killing with impunity.”²⁷ Such

impunity stands the just war theory on its side.

It is morally unsupportable to ask innocents to bear the burden of risk in war when belligerents are not willing to take on any of the same. And because how we fight is increasingly tied to basic criteria of the just war ethic in the resort to war, we cannot allow ourselves to be seduced by the asymmetry of our technology. Even if risk were no longer essential in just warfare, this technological way of war may severely impact an ability to find a lasting and just peace.

Speaking to our adversaries in a language of war they can understand is important. President George W. Bush apparently thought so, though the chosen language seems to have been incorrect. There is still a need to seek peace, to find a settlement to whatever grievances led to war. An ability to respect the way an adversary fights can be the basis of beginning the long conversation leading to lasting peace. To the extent we can find ways to use emerging technologies to bolster this, we ought to do so. Where we find it affecting the conversation as moral equals, we are bound to discard it. It would be the greatest folly to commit military force incapable of achieving the desired national objectives they were invoked to secure.

The defining picture during the bin Laden raid ought to be the norm when legitimate authorities commit their militaries to combat operations. When diplomacy fails, it ought to cost us more than it currently does—perhaps if it did there would be a greater impetus to come to some compromise and solution. We ought to expect our leaders to lose sleep, wrinkle, and go prematurely gray over matters of life and death. We ought to expect average citizens to feel something of the weight—the fear and grinding slog—of mortal combat. War ought to cost us more than a debt we can put off to future generations. Unfortunately it does not, and while both diplomacy and military effectiveness suffer, something deeper still may be lost—our very morality in the depths of war. Without the willingness to risk greatly, we really have no business making decisions about the mortality of others. We ought to at least be willing to die in order to kill. Perhaps Camus was right. **IAJ**

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Is it Time for an *Interagency* Goldwater-Nichols Act?

by Sean M. Roche

Introduction

The unstable global economic situation in conjunction with an ever-increasing fight for resources and power ensure future warfare will resemble the previous ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, the absolute necessity for close cooperation between both sides of the interagency, painfully learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), must permeate doctrine for the foreseeable future. Previously in American history, after fighting a war of limited objectives, such as the Vietnam War (1959–1975), military and civilian professionals refocused the force onto the higher end of the range of military operations, quickly precluding counterinsurgency lessons learned. Today, books by Tom Ricks and Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor demonstrate the risks associated with continuing this trend.¹

However, it appears President and Congress perceive a strategic difference between previous and current post conflict operations and may finally be serious about fixing the current imbalance between the military and civilian sides of interagency. By requiring an implementation plan as set forth in section 1107 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),³ Congressional leaders recently reinforced the President’s intentions to “update, balance, and integrate the tools of American power”² as prescribed in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). These actions could rectify inefficient and ineffective interagency coordination and execution.

Over 300 professionals contributed to a 2008 Project National Security Reform (PNSR) study calling for revolutionary change to our current system of government.⁴ While the current interagency imbalance does necessitate fundamental change, the country’s current domestic and economic situation ensures the failure of such drastic measures. On the other hand, a Presidential Executive Order applying portions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA)⁵ to the civilian side of interagency, passing current legislation, and leveraging current interagency initiatives would lead to the emergence of an interagency “operational” level, which

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would facilitate an evolutionary solution to the problem.

Argument Against “Goldwater-Nichols II” for Interagency

The lack of cohesion within interagency operations stems from the system of checks and balances stamped into the DNA of the United States through the Constitution.⁶ The dictatorial rule by England, a foreign country an ocean away, caused the founding fathers to institute rules preventing any single governmental component from gaining enough control to upset the balance of power. This system functioned well until upset by the country’s inability to pull itself out of The Great Depression and the military’s actions before and during World War II. Historically, three factors must exist to allow the passage of legislation that alters the founding fathers’ version of checks and balances. Passing such “grand legislation” requires, first, a number of highly visible national embarrassments with similar casualties; second, an intense public outcry for change sparked by those embarrassments, and third, a Congressional champion respected on both sides of the political aisle willing to undertake the difficulties associated with passing such a bill.⁷ The GNA perfectly illustrates this process.

In the early 1980s, multiple and very public military debacles occurred in short order, including Operation Eagle Claw (April 1980) and Operation Urgent Fury (1983); however, the death of 231 Marines on October 23, 1983, in Beirut, Lebanon, caused a public uproar. James Locher, in his book *Victory on the Potomac: The Five Year War to Unify the Pentagon*, credits Senator Barry Goldwater’s tenacity throughout the tumultuous, multi-year legislative affair for advancing the Goldwater-Nichols Act into law.⁸

While the Act drastically increased the efficiency of the armed services,⁹ it also illustrated the potential for the unintentional second- and third-order effects of revolutionary

legislation. Congressional politicians compelled the military into unilateral employment during pre- and post-hostility operations; previously close cooperation between the military and the civilian side of the interagency characterized these operations. The combination of exponential Department of Defense (DoD) growth and efficiency and civilian organizations often lacking the capacity and/or will to tackle complex pre- and post-hostility operations resulted in the military’s encroachment into areas previously sacrosanct to the civilian side of interagency.

The combination of exponential DoD growth and efficiency and civilian organizations often lacking the capacity and/or will to tackle complex pre- and post-hostility operations resulted in the military’s encroachment into areas previously sacrosanct to the civilian side of interagency.

Moreover, by allowing the military autonomous actions, the civilians ultimately relinquished a portion of their charter. The military axiom of “unity of command” ossified onto an area that previously required close civil-military cooperation to ensure success. Whereas, most remember that the military led many of the World War II post-hostility operations, many forget that the education of Army civil affairs officers occurred in strict coordination with college campuses such as the University of Virginia and Harvard.¹⁰ The actions resulting from the events of September 11, 2001, caused understandable difficulties as civilian organizations sought their rightful place within the post-event operations.

America’s increasing involvement in complex operations requires close coordination

among the various agencies comprising the interagency. Yet at home, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, and abroad, with Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), coordination efforts were disjointed, unsynchronized, and horribly managed. Independently-planned agency initiatives often contributed to abysmal coordination, which resulted in multiple, duplicative efforts. As a result, civilian partners have played only a minor role in contingency campaign design and execution, which is evoking a strong demand for a revolutionary change to interagency operations.¹¹

America's increasing involvement in complex operations requires close coordination among the various agencies comprising the interagency.

Forging a New Shield, a 2008 PNSR study, represents the culmination of more than two years of work by more than three hundred U.S. national security executives, professionals, and scholars. The report proposes the most far-reaching governmental re-design since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947.¹² A “Goldwater-Nichols II” would go far to resolve many of the current interagency inefficiencies. PNSR dogmatically points to the reinvention of the military after the passage of the GNA as evidence of the possibility for success. Nevertheless, critical aspects that facilitated the passage of GNA into law are different or absent within the current interagency situation.

Analyzing the three factors necessary for the passage of “grand legislation” strengthens the argument for an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary solution to this dilemma. While multiple public debacles have occurred, the country’s preoccupation with current domestic and economic difficulties has stymied a public

outcry for change. Furthermore, political divisiveness diminishes the likelihood of a bipartisan champion, like Senator Goldwater, will advocate such legislation and upset the balance of power.

The Solution

President Barack Obama afforded three pages of the 2010 NSS to the importance of updating, balancing, and integrating all of the tools of American power within a whole-of-government approach; this elucidates the importance his administration places on the subject.¹³ Furthermore, Congress demonstrated its seriousness in identifying a solution within the NDAA by requiring that, “not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation plan for achieving the whole-of-government integration vision.¹⁴ Adopting select components of the GNA, passing current legislation, and applying the law to current interagency initiatives would achieve the mandate Congress placed on the President.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, Title IV, Joint Officer Policies, directs a balanced officer career through education in conjunction with service and joint assignments.¹⁶ Furthermore, it requires officers to attain joint accreditation before they are eligible for promotion to flag officer. Understandably, service members were initially skeptical of this provision.¹⁷ Retired Army Major General Raymond Barrett, the current Deputy Director at the Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation, elucidated this sentiment: “The issue of most concern to me and my peers was the joint duty requirement. I completely bought the institutional argument that there was no time in a normal career path for a rotational assignment away from the Army. Any assignment away from troops was considered wasting time.”¹⁸ When asked if and

when his perceptions changed, Barrett speaks to perceptions gained with time and experience: “My perceptions did change after the Act was made into law, but only over time and as I became more senior. I began to realize that the normal attitude of the Services to optimize their role, capabilities, and even budgets was harmful to national security. It took me about six years to come to this view.”¹⁹ Retired USMC Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper remembers the pervasive influence of senior officers on his opinion of GNA: “Because so many senior Marine officers spoke out against it in various meetings and conferences I attended, I was against it.”²¹ Nonetheless, a more pragmatic consideration of the topic ensued with his assignment to the directorship of the USMC Command and Staff College allowing him to see the wisdom of the legislation.

Undoubtedly, a similar shift in perception on the civilian side of interagency would have the same influence, but it would only be the first step in achieving balance and integration.

While education would lay the foundation for achieving the President’s vision, the passage of current legislation serves as the necessary next step to solving the problem. Fortuitously, Congressional bipartisan agreement exists within the 112th Congress to accomplish this proposal. The Senate and House simultaneously introduced S1268 and HR2314 collectively known as “The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011.” Both bills drew on HR 6249, “The Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development System Act of 2010,” introduced in the 111th Congress, but not enacted.²⁰ However, by mandating interagency personnel rotations in Sect 1107 of the recently passed NDAA Congress has demonstrated their interest in improving the “efficiency and effectiveness” of interagency efforts.

Unquestionably, special interest groups and senior members of each organization will resist

its implementation; nevertheless, the before and after perceptions of GNA by two very senior and successful officers demonstrate the serendipitous nature of change.

The current Chief of Staff at U.S. Southern Command, Major General Juan Ayala USMC, attests to the difficulties associated with changing institutional perceptions. Understandably,

...by mandating interagency personnel rotations in Sect 1107 of the recently passed NDAA Congress has demonstrated their interest in improving the “efficiency and effectiveness” of interagency efforts.

as a young captain he was skeptical of GNA achieving its objectives. Nonetheless, he attributes much of his professional development to “three significant assignments that were either joint or involved working with other services.”²² Thomas Kune’s book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* describes the eventuality of a forced change owing to the inability to explain away anomalies.²³ The experience of each of these senior officers contradicted the accepted wisdom of the day and convinced them of both the importance and inevitability of GNA.

Pervasive problems within interagency actions before, during, and after OIF and Hurricane Katrina combined with continued inefficiencies in OEF necessitate just such a forced change within the interagency system. As the controversy over GNA demonstrated, eventually legislative and executive necessity triumph over internal agency shortsightedness. While the passage of legislation serves as an important part of the process, its enforcement would ensure that educational teachings transition from theory to reality.

Change requires more than just the




Figure 1. Current Lack of an IA Operational level

passage and enforcement of interagency personnel rotation; rotational tours must occur at an operational level that does not currently exist (see Figure 1). The DoD identifies the operational level as the location “where campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.²⁴ In other words, interagency personnel at the operational level receive policy or strategic guidance and/or decisions and transition them into actions on the ground.

In military terminology, the reconciliation from the strategic to the tactical is called “operational art,” which occurs within a combatant command (COCOM) headquarters through, “a cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations

to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.”²⁵

The current lack of an interagency operational level adversely affects its ability to transition policy into action. An executive order elevating the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), formerly known as the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), to the National Security Council (NSC) level could resolve this anomaly.

Elevating the CSO to the NSC level would only apply to the implementation of policy decisions; the CSO would not serve as a member of the Presidential decision-making process. However, this move would allow the CSO to accomplish its intended mission of mitigating interagency tension.²⁷ Hierarchically, CSO would fulfill the interagency’s requirement for a complement to the military’s COCOM (see




Figure 2. Proposed CSO Location

Figure 2).

Understanding how the U.S. government develops, coordinates, and implements domestic and foreign policy reveals why some may view this solution as radical. The NSC²⁸ chaired by the President includes the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Energy, and Defense. In addition, the Director of National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff both provide statutory advice.²⁹ The NSC facilitates making fully informed decisions relating to the employment and coordination of the various governmental agencies commonly referred to as the interagency. In other words, the NSC is responsible for ensuring interagency synchronization, coordination, and execution. The NSC is responsible for integrating the economic apparatus and employing the military, as well as developing, distributing, and monitoring the implementation of the NSS.³⁰

Issuing an executive order affords the President unilateral decision-making authority; however because it runs counter to the national value of checks and balances, it is not the preferred solution. Generally, the President relies on the National Security Staff, led by the National Security Advisor, to reach a solution amenable to each of the impacted agencies.

The National Security Advisor seeks agreement at three distinct governmental levels (see Figure 3, pg. 18). If accord is not attained at the lowest level or the Interagency Policy Committee, the Deputy Committee seeks resolution. If accord remains unattainable, the matter advances to the Principals Committee. Ultimately, the President serves as the final arbitrator.

This decision-making process places many of its members in a paradoxical situation. Each member of the interagency apparatus must




Figure 3. Presidential Decision Making Process

carefully balance its organizational interests with its duty to advise the President. Christopher Lamb, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, identified the compounding nature of this paradox.³¹ In theory, the discourse occurring throughout this process produces thoroughly vetted and agreeable decisions. However, in reality, this problematic process directly attributes to the interagency's inability to accomplish the resulting policy decisions. The inherent difficulties in reaching agreement using this model also suggest a revolutionary change to the system is needed.

Elevating the CSO and assigning it the responsibility to function as an interagency operational-level entity requires further development and explanation. During steady-state operations, the CSO would provide a vital link, between the Ambassador and the COCOM through identical regional assignments.

However, because of the CSO's singularity, the COCOMs would transfer ownership of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to the CSO. These coordination groups would continue to serve within each of their respective COCOM headquarters markedly improving coordination and synchronization among the varying civilian agencies and the military.

The CSO's ability to operate as an interagency operational-planning level would also enhance civil-military crisis response actions. Upon assembling the NSC in response to a crisis, the CSO would immediately begin operational planning, anticipating either serving in a supporting or supported role with the affected COCOM. Furthermore, the CSO would resolve the current trend of assigning responsibility, no matter what type of crisis faced, to the DoD. Actions occurring within Phase IV of OIF demonstrate that this does

not always reconcile strategic decisions into tactical actions. Undoubtedly, the CSO would have assisted in ensuring short-term solutions did not cascade into long-term problems.

Conclusion

While many advocates call for fundamental interagency change in the form of GNA II, the difficulties associated in passing revolutionary legislation compel an evolutionary resolution.

Increased Congressional oversight on the elevated Presidential assignment to resolve inefficient actions could rectify a long-standing problem within the interagency. Adopting portions of the GNA, passing legislation to reinvent the CSO, and enforcing this legislation would lead to the emergence of an operational level for planning and action and provide the interagency, for the first time, the ability to reconcile policy decisions with the necessary action to achieve them. **IAJ**

NOTES

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- 13 “National Security Strategy,” pp. 14–16.
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Social Capital *in the Interagency Environment of Iraq*

by Lynne Chandler-Garcia

Commenting on the mission during his deployment as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker stated, “Iraq is so complex, the challenge is so large, and the stakes are so great, that this effort obviously cannot be a military effort alone. It cannot be a State Department effort alone. You’ve got to bring everybody in.”¹ As the mission transitioned to stability operations and the military prepared to draw down, this was certainly true. The focus was on handing over the residual mission to the State Department and turning most operations over to the Iraqis. Military service members and diplomats worked hand-in-hand to synchronize their efforts and accomplish these transitions.

What was remarkable about the final phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was the high level of cooperation among military members and officials from the State Department both within the headquarters and in the field. From the start of OIF and throughout much of the mission, U.S. officials struggled with joint military-civilian operations. However, by the latter stages of stability operations, the interagency effort had dramatically improved. It seemed as if the joint effort was finally “clicking.” The difference in the interagency relationship when OIF began in 2003 compared to the final years was astounding. What accounted for this change?

I posit that the primary reason for the improved interagency effort were the partnerships military officials and diplomats established that facilitated their working relationships and allowed both sides to benefit from one another’s strengths. The term “social capital” refers to the networks and connections that people and organizations build through forming relationships. Partnership requires trust and cohesion, and these virtues can be employed to realize mutual objectives. Within social capital theory, cooperation and reciprocity are essential in building productive relationships. As social capital accumulates, diverse individuals are better able to cooperate for common goals

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and productivity increases.

Political scientist Robert Putnam most famously explained the concept of social capital in his celebrated book *Bowling Alone*. Putnam likens social capital to physical capital or human capital in that all types of capital enhance productivity. Putnam writes, “[T]he core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value. Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), so too social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups.”² Putnam demonstrates that the cooperation, mutual trust and support, and feelings of goodwill that develop as organizations build social capital are able to augment reciprocity and further the capacities of all those working together. Social capital allows cooperating individuals or organizations to achieve effects that they may not be able to accomplish on their own or would only be able to accomplish with great difficulty.

As the U.S. mission entered stability operations in Iraq, Soldiers and diplomats had built a fair amount of social capital, as they lived and worked together on a daily basis.

As the U.S. mission entered stability operations in Iraq, Soldiers and diplomats had built a fair amount of social capital, as they lived and worked together on a daily basis. Both sides began to understand the cultural differences of the other’s organization and appreciate the unique capabilities each side brought to the mission. As relationships developed, social capital continued to grow, and partnerships further improved because both sides learned to work through their differences for the good of the mission.

As military members and diplomats drew upon the social capital they were building, a number of factors were essential in building successful partnerships. First, both sides realized that their methods differed. While it was sometimes difficult to understand and cope with cultural idiosyncrasies that separated their agencies, military and civilian team members alike learned to be flexible in adapting their work styles, while employing patience as they worked through these differences. Through this process of learning to work together, officials began to trust each other and appreciate their common goals. Both military members and civilians brought unique assets to the mission, and through capitalizing on the strengths of each component, they achieved exponential results. Upon witnessing the benefits of reciprocity, mutual respect for each other’s capabilities grew and further increased productivity. These interagency partnerships built on social capital were the foundation for the success of stability operations in Iraq.

Social Capital Gradually Builds in OIF

As the term social capital suggests, it takes both time and effort to build this resource. Just as persons invest in their human capital through education and training, or businesses expend money to build physical capital, amassing enough social capital to augment productivity requires investment and energy. In the initial stages of OIF, there was little social capital built between the Departments of Defense and State. Cooperation and trust were lacking, and personnel did not fully understand the roles of each agency. As a result, unity of effort suffered.

National leaders planning the strategy for the invasion and post-conflict phases of the campaign did not make a concerted effort to include State Department officials. This was problematic because the military component needed the expertise offered by civilians in order to plan for the nation-building operations

that followed the invasion. Further, as a small contingent of State officials arrived to assist with the post-invasion conflict, some military leaders seemed to rebuff the civilian component. Retired Colonel John Martin, who served as the chief of staff for the first interagency headquarters, described the welcome he received from the military as “underwhelming” and expressed that the interagency effort was certainly not a priority.³

The former commander of coalition forces Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez recounted numerous interagency difficulties as he struggled to establish stability after the invasion. Sanchez portrayed the civilian-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the military as “knocking heads.” Beyond the personality and cultural conflicts that stymied the mission, the CPA was extremely understaffed and did not have the manpower to govern and rebuild Baghdad, let alone the rest of Iraq.⁴ Without a baseline of trust and cooperation between the military component and the CPA or, in other words, a basis of social capital between the two agencies, progress was haltingly slow which had a profound effect on military forces who found themselves trying to conduct reconstruction and governance operations with very little experience or expertise.

Soldiers saw a need and with a “can do” attitude stepped into the void to implement reconstruction strategies. While these efforts were laudable and achieved some effect, overall, the lack of social capital within the interagency effort resulted in delays and inefficiencies in reestablishing order and stability. Brigadier General Peter Palmer, the chief planner for the military headquarters in 2004, explained that the military effort was “not teamed well” with the CPA, and from his perspective, both strategic and operational opportunities were lost as the military and civilian components learned how to work together.⁵

By mid-2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq

(MNF-I) Commander General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad began to establish the groundwork for a fruitful interagency effort. Having seen the challenges Soldiers faced in the initial phases of the campaign, these leaders mutually understood the need to better synchronize efforts. Khalilzad described their motto as “One Mission, One Team,” signifying their common goals and the need for an integrated military-civilian effort.⁶ Casey and Khalilzad laid a foundation for building social capital.

In late 2005, joint operations in the field improved with the introduction of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)... However...when the PRT concept was introduced, there were growing pains as both military units and PRTs adjusted to their roles and learned to work together.

In late 2005, joint operations in the field improved with the introduction of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). PRTs were small, civilian-led units whose members possessed the requisite reconstruction and governance expertise to assist military units in the field. However, just as the interagency process was initially difficult at the strategic and operational levels, when the PRT concept was introduced, there were growing pains as both military units and PRTs adjusted to their roles and learned to work together. Many service members had little to no experience working in an interagency environment and, therefore, had little appreciation for the expertise offered by the civilians. Without understanding the PRT’s purpose, some commanders sidelined

the civilian component. Further, logistical arrangements for the PRTs fell to the ground units, and many Soldiers viewed the PRTs as a burden rather than an asset. Likewise, civilian diplomats were often distrustful of the military, fearing Soldiers were more likely to shoot first and practice diplomacy later.⁷ With the PRT concept just taking hold, relationships were fragile. Military units and the newly launched PRTs had not yet built enough social capital to sustain meaningful partnerships. It would take time and effort to build a foundation of trust, respect, and mutual admiration among these diverse teams that would allow productivity to flourish.

Although working toward the stability of Iraq was the shared goal, members of each of these agencies had different viewpoints and tactics for achieving this goal, which oftentimes created a clash of cultures. The process of building social capital and forming partnerships was demanding.

The necessity of building social capital proved to be correct. At the urging of commanders, PRTs and ground forces started to work together to sort out logistical arrangements and responsibilities within the battle space. As they worked through challenges, partnerships began to form and social capital began to build. Soon, reports from the field indicated that units and PRTs were starting to enjoy productive relationships. The military unit provided transportation and security for the PRT members so they could work within the Iraqi communities. Military members appreciated the knowledge lent by these civilian experts as they embarked on civil-capacity projects.

General David Petraeus took command of MNF-I in January 2007 and three months later, Ambassador Ryan Crocker took the lead for Embassy operations. Both leaders emphasized unity of effort among military and civilian organizations. The close personal and professional relationship cultivated by the two leaders inspired cooperation both within the headquarters and on the ground. To guide a collaborative interagency effort, MNF-I and the Embassy published a joint campaign plan (JCP) and directed that joint operations be the norm. This cooperative relationship continued into 2009 and 2010 as General Raymond Odierno took command of MNF-I. Odierno continued to focus on a whole-of-government approach and his subordinate commanders stressed the need to put PRTs in the lead for stability operations.

On the ground, many of the initial challenges of implementing the PRT concept were resolved, and military members and civilians were learning from experience that cooperation was critical to success. Further, the surge strategy not only increased military boots on the ground, but also significantly augmented the civilian component. As more civilians entered the theater and Soldiers on their second and third tours became more familiar with working in a joint environment, social capital accumulated and interagency relationships thrived.

As the U.S. military entered its final years in Iraq, the social capital amassed between the military and civilian components made productive interagency operations possible. However, this accumulation of social capital was a painstaking process that required a concerted effort on both sides to patiently work through personality and cultural impediments. Although working toward the stability of Iraq was the shared goal, members of each of these agencies had different viewpoints and tactics for achieving this goal, which oftentimes created a clash of cultures. The process of building social capital and forming partnerships was demanding.

Even minute cultural differences such as jargon and meeting styles posed challenges. However, as the teams jointly overcame obstacles, social capital accrued. A brief analysis of how U.S. personnel worked through these cultural disparities illustrates the process of building social capital in an interagency environment.

Building Social Capital through Resolving Cultural Differences

As is often quoted, “Defense is from Mars; State is from Venus.”⁸ A host of cultural differences challenged the process of building social capital as military and civilian officials realized just how much their work styles differed. The first obstacle encountered was often simply a difference in personality-based approaches. The military command structure is dominated by “Type-A” personalities that are driven, ambitious, and sometimes even impatient. Commanders lead large contingents of troops and must achieve measurable results in a short period of time. Further, in conflict situations, service members must act decisively in order to save lives. This context lends itself to the rank-based and results-oriented military culture.

Personality studies of military leaders indicate that behavior preferences of commanders tend toward sensing, thinking, and judging rather than feeling.⁹ This is not surprising given that commanders must perform in high-stress, combat situations where the ability to quickly assess the situation and make decisions is paramount. On the other hand, the personality traits encouraged within the State Department are adaptability and sensitivity.¹⁰ Like their military counterparts, foreign service officers must be dependable and resourceful leaders, but diplomats tend to eschew strict rank orders and are more apt to foster a community of peers rather than rank.

Civilians with little experience in a military environment often were taken aback by the

strong personalities they encountered within the armed forces. As one PRT member put it, “they [civilians] were overwhelmed by the very well-disciplined behavior of the military, and the way the military can give orders and be very effective without having much substance. Because they wear a uniform and they shout a lot, very loudly, they carry the day.”¹¹ Another civilian working with the United States Agency for International Development described his

**“Defense is from Mars;
State is from Venus.”**

military cohorts as only knowing one speed, “and that is a thousand miles an hour, full steam ahead.”¹² This individual found it very difficult to engage in deliberate planning because the brigade was moving so quickly the civilians could not keep pace.¹³

Military members working with the PRTs agreed that the civilian and military timeframes did not mesh. One military officer stated that the military takes ten minutes to make a decision that a State official would take ten days to make. He said, “Time moved differently for the Iraqis, the State Department, and for the military, and that clashed on a regular basis.”¹⁴ A “Type A” military officer equipped with a “can do” attitude tended to move forward at full speed to achieve quick and measurable results. Although effective, military personnel sometimes overwhelmed their civilian counterparts. Likewise, service members found civilians to be painfully slow to make decisions and take action. It was not until the two teams began to work together that they realized they both had good intentions, just different styles for achieving results.

With differences in dominant personality traits, it was expected that working styles would greatly diverge. State officials generally take a

long-term perspective for stability operations. When strategizing, diplomats consider many perspectives and spend considerable time brainstorming and deliberating in a flexible and informal manner. While discussion is also encouraged within the military process, in a war zone, time is of the essence and debate is limited. These differences affected partnerships within the headquarters and on the ground. Military leaders at all levels found themselves needing to exercise patience, a trait seldom embraced by service members, in order to foster productive partnerships with State Department representatives.

When strategizing, diplomats consider many perspectives and spend considerable time brainstorming and deliberating in a flexible and informal manner. While discussion is also encouraged within the military process, in a war zone, time is of the essence and debate is limited.

Taking this deep breath was especially difficult for commanders who needed to achieve rapid results in a hostile environment. Such was the case for Colonel David Paschal who the press described as the quintessential “Type-A” personality. When Paschal led the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division into Kirkuk in September 2007, his brigade was a critical part of the successful surge effort to quell the insurgency. With violence tapering off, Paschal did not rest on his laurels but instead switched his focus to pursuing non-lethal operations with vigor. Recognizing that the PRT possessed the expertise required to maximize results, Paschal pursued a close interagency

partnership. Although he admitted that his relationship with the PRT was not perfect in the beginning, he was willing to be patient with his civilian counterparts and took the time to get to know each of the individuals within the PRT. Through fostering personal bonds, Paschal built social capital among the team that would help weather any cultural disagreements that arose. For instance, the PRT disliked calling their weekly interagency conference a “targeting meeting” due to its kinetic connotations. Therefore, the brigade began calling it the “nonlethal working group.” This small change helped build trust.¹⁵ While the PRT members did not always agree with decisions made by the brigade, their accrued social capital facilitated their ability to work through differences to attain a common goal. By the end of the deployment, Paschal characterized his partnership with the PRT as “phenomenal.”¹⁶ By exercising patience and flexibility as they worked through their cultural and personality differences, both Paschal and PRT Commander Howard Keegan were able to build social capital that they then employed to conduct civil capacity operations.

A further barrier stemming from cultural differences was semantic. Although many deployed diplomats were familiar with the Arabic language, they quickly realized the need to learn the jargon and acronyms of “military speak.” For instance, a civilian member of a PRT in Baghdad described the turmoil that filled his first weeks in country.

I had got all these military acronyms and things on my desk, such as an SIPR (Secure Internet Protocol Routing), and I had no idea. ...It was a bit chaotic. I had never been with the military in any way, shape, or form. I learned a lot in those two weeks about the culture—who the military were, the difference between a colonel and a lieutenant colonel and a captain, and what the command structure was. I absorbed as much of the military language as possible,

and what they were talking about when they said “targeting and deconflicting and syncing”; they meant “target.” When they said “nonlethal work,” it was their word for development and meant “targeting.” In other words, you target bad guys to do them harm, but you target a medical clinic or an irrigation system to do good.¹⁷

Fortunately, after some initial weeks of adjustment, this individual went on to report that he was able to foster strong relationships with his partnered military company. Learning the military lexicon in order to facilitate communication was a significant step in building social capital among these diverse groups. Once military and civilian personnel were communicating effectively, they were able to move forward in the effort to build partnerships.

A similar cultural barrier was the military institution’s reliance on metrics. Within a results-oriented culture, military members quantify their success through precise and measureable data. While civilian teams also tracked various statistics, the heavy reliance on metrics was often difficult to navigate. Further, many civilian officials felt that the armed forces relied much too heavily on measurable results, and this preoccupation with metrics caused the military to lose focus of the greater civil-capacity mission. The State Department’s strength was not in providing snapshots of progress as the military tended to produce, but in analyzing trends for the longer term.

At the same time, military members experienced frustration at the seeming reticence of their civilian counterparts to produce measurable results. For example, a Marine in Anbar pointed out that this was a source of consternation saying, “A military organization is very focused on its mission and what it can accomplish and what gets done. And my impression of the State Department is that they are not as concerned about what gets done.

They don’t establish metrics for themselves or measure accomplishments.”¹⁸ Both Defense and State had their unique strengths demonstrating success, and through incorporating the metrics of the military as well as the trend data provided by diplomats, officials gleaned a more holistic picture of the situation. Units and PRTs who learned from each other’s techniques and shared information were able to analyze a more comprehensive operational picture.

Finally, and perhaps the most daunting cultural obstacle of all, was the process of communicating results within their respective organizations. Paschal explained that military leaders like to conduct briefings which present inputs, outputs, decisions, and the way forward. Although he understood the importance of working through cultural differences, even Paschal admitted to some exasperation when his civilian counterparts engaged in lengthy

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discussions with little measurable results. He stated, “I’m all for collaboration, but at some point you have to make a decision and move forward.”¹⁹ Paschal got through these meetings with a healthy dose of patience and flexibility as he encouraged his counterparts to make hard decisions.

Communication styles also greatly differed when it came to written communication. The State Department has perfected the technique of diplomatic cable writing. Cables contained the information that PRT leaders needed to convey

to their leadership, and were written in a style that was accessible to fellow diplomats. PRT member Gary Anderson called cable writing “a highly developed art form,” but an approach that was unfamiliar to most military members who eschewed lengthy prose and description.²⁰ Rather than try to force his military counterparts to adapt to this style, Anderson generally wrote two reports after each mission—one in a bullet format that was accessible to the military and one as a cable for fellow diplomats. While this was a time-consuming process, Anderson felt the effort paid off in furthering relations with

While military members were easily impatient with diplomatic cables, their civilian counterparts were just as baffled by the military’s preferred method of prose – PowerPoint.

military units. Without a clear exchange of ideas, Anderson could not hope to build social capital with his partnered brigade.

While military members were easily impatient with diplomatic cables, their civilian counterparts were just as baffled by the military’s preferred method of prose – PowerPoint. Diplomats were accustomed to roundtable discussions rather than briefs filled with hundreds of bullet points and matching graphics. The same PRT member who labored to learn “military speak” also struggled to keep up with the pace of briefings requiring detailed PowerPoint slides complete with updated metrics. He described the process stating,

The brigade had all of these PowerPoint jockeys running around to do different things, and you’re briefing every week or every two weeks with your slides about

what your projects are, what they’ve accomplished, boom, boom, boom, boom. ... And there’s all this pressure to brief it, brief it, brief it. There was not a lot of time. You could get sucked into this pace, this incredibly frenetic pace, sucked into running around trying to keep up with everybody...²¹

This was a common frustration voiced by civilians. Military commanders often responded by adjusting their battle rhythm to help build cohesion. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Miska, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment Commander, found that constant meetings crushed his civilian counterparts. Miska streamlined the schedule to a weekly, “acronym-free” interagency meeting where civilians and Soldiers could discuss holistic approaches for success. Miska found that this approach greatly increased interagency social capital.²²

Military behaviors such as the language of acronyms, the heavy use of metrics, and dependency on PowerPoint briefs were indicative of the cultural differences between the two institutions. While seemingly small asymmetries, these distinctions created monumental disparities in the way military and civilian officials conducted daily business. Major General James Hunt who served as the Deputy Commanding General for Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) in 2009 and 2010, vividly described the cultural differences he encountered while trying to facilitate unity of effort. Hunt was responsible for working with State personnel to transition responsibility for rule of law and civil capacity from the military units to the PRTs. He found that State officials were overwhelmed by the sheer size of the military staffs, the intense personalities within these staffs, and aggressive military work habits that quickly buried civilians with briefing slides and frequent planning sessions. Hunt described initial meetings saying, “When we went to a

meeting, we walked in with a platoon's worth of briefers, slide flippers, and other horse-holders to talk with two or three people from State, and we were often appalled to find that there wasn't even a computer and a screen for our 150-slide briefing."²³ Hunt called the military component the "800-pound gorilla" that generally got its way through sheer force. However, Hunt found that this method frustrated both the civilians and the military officers within the headquarters. Different methods were required to build social capital.

Hunt adjusted his methods to reduce the number of briefing slides and metrics, and modified his expectations to allow less precise end states and more discussion. These simple adjustments smoothed relationships and furthered social capital. Hunt concluded that even though the civilian culture was very different, it did not mean civilians were ineffective. By learning to adapt, Hunt was able to make significant progress in creating unity of effort within the MNC-I headquarters during the final phases of the military campaign.

Interagency Social Capital Tested During Final Phases

General Hunt's tenure coincided with the passage of the Security Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq. The Security Agreement included the December 31, 2011, deadline for U.S. troops to depart Iraq effectively ending the combat mission, while a U.S. civilian presence would remain to assist with civil capacity. Both the military headquarters and Embassy personnel needed to prepare for this transition well in advance to ensure the State Department was fully prepared to function without military support. Therefore, planning and implementing this transition were critical components of the campaign as the mission evolved to stability operations.

As the military presence shrank, State needed to develop alternate methods for

protection, living quarters, and transportation in the field. Ensuring that these requirements were met at the same time the military was drawing down was a tall order and required frequent planning sessions among Embassy and military staff members. It was imperative that both camps came to the planning table to collaborate in an environment of open communication and full partnership. The social capital accumulated among the civilian and military components was utilized and even stretched during this decidedly demanding process.

One of the primary challenges for the Embassy was their small staff, which limited the Embassy's ability to strategize for future missions while at the same time keeping abreast of current operations. Further, the civilian component was not as adept as the military component at planning large transitions and draw downs. Planning is a core competency within the military that officers are expected to master through extensive education focusing

Military doctrine outlines a formal planning process that military officers understand and appreciate. This is in contrast to the State Department where the planning process tends to be more informal and flexible.

on war gaming, strategy, and writing planning documents. Military doctrine outlines a formal planning process that military officers understand and appreciate. This is in contrast to the State Department where the planning process tends to be more informal and flexible. State officials do not utilize the military decision making process or other formal processes favored by their military counterparts. Instead, State planning tends to be more task-oriented, tackling problems as they arise. While these

methods were generally sufficient for day-to-day problems, preparing for the draw down and subsequent transitions required more the robust procedures practiced by the military.

To assist with the planning process, U.S. Forces- Iraq (USF-I) sent a number of its trained planners to augment the small Embassy staff and provide expertise. Initially, some Embassy personnel were reluctant to accept this assistance in fear that the military planners, equipped with aggressive “Type-A” personalities, would overreach and impose their own objectives on what was supposed to be a joint effort.²⁴ Despite this apprehension, for the most part, State officials appreciated the assistance, and rather than dominating, defense officers supported efforts. In fact, an embassy official affirmed that this support was critically valuable. He opined, “[Planning] is not an organic skill set for us [diplomats]. But the military brings it out here and it is superb, fantastic.” He continued saying, “[I]t was such a huge force enabler that we sat down with management and identified other problems [where we needed planning help]. We asked for more of these [planners]. And they [USF-I] said, ‘Sure, we’ll put them on loan to you guys’ ...I don’t know what we would have done without them.”²⁵

These joint sessions proved to be laboratories for interagency cooperation and unity of effort. Ultimately, the process required learning from each other, reciprocity, mutual respect for each other’s skill sets, and, perhaps most of all, a healthy dose of patience as both sides of the table drew upon the social capital they had built. While the interagency planning process was by no means perfect, it was much improved from its inauspicious beginning in OIF. Partnerships and social capital facilitated this vast improvement.

The lesson learned from Iraq during stability operations was that interagency unity of effort is difficult to achieve but can be accomplished when personnel from Defense and State build a sufficient amount of social capital to facilitate their transactions. Building social capital is not an easy process; it requires time and effort from all parties involved. However, officials must persevere in building this resource because it is critically necessary in supporting the interagency process.

This lesson is applicable to the current campaign in Afghanistan. As military units draw down and prepare for a limited and diplomatic mission past 2014, Soldiers should understand that the social capital they are building with their civilian partners will go a long way in expediting the stability operations at the end of a major campaign.

Further, the importance of social capital should be considered for future combined military-civilian campaigns. Just as social capital accumulates, it can also erode once the campaign ends and diplomats and service members go their separate ways. Social capital must be maintained so that when the next interagency mission arises, Defense and State do not need start from scratch in building social capital. The agencies must prioritize interagency training and opportunities to embed within each other’s agencies so that civilians and service members can continue to build social capital during peacetime as well as conflict. Interagency assignments should be valued and encouraged. Through increased opportunities such as these, social capital will continue to build among the agencies. If partnerships such as those built during the stability operations of OIF are kept alive and flourishing, the interagency process will be that much easier during the next campaign. **IAJ**

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“All Hands on Deck”

A Whole-of-Government Approach

by Jeffrey A. Bradford

A catastrophic earthquake has struck the New Madrid seismic zone. Eight states within the region are affected by the devastation. Within the zone, tens of thousands of people are dead or injured; hundreds of thousands of buildings are damaged or destroyed; thousands of bridges and roads are damaged or impassable; and millions of people are displaced. This is the moment the United States government (USG) has dreaded for years. This is the “all hands on deck” moment. Every agency of the USG will respond, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The USG will need a whole-of-government approach to quickly and efficiently respond to the devastation wrought by this earthquake. This approach requires that all government capabilities and resources be shared, leveraged, synchronized, and applied toward the strategic end state. In order to do this, interagency members must, to the greatest degree possible, resist seeing their resources as belonging to a single agency, but rather as tools of government power.¹

Whole-of-government planning is probably the most vital aspect to the success of the approach. Dwight D. Eisenhower noted, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of “emergency” is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”²

To optimize the use of various instruments toward achieving the operation’s goals, all stakeholders in an anticipated operation must participate in the planning and consultation.³ Addressing the different planning capacities and cultures of civilian agencies in contrast to the Department of Defense (DoD) is another planning challenge. For example, DoD uses the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), while the Department of Homeland Security

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(DHS) uses the Integrated Planning System (IPS). While different, both systems are evolving to improve interagency planning efforts.

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) directed the USG to use a whole-of-government approach to improve the integration of skills and capabilities within its military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. This requires a deliberate

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and inclusive interagency process. Agencies must integrate their efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies.⁴ The 2010 NSS concept of a whole-of-government approach drew from the 2009 DoD Quadrennial Roles and Missions (QRM) Review report, which states:

The desired end state is for U.S. government national security partners to develop plans and conduct operations from a shared perspective. Toward this end, the Department will continue to work with its interagency partners to plan, organize, train, and employ integrated, mutually-supporting interagency capabilities to achieve unified action at home and abroad.⁵

The term “unified action” refers to the wide scope of activities taking place within unified command, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces (JTFs) under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Achieving unified action at home

is the synchronization and/or integration of joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting operations with the operations of other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations to achieve unity of effort in the operational area.⁶ In short, achieving unified action achieves unity of effort.

Unity of effort is a term that is always mentioned when conducting domestic operations. The phrase briefs well and is the buzzword of our time, but execution is sometimes lacking. The definition of unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization.⁸ Unity of effort is the crux of any domestic, civil-support operation conducted within the U.S. Attaining unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels saves lives, protects property, and mitigates suffering.

Chapter 1 of *Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, identifies how interagency and interorganizational coordination can help achieve the desired end states by facilitating unity of effort, achieving common objectives, and providing common understanding. One difficulty noted is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among U.S. agencies when habitual relationships have not been established. Organizational differences exist between the U.S. military and other government agencies’ hierarchies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to the military joint force commander seldom exist. Further, overall lead federal authority in a crisis response and limited contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a U.S. ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all government agencies and military organizations in the operation.⁹ This is especially true of domestic

operations, since a USG civilian agency will always be designated the lead federal authority.

So how do we get a whole-of-government response for a catastrophic disaster that is well planned, more integrated, mutually-supporting, and provides for unified action in order to achieve unity of effort? The answer at the operational and/or tactical levels is establishing a standing joint interagency task force (JIATF) or interagency coordination center that provides linkage across the whole federal government.

JIATFs have existed for many years, with the most well-known example being U.S. Southern Command's JIATF-South, based in Key West, Florida, whose mission is to conduct interagency and international detection and monitoring operations and facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.¹⁰ A JIATF is a force multiplier that uses a unique organizational structure to focus on a single mission. Like most task forces, a JIATF is formed for a specific task and purpose. JIATFs are formal organizations usually chartered by the DoD and one or more civilian agencies. They are guided by a memorandum of agreement or other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the JIATF's members. The JIATF is staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies under a single commander or director.¹¹

JIATF-South has earned a reputation as the "gold standard" and "crown jewel" of interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion.¹² In Munsing and Lamb's excellent case study on JIATF-South's operations, they highlight the success of JIATF-South's cross-functional teams and how they can be duplicated. In the push to find whole-of-government solutions to problems, understanding how and why JIATF-South is so effective would be a key to exporting the structures, processes, and procedures to other aspects of government

response to various national security challenges.

JIATF-South contains personnel from all branches of the military, nine government agencies, and eleven partner nations. Personnel perform many different functions but do so as a team. It has been widely acknowledged that interagency collaboration within the USG needs to improve and that interagency teams are a promising means toward that end. Interagency teams are cross-functional. As the commander of U.S. Southern Command recently noted:

A JIATF - Joint Interagency Task Force - is a force multiplier that uses a unique organizational structure to focus on a single mission.

This group, beyond doubt, is a team: a joint, interagency, international, combined, and allied team—creative and innovative body that defines "synergy," the blending of experience, professionalism and knowledge being greater than the sum of its individual parts. This kind of success demands total commitment from the entire organization—inspirational leadership, complete integration, collaboration and partnership which exists at every level throughout the command. JIATF-South is the standard for integrating and synchronizing "whole of government," "whole of nation," and "whole of many nations" solutions in confronting challenges to our national and shared regional security.¹³

Using ten performance variables of cross-functional teams, Munsing and Lamb provide an effective method to evaluate whether an interagency organization has the requisite structure, processes, procedures, and personnel in place to be successful in its given mission

set. The ten variables were organized by their scope, beginning with three organizational-level variables—purpose, empowerment, and support. Then they considered team-level variables—structure, decision-making, culture, and learning. Finally, they looked at the individual-level variables—composition, rewards, and leadership.¹⁴ Figure 1 provides a

quick definition of each variable.

Analyzing each variable as Munsing and Lamb applied it to JIATF-South would be lengthy and unnecessary for this paper; however, their research suggests that some performance variables are more important than others, and practitioners can garner some practical lessons learned from JIATF–South’s experience.

Level	Variables	Defined
Organization	Purpose	The broad, long-term mandate given to the team by its management, as well as the alignment of short-term objectives with the strategic vision and agreement on common approaches within the team.
	Empowerment	Access to sufficient, high-quality personnel, funds, and materials and an appropriate amount of authority that allows for confident, decisive action.
	Support	The set of organizational processes that connect a team to other teams at multiple levels within the organization and other organizations and a wide variety of resources the team needs to accomplish its mission.
Team	Structure	The “mechanics” of teams—design, collocation, and networks—that affect team productivity.
	Decision-Making	The mechanisms that are employed to make sense of and solve a variety of complex problems faced by a cross-functional team.
	Culture	The shared values, norm, and beliefs of the team—behavioral expectations and level of commitment and trust among team members.
	Learning	The ongoing process of reflection and action through which teams acquire, share, combine, and apply knowledge.
Individual	Composition	What individual members bring to the group in terms of skill, ability, and disposition.
	Rewards	Material incentives and psychological rewards to direct team members toward accomplishing the team’s mission.
	Leadership	The collection of strategic actions that are taken to accomplish team objectives, to ensure a reasonable level of efficiency, and to avoid team catastrophes.
<p><i>Source:</i> James Douglas Orton with Christopher J. Lamb, “Interagency National Security Teams: Can Social Science Contribute?” <i>PRISM</i> 2, No. 2, National Defense University Press, Washington, March 2011.</p>		

Figure 1.

- Lesson 1: Get a mandate from higher authority. The mission and team must have sufficient legitimacy—that is, sanctioned by a higher authority as a priority—to gain cooperation from other organizations.
- Lesson 2: Tailor a holistic solution set to a discrete problem. It is easiest to forge collaboration around a discrete, clearly identifiable problem with a meaningful and measurable outcome. The organization must take an end-to-end approach to conceptualizing the problem and the functional capabilities required for its solution and then recruit the support required for the mission.
- Lesson 3: Know your partners. To build a coalition of partners willing to collaborate, the JIATF–South leadership had to learn about its proposed partner organizations. Leadership had to understand their equities and appreciate what it would take to develop a trust relationship with them.
- Lesson 4: Get resources. The National Security System was not designed with teams in mind, and it will require extra work to make sure your team is adequately supported. This means getting top-down support in the form of resources and minimally-sufficient levels of legal authority to use those resources with flexibility.
- Lesson 5: Build networks. Beyond the irreducible core of collaborating organizations that must be wooed; forging additional partnerships with varying levels of intensity is important. The complex problems national security teams tackle often require them to build networks with diverse sets of interested parties. These networks should be both horizontal and vertical.

The final analysis also highlights some of the top mistakes to avoid:

- Don't command the presence of interagency personnel on your team.
- Don't segregate interagency staff in separate buildings.
- Don't disrespect smaller partners, because they can make big contributions.
- Don't demand binding agreements on cooperation (at least initially).
- Don't ignore any partners' need to feel they make a contribution.
- Don't make binding decisions without substantial vetting and support.
- Don't forget to build a culture of trust and empowerment.
- Don't take the credit for collaborative success.

Munsing and Lamb conclude that while challenges still exist to establishing interagency teams, JIATF–South has demonstrated that interagency and multilateral collaboration is possible and effective precisely at a time when many national leaders are arguing that better interagency or whole-of-government solutions are essential for U.S. security.¹⁵

Another interagency success story is the outstanding coordination and collaboration conducted at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho. NIFC is the nation's support center for wildland firefighting. Eight different agencies and organizations are part of NIFC: Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Fire Administration, National Weather Service, and the National Association of State Foresters. NIFC makes decisions using the interagency cooperation concept because it

has no single director or manager.¹⁶ Working together with all levels of government agencies involved with wild-land fire management, NIFC coordinates and manages issues from safety and planning, to science, preparedness, operations, strategy development, logistics, intelligence, emergency response, and more.¹⁷ Within the NIFC, the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) is the focal point

Another interagency success story is the outstanding coordination and collaboration conducted at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho.

for coordinating the mobilization of resources for wild-land fire and other incidents throughout the U.S. This coordination center also provides intelligence and predictive services-related products designed to be used by the internal wild-land fire community for wild-land fire and incident management decision making.¹⁸

Wildfire suppression is built on a three-tiered system of providing additional support to firefighting. The first tier to respond are the local assets and area firefighters. The next tier is one of the eleven geographic areas that are established around the nation. Once all the resources in the geographic area are exhausted, a national level response, led by the NICC, would provide any and all additional support to an incident. The U.S. military is normally requested when national civilian resources are committed to fires and there is the need for further resources. The decision to request military support rests with the NIFC. As needed, the military will send a liaison officer (usually a defense coordinating officer [DCO]) to the NIFC, to coordinate closely with the

NICC, which in turn coordinates and tracks national firefighting requirements and plays a key role in mobilizing military resources. The U.S. military may provide aerial and/or ground resources.¹⁹ This process works well, due to the limited military forces usually needed to support wildland firefighting in the U.S.

The method of responding to incidents or natural and man-made disasters is based on the DHS's National Response Framework (NRF). This framework guides how the nation conducts all hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation. It describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.²⁰

The NRF is designed to handle disasters and emergencies at the lowest level possible. Typically, if local authorities are overwhelmed in the initial disaster, they can request help from the state. Once a state's assets, to include the National Guard of that state, have responded and still cannot stabilize the situation, the state would call on other states through Emergency Management Assistance Compact agreements. These compacts are state-to-state agreements that allow one state to supply various material or personnel to support another state, if requested. If those additional assets fail to stabilize the situation, civilian federal assets coordinated through FEMA would respond.

If the scope and scale of the incident or disaster were of such magnitude that FEMA assets were not enough, active-duty military forces would be called on to respond. For the purposes of this paper, the term Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) will be used to identify all domestic assistance missions the military may conduct in support of civil authorities. According to Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated*

Terms, DSCA is defined as:

Support provided by U.S. federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the governors of the affected states elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.²¹

For a disaster of the scope and scale of a New Madrid earthquake, the typical response would be too slow to save the maximum number of lives, protect property, and mitigate suffering. The government must bring all response forces to the area faster and earlier; however, without strong interagency and interorganizational coordination structures in place, the government could have the same problems organizing a coherent response it experienced responding to Hurricane Katrina.

In 2008, FEMA launched a pilot program, Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER), to address some of the issues associated with the Hurricane Katrina response. It was designed to strengthen state preparedness for catastrophic disasters by facilitating greater capacity in and more comprehensive integration of planning efforts across all levels of government. It ended in August 2011. TFER emphasized integrating planning efforts across sectors, jurisdictions, and functional disciplines, as well as among state, regional, and federal agencies, primarily FEMA and DoD.²² Planning is a key component in national preparedness, and it is particularly important in a catastrophic incident that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption that severely affects the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an area.²³

First envisioned by senior DoD leadership, the TFER program was to address the national planning scenarios and strengthen each individual state's catastrophic disaster preparedness. Since DoD is always a supporting element for disaster responses/incidents in the homeland, FEMA was designated to lead the pilot program and emphasize coordinating and integrating state, FEMA, and DoD plans.

The program was on the right track in developing coordinated and integrated plans that cover the full spectrum of disaster response. According to the Government Accountability Office report, all states made progress in building relationships with stakeholders such as FEMA, state agencies, and the National Guard, but coordination with federal military stakeholders was limited.²⁴ At the onset of TFER, DoD provided training to planners and state officials on civil-military planning integration and how U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) could support TFER efforts. After the initial training, the levels of integration and coordination varied depending on a variety of issues including the

In 2008, FEMA launched a pilot program, Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER), to address some of the issues associated with the Hurricane Katrina response.

timing of work schedules, availability to meet, and status of state response plans.²⁵ While TFER is an excellent start, a more concerted effort would be needed to fully prepare the states and federal agencies to quickly and efficiently respond to a catastrophic incident, such as the New Madrid scenario.

Creating a JIATF-North under NORTHCOM for DSCA response could be a

way forward to help both states and the USG conduct planning in support of a whole-of-government response in the homeland. JIATF–North can also provide DoD, DHS, and FEMA with a deployable interagency coordination task force in times of crisis. DoD is currently conducting planning to identify courses of action to support complex catastrophes, and the FEMA director has in the recent past tried to establish a Unified Area Coordination Group (UACG) to provide him a better coordinating structure during disaster response. In a time

Increasingly, JIATFs are being formed to achieve unity of effort and bring all instruments of national power to bear on asymmetric threats.

when the federal government is looking for efficiencies, establishing JIATF–North with memorandums of agreement between DoD, DHS, FEMA, and the Department of Justice, to start, would provide efficiencies in response operations and could provide the answer both DoD and FEMA are looking for. By integrating emergency support function capabilities into the JIATF, it could possibly serve as a forward national response coordination center, or a UACG, for the FEMA director. Any other federal civilian capabilities assigned to the JIATF would be based on agreements between the cabinet secretaries.

Increasingly, JIATFs are being formed to achieve unity of effort and bring all instruments of national power to bear on asymmetric threats. Because they use more than the military instrument of power, JIATFs are generally not a lethal asset but rather develop and drive creative nonlethal solutions and policy actions to accomplish their missions.²⁶ A JIATF would

be tailor-made to integrate DSCA operations in the U.S. The JIATF would use the federal agency personnel expertise to ensure DSCA was more timely, integrated, and efficient. The JIATF would use the planning expertise of the military to help guide state and federal agencies that needed help to shape and optimize their response plans. Establishing a JIATF would also help the military identify USG counterparts and establish habitual relationships with many federal agencies.

There are already many DoD units and agencies conducting planning and providing DSCA to government agencies on a daily basis. Some are doing a better job than others, but regarding catastrophic disaster planning and operational support, the adhoc nature of coordinating and collaborating will still slow the response times to an unacceptable level. NORTHCOM has many military units under its command that could be used to establish the JIATF.

Joint Task Force–Civil Support (JTF–CS) based in Fort Eustis, Virginia, plans and integrates DoD support to the designated primary agency for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence management operations. When approved by the secretary of defense and directed by the commander of NORTHCOM, it deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective command and control of designated DoD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary, critical, life support.

Joint Task Force–North, based at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas, is the DoD organization tasked to support our nation’s federal law enforcement agencies in the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental United States. U.S. Army North’s (ARNORTH) ten Defense Coordinating Elements (DCE), each led by a DCO, works daily within the FEMA

regions to plan for and conduct civil support operations. NORTHCOM's operations division has the lead on managing and developing the dual-status commander program and regularly engages with state National Guard Joint Force Headquarters and JTF staffs. The engagements are designed to establish habitual relationships with National Guard partners, should an incident occur within their state or territory. A dual-status commander is usually a National Guard general officer that is given dual authority to command and control both National Guard and federal military forces that respond to an event or incident within a state or territory, once federal military forces are requested and approved. This operational construct goes a long way toward better integration and coordination of DSCA operations and is designed to provide better unity of effort.

Organizing JIATF-North should take into account the NRF, National Incident Management System, and the Incident Command System (ICS). The latter system is the standard for incident response structures around the nation and a field-level, incident command post is organized around four cross-functional sections: Operations, Plans, Logistics, and Finance/Administration.

From 2003 to 2011, the military had similarly structured adaptive-staff organizations in the form of Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). Each geographic combatant command (GCC) had one assigned to it, and before they were disbanded, they were structured much the same way as ICS organizations. Each GCC, however, utilized and organized its SJFHQ in different ways to suit its command's needs. The SJFHQ consisted of a special staff and four cross-functional teams: a Joint Operations Team, a Joint Plans Team, an Information Synchronization Team, and a Joint Support Team. A JIATF that incorporates a combination of the SJFHQ and ICS organizational constructs could be useful for DSCA responses.

By combining JTF-CS, JTF-North, the 10 DCO/DCEs, and NC/J36 personnel from USNORTHCOM/USARNORTH to provide the initial military structure of the JIATF and DHS, FEMA and Justice to provide initial federal civilian structure, JIATF-North could provide coordinated and integrated federal response capability that is fast and efficient. The staff sections and subordinate branches would have a mix of military and USG agencies. If a chief is USG agency personnel, his/her deputy would be military. A USCG 2-star admiral would be the ideal flag officer to lead the JIATF given his/her ability to work in both the DHS and DoD arenas. A National Guard 1-star general and a DHS Senior Executive Service 1-star equivalent could serve as the Deputy and Vice Directors respectively, which would provide for a leadership team that can better work in both the DHS and DoD realms. In order to provide the seniority necessary to drive the operational

Organizing JIATF-North should take into account the NRF, National Incident Management System, and the Incident Command System (ICS).

aspects of the JIATF, the operations section chief could be a 1-star general. Of note, the deployable aspect of the JIATF is a key element to its success. It must be able to deploy on scene and provide the required interagency coordination needed by all USG entities in order to ensure unity of effort. (See Figure 2, pg. 42)

This article illustrates that a whole-of-government approach to planning and operations provides the best chance of success in any USG operation. The current strategy and doctrine guiding the USG's response to any




Figure 2.

event, incident, or major disaster are designed to achieve unity of effort. Examples of JIATF–South and NIFC illustrate that interagency and interorganizational coordination are the right way to do business, and they have proven very effective in achieving unity of effort. More opportunities exist, however, to utilize interagency coordination structures for other mission sets, such as DSCA and disaster response operations. If a JIATF had existed for Hurricane Katrina or the Deepwater Horizon response, would unity of effort have been achieved more quickly? Establishing JIATF–North in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility in conjunction with DHS, FEMA, and the Justice Department could provide the necessary coordination and collaboration structure to provide a faster, more efficient, deployable whole-of-government response to events, incidents, and major disasters that might occur in the homeland. **IAJ**

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The Interagency Service Club:

(Almost) Free Interagency Training and Education

by Thomas P. Moore

Introduction

You've seen them in every town you've ever visited—the signs on the outskirts of town listing the Rotary Club, Kiwanis Club, and Lions Club. In some cases, these clubs have been in existence for more than 100 years, and they have proliferated around the world. Rotary International claims to have nearly 33,000 local clubs and 1.22 million members worldwide, while Lions International claims 1.36 million members and 46,000 clubs in 206 countries. The goal of these clubs is to provide service to the community. One of goals of Rotary International is, “the advancement of international understanding, goodwill, and peace through a world fellowship of business and professional persons united in the ideal of service.”¹ The mission of the Lions Club is, “to empower volunteers to serve their communities, meet humanitarian needs, encourage peace, and promote international understanding.”²

Besides the altruistic motivations for joining such a club, members also benefit from the professional and social networks they develop as a result of club membership. This article explores how the highly successful concept of the service club might be used to help employees of government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations (IOs) further develop their personal, interagency, and professional network and gain knowledge of other agencies.

Interagency Challenge

Over the past several decades, the U.S. government (USG), especially the Departments of Defense and State, and state and local governments have encountered significant difficulties in working together to plan for and respond to national security crises and natural and manmade disasters. For example, the planning for Operation Blind Logic, the post-conflict plan associated

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with Operation Just Cause (the U.S. invasion of Panama to depose Manuel Noriega) conducted at U.S. Southern Command, “dealt only with those issues that the military could address unilaterally, without the coordination of the [other] government departments.”³ And according to the 2008 Project on National Security Reform, “the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated numerous studies, many of which conclude that the U.S. government is not able to get its various national security organizations to work together well enough.”⁴

Former U.S. Secretaries of State James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger and former Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Lee Hamilton also addressed this issue in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report:

For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others— respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.⁵

Government agencies are encountering more and more circumstances that demand interagency collaboration, coordination, integration, and networking, According to Frederick M. Kaiser of the Congressional Research Service:

In sum, these collaborative efforts extend beyond national security or homeland security—albeit, the most visible issue areas—to other varied policies and programs. Among these are protecting the

environment; conserving natural resources; preparing for and responding to natural disasters and pandemics; restructuring the domestic financial sector; determining the safety and effectiveness of medications; regulating various consumer goods; implementing medical and social welfare programs; and granting security clearances.⁶

According to Kaiser the following four reasons account for the increased need for interagency collaboration:

1. Public demand has increased or changed the responsibilities of some government agencies (for example, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, dealing with terrorist organizations became a new responsibility of the Department of Defense (DoD), while the responsibility of law enforcement agencies regarding terrorism changed).
2. In certain areas, the public has pressured some government agencies (for example, the Environmental Protection Agency) to reduce the size, scope, and cost of their operations.
3. The scope, number, variety, and complexity of programs that assign responsibilities across multiple government agencies have increased (for example, Project Sea Hawk in Charleston, SC).⁷
4. Several significant crises have suffered from inadequate interagency collaboration and coordination (for example Hurricane Katrina, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and much of the immediate post-conflict period in Iraq).⁸

The “interagency challenge” has even been recognized beyond the bounds of governmental organizations.⁹ It is really an “interorganizational challenge” that involves not only the USG, state/provincial governments, local governments, and informal government-

like organizations, but also NGOs, IOs, coalition partners, allies, and even government contractors.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the “interorganizational challenge” is hard to solve, and at the federal level, the structure of the executive branch often hinders interagency collaboration.

Unfortunately, the “interorganizational challenge” is hard to solve, and at the federal level, the structure of the executive branch often hinders interagency collaboration. For example, the concept of unity of command is a well-accepted principle in the DoD and local law enforcement and fire protection agencies. When a crisis arises, this concept says that one person, with no other duties, should be fully responsible for controlling all organizations responding to that crisis in order to ensure the highest likelihood of a successful outcome. However, the current structure of the executive branch makes it extremely difficult for a civilian employee or political appointee working for a department outside DoD to command military units. It is similarly difficult to put a section of personnel from, for example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency under the command of an officer from the DoD.

Basic Barriers to Interagency and Interorganizational Collaboration

Interagency and interorganizational challenges result from a number of causes including the following:

- Collective unfamiliarity with each other’s capabilities and limitations.
- Differences in the use of technical language.¹¹

- Lack of knowledge of organizational cultures in other agencies.
- Lack of personal relationships with personnel from other agencies.
- Significant differences in organizational resources and capabilities.
- Differences in authorized responsibilities and missions.
- Differences in funding and legal authorities to expend government funds and engage in various activities.

Education, Training, and Experience as a Barrier Breaker

According to a study by William J. Davis, Jr., “...education and experience may mitigate any predisposed tendency to be insular and think of ‘other communities’ [interagency] as less able or less important.”¹² Education and experience might mitigate the first four items on the list above. If this is so, then three questions arise: How should this education and experience be made available? Who should be exposed to it? What is its appropriate content?

Federal Programs for Interagency Education, Training, and Experience

In May 2007, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13434, which established the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program. Shortly thereafter, the “National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals” was released by the White House. Both the Executive Order and the “National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals” included homeland security as part of its definition of national security.

According to the national strategy, “The national security professional will need access to education, training, and opportunities

to work in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies, State, local, territorial and tribal governments, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, foreign governments, and international organizations.”¹³ Thus one goal of the NSPD program is to improve interagency collaboration by cultivating a community of national security professionals.¹⁴ In her 2011 analysis of the NSPD program, Catherine Dale concluded that, “While the initial intent of the NSPD program ... appeared to be to include all levels of government, the focus subsequently narrowed to the federal level.”¹⁵ This is probably at least partly because most of the educational products developed in response to the NSPD program have been established at educational institutions operated by the federal government. It is, therefore, not surprising that these programs have a federal perspective on interagency problems. These educational programs include the following:

- The National Defense University (NDU) pilot program for national security professionals, which was taught in the 2007–2008 academic year at three NDU campuses: the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Joint Forces Staff College. Students came from all military services plus six non-DoD agencies of the USG.¹⁶
- Six one-week courses currently offered by NDU’s Information Resources Management College for federal employees in the NSPD program.¹⁷
- Three courses offered by NDU’s College of International Security Affairs for federal employees in the NSPD program.¹⁸
- The Department of State Foreign Service Institute National Security Executive Leadership Seminar, in which approximately half of the students come from outside the

Department of State and are at the GS-15 level or equivalent.¹⁹

- The Department of Defense Executive Leadership Development Program for DoD civilian employees (GS-12 to GS-14). While the students come from multiple services, the student body does not have significant interagency or interorganizational representation.²⁰
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency on-line, three-hour course entitled “National Response Framework: An Introduction,” which is open to employees of government agencies, NGOs, and the public.²¹

“While the initial intent of the NSPD program ... appeared to be to include all levels of government, the focus subsequently narrowed to the federal level.”

In October 2008, Congress authorized the creation of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), led by the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The purpose of the CRC is to have trained personnel from nine agencies of the USG (not including the DoD) ready to go on short notice to apply “whole of U.S. government” capabilities to reconstruction and stabilization problems in other nations. Training includes courses such as “Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations” and “Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization.”²²

Unfortunately, Congress never fully funded the CRC concept, which was to include 250

active members, a 2,000 member standby team, and a 2,000 member reserve component. By the end of 2010, the CRC had approximately 130 active members, 967 standby members, and no reserve members.²³ Furthermore, the S/CRS has recently been abolished and replaced by the Assistant Secretary for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). It is yet to be seen what impact this change may have on interagency training and education and on the CRC.

Perhaps the broadest program for interorganizational education began in 2004 with the creation of the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has reached out to multiple levels of government to offer interagency education and training. Much of the focus of this effort has been on homeland security. For example, the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at NPS offers the following programs:

- The Master of Arts degree in Homeland Security enrolls homeland security officials from all levels of government, including tribal, local, county, state, and federal.²⁴
- The Fusion Center Leaders Program trains personnel from law enforcement and intelligence fusion centers at the local, state, and federal levels.²⁵
- The Homeland Security Executive Leaders Program enrolls homeland security leaders and managers from all levels of government, including tribal, local, county, state, and federal.²⁶

- Executive Education Seminars inform senior state officials and senior officials in large metropolitan areas about homeland security issues, such as federal, state, and local responsibilities and coordination.²⁷

Perhaps the broadest program for interorganizational education began in 2004 with the creation of the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at NPS. Each CSRS seminar ensures a broad mix of attendees from:

- U.S. uniformed services.
- DoD civilian employees.
- Appropriate foreign Ministries of Defense.
- NGOs.
- IOs.
- U.S. non-DoD federal government agencies.
- Faculty in academia and think-tanks.²⁸

To date CSRS has offered 32 seminars with a variety of themes, including interorganizational coordination, security sector reform, demobilization and disarmament activities, post-conflict and stability operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. However, due to recent funding issues, the number of CSRS seminars has been reduced to 2–3 per year.

Recent Changes to the NSPD Program Affecting Interagency Education and Training

In early 2011, the Obama administration made changes to the NSPD program. Called NSPD 2.0, it has a revised structure for managing the program and identifying government personnel to participate in the program. The scope of the overall effort was reduced to a single pilot program that would focus exclusively on the area of domestic

emergency management. In addition, the pilot program was limited to federal employees in the National Capitol Region and holding a grade in the GS-13 to GS-15 range. The Department of Homeland Security was tasked with developing the core requirements for education, training, and rotational assignments across cabinet-level agency boundaries.²⁹

NSPD 2.0 has been somewhat controversial among officials with current or past responsibilities for the program. On the one hand, the selection of domestic emergency management as the focus area allows the NSPD program to take advantage of fairly robust "...existing collaboration mechanisms, and training and educational programs (in particular through FEMA's Emergency Management Institute)..."³⁰ On the other hand, some have expressed concern that the narrowing of the program's substantive focus might make it difficult to broaden that scope again in the future to include a wider array of national security-related concerns.³¹

So while there are a number of individual efforts and scope-limited, collective efforts to provide interagency education and training, these efforts are scattered, often oriented to one particular problem set, and sometimes rather entrepreneurial. When compared to centrally and tightly controlling interagency education and training, the current situation produces a wide variety of approaches to education and training opportunities, content, and delivery methods, which has several disadvantages:

1. It makes it very difficult for federal, state, and local governments to determine if the right people are actually being exposed to the right interagency education and training.
2. It makes it difficult to determine how much is spent overall on interagency education and training.
3. Most of these programs and events provide

no or weak on-going means to develop professional networks that cross agency boundaries.

4. NGOs, IOs, and some quasi-governmental organizations do not have much access to this interagency education and training.³² Nor do they often have much access to means to develop professional networks across governmental boundaries.

The Interagency Service Club (IASC) Concept

The IASC concept provides opportunities for a broad range of people to have access to interagency education, training, and on-going professional network development across agency boundaries. Patterned after the successful Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions club models, it provides a forum to develop and maintain friendships across agency boundaries. It is also intended to greatly broaden access to interagency education and training for managers from governmental,

...while there are a number of individual efforts and scope-limited, collective efforts to provide interagency education and training, these efforts are scattered, often oriented to one particular problem set, and sometimes rather entrepreneurial.

non-governmental, international, and quasi-governmental organizations. The concept is not intended to focus on one particular functional area (such as domestic emergency management or post-conflict operations); however, individual clubs may initially form around a functional area of particular interest to the members.

The primary goal of the IASC is to educate its members regarding capabilities, limitations, organizational cultures, missions, funding issues, and legal authorities of governmental, international, and nongovernmental organizations. It does so by providing a regular, local forum where members can learn about each other's organizations.

The second most important goal of the IASC is to afford its members the opportunity

The primary goal of the IASC is to educate its members...

to develop their personal interagency and interorganizational social networks. The knowledge and professional contacts gained by club members are likely to increase the ability of governmental organizations and NGOs to respond to future crises.

The third goal of the IASC is to take on one or more service projects that meet unfilled needs related to the interagency and interorganizational communities.

Interagency service clubs can most easily be formed in areas that have a sufficient concentration of governmental, non-governmental, international, and/or quasi-governmental organizations. The following locations could sustain one or more IASCs:

- Washington, D.C.
- Tampa, FL (United States Special Operations Command and United States Central Command).
- Miami, FL (United States Southern Command)
- Colorado Springs, CO (United States Northern Command).

- Monterey, CA (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and United States Naval Postgraduate School).
- St. Louis, MO (United States Transportation Command).
- Charleston, SC (Project Seahawk).
- Honolulu, HI (United States Pacific Command).
- Stuttgart, Germany (United States European Command and United States Africa Command).

Three or four people can start a local club. Startup tasks include recruiting appropriate people to an initial organizational meeting; establishing a meeting place, date, and time; developing a set of club bylaws;³³ choosing club officers;³⁴ and applying for non-profit status with the Internal Revenue Service and the appropriate state authorities (optional).

The ideal membership mix would include high-level, mid-level, and entry-level managers/leaders in their respective organizations. IASCs might attempt to recruit leaders and managers from some of the organizations listed in Figure 1.

It is also critically important to achieve a mix of people from a variety of agencies from across all levels of governmental, international, and non-governmental organizations. The most beneficial mix would be agencies that are likely to work together in crises such as Hurricane Katrina, the Haiti earthquake, the Indonesian Tsunami, the Loma Prieta earthquake, and wars such as in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The most challenging aspect of starting an IASC is recruiting the appropriate mix of members. When trying to recruit members, sometimes just obtaining contact information for personnel inside agencies other than your own is a difficult task. A specific IASC would not be very interagency in nature if 90 percent

Federal Government	State Government	County Government	City Government	Special District Government	IOs	NGOs
Dept. of Homeland Security	Dept. of Public Health	Emergency Management Dept.	Public Safety Dept.	Water Agencies	World Health Organization	American Red Cross and International Committee of the Red Cross
U.S. Coast Guard	Army and Air National Guards	Public Health Dept.	Police Dept.	Wastewater Agencies	UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance	Salvation Army
U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Civil Affairs	Dept. of Food and Agriculture	Public Works Dept.	Emergency Services Dept.	Community Services Districts	UN High Commissioner for Refugees	Mercy Corps
FBI; Drug Enforcement Administration; Customs and Border Protection; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Central Intelligence Agency	Emergency Management Agency	Sheriff's Dept.	Fire Dept.	Hospital Districts	UN Children's Fund	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
	Dept. of Public Safety	Planning Dept.	Public Health Dept.	Airport Districts	UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations	International Medical Corps
	Dept. of Transportation	Board of Supervisors	Public Works Dept.	Harbor and Port Districts	UN Population Fund	Save the Children
	Environmental Protection Dept.	Information Technology Dept.	Planning Dept.	Electric Utility Districts	UN Development Program	International Crisis Group
	Dept. of Forestry and Fire Protection		City Council	Fire Districts	World Bank	Relief International
Dept. of State	State Hospitals Dept.			Transit Districts		Catholic Relief Services
U.S. Agency for International Development and Office of Foreign Disaster Relief						International Organization for Migration
Dept. of Agriculture						Habitat for Humanity
Dept. of Transportation						
Army Corps of Engineers						
Dept. of Health and Human Services						

Figure 1.

of its members were, for example, employees of the DoD.

One interesting aspect of the IASC concept is that it can be implemented without seeking funding or formal approval from anyone in the government. And although obtaining tax exempt status does require governmental approvals, it is important only if you raise significant amounts of money for service projects. Otherwise, the club is simply a group of people who get together periodically to share a meal and hear a talk.

Due to the availability, interests, and affiliation of potential members in a given local area, the specific composition of each club will vary substantially. If the IASC concept were to spread beyond areas having a heavy concentration of federal employees and military personnel, the local clubs would be heavily dominated by state, county, and local officials. Regardless, for any given club, the main membership goal is to achieve a broad interagency membership, one that is

representative of all the locally-available levels of government with personnel in the area.

It should also be noted that some states have a form of government that is considered local but is not considered county, city, town, or village government. In California this form of government is called a special district, and these districts include fire districts, water districts, community services districts, cemetery districts, and about 85 other types of districts. This form of local government should not be neglected—some of these organizations can play a significant role in a disaster or other crisis due to their mission, personnel, communications gear, capital equipment, and/or training. There is also a good reason for having two members of the club who do not work for and may have never worked for any of the types of organizations mentioned so far. These members serve as direct connections between the club and the broad civilian population those government agencies and other organizations serve. These members could bring a particular perspective to the club and a point of view that might be valuable to government employees. Four additional categories of possible members include NGOs, IOs, government-regulated private utility companies, and government contractors.

In the New York and Washington, D.C., areas, an IASC should try to include a significant number of members from IOs and NGOs. In U.S. government operations overseas, these NGOs and IOs provide significant services, interact with U.S. government agencies, and sometimes make demands on U.S. government resources. Many of these NGOs and IOs have headquarters and a significant number of employees in New York and/or Washington, D.C., making it possible for some of them to join the local IASC.

Representatives from regulated utilities should be considered for membership because of the role they would likely play in a natural

or manmade disaster. Finally, given the extent to which some government functions have been contracted out to private companies in recent years, it may be appropriate for some clubs to include in their membership a limited number of appropriately-selected government contractors.

Interagency Service Club Template

The following IASC organizational template facilitates creating individual mission statements, club structures, bylaws, and agendas:

- Regular meetings about 75 minutes in length. Each club decides on the date, time, and frequency of these meetings.
- Each meeting should feature a speaker whose topic is intended to expand the membership's knowledge of governmental and non-governmental organizations' activities, capabilities, limitations, and challenges.
- Each meeting should have an agenda. Bylaws should include the club mission and purpose statements, duties and responsibilities of club officers and committees, and club membership composition guidelines and rules.
- Some suggested traditions to establish might include seating rules that ensure each table contains members from multiple agencies; formal, annual business card exchanges; an annual report on the interagency training and education; and annual awards.

Interagency Service Projects

Besides sharing a meal, one of the ways to develop fellowship across interagency boundaries is to work together toward some common goal. Club members should propose specific projects that have an interagency flavor. Three examples of possible "interagency

service projects” include the following:

- The Wounded Peacemaker Project: In the past decade in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, many non-military U.S. personnel have deployed to do important work. These people have come from federal, state, and local governments, NGOs, IOs, and quasi-governmental organizations. Their work has been intended to deter further warfare in these countries and to help the local populations achieve peace and improved living conditions. In the course of this work, some of these people have been killed or injured. Some of the injured cannot return to their jobs, and they must undergo months of rehabilitation before they try to find a job that accommodates their disability. The support systems for these individuals are significantly weaker than the support systems for military casualties. This project would help develop better support systems for these individuals.³⁵
- Interagency Speakers Bureau Project: This project would support civics education in the local area. The club would put together and offer to local high schools and colleges a directory of speakers and topics from the interagency domain.
- Developing a directory of local organizations involved in crisis response.

Interagency Challenge Revisited

Effective, well-funded, interagency training and education will not by itself dispose of the interagency challenge, but it will help. Unfortunately, at least for the near term, it appears that Congress does not have the will to pass legislation to comprehensively address the interagency challenge. Absent such a “Goldwater-Nichols Act” for interagency processes, interagency training, education, and network building that can be accomplished with little or no Congressional support becomes a lot more important. Although very flexible, the IASC concept is but one approach to interagency education, training, and professional network building. **IAJ**

NOTES

1 Rotary International, <<http://www.rotary.org/en/AboutUs/RotaryInternational/GuidingPrinciples/Pages/ridefault.aspx>>, accessed on October 14, 2011.

2 Lions Clubs International, <<http://www.lionsclubs.org/EN/about-lions/mission-and-history/our-mission.php>>, accessed October 14, 2011.

3 Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1993, p. 18.

4 “Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield,” Center for the Study of the Presidency, Arlington, VA, 2008, p. 17.

5 James A. Baker, III, et al., *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach*, Vintage Books, New York, 2006, p. 61.

6 Frederick M. Kaiser, “Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations,” *Inter Agency Paper No. 5*, Colonel Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Coordination, June 2011, p. 13.

7 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Napolitano Tours Project Seahawk,” online press release, Washington, July 6, 2009, <http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1246911374161.shtm>, accessed on October 19, 2011. Project SeaHawk was established by Congress in 2003 as a collaborative initiative designed to bring multiple agencies together to protect the port. Located at Port Charleston in South Carolina, Project SeaHawk enables federal agencies to work together with South Carolina authorities to share information and coordinate maritime response efforts.

8 Kaiser, p. 14.

9 For example, Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, June 24, 2011, contains descriptions of 12 international organizations and four nongovernmental organizations with which military forces may have to interact during crisis action planning and during execution of such a plan.

10 Organizations that responded to Hurricane Katrina included the U.S. Navy, Louisiana Army National Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, New Orleans Police Department, American Red Cross, Salvation Army, USA Freedom Corps, Citizen’s Corps Council, Catholic Charities USA, Wal-Mart, AMTRAK, Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, Gretna City Police Department, Crescent City Connection Police, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and many more.

11 To a military member on the staff of an operational or tactical military organization, planning is the process by which he/she examines a problem, considers alternative courses of action, selects the best course of action, and prepares the order needed to execute that course of action. To a member of the U.S. Agency for International Development and absent any additional context, planning is the process used to obtain money from Congress.

12 William J. Davis, “Is a Sense of Community Vital to Interagency Coordination?” *Inter Agency Paper No. 3*, Colonel Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Coordination, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 2011, p. 10.

13 “National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals,” Executive Office of the President, Washington, July 2007, p. 2, <<http://www.cpms.osd.mil/ASSETS/13DCDB52B7D7453A9F78343E46F11F99/National%20Strategy%20for%20Professional%20Development.pdf>>, accessed on October 19, 2011.

14 Catherine Dale, “National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience and Issues for Congress,” report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, September 26, 2011, p. 8.

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18 *Ibid.*

19 Dale, p. 14.

- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid., p. 16.
- 22 Department of State, <<http://www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/join/faq/index.htm#14>>, accessed on July 19, 2012.
- 23 Samuel S. Farr, "From Idea to Implementation: Standing Up the Civilian Response Corps," *Prism* 2, No. 1, December 2010, p. 22.
- 24 Center for Homeland Defense and Security, <<http://www.chds.us/?masters/overview>>, accessed November 1, 2011.
- 25 Ibid., <<http://www.chds.us/?special/info&pgm=FCLP>>.
- 26 Ibid., <<http://www.chds.us/?special/info&pgm=Exec>>.
- 27 Ibid., <<http://www.chds.us/?met>>.
- 28 Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, <http://www.csrns-nps.org/logistica/public/docs/CSRS_Brochure_March_2011.pdf>, accessed November 1, 2011.
- 29 Dale, p. 20.
- 30 Ibid., p. 21.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Quasi-governmental organizations provide some sort of government service or services under contract to or under the regulation of some part of the local, county, state, or federal government.
- 33 You will find a template for this purpose at <<http://www.interagencyclubs.org>>.
- 34 A president, vice president, treasurer, secretary, venue coordinator, and speaker coordinator are the suggested club officers.
- 35 Medical coverage, long-term care, dependent care, rehabilitation training, disability income, and life insurance programs are examples of these support systems.

Catastrophe Beyond Disaster:

Learning from Katrina

by Thomas J. Murphy

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in our Nation's history and has caused unimaginable devastation and heartbreak throughout the Gulf Coast Region. A vast coastline of towns and communities has been decimated.

***President George W. Bush
September 8, 2005***

Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history. The destruction by the large and powerful hurricane, as well as the catastrophic flood that followed, vastly exceeded that of any other major disaster before it. The area affected exceeded 90,000 square miles and left over 118 million cubic yards of debris. The subsequent flooding after the levees were breached inundated the majority of the city, displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and killed hundreds in the New Orleans metropolitan area. And within the first six months, the estimated cost in damages exceeded \$96 billion.¹

Over the past one hundred years, the breadth and degree of impact on communities and the nation from natural and man-made disasters has grown and given rise to categories heretofore unused: Incidents of National Significance (INS), Spill of National Significance, and Complex Catastrophe.² In 1988, The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act provided definitions for an emergency incident and a major disaster, which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) incorporated into the National Response Plan (NRP). The DHS also added its own definition for a catastrophic incident.

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Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All catastrophic events are Incidents of National Significance.³

Applying this definition, Hurricane Katrina's destruction and disruption of life across several state borders was more than a major disaster, it was a national catastrophe and an INS.

Although responders may have understood these definitions conceptually, they did not clearly recognize the evolving magnitude of the incident. Consequently, appropriate and timely elements of the local, state, and federal response did not occur in preparing for or responding to Hurricane Katrina. Jeff Smith, Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, later testified to a Congressional committee about the failure to recognize the incident's magnitude and respond properly. "The single biggest failure of the federal response was the Department of Homeland Security's failure to recognize that Katrina was a catastrophic event and implement the catastrophic incident annex to the National Response Plan." If it had, federal assistance would have arrived days earlier.⁴ Clearly, leaders at the operational level must have "indicators" that enable them to provide timely input to the strategic-level assessment that will trigger a proactive federal

response to an incident that grows from a major disaster to a catastrophe.

"The single biggest failure of the federal response was the Department of Homeland Security's failure to recognize that Katrina was a catastrophic event..."

"Déjà vu All Over Again"

Katrina may be the most significant national catastrophe to befall the U.S., but it is not the first. At 5:12 a.m. on April 18, 1906, a magnitude 7.9 earthquake struck San Francisco. The earthquake collapsed hundreds of buildings, ruptured gas and water lines throughout the city, and caused numerous fires. The few remaining fire crews could not move through the rubble-strewn streets and the fires quickly spread. More than 500 square blocks burned and 28,000 buildings were razed, leaving over half the city's residents homeless. An entire city was destroyed. In the aftermath of fire and disease, brought on by crowded, unsanitary camps and shelters, over 3000 people died; hundreds more died in towns surrounding San Francisco. The U.S. Mint was saved; however, 37 banks were lost, and the monetary losses to government, commercial, and private properties exceeded \$6 billion. Today, the population and urban development of the San Francisco Bay Area is more than 10 times as large, and a similar earthquake could result in tens of thousands killed and a financial loss of over \$260 billion in damages to residential and commercial properties alone.⁵

The "Spanish" influenza pandemic of 1918 is estimated to have killed approximately 675,000 people across the U.S. The name, "Spanish Flu"

is attributed to Spain being the first nation to report large losses of life from the influenza; however, the first wave of the influenza in the U.S. can be traced to military camps in Kansas as early as the spring of 1918. The disease spread from person to person, from patient to care-giver, across the country more rapidly than medical authorities could respond. The pending national catastrophe was not recognized, and subsequent preventative actions were so limited that by the early winter of 1918, the epidemic affected the entire nation. Millions were ill, the

Hurricane Katrina was a watershed event for lessons on planning and preparing for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic incidents.

medical healthcare system was overwhelmed, and the railroad transportation system, upon which every aspect of the national economy depended, would not accept passengers without certificates verifying their good health.⁶ In less than one year, the “Spanish” influenza took more lives and did more economic damage to the U.S. than World War I.

Both of these major disasters quickly exceeded the resources and capabilities of first responders and local and state governments. In fact, the emergency personnel and government entities rapidly became part of the disaster, often struggling to rescue themselves and unable to request or direct assistance from the federal government. Eighty-seven years later, Hurricane Katrina was no different in spite of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) hurricane simulation exercise conducted during the summer of 2004.⁷ The local authorities, state government, and federal government, with its representative Principal Federal Officer and Federal Coordinating

Officers on the scene, fell behind in anticipating and providing the necessary resources to prepare for the impending major disaster or respond to the national catastrophe.

Progress After Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina was a watershed event for lessons on planning and preparing for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic incidents. In the seven years since Katrina, the legislative and executive branches of the federal government undertook numerous actions to improve the nation’s preparedness for future catastrophes. Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 and amended the Stafford Act in 2007, establishing new leadership positions and requirements within FEMA and amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002. And most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 authorized a dual-status command construct when the armed forces and the National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the US.⁸ President Barack Obama signed the Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) aimed at strengthening “the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.”⁹ The DHS through FEMA replaced the NRP with the National Response Framework (NRF), developed and published in 2008, and overhauled roles and responsibilities and the national preparedness capabilities. The Department of Defense (DoD) began revising doctrine for Defense Support to Civil Authorities, issued DoD Directive 3025.18 for such support, and established a complex catastrophe work group, whose recommendation resulted in the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum for Actions to Improve Defense Support in Complex Catastrophes.

On April 20, 2010, a blowout at the Macando 252 well caused a major explosion that resulted in fire and the sinking of British Petroleum's Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, approximately 45 miles off the coast of Louisiana. The discharge of oil continued for almost three months and affected every state along the Gulf of Mexico. As an oil spill, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was the applicable legislative statute for actions. The federal government responded by applying the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), which is described as an "operational supplement" to the NRF in the Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex.

Unfortunately, the state and local governments were not familiar with the top-down oriented NCP. Because they expected operations to be conducted along the "bottom-up" orientation of the NRF, there was some confusion over who was in charge. The NCP designates a National Incident Commander, while the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 designates the DHS Secretary as the Principal Federal Official for incident management within the U.S. Overall, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) showed improvement in execution over Hurricane Katrina and execution may further improve as DHS and other federal departments continue to implement PPD-8.

Super Storm Sandy has been the latest test of the National Preparedness System. As the super storm grew from a tropical storm in the Caribbean Sea, worked its way north along the eastern seaboard, and made landfall in New Jersey on 29 October, 2012, a whole community approach was applied in preparation. Under the direction of DHS, FEMA coordinated with other federal departments and authorities within the state, local, and tribal governments to poll military and civil organizations on preparedness and to stage resources. This proactively set the

conditions for a rapid response to emergency needs and assistance. FEMA and DoD employed a dual-status command structure for the joint task forces in New Jersey and New York, merging active and National Guard forces in one staff under an Army National Guard brigadier general. This merger enabled a better integrated structure, leveraging the expertise of both forces to achieve a more seamlessly coordinated response than in previous incidents.

...most "first responders" are from the local authorities. They are the first to arrive and last to leave, and additional support is provided when it becomes clear that local capabilities will be insufficient...

Planning and Response

Historically, the process for planning and responding to emergencies and disasters occurs at three successive levels: local, then state government, then federal government as required. This is because most "first responders" are from the local authorities. They are the first to arrive and last to leave, and additional support is provided when it becomes clear that local capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted. When a state and federal response is initiated, it is at the request of and in support of the local authorities. Ultimately, the intent is to manage the incident at the lowest, supportable level of authority.

The foundation for this delineation of state and federal powers began with the U.S. Constitution and has been periodically reinforced through legislation and Presidential action. And, this delineation worked well. The state and local governments, because of

proximity and daily interaction, knew their jurisdictions, knew their local populace, and knew their capabilities and requirements in the event of a disaster. The federal government, providing a central and unifying capability was best suited for a supporting role that recognized and sustained the authority of the state and local governments.

...it was the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, that brought to the forefront the need to integrate state and federal planning in order to ensure a more effective response to all disasters.

However, this process of delineation also developed “cultural obstacles” that resulted in inefficiencies for planning and response. Across the federal government, planning occurred at all levels with minimal coordination or synchronization. The response to a disaster was then predicated on a “pull” technique of each local and state government exhausting or anticipating exhausting its resources before requesting a federal response. This process was codified into law with the Stafford Act of 1988. Essentially, a local official notified the state government that assistance was needed; when the state’s resources were exhausted, the Governor requested assistance from the federal government. At the federal level, FEMA would request and coordinate assistance from other federal agencies. Complicating this process were the requirements to ensure that assistance rendered did not violate federal statutes, such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

After experiencing dissatisfaction with the state and federal response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, seventeen southern states developed the Southern Regional Emergency Compact, which

led to the national Emergency Management Assistance Compact in 1996.¹⁰ However, these actions were focused on natural disasters, and it was the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, that brought to the forefront the need to integrate state and federal planning in order to ensure a more effective response to all disasters. In July 2002, the White House released the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, and President George W. Bush proposed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which came into being with the Homeland Security Act signed into law on November 25, 2002. Shortly following this, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) that directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a comprehensive management system that provides a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity and an integrated response plan that integrates federal government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan.

Through a set of standardized organizational structures, the NIMS provides a consistent, flexible, and adjustable national framework with which government and private entities at all levels can work together to manage domestic incidents. The NRP established a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery by incorporating the best practices and procedures from various incident management disciplines and organizations in order to provide interagency and multi-jurisdictional mechanisms for federal government involvement in domestic incidents. The NRP also introduced the term “Incidents of National Significance” and based its definition

on situations related to the following four criteria set forth in HSPD-5:

- A federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
- State and local resources are overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate state and local authorities.
- More than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to an incident.
- The Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed to assume responsibility for managing a domestic incident by the President.¹¹

These criteria were intended to serve as a “trip-wire” for declaring an INS and enacting the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex, which would provide the overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive, national response to a catastrophic incident.

“Pull” versus “Push”

This process, however, contained two basic flaws. The process was essentially a “pull” system in that local and state governments had to exhaust local resources before requesting federal assistance unless it was declared an INS. The INS trip wires, however, were conceptually formulated in alignment with the existing, non-INS process. One of the trip-wire criteria was the Stafford Act, and two other criteria were basically variations of the Stafford Act, in that federal departments or agencies will not become engaged until the state governments exhaust their resources. The fourth criteria offered the possibility of a proactive process with the President directing the DHS Secretary to assume responsibility for managing the

domestic incident and thereby triggering an INS situation, but there were no associated sub-criteria or indicators that provided the President an objective assessment upon which to base this decision.

The second flaw was that the annex was proactive in planning but not execution. The intent of the annex was to plan for incidents in which the federal response posture would switch, upon declaration of an INS, from the traditional “pull” system to a system that includes a proactive “push” process for employing assets and resources in the incident area. Once the annex was activated in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident, the standard procedures outlined in the NRP regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended. This would enable the federal departments and agencies to provide assistance without waiting

...as written, the general operating presumption was that federal, pre-deployed resources would remain at staging areas outside of the incident area until requested by the state and local incident command authorities.

for local and state requests; it would keep the response ahead of the need. However, as written, the general operating presumption was that federal, pre-deployed resources would remain at staging areas outside of the incident area until requested by the state and local incident command authorities. Therefore, though the support was established, it wasn’t employed until the state requested it, and the process of providing federal assistance to local and state incident commands and even other federal departments and agencies remained a “pull” system.

The NRF superseded the NRP in 2008. It was an evolutionary growth to previous federal planning documents and incorporated both structural and substantive changes to improve usability and nation-wide whole community applicability. Similar to the NRP, the NRF is a companion document to the NIMS and retains revised versions of the Emergency Support Function Annexes, Support Annexes, Incident Annexes, and Partner Guides as supporting documents. It identifies response doctrine, encourages a higher level of readiness by drawing a sharper focus on preparedness activities, and provides a guide for government, business, non-government leaders, and emergency management personnel for responding more effectively to incidents¹²

The efforts for national preparedness continue to evolve and grow with discussions on the concepts of complex catastrophe and whole community.

The efforts for national preparedness continue to evolve and grow with discussions on the concepts of complex catastrophe and whole community. First termed “mega-catastrophe” by Dr. Paul Stockton, he characterized these incidents as “very low probability, ultra-high consequence events where multiple, geographically dispersed, and near simultaneous incidents produce mass casualties on a scale, way beyond the scale of what we saw in Katrina or 9/11.”¹³ A complex catastrophe, theoretically, could overwhelm the NIMS, lead to a breakdown in public order, and necessitate DoD taking the lead in the emergency management response. As evidenced by the Secretary of Defense memorandum Actions to Improve Defense Support in Complex Catastrophes, the DoD is examining ways to leverage a broader

range of DoD forces and capabilities to develop plans, policies, and force management tools for complex catastrophes and enable a unity of effort and broader use of DoD forces in complex catastrophes. Simultaneously, FEMA is developing a whole-community approach to emergency management in support of PPD-8. This approach is a means by which residents, emergency management personnel, organizational and community leaders, and government officials collectively understand and assess their respective community needs and determine how to best organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests.¹⁴ When realized, a whole-community approach to emergency management is intended to achieve the integrated, all-of-nation, capabilities-based preparedness for threats to the U.S. as described in PPD-8.

Incident Assessment and Indicators

Fundamental to any incident or operation are assessments. Referred to as staff estimates in military organizations, these are integral to mission analysis and planning. For the NRF, the process of assessment begins at the National Operations Center (NOC) which maintains daily situational awareness to identify and monitor threats or potential threats to the territorial U.S. This awareness comes from reports and information provided to the NOC by federal, state, and local authorities and forms the basis of an incident assessment. The NOC provides the Secretary of Homeland Security and other principals with information necessary to make critical national-level incident management decisions and initiate the appropriate warnings, bulletins, and actions.¹⁵ In a similar manner, the Incident Management Assessment Team (IMAT), an interagency, regionally-based response team, may conduct assessments to provide information necessary for decisions and direction on providing support to the affected incident area.

For both the NOC and the IMAT, these organizations use information and reports as “indicators” to develop their assessments. By definition, mechanical indicators are any various meters, gauges, or instruments that monitor the operation or condition of an engine, furnace, electrical network, reservoir, or other physical system. Applying their experience, operators use these indicators to assess what is happening in the system and what needs to be done to maintain, improve, or correct the system. Thus, in a broader context, an indicator can be the measurement of a system condition that points to a future outcome or effect. For example, the indicator for the FEMA simulation exercise of Hurricane Pam, was a Category 3 or higher hurricane making landfall within a specific distance of the New Orleans levee system, and the outcome or effect would most likely be a breach instead of an over-topping¹⁶ Ironically, after applying effects-based analysis to the potential situation, responders to Katrina assumed these indicators and outcomes for planning purposes.¹⁷

Associating Effects with Indicators

It is one thing to associate effects with indicators. It is another to apply them. Many organizations prepared for and responded to the devastation wrought by Katrina. Some local, state, and federal organizations did poorly or failed because they did not recognize the effects, especially the second- and third-order effects the hurricane would have on the area. Less than 24 hours before Katrina made landfall, the Mayor of New Orleans changed the designation of the New Orleans Superdome from a “shelter for special needs” to a “shelter of last resort” for the general population, which significantly shifted the possible location and increased the potential number of evacuees from the city.¹⁸ Poor prior planning combined with poor situational awareness resulted in haphazard evacuation support marked by a lack of evacuation routes,

transportation assets, communications, and coordination of local, state, and federal efforts. The second- and third-order effects were tens of thousands of displaced people overcrowding a shelter from which they could not initially be evacuated.

At the same time, other organizations, such as JTF-Katrina, reviewed and updated existing plans using effects-based analysis applied to NRP emergency support functions and then war-gamed scenarios to identify requirements and needs. In effects-based operations, an organization applies a methodology of planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific effects in order to achieve a desired outcome or objective. For Hurricane Katrina, the task force reversed the viewpoint to observe what effects the hurricane’s wind and tidal surges would have on the affected areas. The resulting matrix enabled the staff to “see first” and develop assumptions and potential tasks for the task force.

This same process can be applied to other potential incidents using the emergency support functions found in the NRF. Planners use these functions because they are the basic capabilities and services needed to respond to an incident

Some local, state, and federal organizations did poorly or failed because they did not recognize the effects, especially the second- and third-order effects the hurricane would have on the area.

and the primary operational-level mechanisms for providing assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to federal departments¹⁹ Whether the incident is a hurricane, an earthquake, a pandemic virus, or a terrorist attack using a nuclear device, applying effects-

	Emergency	Major Disaster	Catastrophe
Emergency Support Function (ESF) #7 Logistics Management and Resource Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-positioning of supplies by air and land disrupted due to deteriorating weather conditions and evacuations • Stockpiling will empty stores of food, bottled water, batteries, sanitary supplies, plywood, plastic, and portable generators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No incoming resources until cause of incident has cleared the area • Damage assessment and humanitarian aid assessments restricted until lines of communication are restored 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of resources severely impacted due to impassable road networks and citizens' inability to get to the distribution points • Distribution may be restricted to the most affected areas until additional resources become available
ESF#8 Public Health and Medical Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local hospitals, nursing homes, and rest homes evacuated/patients transferred to treatment facilities outside predicted incident area • Emergency treatment capability degraded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local hospital sustain severe damage • Hospitals that are open are overwhelmed with patients requiring emergency care • Medical capability severely degraded • Local clinics and nursing/rest homes will be without power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thousands are homeless • Public health threatened by shortage of drinking water, food that is in short supply and spoiling due to lack of refrigeration, damaged sewage treatment plants, dead animals, and other hazardous chemicals and materials • Public health threatened due to sanitary conditions in rural areas, small communities, and emergency shelters
ESF#9 Search and Rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Search and rescue teams respond to initial calls for assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Search and rescue operations severely degraded by impassable roads, downed power lines and trees, and debris fields 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Search and rescue only possible by helicopter and/or all-terrain vehicles until roads are cleared • Officials overwhelmed with requests for assistance

Figure 1. Incident-Level Indicators

based analysis to a potential, affected area can determine the effects of that incident. As shown in Figure 1, these effects can be aligned with incident levels and become an indicator for the potential incident level.¹⁹

The incident-level indicators become an enabling factor to a proactive, decision-making process by the IMAT and the NOC. The IMAT incorporates this process into its mission analysis to identify needs and requirements that are briefed for action or forwarded to another agency. The process, however, is not a simple emergency support functions matrix but rather a system of matrices that are cross-referenced.

Base matrices, such as Figure 2, are also needed to determine the level of damage and destruction. For example, using Figures 1 and 2, the IMAT can quickly identify that an earthquake of magnitude 7.9, similar to the one in 1906, would result in several effects that exceed the response capabilities of an emergency or major disaster while an earthquake of magnitude 6.7 may still only result in effects equal to a major disaster.

	Magnitude 6.6 to 7.0	Magnitude 7.1 to 7.5	Magnitude 7.6 to 8.0
Highways/ Primary Roads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major structural damage on most overpasses and bridges; minor structural damage on most tunnels Downed power lines and trees on non-highway roads; debris on most roads 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major structural damage on all overpasses, bridges, and tunnels; some highways and roads buckled Downed power lines on non-highway roads; debris on most roads Low-lying roads may be flooded from broken water and sewage lines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major structural damage on all overpasses, bridges, and tunnels with many collapsed Cross-bay bridges not structurally sound for use and may be collapsed Downed power lines on non-highway roads; debris on most roads Low-lying roads may be flooded from broken water and sewage lines
Secondary Roads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor structural damage from cracking and buckling Downed power lines and trees on roads; debris on most roads Landslides on Coast Highway 1 possible Low-lying roads may be flooded from broken water and sewage lines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major structural damage from cracking and buckling Downed power lines and trees on roads; debris on most roads Landslides on Coast Highway 1 probable with sections impassable Low-lying roads may be flooded from broken water and sewage lines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major structural damage; cracking and buckling of most roads Downed power lines and trees on roads; debris on most roads Landslides on Coast Highway 1 probable with sections impassable Low-lying roads may be flooded from broken water and sewage lines
Water and Sewage Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hetch-Hetchy Water System pipeline disrupted Some city and county water lines broken; some pumping stations non-operational; system disrupted Some city and county sewage lines broken; system disrupted; some waste treatment facilities non-operational 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hetch-Hetchy Water System pipeline disrupted; some sections of pipeline may be destroyed Some city and county water lines broken; some pumping stations non-operational; system disrupted Some city and county sewage lines broken; system disrupted; some waste treatment facilities non-operational; breach of waste containment tanks possible 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major sections of Hetch-Hetchy Water System pipeline destroyed Some city and county water lines broken; most pumping stations non-operational; system non-functional Most city and county sewage lines broken; system non-functional; waste treatment facilities non-operational; breach of waste containment tanks probable
Crystal Springs Dam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal effect Water release gates require operational check Structural integrity checked required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moderate effect Water release gates require operational check Structural integrity check required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structural engineering specifications exceeded; structural breach is possible Water release gates cannot be operated until dam structural integrity confirmed

Figure 2. Earthquake Effects for San Andreas Fault on Peninsula of San Francisco (Partial Table)²⁰

The previous example is intentionally a reactive scenario. Earthquakes cannot be predicted with any precision that would warrant the alert and pre-positioning of federal assistance prior to its occurrence. However, the scenario illustrates how an IMAT can quickly move from a reactive process to a proactive process. Using known facts, such as a 7.9 magnitude earthquake, cross-referenced with expected effects and incoming information and reports, the IMAT does not have to wait for local or state authorities to request potable water because it can assess that the water system is already disrupted.

Moving Forward

Historical traditions and the Stafford Act resulted in a cultural mindset and legal precepts that hindered the response to major disasters and incidents of national significance. In spite of the establishment of the DHS, the creation of the NIMS, and the development of the NRP, which were all intended to provide a nationally-unifying framework and mechanism for coordinating federal assistance, the execution in response to Hurricane Katrina was one of reactive “pull” instead of proactive “push.” This led to delayed and often uncoordinated responses to the assistance needs of local and state authorities. Simultaneously, the local and state authorities lacked a sufficient process for proactively determining their needs for assistance and sometimes compounded the scale of the catastrophe through slow decisions or ill-advised actions.

Since Hurricane Katrina, the nation has made tremendous strides toward improving preparedness for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the U.S. Congress amended the Stafford Act and other related legislation, passed new legislation, and amended authorities within national security. These actions are streamlining leadership authorities, improving coordination across whole-of-community, and enabling a more proactive response to incidents. President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness in order to guide how the nation can “prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from” threats that pose the greatest risk to the country. And, DHS, DoD, and other federal departments have updated doctrine and procedures and engaged in discussions to develop concepts that will improve emergency management processes.

In spite of the significant progress made to improve national preparedness, decision-makers still need a process that indicates and enables them to recognize the transition from emergency to major disaster to national catastrophe or complex catastrophe and respond proactively. DHS supported by DoD and working with other agencies at the local, state, and federal levels can apply effects-based analysis to incident scenarios and determine the resulting effects based on known information. If an earthquake of “X” magnitude occurs along this portion of the San Andreas Fault, the effects will be “Y.” With an effects-based analysis process, operational-level leaders can better recognize and understand the future effects from a potential or on-going incident. These leaders can then provide timely input to the strategic assessment and enable strategic leaders to be proactive in their decision making.

While the destructive catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina was overwhelming and seemingly a once in a generation event, a national catastrophe will occur again within the U.S. Whether it is a natural or man-made is irrelevant. The DHS can and should develop incident-level indicators for the emergency support functions and incorporate these into the NRF-Crisis Incident Annex or Crisis Incident Supplement in order to provide the operational-level commanders and leaders with a proactive tool with which to assess and respond to the next national catastrophe. **IAJ**

NOTES

- 1 “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,” The White House, Washington, 2006, p. 7. This estimate is for physical property and durable goods and does not include personal property or injury.
- 2 The term Incident of National Significance was introduced in the National Response Plan (NRP) in December of 2004 and rescinded in 2008 when the National Response Framework replaced the NRP. Spill of National Significance originated with the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010. The Department of Defense is currently developing a definition for complex catastrophe.
- 3 “National Response Plan,” December 2004, p. 63.
- 4 Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), written statement submitted for the Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session, December 14, 2005.
- 5 Patricia Grossi and Robert Muir Wood, *The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Fire: Perspectives on a Modern Super Cat*, Risk Management Solutions, Inc., Newark, CA, 2006, p. ii-9, <http://www.rms.com/Publications/2006_SF_EQ_SuperCat.pdf>, accessed on April 15, 2006.
- 6 Molly Billings, “The Influenza Pandemic of 1918,” Stanford University webpage, February 2005, <<http://www.stanford.edu/group/virus/uda>>, accessed on April 15, 2006.
- 7 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conducted a disaster simulation exercise in July 2004 in which a fictional Hurricane Pam struck the New Orleans area as a Category 3 hurricane. In the scenario, the storm surge overtopped levees, destroyed over 500,000 buildings, and caused the evacuation of over 1 million people. The simulation exercise involved more than 50 federal, state, and local agencies and volunteer organizations and was intended to help officials develop response plans for such a scenario should it occur. Robert Longley, “FEMA’s ‘Pam’ Simulation Foretold Katrina Disaster: Preparedness Action Plans Not Implemented in Time,” About.com, U.S. Government Info webpage, April 2006, <<http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/defenseandsecurity/a/femapam.htm>>, accessed on April 15, 2006.
- 8 “National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2012,” Public Law 112-81, 125 STAT 1394, 12304a.
- 9 Barack Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive-8: National Preparedness,” Office of the President of the United States, Washington, March 30, 2011.
- 10 “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,” p. 31. Approved by Congress in 1996, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is an interstate mutual aid agreement among member states to provide assistance after disasters overwhelm the affected state’s capacity. This agreement provides the legal structure for states to request assistance from one another, such as temporary shelters, aircraft support, and the National Guard while under state control.
- 11 “National Response Plan,” p. 4.
- 12 “National Response Framework–Fact Sheet,” Department of Homeland Security web page, <<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRFOnePageFactSheet.pdf>>, accessed on January 9, 2013.
- 13 Dr. Paul Stockton, “The Department of Defense and the Problem of Mega-Catastrophes,” in *Threat at Our Threshold*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2007, p. 28.

- 14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, *A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action*, Washington, December 2011, p. 3.
- 15 “National Response Framework,” p. 55.
- 16 U.S. House of Representatives, “A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina,” p. 82. The FEMA simulation exercise used a computer modeling program designed by Professor Ivor van Heerden of Louisiana State University that generated an over-topping scenario instead of a breach. However, severe flooding with large-scale evacuations was the result in this situation, too, and the overall flooding pattern was very similar to what occurred following Hurricane Katrina.
- 17 Lieutenant General Russel L. Honore and Colonel (retired) Barney Barnhill, “Joint Task Force Katrina: See First-Understand First-Act First,” *Journal of the Department of Operational Art and Campaigning*, Spring 2006, p. 8.
- 18 “National Response Plan,” pp. 26–29. A “shelter of special needs” is intended for people who have medical or disability needs that cannot be provided at the normal facility because of the on-going incident. A “shelter of last resort” is intended as a location for people to move to if their home or other shelter becomes unusable; it is an evacuation point in most incidents.
- 19 “National Response Plan,” p. 65. The emergency support functions are transportation; communications; public works and engineering; firefighting; emergency management; mass care, housing, and human services; logistics management and resource support; public health and medical services; search and rescue; oil and hazardous materials response; agriculture and natural resources; energy; public safety and security; long-term community recovery and mitigation; and, external affairs.
- 20 Figure 1 is identical to Figure 2: Effects Based Analysis of Emergency Support Functions in “Joint Task Force Katrina: See First-Understand First-Act First,” modified only to replace direct references to Hurricane Katrina and to replace the Effects headings with Incident headings.
- 21 This is a fictitious table using fictitious data. However, it should be noted that the Hetch-Hetchy Water System and Crystal Springs Reservoir Dam do exist and provide all of the potable water for San Francisco. Furthermore, a significant breach in the dam would most likely close the Interstate 280 Bridge that passes near the dam and flood Highway 101 which would effectively cut off the primary overland routes to San Francisco, leaving Coast Highway 1 as the only overland route into the city.

The U.S. Government as an *Interagency Network*

by Ryan Whalen

This article weaves together two parallel threads. On the one hand, it seeks to answer substantive questions about the structure of the U.S. government (USG). On the other, it explores methodological issues relevant to interagency studies and interorganizational network analysis. The methodological portion of the article tackles a number of questions left unanswered by the growing field of interorganizational network studies. The growth of this field has been encouraged by the explosion of available digital data about how organizations relate to one another. Many of the studies using this data rely on abstract measurements and untested assumptions. In this article, I propose a move toward triangulation of organizational relation measurement and a multiplex approach to understanding interorganizational networks.

The substantive portion of this article takes on a topical and important series of questions: Are there theoretically meaningful “communities” of interagency relationships within the federal government? Is the government becoming more or less hierarchical? As technology and economic imperatives transform the way governments serve citizens and the way agencies and departments relate with one another, can we better understand intergovernmental structure?

Studying Structure

The practice of conceptualizing organizations as part of an interorganizational system and subsequently using relational information to map out their place within that system is at least fifty years old. Evan was an early advocate of interorganizational analysis.¹ His focus on management led him to see interorganizational analysis as a way to better understand individual organizations—the “focal” organization of study. In recent years, scholars have sought to understand not only the component parts of the organizational network, but also the system as a whole.

The explosion of available data, especially digital trace data, has made interorganizational

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network studies much easier than in years past. It seems wherever researchers look, they are apt to find data that can somehow be used to infer how one thing relates to another. In many cases, these data can be abstractly interpreted as a form of organizational relation. Scholars have used email logs, corporate ownership records, and hyperlinks as ways to abstractly measure relationships.²

Many believe the digital communications revolution will bring widespread changes to government structure and argue that digital governance will lead to a more networked, less hierarchically-structured government.

The convenience of digital trace network studies has been no small development for social science. Where previously scholars had to either exhaustively survey subjects about relations³ or carefully pore over records and assemble relational data structures by hand, they can now computationally mine huge amounts of data and extract the measurements of their choice.⁴

Government Structure

The digital communications revolution that has brought so much change to the practice of interorganizational network studies has also brought sweeping practices to the way governments function and—according to some—to the way governments are and will be structured.

Traditional ways of trying to understand how governments are structured have focused on the legislation and rules that create and empower government bodies. These legal representations ignore many empirical relationships and focus almost solely on hierarchical structure.

The lateral relational dimension excluded from legal representations of government is important, not only to better understand how the federal government is structured, but also to provide insight into changes in government organization and provide feedback when public administrators consider organizational reforms.

The past three decades have seen increasing discussion about the potential for substantial reforms of government organization. Many believe the digital communications revolution will bring widespread changes to government structure and argue that digital governance will lead to a more networked, less hierarchically-structured government. In his wider discussion of the emergence of a “networked society,” Castells argues that “the rational bureaucratic model of the state of the industrial era is in complete contradiction to the demands of the network society”⁵ Fountain also argues that “the nature and structure of the state is changing fundamentally as information and communication technologies are being absorbed into governments.”⁶

The structural changes that may have accompanied “digital era governance”⁷ are, as of yet, unclear. Without established metrics to measure something as abstract as “government structure,” it is difficult to determine whether claims of the transformational power of digital communications are supported by reality.

Some argue that the prophesied transformations have not or should not take place. Kraemer and King quite strongly rebuke claims that adopting new information technology (IT) will lead to substantial changes in government structure stating that “IT is not a catalyst for administrative reform in government” and “[t]he benefits of IT use are largely focused on administrative efficiency, and not on reform of administrative organization, practices, or behavior.”⁸ Others take the middle ground as with Scholl, who suggests that—at least in the short term—adopting government

technology has led to a change in government mode rather than in government nature⁹ and Cordella, who argues the bureaucratic structure serves an important function and should be largely preserved as governments adopt new technological developments.¹⁰

These competing claims about the nature of twenty-first century government structure have led to calls for a more thorough examination of how adopting technology may or may not lead to changes in government structure.¹¹ This ongoing, digital-era governance structure debate requires a degree of empirical reflection and leads to the following questions regarding the USG's structure and how that structure has changed:

- Is the U.S. government structured in a predominantly network or predominantly siloed fashion?
- Is government structure static or is it shifting toward an increasingly networked or increasingly siloed structure?

If we treat government agencies as nodes in a network, we can apply network metrics to better understand interagency structure and answer the above questions. Agencies are connected in many ways by sharing resources, working in similar domains, and providing services to the same constituents; however, there is no objective record of agency relations. We need to devise indirect measures of agency relationship to assemble an interagency network.

Hyperlinks have become a popular way to abstractly measure the relationship between organizations. They are attractive for a number of reasons. Most organizations have some sort of web presence, meaning there will be some way to measure their hyperlinking behavior. Crawling the web—while not as simple as it might seem at first glance—is becoming easier, as new tools are developed,¹² and unlike many traditional forms of data collection, it does not require the cooperation of the study population.

This analysis of the USG capitalizes on these strengths and mapped hyperlinks within the .gov domain.

Using Yahoo's Site Explorer, a well-established method for link analysis studies,¹³ allowed me to leverage a very large and detailed web graph, while avoiding many of the pitfalls of individually crawling the web space of interest. In order to limit results to federal sites, I used a semi-manual spidering technique. The 85 government institutions and agencies listed in the *US Government Manual's* organizational chart seeded the search. Following the first and subsequent waves, the results returned were parsed to identify all the new .gov sites encountered. I then manually coded each of these sites. Any site representing a federal agency, organization, or initiative was coded as federal. All others, including state and municipal websites, were coded as non-federal. The federal sites were then used to generate another wave of searches. These waves continued until no new federal websites were discovered, and the inlink data for each federal website had been determined.

If we treat government agencies as nodes in a network, we can apply network metrics to better understand interagency structure...

When considered in aggregate, hyperlinks “reflect deep social and cultural structures”¹⁴ and can lay bare organizational relations that would not otherwise be evident. Unfortunately, they are not perfect, and when used to infer organizational structure, measurement difficulties and their high level of abstraction pose a number of problems for hyperlinks.

There is no definitive way to measure hyperlinks. If researchers use web crawlers to

collect their own data, those crawlers are subject to the limitations of their code and the time and computational resources available to crawl. The hyperlink graph is vast and dynamic, and any one crawl can only hope to provide a limited snapshot of a part of that graph. Perhaps more importantly, without interviewing web site creators, it is difficult to say with any amount of certainty and precision just what a hyperlink means.

While hyperlinks allow for an abstract measure of institutional affinity, they do not contain any information about the activities of the institutions in question.

In an interorganizational analysis situation, hyperlinks are usually interpreted as measurements of institutional affinity. Those sites sharing more links are considered “closer” in the interorganizational network. But hyperlinks exist for many reasons, not all of which can translate to institutional affinity. In some instances, hyperlinks are used to reject the contents of another website, linking to contested materials. Other times, hyperlinks contribute to site functionality, as when a site links to Adobe’s homepage to steer users towards their *Flash* or *PDF Reader* software. These are functional links that are probably not best interpreted as expressing any sort of institutional affinity.

For these reasons, studies using only hyperlink networks are somewhat problematic. Hyperlinks lack standardization,¹⁵ are highly abstract,¹⁶ and pose many data gathering challenges.¹⁷ They are too abstract and too small a part of complex relationship networks to be considered in isolation. This leads naturally to an argument for multiplexity, which is why two other measures of government organizational

structure are used in this analysis: metadata and lobbying disclosure relationships.

While hyperlinks allow for an abstract measure of institutional affinity, they do not contain any information about the activities of the institutions in question. This lack of context contributes to the abstractness that challenges many hyperlink-structure analyses. Researchers can mitigate this abstraction by complementing hyperlink analysis with datalink analysis.

As the semantic web grows in popularity, more and more data is available in a Resource Description Framework (RDF) format. This data can be mined and analyzed to generate data networks with links generated between organizations that publish similar types of data. In the government context, data.gov acts as a central repository for government supplied data and publishes a catalog of available RDF datasets. Using the keyword descriptions contained in this data.gov catalog, researchers can generate a semantic network, linking organizations that publish sets of data that contain the same keyword descriptors.¹⁸

The result is a network similar to that achieved by hyperlink mapping the .gov domain; however in this network, government entities that work on similar issues and, therefore, publish similar datasets are linked together with links weighted by the number of keywords shared.

The hyperlink and datalink networks both reflect internal perspectives on government structure. They each use artifacts generated by those within government (i.e., hyperlinks and datasets) to infer relationships between government entities. To complement these perspectives, this analysis also measures a third external perspective of intergovernmental relations and adds it to the multiplex network: lobbying relationships. Using Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) documents to build a co-mention network of government agencies creates a network of the U.S. government as it

is seen by lobbyists.

The LDA of 1995 requires that the federal government keep a record of registered lobbyists and their lobbying-related activities. These records include reports filed with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate that detail which agencies were the target of lobbying activities.¹⁹ The network generated by analyzing these reports provides another layer of relational data to add to the hyperlink and datalink networks. While the hyperlink network provides insight into how government agencies view their relations to one another, and the datalink network shows which agencies have similar areas of interest, the LDA data facilitates understanding how agencies are seen by outside actors.

This analysis uses a co-occurrence technique to construct the LDA network. Lobbying disclosure reports list the set of government entities lobbied by the reporting organization during the given period. It is assumed that those entities often listed together—and thus lobbied by the same organizations—are in some dimension more closely related than those who never appear on the same disclosure document. So, each time two agencies are mentioned together on the same lobbying disclosure document, they are attributed one link within the network. These links are aggregated across documents and a one-year reporting period.

Multiplexity

While one could analyze any one of the individual networks on its own, they each represent a unique dimension of interagency structure. If one's research interest is not

precisely reflected by that particular dimension of structure (hyperlinks, data similarity, or co-lobbying), combining multiple types of relation into a multiplex network can help provide a more accurate reflection of agency proximity. The assumption here is that each measurement of interagency proximity carries with it its own biases and degree of measurement error. By combining multiple measures, one triangulates these biases and error to arrive at a closer approximation of the underlying structure.

Because of the different natures of the metrics, the networks described below show a good deal of variation in size and density. Table 1 describes the network by size and density.²⁰ The hyperlink network is clearly the largest, but this includes relatively obscure nodes that often do not refer to a particular government entity, like *students.gov*. The metadata network reflects government agencies that share a lot of data and are verbose in their descriptions of their shared data. The lobbying network has a bias for government agencies and entities that have the power to influence policy, especially policy that is of interest to those with the resources to engage in lobbying campaigns. Combining networks leaves us with a multiplex network that shows how 166 different government agencies and entities relate to one another.

The networks vary not only on their dimensions, but also in the details of which agencies and relationships are most prominent. Table 2 (pg. 74) shows the top nodes by degree and the strongest relationships between nodes for each of the three dimensions and the resulting multiplex network.

	Hyperlink	Metadata	Lobbying	Multiplex
Nodes	1002	132	189	166
Links	35,288	2556	6623	3306
Density	0.035	0.30	0.37	0.24

Table 1. Network by Size and Density

	WWW	Lobbying	Data.gov	Multiplex
Nodes by degree	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Library of Congress (LoC) White House Government Printing Office (GPO) National Institutes of Health (NIH) House of Representatives (HoR) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HoR Senate White House Department of Defense (DoD) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPA Census Bureau DoD US Geological Survey (USGS) Department of State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPA HoR White House Senate DoD
Edges by weight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH)/LoC DoD/Navy NIH/Health and Human Services (HHS) GPO/LoC White House/ US Department of Agriculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> House/Senate White House/ Senate HoR/White House DoD/HoR DoD/Senate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Census Bureau/EPA EPA/USGS Center for Disease Control/EPA General Services Administration/EPA Department of Energy/EPA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> House/Senate NEH/LoC DoD /Navy Census Bureau/ EPA NIH/HHS

Table 2. Nodes by Degree and Relationship

This final multiplex network is an agency proximity graph. Agencies that are closely related to one another in this network work in similar domains, whereas agencies that are not linked to one another and those removed from one another by one or more steps work in different government realms.

One strength of network analyses is the ability to apply meaningful clustering or community detection algorithms to the data and determine where particularly well-connected groups of nodes exist. Applying an unfolding algorithm to the weighted multiplex network decomposes the federal government into eight communities.²¹ Table 3 describes seven of these communities—excluding a single one-node community—showing fairly clear separation of governance roles. Some of these communities have more clearly defined roles, such as the transportation group in which almost all nodes have some relevance to transportation and transportation infrastructure, while others are more mixed, such as regulation, management, and statistics that contains many of the agencies responsible for day-to-day governance and somewhat more focused regulatory agencies.

The modularity score for the multiplex network of 0.21.30 suggests that, while these communities do exist and nodes within them share more connections with one another than with nodes outside their communities, there is still a significant number of inter-community links. The clustering results help shed some light on the first question. Some agency communities, largely organized by government domain, are by no means exclusive, and there is a significant amount of cross-community linking. However, this community structure and the accompanying modularity score do not provide absolutely clear evidence of how integrated or hierarchical the government is.

	Size	Notable Agencies
Transportation	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAA • NHTSA • NTSB
Health and Wellbeing	19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FDA • NIH • HHS
Defense	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DOD • Navy • Defense Logistics Agency
Trade, Finance, and Legislature	64	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farm Credit Administration • Export-Import Bank • Senate • House • Dept. of Treasury • DOT • Dept. of Commerce DHS
Communications	14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Library of Congress • FCC • Nat'l Telecommunications and Information Administration • Copyright Office
Regulation, Management, and Statistics	43	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dept. of Interior • GSA BLM • OSHA • EPA
Misc.	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education • USDA • Office of Management and Budget

Table 3. Communities and their Nodes

Another way we can get some insight into the degree of hierarchy within the U.S. government network is by examining how entities at different levels link to one another. If there are a preponderance of links between executive level agencies and lower level or independent agencies, it suggests a hierarchically-structured network. On the other hand, if there are many links between nodes at the same hierarchical level it suggests a flatter more integrated structure.

This analysis utilizes a p^*/ergm exponential random graph model to determine whether lateral links are significantly more or less likely than what one would expect to see by chance. The exponential random graph model demonstrated that the network is somewhat sparse and has more highly centralized hubs than would be expected. The model also

...executive agencies are more likely to link to subordinate or independent agencies and vice versa. All else being equal, links between agencies at the same organizational level happen significantly less than would be expected.

shows a negative coefficient for the nodematch parameter that suggests that links are more likely to form between agencies at different hierarchical levels than between agencies at the same level. That is to say, executive agencies are more likely to link to subordinate or independent agencies and vice versa. All else being equal, links between agencies at the same organizational level happen significantly less than would be expected. Finally, the positive budget coefficient shows that nodes with a greater absolute difference in budget are more likely to form links between one another than

those with similarly-sized budgets.

Combining the p^*/ergm results with the cluster analysis suggests that the federal interagency network exhibits both silo-like clustering and hierarchical organization, leading to the conclusion that the federal government has yet to achieve a post-hierarchical networked structure. The clusters we observe do not correspond one-to-one with traditional government portfolios. Instead we see some areas that remain relatively distinct from the larger network, such as transportation and communications regulation, and some areas where the boundaries have blurred. These clustering behaviors suggest that some government domains do indeed show tendencies toward a more networked interagency structure, whereas others remain relatively siloed.

Answering the second question requires an analysis of longitudinal data. Unfortunately, we only have multiple measures for one dimension of relationship. The LDA data goes back to 1999, allowing us to measure the structure of at least this one dimension across time.

The degree distribution within a network can inform us as to how centralized the network is. A highly skewed distribution would suggest that a few agencies have the majority of the links and are thus highly central. On the other hand, a more even degree distribution suggests less centralization in the network. We can measure degree distribution skewness by plotting the degree probability distribution function $p(k)$ and measuring the slope of a line fit through the $p(k)$ plot. For instance, Figure 1 shows the lobbying network $p(k)$ plot for 2010.

Figure 2 demonstrates that as the years go by, the slope of a line fit through the lobbying network $p(k)$ plot quite steadily increases. This suggests that as the years go by, the degree distribution is becoming more and more skewed, which suggests that there are fewer agencies garnering a greater proportion of the links within the network.




Figure 1. 2010 $p(k)$ for the Lobbying Network




Figure 2. Lobbying $p(k)$ Slope Over Time

While these results do not conclusively demonstrate that the interagency network is becoming more centralized, it does suggest—at least within the lobbying dimension—fewer agencies are attracting a greater proportion of the links. The tentative answer to the second question is that the government is becoming more hierarchically organized over time. If agency influence were becoming more

dispersed—as some prognostications about the future of government would suggest—we would expect to see the exact opposite trend. If power were transferring from the center to the periphery, we would expect to see more agencies being lobbied together and thus a less skewed degree distribution. What we see instead is more concentration of lobbying efforts among a few central government entities.

Discussion

The multiple dimensions represented within this multiplex network lend more credence to the resulting analysis. By triangulating measurements, we come closer to understanding the reality of agency proximity. The results suggest that claims of a less hierarchical government in the twenty-first century are either wrong or premature. What we see instead is a structure that exhibits functional silos and a significantly high degree of hierarchy. While it is true that the year 2010 measurements that

...efforts like data.gov act as hubs connecting many agencies by publishing their datasets in a centralized repository.

we rely on for the multiplex network may not show impending changes, the one dimension of time-series data we do have suggests that the interagency system is becoming more, rather than less, hierarchically structured.

While hierarchy remains in the observed interagency relations, there are still many connections between government entities at the same institutional level. The clusters of agencies suggest that there are some governance domains that remain relatively insulated from the more general interagency network, and some that tend to be more integrated. These domains tend to be more specialized, such as communications and transportation regulation, and specialized defense agencies tend to form their own clusters. On the other hand, many of the agencies that function in less-specialized domains cluster together in large groups.

The interagency network analyzed here uses agencies or other government entities as nodes. While this method shows a system that is both siloed and hierarchical, it does

not include some interagency efforts that may suggest a move toward networked government. For instance, efforts like data.gov act as hubs connecting many agencies by publishing their datasets in a centralized repository. Indeed, by promoting data mash-ups, both by agencies and individuals, data.gov actively encourages cross-agency connections. Because they lack history and formal institutionalization compared to traditional government agencies and efforts, these interagency projects and projects undertaken by an individual agency that focus on amalgamating the work of diverse agencies are largely invisible to this analysis. It could be that changes in government structure will originate in these less formal, less institutionally-vested entities. Finding a way to map the structural traces of these activities and entities will be essential for future government structure research.

One of the biggest challenges to any study that attempts to measure interagency structure is the lack of an objective yardstick with which to assess accuracy. While measuring multiple dimensions helps allay some of the concerns about accuracy, without an objective comparison, it is impossible to say with certainty to what degree one's measurement reflects reality. The lack of an objective touchstone, a limitation implicit in many social scientific measures, is this study's chief limitation. That said, many of the constructs that social scientists are interested in cannot be objectively measured. Various indices and indicators are used to measure these constructs with the greatest reliability and validity possible. I believe that, in the realm of interorganizational analysis, a multiplex approach as used here is, all else being equal, inherently more reliable and more valid than any approach that only takes into account one dimension of relationship.

This study also struggled with was a lack of time-series measurements. The analysis relied on only one dimension—the lobbying

relationships—to draw conclusions about how government structure has changed over time. If more dimensions of time series data were available, it would make those conclusions that much more robust.

Conclusion

This multiplex analysis of the federal interagency network demonstrates how we can use digital trace data to measure multiple dimensions of interorganizational relationship and thereby more accurately reflect the reality of agency proximity. The resulting multiplex network shows a significantly high proportion of hierarchical relationships and fewer intra-level links than we would otherwise expect to see. In addition, we see many agencies clustered by domain with government entities engaged in activities such as communication regulation or transportation more likely to share links between one another than with others operating outside their domain.

While these results are not conclusive, they do suggest that those who claim that the organizational logic of twenty-first century communications technology will lead to a less hierarchical government structure may not be correct. Rather, the evidence suggests the existence of functional silos and a greater degree of hierarchical organization than we would expect to see by chance. **IAJ**

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Worth Noting

Compiled by Elizabeth Hill

Paper Details Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center Progress

United States European Command's (EUCOM) Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (JICTC) recently provided the Simons Center with an update of JICTC's progress since its establishment. JICTC, modeled after U.S. Southern Command's Joint Interagency Task Force – South, was stood up in September 2011 and was signed into EUCOM's Theater Campaign Plan in April 2012. JICTC supports U.S. interagency and U.S. country team efforts, and collaborates with a variety of international organizations to counter illicit trafficking and other threats related to transnational organized crime (TOC).

JICTC takes a whole of government approach to trafficking and TOC issues, working with senior representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the State Department, and other USG departments and agencies. JICTC also collaborates with other DoD organizations and international partners, such as the European Union, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, World Customs Organization, the UK's Serious Organized Crime Agency, and their new National Crime Agency.

Illicit trafficking and TOC have grown rapidly. Trafficking networks distort economies, corrupt democracies, weaken allegiances, disrupt cooperation, and contribute to terrorism. It is estimated that 8-15% of the world's GDP is the result of illicit trafficking in narcotics, persons, and nuclear materials. As of 2011, profits from illicit trafficking were estimated at over \$7 trillion, and were expected to grow. Human trafficking alone is estimated to have created \$21 billion in revenue in 2011.

JICTC and their partners have cooperated on a variety of activities in the short time they have been in operation. For example, JICTC and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are working with Kosovo law enforcement on improving Kosovo's border security techniques and border management system. JICTC also collaborated with the Department of Treasury to build Kingpin and Transnational Organized Crime Designation Sanctions against criminal organizations. JICTC also has a team of Counter Threat Finance Specialists who analyze financial activities of known or suspected trafficking organizations.

JICTC will continue its functional team approach in 2013, supporting partner efforts to counter the trans-Atlantic cocaine flow, providing counter-trafficking support in the Balkans, and countering illicit activity in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. JICTC also plans on increasing their efforts on combating human trafficking with the help of the JICTC senior representative from USAID. JICTC will also continue to expand collaborative relationships and information sharing with international partner organizations. **IAJ**

Interagency Personnel Rotation - National Defense Authorization Act of 2013

Early in January 2013, President Barack Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 into law. The Act authorizes appropriations for Department of Defense (DoD) activities for fiscal year 2013, and addresses specific interagency issues, including personnel rotations.

Section 1107 of the NDAA establishes an interagency personnel rotation program, which the Simons Center assisted the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee in drafting. The program is meant to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the government by fostering greater interagency experience among executive branch personnel on national and homeland security matters involving more than one agency. The interagency personnel rotation program is designed to be carried out in at least two Interagency Communities of Interest—stabilization and reconstruction operations, and emergency management.

The interagency personnel rotation program requires national security professionals to complete a one-year assignment in another government agency outside their parent organization prior to elevation to senior leadership or Senior Executive Service positions. Participation in the program is voluntary, but requires the consent of the employee's head agency. After completing their rotation, the employee is permitted to return, within a reasonable amount of time, to their previous position at their parent agency, or a corresponding or higher position. Employees who have completed an interagency rotation are to be given strong preference when pursuing senior positions within the Interagency Community of Interest.

Section 1107 also establishes a Committee on National Security Personnel, which will be made up of members designated by Department heads and the President. Also included in this section of the NDAA is a provision for a National Security Human Capital Strategy. The Strategy, developed by members of the Committee, will establish the policies, processes, and procedures for the interagency personnel rotation program within National Security Interagency Communities of Interest.

The NDAA also makes provisions for review. According to subsection (g), the Committee on National Security Personnel must assess and report to Congress the performance measures used in the interagency personnel rotations no later than the end of the second fiscal year after the NDAA is enacted. Subsection (h) requires similar reporting by the Comptroller General of the U.S. no later than the second fiscal year after the NDAA is enacted. This report would address the extent to which the requirements set out in Section 1107 were implemented, the extent to which national security agencies have participated, the extent to which participants benefitted from the interagency rotation, and the extent to which the rotation improved or is expected to improve interagency integration and coordination. **IAJ**

State Bureau Focuses on Preventing/Responding to Conflict

The State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) recently entered its second year of operation. CSO subsumed the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in November 2011, and helps prevent and respond to conflict by providing tools and resources for analysis, strategy, and operational support.

CSO utilizes many tools in analyzing conflict, including rapid conflict assessments, scenario-based brainstorming sessions, and open-source trend analysis and scenario modeling. CSO can then build on that analysis through interagency strategic planning or support to host nation stabilization planning. It can also incorporate conflict analysis into Joint Regional Strategies, Functional Bureau Strategies, and Integrated Country Strategies. CSO provides operation support of local initiatives through its network of civilian responders, which includes experts in strategic communications, security sector reform, election assistance, community mediation, international negotiations, rule of law, and civilian-military relations. When collaborating with interagency and other partners outside the U.S. government, CSO can also offer lessons learned and best practices on a variety of issues.

Prior to committing to an engagement, CSO examines the situation, evaluating U.S. national security interests, urgency for action, and opportunities for impact within the next 12 to 18 months. CSO also works with a select number of countries to test innovation where there is opportunity to learn from new approaches to conflict prevention and mitigation.

CSO is part of State Department's "J Family," a team of offices and bureaus that contribute to conflict prevention and crisis response missions. This team also includes the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL); the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL); the Office of Global Criminal Justice (S/GCJ); the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); and the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT).

CSO's work is defined by four core principles: agility, strategic focus, local ownership, and partnership. CSO partners with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, and other U.S. government agencies, as well as other offices and bureaus within the State Department. USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) is a major player in CSO's conflict and crisis operations, as are the Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional Combatant Commands within DoD, and the Civilian Response Corps.

In 2012, CSO provided non-lethal equipment and training to the Syrian civilian opposition, increasing their effectiveness against the assaults of the regime. The training provided by CSO covered transition planning, civil administration, civil resistance, strategic communications, and countering sectarian violence. In Belize, CSO supported the office of the prime Minister, strengthening a gang truce and training 38 local mediators. CSO also supported efforts aimed at weakening the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa. **IAJ**

Homeland Security Partnership Council Established

On October 26, 2012, the Obama Administration established the White House Homeland Security Partnership Council. The Executive Order increases the U.S. government's ability to develop local partnerships to support homeland security priorities. This collaboration enables the federal government and its partners to use resources more efficiently while strengthening homeland security capabilities.

The Council will foster local partnerships between the federal government and the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, community-based organizations, and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and law enforcement agencies. Council members will include representatives from a variety of executive departments, agencies, and bureaus. Prospective Council members will be nominated by their agency heads before being selected by the Steering

Committee.

The Steering Committee will govern the Council, and will be made up of representatives at the deputy agency head level. **IAJ**

Simons Center Debuts Bigger, Better Bibliography

The Simons Center recently debuted their newly redesigned interagency bibliography available in the “Resources” section of their website (www.TheSimonsCenter.org). The new bibliography builds on the Center’s previous work in this area, and now includes over 1,200 annotated entries on interagency topics. The bibliography includes government reports, declassified documents, theses, monographs, interviews, articles, and other texts on topics ranging from national and homeland security to counterterrorism to legislation to humanitarian aid and peace keeping.

The bibliography includes documents from U.S. government departments and agencies, all branches of the military, academicians, NGOs, and international organizations. The entries have been organized by topic and tagged with keywords, making research on the Simons Center’s website easier than ever. Researchers and other interested individuals now have the option of browsing the bibliography by topic or using the site’s built in search engine to search for documents related to their interests.

The Simons Center is constantly adding new entries to the bibliography, and is looking forward to watching it grow and expand. If you know of a report, book, or other text that you believe would be an asset to the Simons Center’s interagency bibliography, please contact the Program Assistant at ehill@TheSimonsCenter.org. **IAJ**

Report Identifies Mechanisms for Collaboration

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in September 2012 identifying mechanisms to implement interagency collaborative efforts. The report, GAO-12-1022, also examined the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 Modernization Act of 2010, which was established to improve government performance.

GAO-12-1022 identifies the mechanisms that the federal government uses to lead and implement interagency collaboration. The report also identifies issues that should be considered when implementing these mechanisms. While conducting their research, GAO reviewed literature dealing with interagency collaborative mechanisms and interviewed various experts in the field of collaboration. GAO also reviewed previous reports involving collaborative mechanisms.

In the report, GAO stated that federal agencies use a variety of mechanisms to implement interagency collaborative efforts, including the use of a presidentially-appointed coordinator, agencies co-located within one facility, or the use of interagency task forces. These mechanisms can be used to address policy development, information sharing and communication, capacity building, and a variety of other purposes.

GAO also found that additional issues should be considered when implementing these mechanisms, including outcomes and accountability, leadership, participants, and resources. Other issues to consider included the organizational cultures of the participating agencies, the roles and responsibilities of those involved, and any documented agreements between participating agencies. **IAJ**

Report Assesses DoD-DHS Cooperation

In October 2012 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report assessing cooperation efforts between the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS). The report, GAO-13-128, provides an overview of DoD involvement with DHS in the event of major disasters or emergencies, and examines the extent to which DoD has issued current guidance, including doctrine, policy, and strategy, for its homeland defense and civil support missions.

In preparation of the report, GAO met with select DoD and National Guard officials and analyzed DoD homeland defense and civil support guidance. GAO also reviewed previous reports and other relevant documentation.

In the report, GAO identified and addressed the impacts of gaps in DoD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and gaps within the dual-status commander construct and domestic cyber.

GAO-13-128 makes many recommendations to address these gaps, including DoD assessing and updating its primary strategy; developing implementation guidance on the dual-status commander construct; and aligning guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities. **IAJ**

USAID Details Multi-Agency Efforts Against Gender-Based Violence

In August 2012, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released the United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally. The strategy was developed with input from the White House and the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security, as well as from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Peace Corps, and other agencies and organizations. The purpose of the strategy is to establish a government-wide approach that identifies, coordinates, integrates, and leverages current efforts and resources in preventing and responding to gender-based violence (GBV) around the world.

The strategy has four objectives: to increase coordination of GBV prevention and response efforts among U.S. government agencies and with other stakeholders; to enhance integration of GBV prevention and response efforts into existing U.S. government work; to improve collection, analysis, and use of data and research to enhance GBV response efforts; to enhance or expand U.S. government programming that addresses GBV.

The strategy builds on an existing foundation that includes the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; and other GBV efforts. The strategy also provides federal agencies with a set of concrete goals and actions to be implemented and monitored over the course of the next three years with an evaluation of progress midway through this period. At the end of the three years, the agencies will evaluate progress and chart a course forward. **IAJ**


Interagency Action Plan on Children in Adversity Released

In December 2012, the U.S. Agency for International Development released its first-ever Action Plan on Children in Adversity. Seven U.S. government departments and agencies provided input for the plan, which has been endorsed by over 100 civil society and faith-based organizations. The plan calls for an interagency strategy to assist vulnerable children in low- and middle-income countries, and provides a framework that will guide government agencies in protecting vulnerable children around the world.

The plan provides overarching policy and guidance for U.S. international assistance to children, and focuses on children whose living conditions make them the most vulnerable to human trafficking and other crimes. These conditions include living on the streets, affiliation with violent or dangerous groups, and displacement by natural disasters or other causes.

The plan has three principle objectives: to build strong beginnings; to put family care first; and to protect children from violence, exploitation, abuse, and neglect. Its supporting objectives include strengthening child welfare and protection systems; promoting evidence-based policies and programs; and integrating the USAID plan within other U.S. government departments and agencies. **IAJ**

Book Review



**Reviewed by Lt. Col. Leonard Lira, U.S. Army
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Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2004–February 2007

by George W. Casey, Jr.

National Defense University Press, 215 pp., \$24.95, or download free at <<http://www.ndu.edu/press/strategic-reflections.html>>.

In wars conducted by democratic nations, the adage still stands: The interagency process is good at teeing up problems but not so good on the follow through. Perhaps, as General George Casey, former commander of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, reflects, this is because for strategic leaders, “the higher up you go the less guidance you receive.”¹ Casey points out that interagency implementation is a very personal endeavor, one that involves direct leadership in execution. In *Strategic Reflections*, Casey surmises that it is not a lack of guidance on the goals and objectives, but rather a lack of direction on how to achieve them that provides the core of the operational dilemma in the interagency process.

Casey relied on three sources of strategic direction for guidance in executing the war in Iraq: National Security Presidential Directive 36 of May 11, 2004, the President George W. Bush’s May 24, 2004, speech at the Army War College, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. He used all three sources to guide how he framed his mission and how he used Bush’s five-step framework for achieving his goals. However, he still lacked guidance on how to make this all happen and how exactly to implement the five steps, achieve the goals, and ensure the mission was a success. In fact, all three sources of guidance created a major obstacle to success, one that all democratically subservient armies must contend with. They divided the authority and responsibility for political and military efforts between the State Department’s agent, Ambassador John Negroponte, and the Defense Department’s agent, General Casey. The crux of Casey’s interagency problem was how to control things and people outside his control.²

Dividing the responsibility for the war’s execution between two culturally different organizations also meant separate reporting chains, separate budgets, and, thus, separate implementation efforts. Without the principle of unity of command, Casey and Negroponte were forced to create the necessary unity of effort [emphasis added] by developing a “one team/one mission” concept for interagency operations.³


To implement “one team/one mission,” Casey and Negroponte cross-leveled staff and assigned deputies from one organization to the other. They also developed a Red Team composed of members from both organizations and charged it with looking at integrating efforts to ensure the intellectual integrity of their joint campaign. Nevertheless, their most important step in implementing this

concept was the personal attention both leaders poured into it. They issued joint mission statements, collocated their offices, traveled together, and consulted regularly in a visible manner to ensure that members of both organizations witnessed their joint effort. In all, Casey concedes that he and Negroponte spent a lot of personal time integrating the efforts of the Embassy and MNF-I with the interim Iraqi government.

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom significantly changed how agents of the U.S. government, both civilian and military, think about executing wars. Casey reflects on his actions and the actions of his headquarters in executing modern war. For those interested in studying the interagency at the operational level, *Strategic Reflections* provides insight on how to make interagency happen. Toward that perspective, Casey advises that creating unity of effort among diverse organizations that fall outside a leader's control is and will continue to be one of the key tasks of senior leaders in twenty-first century warfare."⁴ *Strategic Reflections* provides advice for executing strategy in modern war. How Casey dealt with the modern dilemma of bureaucratic pathologies in interagency operations during his tour in Iraq is the primary take away for interagency scholars and practitioners. **IAJ**

NOTES

- 1 George Casey, *Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom July 2004–February 2007*, National Defense University Press, Washington, 2012, p. 6.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 157.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 157.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 159.



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The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in Public Diplomacy

Edited by William P. Kiehl

The Public Diplomacy Council/PDWorldwide,
196 pp., \$14.99 (paperback)

How hard can it be to communicate in foreign countries? This is America, the land that invented marketing, public relations, and survey research, right? After all, most Americans know from watching television advertising and political campaigns that there are just a few rules: develop a clear message, keep it simple, and say it often. In a foreign environment, forget translating from English. Just turn up the volume and repeat. Right? Sometimes public diplomacy practitioners slip into the language, if not the theory, of artillery.

They use terms like target audiences, OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, concentrating fires, and preparation of the battle space. Those who communicate in the real world know that messages are not cannon shots, civilian audiences are not targets, and what matters is not what they say, but what their audience hears.

That is why *The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in Public Diplomacy* is a welcome addition to the interagency library.

This book, published by the Public Diplomacy Council and edited by William Kiehl, is unique. Where else do you find current public diplomacy practitioners pulling back the curtain on their craft, explaining the judgments, and analyzing the factors that led them to take one path or another to accomplish something in a foreign context?

Take for example the excellent description of the effort to “recapture the narrative” in Turkey, a vital U.S. ally, NATO member, regional power, and example of a secular Muslim majority nation with democratic values. Yet, the embassy faced one of the world’s most hostile and erratic media environments. Public diplomacy chief Elizabeth McKay writes, “[they] recognized that if we addressed the problem from the sole perspective of what we wanted, our efforts would be less successful than if we approached things from the perspective of what our audiences wanted from us.”

McKay goes on to describe what the embassy did with Turkish youth, from entrepreneurship training to innovative film production. If there is a lesson in here for communicators, it is that they need “to approach the design of programs with the audience’s needs in mind” rather than merely their own.

Consistency over time is another lesson that comes through in many of the accounts.. Public diplomacy, like military information operations, takes time. This book makes it clear that success depends on four and five rotations of officers continuing with the same vision, the same commitment, and the same program activities. Newly arrived ambassadors eschew the impulse to invent a new program with their name on it and instead put their full enthusiasm to making a success of something started by predecessors once or twice removed.

With the current enthusiasm for digital diplomacy, many will want to examine closely the case study of @America, the innovative, high-tech approach to Indonesian youth chronicled in this book. In a logical but unprecedented step for the stodgy State Department, Embassy Jakarta moved its youth outreach efforts to a shopping mall. As Hillary Clinton told Time Magazine, we are taking “America’s message to where people actually live and work!” Why not a shopping mall? That’s where people are today, isn’t it?

Beyond the adventuresome leap to the mall, the diplomats struck deals with American companies like Apple and Google to provide an American experience to Indonesian visitors. Indeed, from the moment newcomers walk into @America and are greeted by young, English-speaking Indonesian “E-guides” they engage with an array of technology, videos and photos, interactive games, and myriad U.S. information sources. An educational advising service answers questions for free. Sounds vaguely like an Apple store, doesn’t it?

To be honest, not every chapter is as energizing and creative as the one from Indonesia. But each chapter opens a door on what really goes on in public diplomacy. The country case studies and political challenges as well as the responses are as varied as a day at the United Nations.

And, you can see the gaps. One could wish, for example, that public diplomacy officers spent more time measuring the impact of their programs in objective terms or at least measuring effects

and adjusting as they go. There are not a lot of OODA loops in State's version of public diplomacy. Nevertheless, the military officer will begin to appreciate the operational mindset as well as the challenges that confront the "diplomatic IO" folks. You know, the ones who talk about "public diplomacy."

The fact is, we need to learn from each other's experiences. **IAJ**

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