The National Security Council Deputies Committee

Engine of the Policy Process

by Mark Wilcox

"They are a hugely influential group of public officials that most of the public knows very little about."

John Norris, CEO of the Enough Project.¹

Action by the agencies of the United States government at the operational and tactical levels is premised on policy and decisions made inside the Beltway at the strategic level. While the heavyweights who meet as the National Security Council (NSC) garner the public’s attention, more often than not it is their deputies who do the heavy lifting. Working as the NSC Deputies Committee (DC), they process inputs from subordinates and the lower-level groups that do the nuts and bolts work on policy, tee up issues for consideration by the NSC and decision by the President, and manage responses to crises. The NSC DC is, in fact, the engine of the policy process.

The National Security Act of 1947 established the NSC and its statutory members and advisers. Over time, Presidents have added the NSC Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the National Security Adviser) to assist them in discharging their national security responsibilities. Presidents have also created standing and ad hoc committees and other bodies to manage the process of formulating and executing national security policy. Since the late 1980s, to some extent as a result of lessons learned from the Reagan Administration’s Iran-Contra affair, the DC has played a key role within the NSC system. The endurance of the DC over the course of multiple presidential administrations from both political parties attests to its effectiveness.

The goal of this article is to offer insights into the organization and functioning of this hugely influential group of public officials over the course of several presidential administrations. Because the content of DC meetings is classified, this article draws on studies of the NSC, memoirs of participants, and open-source reporting to paint a picture of the workings of the DC.

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**Origins of the Deputies Committee**

The immediate predecessor to the DC was the Policy Review Group (PRG) established by President Reagan’s National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair. Carlucci’s successor, General Colin Powell, later lamented that the George H.W. Bush administration eliminated the PRG in its initial national security decision-making structure. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) under Bush, Powell witnessed a dysfunctional crisis-management process as the administration grappled with an attempted *coup d’état* against Panamanian leader General Manuel Noriega in early October 1989. This experience, as recounted by Powell, would lead to the birth of the DC:

This [the Panama crisis] was my first opportunity to see the Bush team in action and I was surprised that critical deliberations were taking place with no preparation or follow-up planned. The PRG system that Frank Carlucci and I created had been dismantled by the new team. Brent Scowcroft, a sharp player, later diagnosed the problem and reorganized by reincarnating the PRG as the Deputies Committee, chaired by Bob Gates, his deputy.²

The DC can trace its official birth to 25 October 1989, when Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Adviser, issued a supplement to National Security Directive (NSD) 1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” that directed the NSC DC “be responsible for day to day crisis management, reporting to the National Security Council.”³ The DC thereby transformed from purely “a forum for policy development, sifting through different options and narrowing choices for the president and his principals to consider” to a body also “responsible for meeting regularly at times of crisis, summarizing information, developing options, and following up on any decisions the president had made.”⁴

**The Gold Standard**

The NSC system Brent Scowcroft ran for President Bush is widely held up as the gold standard. Under the chairmanship of Scowcroft’s deputy, Robert Gates, the DC became “the engine of the policy process.”⁵ Records maintained at the George H.W. Bush Library show that the DC met 433 times between February 1989 and January 1993.⁶ In his memoir, Gates explained that the DC was the administration’s senior-level group charged with managing the national security process. “This group…would develop the medium- and long-range objectives of U.S. policy and would manage U.S. policy day to day through one of the most remarkable periods in modern history…the DC was also assigned by the President to handle crisis management for the American government.”⁷

The performance of the DC under President George H.W. Bush owed its success to the people involved—thanks to both their individual personalities and stature in their respective organizations and the management of the process. The members of the DC developed friendship and trust, “cutting down dramatically on the personal backstabbing and departmental jockeying that had been so familiar.” The members of the group also “never forgot that it was [their] bosses and ultimately the President...
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management issues that occupied the nominal deputies in these departments. The second rule was that the “deputy” had to have round-the-clock, immediate access to the department or agency principal.9

Robert Gates’s adroit management of the DC also contributed to its effectiveness. Aside from maintaining closeness to National Security Adviser Scowcroft and President Bush, Gates was skilled at preparing and running meetings of the DC. Richard Haass, a member of the NSC staff at the time, wrote that Gates’s talent for meeting management “…is worth noting because meetings are so prevalent and so few people know how to conduct them.” Haass described a meeting management process that aimed to achieve results and ensure common understanding among the participants:

Beforehand he and I would sit down to review what needed to be discussed, what was likely to come up, and where we wanted things to come out. People got the chance to say their piece but not to filibuster. We would get through the agenda in the allotted time, and at the close of the meeting everyone understood what had been decided and what was expected in the way of follow-up.10

Continuity (With a Few Adjustments)

President Clinton retained the NSC system, including the DC Scowcroft had established under President Bush. One significant change, however, was the addition of Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore’s national security adviser, to the committee’s membership.11 Fuerth’s participation in national security decision making, as a representative of the Office of the Vice President set a precedent that pre-dated the active intervention of Vice President Cheney in national security affairs in the George W. Bush administration.

The DC, along with the Principals Committee and working groups below the deputies, survived the transition to the George W. Bush administration. Under National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s tutelage, the NSC system worked in an “orderly policy process.” Issues were first worked in interagency committee meetings (Policy Coordination Committees [PCCs]), then by the deputies, and finally by the principals and the NSC. Inherent in such an orderly and hierarchical process, however, was the potential for delay. As an example, the Counterterrorism and Security Group reported to the DC under Rice’s system, rather than to the Principals Committee, as had been the case during the Clinton Administration.

The effect of this decision, according to one observer, “was to delay the development of an effective strategy [toward Al Qaeda]. While other issues such as Iraq and missile defense...
were fast-tracked and quickly discussed by the principals, Al Qaeda and terrorism were moving along slowly. It would take more than three months to convene the first DC meeting on the issue.”

As was the case in the NSC system under President Clinton, the “deputies” who attended the meetings were not always the department deputy secretaries. In the case of the Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith assumed many of the departmental lead duties for the DC, much as Paul Wolfowitz had done for his deputy secretary during the George H.W. Bush administration. Membership on the DC also remained a part-time job that nonetheless required mastery of (or at least familiarity with) a host of issues, as Feith explained in his memoir:

Regulars on the Deputies Committee… did not deal only with a particular region, function, or subject matter, but with whatever national security issues arose. Work crossed our desks as a profuse tangle of diverse demands for attention—some important, some merely pressing, some both.

The DC and the Policy “Battle Rhythm”

Whether in the routine formulation of policy or during crisis management, the DC meetings fall within whatever schedule, or “battle rhythm” in military parlance, the administration follows. During a crisis, the battle rhythm could prove to be quite robust, as Robert Kimmitt, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the George H.W. Bush administration, described it during the crisis over Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait:

8:00 AM Internal State Department “all hands” meeting.

10:00 AM Interagency PCC meeting.

(immediately preceded by an internal State Department small group meeting).

11:00 AM DC meeting by video teleconference.

12:00 PM DC “small group” meeting at the White House.

2:00 PM Expanded DC meeting at the White House.

Additional DC small group and internal State Department meetings would usually follow.

Richard Armitage, a veteran of several administrations and Colin Powell’s Deputy Secretary of State during the George W. Bush administration, offered a blunt take on the NSC system’s battle rhythm and the place of the DC in it:

We’d get on the gerbil wheel every morning getting ready for these DCs [DC meetings] and PCs [Principals Committee meetings]… Then we’d get off the gerbil wheel and wait for an answer. No answer would ever come back from the NSC, so we’d get back on the gerbil wheel the next morning.

The battle rhythm depends on the role assigned to the DC in a given administration and the scope of issues that fall within its purview. According to one source, the DC in the Obama Administration has conducted a standing meeting once a week in the White House situation room. “In a busy stretch [then-Deputy National Security Adviser Thomas] Donilon might lead as many as four deputies meetings in one day.” Under these circumstances, the members of the DC cannot be expected to command detailed information on each issue, so they depend on their “plus ones,” the assistant secretary-level officials and others who accompany them for preparation, inputs, and advice during the meetings.
Military Advice

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The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) represents the CJCS and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the DC. In this capacity, the VCJS must stay abreast of both operations and policy issues. The VCJCS and the rest of the deputies “usually analyzed the issues first and then presented options to the principals, the leaders of the departments and agencies represented on the National Security Council.”17 In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, for example, the members of the DC immediately turned their collective attention to military responses. The DC met by video teleconference at 6:30 PM on 11 September 2001 to prepare for a meeting of the NSC the next afternoon. Then VCJCS General Richard Myers and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke from the Pentagon, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley from the White House, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage from the State Department, and various members of the intelligence community from their offices. Topics of discussion included the status of military units, terrorist target lists, potential allies and partners, and initial military options.18

Collaboration between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) about what military advice to offer to the deputies (and principals in both the Principals Committee and the NSC) was not always evident. General Peter Pace, who served as both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Vice Chairman, recalled that when he was the Director of Operations (J3) from 1996 to 1997 the Joint Staff often prepared its position independently of OSD. At White House meetings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD representatives frequently did not know what the other might say. From 2001 to 2007, the situation was completely different. The Joint Staff and OSD coordinated their positions closely, and the Chairman or, in the case of DC meetings, the Vice Chairman, would ride to the White House with his OSD counterpart, so when they arrived for the meeting at the White House, “there was absolute clarity on what everybody’s position was.”19

Post-9/11 and Iraq

The work of the DC in preparing options for actions at the operational and tactical levels was on full display as the George W. Bush administration debated a response to the 9/11 attacks and later shifted to planning for the invasion of Iraq. The deputies had taken up the topic of terrorism and, specifically, Osama Bin Laden, prior to 9/11. In April 2001, the DC recommended a policy that would arm the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban. In July, the deputies recommended a plan to take the offensive against Al Qaeda, destabilize it, and eliminate it.20 Following the 9/11 attacks, the deputies met regularly to discuss homeland security, U.S. desiderata for support from various countries for potential operations in Afghanistan, reconstruction and stabilization in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and new threats (e.g., radiological weapons).21

In the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks, the deputies met to prepare initial U.S. responses. On 13 September, the DC met in advance of the critical meeting of the NSC that would take place the next day at Camp David. The deputies considered three options National
Security Adviser Rice’s staff had developed: attack Al Qaeda targets only; attack Al Qaeda and Taliban targets; and attack Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Iraq threat. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, and VCJCS Myers were the primary interlocutors.22 When the DC debated whether to restrain the Northern Alliance forces as they moved toward Kabul in October 2001, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin raised his concern that too rapid an advance by the Northern Alliance might alienate the Pashtuns. McLaughlin’s intervention during the 9 October DC meeting led Wolfowitz, in an aside to his “plus one” Douglas Feith, to remark on how frequently CIA officials made policy arguments.23 Implied in Wolfowitz’s aside was an admonition to intelligence community representatives to limit themselves to providing intelligence and remain aloof from policy advocacy, which might color their intelligence judgments. As the executor of policy via a covert operation, in other words, as the owner of the boots on the ground at the tactical level, the CIA deputy had a policy stake in this instance.

The deputies’ involvement in broad, strategic planning that would pave the way for subsequent action on the ground was evident in the Bush Administration and its approach to Iraq, which made its way to the deputies’ agenda shortly after President Bush’s inauguration. One of the first topics was support for Iraqi opposition groups, such as Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC). According to Bob Woodward’s account, the deputies’ goal was “to increase pressure on Saddam, to try to create fissures and disagreements within the regime,” and “the debate was passionate about how far and how fast to go with the opposition.” Indicative of the divisiveness of this aspect of policy toward Iraq among the deputies was their failure to reach agreement, which led the DC to pass the issue up to the full NSC on 1 June 2001.26 Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, who chaired the committee, convened the deputies four times between 31 May and 26 July 2001 “to work the Iraq policy.” The deputies’ work resulted in a Top Secret paper entitled “A Liberation Strategy” that they forwarded to the principals on 1 August 2001.
Beginning in November 2002, the DC debated the transition of power in post-Saddam Iraq following the end of major combat operations.27 Douglas Feith described the nature of the DC’s work on Iraq, which by the summer of 2002 “dealt less with whether the United States should press for regime change and more on how to bring it about.”28 Feith’s description succinctly captured the essence of the planning the deputies carried out in Washington, which he explained differed significantly from the military planners’ work at the United States Central Command:

The planning documents written by officials in Washington were, as a rule, general, conceptual, strategic, and short. They were referred to as policy plans. Steve Hadley and the DC orchestrated this Washington work, coordinating input from an elaborate set of interagency groups.29

### The DC and the Obama Administration

President Obama’s first National Security Adviser James Jones assigned the DC three responsibilities:

- “Review and monitor” the work of the interagency process, to include the Interagency Policy Committees. Specifically, the DC “shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC [Principals Committee] or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision.”
- Implement policy (a task for “significant attention”) to include “periodic reviews” of major foreign policy initiatives “to ensure they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner.”
- Day-to-day crisis management.30

The Deputy National Security Adviser who chairs the DC is responsible to set the agenda, ensure required papers are prepared, and record and circulate conclusions of the DC meetings to members of the interagency. The DC is charged to “...ensure that all papers to be discussed by the NSC or the NSC/PC fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications or each.”31

Jones, in his broad guidance on the interagency process in the Obama Administration, reinforced the role of the DC in monitoring policy implementation. As part of “an NSC that monitors strategic implementation, the DC will be responsible for establishing a system for tracking implementation so that Principals can be informed regularly about where progress has been made as well as where critical benchmarks are not being met.”32 Jones also set out a series of general principles to guide interagency meetings, including those of the DC. A number of these principles are reminiscent of the procedures Robert Gates employed during his tenure as the Deputy National Security Adviser and Chairman of the DC during the administration of President George H.W. Bush:

- There will be a regular and announced schedule of PC and DC meetings.
- There will be an agreed agenda for each meeting which will be circulated to participants well in advance of regular
meetings

- As standard practice, discussion papers will be circulated to participants at least 48 hours prior to regular meetings.

- Every meeting will end with clear agreement on what was decided and what may have not been decided. Such an ending will also include the delegation of responsibilities for implementation. Summaries of conclusions reflecting agreements will be circulated within 48 hours of any meeting.

- Each agency in NSC meetings will be represented by the relevant member plus one other agency representative, unless specifically excepted. Substitutes for members will occur only with the approval of the chair.

- Agency representatives must be able to speak for their agency.

- Deputies should be able to speak for their Principals; if necessary. Principals’ concurrence will be obtained within 24 hours of any DC meeting.33

The DC has habitually operated outside the spotlight, however, in January 2010, a meeting of the DC on Sudan policy caught the attention of a coalition of Sudan advocacy groups. The coalition bought an advertisement in The Washington Post in an effort to call attention to the deputies by name (U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice’s deputy Erica Barks-Ruggles, Deputy National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levy, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy) and to influence the policy discussion.34 John Norris, Chief executive Officer of the Enough Project, told a blogger for Foreign Policy magazine, “We’re not trying to hold [the deputies’] feet to the fire...It’s not an effort to demonize them, but we recognize they are key decision makers” (emphasis added).35 According to one report of the Sudan meeting, which apparently did not go well, the deputies were limited to sharing their views and their agencies’ assessments of the issue, because “the briefing paper that was to have all the agencies’ positions clearly spelled out was not prepared in advance, hurting the deputies’ ability to iron out any differences.” The same report asserted that National Security Staff Director for Africa Michelle Gavin received a dressing-down from Deputy National Security Adviser (and DC chairman) Thomas Donilon for the lack of preparation.36 If true, this omission violated the “standard practice” set out in the third of National Security Adviser Jones’ general principles listed above. Whether this deviation from procedure reflected a shortcoming in the functioning of the DC and supporting staff or the contentious nature of Sudan policy within the Obama administration at the time remains unclear.

Subsequent events, for example the uprisings in North Africa and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, demonstrated that the DC has retained its responsibility for various aspects of crisis-management throughout the Obama Administration. As a part of the battle rhythm of meetings at the White House to deal with the crisis in Egypt that began in January 2011, daily
morning meetings of the DC under the chairmanship of Deputy National Security Adviser Denis McDonough established the “‘play of the day’— in West Wing jargon—a plan for responding to the day’s unfolding events.”37 In the case of the disaster in Japan, the DC became the forum for discussion about whether to authorize the departure of USG dependents from Japan following the meltdowns at the Fukushima nuclear power station. “A number of heated DC meetings,” which also included the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, John Roos and military commanders in the region, eventually led to Washington’s decision to authorize the voluntary departure of dependents, a step that addressed the concern for the safety of U.S. citizens while not undermining confidence in the Japanese government. In this case of crisis management, the DC gathered inputs from outside the Beltway and brought in players such as the Department of Energy and the White House Science Adviser, who contributed expertise not normally resident in the committee.38 The DC was involved in not only assigning tasks to the operational- and tactical-level operators who implement policy, but also in ensuring the welfare of these operators and their families.

Conclusion

The NSC DC remains a lynchpin in the national security policy and execution process. When military and civilian personnel carry out the tasks of defense, diplomacy, and development on the ground, chances are the DC had a hand in the process. Presidents, national security advisers, and cabinet secretaries have come to rely on their deputies to collectively formulate U.S. policy and develop guidance for the entire government, whether in regard to routine matters or during management of crises. President Bush and President Obama’s promotions of deputy national security advisers Stephen Hadley and Thomas Donilon, respectively, to the post of national security advisers highlight the value they place on these individuals and, indirectly, the DC. The committee’s members depend on the work of their assistant secretaries, bureau chiefs, desk officers, and action officers—the officials who comprise the next lower level of NSC committees (be they interagency working groups, policy coordinating committees, or interagency policy committees) to do the “nug work” in support of their deliberations.

The endurance of the DC over the course of multiple presidential administrations from both political parties attests to its effectiveness in the national security policy formulation and execution system. As the insights cited in this article suggest, the committee’s deliberations are not always easy, as bureaucratic and genuine policy differences are aired out. Nonetheless, when the deputies build relationships based on trust and operate under a clearly understood set of rules and procedures, their collective efforts as the DC add value to the national security policy formulation process and set the conditions for coordinated interagency execution on the ground. **IAJ**
Notes


8 Ibid.

9 Rothkopf, p. 267. See also Daalder and Destler, p.185.


11 Daalder and Destler, p. 213.

12 Ibid., p. 263.


14 Rothkopf, p. 270. During the Gulf Crisis, “the deputies would meet at least twice a day and often more frequently to keep track of the seventy-five detailed items that had to be handled each and every day.” See also Daalder and Destler, p. 185.

15 Daalder and Destler, p. 277.


21 Ibid., pp. 111, 175, 193, and 227.
22 Feith, p. 49.
23 Ibid., p. 98.
25 Ibid., p. 431.
27 Ibid., pp. 280–281.
28 Feith, p. 274.
29 Ibid., p. 275. Feith offered this explanation as part of his case that the Bush administration did not neglect postwar planning for Iraq. Regardless of the merits of his argument or one’s view on this issue, Feith’s insight into the Deputies Committee’s planning responsibilities is useful.
31 Ibid., p. 4.
33 Jones, p. 4.
34 Rogin.
35 Ibid.