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How Operations in Haiti and Japan Informed Joint Publication 3-08: The Future of Interorganizational Operations

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Arthur D. Simons Center
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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by David J. Pasquale

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Introduction

Interorganizational efforts are the foundation of the whole-of-government approach and vital to harnessing the combined efforts of the nation's power and integrating that power with allies.¹ Since September 2001, numerous agencies within the United States government have contributed to the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DoD) and other organizations have benefitted from the interaction and the joint learning environment these missions provided. As the government brings closure to its efforts in Afghanistan in 2014, that interactive learning environment will no longer be available. However, one mission, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), will still require a whole-of-government approach to save lives and relieve suffering. FDR is listed among the government's national security interests.² This type of mission does not occur often; however when required, there are often hundreds of thousands of lives in immediate danger. While joint doctrine has evolved to address actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there remain gaps from historical lessons learned in terms of FDR.³ As the opportunities for interorganizational interaction decrease, it is important for DoD to capture lessons learned from its most recent FDR missions to allow for "the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly."⁴

In the wake of the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 (Operation Unified Response) and the tsunami in Japan in March 2011 (Operation Tomodachi), the governments of Haiti and Japan requested assistance from the U.S. government. These two disasters provided the U.S. government and DoD excellent opportunities to look at their approaches to the whole-of-government method in two vastly different environments, which meets the intent of the joint operational concept of unified action, which specifies a whole-of-government solution in line with the government's national defense strategy. To what degree does the guiding doctrine, *Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, published in March 2011, reflect the lessons learned from two incredible natural disasters to inform future joint commanders and staffs?

The leadership and populations of foreign countries look at FDR operations to understand how the U.S. interacts within the dynamic system of the global network of nations. FDR remains a significant platform and possibly the lone platform, for both allies

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and adversaries to observe the whole-of-government approach and the significant role DoD plays in the process.

DoD's understanding of the whole-of-government approach significantly affects five historical areas specific to FDR. The Joint Center for Operational Analysis describes these areas as:

1. Coordination with host nation and other organizations.
2. Situational awareness and assessments.
3. Medical capabilities.
4. Distribution management.
5. Roles and responsibilities.^{5,6}

The joint leader can use this list to determine to what degree DoD captured and incorporated the lessons learned from these two disasters in the new *Joint Publication 3-08*. Reviewing changes between the 2006 and 2011 versions also answers the question: Did DoD bridge the historical gap in joint doctrine to prevent learning the same lessons in future joint operations?

Policy and Doctrine Informed by Lessons Learned

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The commander and planners within a joint task force perform operational art “through the use of creative thinking...to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces.”⁷ Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, skillfully describes operational art as linking tactical action to strategic purpose. National and theater objectives, as defined by policy, inform this strategic purpose.⁸ Therefore, not only will policy inform doctrine, but also inform the ideas shaping the ends, ways, and means that will enlighten the whole-of-government approach.

The five historical areas address interorganizational understanding and allow leaders to focus on what specifically the DoD should have learned from Operations Unified Response and Tomodachi. Understanding the lessons learned in these areas allows for a greater appreciation of the recommendations made in several reviews for policy change in relation to the whole-of-government approach. Understanding lessons learned and recommended policy changes leads to developing new doctrine, which assesses the foundational ability of future operational level planners and commanders to account for past errors and determines their ability to focus on the immediacy of the mission and the task of preventing the further loss of human life and reduce suffering.

Due to the immediacy of the mission, joint operational planners have a limited time to create understanding and develop the plan for the operational commander to synchronize tactical actions in time and space with a unified purpose to achieve the overall strategic objectives. Standing up a joint task force to execute a joint operation such as FDR does not happen often. Consequently, joint doctrine forms the foundation for the commander's understanding, visualization, and description of his solution to the problem. Doctrine must be sound and as inclusive as possible for the planners to initiate the planning process.

EXPLAINING THE HISTORICAL CHALLENGES FOR FDR

Using these five historical areas, leaders can assess how the responding task forces structured their assistance to the host nations and account for historic challenges that affect interorganizational coordination.⁹

Coordination with host nation and other organizations includes both government and nongovernmental organizations from the host country and those countries giving assistance. During the initial emergency phase of FDR, the need is immediate and often unknown in terms of quantity or quality. The challenge for the lead nation or agency in coordinating a response in the emergency phase, defined as the first forty-eight hours, is to take charge. The lead organization from the U.S. for FDR will be U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) per *National Security Presidential Directive-44*.¹⁰ The host nation does not relinquish sovereignty, and if able, at the submittal of its initial request for assistance establishes the overall lead organization. The disaster influences the host nation's ability to take that role themselves; that role could also fall to the United Nations or another organization if required.

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Situational awareness and assessments are interdependent. Assessments create situational understanding, which determines the required assessments. It is imperative for the lead agency to manage the assessments to increase understanding of the problem. These assessments are critical to the initial response as they inform further requests for assistance.¹¹ During the emergency phase, the lead agency prioritizes assets from personnel and equipment to food and water. Proper assessments will allow the lead agency to manage a most likely strained logistics channel.

The U.S. military does not have the capacity in terms of medical supplies for even medium grade disasters. Integration with outside organizations, such as the World Health Organization or the host nation is significant to the promotion "of the host nation's long-term medical capacity."¹² The U.S. military can provide a key capability to

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assess local medical facilities and link their needs with the services provided by governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The scale of the disaster will play a considerable role here as well.

U.S. policy defines the roles and responsibilities for the supported (USAID) and supporting (DoD) agencies in FDR. However, due to the size of USAID's Disaster Assessment Response Teams (approximately fifteen personnel) the size of the disaster and expectations may prove to be overwhelming. The lead agency should reinforce roles and responsibilities to ensure there is no duplication of effort and all scarce resources are properly utilized.¹³

APPLYING THE HISTORICAL CHALLENGES TO OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE: HAITI

On January 12, 2010, Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude earthquake. The devastation to the capital of Port-au-Prince and surrounding suburbs killed an estimated 316,000 people and affected over three million.¹⁴ In response, the U.S. government tasked Southern Command to form Joint Task Force–Haiti (JTF-H); augmentation came from U.S. Army-South and the XVIII Airborne Corps. Within two weeks, JTF-H consisted of over 22,000 service members, fifty aircraft, and twenty naval ships.¹⁵

Given this incredible task, Lieutenant General P.K. Keen, the JTF-H commander, understood his mission in this context:

The purpose of the Joint Task Force was to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of Haiti and United States Agency for International Development.¹⁶

Key to this statement is the understanding of the supported and supporting relationship by the commander between the military, the host government, and USAID.

Due to security issues and civil unrest, the UN established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004.¹⁷ In October 2009, the UN increased this mission to eighteen countries providing military personnel and forty-one countries providing police.¹⁸ MINUSTAH, commanded by Major General Floriano Peixoto of Brazil suffered considerable personnel and equipment losses resulting from the earthquake¹⁹ and were augmented with a 3,000-person brigade combat team from the Global Response Force.²⁰

General Keen and General Peixoto, who had known each other for over twenty-five years, immediately decided both organizations would be completely open and transparent with no classified briefs.²¹ General Keen stated,

I can honestly say that...we have not had any problems sharing information. One of the key reasons for this is that from the outset of this crisis, we at the Southern Command Headquarters decided to classify our Operations Order as unclassified. This classification gave us ease of transmission across the military, civilian sectors, and with our partner nations.²²

While classification was not an issue, it was difficult to create and understand a unified message. JTF-H established a Joint Information Center to facilitate information flow. Foreign embassies barraged the State Department with inquiries, which caused Southern Command to adjust its support to USAID.²³ JTF-H used the All Partners Access Network and a User Defined Operational Picture to create a link to USAID and other governmental sites. Though intended to create a near real-time, information-sharing environment, the lack of a common operational picture and the inability to communicate with all interorganizational partners about the existence of these tools resulted in limited collaboration and information sharing across the interagency operation.²⁴

Non-governmental organizations provided substantial medical supply capability and capacity, with field hospitals set up by volunteers from the U.S. and other countries. Further issues stemmed from the fact that Haiti had one doctor for every 4,000 people and the extensive damage to medical facilities in the Port-au-Prince area.²⁵ Many hospitals were structurally unsound and patients were placed outside the hospitals exposed to the elements. These conditions coupled with the transition from the Emergency Phase to the Recovery phase exposed two immediate needs: (1) the requirement to deal with amputees; and (2) the acquisition and distribution of pharmaceuticals to prevent and treat both acute and chronic illness.²⁶ While supplies were located at a warehouse in Port-au-Prince run by Programme de Médicaments Essentiels, an inventory and request mechanism did not exist.²⁷ With the rainy season approaching, the requirement for vaccination against communicable diseases drew closer each day.²⁸

Despite USAID receiving a clear mandate from the President as the lead agency for U.S. efforts, there remained confusion as to who was in charge from an interorganizational and international prospective. The seventeen-person Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART) faced many challenges stemming from an already established, yet broken UN and nongovernmental organization structure. Simultaneously, a growing U.S. military presence and a UN police organization with the Brazilian military, backed by a country that wanted to assert itself on the world stage, added

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to the confusion.²⁹ The under-resourced DART struggled with its mandated responsibilities in this large and complex disaster.³⁰ The organizational structure of Southern Command's headquarters further confused roles and responsibilities. Southern Command arrived aligned with agencies it coordinated with on a day-to-day basis in Tampa, not by traditional joint staff codes, which "made the task of forming a Joint Task Force very challenging."³¹ This was a significant issue, and General Keen decided to change the arrangement to the joint staff model at the very beginning of the crisis.³² The next challenge was how to integrate supporting and supported relationships with the UN.

The UN asserted control by giving "approval of a U.S. humanitarian mission and stated that the American troops would not stay long although the plan was not yet developed."³³ USAID asserted itself by taking on the responsibility to coordinate U.S. government efforts for the roads, port, airports, and humanitarian aid distribution. As a result, it had final approval of missions and leveraged already existing relationships with nongovernmental organizations to create a more coordinated response. However, USAID struggled to prioritize all the required efforts with its limited organizational structure and consistently had to reassert itself as it continued to face additional bureaucratic and administrative trials. Several U.S. government agencies that operated in Haiti were familiar with the "United States National Response Framework" and could function within its perimeters and expectations. However, the international model did not have the same level of institutional knowledge, nor did it account for the UN organizations or host nation assets and personalities.³⁴ Despite the disaster-imposed limitations on both the UN and Haiti, USAID still had to be part of the solution. Procedures between agencies did not occur as expected, and the consistent issue of funding through title responsibilities was ambiguous.³⁵

Results from an independent review found the need for the policymakers to delineate the mandate and role of the military, complete with an end state before mobilization. With a lack of a plan, Southern Command and JTF-H felt the need to plan for everything.³⁶ The situation was further complicated when, U.S. Forces Command, the command designated with the responsibility to align personnel to missions, did not augment the Global Response Force task force with the capability to perform as a joint task force. The skeletal joint task force supplied by the XVIII Airborne Corps lacked a joint logistics element and command and control capability, normally provided by a Joint Communications Support Element. Further enablers (engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, and medical) were not in a contingency status like the Global Response Force.³⁷ In addition to the XVIII

Airborne Corps, the JTF-H received augmentation from the Joint Force Maritime Component Command Task Force 41,³⁸ along with medical staff and personnel from the 12th U.S. Air Force Air Component Coordination Element.³⁹

To integrate with the UN cluster system, the JTF-H placed a military Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell at the UN logistical base. The joint task force commander designated Brigadier General Nicolas Matern, a Canadian exchange officer, as the lead.⁴⁰ This organization worked to forward issues and assessments by cluster participants (military units and nongovernmental organizations) and tied them to resources.⁴¹ Because the supported and supporting agencies lacked an internal, trained, assessment capability and capacity, JTF-H created a cell for that purpose. With both organizations working in parallel and no standard for data collected or the priority placed in collection, everything seemed important.⁴² Therefore, those that came with data first or could use convincing verbiage received resources. The lack of a common operational picture also generated confusion. Different maps reflecting varying degrees of reality permeated the joint operations area.

The historical challenges identified before the earthquake in Haiti were still issues during Operation Unified Response. Prior to the disaster, it had been argued that Southern Command established the best working relationships with outside agencies of any geographic combatant command. The deputy was from the State Department, and the structure of its headquarters was established for interaction with those organizations. However, its unique organizational structure did not work. The whole-of-government approach did not work to its maximum potential due to the five historical challenges.

The historical challenges identified before the earthquake in Haiti were still issues during Operation Unified Response.

APPLYING THE HISTORICAL CHALLENGES TO OPERATION TOMODACHI: JAPAN

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 8.9 earthquake occurred off the shore of Japan that resulted in a tsunami and subsequently a foreign disaster relief request from the government of Japan. The U.S. government's approach to the disaster in Japan would be considerably different from the approach used in Haiti. Japan's government was better prepared and able to solve its own problems. However, according to a U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis information paper, the same areas became the immediate focus.⁴³ The request for 450 radiological and consequence management experts made this mission decidedly different from the FDR mission in Haiti.⁴⁴ Additionally, there were an estimated 15,800 dead, over 3,200 missing, and over 342,000 evacuated.⁴⁵

The Japanese task force had little or no experience in joint, combined, and interagency operations required in such an effort.

The earthquake and tsunami caused a crisis at the six-unit Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, which resulted in explosions, core meltdowns, and radioactive offsite release.⁴⁶ Tailored for only a nuclear disaster in the U.S., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission response program lacks an international response plan. The U.S. National Strategic Response guidance was the only document that provided a foundation for how to respond; however, it did not provide integration or guidance for international disasters. Better defining lead and supporting agencies for an international response effort could result in more effective communication.⁴⁷

Admiral Patrick Walsh, the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, established the Joint Support Force on March 24, 2011, by activating elements of Joint Task Force 519 to augment the staff of U.S. Forces-Japan. This force supported both the government of Japan and the Japanese Security Defense Force and oversaw humanitarian assistance and disaster response from the U.S. military as part of Operation Tomodachi.⁴⁸ Third Marine Expeditionary Force and Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade established the first U.S. military command post in Japan and sent a forward command element of fourteen personnel into Japan on March 12, 2011, just twenty-nine hours after notification. Four humanitarian assistance survey teams accompanied this element. The lead U.S. government agency, did not enter the country until USAID personnel arrived four days later.⁴⁹ The Japanese had a divided joint task force and did not operate as a fully integrated staff. The orders coming from this divided task force lacked the detail to integrate the U.S. military augmentation. The Japanese task force had little or no experience in joint, combined, and interagency operations required in such an effort.⁵⁰ Nor did it truly understand the capabilities and capacities that the U.S. provided to the relief efforts.⁵¹ In addition, rather than a coordinated DoD response, each service component used its immediate response authority independently without an understanding of other component's activities.⁵²

The U.S. government identified the State Department as the lead and supported agency in the whole-of-government approach for Operation Tomodachi. However, requests from the Japanese task force circumvented the lead U.S. agency and went directly to the Marine Forward Command Element. Subsequently, the Marines worked through the Japanese Security Defense Force, and issues developed over how to request assistance. Ultimately, they developed the Bilateral Coordination Center, a name chosen because the Japanese thought the more commonly used terms, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell and Civil-Military Operations Center, applied to operations in less-developed countries.⁵³ This center worked out to the benefit of both the U.S. military and the Japanese

Security Defense Force by resolving conflicts and coordinating all future requests for assistance. Requests from the Bilateral Coordination Center went forward to the Marines and Joint Task Force commander for action. If unable to support from that level, these requests went forward to the commanders and staffs of U.S. Forces-Japan and the Japanese Security Defense Force.⁵⁴

The operations officer of the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade stated that his organization “must be able to function as the lead agency in Joint and Combined operations.”⁵⁵ This clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding with respect to U.S. government policy for lead agency designation during foreign disaster relief operations. This was further amplified in the after action review for the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, when the Joint Forces Land Component Commander stated that he received his order to stop humanitarian aid from the Japanese government and not the lead U.S. agency.⁵⁶

The survey teams that accompanied the joint support force forward command element came in the form of Humanitarian Aid Survey Teams. These teams consisted mainly of logistics, engineers, aviation, medical, and civil affairs personnel and became part of the future operations cell in the Marine Forward Command Element.⁵⁷ The Land Component Commander stated that the Japanese restricted the movement of survey teams, thus limiting the information the land component received.⁵⁸ Because these teams only accompanied the Japanese Security Defense Forces and obtained assessments in areas these forces occupied, they supported the needs of the host nation as opposed to those of the joint support force. These assessments were further coordinated through air and maritime components.⁵⁹

With confusion in roles and responsibilities came significant difficulties with communication.⁶⁰ The disaster caused the collapse of the supporting civilian communication infrastructure. The repair of the civilian communication infrastructure and the identification of augmentation requirements occurred simultaneously.⁶¹ Despite the commander’s guidance to establish a platform that those providing relief and the Japanese people could use, the number of communication platforms (All Partners Access Network, Harmonieweb, SharePoint, different chat room programs, and Defense Connect On-line) created confusion.^{62,63} Separately, the UN created the “Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan,” a network of nongovernmental/volunteer organizations to simplify communication and exchange of information to coordinate assistance among the organizations working in the Tohoku region.⁶⁴

With confusion in roles and responsibilities came significant difficulties with communication.

Policy and Doctrine Leading to Efforts in Haiti and Japan

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Changing world events inform the leaders who shape U.S. policy to create strategic advantages for the nation. The military shapes its doctrine, the foundation for planning and operations, to support the policy established by strategic leaders. In 2006, during the George W. Bush administration, the recommendations of the Project on National Security Reform sought to increase the security of the U.S. by combining the power of the agencies within the U.S. government. The project led to the idea of the whole-of-government approach. The intent of the project was to reform the sixty-year-old structures and processes that arguably no longer facilitated the construction of national security strategy.⁶⁵ Several of the issues raised in the report were still in place a year later when the earthquake struck Haiti. Operations in Haiti utilized this approach and as a result twenty-eight agencies within the U.S. government contributed to providing assistance to the relief efforts.⁶⁶

Several core documents formulate national security strategy with respect to interagency cooperation. By reviewing selected documents and the doctrine that supports them, we can identify where policy and doctrine collaborated to allow the same five historical problem areas to reappear in both foreign disasters.

THE POLICY THAT SHAPED EFFORTS IN HAITI AND JAPAN

“The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961” established USAID, and Congress amended the Act in 2002 to establish the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, whose responsibility shall be “to promote maximum effectiveness and coordination in responses to foreign disasters by United States agencies and between the United States and other donors. Included among the Special Coordinator’s responsibilities shall be the formulation and updating of contingency plans for providing disaster relief.”⁶⁷ For the response to the Haiti earthquake, President Obama named Rajiv Shah the Unified Disaster Coordinator and identified USAID as the lead federal agency to coordinate the U.S. response. Despite the standing and support of the political leadership, an independent review stated the “the agency lacked the political standing and operational capacity to completely fulfill its leadership mandate.”⁶⁸ For the Japanese earthquake, the President did not appoint a lead disaster coordinator. Instead, USAID sent a DART and two Urban Search and Rescue teams, which explains why the U.S military reported to the Japanese joint task force and not the mandated U.S. government lead agency.

The 2009 Defense Authorization Act supported realigning the

Southern Command staff from the standard Napoleonic structure to a structure focused on interagency and international coordination. Some questioned Southern Command's ability "to manage and evaluate its internal transformation, including measures of progress" as well as its ability to integrate with commands "that maintain traditional joint directorate structures."⁶⁹ Southern Command began to implement these changes in 2008 and they completed them prior to the earthquake in Haiti. In the Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee requested that Southern Command capture the lessons learned from the transformation for DoD to apply to other combatant commands. As mentioned in the previous review of roles and responsibilities, integrating into both the Joint Staff and JTF-H proved too difficult for the Southern Command headquarters, and as a result, General Keen ordered the transition back to the Napoleonic staff structure within the first two weeks of Operation Unified Response.

The Department of State and USAID released their strategic plan for FY 2007–2012 in May 2007 with the mission to:

Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.⁷⁰

Released during the presidency of George W. Bush, the strategic plan is in line with "The Bush Doctrine."⁷¹ The document laid out seven strategic goals, including "providing humanitarian assistance," which includes disaster relief. This strategy identified the need to assist affected nations during disasters and allow that nation's government to serve its people and thereby prevent inroads for terrorists in a failed state. With a majority of the efforts of the U.S. government focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategy did not prioritize disaster relief. The focus on democracy in the Middle East and Africa rightfully drew competing resources at the height of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, as a result, democratic, poor countries, such as Haiti, did not receive considerable efforts from USAID, despite its presence in that country for decades. Emphasis on DART development and integration with DoD did not make a long list of priorities, despite emphasis placed on humanitarian assistance.⁷²

Nor did the "2008 Civil-Military Cooperation Policy" discuss integrating DoD into humanitarian assistance. Despite multiple coordination efforts with DoD in fiscal year 2009, USAID and its Office of Disaster Assistance did not issue guidance for civil-military

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cooperation, most likely due to the scale of DoD involvement in relief efforts. In the two years leading up to the disasters in Haiti and Japan, less than 10 percent of the over 180 disasters the Disaster Assistance Office responded to required assistance from DoD, mostly for its logistical and engineering capability. Haiti and Japan represented two of the largest FDR operations, integrating over 22,000 personnel and hundreds of aircraft and ships from DoD. Improvising to execute relief and a whole-of-government approach on this scale happened during the emergency phase of the effort. “These improvisations included developing protocols for the exchange of staff between agencies, managing the transfer of budgetary authorities, and setting up systems for communication and sharing of information among agencies.”⁷³

At the time of both FDR missions, “DoD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief” was the most current directive, and it did not reference lead agency responsibilities nor mention USAID.⁷⁴ This document instructs the combatant commander to report his actions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides little direction to the Department of State, other than the requirement to establish liaisons. This directive gives great flexibility to the military, and nothing in this document prevented a “military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so.”⁷⁵

DOCTRINE THAT SHAPED EFFORTS IN HAITI AND JAPAN

Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization during Joint Operations*, Volume 1, published on March 17, 2006, is the first update to the original published in 1996. Additionally, it is the first update since the terrorist attacks in 2001. Informed by the Bush Doctrine from the National Security Strategy of September 2002, this publication emphasized homeland defense and DoD’s integration with the Department of Homeland Security. The joint publication mentions a shift from the bipolar world of the Cold War and acceptance of the liberal ideas behind the United Nations.⁷⁶ The support DoD provides other countries in the operational environment are peace and complex contingency operations; FDR is not mentioned by definition. However, complex contingency operations best describes FDR.⁷⁷

Identifying the lead federal agency for complex contingency operations can produce conflict with respect to roles and responsibilities. From the examples presented in the updated publication, the lead organization for foreign humanitarian assistance is the DoD. JP3-08 (2006) emphasizes command support relationships

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through the identification of “close coordination” regardless of established supported or supporting relationships. The command relationship section mentions USAID as an “implementing partner,” but offers no further relationship definition. It further clarifies that complex contingency operations are “likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by an ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all U.S. government agencies and military organizations in the operation.”⁷⁸ Examples provided in JP 3-08 (2006) and unconsolidated and ambiguous references for command and coordinating relationships lead to misunderstandings before planning for an operation begins.

JP 3-08 (2006) emphasizes including other U.S. government agencies and regional resources, such as nongovernmental organizations, during the development of the operation. Further stating that part of the operational plan should include the transition of roles and responsibilities once the military force has left the operational area to nonmilitary bodies at the conclusion of contingency operations.⁷⁹ The publication identifies the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) as the means through which the combatant commander and his staff will collaborate at the operational level. This group and its interagency members retain the ability to reach back to their parent organizations to participate in crisis operational planning to synchronize the efforts of civilian agencies from the U.S. government. This group also plays a significant role in developing and resourcing courses of action for the commander. Collaboration within the JIACG allows the commander to ensure unity of effort throughout his campaign plan and the associated contingencies. Integral in the planning process is the commander’s political advisor from the State Department, who will assist in interagency cooperation and promote the development of relationships between planners.⁸⁰ Figure 1 (pg.14), represents Southern Command’s collaboration with outside agencies for its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan.⁸¹

Both Southern Command and Pacific Command did an excellent job in placing emphasis on interagency relationship building. However when viewing Haiti and Japan through the historical challenge areas, it was not enough to build success. Was the difference UN involvement?

The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs only accounts for a headquarters and operational field elements; there is no counterpart at the operational level. Therefore, when the UN is in the lead, as was the case in Haiti, there is structural shortage specific to planning and executing FDR with a joint task force, which requires improvisation from both the UN and operational level commander. In the case of Haiti, the Office for the

JP 3-08 (2006) emphasizes including other U.S. government agencies and regional resources, such as nongovernmental organizations, during the development of the operation.




Figure 1. Contributing Partners to Southern Command 2009 Theater Campaign Plan.
(Source: Joint Operational War Plans Division, Joint Staff.)

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs eventually established a field team that worked out of the UN logistical compound, which did fill the discussed gap; however, there were issues with application of resources as well.⁸²

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SURVEY TEAM

Doctrinally, the combatant commander sends the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team forward to determine what resources are immediately required to stabilize the humanitarian crisis. When employed properly, the team will survey the capability of the agencies and organizations in the crisis area and provide recommendations as to where the military can best contribute during the course of action development. This team consists of members from the interagency community and establishes liaison contact with the UN, U.S. Embassy, the host nation, nongovernmental organizations, and other

U.S. government agencies. So empowered, the team will “define coordination relationships and lines of authority among military, the embassy or consulate, USAID, and other U.S. government and nongovernment organizations. This action helps identify specific support arrangements required for the collective logistic effort.”⁸³ Ideally, this team conducts an assessment with the joint task force assessment team. This did not happen in Haiti or Japan.

JOINT TASK FORCE ASSESSMENT TEAM

The joint task force assessment team (JAST) is the early entry argument to the challenges of FDR. Similar in function to the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team, it acts as a liaison with the “ambassador, chief of mission, country team, host nation, and, if present, multinational members, United Nations representatives, and inter/non-governmental representatives.”⁸⁴ In conjunction, the two teams will facilitate baseline coordination among the joint task force, combatant command, and interagency partners within these two command organizations. This team consists of “staff members who are subject matter experts and representatives from service and functional components expected to participate in the actual operations.”⁸⁵

USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Team, from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, consists of 22 personnel with specialties in logistics (supply, transportations and aviation); operations (medical, technical/scientific and search and rescue); procurement; administrative; information; communications; and planning. This team feeds assessments into the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell for further action by the unified team. In Haiti and Japan these teams required significant personnel augmentation to make the assessments required to focus planning and activities.

By doctrine, the combatant commander establishes a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell to assist with interagency coordination and planning. It is normally a temporary body used during the early stages of planning and coordination of FDR or humanitarian assistance. The lead civilian agency replaces this cell with a civil humanitarian operations center once they get established in country. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell receives support from and integrates into the combatant command staff. JP 3-08 (2006) gives an example of a civil-military operations center as seen in Figure 2 (pg. 16).⁸⁶

In Haiti and Japan [USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams] required significant personnel augmentation to make the assessments required to focus planning and activities.




Figure 2. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center
(Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08, 2006.)

In both Japan and Haiti, the joint task forces used a version of such a cell to form the Bilateral Coordination Center and Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell respectively. The commands used these names instead of civil-military operations center due to cultural sensitivities either in the host nation or with the UN and supported nongovernmental organizations to facilitate military interagency cooperation. Once the cells begin receiving surveys and assessments, the requirement to share becomes an imperative.

Information-sharing among joint task forces, interagency and nongovernmental organizations, UN, and the host nation is critical. Drawing largely from operations in the early 1990s, JP 3-08 (2006) emphasizes the proper classification of documents to ensure maximum sharing and collaborative capability. It provides further guidance in minimizing terms that may hinder cooperation with non-governmental organizations due to sensitivities with military collaboration such as referring to analyzed data as intelligence.

JP 3-08 (2006) identifies logistical capability and capacity as the main resources the military can provide to the whole-of-government approach, specifically in complex contingency operations in

an undeveloped theater. Additionally, the military has a robust command, control, and communications capability and the ability to plan, deploy, and secure logistical resources. Per JP 3-08 doctrine, the joint task force establishes the movement priorities between itself and other team members in the whole-of-government approach. Disasters can degrade throughput and place logistical capacity in competition with further disaster relief capability such as search and rescue and humanitarian supplies; therefore, the assessment of both current capabilities and requirements on the ground is crucial to ensure proper prioritization of logistical throughput.

Did Policy and Doctrine Change after Haiti and Japan?

Since the U.S. government established the Department of State as the lead agency for FDR it makes sense to review what State has changed in terms of policy and perspective with relation to the whole-of-government approach. The base agency document, designed to look forward by reflecting on actions in the past, is the “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review” published in December 2010.

While the document itself provides many actions for the department to pursue internally, those that focus on the whole-of-government approach provide insight into how they will integrate with DoD for unified action. First, the document designates the Chief of Mission as the chief executive officer of the interagency mission with authority to direct, supervise, and coordinate all civilian personnel at overseas posts. However, it does not reach beyond civilian agencies, emphasizing the need to seek input from other agencies. The State Department paves the path forward toward the whole-of-government approach without encroaching on authority within the DoD structure. Specifically the State Department holds itself accountable to its own ideals by using the ability to cooperate as criteria for selection to the position. Further, the department recognizes the influence of other agencies, and states it will engage interagency counterparts outside the U.S. The State Department places the responsibility of implementation of the whole-of-government approach within the position of the Chief of Mission.⁸⁷ By making their highest representatives outside Washington, DC, the standard-bearers for this approach, the department sets the tone across the organization for success on the world stage.

President Obama’s 2010 “Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 6, Global Development,” elevated development to one of the pillars

The State Department places the responsibility of implementation of the whole-of-government approach within the position of the Chief of Mission.

...in its “Policy Framework 2011-2015”... USAID misses an opportunity to emphasize DoD cooperation in the lexicon used when describing a whole-of-government approach.

of national power. Additionally, this directive provides specific guidance in maintaining a balanced power approach among agencies cooperating in crisis management.⁸⁸ Unfortunately, USAID does not use the same tone and language in its “Policy Framework 2011-2015.” USAID mentions DoD cooperation in the Global Health and Global Warming initiatives but not in international crisis management or humanitarian assistance. In so doing, USAID misses an opportunity to emphasize DoD cooperation in the lexicon used when describing a whole-of-government approach. Throughout the document, USAID identifies itself as the lead agency for the U.S. government in humanitarian crisis, places considerable emphasis on planning and assessing, and identifies the way ahead from some key lessons learned in both Haiti and Japan. The document highlights capacity issues and emphasizes joint planning informed by assessments.⁸⁹ However in terms of a whole-of-government approach, this document does not improve upon the limited civil-military cooperation policy produced by the agency in 2008.⁹⁰

DoD made significant improvements in the 2012 “DoD Directive 5100.46.”⁹¹ This directive clearly identifies USAID as the lead agency of the U.S. government for FDR. Additionally it lends clarity to the funding issue that came about in Haiti and Japan, giving specific direction for the use of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds. The directive further clarified the actions of the military commander supporting the FDR mission:

Nothing in this Directive shall be construed as preventing a military commander with assigned forces at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from taking prompt action to save human lives. In cases in which this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the host nation and U.S. Chief of Mission of the affected country before committing forces.⁹²

This statement provides clear guidance with respect to the supported authority and is in line with the State Department with respect to the Chief of Mission being responsible for the actions of all U.S. government agencies in a foreign country. To prevent the directive from becoming outdated, DoD established an expiration date five years from the publication in 2012. Clearly taking from the lessons learned in Haiti and Japan, this document provides clear and succinct guidance that informs doctrine.

Doctrine for the Future?

A side-by-side comparison of the 2006 and updated 2011 version of JP 3-08 reflects a considerable change in how DoD approaches the whole-of-government approach. DoD replaced the negative and at times combative tone throughout the 2006 publication with vocabulary that is more in line with the ideal of unified action. This makes the 2011 version easy to read from an interagency perspective. The 2011 publication is less definition-based and more idea-based, specifically in the first two chapters. The definitions are more properly positioned in context within Chapter Three, “Domestic Considerations” and Chapter Four, “Foreign Considerations.” Of particular note is the removal of the term complex contingency operations referenced in the 2006 publication.

The following analysis will identify what influenced the changes from 2006 to 2011, the advantage or disadvantage of these changes, and how they do or do not support the intent of unified action.⁹³

JP 3-08 (2011) clearly defines the Department of State and particularly USAID as the lead agency for disaster relief. However, the publication retains some of the conflicting examples from the 2006 version. Specifically, the mention of the military being the lead for the foreign humanitarian assistance mission, Operation Provide Comfort, remains. While DoD changed the title of the section from “Command Relationships” in the 2006 version to “Working Relationships and Practices” in the 2011 version, the very first paragraph of Chapter 4 provides an example that still identifies the military in a leading role: “During combat operations such as Operation Desert Storm or in foreign humanitarian assistance operations such as Operation Provide Comfort, DoD was the lead agency and was supported by other [U.S. government agencies].”⁹⁴ The effort to expand the understanding how interorganizational relationships are separate from that of the military is undone with this poor example. Operation Unified Response would have been a better choice to illustrate the point of the paragraph.

Additionally JP 3-08 (2011) misses an excellent opportunity to expand on the relationship between General Keen and his Brazilian counterpart, General Floriano Peixoto during Operation Unified Response. Instead, a change to one example provides an explanation of the relationships between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus in Iraq and General McCrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry in Afghanistan. Missed as well is the close working relationship with leaders in Japan and the Pacific Command during Operation Tomodachi and the State Department and World Food Programs planning efforts with the joint task force staff during Operation Unified Response.

JP 3-08 (2011) clearly defines the Department of State and particularly USAID as the lead agency for disaster relief. However, the publication retains some of the conflicting examples from the 2006 version.

The 2011 version states the “supported” commander has the option of using the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams to “acquire information for planning.”⁹⁵ While both operations in Haiti and Japan did not use Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams due to the immediacy of the disaster and the need created, it is helpful to point out that the lessons learned from both operations have not affected this version of the publication nor is this section influenced by unified action. The team by doctrine is organic to the combatant commander and pulls information from the DART and host nation government as required. Tying the use of the Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team to the supported commander creates ambiguity for future missions, namely FDR. Combatant commanders are not the supported commanders for FDR per chapter four in the 2011 publication. This may seem overcritical; however, language matters in doctrine, and if a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team is an option to the combatant commander regardless his headquarters relationship (supported/supporting), then the publication should remove this “supported” reference.

While JP 3-08 (2011) still identifies correctly the limitation of interorganizational and interagency staffing to liaison at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, it does improve the knowledge of the capabilities of USAID and its ability to plug in or represent at all three levels. In Figure 3, JP 3-08 (2011) provides improved detail on the representative structure of USAID, the lead organization for FDR.⁹⁶

JP 3-08 (2011) removes verbiage that specifies the combatant commander as the lead organizer of “many operations” and supplants this idea with a more unified effort approach in line with unified action.

The explanation on short- versus long-term view among the military and other governmental agencies will assist the staff of a joint task force executing FDR or a combatant command staff managing a joint task force in that role. The emphasis placed on short- and long-term is very much in line with the thinking of both departments. In the case of Operation Unified Response, USAID focused on long-term planning and working to fix the underlying issues of government corruption and manipulation of the market, while the military focused on getting food and shelter to people in need. This does not mean that USAID did not focus on the crisis. However, USAID did not properly convey the problem and associated long-term view to the joint task force and its subordinates. A joint task force staff should pay close attention to this emphasis and compatibility between the two missions and convey this understanding horizontally and vertically, specifically to subordinates.

JP 3-08 (2011) removes verbiage that specifies the combatant commander as the lead organizer of “many operations” and supplants this idea with a more unified effort approach in line with unified action. Further, the publication changes the idea of transitions. Gone

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

	ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES	EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES	STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
STRATEGIC	Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant Commander	National Headquarters Department Secretaries Ambassador/Embassy Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Response Coordination Center	Governor
OPERATIONAL	Combatant Commander Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) Defense Coordinating Office/Defense Coordinating Element	Ambassador/Embassy United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Director Liaisons Federal Coordinating Officer Regional Office Integration Planning Cell FEMA Regional Response Coordinating Center	State Adjutant General Office of Emergency Services Department/Agency
TACTICAL/ FIELD-LEVEL	CJTF Army Corps, Divisions Navy Carrier Strike Groups Air Force Wings Marine Expeditionary Force	Ambassador/Embassy Field Office USAID Office Director Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)/Liaison Response Team US Refugee Coordinator Advance Civilian Team FEMA Joint Field Office	State Coordinating Officer National Guard Units County Commissioner Mayor/Manager County, City, (e.g., Police Department)

Figure 3. Organizational Structure Comparison of U.S. Agencies.
(Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08, 2011.)

is the reference to what the combatant commander desires as the conditions to enter and exit the operations. Replacing that idea is a more inclusive effort of integration of agencies and organizations outside the military in the planning process with a unified effort to identify transition points. In the terms of planning and development coordination, DoD replaces the term “mutual interference” with language that is not as divisive and more in line with the theory of unified action. Not specifically attributed to Haiti and Japan, the reader notices changes based on several of the issues mentioned in

“U.S. government agencies do not want to react to a military plan after the fact. U.S. government agencies want a seat at the table to conduct strategic assessment, policy formulation, and planning.”

the lessons learned section. Particularly with Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” the publication places care in the involvement early and often of outside organizations in the planning efforts.

JP 3-08 (2011) states that this annex should receive the same focus from a joint staff as Annex C, “Operations:” “U.S. government agencies do not want to react to a military plan after the fact. U.S. government agencies want a seat at the table to conduct strategic assessment, policy formulation, and planning.”⁹⁷ The publication provides further guidance in stating that the supported command is responsible for the development of Annex V. Here is where considerable issues may arise. Since the State Department or USAID is the supported agency and DoD is in a supporting role, who in the Department of State or USAID will compose Annex V? The data provided in Annex V are capabilities desired by the military, shared understanding of the situation, and common ways to the unified ends. All of these are important to subordinate units of the joint task force to increase its understanding of how it will support the mission and other organizations.

JP 3-08 (2011) uses a 2008, Southern Command example to illustrate how it reorganized its command and control structure to fall in line with a more integrated interagency approach. Additionally, the publication mentions how Africa Command is using the same model.⁹⁸ Presented in Figure 4 is an example of how Southern Command organized prior to the execution in Haiti.⁹⁹ The publication fails to mention that General Keen terminated this structure only a few days into the operation, recognizing the design did not have the link in points that the subordinate joint task force had under the normal joint staff model. This caused considerable confusion at first as the two headquarters had issues communicating with each other. The difficulty increased significantly when General Keen decided to change over to the joint staff model only a few days into the mission, as seen in Figure 5.¹⁰⁰

Listing this as an example and not identifying the risks and issues involved is unfortunate. Since the departure away from the joint staff model required additional funding it required Congressional approval. Therefore, this approval is a limitation placed on combatant commanders to prevent this from happening again.¹⁰¹

JP 3-08 (2011) specifically addresses the ability to share information over the Internet. This addition is more attributable to the current times and less to the lessons learned in Haiti or Japan. What is lacking is the discussion of the establishment of a collaborative environment early on in the planning, be it for crisis or other contingency planning, particularly, in the standup of the joint interagency coordination group or as an assigned output of the joint assessment teams. Continued improvements in the 2011 publication




Figure 4. Southern Command Organizational Structure after 2008 Transition.
(Source: Southern Command.)




Figure 5. Southern Command’s Adopted Organizational Structure in Haiti.
(Source: Southern Command.)

focus on the understanding of the host nation and its interaction with the information technologies that exist today.

Further expanded in chapter four is the nesting of the combatant commander’s campaign plan to that of the State Department and USAID Joint Strategic Plan, Bureau Strategic and Resource Performance Plans, and Mission Strategic and Resource Plans. Of consideration and alluded to in the 2011 publication is that USAID and State are not regionally aligned as the combatant commands are aligned. The joint task force should consider this when planning during disaster relief, as foreign policy advisors for the combatant

commander may only be a conduit for regional issues. Further complication will undoubtedly come from the USAID geographic bureaus being located in Washington, DC, and not in their specific geographic regions of responsibility.

Conclusions

The U.S. government's scale of operations to assist other nations or act in the strategic interest of the U.S. is independent of the complexity of that operation. In a globalized world where interaction between nations occurs through a variety of mediums, even small operations can have multiple actors that contribute. This contribution through interaction provides an opportunity for the U.S. government to learn how its agencies act in the dynamic system of globalization. The U.S. government finds itself consistently operating this system with its many interconnected and interdependent parts. The agencies that construct this systemic response will remain significant actors within the global network of nations. Their coordinated efforts must be able to respond efficiently and rapidly to the demands of the nation, be it to influence a natural or man-made crisis. The executor from the DoD in this system is the joint task force and its foundation for action is joint doctrine.

The Operations in Haiti and Japan undoubtedly informed both U.S. government policy and doctrine. However, DoD missed some of the most important lessons learned in these unique disasters and at times, captured them incorrectly.

There is relationship between doctrine and practice when “brought together in a single learning-cycle”¹⁰² to provide the ability to increase knowledge as an “outcome of the subjective interpretation of human experience within given contexts.”¹⁰³ The requirement stands that joint doctrine needs to accomplish this. By using the experiences of the joint force as a positive feedback loop based on the emergent lessons of those operations, DoD can codify concepts in doctrine that prevent a negative feedback loop, whereby joint forces operate from doctrine that forces the same lessons to be re-learned. This requirement to re-frame truly creates a learning organization and allows DoD to contribute in a manner that saves lives, resources, and effort. The missions in Haiti and Japan allowed this re-framing process to take place.

The Operations in Haiti and Japan undoubtedly informed both U.S. government policy and doctrine. However, DoD missed some of the most important lessons learned in these unique disasters and, at times, captured them incorrectly. There is a lack of attentiveness to ensure that the doctrine is consistent in examples and context of unified action. The new publication includes many references and lessons learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom. These lessons include those from provincial reconstruction teams and other joint interorganizational operations.

The lessons learned from Haiti and Japan should hold equal footing for they represent the harder of the tasks where the integration of agencies and organizations outside of the DoD and U.S. government are required on a moment's notice. The opportunity for force build up or diplomacy to buy time does not exist with hundreds of thousands of lives in the balance. With doctrine as the foundation of learning and application in planning, it is important to retain the lessons of the operations still being conducted while maintaining the lessons from those in the past. Future generations can benefit from each operation and its lessons. Since the evolution of joint doctrine under the "Goldwater-Nichols Act," the U.S. government had not seen the levels of devastation that resulted in Operations Unified Response and Tomodachi. As such, these operations provide an excellent opportunity to capture lessons that might not be applicable again for years. However, a joint task force can apply these lessons across all interorganizational operations regardless of the scope of the mission and could very well define the strategic future for both the organizations involved and the U.S. government.

With doctrine as the foundation of learning and application in planning, it is important to retain the lessons of the operations still being conducted while maintaining the lessons from those in the past.

The opportunity to re-frame how DoD sees itself interacting within the system of the U.S. government and the whole-of-government approach is continuous. The DoD should not limit themselves to just FDR lessons from the 1990s, the "Global War on Terrorism," and the overseas contingency operations that followed to improve its understanding of interorganizational operations. Foreign disaster relief gives the joint force an excellent medium to test interorganizational responsiveness to operate as a true joint force under the capstone concept of unified action. This is true for three reasons. First, the U.S. is a global leader with the ability to project power and influence to save lives and assist foreign governments when they are most vulnerable. Second, the ability to project this power in an immediate fashion is only an advantage if the lead agency can coordinate these efforts in concert with the organizations that will influence the outcome of the operation. Lastly, FDR provides a platform for DoD to have a strategic effect to influence other nations to the benefit of the U.S. government.

Operations Unified Response and Tomodachi, when looked at from the outside were successful; the U.S. government prevented loss of life and delivered historic levels of aid to two completely different countries. When looking inward, the DoD cannot miss the opportunity to prevent the mistakes it and other organizations made. Disasters of this magnitude most likely will not occur in the immediate future and the lessons learned from these events are indeed unique. DoD needs to codify them in doctrine before the lessons learned are lost to another generation of joint leaders. **IAP**

Endnotes

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- 3 Debarati Guha-Sapir et al., *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake*, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Silver Spring, MD. This independent review made seven recommendations focusing on the whole-of-government approach to bridge these gaps. Three of these recommendations dealt specifically with U.S. government interorganizational issues.
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- 8 Ibid. Figure I-5 displays this graphically and includes the text referencing the linkage between tactical tasks and strategic purpose.
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- 17 “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1542,” 2004.
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- 22 Keen, “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” p. 12
- 23 David R. DiOrio, “Operation Unified Response—Haiti Earthquake 2010,” p. 12.
- 24 Ibid., p.13.
- 25 Central Intelligence Agency. The agency defines medical doctors as doctors that study, diagnose, treat, and prevent illness, disease, injury, and other physical and mental impairments in humans through the application of modern medicine. They also plan, supervise, and evaluate care and treatment plans by other health care providers. The World Health Organization estimates that fewer than 2.3 health workers (physicians, nurses, and midwives only) per 1,000 would be insufficient to achieve coverage of primary healthcare needs. The Central Intelligence Agency Factbook lists Haiti’s capability as 0.25 healthcare workers per 1000.
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- 32 Ibid., pp. 7–8. The Joint Task Force integrated 274 new members from the Joint Staff, other combatant commands, and the services over the course of six weeks.
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- 34 Ibid., p. 5.
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- 45 "Road to Recovery," Government of Japan, Tokyo, 2012, Slide 3.
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- 47 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
- 48 "Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Update," Center for Excellence in Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance, Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii, 2011, p. 42.
- 49 Karl C. Rohr, "Operation Tomodachi: After Action Report and Assessment," 3rd MEB, 2011, pp. 2–5.
- 50 "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Japan Earthquake and Tsunami," United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Quantico, VA, 2011, p. 4.
- 51 "Providing Assistance to the People of Japan," *Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2012, p. 12.
- 52 "Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Response Lessons and Observations Report," Pacific Air Forces Collection Team, Hickam Air Force Base, HI, 2011, p. 26.
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- 54 Rockie Wilson, "Operation Tomodachi: A Model for American Disaster Response Efforts and the Collective Use of Military Forces Abroad," *Defense Management*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2012. Wilson states there are conflicting sources that attribute the establishment of the Bilateral Coordination Center to both 3rd MEB and the Department of State through United States Agency for International Development.
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- 56 "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Japan Earthquake and Tsunami," p. 18.
- 57 Ibid., p. 24.
- 58 Ibid., p. 17.
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- 60 Rohr, p. 6.
- 61 Ibid., pp. 6 and 8.
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- 64 James R. Locher, *Forging a New Shield*, The Center for the Study of the Presidency, Arlington, VA, 2008, p. i.
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- 70 Ibid. President Bush stated in his second inaugural address: “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”
- 71 Ibid., pp. 30–34 and 54–58.
- 72 Paul Weisenfeld, “Successes and Challenges of the Haiti Earthquake Response: The Experience of USAID,” in *Emory International Law Review*, Emory Center for International and Comparative Law, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 2011, p. 1105.
- 73 “Department of Defense Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief,” 1975.
- 74 Ibid., p. 2.
- 75 Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vol. I, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2006, p. I-4.
- 76 Ibid., pp. GL-6 and GL-13. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*, defines “peace operations” as a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. It also defines “complex contingency operations” as large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that involve one or more of the elements of peace operations that include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency.
- 77 Ibid., pp. I-3–I-7.
- 78 Ibid., p. II-3.
- 79 Ibid., pp. II-15–II-17 and II-20.
- 80 “National Security Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DoD’s Southern and Africa Commands,” United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-962T, Washington, DC, p. 5.
- 81 Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*, Department of Defense, 2006, pp. II-23–24. The author’s firsthand account provides the location of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs team.

- 82 Ibid., p. III-10. Neither combatant level commands sent a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team to Haiti or Japan. After action reviews contest the need as in both operations these combatant commands had personnel on the islands. However, the personnel in-country did not fulfill the role described in the joint publication and assist in the loose definitions applied to roles and responsibilities, nor did they have the ability to make proper assessments.
- 83 Ibid., p. III-14. The joint task forces established for Operations Tomodachi and Unified Response did not provide assessment teams to early entry capability into the joint operations area.
- 84 Ibid., p. III-18.
- 85 “The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power,” Department of State, Washington, DC, 2010, pp. 29–30.
- 86 “Presidential Policy Directive 6; U.S. Global Development Policy,” The White House, 2010, p. 3.
- 87 “USAID Policy Framework 2011–2015,” United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. 17–18, 20, 28, and 30–31.
- 88 “Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,” United States Agency for International Development.
- 89 “Department of Defense Directive 5100.46: Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR),” 2012.
- 90 Ibid., p. 2.
- 91 Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. I-1–IV-36. With respect to “complex contingency operations,” the DoD has not replaced the term just removed it from doctrine. In one instance, the term “crisis” replaced “complex contingency operations.” Interpret crisis as mentioned in any accepted dictionary, as the publication does not define this word.
- 92 Ibid., p. I-9.
- 93 Ibid., p. IV-17.
- 94 Ibid., p. I-14.
- 95 Ibid., p. II-7.
- 96 Ibid., p. I-6.
- 97 “U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation,” United States Government Accountability Office, p. 22, <<http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-801>>, accessed on November 27 2012.
- 98 Ibid., p. 28.
- 99 “Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,” p. 196.
- 100 “U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation.”
- 101 Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, pp. II-26–II-27.
- 102 Zvi Lanir and Gad Sneh, “The New Agenda of Praxis,” 2000, <www.praxis.co.il>, accessed on November 27, 2012.
- 103 Ibid.

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