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Defeating the Taliban’s Shadow Government:

A Foreign Internal Governance Strategy

by Daniel R. Green

I believe that government starts at the bottom and moves upward, for government exists for the welfare of the masses of the nation.¹

Former Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay

As the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) assumes greater control of its sovereignty and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan diminishes, the ability of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to exercise positive political influence on both GIRoA and the Afghan people in support of village stability operations (VSO) will greatly diminish. This trend is exacerbated by the fact that those elements of the United States government that do exercise political influence, such as provincial reconstruction teams and district support teams, and their civilian enablers, such as the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), will either disappear from the area in the next few years or their presence will be greatly reduced.

Since the Taliban insurgency will persist for some time, the need to confront its political arm as much as its military arm will persist for special operations forces into the near future. In many respects, special operations forces are better able to work with GIRoA at all levels than the State Department, USAID, or conventional military forces because of its organizational structure, constant contact with the Afghan people, and ability to leverage personal relationships to exercise influence. Special Operations Forces have a robust tradition of working by, with, and through indigenous institutions, and while many of the skill sets for coaching, teaching, and mentoring indigenous security forces are distinct from those required for working specifically with the political institutions of host governments, there are far more similarities than differences. The

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While the Taliban will impose their will on villagers if they must and have done so, often violently, they also have a positive agenda that entices supporters to support their cause.

The Taliban’s Political Program

Social injustice, bullying by military or police, and corruption must be seen as grave weaknesses in the defense of a country, errors that can lead to its downfall and eventually, as our friends are eliminated, to the downfall of the United States.

– Edward Geary Lansdale

Even though the Taliban’s strategic goals of uniting the Pashtuns, ejecting foreign military occupation, and imposing Sharia law are well known, their tactical political program is less well understood and its popularity among many Pashtuns even more so. The Taliban have carefully crafted a political strategy that taps into Pashtunwali traditions; takes advantage of U.S., coalition, and Afghan government mistakes; and capitalizes on the weaknesses of the Afghan state in the villages. Though the U.S. has expended substantial efforts to promote good governance in the provinces, its efforts have been unequal to the task, cumbersome, bureaucratic, and sometimes even counterproductive.

The Taliban’s positive political program has at least five aspects: justice, micro-politics, reconciliation, laissez-faire, and democracy. While the Taliban will impose their will on villagers if they must and have done so, often violently, they also have a positive agenda that entices supporters to support their cause.

In the face of corrupt and/or murderous government officials, a non-functioning judiciary, and the perversion or suspension of Pashtunwali traditions, the typical villager has a limited ability to seek justice for the things that bother him most—murders, theft, assault, rape, and land and water disputes. For the Taliban political agent, this vein of discontent is rich and can be mined by appealing to the structures of justice created by Sharia law. While the villager may not be inclined to support Sharia law in its totality, he is likely to do so in the absence of a viable alternative. Because the Taliban agent is sitting in the villager’s home, solicits his grievances, and then quickly seeks to remedy them, the villager is hard-pressed to support a government that is often distant and abuses its authority.

Along these same lines, the Taliban practice micro-politics to a remarkably high degree of sophistication. The Taliban political agent will find any problem that a village or individual may have and make it his own. If a village is hoarding water from a stream causing a downstream village’s crops to fail, the Taliban will enlist with the aggrieved party. If a tribe has been abused by the Afghan government, the Taliban will join with them to seek justice. This political granularity stands in marked contrast to the frequently inept, ineffective, and insouciant
efforts of the Afghan state and the sometimes counterproductive work of the coalition.

The Taliban’s political program is also furthered by their “do-no-harm” approach to the central drivers of local politics and economies. If a farmer wants to cultivate poppy, the Taliban allow it; if he once worked for or supported the Afghan government, he is allowed to reconcile with the Taliban; if a tribal leader wants his authority respected, they will do so if it furthers their agenda. Additionally, if villagers feel that “their” government does not represent them or has unfairly attacked their interests, then the Taliban preach inclusion, grievance, and justice. Against this well-crafted, flexible, dynamic, and pervasive program, U.S., coalition, and Afghan efforts lag significantly.

The Afghan Constitution Inhibits Local Success

I believe that he who has less in life should have more in law. . . . I believe that a high and unwavering sense of morality should pervade all spheres of governmental activity.3

– Former Philippine President
Ramon Magsaysay

One of the central challenges of Afghanistan has been building a viable government at the provincial, district, and village levels that can compete with the Taliban’s political program. While security conditions have long been a limiting factor to establishing an effective government in many parts of the country, Afghanistan’s history of a decentralized or nonexistent state has also complicated the task. Good governance efforts have been further hindered by Afghanistan’s high illiteracy rates, formidable terrain, and lack of trained civil servants. While the state is quite weak in many areas, it is too strong in others where the central government has so much authority that local initiative is often stymied. Often in these areas, provincial officials must secure the central government’s approval for actions that rightfully should fall within the discretion of community leaders.

Afghanistan’s “democracy deficit” at the provincial level also inhibits the creation of a dynamic government able to address the concerns of the people. Because provincial governors are appointed by the central government, they are indirectly accountable to the people. They often lack direct budget authority and the ability to hire and fire local officials, and because they are ever mindful of maintaining political connections in Kabul, they are not overly concerned with local sentiment. Because the people are unable to hold corrupt or ineffective provincial officials accountable, they often turn to the Taliban to address injustices or to “right the balance” of accountability at the local level.

This system of government encourages corruption because accountability and responsibility are disconnected. Because they lack a viable judiciary and political party system, local residents have no realistic way of addressing complaints. Because no formal political party system exists in Afghanistan, an informal network of personal, tribal, factional, and regional groups operate not only within the formal Afghan government system, but also around it to exercise political influence. This informal dynamic is much more agile, better-informed, and capable than the bureaucratic processes of the Afghan state. Similarly, it is far
more capable of exercising political influence than most U.S. government agencies ostensibly focused on good governance efforts.

**U.S. State-Building Efforts Lack Presence, Persistence and Performance**

*I believe that the pulse of government should be strong and steady, and the men at the helm imbued with missionary zeal.*

– Former Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay

A week after his initial meeting with Wilson, when his assignment had been confirmed and he had finished his processing, Vann went to the embassy for a political briefing on the province. The political section could not find its sparse file on Hau Nghia, and he left.

– Neil Sheehan

U.S. state-building efforts in Kabul are poorly coordinated and integrated, have a bias toward the central government versus the field, are fraught with continuity problems due to frequent personnel rotations, and are characterized more by friction, miscommunication, lack of teamwork, and poor planning than by being a well-organized and coordinated effort. While the civilian uplift significantly increased the presence of the State Department, USAID, and U.S. Department of Agriculture personnel in the field, the effort was unequal to the challenge of building the Afghan state in the countryside. Large numbers of Afghanistan’s districts did not receive any interagency support, and even in those districts that did, it was not uncommon for the full complement of interagency personnel to be absent or never filled. This tendency will be further exacerbated as the presence of U.S. interagency draws down in the next two years.

Establishing the Interagency Provincial Affairs Office at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, civil-military working groups, and senior-civilian representative positions at the regional commands did provide greater coherency to state-building efforts. However, absent a sufficient presence in the districts, these efforts did not have the collective desired effects.

Because of insufficient training, frequent leave breaks (up to five a year), poor recruitment, and poor integration with the U.S. military, many U.S. interagency state-building efforts achieved less than was hoped for or was promised. When it comes to the collective good governance efforts of the U.S. and the international community, the United Nations has the mandate but not the manpower, the State Department has the responsibility but not the resources, and the military has the manpower but not the mission.

President Karzai and his political supporters continue to outmaneuver the U.S. between the vertical seams of the military and civilian agencies and horizontally between the different tactical, operational, and strategic levels. His ability to “out-govern” and “out politick” the U.S. government is great, and while his formal government is still weak, his informal government of tribal allies, warlords, and friends is fully organized, capable, and effective.

While much has been done to improve U.S. and coalition state-building efforts, the U.S. needs a new, better-resourced approach that fully integrates civilian and military efforts, connects the field to the capital, and is sustainable for the
long-term, especially as districts and provinces transition to civilian GIRoA control.

**A Strategy of Foreign Internal Governance**

*In conventional warfare, the staff of a large military unit is composed roughly of two main branches—“intelligence/operations” and “logistics.” In counterinsurgency warfare, there is a desperate need for a third branch—the “political” one—which would have the same weight as the others.*

— David Galula

_This is first a political war, second a psychological war, and third a military war._

— Lieutenant General Lewis Walt

While much has been accomplished with respect to building the Afghan state, the ability to conduct politics within U.S. good governance efforts has consistently been erratic. Politics within good governance efforts focus on the machinations of political players in Kabul rather than those at the local level that are most likely to confront the Taliban’s political program. The U.S. interagency has proven to be an imperfect instrument in prompting GIRoA to optimize its performance. The U.S. must embark on a new, complementary effort. The U.S. approaches stability operations by doing what its bureaucracies are comfortable with, rather than dealing with the problem of insurgency on its own terms. A significant portion of this strategy has been capital centric, biased toward formal government institutions, focused on long-term development versus stabilization, and imperfectly partnered with the U.S. military. In the face of an opponent that blends civil and military approaches seamlessly, is strongest in the countryside, has a nuanced engagement strategy with the local population, and is not suffering from any manpower shortage, it is not surprising the U.S. has had problems implementing a good governance strategy. A new approach that institutionalizes state-building programs and puts them on a more sustainable path for long-term development will do much to ensure that the sacrifices of our forces in Afghanistan will have not been in vain. The U.S. government must recognize that politics, good governance, and development are too important to be left solely to the civilian interagency in Afghanistan, and it is time for the military to assume a more central role.

What is required is a tightly organized, vertically integrated, influencing initiative that seeks to maximize GIRoA performance, especially with respect to defeating the Taliban’s local political program and leveraging Afghan informal networks that also shape government behavior. This initiative must be able to reach as many villages as possible, continually liaise and embed with government officials, conduct political action, and exercise persistent presence and performance. The integrated VSO approach of using District Augmentation Teams, Provincial Augmentation Teams, and regional village stability centers up to the national level to partner with Afghan officials is a basic structure that if strengthened could provide a light, lean, and long-term capability to undertake the essential non-kinetic tasks that provide stability to rural Afghanistan.
A foreign internal governance strategy to complement a foreign internal defense approach through village stability operations will provide a means of exercising consistent and positive political influence at all levels of government within Afghanistan. A foreign internal governance approach will not replicate the state-building efforts of the State Department and USAID but will seek to exercise political influence through embedded mentoring with GIRoA officials, shape GIRoA policy and programmatic outcomes through relationships, and address local drivers of instability through possible a detailed understanding of the Afghan human terrain with a political action arm able to influence Afghan officials with diminished assets in theater.

The following ten recommendations are intended to strengthen and better integrate existing approaches to exercising positive political influence by, with, and through the GIRoA and to create new efforts to maximize personal relationships with the GIRoA to better support village stability operations.

1. **Establish Village Augmentation Teams.**

In order to better serve village stability programs and to bring focused attention to local political issues, the augmentation team concept should be expanded to the village level. This will not only free-up local SOF to concentrate on other pressing tasks, such as recruiting and training Afghan local police, but will also allow for a professional focus on the sorts of political, tribal, and development issues the Taliban exploit to their benefit. A team of this nature should consist of at least two individuals in order to provide a more expansive program of local interaction, as well as to allow better continuity during unit rotations or when members go on leave.

2. **Bolster District and Provincial Augmentation Teams.**

As the U.S. civilian interagency presence diminishes, the U.S. must develop a more robust capability at the district and provincial levels of government to better support village stability programs and their issues with the GIRoA. Based on the size of the province, District Augmentation Teams should consist of at least two personnel, and Provincial Augmentation Teams should grow to at least six members.

3. **Establish stability operations information cells and human terrain teams at all levels of SOF.**
While the U.S. has made great strides in understanding the human terrain of Afghanistan, past efforts to centralize this information at all levels have been uneven. The U.S. must maintain a detailed and well-informed understanding of formal and informal Afghan leaders, local economics, tribal and political histories, government programs, and good governance and development initiatives. While the Village Augmentation Teams, District Augmentation Teams and Provincial Augmentation Teams will largely be responsible for collecting this sort of information, they will need dedicated intelligence support in order to organize it and make it useful.

4. **Integrate U.S. interagency representatives into each advanced operations base (AOB) and special operations task force (SOTF).**

Even though the civilian inter-agency’s presence in Afghanistan will dramatically decrease in the next few years, opportunities still exist to work with the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture. SOF should review the practical aspects of having select, civilian-interagency representatives at each of its AOBs and SOTFs as well as at Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) in order to enrich non-kinetic planning and operations as well as to enable SOF to access U.S. Embassy programming.

5. **Create a consolidated civil-military center in Kabul.**

Exercising positive political influence with the GIRoA will require a well-resourced but lightly organized structure within Kabul. A series of institutions have been created in the last few years that in totality exercise some degree of influence on Afghan governing institutions, but they are not sufficiently integrated, well-resourced, or placed to have a maximum impact. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command’s Information Dominance Center and Ministerial Outreach program, the Task Forces on Anti-Corruption and Contracting, and the Village National Coordination Center are examples of the kinds of initiatives required to exercise positive political influence by, with, and through Afghan governing structures. However, these and other programs should be consolidated and in some cases re-examined. The Ministerial Outreach program must be dramatically expanded, and a Parliamentary engagement program must also be created. Additionally, to facilitate better GIRoA interactions at all levels, a Visitor’s Bureau should be created for provincial and district officials visiting the capital. A civilian head of this organization should be appointed to prevent any potential concerns about military influence in politics.

6. **Recruit civilian advisors at all levels.**

While SOF will possess many of the skill-sets, training, and concepts required to effectively engage in Foreign Internal Governance, some abilities, such as financial advising, language ability, agricultural expertise, and construction, can be found in greater quantities in the civilian sector. Additionally, it may be difficult to exercise positive political influence among some Afghans who might object to a SOF presence in ostensibly civilian institutions. In these cases, a cadre of civilian political officers and advisors must be recruited to supplement SOF efforts.

7. **Expand the Ministerial Outreach Program.**

Afghan ministries suffer from a dearth of talented employees, and it is not uncommon for government offices to have only two to three
literate, educated, and trained employees. To fill this gap, as well as to better link the central government to the provinces, a more robust ministerial outreach program must be created and tightly integrated into a national influence initiative. There should be at least five to six SOF liaisons to the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development, and the Ministry for Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.

8. Establish a Parliamentary Outreach Program.

The U.S. military tends to defer to the State Department and USAID when it comes to working and liaising with Afghanistan’s Parliament. However since State/USAID capacity building programs will continue, there must be a dedicated effort to understand and influence Afghanistan’s members of Parliament in support of village stability operations. This endeavor will require a team and should be closely integrated into the Civil-Military Center in Kabul.


While many provincial and district officials are able to secure meetings with central government officials when they visit Kabul, many lack the crucial connections to exercise influence with their government. Establishing an Afghan Visitor’s Bureau to support the visits of local officials outside of Kabul to the capital will greatly facilitate closer links among the different levels of Afghanistan’s government, as well as empower these individuals to assist their communities. This bureau would track the movements of local officials as reported by Village Augmentation Teams, District Augmentation Teams and Provincial Augmentation Teams and assist them in meeting Kabul-based officials through the Civil-Military Center and Ministerial Outreach program.

10. Create a separate political section at each AOB and SOTF and at CJSOTF-A and SOJTF-A.

While many of the traditional non-kinetic enablers at SOF, such as civil affairs, military information support operations teams, and cultural support teams, shape local politics and exercise influence by, with, and through the GIROA, it is important to elevate and integrate these various components into a political structure. These different enablers should be subordinate to the Village Augmentation Teams, District Augmentation Teams and Provincial Augmentation Teams in order to ensure a greater unity of effort, as well as to better focus their collective non-kinetic effects on exercising influence by, with, and through GIROA structures and officials.

Conclusion

As U.S. conventional military forces withdraw from Afghanistan and the civilian interagency presence declines in the countryside, the necessity for SOF to exercise positive political influence by, with, and through the GIROA in support of village stability operations will not only continue but will have to expand. SOF is in many ways best positioned in Afghanistan to work with the GIROA in a sustainable manner.

A well-resourced but light, lean, and long-term Foreign Internal Governance approach to complement the strategy of Foreign Internal Defense within Afghanistan will enable SOF to better
focus GIRoA’s resources to the isolated villages in which Village Stability Operations principally operates. A determined Foreign Internal Governance strategy will prompt the GIRoA to address the needs of its citizens in a more consistent fashion; blunt, if not defeat, the Taliban’s political program reducing its appeal to the broader Pashtun community; and harness Afghan informal tribal, factional, and personal networks in support of good governance in a more concerted manner.

While many of the skill sets for coaching, teaching, and mentoring indigenous security forces are distinct from those required for working specifically with the political institutions of host governments, there are far more similarities than differences. The ability to build and leverage relationships with both security and government officials within the GIRoA to further the goals of stabilizing Afghanistan will assume greater importance in the next few years, and SOF will be better positioned to do so if it assumes a more aggressive approach to good governance within Afghanistan. *IAJ*

**Notes**


3 Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation homepage.

4 Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation homepage.


Team of Rivals:

Building Civil-Military Synergy in the Interagency

by Jeffrey S. Han

Though force can protect in emergency, only justice, fairness, consideration and cooperation can finally lead men to the dawn of eternal peace.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

A cord of three strands is not easily broken.

Ecclesiastes 4:12

In the summer of 2009, in the aftermath of the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, I deployed as a newly-minted, active duty, Army civil affairs officer to Sri Lanka. The challenges at the time—widespread destruction of infrastructure, landmines embedded in critical agricultural and residential areas, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians—required a great deal of communication between the governments of Sri Lanka and the United States, as well as among assigned U.S. government agencies.

It was important for the U.S. government to maintain relations with the Sri Lankan military that controlled access to the areas of conflict within the Northern Province. Military personnel could operate in remote, austere locations, such as the war-torn conflict-affected areas, with very little

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent the views of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense or the United States government.

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A majority of the civilian U.S. government representatives at the embassy had a difficult time understanding the role of military personnel assigned to a country outside a combat zone. Additionally, any discussion on the interagency in the context of civil-military relations centers on the elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). It is tempting to conveniently oversimplify and associate each of these elements with a corresponding agency in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy interests. However, this would deny the complexities of the world today. While the components of the interagency have competing interests and priorities in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, it is necessary to see these components as strands in a cord that must bind together as tightly as possible in order to achieve maximum strength. Any goals or objectives that run counter to this interwoven unity dilute the strength of American power. Recent struggles in U.S. foreign policy would lend some credence to such a view.

Roots of the Divide

According to prevailing theories in psychology, cultures or groups come together when individuals are united by common purpose. Members interact with one another, are psychologically interact with one another, and perceive themselves to be a group. Further, a
work group is a collection of people who share a definable membership, group consciousness, a sense of shared purposes, interdependence, and the ability to act in a unitary manner. In the “forming” stage of a work group, members seek to get to know one another, understand the task, and acquire the necessary resources to accomplish the task. Organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) recognize the value of this concept by encouraging team-building exercises at the beginning of important planning sessions.

Typically, the first chance that civilian and military representatives have to bond is when they come together to address a pressing, real-world problem.

In the military, group formation often comes about through shared hardship or other formative experiences, especially at the early stages of individual careers. Typically, the first chance that civilian and military representatives have to bond is when they come together to address a pressing, real-world problem. By the time this civil-military alliance produces the rapport and trust necessary to foster genuine teamwork, precious time has passed, and the problem set has grown far more complex. Making the process of building bridges outside of individual agencies even tougher are factors that degrade unity internally. From the military perspective, one of the Principles of War is unity of command, which drives unity of effort. However, in the absence of overarching leadership for a particular campaign or operation, subcultures supersede broad identification of military members with one another. There is understandably a distinction between active duty Soldiers who work full-time with one another regularly for extended periods of time and reserve counterparts who mobilize temporarily and sporadically. Members within Army special operations forces, Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and other “elite” units tend to hold members of Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations in lesser regard, despite the fact that each of these branches receives specialized training to qualify members for special operations and often at the same schools. The perception that certain accomplishments and sacrifices are unique to “Green Berets” makes Special Forces Soldiers internally very cohesive but withdrawn from military personnel outside the “brotherhood.” Other branches must prove themselves through shared experiences of hardship or other discriminating factors.

There is a similar distinction within civilian agencies such as the State Department and the USAID. Foreign service officers (FSOs) within the State Department distinguish themselves from other employees as a result of the rigorous vetting process they undergo, which includes a multi-step application and interview process as opposed to the more simplified hiring process for non-FSOs. A noticeable class divide results. After serving as a major in the U.S. Army Signal Corps, one information management specialist describes it this way: “I was proud of the title ‘communicator,’ which the military considers a distinguished profession. ...It quickly became obvious during my first tour that this was not the case in the State Department, where the title is viewed as somewhere equivalent to ‘janitorial staff.’” In USAID, there is a similar distinction between FSOs and other positions, such as personal services contractors. The discrimination that results is subtle but significant, especially when undertaking initiatives that require the approval of the highest-level officials at an embassy, such as the Deputy Chief of Mission or the Ambassador, who are FSOs themselves. As in the military, shared accomplishments
bring with them the bona fides that provide the context for relationships. In the absence of other weighing factors, the more selective and well-regarded the accomplishment, the greater is the sense of camaraderie. The result is an informal hierarchy of confidence and trust that sometimes undervalues the contributions of those outside this informal group.

The underlying dynamics of loyalty contribute to an even more pronounced parochialism when working with other organizations. Even with internal differences, the fact that employees share a common identity allows the organizations to function reasonably. There are regulations and operating procedures that mandate the flow of work by individuals, somewhat mitigating the influence of informal groups and personal preferences. Outside of these organizational guidelines, however, the only trait interagency components share is that they are U.S. government employees. While this is a unifying force, it rarely contributes to enhanced professional cohesion. The lack of trust and common purpose among organizations within the government is simply impossible to overcome without great effort.

A member’s academic pedigree can also exacerbate the differences between civilian and military representatives of government. In civilian circles, prestigious schools and impressive resumes contribute to the likelihood of high-caliber performance, especially in positions requiring political savvy. Civilian officials, such as FSOs, often present formidable academic credentials from elite educational institutions and will likely have advanced degrees to boot. Similarly, in USAID, there are a significant number of FSOs who have served in the Peace Corps or who boast of work experience that speaks favorably to their worldly IQ. These qualifications distinguish certain individuals and provide an edge in advancement through networks of senior official alumni. Despite the fact that many military officers have impressive educational experience and some, such as retired General David Petraeus, have advanced degrees from Ivy League schools, there is an unshakable view that the general military population is less educated and sophisticated than civilian officials when it comes to international affairs. This is a stereotype that must be resolved in order for civil-military cooperation to advance beyond theoretical constructs.

Within the military, the equivalent to a distinguished resume is the military file that details various experiences, awards, qualifications, certifications, and ratings. In uniform, many service members literally wear their badges of honor from previous training. Additionally, military officers proceed through their formative years in cohorts that bond them through shared experiences. Officers will gravitate toward classmates from various commissioning sources, such as the service academies. Enlisted Soldiers will bond with peers who “check out” in terms of certain military schools, deployment locations, or postings.

Needless to say, civilians who have never had the opportunity to gain these experiences and qualifications are at a disadvantage when it comes to gaining the trust of military members. Even civilians with prior military service suffer in the eyes of military men and women because of the length of time civilian officials have been away from the service. Prior military civilian officials miss out on the promotions, deployments, and experiences of military personnel who continue to serve. Furthermore,
military professionals base their esteem for their colleagues on a perception of hard work as measured by results and willingness to sacrifice for the greater good. When it comes to interactions with civilians, the 24/7 military work ethic sometimes does not reconcile with civilian practices such as timesheets, abstract goals, and departmental priorities.

The negative consequences of discord among the elements of national power are increasingly grave, as military, political, and societal threats to American interests are emerging all over the world.

The Problem Set

Biases that result from disparate backgrounds feed a dysfunctional working civilian-military environment. When it comes to developing goals and plans, each organization will pursue courses of action that serve its own best interest, rather than pursuing the greater good or, even, the collectively optimal path. In political theory, the Bureaucratic Politics Model is best summarized by the phrase “where you stand is where you sit.” This model applies very appropriately to the issue of civilian and military organizations working through “stovepipes” of information that are processed internally within each agency but are difficult to translate to the outside. These stovepipes are designed to efficiently deliver information up and down each respective organization’s hierarchy without consideration or regard for any collaboration that might need to take place. Communication architecture in each department is a very tangible manifestation of this exclusive system. Each government agency uses distinct networks and systems to process and share information. The Defense Department excludes other agencies in regular correspondence through classified information networks. Employees of other branches of government, such as USAID, do not have access to these networks. It takes a great deal of effort to transmit information between networks, even when threats are imminent or when events require urgent interagency communication. Institutional firewalls, therefore, exist to preclude routine collaboration. It is notable that after the WikiLeaks scandal, the State Department removed access to all of its diplomatic cables from the secure Defense Department SIPRNet.

This action severely limited an important means of transmitting strategically and operationally significant information among agencies. That an agency was able to take such unilateral action without much objection or “blowback” demonstrates the extent to which organizations are isolated from one another.

The negative consequences of discord among the elements of national power are increasingly grave, as military, political, and societal threats to American interests are emerging all over the world. The attacks of September 11, both in 2001 and 2012, saber-rattling from pariah states such as Iran and North Korea, and the persistent presence and growth of violent extremist organizations illustrate the wide range of security challenges the U.S. government faces in the twenty-first century. All of these threats are increasingly intertwined with civilian populations that are motivated by conditions such as food and water availability, educational opportunities, and the absence of law and order. Grievances against economic or political policies and cultural differences trigger conflicts in today’s world more often than do the actions of a country’s leader or its standing army. Combatants are just as likely women and children recruited into paramilitary organizations or criminal enterprises, as they are military-aged males in uniform. Neither the
military nor civilian institutions can address these problems on their own. They must work together to find solutions and dedicate all available resources precisely and quickly in order to prevent issues from becoming more complicated.

Examples of some of the consequences abound in recent history. As this year marks the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the rebuilding of the country after the end of the first phase offers an illustrative example. Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), a critic of Iraq war policy, said that interagency cooperation was an “utter, abject failure” and that government divisions worked at cross-purposes, forming a “circular firing squad.” At the operational level, poor coordination with other agencies—especially early in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—led to the duplication and waste of resources. The lack of cooperation impacted cooperation at the tactical level as well. The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction noted the comments of an Army effects officer during OIF who pointed out the frustrating outcome of these dysfunctional processes:

We had minimal coordination with State and USAID. Sometimes we were pushed to implement their programs like the micro loan program. This was funded by USAID but implemented by Iraqis and the Iraqis for the most part weren’t supposed to know where the money came from. There were supposed to be certain standards for applications but how many Iraqis can write up a business plan? It was intended to be in-kind where we provided items and not cash but did they really think we could go inspect some baker’s shop, see that he needed an oven, go to the market, buy the oven, and then deliver it to his place? We had other patrols to run. In the end we usually gave them money directly to make the purchase themselves.

Results such as this are due to a lack of trust and familiarity among interagency organizations at the outset. There is no centripetal force to consolidate the various interests, knowledge bases, and resources in a focused approach toward common goals. Instead, these elements not only dilute the elements of national power, but also often conflict with one another. A brigade commander during OIF cited “lots of fratricide between CERP [Commander’s Emergency Response Program], USAID, and even USACE [U.S. Army Corps of Engineers]” in addition to lack of transparency as one of the more problematic aspects of wartime spending. “Fratricide”—inadvertent attack on a member of the friendly force—is usually not intentional, but subsequent tragic deaths or injuries are significant combat losses nonetheless. In the case of uncoordinated expenditure of funds for projects or similar lines of effort, civilian and military agencies can unknowingly contradict one another’s goals, send conflicting messages to host nation beneficiaries, and contribute to corruption and other problems that exacerbate the conditions the projects are intended to address in the first place. Improved communication and collaboration is essential to avoiding these kinds of issues.

Outside of a combat environment, the problems caused by lack of interagency cooperation are just as prevalent, if not more so. The DoD leverages a number of foreign policy tools that would ideally benefit from close interagency collaboration. The Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic...
Aid program is an over $100 million annual appropriation that can be leveraged to great effect when distributed in concert with complementary development and diplomacy programs. In addition, there are numerous foreign military equipment procurement, personnel exchange, and technical training programs that would benefit from thorough collaboration among various stakeholders representing the U.S. government abroad. While there is certainly awareness and oversight of these programs by ambassadors and other civilian representatives both abroad and in Washington, the funding and planning decisions usually default to the military commanders and their staffs at regional combatant commands, as well as senior officials within the DoD. At the tactical and operational levels, interagency representatives are simply too overwhelmed with their own responsibilities to take on coordination outside their assigned tasks. The most successful application of these policy tools tends to occur in those environments in which civilian and military personnel informally build great personal relationships and develop trust in one another over time. When personality conflicts or assignment turnovers emerge, inadequate mutual understanding and unstable relationships between individuals at an informal level risk the success of even the most simple and straightforward programs. It is imperative that both civilian and military systems encourage collaboration that ensures success regardless of idiosyncrasies and personnel reassignment.

Civilian-led U.S. government programs also leave some room for improvement when it comes to foreign policy and civil-military cooperation. The mission of USAID is partly to “further U.S. interests” and to carry out “U.S. foreign policy by promoting broad-scale human progress at the same time it expands stable, free societies, creates markets and trade partners for the United States, and fosters good will abroad.” To the extent that advancing U.S. interests is a priority, USAID stands to benefit from integrating its programs with U.S. military efforts abroad. The encouragement of “stable, free societies” is at least one goal in common with the military. In theory, the military would be a natural partner to provide resources toward humanitarian assistance (using the tools mentioned above) and security, which are essential to building up impoverished communities. In practice, however, there are tendencies by many USAID officials and representatives of similar civilian agencies to shy away from collaboration with the military, fearing negative perceptions by host nation partners and nongovernmental implementing organizations. Some of this reluctance can be attributed to misunderstandings on the part of civilians. Many have never worked with military personnel and are not familiar with civil-military interactions. A better understanding of the people who make up the military would easily reveal shared interests and similar practices in engaging populations and governments abroad.

**Potential Solutions**

The difficulties facing interagency cooperation can be compared to the challenges of integration and collaboration within the military branches of service. The shortcomings in the relationships among the services became apparent in 1980 during Operation Eagle Claw, the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran during the Carter Administration. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, passed in response...
to the failure, paved the way for greater collaboration within the military by creating environments in which the branches of service are forced to work together.\footnote{12}

Subsequently, the service chiefs established joint commands and assignments for this purpose. In addition, a military officer’s career progression has increasingly depended on his or her joint credentials. Mid-level military officers have the desirable option of attending a sister service education program to obtain credit for professional development. This kind of concept should apply to the interagency to the maximum extent possible. At higher levels of command, interagency cooperation exists and is developing as interagency positions become ingrained in the military hierarchy. There are already political advisor and senior development advisor positions for State Department and USAID representatives at major military commands, such as the geographic combatant commands and theater special operations commands. In turn, military officers have opportunities to gain experience working at other government agencies through prestigious fellowships and internships and seek these assignments in order to advance their careers. On the other hand, there is no strong incentive for civilians to seek positions within military units other than possibly geographic location preference and individual curiosity. Taking existing measures further to promote career progression that depends on evidence of interagency proficiency would be a powerful incentive for creative up-and-coming leaders.

In addition to promoting formal administrative structures that force interagency integration, organizations should foster the shared experience that contributes to the much-needed bonds among professionals within the interagency. Collaboration does exist at senior levels such as the War College or similar advanced academic programs, but these occur too late in career progressions to alter the proclivities of leaders whose formative years are behind them. It is important to incorporate interagency training throughout career development in various institutions in order to feed the ideal that we are all “one team” working toward a common purpose: to serve the people of the United States and advance our interests as a nation together. At more junior levels, the Foreign Service Institute, to a certain extent, offers seats for certain courses to military personnel when they are available. However, these are very few and far between. Furthermore, much of this training focuses on preparing for major combat operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the U.S.

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It is important to incorporate interagency training throughout career development in various institutions...
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Members of interagency organizations can also find common ground in advanced education. Shared experiences in academia are great starting points for interagency partners looking for solutions to problems of mutual interest. Early in career development, fellowships and other programs that group civilian and military personnel into cohorts may encourage the development of academic roots in common. Rhodes Scholar and East-West Center degree programs present great environments to build lasting relationships with future leaders in the civilian sector. However, only a handful of military officers per year are able to gain these types of experiences. A more useful means of promoting collaboration might be to sponsor degree fellowship programs for a cohort of interagency representatives. Existing advanced civil-schooling programs and internships could evolve into one-for-one exchanges and include a follow-up requirement to share lessons learned.

In addition to shared experiences, it is necessary to promote and leverage positions and organizations devoted to working as helpful catalysts for improved interagency collaboration. The number of existing internships, offices, and positions dedicated to facilitating collaboration between civilian and military institutions should increase and have more influence within each organization. In their current form, Army Civil Affairs units and offices such as USAID’s Office of Civil-Military Cooperation are tiny specks within the overall structures of their respective organizations. The Civil Affairs branch, which is the only branch exclusively dedicated to fostering interoperability among civilian organizations and the military, is the smallest in the active duty Army. Even with the rapid expansion of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) and the recent creation of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, most military personnel are unaware that these units exist, much less of their purpose. The average Soldier, Sailor, Marine, or Airman has no concept of interagency collaboration and how it is relevant to his or her role in modern-day military missions. Civil Affairs personnel exist to bridge this gap. Likewise, civilian offices, such as USAID Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC), exist to educate and inform their organizations about the military and how to find common ground on issues that confound both sides. However, entities such as the CMC are new concepts that have mostly developed out of the need to coordinate efforts in major combat operations. It is unlikely that these entities will grow or even endure into the future without a significant push from higher levels of the government. In order to foster greater civil-military cooperation and improve the performance of each side, both civilian and military organizations must empower their liaison entities and provide substantial resources with which to expand.

Conclusion

The potential benefits of fostering improved civil-military collaboration and cooperation are obvious and many. Bringing to bear all the elements of national power into a synchronized force will have a much more potent effect on the prevailing problems of the nation. By ensuring that defense, development, and diplomacy are unified against existing threats, the U.S. government sends the best of the nation out to the world as a cohesive team rather than a collection of individuals with diverging
interests. During the almost 30 years since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, joint military power has deployed in awe-inspiring ways. The almost effortless expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and the successful hunt for Osama bin Laden have been two examples that demonstrate the prowess of the military and its proficiency as a joint force effectively employing all of the elements of military power at its disposal. To a certain extent, the successful hunt for Osama bin Laden also provides a hint of the potential of interagency cooperation as our civilian intelligence resources were an overwhelmingly potent tool in this case.

It remains to be seen what an even further invigorated and unified interagency can achieve in the future if the capabilities of all of our civilian and military organizations can be brought to bear. While there will always be challenges and unexpected threats requiring action, it can be just as satisfying and much more cost effective to prevent conflicts rather than fight them. This would be the true power of a civil-military collaboration applied to full potential. The available tools will increase with the continued development of society, and there is a vast pool of talented individuals who will be able to anticipate and address the challenges of the future before they become problems. Society should be able to answer President Kennedy’s famous challenge of “ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country” by responding with a branch of public service that best employs a given talent. All government employees are ultimately servants, and they owe the American people their very best. Our nation’s best is yet to come.

Notes


2 Ibid.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 22.


Fiscal Crises Experimentation: A Darwinian Approach

by Allan D. Childers and Mark H. Sweberg

"It is not the strongest of the species that survive, not the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change."

Charles Darwin

History demonstrates that periodically the nation goes through fiscal evolutions that change the environment in which U.S. government departments and agencies shape their organizations, programs, and activities. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution posits that the struggle for resources favors actors who adapt best to their changing environment.¹ Those who do not adapt tend not to survive. As a result, U.S. government officials responsible for international relations must recognize that serious policymaking, planning, and international programs that provide support in peacetime and during crises will not survive in the current fiscal environment by continuing to conduct business as usual.

America’s greatest resource is its peoples’ ability to adapt to necessary change. Today’s fiscal challenges offer renewed opportunities to refine U.S. government policies, practices, and procedures on a local, national, and international scale. Currently, policymakers and pundits view the collective capacities and capabilities of both federal and non federal departments and agencies as individual stovepipes that respond to international security, stability, and market opportunities through their individual processes and resources. The threats proffered by budget reduction initiatives are an opportunity for policymakers to take a fresh new approach to national and international causes—a whole-of-nation approach.

Experimentation can forge a way to evolve the structures and processes of departments focused on national security and foreign affairs, specifically the Department of Defense (DoD),

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the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). These departments have primary lead for defense, diplomacy, and development. In fact, although not the focus of this article, all components of the U.S. government can benefit from effective experimentation.

The real source of untapped energy to respond to national and international capacity building lies in the overlapping branches and root structures of governments and private organizations that reinforce each of the elements of national power. The argument against fiscal reductions in the federal budget has focused on the impact on individual government departments, agencies, programs, and personnel or social programs—not the overall impact on a comprehensive federal approach to supporting the national security strategy. Reduced budgets that emerge from Congress provide the opportunity to embrace jointness among the individual military services; adopt a comprehensive approach among the DoD, State, and USAID; and integrate the U.S. government response with nongovernmental and international governmental organizations. Fewer available resources among federal departments demand policies and practices that enforce complementary budgeting processes, sharing of resources, and full integration of policymaking and planning. It is imperative during a period of reduced budgets that federal departments find new ways and new procedures to cooperate and collaborate that do not jeopardize the national interests and U.S. government interactions on the international stage.

DoD, State, and USAID generally plan and budget for response to national and international programs as stove-piped defense, diplomacy, or development efforts. Government leaders fail to fully analyze, assess, and consider the value of interconnected capacities. Even now, in the face of fiscal constraints, military services within DoD focus on protecting and defending their programs without offering new proposals for collaboration with other services or government departments or even nongovernmental institutions. Collaborative approaches produce better efficiencies and reduce costs, especially in hardware acquisitions, logistics, and communications technologies. Economic belt-tightening serves as the fuel for policymakers to search out, understand, and use the untapped strength of combining resources within the government with those outside the government to respond to emerging crises and international responses vital to U.S. interests. Developed in the 1950s–1960s, the concept of a comprehensive approach to solving emerging crises called “community capacity building” once again became part of the international development community’s lexicon during the 1990s. International government organizations, such as the United Nations Development Programme, and nongovernmental organizations, such as Oxfam International, enable community capacity building through a number of development activities at individual, institutional, and societal levels.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) offered a catalyst for a comprehensive approach to defeating our enemies, stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, and reconstituting their capacities to participate in a global society of peaceful nations capable of defending themselves and providing for the welfare of their citizens. In reality, because of
The U.S. government interagency system developed for collaboration and cooperation has made great, albeit, insufficient strides in the last decade. State and the DoD began to work more collaboratively. Both departments published limited guidance within individual agencies and shared resources when it was practical to do so. Nevertheless, the specter of significant economic constraints threatens to doom the limited collaborative initiatives to create a whole-of-government response.

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended and regularly extended, was a successful example of collaboration and cooperation, however, much more collaboration and cooperation is critically needed whether or not fiscal constraints have catastrophic consequences. The departure of Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton, who pursued a truly comprehensive approach between the departments, places additional strains for progress on the effort. Integrated training, education, planning, resourcing, and execution continue to elude the U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations.

Although highlighted in regulations and doctrine, regular serious collaboration with private international organizations is rarely effected prior to crises response. The legislative and judicial branches of government have not been engaged, which further weakens the executive agencies’ requirement to work together. An extremely significant, recent, legislative action regarding interagency collaboration is the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239, January 2, 2013), Section 1107. This section’s purpose is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. department and agency collaboration. The law creates an interagency personnel rotation program for emergency management and stabilization and reconstruction within interagency communities of interest. The law establishes a Committee on National Security Personnel to manage the program, and specifies that each agency participating in the program will give strong promotion preference to those who perform interagency rotational service.

Rather than see the fiscal challenges as the opportunity to demonstrate responsive change in a comprehensive manner, agencies are circling their wagons to preserve as much of the budget pie for each department as they can.
Adaptation via Experimentation

Collaboration requires mutual understanding of and respect for potential partner contributions; it is not something agencies can accomplish as needed during a crisis. Collaboration requires information sharing and working regularly with potential partners. Necessary familiarity and comfort levels develop only over time. The fiscal crisis in America serves as a catalyst for the interagency community to renew experimentation. The effects of budget reductions and collaborative responses to those reductions can be measured, recorded, validated, and analyzed prior to implementing changes. During experimentation, variables influencing collaborative policymaking, planning, and action can change in an organized manner. The effects of these changes on associated conditions within each organization can also be measured, recorded, validated, and analyzed to make such collaboration effective and efficient. Experimentation can take the lessons of the past ten years to set the stage for the new approach. U.S. departments and agencies should embrace as future fiscal resources become more uncertain and regional and international threats likely multiply.

Interagency experimentation offers a method to explore new ways of operating across diplomacy, defense, and development missions in a whole-of-nation approach. Modeling and simulation can develop collaborative capabilities while applying new technologies. Interagency experimentation places participants in an environment conducive to discovering new tactics, techniques, and procedures. Experimentation is a proven method to help organizations test and evaluate new methods and procedures under controlled conditions. Experimentation allows for trial and error so that participants have a foundation of confidence in the results produced by modeling and simulation.

Policymakers should use fiscal challenges to implement interagency experimentation as a strategic approach through whole-of-nation doctrine. They should identify key customers inside and outside the federal government; agree upon collaborative visions, goals, and strategies; and refine integrated processes and tools to support peacetime, contingency, and stability preparation, planning, and implementation. Interagency experimentation facilitators should define training and education processes and leadership experience requirements. The goal is to develop a whole-of-nation strategic baseline that combines the elements of diplomacy, defense, development, and intelligence in the national security architecture with the strengths of private organizations that rely on information and economic factors to generate successful solutions. As budget cuts and program realignments influence national budgets and nongovernmental budgets in the next decade, the objective is to plan and implement limited financial resources to ensure the U.S. government is getting the best “bang for the buck.”

Staring Over the Precipice

The current multi-year fiscal crisis should alter the way strategists think about engagement. The norm for many years has been to consider planning for unthinkable crises that could demand U.S. intervention—“big picture” scenarios that can define Presidential
Recent history consistently shows the importance of preparing for the unanticipated in resource-constrained environments. In 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell convened a small group to develop and recommend plans to reduce the number of combatant commands. At the time resources were dwindling, and there was pressure to reduce the total number of commands and flag officer billets across the DoD. The small group identified U.S. Central Command as the first command to be eliminated. Before the group completed its work and offered its recommendations, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the Chairman permanently shelved his plans to reduce the number of commands. Instead, U.S. Atlantic Command was renamed and given a new mission as U.S. Joint Forces Command; U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Strategic Command were created as unified commands; U.S. Cyber Command was formed as a sub-unified command; and each new command developed service components to provide support. Ironically, the only command disbanded was U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) whose mission was to integrate and experiment with joint, interagency, and comprehensive approaches to national security response.

No one will know the different scenarios and responses that could have played out in the Middle East and South Asia from 2002–2014 if resource constraints had driven the Chairman to continue with combatant command reductions post-Desert Storm. Few can conceive what may have resulted without a USCENTCOM in the region throughout the 1990s. Under resource constraints driven by a fiscal crisis scenario, U.S. government departments and agencies should collectively revisit the number of combatant commands but in a way that balances U.S. national interests across all appropriate peacetime and contingency responses by both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Fiscal reductions demand U.S. policymakers reconsider the reality of current scenarios and how responses can be more effective. In the nearly 70 years since nuclear weapons were used in conflict, strategic decision makers planned and prepared for a global or regional nuclear exchange. Yet the reality is that the world has more often felt the devastating effects of nuclear accidents at military and civilian facilities. Governments with nuclear weapons may be better trained to launch them
than they are able to protect these weapons and materials from theft or accidents. The world is now gripped with images of terrorists releasing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in cities and at embassies and sports venues via bombs and commercial aircraft. Commercial chemical accidents have forced the use of chemical weapons response plans and procedures that were originally envisioned for far more sinister attacks.

Governments spend more planning and response resources on the ability to protect WMD materials than on protecting populations from the use of commercial vehicles as weapons. Governments are better at averting WMD-enabled crises than disease and starvation crises. By using experimentation, the U.S. government can determine how all resources of the government and nongovernmental organizations can be brought to bear on a crisis rather than the resources of just one or a few.

Fiscal challenges should cause policymakers to better balance collective response planning participation. There are a number of Department of Homeland Security-developed, national planning scenarios for interagency responses to WMD, radiological attacks, earthquakes, and hurricanes. These scenarios identify needed capabilities and resource requirements and establish an exercise program to test local, state, federal, nongovernmental organization, and private sector responses. However, if the scenario is not sufficiently catastrophic, the Pentagon does not participate, and if the scenario is sufficiently catastrophic for the Pentagon to participate, other sectors are overwhelmed and do not participate. Because of this ever-present problem, sectors outside the Pentagon learn little from these scenarios and, therefore, they develop few comprehensive approaches.

There is insufficient collaborative planning among agencies. Few agencies outside of DoD have robust staffs to support comprehensive planning, training, and exercising. Departments and agencies are not sufficiently versed in other departments’ missions and capabilities to coordinate. Moreover, there are few collaborative environments for federal agencies to be educated, trained, and exercised on a routine and systematic basis. Additionally, non-DoD agencies do not have staffs dedicated to considering these scenarios nor to plan their agencies’ responses to these scenarios should they occur. Staffs in these agencies are often “one deep” and focus on their primary responsibilities. They consider WMD-related issues and similar scenarios as secondary responsibilities.

The problem is compounded because national planning scenarios support the much simpler effort of responding to crises, not to preventing and managing a developing crisis before the response is needed. More than a decade after 9/11, when the lessons learned from fragmented interagency missions, leadership, doctrine, policies, planning, resourcing, education and training, and operations should have been learned and addressed with a whole-of-nation approach, U.S. federal, state, local, nongovernmental, and private organizations are still not prepared to respond to massive or individual assaults on national sovereignty or to support stability operations overseas. Since 9/11, no significant Congressional legislation equivalent to Goldwater-Nichols has driven the interagency to function collaboratively. In fact, federal budget constraints and inaction caused
the elimination of the single organization tasked to support and prepare military forces for such collaboration—the USJFCOM—and is driving the military services and interagency departments and agencies to cooperate less, not more. As budgets decline, cooperation wanes.

Surviving Fiscal Realities

Logic suggests that interagency departments and agencies should see the benefits of more collaboration in a resource-constrained environment. In reality the opposite occurs. Sharing resources, closing gaps, eliminating overlapping missions, better delineating supported/supporting relationships among interagency partners, and obtaining greater knowledge of the capabilities and resources within each organization would benefit each of the departments and agencies. But there must be a forum that encourages these actions. The Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) Planning Group was formed to demonstrate a commitment to improve a whole-of-government approach and develop interdepartmental coordination for national security challenges, but very little information is available on what they accomplished. Sadly, dwindling resources are engendering a “circle the wagons” mentality in all agencies, at a time when broader cooperation and collaboration is called for more than ever.

The exception once found in the collaboration between the State Department and DoD appears to be withering with the wearying of the Middle East conflicts and the arrival of budget restraints. These agencies reached an accommodation through a memorandum of understanding that they would work on common issues. Prior to the most recent fiscal constraints, DoD had been increasing the number of personnel working at the State Department in Washington and diplomacy specialists working at the combatant command levels. The two organizations agreed to contribute cooperatively to a $250 million Global Security Contingency Fund for use in emergent and urgent challenges in “areas that were not planned for in the budget but popped up.”10 The State Department understands that “DoD has more money and has a lot of planning capability, [so this level of cooperation] ensures these efforts are not stove-piped, but working together.”11 This is a far cry from the original intent of Presidential Study Directive-1, “Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,” to organize a cohesive and integrated structure12 and does not even address cooperation outside of crisis response. It also falls short of Secretary of State Clinton’s statement made after the release of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review that the State Department must be recognized for its statutory authority to lead in these efforts beyond U.S. borders as well as the responsibility “to make this civilian-military partnership something more than just a phrase,”13 and it is inconsistent with DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” policy guidance that recognizes the leadership role of the Department of State in international crisis situations.14

The State Department and DoD both recognized and began to address the problems in a collaborative approach, but such collaboration seems to have stalled. Now is the time for the U.S. government to capitalize on lessons learned and develop a whole-of-nation approach based on restructuring brought about...
Adapting to Maintain Relevance

Fiscal constraint lessons require a more strategic approach to interagency cooperation than the one evolving in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan reduced-budget environment. To date, interagency coordination has had only two models: (1) the Cold War, where each agency’s mission was clearly defined and resourced adequately to support its individual mission; and (2) during the 11 years of OIF and OEF, where military forces led or co-led diplomacy and development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Neither model suits the future of government and private organization cooperation in a whole-of-nation approach where budgets are constrained. It is also time for the National Security Council (NSC) to pull together the interagency engaged in international activities and begin an experimentation program that supports whole-of-nation collaboration at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The NSC should develop a concept of interagency force capabilities that considers and embraces nongovernmental and corporate abilities to provide material and non-material solutions. Because of the continuing imbalance of resources, DoD should provide the facilities and the bulk of experimentation resources, but there must be State and USAID commitments to fully engage, as well as commitments from other government and private organizations to participate.

In the past 10–15 years, especially as a result of U.S. engagement in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the departments have accepted the view that crisis prevention, crisis avoidance, and state reconstitution all require dynamic blends of military, diplomatic, and development initiatives. The U.S. government should focus on finding the most efficient and effective means for virtual, live, and constructive training for all interagency and relevant nongovernmental organization professionals—not just a select few who are assigned in other departments. Taking resources and staffing into account, effectively addressing future whole-of-nation cooperation, collaboration, and response will require innovative new approaches as well as sacrifices from all agencies of the government.

Experimentation can develop interagency doctrine, processes, and tools that expand upon the “Interagency Contingency Planning Online Toolbox”\textsuperscript{15} to support peacetime, contingency, and stability preparation, planning, and implementation. It can define training and education processes as well as governmental leadership experience requirements. It can bring out best business practices currently being developed separately by each of the military services, interagency departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and corporations to help shape a consistent, comprehensive, collaboration regime. Experimentation can make each level of government and private organizations comfortable with working within supported/supporting relationships and help other government, nongovernmental, and corporate organizations understand how best to relate to U.S. government diplomacy, development, and defense organizations supporting stability, crisis, and reconstruction tasks.

Among many other benefits, experimentation can also help DoD, State, USAID, and supporting agency leaders build stronger relationships and assess the value...
of corporations, contractors, and consultants who support interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{16} The results can provide comprehensive and consistent guidance to the combatant commands and military services, as well as all the bureaus within interagency departments. Material developed during the past 11 years on interagency coordination is available to identify and consolidate the best recommendation and discard those no longer needed. By using experimentation, all partners can recognize and appreciate the advantages of introducing new ideas and developing evaluation processes and procedures in an environment where simulated failure is accepted and educational. If done correctly, experimentation identifies what works and what does not work in a setting where failure is not catastrophic and resources are not squandered.

Collaborative interagency coordination education has diminished since the closure of USJFCOM, and whole-of-nation experimentation has struggled to find a sponsor. The NSC staff must lead. DoD must take a more active role in collaborating with State to lead each organization’s bureaus and components into supporting whole-of-nation experimentation, actively enlisting nongovernmental organizations and federal/state agencies participation, and implementing resulting lessons learned. Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development (J7) is responsible for joint force development experimentation but not equipped or staffed to approach whole-of-nation experimentation. A new Whole-of-Nation Concept Development Experimentation Campaign Plan (WON CDE Plan) patterned after the original USJFCOM plan\textsuperscript{17} should serve as the template for NSC action to define a more balanced experimentation approach that supports all whole-of-nation concepts.

Conclusion

Darwin rationalized his theory concerning evolution in nature to the manner in which mankind had accomplished mutation in domesticated animals and plants through selective breeding. Experimentation from generation to generation improved the survival or elimination of selected species. Experimentation uncovers solutions for remaining relevant in a resource-constrained world. The answer—the whole-of-nation approach—is apparent, but few grasp the question, “How does the U.S. remain responsive to change in a fiscally-constrained world where threats have evolved, continue to evolve, and where ‘business-as-usual’ policymaking and response structures are less responsive or relevant?” Preliminary analysis and concepts must determine the sorts of problems the whole-of-nation approach can solve. Not every national security question needs a whole-of-nation solution, and not every scenario needs to be of a catastrophic nature. While policymakers, planners, and budgeters have been dealing heavily with post-conflict stabilization actions over the last decade and developed concepts and processes to deal with such issues, whole-of-nation approach scenarios are now more applicable.

Policymakers should recognize the inherent benefits stemming from an interagency tabletop exercise to discuss and determine the types of scenarios that would require, or at least benefit from, a whole-of-nation approach. Agencies should ensure scenarios consider resource

\textbf{If done correctly, experimentation identifies what works and what does not work in a setting where failure is not catastrophic and resources are not squandered.}
constraints as they might actually occur, rather than develop scenarios that play out in an unlimited resource environment.

Over time every agency of the government has developed its own procedures, policies, doctrine, and processes that support its unique mission. Because missions are unique, no single way of collaborating will be common to all the agencies or to private organizations. Rather than seeking a “one size fits all” way forward, experimentation should help practitioners understand the unique methodologies used by other agencies and determine practical bridging mechanisms that effectively manage disparate ways of doing business.

Trying to make everyone do things the same way is counterproductive. In fact, the differences between the agencies involved in addressing a common challenge offer strengths for achieving success. Different organizations bring distinct perspectives, skills, and expertise to the table. The combination of different professional perspectives is necessary to understanding and responding to complex challenges in complex contingency instances.

A key component of success in future operations will be the “capability, capacity, and will to leverage the appropriate balance of national power in a coordinated, synchronized, and focused manner to mitigate risk and exploit opportunities.” The U.S. usually possesses the will. The challenge is to identify correctly the available capability and capacity that most effectively and efficiently performs the task. Experimentation may not provide clear answers, but experimentation can identify the wrong paths and increase the understanding needed to achieve capability and capacity. The overall focus of effort should be the same no matter what individual organizational processes and goals direct.

Experimentation does not substitute for training nor is it a replacement for rigorous training. Experimentation allows for trying new ideas, new processes, and new systems at minimal risk. Different experimentation environments provide the means to enable interagency partners to develop the ways to work together. Previous DoD experimentation uncovered the challenges to integration, the need for more capacity among civilian agencies, and the short- and mid-term requirements for capacity and capability building in foreign nations.

Conducting innovative and dynamic whole-of-nation experimentation to meet real-world challenges can achieve successes simply by identifying shortcomings, needs, and capabilities. It can help decision makers understand the overlaps and gaps in government and nongovernmental organization capacities to work together to achieve common goals in building stable environments that enhance each organization’s capability to succeed. Fiscal crises require the U.S. government to find new and innovative ways to operate successfully, effectively, and efficiently. Whole-of-nation experimentation can minimize waste and identify false pathways as fiscal crises are confronted head on. It can ensure better adaptation for current and future environments to enable survival of the fittest. IAJ
Notes


3 An exception is found at Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-13-02, Subject: “Improving Acquisition through Strategic Sourcing,” where a structure is established to manage government-wide acquisition contracts. However, this does not provide for potential efficiencies through broader scope with non-federal organizations. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-02_0.pdf>.


7 Mark Sweberg was assigned to this small group from the Joint Staff J2, where he was the senior Long Range Planner on the J2 staff. From 1995–1998, Lieutenant Colonel Allan Childers was assigned to HQ USCENTCOM J5 as South Asia Branch Chief and country desk officer.


11 Ibid.


14 DODI 3000.05.


16 One such consultancy is Development Transformations (DT) that specializes in improving the effectiveness of stabilization and development programming in post-conflict environments. See <http://www.developmenttransformations.com/>.


Intellectual Habits in Understanding the Operational Environment

by James T. Wilson

Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.

Albert Einstein

Einstein acknowledges the importance of understanding the operational environment. If we do not understand the complex environment in which we operate, then we are likely wasting effort or possibly worsening the condition. The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) was developed by the U.S. government to provide a better understanding of conflict environments. However, simply knowing the ICAF is insufficient to developing a true appreciation of the conflict environment.

It is imperative that we develop intellectual habits that inform our analysis within the ICAF. The two tasks of the ICAF are conflict diagnosis that segues into planning. The framework emphasizes the first task in order to develop a better understanding. The second task is dependent on the various planning processes of the multiple U.S. government and partner organizations and the desire of the U.S. government elements in the region. Conflict diagnosis is broken into four steps that are graphically depicted in Figure 1.1

The first step is to analyze the context of the conflict region. Context consists of factors that do not cause a conflict but create fertile ground for problems to grow. Environmental conditions, poverty, and history of conflict are possible context attributes. Context affects and is affected by each of the other components in the ICAF.

The second step is to examine the identity groups and their societal patterns and institutional
performance in order to identify the core grievances and social and institutional resiliencies. Identity groups are people who identify with each other along common interests. In a conflict environment, these groups may feel their basic human needs are threatened. Societal patterns are how the various groups interact with each other, particularly when there are perceived deprivations and competing interests or when their cooperation can add to peaceful conflict resolution. Institutional performance assesses formal and informal institutions that should be providing for basic human needs, and how they may be improving or worsening a conflict.4

In the third step, analysts look at key actors’ motivations and means to derive the drivers of conflict and mitigating factors. How do key actors mobilize groups around core grievances or sources of resilience? The drivers of conflict identified in this analysis can be understood as active energy. Core grievances identified in step two can be understood as potential energy. Core grievances may not actually cause a conflict; however, groups are often willing to act on these core grievances. They become drivers of conflict when key actors are able to mobilize and resource a group to commit violence. Mitigating factors are able to counter core grievances, and sources of resilience actively work to resolve conflict peacefully.5

In the final step, analysts look at windows of vulnerability or periods of time in which a conflict may increase or decrease. The ICAF assessment team will use this understanding of time to prioritize the drivers of conflict and mitigating factors identified in step three. Once the conflict diagnosis task is complete, the analysis feeds into either crisis response planning or conflict prevention planning.6

The ICAF assessment team will depend on the environment and the circumstances of the conflict. The team will try to determine who is trying to gain a better understanding of what is
occurring in the conflict environment and why. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Planning during Joint Operations*, provides an outline of ICAF for the Department of Defense (DoD) and directs the Ground Combatant Commander to “incorporate, support, and participate in interagency planning processes, such as the . . . Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to the greatest extent possible.”

The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework is a framework intended to provide the U.S. government with a common understanding across the interagency and in collaboration with the host nation. This framework is grounded in theory and best practices over time. Fundamentally, it is built on nine social theories:

- John Paul Lederach’s Conflict Transformation and Peace Building.
- Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s Greed Versus Grievance.
- Ronal Fisher’s Interactive Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving.
- Hizkias Assefa’s Concept of Reconciliation.
- Edward Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict.
- Marie Dugan’s Nested Model Of Conflict.
- Vamik Volkan’s Chosen Trauma.

Our understanding of conflict and political action has evolved since the creation of the ICAF. We make observations in a conflict environment or any environment and apply abductive reasoning based on our understanding of political action in order to interpret what is occurring. As the theories on which the ICAF are based continue to grow and evolve, so will our assessment of a conflict. While the foundational ICAF theories provide a baseline understanding of the framework, understanding the latest social science research will inform abductive reasoning to better understand a conflict.

The complexities of the operational environment demand that we evaluate conflict dynamics through conventional and emergent causality. ICAF assessment teams must apply
intellectual habits in order to best understand what is occurring. This process is shown in Figure 2.

In his theory of conflict transformation and peace building, John Paul Lederach outlines five aspects to building sustainable peace:

- Address conflict in a “middle out” approach by leveraging mid-level leaders.
- Employ a sub-system strategy that looks below the surface of an issue to determine what systemic problems exist.
- Emphasize reconciliation in the peace building process.
- Look for innovative approaches that address the roots of a conflict.
- Coordinate—it is a central component to peace building.\(^\text{10}\)

Since the creation of the ICAF, Lederach has updated his understanding of conflict and peace building. In his book *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building*...
Peace, he discusses the need to use imagination and an understanding of “a canvas of human relationships” to create social change that will move destructive conflict to productive peace. Lederach points to the difficulty in using his theory on conflict transformation and peace building in real world applications. His theories portray a continuously more complex understanding of the environment. Lederach acknowledges that his understanding of conflict and peace building continues to evolve. He describes “the nature of ideas and learning as an indefinite, constantly evolving process.”

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler developed the theory of greed versus grievance. Since then, Collier has expanded his study of how economic conditions can explain conflict. He notes that the bottom billion people in the world live below the poverty line. He explores how the type of government and economic resources correlate as pre-conditions for conflict. He finds that perverse foreign aid incentives lead to corrupt democratic practices in the poorest countries of the world. He also finds that the corrupt democratic practices often lead to internal violence.

We use abductive reasoning and our understanding of political action to explain causes of a conflict. Abductive reasoning best describes the reasoning method used to determine causality of action in a conflict. Abduction reasoning draws a conclusion based on probabilities of explanation.

Charles Peirce introduced the idea of abductive reasoning. He stated that all lines of reasoning must have a rule (x), a result (y), and a case (z). In deductive reasoning, if the lawn gets wet when it rains (x), and the lawn is wet (y), then one could say it rained (z). In inductive reasoning the lawn is wet (y), and you know that it just rained (z), then you could say the lawn will always get wet when it rains. Abductive reasoning would determine that it is probable that the lawn is wet because it just rained (y). There are other possibilities why the lawn is wet, but based on what is known of the circumstances, it makes the most sense to use the explanation of it just rained.

Abductive reasoning provides the most probable explanation for conditions we observe. An outcome from political action is detected. A cause is then attributed to this action based on our understanding. We use abductive reasoning to explain the outcome using our understanding of possible theories. Familiarity with conflict and political theories provides an academic foundation from which to apply abductive reasoning in order to explain the outcome of violence. Conflict is complex, so there are often multiple causal mechanisms at play. Only through familiarity with the latest research and an understanding of political action can we apply the diagnostic process with any certainty.

Furthermore, it is not enough to simply be familiar with a culture or the basic context of a conflict. There are forces affecting action that are not immediately evident...
their action is influenced by different factors. The first example is a wedding ceremony between a man and a woman in the contemporary U.S. The second example is a worker who is unemployed, and thus gratefully agrees to a job in which he receives half the minimum wage. The final example is a battered wife who chooses to return to her spouse knowing that she will face more abuse in the future.18

In Shapiro’s first example, the couple is committing themselves to each other in marriage. This is an act of love and affection, but it is also the reproduction of social structure of the nuclear family. The couple may not be fully aware of the external pressure they feel to perform a wedding ceremony or why those pressures exist. To the couple, they are acting in a manner consistent with the feelings they have for each other, and they are likely unaware of these external pressures placed on them.19

In the second example, the unemployed worker is taking a job unaware of all of the forces affecting him. He may blame himself for losing his last job, or he may blame the poor economic conditions for lack of other job opportunities. He likely does not analytically examine the causal mechanisms shaping his situation. He takes the job because he is happy to gain employment.20

The final example combines the forces of the first two examples. The wife may not understand all of the forces that push her back to her abusive husband. Furthermore, she may have a psychological syndrome that causes her to interpret her husband’s abusive behavior as affection. In this interpretation, “she may be inadvertently reproducing an exploitative relationship.”21

Each of these examples highlights the importance of an external observer to be intellectually aware of the latest theories in social science. Interviews with the actors would not draw the forces affecting action in each situation. The combatants in a conflict will not understand the subtle detail of why the conflict is occurring but will have personal experiences that convey their internal interpretation of the events. The actors’ interpretations are not wrong, they are just incomplete and do not provide the best understanding of the environment.

A conflict environment is complex. There are multiple open systems that interact with each other over time. Systems affect each other and the canvas of human connections in unforeseen ways.22 Furthermore, there are actions unknown to the actors themselves, resulting in seemingly irrational behavior. There are multiple causal mechanisms that affect behavior.

In order to fully examine possible causal mechanisms at work in a conflict, a rigorous model of causal explanation is necessary. Craig Parsons’s four causal logics of structure, institution, ideation, and psychology are comprehensive and internally coherent. They cover all possible conventional explanations of causality, and each is distinct from the others. Structural causality is the material landscape within which people must navigate. The actors within a structural explanation make rational decisions based on their environment. Conversely, institutional causality is the product of man-made rules and norms that result in an unintended consequence. The outcome is the result of a rational actor making decisions within an institutional environment. Ideational causality can be understood as a cultural,
religious, or other similar understanding driving the actions of people. Finally, psychological causality is the hard-wired irrational action people take.23

Understanding structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological causal logic would inform a more thorough understanding of the operational environment. What are the structures at play in the conflict? What are the secondary, unintended consequences of institutional action taking place within the conflict? What ideational factors are creating conditions that contribute to the conflict? What psychological factors are affecting the actors involved in the conflict? Each has some role in a conflict, and understanding the theories at play would allow a thorough understanding of how they aggravate or mitigate the conflict.

We also know that complexity prevents us from achieving complete understanding of the operational environment. There will always be a gap between what we know and reality. Connolly borrows an understanding of emergence from complexity: “…emergent causality—the dicey process by which new entities and processes periodically surge into being—is irreducible to efficient causality.”24 Emergent causalities are those actions that are greater than the sum of their parts, and they could not be predicted. An action occurs that was not foreseen and throws other systems into disequilibrium. It can show traces of the systems that it touches, but its action is “irreducible to its precursors.”25

A natural disaster such as a tsunami or earthquake and the effect it has on groups in conflict could best be understood as emergent causality. The action will have traces of each system before the disaster, but the event is too complex to be understood with conventional causality. Furthermore, the result of events after a natural disaster will not be evident for some time.

This rigorous causal explanation model with a familiarization of academic research and social sciences allows us to apply abductive reasoning in order to better understand a conflict environment. This understanding is necessary when conducting an ICAF assessment and will result in a more accurate product. It will shape U.S. government and host nation response to a conflict in a more effective strategy. Task one of the ICAF is conflict diagnosis, and task two offers a segue into planning. This model of intellectual habit will inform the diagnosis during task one, and it will shape possible courses of action during task two.

Military professionals may be members of an ICAF assessment team, and they will plan and execute action in a conflict environment. Using intellectual habits is critical to understanding the operational environment and taking action that will most likely achieve U.S. government objectives. This model has demonstrated how to achieve maximum understanding and recognize that a gap in knowledge will always exist.

It is important to understanding the theories that underpin the ICAF in order to appreciate each step of the framework. This familiarization will provide a better understanding of the operational environment. Social science is a growing field of study, and continuous research adds to our understanding of political action. Familiarity with the latest understanding of political action enables us to apply abductive reasoning and a rigorous causation model in order to inform and enrich our understanding of a conflict. This increased understanding could be of critical importance when looking at the U.S. government strategy for reducing conflict in the region. Failure to appreciate the complexity of the environment or understand the action that is taking place may cause us to act in a manner that is incongruous with U.S. government interests. IAJ
Notes


2 Ibid., p. 7.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., pp. 8–9.

5 Ibid., pp. 10–12

6 Ibid., p. 13.


8 Ibid., p. II-10.


15 Ibid.


17 Ibid., pp. 3–4.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.


24 Connolly, p. 44.

25 Connolly, p. 82.
Achieving Civil-Military Unity of Effort:

Jordan Case Study

by William J. Hackenbracht

Background

Following a joint planning session comprised of representatives from Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Jordan Mission, the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan approved the integration of a four-man Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) into the U.S. Embassy in Jordan. CMSE-Jordan would be an extension of the Civil-Military Engagement (CME) program, a U.S. Special Operations Command program of record that “facilitates the U.S interagency, host nation indigenous interagency authorities, select intergovernmental and nongovernmental partners, and the private sector to build, replace, repair, and sustain civil capabilities and capacities that eliminate, reduce, or mitigate civil vulnerabilities to local and regional populations.” The intent of the CME program is “to eliminate the underlying conditions and core motivations for local and regional population support to violent extremist organizations and their networks.”

Upon their arrival in Amman, Jordan, in late March 2012, CMSE-Jordan team members immediately began coordinating with U.S. country team members to identify civil vulnerabilities in critical areas that were outside the scope of current U.S. interagency programs and activities. CMSE-Jordan, at the recommendation of USAID and other country-team members, began developing a close working relationship with the Regional Refugee Coordinator (RefCoord) from the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). As a result of these initial coordination meetings, PRM requested CMSE-Jordan begin planning how to mobilize resources to mitigate potential gaps in the U.S. interagency, international, and Jordanian assistance to Syrian refugees.

As the lead U.S. government agency for coordinating refugee response, PRM works primarily with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). PRM coordinates with these organizations, contributes to their programs, and monitors these programs for effectiveness and
compatibility with U.S. government policies. Prior to the current Syrian crisis, PRM's RefCoord was based at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria, and coordinated U.S. support to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. However, after escalating violence in Syria resulted in the February 2012 closing of the U.S. embassy, the RefCoord relocated to Amman. There the RefCoord began directly coordinating with UNHCR to address the growing number of Syrian civilians fleeing the Assad regime.

At the beginning of March 2012, UNHCR estimated the number of Syrians in Jordan at 140,000, including migrant laborers and others capable of sustaining themselves through private and personal donations. However, from March to April of 2012, the Syrian refugee population in Jordan requiring daily assistance doubled to approximately 10,000. In view of this dramatic increase and the potential for even further growth of refugee populations, the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan instructed U.S. government agencies in Jordan (“the interagency”) to collaborate on the Syrian refugee issue and begin contingency planning for a whole-of-government response. Operating under this guidance, PRM and CMSE-Jordan began joint assessments of current and proposed Syrian refugee infrastructure and plans, including the planned location of the 100,000 capacity Zaatari Refugee Camp, to be based outside Mafraq City in the Mafraq Governorate.

While UNHCR and their implementing partners were willing to discuss the current refugee situation in Jordan and issues faced by their organizations, both CMSE-Jordan and PRM quickly recognized that UNHCR and other relief organizations were reluctant to directly include Department of Defense (DoD) elements in the refugee response. UNHCR explained that including the U.S. military in its response efforts risked creating the perception that the response effort was being militarized and could place humanitarian workers at risk.

To mitigate these concerns, PRM initiated a series of meetings and discussions among stakeholders. By limiting DoD involvement to providing infrastructure, assisting the Jordanian government, and partnering with Jordanian security forces, primarily the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) Border Guard tasked with receiving Syrian refugees, CMSE-Jordan received informal support and approval for projects. CMSE projects would be implemented only in the event that the response effort was overwhelmed; therefore, the U.S. military became a resource of last resort. Under these limitations, CMSE-Jordan began using the civil affairs methodology to develop a course of action that supported a unified U.S. government response to Syrian refugees in Jordan.

UNHCR explained that including the U.S. military in its response efforts risked creating the perception that the response effort was being militarized...

Civil Affairs Methodology

U.S. Army doctrine directs civil affairs soldiers to apply a specific planning process for conducting civil affairs operations, a process referred to as civil affairs methodology. Civil affairs methodology consists of six steps: assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate, and transition. Utilizing this planning process, CMSE-Jordan began working directly with PRM, UNHCR, and Jordanian officials to design programs and projects that would bring to bear the required organization and resources to identify and mitigate gaps in the refugee response.

Assess

CMSE-Jordan assessed the Syrian refugee situation and developed civil information
products that informed the interagency decision-making processes. After performing initial joint assessments in coordination with PRM, CMSE-Jordan conducted a series of meetings and discussions with Jordanian and UNHCR officials involved in receiving and processing Syrian refugees. During the time period being assessed (April to May 2012), UNHCR and the government of Jordan used a “bail-out” system, in which refugees underwent a security screening and were released into the community after a surety was provided by a Jordanian friend or relative. The bail-out process was based in the Ramtha District, across the border from the Syrian city of Da’ra and overseen by the Ramtha District Governor. When border crossings increased dramatically over a period of one to two nights, this system would experience a backlog. This backlog resulted in refugees being stranded at Jordanian military border control points, often overnight, until they could be transported to temporary UNHCR-administered housing, where they would remain in cramped and crowded conditions for days. While both the border control points and UNHCR-administered housing lacked the capability to handle large numbers of refugees, the Jordanian government was reluctant to authorize the resourcing and construction of planned Zaatari Refugee Camp due to concerns that camp construction could provoke the Assad regime.4

CMSE-Jordan and PRM assessed that a sustained, significant increase in the numbers of Syrian refugees would result in a critical lack of water, food, and sanitation. Additionally, delaying the resourcing of Zaatari could result in a situation where a large influx of refugees would overwhelm the ability of UNHCR and other relief organizations to execute contingency plans, which included the rapid construction of a camp.

During this time period, CMSE-Jordan also conducted an assessment of host communities affected by Syrian refugees. At the invitation of the Mafraq Governor, CMSE-Jordan participated in an open discussion including local administrators of many Jordanian government agencies active in Mafraq, including the water authority, police, sanitation, and health. Participants at this meeting concurred that Syrian refugees were adversely affecting the delivery of essential services in host communities, sentiments that were echoed by Jordanian representatives in other border communities, such as the Ramtha District.

Jordanian officials also relayed constituent complaints that despite widespread poverty in Mafraq, international assistance was being provided exclusively to Syrians, while Jordanians were suffering from increased competition for employment and increased costs for water, food, and housing. CMSE-Jordan requested specifics from Jordanian officials, and were subsequently informed that water use and trash disposal within Mafraq City had doubled. Additionally, Jordanian government officials provided the team with a list of clinics affected by Syrian refugees, including the equipment required to continue serving an expanded population base. Using the pre-conflict population of Mafraq City (50,000) and civil information received from Jordanian officials, CMSE-Jordan estimated the current Syrian population in the Mafraq Governorate at 50,000, and determined that if the Zaatari Camp (100,000 capacity) were to open at
near capacity, the ability of Jordan to continue providing essential services in the area would be overwhelmed due to the 50 percent increase in population in the Mafraq Governorate (300,000 to 450,000). CMSE-Jordan compiled these assessments into information products that were rapidly shared and discussed with PRM, USAID, and other members of the U.S. country team, as well as recently arrived members of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), an organization tasked to synchronize CENTCOM operations with nonmilitary stakeholders in Jordan.

Decide

CMSE-Jordan coordinated with the interagency to determine appropriate programs and projects for the team to execute. Using the U.S. ambassador’s instruction to support a whole-of-government response as planning guidance, CMSE-Jordan began designing potential programs and projects that could be synchronized with the Jordanian government, UNHCR, and other U.S. government plans. As a funding mechanism for these programs and projects, CMSE-Jordan intended to use the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program, administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA grants approval and program management authority for minimal-cost projects to combatant commanders and established the minimal-cost threshold in Jordan at $10,000. Based on assessed needs and PRM and UNHCR requests, CMSE-Jordan submitted minimal-cost OHDACA projects for water tanks, kitchen equipment, and electrical generators, and received approval for these projects to be held in abeyance for contingency purposes. Additionally, during this time frame, SOCCENT and CENTCOM planners overseeing CME efforts began a successful negotiation with DSCA to increase the OHDACA minimal-cost threshold in Jordan to $75,000, which would provide CME in Jordan greater flexibility in response efforts, including CMSE-Jordan.

CMSE-Jordan identified the Jordanian Special Operations Forces (JORSOF) Civil Military Company (CIMIC) as a host-nation partner for these potential programs and projects. JORSOF CIMIC had previously participated in episodic subject-matter exchanges with SOCCENT CME elements, to include instruction in basic civil military operations and tactical combat casualty care. Furthering this partnership, both JORSOF CIMIC and CMSE-Jordan were scheduled to participate in Eager Lion 12, a multi-national exercise that included dislocated civilian operations training. CMSE-Jordan designed and implemented a program of instruction that focused on displaced civilian operations training for JORSOF CIMIC, culminating in a refugee camp assessment validated by UNHCR protection officers.

In response to issues raised by Jordanian officials concerning the host community, CMSE-Jordan began publicizing these issues to the interagency and international relief community and conducted joint planning with USAID health officers to provide medical equipment to clinics affected by the influx of Syrian refugees. CMSE-Jordan and USAID health officers identified and selected twenty clinics and began coordinating with Jordanian Ministry of Health officials to ensure that equipment requested for these clinics was in accord with ministry plans and compatible with
CMSE-Jordan also served as the eyes and ears for Department of State and DoD entities conducting strategic-level planning

Develop and Detect

CMSE-Jordan further developed rapport and relationships with organizations and individuals involved in the Syrian refugee response. In coordination with the interagency, CMSE-Jordan detected conditions that called for the employment of CMSE contingency projects.

After completing initial joint planning with PRM and USAID, CMSE-Jordan began developing relationships and rapport with Jordanian and UNHCR representatives in order to establish the capability to quickly identify when and where CMSE contingency projects were needed. On behalf of PRM and the U.S. country team, CMSE-Jordan attended bi-weekly Syrian refugee coordination meetings chaired by the Ramtha District Governor and UNHCR and NGOs delivering assistance to Syrian refugees. CMSE-Jordan also continued to meet with the Mafraq Governor, who asked CMSE-Jordan to provide humanitarian assistance to accommodate the increasing number of Syrian military deserters. PRM, UNHCR, and relief organizations active in Jordan were aware of the food and water shortages faced by Syrian deserters, but were unable to assist due to organizational constraints preventing them from providing support to military populations. CMSE-Jordan received CENTCOM approval to utilize some of its contingency project funding for this population and rapidly provided refrigerators, kitchen equipment, and water storage tanks to the Jordanian officials administering the Syrian deserter camp. While this project was not technically part of the international response to the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan, it gave CMSE-Jordan the opportunity to demonstrate to UNHCR and associated relief organizations the team’s ability to respond to a humanitarian situation in a rapid and flexible manner.

While building credibility and rapport with organizations and individuals responding to the influx of Syrian refugees on the tactical level, CMSE-Jordan also served as the eyes and ears for Department of State and DoD entities conducting strategic-level planning with Jordan and the international community. As a participant in the weekly U.S. Syrian Working Group, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan, CMSE-Jordan provided situational awareness and ground-truth reports to senior leaders on the U.S. country team. In addition to providing SOCCENT and CENTCOM planners with the same situational awareness, CMSE-Jordan also facilitated the establishment of the CENTCOM CMOC in Jordan, providing that organization with a tactical framework that could serve as a foundation for building operational compatibility with Jordanian military units identified as potential partner forces in the event of a humanitarian crisis. CMSE-Jordan provided CENTCOM CMOC with detailed assessments and introduced CMOC representatives to their counterparts in the Jordanian Armed Forces, specifically the border guard.

One result of its success in developing...
tactical-level relationships was that CMSE-Jordan was among the first U.S. government entities to be informed of the massive influx of Syrian refugees during the evening of July 22, 2012. In the following days, refugee housing facilities in the Ramtha District would swell to eight times capacity, and the Jordanian government would request UNHCR assistance in constructing and establishing a refugee camp at Zaatari, which began receiving refugees a week later.

**Deliver**

CMSE-Jordan rapidly and effectively employed CMSE contingency projects. In the month before July 22, the average number of Syrians crossing each night slowly increased to approximately 400, placing a growing stress on the bail-out system then in place. When, over the following week, the average jumped to 1,100, Jordan decided to terminate the bail-out program and announced that Syrian refugees would be housed at a refugee camp to be constructed by UNHCR at Zaatari. UNHCR, suddenly burdened by the need to construct a camp and transport a growing number of refugees, requested CMSE-Jordan assistance to ensure that the Jordanian border guard had the infrastructure in place to provide humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees crossing the border. CMSE-Jordan received approval from CENTCOM to activate plans for its remaining contingency projects and began to jointly plan with JORSOF CIMIC leadership to deliver water tanks and kitchen equipment to border control points.

During the earlier delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Syrian military deserter camp in Maafraq, CMSE-Jordan had developed an informal relationship with USAID procurement officers. After receiving the U.S. ambassador’s approval to design a process to expedite procurement and delivery of humanitarian assistance, CMSE-Jordan formalized this relationship with USAID procurement and expanded the process they had developed to include contracting officers from the General Services Office at the U.S. embassy in Amman. The final process consisted of CMSE-Jordan identifying projects to mitigate critical vulnerabilities, PRM determining that these projects supported U.S. policy and UNHCR plans, USAID and General Services Office procuring and contracting the humanitarian assistance, and CMSE-Jordan executing these projects in partnership with JORSOF CIMIC, Jordanian officials, and UNHCR.

This process allowed CMSE-Jordan to rapidly deliver electrical generators to the Jordanian government, which were then used by UNHCR to begin operations at the Zaatari Refugee Camp. Additional assistance included the delivery of kitchen equipment and water tanks to ten border control points along 150 miles of the Jordan-Syria border, as well as beginning the procurement process for over 50 pieces of medical equipment for Maafraq medical clinics.

**Evaluate**

CMSE-Jordan determined the effectiveness of delivered projects and identified follow-on actions in coordination with the interagency. Throughout the execution of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Zaatari Refugee Camp and along the Syrian border and during the subsequent evaluation of each project’s effectiveness and sustainability, CMSE-Jordan continued to conduct joint assessments with PRM and USAID to evaluate the effects of
each project and the situation at each location. As the tactical-level agent for both PRM and CENTCOM, CMSE-Jordan identified several humanitarian concerns within the camp, host community, and at the border:

- **Zaatari Refugee Camp:** As the population of the Zaatari Refugee Camp steadily increased and outpaced construction, Syrian refugees began protesting over living conditions within the camp. Syrian refugees at Zaatari were primarily upset over the dusty conditions, a complaint validated by health workers who reported a growing number of respiratory illnesses. UNHCR had planned to lay a base course of gravel over the camp; however, international donors who had agreed to fund this activity had not yet delivered on their commitments.

- **Host community:** Within the Mafraq Governorate, Jordanian officials were concerned that school-age children in the camp would overwhelm the Mafraq public school system. As in the case of laying a base course of gravel, UNICEF planned to build several schools in the camp; however, no funds were currently available. Ministry of Health officials informed CMSE and USAID that clinics outside of Mafraq were also beginning to be affected due to the strains placed on the health system in Jordan by Syrian refugees.

- **Syrian border:** Along the border, the lack of latrine facilities and shelter was causing an immediate sanitation issue and threatened to put Syrian refugees at risk of exposure.

- **In response to these issues,** CMSE-Jordan began generating follow-on projects to mitigate these civil vulnerabilities: gravel and schools for the Zaatari camp, further medical equipment purchases, and latrines and shelter for the border.

A key factor in determining the effectiveness of CMSE-delivered projects was to evaluate its success in supporting U.S. government strategic objectives. During the weekly Syrian Working Group meetings, the U.S. Ambassador to Jordan expressed frustration with the difficulty faced by the U.S. government in publicly demonstrating its strategic commitment to Syrian refugees and the host community.

In support of meeting the ambassador’s strategic intent, CMSE-Jordan began collaborating with the country team to ensure that future CMSE projects would also support the strategic objective of demonstrating U.S. commitment. Specifically, CMSE-Jordan coordinated between the embassy’s public diplomacy office and public affairs officers from SOCCENT so that as future projects for the Zaatari Refugee Camp reached completion, they would include public press releases and ribbon cuttings.

While the $450,000 total cost of CMSE-Jordan projects represented less than 1 percent of the over $130 million in assistance provided by USAID and PRM to the overall Syrian refugee response, USAID and PRM assistance were largely intangible contributions that consisted of cash transfers to the Jordanian government, UNHCR, and implementing partners. CMSE-Jordan projects were tangible examples of U.S. assistance, and the U.S. ambassador along with representatives from PRM and USAID would use CMSE-Jordan projects to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Syrian refugees, while highlighting the leading role PRM and USAID
played in funding the international response.

**Transition**

CMSE-Jordan completed follow-on projects and readied to transition future projects to follow-on civil affairs units, other military units, Jordanian government organizations, UN organizations, international governmental organizations, NGOs, and other civilian agencies as appropriate.

Prior to completing the initial CMSE-Jordan deployment rotation in October 2012, CMSE-Jordan was established as a persistent CME presence in Jordan. Before re-deploying, the team ensured that projects and programs within the Zaatri Refugee Camp, the host community in Jordan, and along the border were either retained by the follow-on CMSE or transitioned to the Jordanian government, UN agencies, and other U.S. military units:

- **Zaatari Refugee Camp:** Utilizing the established interagency procurement process, CMSE-Jordan used OHDACA funds to deliver and spread approximately 30,000 square meters of crushed gravel to the Zaatari Refugee Camp, as well as construct four pre-fabricated school buildings. These deliveries provided PRM the space and time to assist UNHCR in fully mobilizing the international donor community, resulting in transitioning these initiatives to UNHCR and UNICEF. Also, in support of demonstrating U.S. commitment to Syrian refugees in Jordan, CMSE-Jordan transitioned the publicizing of these projects to the U.S. embassy public diplomacy and public affairs offices, which culminated in a publicized ribbon cutting on March 17, 2013, by the U.S. ambassador at the Zaatari Refugee Camp.⁷

- **Jordanian host community:** As CMSE-Jordan assisted officials in publicizing the issues faced by the Jordanian government in delivering essential services to communities affected by Syrian refugees, the effort to support the Jordanian government in the Mafraq Governorate transitioned to the international relief community.⁸ This process allowed CMSE-Jordan to transition projects and programs to support the Jordanian government’s delivery of essential services in communities outside of Mafraq to subsequent CMSE teams deployed to Jordan. As the current CMSE-Jordan finishes the delivery of medical equipment to Mafraq clinics, the team is developing relationships in southern Jordan and assessing civil vulnerabilities in these impoverished and disenfranchised areas. CMSE-Jordan projects within the Jordanian host community specifically address the public perception that all international assistance ignores Jordanians and is, instead, solely directed towards Syrians.

- **Syrian border:** In support of the establishment of an operational CENTCOM CMOC in Jordan, CMSE-Jordan transitioned a number of initiatives along the Syrian border to the newly established organization. Since the transition of projects and relationships at the border, the CENTCOM CMOC has used the established interagency procurement process to deliver OHDACA funded mobile latrines, as well as to provide tentage and lighting from excess property (authorized by Defense Logistics Agency for transfer to the Jordanian Armed Forces).

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⁷ Before re-deploying, CMSE-Jordan ensured that projects and programs...were either retained by the follow-on CMSE or transitioned to the Jordanian government...
Future of Civil-Military Engagement in Jordan

Looking ahead, the SOCCENT CME effort in Jordan is postured to continue supporting interagency coordination, cooperation, and collaboration at the tactical level in areas of potential instability across Jordan. Through partnership with JORSOF CIMIC and other JORSOF units, CMSE-Jordan maintains the ability to conduct assessments along the border, in the Zaatari Refugee Camp, and in affected host communities throughout Jordan. CMSE-Jordan continues to contribute tactical-level situational awareness and a common operating picture to the interagency of the U.S. country team, which minimizes duplication of effort and ensures unified support to U.S. strategic objectives.

Regional Recommendations

Partnerships between USAID, PRM, and the CME program have achieved measurable success in the U.S. government’s civil-military unity of effort in the response to Syrian refugees in Jordan. Similar partnerships should be established across the region in areas affected by the conflict in Syria. CMSE Lebanon, as part of Special Operations Command Forward Lebanon, has already established a partnership with the USAID Lebanon Mission and would be an ideal partner for PRM. In other countries affected by Syrian refugees but without a CMSE, such as Turkey and Iraq, CME elements should be integrated into the U.S. country team, either through the deployment of liaison officers for information exchange and joint planning or via episodic engagement from the theater special operations commands. CMSE-Jordan could advise and provide a link between the PRM RefCoord and CME in the region to coordinate and facilitate unity of effort among all U.S. partners.

Institutionalizing Relationships

As relations in Jordan between the CMSE and members of the U.S. country team evolved from informal to a more formalized relationship, as exemplified by the procurement process, CMSE-Jordan supported the transition of programs and projects by institutionalizing what would have otherwise been dependent on personal relationships. If members of the interagency agree that the CME effort in Jordan has been successful, relationships such as that between the CMSE and PRM should be formalized and institutionalized. Using the relationship between CME and PRM as an example, lessons learned in Jordan could serve as a starting point for discussing this relationship. For example, in areas with existing or potential refugee situations (Balkans, Africa, South Asia), CMSE-Jordan can provide a model for future interagency coordination. Furthermore, expanding the institutionalization of the relationships between U.S. civil affairs and the interagency writ-large would better facilitate joint planning and training and ensure a transition from personality-driven to institution-based coordination. This would better posture the interagency to achieve civil-military unity of effort in conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response operations.

Conclusion

As demonstrated by the CMSE-Jordan, the CME program enables the interagency to anchor the civil-military domain within the National Security Strategy through the deployment of small-footprint CMSEs and similar units. CME provides the interagency with a means to ensure
unity of effort within civil-military operations and avoids the need to deploy larger units in an evolving resource-constrained environment. Ensuring that the CME program is fully integrated with the interagency provides both U.S. ambassadors and combatant commanders with an ideal resource for facilitating whole-of-government approaches to conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. 

**Notes**


3. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*.


An Interagency Experience with the Department of Veterans Affairs

by Khanh T. Diep

The experience of the past decade of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the value of holistic thinking and problem-solving. Terms such as “team of teams” and “interagency coordination” have become fashionable, as military leaders seek ways to deal with complex challenges that defy one-dimensional solutions. While much professional discourse has focused on this topic within the context of counterinsurgency or national security strategy in general, there are other challenges facing the nation that require a similar, multi-faceted outlook. Recent headlines describe on-going challenges associated with providing benefits to returning veterans, a task that has never been more important. The obstacles to fixing this problem are numerous, and it is beyond the capability of a single agency to find a solution alone. The backlog in benefits claims, although only one of many such issues confronting the federal government, offers a clear illustration of the growing importance of true interagency cooperation and the need to educate military leaders to better facilitate this type of close coordination in the future.

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSG) Interagency Fellowship is an invaluable program that not only provides professionally broadening experiences to those officers fortunate enough to participate, but also contributes to the synergy between the Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies of the federal government. The fellowship has three objectives: (1) improve synchronization between the various agencies and the U.S. Army, (2) ensure continued partnership between the Army and those agencies, and (3) enhance interagency operations overall within the U.S. government. Recent conflicts as well as economic trends and other conditions within our country and across the globe portend an increased focus on interagency coordination in the coming decades. Therefore, this year-long fellowship that offers Intermediate Level Education credit is likely to remain an important program in the professional development of the Army’s officer corps.

Major Khanh T. Diep was born in Saigon, Vietnam and commissioned into the U.S. Army from the United States Military Academy. She is currently a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Interagency Fellow serving ten-month exchange assignment with the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Among approximately 20 federal agencies that are part of the program, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) stands out as a vital player within the human resources arena. VA is the key interagency partner of DoD in ensuring the nation’s current military members and veterans continue to enjoy the benefits they have rightfully earned. This partnership is among the most important the interagency fellowship can help to enhance. An examination of the interagency fellowship experience at VA within the context of the program’s stated objectives provides an illustration of the program’s value in strengthening the department’s connection to the past and present members of the U.S. military. This article provides an informative look into the Department of Veterans Affairs by highlighting its Secretary’s three priorities of enhancing access, reducing veteran homelessness, and reducing the claims backlog. Furthermore, it aims to increase awareness of the healthcare coverage and benefits VA has to offer.

**Overview of the Department of Veterans Affairs**

The Veterans Administration was established as an executive department in 1930 when Congress authorized the President to bring together all government activities and initiatives related to veterans. Not until March 15, 1989, was the Department of Veterans Affairs created to succeed the Veterans Administration. VA is the second-largest of the 15 Cabinet departments and operates nationwide programs for healthcare, financial assistance, and burial benefits. It includes many different programs, each charged with administering different categories of services and benefits to currently-serving military members, as well as those who have left the service with eligibility for specific benefits. The three administrations of VA are the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). Overall, VA consists of more than 323,000 employees that work in 152 VA hospitals, 821 Community-Based Outpatient Clinics (CBOCs), 300 Vet Centers, 56 VBA regional offices, and 131 national cemeteries located throughout the country (Figure 1).

The organizational chart in Figure 2 (pg. 54) outlines VA’s three administrations and other staff offices that serve as principal staff advisors to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs and oversee or administer programs in their respective areas of responsibilities. VA currently serves over 22.3 million veterans (Figure 3, pg. 54). VHA provides healthcare services to nearly 6.2
million veterans and is the nation’s largest integrated healthcare system, with more than 1,700 hospitals, clinics, community living centers, domiciliary care programs, readjustment counseling centers, and other facilities.

Currently, the single largest, period-of-service component of the veteran population is the approximately 7.5 million individuals who served during the Vietnam era. (See Figure 4, pg. 55) VBA provides benefit programs and services that include compensation, education and training, home loans, life insurance, pension, vocational rehabilitation and employment, and other services. In fact, two children of Civil War Veterans still draw VA benefits, and about 184 children and widows of Spanish-American War Veterans still receive VA compensations or pensions. Finally, NCA currently maintains 3.1 million gravesites at 131 national cemeteries in 39 states and Puerto Rico, as well as in 33 Soldiers’ lots and monument sites. Burial and memorial benefits are available

![Projected Veteran Population](image)

**Figure 2. VA Organization**

**Figure 3. Veteran Population**
for eligible service members, veterans, and family members.

**Interagency Synchronization: Improving Access and Knowledge of Claims Systems**

The partnership between VA and DoD is indispensable. It is hard to grasp this relationship if one does not truly understand the responsibilities, mission, and scope of VA and its three administrations. Everything from healthcare services to benefits including burials falls within the realm of VA’s duties and responsibilities. Every active duty military member along with those in the National Guard and Reserve components who serves at least 90 days on active duty will transition to VA programs once they depart the service. Providing services and benefits to such a large number of potential customers requires efficient systems that are both accessible and readily understood by all. (See Figure 5, pg. 56)

For active duty personnel, healthcare services and benefits for the individual and family members are of paramount importance, and VA is the conduit for accessing them. Various initiatives aim to improve the synchronization between VA and DoD for every military member entering accession. For instance, recent improvements to the online portal where veterans access benefits (www.eBenefits.gov) allows for easier navigation of the online disability compensation claim submission process. This new format uses interview-style questions and drop-down menus similar to tax-preparation software, instead of the traditional fill-in the blank forms that users often find confusing because of the lack of detail or technical language. To help ensure this tool is readily accessible, Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) now require new military members to establish an eBenefits account.

Despite recent negative headlines in the news media regarding the backlog in veterans’ compensation claims, VA has begun several initiatives to deal with this problem. The Integrated Disability and Evaluation System (IDES) aims to reduce average waiting time for claims from 262 to 54 days after separation. IDES is currently operating at 139 military installations, and VA Military Service Coordinators serve as liaisons for the service member and his/her family throughout the IDES process. Furthermore, the Veterans Benefits Management System, an electronic claims system, will be in use at all 56 VBA regional
offices by the end of 2013, providing veterans with another online avenue for submitting their claims. Maximizing the use of these online systems is important to the overall speed and efficiency of claims processing. Many do not realize that VA still serves veterans’ families going back to the Civil War era, and many claims, once started on paper through the much slower manual processes, will be followed through on paper, thus prolonging the process. The time delay in processing often causes many veterans to re-file, as they believe their claims need to be upgraded or have somehow been lost in the system. This redundant filing creates further backlogs.

In understanding the reasons for the backlog in veterans’ benefits processing, the most revealing statistic is that 61 percent of claims in the current inventory are supplemental. These are requests to adjust current claims based on changes in benefits policy, such as the 2009 decision to add conditions incurred from exposure to Agent Orange, or because of new or changed medical conditions, such as an increase in disability compensation. Additionally, nearly eight out of every ten of these supplemental claimants are already receiving monetary benefits from VA. Since supplemental claims are inherently more complex to begin with, the presence of already existing monetary compensation serves to further complicate and delay the claims process, since it takes even more time to review each request on a case-by-case basis. When combined with redundant filing on the part of claimants, it is easy to see the magnitude of the challenges facing VA in this very important area.

To meet these challenges, VA must maximize its use of the above-described, newly improved systems. To do so, both VA and DoD must continue to educate veterans about how to gain access to services and benefits. Such efforts will serve to make VA a trusted and lifelong partner for the nation’s veterans. Within the military itself, leaders must ensure service members understand the systems at their disposal for accessing benefits. Synchronization between VA and DoD is critical to improving interagency operations that affect the veteran population.

**Partnership: Mobilizing Support for Veterans**

Partnership between VA and DoD has increased over the last several years. The most current White House initiative “Joining
Forces,” a comprehensive effort with DoD, VA, veteran services organizations, private companies, schools, and local communities, connects service members, veterans, and military spouses with VA-provided resources as they seek employment in the civilian sector. VA identified six major areas where it can help by developing programs and providing robust resources to:

- Increase behavioral healthcare services through prevention-based alternatives and integration of community-based services. Specifically, the development of a joint DoD/VA integrated mental health strategy to better determine mental health conditions.

- Build awareness among military families and communities that psychological fitness is as important as physical fitness. With the Department of Health and Human Services and DoD, leverage partnerships with professional associations and academic institutions to ensure military culture is included in core curricula and published standards.

- Eliminate homelessness and promote housing security among veterans and military families. VA has partnered with the Department of Urban Development and other federal agencies to end veteran homelessness by 2015.

- Increase opportunities for federal careers, which include increasing outreach to military spouses in the federal hiring process.

- Increase opportunities for private-sector careers, such as the development of two veteran-owned small business projects: Women Veterans Igniting the Spirit of Entrepreneurship and Operation Endure and Grow.

- Increase access to educational advancement to include continued support of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, which is transferable to military spouses and dependents.

As the U.S. continues to recover from the recent economic downturn, programs such as those listed above are examples of what today’s military families and veterans deserve from the nation they have served so well. These initiatives are just the start of the partnership that VA, in coordination with DoD, is in the process of establishing with civilian organizations, private businesses, and local communities.

**Interagency Operations: Change and Challenges**

VA is constantly evolving to meet the ever-changing needs of veterans. One of the more recent changes to these needs is a significantly increased population of women veterans. At the end of World War II, women made up only 2.4 percent of the active duty force. Today, women make up approximately 15 percent of the active duty force and 18 percent of the National Guard/Reserve components.

In the past decade while fighting two major wars, the military has faced unprecedented challenges. Recently, the DoD lifted the ban for women in combat and included openly homosexual men and women within its ranks. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury as a result of multiple deployments have placed additional stress on veterans and the agencies who are tasked with helping them readjust to society. Upon returning home, many transition out of the military only to face a grim job market. In such an environment, it is more important than ever that VA and DoD have a strong capability to link-in with other agencies of the federal government to assist military members through the trials that await them both in and out of uniform.

Both VA and DoD are reaching out in
a coordinated manner to other agencies, such as the Department of Labor (DOL), through programs such as the Warrior Care and Family Support and “Soldier for Life” initiatives. These programs prepare Soldiers, veterans, and families to leave military service “career ready” and find an established network of enablers to connect them to employment, education, and healthcare opportunities. Improving the quality and timeliness of small processes can assist the veteran to successfully reintegrate back into civilian society and receive benefits in a timely manner. One such change is the paperless processing of the DD Form 214, “Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty,” from DoD to stakeholders such as VA, DOL, and other required agencies.

Ending homelessness remains a challenge. Although homeless veterans represent a relatively small share of the total veteran population, less than 1 percent (1 in 150 veterans), veterans are overrepresented among the homeless population. VA provides healthcare and benefits to more than 100,000 homeless veterans each year and continues to engage veterans in outreach, medical care, benefits assistance, transitional housing, and case management for veterans in permanent housing.

The charts in Figure 6 used data from the 2009 and 2010 Annual Homeless Assessment Reports to Congress. They were sponsored by HUD and VA. A sheltered, homeless, individual veteran is a homeless veteran who uses emergency shelters or transitional housing facilities. This chart illustrates their demographic characteristics and compares them with non-veteran, homeless, individual adults for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. In 2010, veterans account for 10 percent of the total adult population and 16 percent of the homeless adult population. However, veterans comprised 13 percent of sheltered, homeless adults in 2010 and 16 percent of homeless adults at a given point in time.
Conclusion: Value of the Interagency Fellowship

Close interagency cooperation is the key to solving the nation’s most pressing foreign and domestic issues. In order to remain a constructive contributor in solving these complex problems, leaders at all levels must be prepared to operate comfortably in collaborative environments where other agencies of the federal government are co-equal (and often senior) partners. Few problems of national significance are solved by one element of national power—or one governmental agency. The scope and complexity of today’s problems, both international and domestic, require multi-faceted approaches that synchronize initiatives over time and result in true partnership among agencies with mutually supporting capabilities and shared objectives.

These situations are not limited to the complex battlefields of counterinsurgency campaigns, as evidenced by the challenges associated with eliminating the backlog in VA benefits claims. In this case, DoD and VA are working together to forge real solutions by synchronizing efforts to facilitate the transition of personnel from active duty service, as well as partnering to find better ways of connecting veterans and their families with the services and programs available to them. New dynamics, such as a vast increase in the number of women veterans and rampant homelessness among our veteran population, further magnify the need for effective multiagency solutions. None of this would be possible without the type of teamwork and understanding that arises out of true interagency cooperation.

The CGSC Interagency Fellowship provides just such an opportunity to place military officers in a position to directly participate in developing solutions and building understanding that will allow greater coordination between DoD and other governmental agencies. The objectives of this program are in direct alignment with the requirements of today’s complex and challenging world. As the U.S. Army moves into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the synergy of interagency operations will depend, in large part, upon the ability of Army leaders to operate effectively with representatives of organizations outside DoD. There is no better program to prepare those leaders for this task than the U.S. Army CGSC Interagency Fellowship Program. IAJ
FEMA Releases Disaster Response Frameworks

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recently released updated editions of three of their five National Planning Frameworks. The National Planning Frameworks are part of FEMA’s National Preparedness System, which includes one Framework for each of the five preparedness mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Each Framework describes whole-of-community efforts to address the five mission areas, and summarizes the roles and responsibilities of those involved. The Frameworks also define the mission area’s core capabilities, list new and existing coordinating structures, and inform the development of interagency operational plans. The updated Frameworks involve the prevention, mitigation, and response to disasters.

The National Prevention Framework provides the context for how the whole community is involved in preventing terrorism, and how prevention efforts relate to all other parts of national preparedness. While the other Frameworks focus on all hazards (natural and man-made), the Prevention Framework is the only Framework that focuses solely on terrorism. Among the Prevention Framework’s core capabilities are intelligence and information sharing, interdiction and disruption, planning, and operational coordination.

The National Mitigation Framework covers the capabilities needed to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the effects of disasters. The Mitigation Framework focuses on building resilient communities that understand the risks they face and can address these risks. The Mitigation Framework’s core capabilities include threat and hazard identification, risk and disaster resilience assessment, planning, and long-term vulnerability reduction. Like the Prevention Framework, the Mitigation Framework also prioritizes operation coordination.

The National Response Framework focuses on saving lives, protecting property, and meeting basic human needs immediately before, during, and in the first few days after a disaster. This is the second edition of the Response Framework, the original having debuted in 2008. The new Response Framework is based on the original, but also focuses on whole community efforts, stressing the importance of individuals, families, and households in response activities. The new Response Framework has 14 core capabilities, which include planning, operational coordination, operational communications, infrastructure systems, health and safety, and other medical and care services.
Report Identifies Lessons Learned for Stability, Reconstruction Operations


The report explores the challenges faced by those involved in the various projects and programs during the nine-year reconstruction effort. Learning from Iraq also serves as a follow-up to SIGIR’s previous review, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, and includes lessons learned from SIGIR’s 220 audits, and 170 inspections. SIGIR’s audits of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) found expected weaknesses, but also revealed progress made by the programs. For example, SIGIR found that PRT success hinged on the performance of the PRT leader, while CERP success depended on limited project scopes and continuity of oversight.

The report reviews civil-military and law enforcement efforts in Iraq, and describes the many ad hoc entities that managed the rebuilding of Iraq, concluding with seven final lessons learned. These lessons involve civil-military planning, security, host-country engagement, management systems, oversight, and the preservation and future use of programs developed in Iraq.

USAID Partnership Focuses on Global Food Security

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Syngenta International AG, one of the world’s leading companies focused on increasing crop productivity and improving health and quality of life. The MOU broadens Syngenta and USAID’s partnership, and supports agriculture and food security activities in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

USAID and Syngenta’s collaborative efforts will include research and development, capacity building, and working with other agriculture and food security partners. USAID and Syngenta will work to advance agricultural development and food security goals that have been set by the governments of developing countries. These efforts will be supported by USAID and Feed the Future, a U.S. Government global hunger and food security initiative. USAID will also focus on increasing the use of technology and will expand access to tools like crop insurance and seed treatment.

USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah recently spoke about the importance of drought-tolerant seeds and crop insurance in food security, saying that USAID’s partnership with Syngenta would “reduce hunger and undernutrition across three different continents and help bring the end of extreme poverty within reach.” Mike Mack, Chief Executive Officer of Syngenta also stressed the important role public-private partnerships play in increasing farm productivity worldwide, saying that “partnerships such as this, drawing on the strengths of each party, will be catalysts for transforming agriculture […] especially in developing markets.”
State Releases International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

Early in March 2013, the Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) released the 2013 “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report” (INCSR). The INCSR provides an overview of counternarcotic efforts by the governments of over 90 countries and several U.S. departments and agencies to reduce illicit narcotics production, trafficking, and use in 2012. The two-part report documents efforts to combat all aspects of the international drug trade in 2012, with volume I covering drug and chemical control, and volume II covering money laundering and financial crimes.

Volume I identifies Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela as major drug transit and/or major illicit drug producing countries. The report also highlights Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotic agreements and implement the measures set forth by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Volume I also focuses attention on international counternarcotic training programs that are managed by INL. The INL training is implemented by a variety of U.S. government and law enforcement entities, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Money laundering and other financial crimes are covered in volume II of the INCSR, which lists over 60 countries as major money laundering countries in 2012. This volume also highlights the most significant steps countries and jurisdictions have taken to improve their anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing regimes. Volume II also details U.S. government counter-money laundering efforts by the Federal Reserve System as well as the Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Justice. IAJ

New Directive Addresses Critical Infrastructure Security

In February 2013, the White House released the “Presidential Policy Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience” (PPD-21). PPD-21 advances a national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure, and tasks various government entities with securing U.S. critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats.

The directive refines and clarifies functional relationships across the federal government to advance national unity of effort to strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience, while enabling efficient information exchange by identifying baseline data and systems requirements for the federal government. The directive will also implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning and operational decisions regarding critical infrastructure.

The directive also assigns roles and responsibilities to several government departments and entities. Among their specified duties under PPD-21, the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for identifying security and resilience functions that are necessary for effective public-
private engagement with all critical infrastructure sectors. The Secretary also develops a national plan in coordination with Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) and other critical infrastructure partners, and integrates and coordinates Federal cross-sector security and resilience activities.

SSAs have a variety of duties and roles in addressing threats to each critical infrastructure sector. Among these duties is coordinating and cooperating with DHS and other SSAs, including the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, Commerce, and Interior, as well as the Director of National Intelligence. IAJ

White House Releases Executive Order for Improving Cybersecurity

On February 12, the Obama Administration released their Executive Order for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity. The order creates a policy for addressing cyber intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure, and enhances the security and resilience of that infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes national security, economic security, and public health and safety systems. The order also increases the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement entities, while protecting intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, operations, and investigations.

The new order increases intergovernmental and interagency cooperation, and strengthens U.S. government partnerships with private sector entities. It also establishes a consultative process that requires the coordination of relevant councils, critical infrastructure owners and operators, various agencies, universities, experts, and state, local, territorial, and tribal governments. IAJ

Interagency Health Operations Essential to National Security

In a recent interview, Dr. Charles Beadling, director of the Department of Defense Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, stated that global health operations have an important role in U.S. national security. “We do feel that there is a strong link between global health engagement and security,” said Beadling, who noted that such efforts reduce insurgency and terrorism.

The Center focuses on the development end of the “three Ds” – diplomacy, defense, and development – and operates under the premise that health is “a global common good.” Beadling also stated that while the Center is still in its early stages of development, it is imperative that they work in close coordination with the U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations to achieve the Center’s mission.

The Center’s Emergency Management and Preparedness Program implemented their first program in Mozambique, in December 2012. IAJ
Interagency Task Force Releases Report on Human Trafficking

On April 9, 2013, the President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (PITF) released a progress report on their anti-trafficking efforts. *Progress in Combating Trafficking in Persons: The Obama Administration’s Accomplishments* is a compilation of PITF’s accomplishments as of February 2013.

The report focuses on achievements related to PITF’s ten strategic objectives, which prioritized the prosecution of traffickers and the dismantling of trafficking networks, enhanced anti-trafficking training, increased public awareness, better victim identification and treatment, and expanded partnership and collaboration efforts of U.S. government and international entities, among others. The report details the combined efforts of the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor in investigating human trafficking, as well as the formation and training of Anti-Trafficking Coordination Teams. The report also describes victim support and stakeholder training efforts by the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, Labor, Justice, Homeland Security, and Education, as well as those by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

PITF was authorized by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and established by Executive Order 13257 in 2002. PITF is comprised of various federal departments and agencies focused on a whole-of-government approach to address all aspects of human trafficking.*IAJ*

Davis-Monthan Hosts IA Personnel Recovery Exercise

Davis-Monthan Air Force Base recently hosted the world’s largest personnel recovery exercise. Angel Thunder 2013 took place from April 7 to April 20, with various training scenarios located in California, Arizona, and New Mexico. Davis-Monthan conducted the first Angel Thunder in 2006 as a base-specific exercise, but Angel Thunder has since grown to become an international and interagency training opportunity for all personnel recovery assets.

Angel Thunder 2013 is the largest and most realistic search and rescue exercise designed to provide personnel recovery and combat search and rescue training for combat aircrews, pararescue, intelligence personnel, battle managers, and joint search and rescue center personnel. The exercise included personnel from the U.S. Air Force Rescue forces, as well as their joint, interagency, and international counterparts. Participants trained for full spectrum personnel recovery operations with ground recovery personnel, air assets, special forces teams, and federal agents.

Angel Thunder 2013 included a variety of training scenarios, including exercises in air-sea battle, security cooperation, interagency operations, and support to civil authorities focused on catastrophic incident search and rescue.*IAJ*
In the decade before 9/11, the prospect that war with Iraq could leave the U.S. vulnerable in other theaters persuaded defense planners to retain the two-war doctrine. In broad outlines, the capability to wage two simultaneous military campaigns had served as a standard for preparedness since World War II. But by 2003, it was unclear whether U.S. forces were, in fact, up to the task, particularly in an international system replete with unconventional threats such as terrorism. The decision to invade Iraq amid ongoing fighting in Afghanistan tested the credibility of post-Cold War, U.S doctrine. Interestingly though, few works in the voluminous literature have analyzed the Afghanistan and Iraq missions in the framework of a multi-theater conflict. *From Kabul to Baghdad* fills the void with an accessible narrative of both military campaigns through 2012.

The three co-authors are defense academics by background and largely stay within their areas of expertise. *From Kabul to Baghdad* offers insightful critiques on how bureaucratic arrangements, management structures, and chains of command between Washington and the field impacted the war efforts. They err toward institutional explanations rather than focusing on the broad socio-political dynamics of the Middle East or on the types of personalized anecdotes that fill “insider accounts.”

The book’s analysis is enriched with historical background. By describing the simultaneous, multi-theater wars that have occurred since the eighteenth century, the authors consider the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions in proper perspective, highlighting America’s “long experience with dual campaigns.” Their account of the U.S. experience with counterinsurgency doctrine in the 1980s and early 1990s dispels the “common misperception, often repeated and almost considered gospel…that the U.S. military, and in particular the army, deliberately and systematically avoided thinking about counterinsurgency doctrine in an attempt to bury the ghosts of Viet Nam.”

The strongest sections of the book are those that illustrate how events in one theater impacted outcomes in the other. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the authors note, were doubly taxing on the military, since both conflicts, by virtue of their centers of gravity in the greater Middle East, were housed under Central Command (CENTCOM). Thus, CENTCOM was responsible for managing deployments, logistics, and intelligence in both theaters. Its planners were consumed with dilemmas stemming from the reality that certain military assets such as airborne reconnaissance...
would be stretched beyond their operational capabilities.

With CENTCOM overtasked, the fates of the two missions were determined in large part by the improvisations of diplomats and commanders in the field. The results were mixed. Notable is the authors’ convincing, if somewhat counterintuitive, thesis that the diversion of attention from Afghanistan to Iraq actually contributed to successes in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2005. Resource constraints incentivized Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and General David Barno to leverage “all elements of national power” available to them through the collaborative efforts of “a true interagency team.” The wide autonomy that Khalilzad and Barno enjoyed due to Washington’s focus on Iraq allowed them to shift from a counterterrorism to counterinsurgency mission, with little bureaucratic resistance. The authors succeed in showing how “a uniquely structured U.S. country team that seamlessly blended diplomatic, informational, economic, and military means” enabled the U.S. to cajole Afghan leaders on sensitive issues such as national elections, warlords, and the building of national security forces.

However, lessons from the 2003–2005 Afghanistan experience only haphazardly informed operations during the duration of the U.S. wars in the two theaters. Greater oversight from Washington notwithstanding, the Iraq mission in its early stages went awry due to the dysfunction between the Coalition Provisional Authority and Combined Joint Task Force 7. When more cohesive teams arrived in Baghdad, counterinsurgency lessons from Afghanistan contributed to the turnaround in Iraq. But by then, disengagement from Washington, which had provided Khalilzad and Barno with room to innovate, backfired when a less dynamic country team took charge in Kabul, and NATO allies assumed greater responsibility from the U.S. in Afghanistan during the peak of the civil war in Iraq.

While the book’s military analysis is generally persuasive, the authors’ final assessments of the two wars’ outcomes are more mixed. On the positive side, the authors capture the scope of the transformation that the military underwent through the wars: “The full integration of irregular and conventional capabilities and techniques exhibited by American forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan represented a new way of warfare at the tactical and operational levels.”

The book’s underlying skepticism of the decision to fight simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, is too often influenced by debatable assumptions that the authors fail to defend. At times, the authors attribute missteps to operational handicaps imposed by simultaneous operations in the two theaters when more pertinent explanations are found simply in context-specific misjudgments. An example is CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks’s failure to deploy Army Rangers at Tora Bora in December 2001.

Dubious too is the authors’ rather sanguine assessment of Pakistani intentions. “Pakistan had hoped to develop strategic depth in Afghanistan, but it most likely will reap increased instability…” the authors predict, without recognizing that fomenting instability could in fact be consistent with Pakistan’s idea of strategic depth. The authors’ evident under-appreciation of the Pakistani threat may explain the book’s remarkable theory that the U.S. “would have been prudent to have withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan in 2005 after the departure of David Barno and Zal Khalilzad from Kabul.” Such a bold claim requires, at a minimum, answers to questions that the authors do not address. What would have happened to fragile coalition and Afghan gains had U.S. forces not been available to impede the onslaught of Pakistan-backed insurgents? How would the Iraq War have unfolded in a strategic context in which emboldened terrorist networks like al Qaeda had filled the vacuum from a U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan?
These shortcomings however do not detract from the book’s enduring value. Even if future presidents agree with the authors that the U.S. should “fight two enemies simultaneously…only under the most dire of circumstances,” history points to the uncomfortable reality that more multi-theater wars could be on the horizon. IAJ

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Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization

Edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer


Reviewed by Richard E. Berkebile, Ph.D.; Heather R. Karambelas; G. Scott Thompson; and Christopher J. Heatherly

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Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, a collective work of nineteen different authors, is topical, not collaborative, so there is plenty of overlap and some helpful divergence in perspective. The stated aim of the book is to educate national and international security leaders on the current and growing threat from the hybridization of organized criminal, insurgent, and terrorist groups or rapidly-formed, symbiotic relationships among them—in a word convergence. The book is largely successful on this score. Although the effort to persuade on the danger of convergence is often overwrought, readers will walk away convinced of the real damage to economies, governance, and victims and the beneficial aspects of the globalized international system.

The book is descriptive in its content; audiences seeking theories and causal mechanisms will need to look elsewhere. A recurring theme is the need for a networked response to a networked threat. Nonetheless, the networks described are horizontal among agencies of the national government or multilateral among states. There is little more than a passing description of vertical networking to local governments, commercial interests, or the private sector. The collection makes several sound proposals for making better use of existing interagency, diplomatic, and military tools, but does
little to promote radical innovation to counteract an adaptive and agile threat.

Part I, A Clear and Present Danger, frames the global environment as one that encourages a flourishing market of illegal goods and services, and it describes the problem of illicit networks. Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber label this problem “deviant globalization.” They describe the legal global market and the technological improvements that enhance the ability to match supply with demand for goods and services. Gilman et al. then describe how these advances benefit those dealing in illicit distribution of goods and services. They conclude with a recommendation for a strategic shift away from prohibition-type policies.

Phil Williams continues the theme of describing the twenty-first century environment in which lawlessness and disorder are driving increases in illegal market supply and demand. He discusses complex trends overlapping and challenging state resources in a way that provides opportunity for a “rise of alternative governance.” He persuasively argues current policies are not working and warns of an approaching “perfect storm” of even more disorder. Justin Picard confronts the “challenge of measuring the collective size and impact of illicit markets and networks.” He compares pronouncements in policy and media circles to quantifiable statistics. Picard convincingly uses data to dispute conventional wisdom and points the way forward for future models and evidence-based policy.

Part II, Complex Illicit Operations, refines the concept of the flourishing black market economy with more analysis and examples. Each essay provides a perspective accessible to the generalist with little or no background knowledge. This section, however, would benefit from more focus on how this information could inform deeper study or policy development.

Duncan Deville considers the effect of illicit trade networks on governance. Responding to the same market forces as commercial enterprises, these organizations form efficient and adaptable networks. Deville posits criminal methods such as violence and bribery damage governmental functions in states where they operate. Douglas Farah focuses on the lateral actors enabling networks to function. “Fixers” connect local criminal enterprises to global financial markets, either gray markets for exchange or occasionally to legitimate companies. These access services and managed connections make one “fixer” critical to dozens of criminal efforts.

Switching away from the networks themselves, Patrick Keefe examines environmental features of criminal hubs—geographic locations where illicit networks operate. Analyzing characteristics such as state degradation, poverty, and corruption, he argues conventional wisdom is incorrect. Criminal enterprises operate wherever conditions are favorable and not just in failed states. Lindholm and Realuyo provide an overview of financial instruments and methods used to smuggle bulk cash and launder money through Internet gaming. Contemporary criminal enterprises rapidly and efficiently raise, move, and hide money and necessitate synchronization among financial intelligence and law enforcement, international institutions, and national governments to combat the problem. Louise Shelley focuses on a particular financial abuse: money laundering through real estate transactions. She highlights the lack of legislation, potential impact on broader financial markets, and dearth of study in this area. Shelley also explains consequences such as overbuilding, artificially elevated residential and commercial real estate prices, and the prospective triggering of a global financial crisis.

Part III, The Attack on Sovereignty, identifies threats to state sovereignty. Michael Miklaucic and Moises Naim propose a useful typology describing the degree of criminalization within a state and convincingly debunk the previous era’s assumptions about the nature of organized crime.
Using a spectrum from infiltration to becoming the regime itself, they explain how illicit actors exploit the rule-based international system of sovereign states to increase their effectiveness and survivability. Written from the viewpoint of a global power—the U.S.—their arguments are less persuasive on the threat to the international order as a whole, and they do not examine weaknesses in their proposed multinational and government-centric cures.

Whereas Miklaucic and Naim’s typology examines the convergence of criminal organizations and state, John Sullivan describes the degree of criminal independence and impunity from state sovereignty. Using examples from Mexico and Central America, he details the usurpation of specific sovereign tasks by illicit actors. Sullivan somewhat abruptly introduces a “generation of gangs” typology, but his explanation is cursory and dependent on a different publication. Vanda Felbab-Brown presents a compelling case study on the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of U.S. and allied counternarcotic policies in Afghanistan. Her detailed description of the tradeoffs in regards to suppressing drug production, economic development, and pacification are a must read for law enforcement, military, and development practitioners and researchers alike. Unfortunately, Felbab-Brown’s case study is misplaced in the collection in general and the sovereignty section in particular. The chapter does not use the term “sovereignty.” One can glean implications for foreign influenced state capacity and sovereignty building, but readers are on their own.

Having described the myriad number of global threat organizations, Part IV Fighting Back describes how the U.S. and its allies employ multiple ways, ends, and means to confront them. Each chapter describes elements of America’s response strategy, under the auspices of the Departments of State, Defense, and other government agencies, to work with international and private-sector partners against global narco-criminal-terrorist threats. In essence, Part IV reiterates the case for and explains how the U.S. employs a network to meet a networked threat.

David Luna advocates a network-centric method in a “fight fire with fire” approach. Luna explains how threat networks leverage differences in individual nation’s border security. In response, he argues for the greater international community to adopt a holistic, networked plan of action. He cites the Obama administration’s “2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security” (SCTOC) as a positive step. The SCTOC “aims to protect Americans and citizens of partner nations from violence and exploitation at the hands of transnational criminal networks.” Luna describes the program, its associated goals, and implementation strategies through longstanding bodies such as the Organization of American States and new initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Network.

William Wechsler and Gary Barnabo continue this theme by examining the Department of Defense (DoD) role. They explain how narco-criminal organizations cooperate with non-state actors and terrorist groups to threaten national security. Wechsler and Barnabo employ a series of case studies, beginning with U.S. support to Columbia in the 1980s, to highlight DoD ability to contribute to the overall fight against threat networks. They examine the spectrum of DoD capabilities including military-to-military support, building partner capacity, providing intelligence to law enforcement, and direct action operations. Celina Realuyo concludes the SCTOC study by discussing interagency and international roles. She begins with the by now familiar review of illicit networks and explains how their activities overlap to threaten four key elements of global supply chain management — material, manpower, money, and mechanisms. Realuyo discusses past successes and continuing challenges of several interagency and international programs, citing the collaborative efforts of Joint Interagency Task Force South as the best model.
A key element missing from *Convergence* is a thorough “no-holds barred” analysis on the effectiveness of programs and friendly networks in combating the threat. Workshops, information sharing, international agreements, and similar programs are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. However, a key question remains unanswered: Are these initiatives making a difference? The authors highlight individual successes, but the work lacks a comprehensive analysis on the overall efficacy of these programs. *IAJ*

**Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: A Strategic, Participatory, Systems-Based Handbook on Human Security**

*by Lisa Schirch*

Kumarian Press, 250 pp., $22.00.

*Reviewed by Lt. Col. Celestino Perez, U.S. Army, Ph.D. - U.S. Army Command and General Staff College*

Lisa Schirch’s volume “aims to improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding by better linking conflict assessment to self-assessment, theories of change, and the design, monitoring, and evaluation of peacebuilding efforts at all levels, from community-based projects to international policies.” Her approach shares affinities with other practice-minded studies of conflict mitigation, such as the Berghof Foundation’s Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II, the U.S. government’s “Interagency Conflict and Assessment Framework,” and the U.S. Army’s Design Methodology. Schirch’s contribution represents a thoughtful—and necessary—complement to these predecessors. Yet, I suggest, the volume must be part of a broader, educational effort attuned to the granular realities of conflict dynamics and collective action.

*Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning* (CAPP) handbook insists on the use of a structured exploration of peacebuilders’ biases and the dynamics of conflict. The book advocates a systems approach, which includes mapping the relationships between “stakeholders” and potential “peacebuilding actors,” the “factors driving and mitigating conflict,” and “the existing peacebuilding activities taking place in different sectors.” These actors, factors, and activities compose an “ecological relationship” characterized by interdependence; hence, the book’s approach emphasizes “the importance of understanding the whole system rather than just discrete elements of a conflict.”

The author recommends “whole of society” interventions because “neither government nor civil society can build peace alone.” Since “peacebuilding includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national, and international levels,” the CAPP handbook envisions collective action among multifarious governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Each of these entities is to strive chiefly toward “human security” and accordingly “align” and “link” their more parochial security and organizational interests.
Schirch’s volume is to serve as the shared playbook for this coordinated and linked (i.e., “strategic”) peacebuilding.

The CAPP handbook includes 13 chapters organized around an explication of five iterative activities. First, self-assessment obliges researchers to “spend less time examining the question of ‘What can we do to change them’ and more time asking the question of ‘What can we do differently that might influence our own role in the conflict?’” Second, conflict assessment requires research in accordance with a journalistic, interrogative framework comprising where, who, why, what, how, and when questions. These questions help researchers uncover a conflict’s context, including connections and cleavages among the population, key stakeholders, motivations, grievances, interests, needs, power, means, timelines, and violence-inducing triggers, as well as windows of vulnerability, opportunity, and uncertainty.

Third, the CAPP handbook requires the specification of a theory of change, which “is a statement about how a program hopes to foster change to produce intended outcomes and impacts.” Fourth, the author imparts design and planning guidance with an emphasis on “key principles of peacebuilding design,” such as the prioritization of local ownership, local leadership, transparency, accountability, and the “do no harm” imperative. Finally, the CAPP handbook offers considerations to help monitor and evaluate “whether the intent of the design matched the impact in the real world.”

As a military professional and educator, I see much merit in Schirch’s volume. She succeeds in crafting a readable, jargon-free work whose several figures, question sets, and lenses will guide aspiring peacebuilders through conceptual and substantive terrain they would otherwise miss. Its premise is that mindful, systematic research must precede planning and intervention and will productively discomfit those governmental agencies and representatives whose cultural, organizational, and logistical habits discourage sustained research, planning, and cooperative action. Similarly, her emphasis on whole-of-society will force military professionals, whose boots are invariably on the ground in trouble spots, to de-center their approach to conflict intervention by hewing more authentically to a “unified action” mantra, whereby service members work with all partners—governmental, nongovernmental, public, and private—on stabilization and peace.

Yet Schirch’s approach does raise questions that relate not to any theoretical weaknesses in her book for it is quite strong, but to the ways in which real wars and conflicts occur. She presents her work as an improvement on other approaches, which tend to fail because they neglect research and planning, local knowledge and dynamics, or assessments. The reader infers that Schirch’s is to be the first method that—if adhered to—will be efficacious. But what empirical back-up does she have for such a claim? How can she be sure that whole-of-society is possible and works? Given the reality of complexity that Schirch embraces, what empirical basis do we have to believe that judicious planning really is the one factor among countless others that conduces to hygienic conflict termination? What about the roles of exhaustion, military superiority, coalition building, successful ethnic cleansing and genocide, diplomatic prowess, military strategy, military tactics, fear, financing, foreign intervention, leadership, and good old-fashioned contingency, fog, and friction? When peacebuilding does achieve short-term success via, say, negotiated settlements, how often do these settlements become—over time—counterproductive and bloody? Put simply, what is the author’s own “theory of change,” such that whole-of-society peacebuilding can overtake these other (often deleterious) factors as the principal cause of peace?

The CAPP handbook envisions strategic planning that “coordinates multiple actors, works at
multiple levels in multiple sectors, and works at both short- and long-term change.” What enduring structural factors physically obstruct such coordination? What institutional incentives exist to render Schirch’s approach, if not overly optimistic at least a tad too ambitious? What cultural and psychological biases resident among governmental and nongovernmental organizations might render aspects of her approach problematic, even in the wake of a thorough self-assessment?

Despite the foregoing questions, Schirch’s volume provokes much less than neglects and “interagency” advocates should study the CAPP handbook. The push for greater “interagency” coordination is well-known; yet, the rhetoric-to-reality ratio remains disappointing. I suspect “whole-of-society” will present an even greater challenge, since the concept is as yet insufficiently theorized, socialized, and, in practice, exponentially more difficult.

I recommend the CAPP handbook as a useful bureaucratic gadfly, but I would supplement it with two texts, each a gateway to further study. First, I recommend The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid. The authors use Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework to examine—theoretically and empirically—the challenges that confront collective-action problems of the kind peacebuilders encounter. Specifically, aspiring peacebuilders (including military professionals and bureaucrats) should learn to recognize the perverse incentive structures that engender free-riding, moral hazard, principal-agent situations, adverse selection, signaling problems, rent-seeking, and corruption. These pathologies invariably arise in every detail of peacebuilding, but also in every detail of security cooperation, security force assistance, anti-corruption efforts, humanitarian aid, and development assistance.

Second, I suggest aspiring peacebuilders read Stathis Kalyvas’s The Logic of Violence in Civil War. This scholarship and others in the same genre (by James Fearon, David Laitin, Paul Collier, Patricia Sullivan, Fotini Christia, Paul Staniland, Elizabeth Wood, Monica Duffy Toft, et al.) have uncovered hidden and counterintuitive dynamics at play that, if known to peacebuilders, might render their interventions more efficacious. Abductive reasoning, or the practice of crafting theory-informed explanations for a specific, real-world problem, is the name of the game. Schirch’s volume certainly conduces to abductive reasoning and, thereby, political judgment. But it is a very difficult game indeed, and the integration of expert knowledge of institutional pathology and civil wars can only help.