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Pacific Command: Attacking the Nexus of Emerging Threats
Jan Schwarzenberg
**InterAgency Journal**

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Insights to Effective Interorganizational Coordination

by David Grambo, Barrett Smith and Richard W. Kokko

The Joint Staff J7, Joint Force Development, supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and contributes to the operational effectiveness of the joint force through the publication of focus papers containing insights and best practices across several different functional areas. This article, written by members of the Interorganizational Coordination branch of the Deployable Training Division, focuses on interorganizational coordination insights and best practices collected and compiled by Deployable Training Division observer/trainers working with geographic combatant commands, functional combatant commands, Services, and joint task force headquarters. These insights and best practices are intended to enhance the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the joint force by improving communication, enhancing collaboration, and promoting unity of effort among Department of Defense (DoD) and interorganizational partners.

Strategic guidance provides joint force commanders (JFCs) a framework to achieve interorganizational coordination by providing the authority and legitimacy for unity of effort. JFCs must actively seek to horizontally integrate with potential mission partners and other external stakeholders as part of an overarching comprehensive approach. By promoting and facilitating inclusion, starting with the planning process, JFCs enable a better understanding of the situation through the aggregation of multiple perspectives in framing the problem and way ahead and setting the conditions necessary for the eventual and successful transition of roles and responsibilities to other mission partners.

While the CJCS’s White Paper on mission command focuses primarily on the vertical aspects of command relations between the commander and subordinate, there are also horizontal and external dimensions of the principles of mission command that must be considered to achieve unity of effort.

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U.S. military operations are typically conducted within a unity of effort framework that may include U.S. agency partners, foreign agencies and militaries, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector. Co-creation implies a mutual, two-way flow of information and can improve the situational awareness of all mission partners and stakeholders. A mission partner is an agency or other external stakeholder that the U.S. military works with in a specific situation or operation, based on an agreement, commitment, or willing arrangement to advance mutual interest. Other stakeholders are individuals, organizations, or entities that affect or can be affected by actions of the U.S. military. Federal agencies and allies are mission partners; not all stakeholders are necessarily partners. The challenge lies in achieving unity of effort across these diverse participants, while understanding and managing the different cultures, authorities, capabilities, capacities, and procedures inherent in each organization and creating synergy in the process. The priorities and outlooks of the participants with respect to the situation may differ in important ways. An effective and consistent inclusion of mission command principles applied horizontally to mission partners and other external stakeholders can help develop context and better inform the commander’s decisions.

Developing Unity of Effort

U.S. military operations are typically conducted within a unity of effort framework that may include U.S. agency partners, foreign agencies and militaries, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector. Every headquarters observed identified unity of effort as key to achieving strategic objectives and recognized the value of harmonizing and synchronizing military actions with the actions of other instruments of national power. “C5 thinking” (command, control, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration) is much more appropriate to facilitating unity of effort than a mindset singularly focused on command and control.

Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, introduced the term “interorganizational coordination” to address DoD interface with all external stakeholders including domestic and foreign government agencies, foreign militaries, IGOs, NGOs, and private organizations. Interagency coordination is a subset of interorganizational coordination. Achieving unity of effort is the stated goal of many mission partners; however, even defining “unity of effort” can be difficult. DoD and Department of State (State), two interagency partners that frequently work closely together, define unity of effort differently (see Figure 1). While these differences are, arguably, slight, they demonstrate the differences in culture, language, and perspective at the heart of the challenge of achieving unity of effort among diverse groups.
Successful JFCs understand the different authorities, perspectives, and cultures among entities; avoid taking an authoritative lead role; and realize the value of different perspectives and capabilities. They understand that a military-led approach may be counterproductive to effective relationships, impede overall unity of effort, and compromise mission accomplishment. While interorganizational coordination continues to improve, friction normally remains at the operational and theater-strategic levels with respect to coordinating day-to-day operations.

One of the main sources of friction between DoD and other U.S. government departments is the difference in each organization’s capacity. Figure 2 (page 6) illustrates budget outlays among U.S. government Executive Branch agencies in FY14 and is representative of how Congress normally apportions the federal budget. It is important to note the size of DoD expenditures versus interagency partners. While DoD uses the old adage “requirements drive spending,” in other agencies, “spending may drive requirements.” Interagency partners may only be able to plan for and fulfill requirements that fall within their budget authority. Agency partners do not have the depth in personnel DoD enjoys and may turn to DoD for assistance during both foreign and domestic operations when their resources are insufficient to accomplish the tasks. Regardless of the numerous challenges to fully achieving unified action, JFCs and interagency partners have overcome many of the difficulties at the operational and theater-strategic levels by developing personal relationships, mutual respect, enhanced communication, and integration.
Framework for Domestic Operations

Military operations inside the U.S. and its territories consist of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and homeland defense. DoD normally supports a primary federal agency during DSCA and is the lead federal agency for homeland defense. The President and Secretary of Defense define the circumstances under which DoD will be involved in domestic operations. DoD integrates into the national incident response architecture through DSCA. DSCA refers to DoD support provided by federal military forces, DoD civilians and contract personnel, and DoD agencies and components to a primary federal agency in response to State and tribal requests for assistance. The Secretary of Defense will authorize DSCA provided the support does not impede DoD’s ability to meet national defense requirements. DoD typically provides DSCA on a reimbursable basis as authorized by law.

For major domestic disaster response operations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) establishes a joint field office (JFO)—a temporary federal facility at the operational level—as a central coordination point for federal, state, and local executives with responsibility for incident oversight, direction, and/or assistance to effectively coordinate response and recovery assets and resources for an incident. Within the JFO, the federal coordinating officer manages federal resource support activities, including DoD, when DSCA is contemplated or occurs.

The defense coordinating officer (DCO) is a U.S. Northern Command asset permanently stationed at each FEMA region and assigned...
to JFOs when activated. Assisted by a defense coordinating element, the DCO serves as DoD’s single point of contact in the JFO, receiving and processing requests for assistance.

Based on the magnitude, type of incident, and anticipated level of resource involvement, the DoD may designate a JTF commander to command federal (Title 10) military activities in support of the incident objectives. The use of a JTF does not replace the requirement for a DCO who remains DoD’s single point of contact in the JFO for coordinating DoD support. It is worth noting that the JTF will have no control over non-federalized (i.e., Title 32) National Guard forces. Many states have designated dual-status commanders who when authorized by the affected state governor and Secretary of Defense will provide unity of command to both Title 32 and designated Title 10 forces involved in DSCA events. A dual-status commander may be established in addition to a purely Title 10 JTF.

In accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF), the JTF synchronizes its actions with multiagency coordinating structures at the field, regional, and national levels. However, the JTF’s main area for coordination is at the JFO. The command and control element of a JTF will normally be part of the JFO coordination group, ensuring coordination and unity of effort. Observer/trainers have identified the following insights and best practices for the JTF staff:

- Upon activation of a JTF, clarify roles and responsibilities of the DCO and JTF commander with respect to the federal coordinating officer and the geographic combatant commander (GCC).
- Understand and follow the NRF-described role of the DCO and provide robust liaison to the DCO to help share situational awareness, determine current and future support requirements, and support the mission assignment development process.
- Understand the role of the dual-status commander(s), if established, and develop appropriate means of interaction. Understand the National Incident Management System framework; specifically, how the incident command posts and area command centers relate to the multiagency coordination centers.
- Understand the scalable organizational structure of the JFO (i.e., the management, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration sections).
- Offer assistance to the federal coordinating officer and DCO with JTF staff planning, monitoring, and assessment capabilities in the JFO. Advise the federal coordinating officer and DCO on the best use of JTF capabilities and assist with development of requests for assistance. This staff support may often be provided along emergency support function lines.
- Use an existing common, unclassified, information-sharing mechanism, such as the Homeland Security Information Network, to collaborate and share information with the agencies and other external stakeholders.

**Framework for Foreign Operations**

By U.S. Code, each U.S. government agency has unique authorities and responsibilities. For example, Title 10 provides the authorities for DoD security cooperation activities. However, Title 10 funding for the outright training and equipping of foreign militaries is not authorized. Title 22 funding, which provides authority for State activities, allows for the training and equipping of foreign militaries; as a result, many of the security cooperation programs undertaken by GCCs in support of steady-state operations are funded by State. While this is a
Commanders and staffs must understand how to most effectively incorporate, leverage, and integrate partner capabilities throughout the commander’s decision cycle in order to maximize unity of effort in pursuit of shared objectives.

Within a theater, the GCC retains the responsibility for planning and implementing regional and theater military strategies, policies, plans, and engagements that require interagency coordination. As such, the GCC coordinates closely with each Chief of Mission within his area of responsibility (AOR) to develop country plans that provide overall focus and theater strategic goals. There may be some benefit to negotiating with the country team to have a GCC or JTF liaison officer (LNO) at the embassy for a specified event or operation. A well-developed relationship between an embassy country team and the JFC will help develop the two-way, horizontal trust required for effective coordination.

U.S. government agencies, including DoD, may support or be supported by IGOs—organizations usually formalized by treaties between two or more governments (e.g., United Nations, Organization of American States). The relationship with an IGO will depend on the situation and the governing treaty. However, in some operations, U.S. government agencies’ relationships with IGOs are neither supported nor supporting, and cooperation is voluntary and based upon national guidance, common goals, and good will. When working within a coalition or IGO structure, it is important that the JFC understand other nations’ prerogatives, operational caveats, limitations, and relationships. Coalition and multinational partners can also bring significant capabilities. Commanders and staffs must understand how to most effectively incorporate, leverage, and integrate partner capabilities throughout the commander’s decision cycle in order to maximize unity of effort in pursuit of shared objectives.

NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IGO hierarchies. Relationships between the armed forces and NGOs are essentially cooperative and normally driven by common interests such as providing humanitarian assistance/disaster response. NGOs often endeavor to maintain their neutrality and impartiality toward various parties in an effort to ensure their security and access to the society they are trying to affect. As a result, NGOs will, to a varying degree, avoid direct interaction with military forces in order
to counter perceptions of favoritism or choosing of sides. It is important that JFCs understand and respect these nuances when working with NGOs to allow for greater cooperation and minimize unnecessary friction.

Foreign operations require consideration of host nation concerns and perspectives, particularly regarding the civilian population. U.S. forces are typically operating in foreign countries at the invitation of the host nation. Some operational commanders raise information about host nation institutions or organizations to the same level as priority information requirements (PIR) and friendly force information requirements (FFIR) all subsets of a commander’s critical information requirements; however, host nation information requirements, a unique information requirement—not falling under either PIR or FFIR categories—provide the JFC with the necessary information to more effectively partner, develop plans, integrate with civilian activities, and make decisions. Observer/trainers have identified the following insights and best practices for the JFC:

- Develop strong personal relationships with Chief of Mission, SDO/DATT, country team, and other key agency and IGO leadership to promote unity of effort and overcome organizational and cultural differences.

- Clarify the JTF commander’s authority, with respect to that of the GCC, when interacting with the affected Chief of Mission. Additionally, clarify the JTF role with the SDO in terms of speaking with one voice to the Chief of Mission and the country team.

- Sending LNOs to an embassy is a negotiated process; it is not automatic.

- Understand the capacity of mission partners and other external stakeholders; channel most communications through the LNO or SDO/DATT team.

- Incorporate and enable LNOs from host nation, coalition, and multinational partners to ensure their limitations, capabilities, and caveats are appropriately addressed and factored into operational planning and execution.

- Respect the role of NGOs in the area of operations; understand their perspectives to better avoid conflict or friction.

### Coordination Insights and Best Practices

Coordination at the operational and theater-strategic levels during foreign operations is difficult because of the differences in organizational structures between DoD and other organizations. The military is structured to operate at the national-strategic level in Washington, D.C.; theater-strategic level at the combatant commands; and operational and tactical levels at the JTF and below. Most U.S. government agencies and departments are organized to operate at the strategic and theater-strategic levels in Washington, D.C., and at the operational and tactical levels in the field. For example, regional bureaus of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which have a GCC theater-strategic view, do not align with GCC AORs. This geographic separation between GCCs and Department of State/agency regional bureaus complicates coordination efforts at the theater-strategic and operational levels. Often, the
headquarters of the U.S. government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs will work directly with their field representatives and embassies, creating information and coordination “voids” with GCC and JTF headquarters at the operational level.

By exchanging information with other agencies and facilitating inclusiveness, LNOs serve as an excellent means for promoting a shared understanding of the operational environment.

The theater-strategic and operational headquarters have gained numerous insights in how to improve coordination at these levels with the intent of filling this void and achieving better unity of effort. For example, a JFC’s adjacent, higher, and subordinate commands may use differing structures. The better a JFC and staff understands these structures, the better they will be able to leverage other capabilities and avoid duplicative efforts.

As discussed earlier, even close partners have their own culture, philosophy, goals, authorities, responsibilities, skills, and processes. Successful JFCs, their staffs, and their partners have spent time gaining an understanding of the others’ unique differences and recognize the value in building and maintaining personal relationships. This education and relationship-building is iterative and difficult but has high payoff in bridging these gaps.

Words matter and can affect external stakeholder perspective. Something as simple as the name of an organization, mission, or task may affect the willingness and ability of some agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector entities to participate in U.S. military-led missions. A prime example of this was the tsunami relief effort in 2004. By understanding the operational environment and adjusting to this reality, the JFC focused the names of the organizations to the tasks at hand. The JTF became known as the Combined Support Force, and the term “disengagement” was replaced with “transition.” Both instances promoted clarity and assurance.

Coordination is centered upon people and relationships. One insight regularly reinforced is the importance of quality LNOs to other organizations. By exchanging information with other agencies and facilitating inclusiveness, LNOs serve as an excellent means for promoting a shared understanding of the operational environment. An LNO is often the only representative of the sending unit with which the other organization’s leadership and staff interacts. Observer/trainers have identified the following insights and best practices on the use of LNOs:

LNOs from other agencies/organizations –

- Fully assimilate LNOs into the organization and clarify their roles in terms of their authority, as either a representative that has the authority to speak on behalf of the agency leadership or as a conduit of information to/from that organization.
- Clarify the LNOs’ roles and authorities with respect to other personnel from their agency/organization that may be members in coordination centers or working groups in the headquarters.
- As appropriate, recognize and use LNOs as their parent agency’s personal representative to the command.
- Identify at the Chief of Staff and principal J-code Director Level how to best leverage the LNOs’ skills, knowledge, and access to their parent agency.
- Do not tie LNOs to a desk in the joint
operations center monitoring operations or pigeon hole them into only one working group/cell.

- Include LNOs in any physical or virtual meetings with their parent organization.

- Support them with appropriate information technology, desk space, and telephones to reach back to their agencies. Include them in the information management plan. Request the LNOs’ support for monitoring and solving connectivity and classification issues with their agencies.

**Command’s liaison to other agencies –**

- Send quality personnel. As the JFC’s personal representatives, impress on them the need to establish and maintain quality personal relationships with the gaining organization.

- Ensure they understand the respective authorities, responsibilities, goals, processes, and cultures of the agencies/organizations to which they are being assigned.

- Ensure they understand the commander’s guidance and intent prior to dispatching them to other agencies. Keep them informed of changing guidance and staff activity so they can provide credible and accurate input.

- Empower them to speak on behalf of the JFC to the gaining organization. Reinforce their credibility and the command’s trust and confidence in them at every opportunity with the gaining agency.

- Involve them in internal JFC updates and assessment.

- Keep them focused on watching for and solving connectivity and classification issues.

Advisors bring specific expertise to a headquarters; however, they are in all likelihood not authorized to speak for a particular agency. The advisor’s role is to provide the JFC with personal advice based on past experience. The presence of advisors does not absolve the JFC and staff of establishing and integrating external stakeholders and promoting effective interorganizational coordination.

**Advisors bring specific expertise to a headquarters; however, they are in all likelihood not authorized to speak for a particular agency. The advisor’s role is to provide the JFC with personal advice based on past experience.**

Two examples of advisors employed at the JTF-level to ensure effective interorganizational coordination are the political advisor (POLAD) and the senior civilian representative (SCR). The POLAD is a U.S. State Department foreign service officer assigned at the operational or strategic level to provide advice to the commander on State Department and regional political perspectives. The POLAD is not an LNO from State, but rather an experienced advisor to the commander to assist in developing a broad understanding of regional and global perspectives.

The SCR enables better synergy and harmony with interagency partners. The SCR is normally sourced from a parent organization, such as State, the UN, or USAID, depending on the operational focus and predominance of effort. The SCR’s authorities are normally specified by the Chief of Mission and often include supervisory authority over non-DoD
civilian personnel in the staff and subordinate organizations. The personal relationships between the commander and SCR are critical to overall synergy of operations and directly affect the civilian/military relationships throughout the staff and organization. The relationship between the commander and his civilian advisors is critical to developing the trust and building horizontal co-creation of context. This relationship also sets the tone for the rest of the staff and how they interact with civilian counterparts and mission partners. Observer/trainers have identified the following insights and best practices on the use of advisors:

- Clarify their authority to speak on behalf of an agency/organization.

- Clarify their relationship with any liaison or other element from the respective agency or organization and within the joint force command.

- Give them a seat at the table. Ensure they are included in key staff meetings and that their perspective is valued in the decision-making process.

- Recognize their limitations; they are providing their viewpoint based on their experiences and background.

The relationship between the commander and his civilian advisors is critical to developing the trust and building horizontal co-creation of context.

coordinate with agencies and other external stakeholders will vary widely, there are key considerations that shape determining the right organization and assigning the appropriate roles within each headquarters to accomplish those responsibilities.

The nature of the JFC’s mission will determine how much interorganizational coordination will be conducted and with whom. CCMDs conduct, plan, and execute extensive theater-security cooperation in collaboration with embassies, foreign governments, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector entities. JTFs with a warfighting focus may have limited requirements for interorganizational coordination, while a JTF with a noncombatant evacuation operation or humanitarian assistance/disaster response mission will have extensive interface with agencies and other external stakeholders. Nearly all will have a multinational aspect to their missions. Mission analysis products should identify those agencies and other external stakeholders that impact the command’s mission, either positively or negatively. Such impact can be based on capabilities, authorities, or political influence.

Further analysis of the JFC’s mission should then determine the needs of each staff functional area to conduct coordination with agencies and other external stakeholders, as well as to have situational awareness of the activities and to understand the perspectives and interests of the appropriate external stakeholders.

The JFC should vertically synchronize its interorganizational coordination actions with those of its higher headquarters and its subordinates. The JFC should define appropriate interorganizational coordination roles, responsibilities, and authorities between its level and that of its subordinates, as well as set the conditions for success at the subordinates’ level.

Similarly, the JFC should strive to synchronize its interorganizational coordination
actions with adjacent DoD commands, particularly those who are in a supported-supporting relationship with the JFC. Along with the vertical synchronization described above, it is necessary to ensure DoD is speaking with one voice and acting consistently in dealing with agencies and other external stakeholders. Both horizontal and vertical synchronization require awareness and understanding of the mechanisms with which adjacent, higher, and subordinate commands conduct interorganizational coordination.

Finally, it is critical to recognize interorganizational coordination as a staff process. As with other staff processes, it requires sufficient ownership and defined responsibilities within the staff to function properly. Interorganizational coordination often occurs at multiple points across a joint force staff. A lack of discipline in coordinating with external entities can result in inefficient and stove-piped efforts that are prone to gaps and duplication of effort. Continuous internal synchronization of the external coordination effort is necessary to ensure the joint force headquarters sends an accurate and consistent message to other organizations, that information gained from this effort is internally shared, and the perspectives and equities of external stakeholders are brought into the planning, assessment, and decision-making process.

JFCs should manage their own expectations on external stakeholder processes, procedures, and structures. As previously discussed, each of these entities will have its own culture and means of doing business. Commanders cannot assume the interorganizational partner’s decision cycle will move at the same rate as theirs, but they must anticipate when and how to best engage and synchronize actions. The JFC’s staff must anticipate the partners’ needs and be able to lean forward, particularly in operations where a rapid response is critical. Again, the use and inclusion of LNOs will be important to support this process.

As the U.S. transitions from military-led and focused operations, as discussed in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, it becomes vitally important that commanders consider the decision cycles of other mission partners and external stakeholders. The commander’s decision cycle will not always be the driving cog in the machine. This is notably true for DSCA operations, where DoD is in a supporting role. It is important to note the differences in the synchronization (or timing) of events and how they do not necessarily conform to one another, thus creating a potential source of friction in staff processes. Armed with this knowledge, JFCs and staffs can create a battle rhythm that aligns these processes and enhances interorganizational coordination. Observer/trainers have identified the following insights and best practices for coordinating decision cycles:

• Continuous communication and coordination during assessment, planning, directing, and monitoring actions enables better understanding of the operational environment and takes advantage of the complementary capabilities of different agencies. Coordination during planning results in feasible, executable, and better-integrated plans.

• JFC’s involvement in a partner’s planning...it is critical to recognize interorganizational coordination as a staff process. As with other staff processes, it requires sufficient ownership and defined responsibilities within the staff to function properly.
efforts can enhance their operations and vice versa.

- Develop and agree to an interorganizational operating rhythm that establishes the timing, location, purpose, and participants for routine meetings for coordination and collaboration.

- Include stakeholders in physical and virtual collaboration. Achieving some degree of information sharing must be a focus area for the commander and staff going into an operation. They must determine the right networks (from the standpoint of classification) and ensure all the stakeholders agree on common tools and software.

- Because interorganizational organizations are staffed at much lower numbers, they cannot support the level of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups found at the joint force level.

- Ensure information is effectively shared and allow them to prioritize their time.

- Identify or develop any required memorandums of agreement to support interagency coordination, command relationships, personnel exchanges, and other important processes.

- Write for release (within mission parameters) for interorganizational and external stakeholders and incorporate robust disclosure policies and procedures.

- Other agencies and entities have their own libraries of acronyms; learn theirs and translate yours.

- Establish (or if possible use existing and accepted) information sharing and collaboration protocols to work with interorganizational players and other external stakeholders. Allow for an interactive and dynamic interface to enable collaboration between the joint headquarters and the interorganizational players.

  Determine information sharing means in terms of the network, web portals, and e-mail to allow for inclusion of your interorganizational stakeholders. Ensure all parties maintain shared situational awareness and have access to all relevant information. There are numerous push and pull means to share information—the appropriate method is dictated by type of information and its urgency.

  Assign responsibility for interagency and interorganizational coordination to a principal staff director. Use staff integration elements, such as working groups and cells, to ensure continuous horizontal synchronization of coordination with external organizations.

**Conclusion**

In order to promote effective interorganizational coordination, JFCs must actively seek to horizontally integrate with potential mission partners and other external stakeholders as part of an overarching comprehensive approach. By promoting and facilitating inclusion, starting with the planning process, JFCs enable a better understanding of the situation through the aggregation of multiple perspectives in framing the problem and way ahead and setting the conditions necessary for the successful transition of roles and responsibilities to other mission partners. Understanding the different cultures, processes, capabilities, capacities, and authorities that potential partners
bring to a mission should inform the creation and/or modification of internal staff process in order
to facilitate inclusion and bridge any perceived gaps that prevent the realization of unified action.
In so doing, JFCs will ensure success and achieve national, theater-strategic, and operational
objectives. IAJ

NOTES

1 General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Mission Command Paper,” April 3,
2012. The principles of mission command articulated in the paper include understanding, intent, and trust.

2 “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington,
September 10, 2012.

3 Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Washington, June 24, 2011.


5 “Joint Field Office Activation and Operations: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure,”

6 Designated by the DHS Secretary.

7 The DCO is normally an O6.


9 The source for much of this doctrinal information is Joint Pub 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination
During Joint Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, June 24, 2011.

10 “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success,” RAND, Arlington,
accessed on May 29, 2014.


12 Some of these are APAN-info.net, Acbaz.org, Harmonieweb.org, Interaction.org, Globalaction.net, and
Reliefweb.org. Be cautious about introducing new means as the interagency, IGO, and NGO communities
may already have an established means to collaborate and share information.
Improving Interagency Coordination in Africa

by Robert Bennett

United States Army Africa (USARAF) executes over 400 activities annually valued at $2 million. These activities augment activities sponsored by other U.S. government, private charitable foundations, churches, and regional African organizations. The stated goals for these activities are complementary, but coordination among the groups is generally ineffective or nonexistent. Obstacles to activity synchronization in Africa fall into two major categories—administrative and mission command structures and planning procedures. While development and implementation of a system to coordinate all activities is unlikely in the near term, it may be possible for the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and USARAF to design a model for activity synchronization that better focuses the resources available to meet U.S. policy objectives on the continent.

Administrative and Mission Command Structures

State and DoD do not view the continent of Africa the same way. State divides the continent into two major regions under two bureaus (Near Eastern Affairs and Sub Saharan Affairs). DoD, through its geographic combatant command U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), looks at the continent as a whole with the exception of Egypt, which is managed by U.S. Central Command. State Department bureaus manage day-to-day activities on the continent independently through 54 embassies that focus on five regions. These different perspectives often cause miscommunication between the two agencies. State’s analyses often demonstrate a great depth and situational understanding of a state or regional need, but are not well linked to activities that could enhance the effectiveness of an activity or operation. DoD’s analyses clearly focus on an objective but frequently overlook or fail to account for situational details that either denigrate the effectiveness

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of an activity or cause it to fail. For example, State may identify a capability that a regional state can provide with DoD training; however, providing this capability to one state may negatively impact DoD’s plan to deploy a common system across multiple states. State’s solution meets the requirements for the state with whom a diplomat is tasked to coordinate but complicates successful execution of a regional DoD objective.

DoD established AFRICOM in 2008 during the height of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, it did not have sufficient forces to dedicate to activities on the African continent. As the force requirements for the campaigns declined between 2011 and 2014, more forces became available, but the administrative systems that designate control of forces did not substantively evolve. Instead, the Services identified forces that were already assigned a primary mission to have a second focus area on Africa. For example, U.S. Naval Forces Europe created a planning cell to meet mission requirements established by AFRICOM with no change in the forces allocated to the fleet, and the commander was also dual-hatted as the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Africa. Similarly, the U.S. Air Forces Europe commander was designated as the commander of U.S. Air Forces Africa.

The Army applied a different solution by dedicating a commander and headquarters to support AFRICOM—U.S. Army Africa/9th Army/Southeast European Task Force in Vicenza, Italy. The headquarters focuses on planning multi-component operations on the continent, including exercises, training, and security cooperation activities; however, the headquarters had no assigned units to execute this range of activities. Instead USARAF relied on a mission-by-mission allocation of forces through the Global Force Management System to meet each individual requirement in 2011 and 2012 (434 activities).

Beginning in fiscal year 2013, the U.S. Army designated the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division as a regionally aligned brigade (RAB) focused on Africa. It serves as an available force for USARAF planners. Also in 2013, USARAF conducted its first synchronization conference with the Adjutants General from the eight states participating in the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program (SPP) aligned with Africa. During 2013, USARAF was able to increase its activity on the continent to 434 activities, including 53 RAB and 93 SPP activities.

The use of the RAB and improved synchronization with SPP partners did not work as smoothly as envisioned by any of the commanders or staffs involved. The term “aligned” did not fit within the global force management model; consequently, planning assumptions regarding the availability of forces to conduct tasks or activities were often incorrect. It was wrongly assumed the initial alignment of the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) staff with Africa-led USARAF planners would be responsive to requests for detailed planning or analysis in support of likely contingencies. 1CD staff was focused on its subsequent deployment and preparations for that operation. Similarly, many of the low density/high demand enablers including civil affairs, engineer, and intelligence units that were aligned to Africa were subsequently unaligned by the Department of the Army when USARAF planners identified numerous requirements that committed those units’ personnel and made them unavailable to tasks higher in priority than Africa. One impact

DoD established AFRICOM in 2008 during the height of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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of these invalidated planning assumptions for available forces was the delayed issuance of the USARAF 2014 training and engagement plan. A second impact was a significant gap between missions USARAF planned for execution during 2014 and forces available to conduct them. The mission management debacle generated by the federal government’s budgeting dysfunction in September/October 2013 further exacerbated the mismatch between missions planned and the ability of the Army to conduct them.

The global force management model executed by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) also contributed to frustration for military planners and operators focused on Africa. Staff officers identified the following methods to fit USARAF’s request for RAB forces into the global force management model:

- USARAF developed a request for each specific requirement and requested to use the RAB in one message.
- USARAF provided the message as a draft for AFRICOM to issue to FORSCOM and provided a copy of the draft message to the RAB to support concurrent planning.
- AFRICOM staffed the draft message internally to ensure it was nested inside AFRICOM objectives and subsequently issued the message to FORSCOM.
- FORSCOM staffed the message and generally determined that the RAB would source the identified requirements.
- FORSCOM issued a task order to the RAB to support the requirement.
- USARAF then issued a task order to execute the activity or requirement.
- The RAB executed the activity or requirement.

Fitting the square peg of using an aligned force into the round hole of the global force management procedure required approximately two weeks to execute because of the staffing procedures at USARAF, AFRICOM, and FORSCOM. On at least two occasions, this caused the Soldiers tasked to execute the mission to delay an activity because they were unable to legally request visas or transportation requests until the last step of the process was complete, despite understanding and planning for the requirement weeks earlier. On one occasion, over 30 Soldiers were mustered for movement at a commercial airport over 100 miles from their unit location, but their tickets were not validated by the airport because the FORSCOM task order had not been approved. The mission was delayed by a week, and an African unit that was to be deployed in support of a UN mission had to adjust its deployment plan and the plans of three other UN units deployed in support of that mission.

**Activity Planning Procedures**

State activities are not organized and planned with a specific, achievable mission objective. The National Security Strategy organizes Sub-Saharan African policy objectives into four broad pillars: strengthening democratic institutions, supporting African economic growth and development, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development. State’s current strategy lists 21 categories of activities that support these four pillars, including seven that can be effectively sourced by the DoD. The source for most activities is one of the 54 country teams resident in the capital cities of the 54 states on the continent.

One State program that generated eight activities in 2013 and early 2014 was the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. The program provided African states with tailored training that allows their forces to execute African Union (AU) and
UN peacekeeping missions on the continent. Many of the training missions under this program were executed by private companies on contract to the State Department. However, the Army’s regionally-aligned force executed six such training missions. Planning for these missions begins when an African state identifies an AU or UN mission requirement it is willing to fill, which usually occurs 100–200 days prior to execution. State then publishes a request for proposal to interested firms to source a training activity. State concurrently reviews the roster of potential trainees to ensure that they meet human rights standards imposed by Congress. Regulatory guidance requires a request for proposal remain open for 15 days. Therefore, if no qualified commercial firm responds to the proposal, DoD is asked to support the training activity less than four weeks prior to activity initiation. Of the six missions executed by the regionally-aligned force in early 2014, four of them were delayed due to late notification to DoD that the requirement existed.

DoD charges AFRICOM with management of “all U.S. Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, its island nations and surrounding waters.”

DoD charges AFRICOM with management of “all U.S. Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, its island nations and surrounding waters.” Like State’s activities on the continent, AFRICOM activities are organized in support of six key tasks: counter violent extremist organizations and their networks, support defense institution building, strengthen maritime security, support peace support operations, support humanitarian and disaster response, and counter illicit flows. AFRICOM prioritizes activities in support of these key tasks and assigns responsibility to its components for execution in a series of annual task orders that are generally published in May or June prior to their effective date of 1 October. These task orders inform the production of component, annual, planning documents. USARAF’s document is titled “Fiscal Year Annual Order.”

While this timeline nominally supports sequential development of goals and objectives, the late production of annual planning documents negatively impacts DoD’s ability to plan activities on the continent. In 2013, AFRICOM published is fiscal year 2014 to USARAF on 2 August causing USARAF to delay publishing its “Fiscal Year Annual Order” until 9 September. The late issuance of these documents and lack of an annual budget brought about by the federal government shutdown led USARAF to plan fewer activities in the fourth quarter of 2013. It also generated frustration within State, whose regional experts and planners felt DoD was failing to take advantage of good weather and cultural acceptance of training opportunities during the October/December period.

Despite the administrative and mission command and planning obstacles to effectively synchronize activities in Africa, State, AFRICOM, USARAF, and the RAB executed over 1,500 activities during the last four fiscal years. Many of the products required to better synchronize activities exist, but the content of the products or the timing/sequencing of their release can be adjusted to create a new model for mission coordination among the individuals focused on American policy goals in Africa.

An Improved Model

The overarching guidance for U.S. policy in Africa is currently articulated in the June 2012 “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan
Africa.” This policy has two broad objectives—“strengthening democratic institutions and boosting broad-based economic growth.” If the current administration updates its policy objectives for Africa, supporting documents identifying specific objectives should be published in January of the calendar year in which they will take effect. This will provide AFRICOM and State sufficient time to design their orders for the following fiscal year in support of those policy objectives.

The majority of activities on the continent executed by AFRICOM or USARAF are first identified and frequently funded by the Department of State. In order to ensure military’s annual orders meet these requirements, State should publish a working first draft of its priorities and identify missions requiring DoD support in the upcoming year no later than mid-March—seven months prior to the fiscal year in which the requirements will be executed.

The ideal tool for identifying these tasks is the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS). This system is designed to centralize the planning and sequencing of security cooperation activities over a three year period—12 months of archived data and 24 months of planned activities. DoD, AFRICOM, USARAF, or State planners rarely adhere to the timelines associated with this system; simply applying discipline to the current system will improve planning and synchronization. While currently a DoD system, interagency use of this tool will keep task management consistent and provide State Department leaders with an opportunity to monitor the progress of activities during the fiscal year these activities are being executed. Current business rules in Africa enable Defense attaches, AFRICOM and USARAF theater security cooperation planners, and a database manager at each headquarters to enter activities into the database. The first required action is adding State Department planners within the Africa Bureau and members of the embassy country teams designated by ambassadors to the list of individuals authorized to enter activities into the database. Training these individuals will be a low-cost initiative as training classes and modules are available to individuals new to the system.

Under this new model, AFRICOM receives State’s prioritized mission requirements in March and applies them to the production of its annual task order to its subordinate component commands, which in turn publish their annual orders no later than early June. While staffing and developing its task order, AFRICOM would share drafts with their components, enabling parallel planning and quick publication of subordinates’ annual orders. Instead of listing activities for each component’s execution as an annex to the task order, the new model stipulates that AFRICOM planners validate, add, delete (with justification to State), or amend G-TSCMIS entries and refer the components to the G-TSCMIS database. This keeps activity planning consistent in the database and retains a single, authoritative database of record that extends two years into the future. It also enables the AFRICOM staff to conduct strategic and operational-level planning because it is focused sufficiently in the future, where leaders can shape resourcing and major exercise scheduling with African partners.

In addition to overcoming planning obstacles, AFRICOM has the capacity to unilaterally and immediately overcome an
administrative/mission command obstacle at no cost to the government. AFRICOM should delegate to USARAF operational control of Army RAB forces. Current procedures requiring USARAF to request use of these forces through AFRICOM to FORSCOM after publication of its annual order delays mission planning at the unit level and inhibits operational- and tactical-level execution of activities. The perception among Army planners is that neither the AFRICOM commander nor his staff trusts that USARAF is capable of fulfilling its statutory responsibilities as the Army component command and, therefore, withholds control of RAB forces. However, AFRICOM can delegate operational control while exerting ultimate control by tasking USARAF through existing orders processes.

One potential method to overcome both the administrative and planning obstacles available to both USARAF and State is to adjust interagency representation on the USARAF staff. USARAF currently has a senior diplomat serving as the commander’s political advisor, which is a remnant of the USARAF organization’s time as a sub-component of U.S. Army Europe. Prior to assuming its role as USARAF, U.S. Army forces in Vicenza focused on European contingencies and maintenance of the relationship with Italy. Today as AFRICOM’s Army component command, USARAF interacts with 54 African leaders in addition to Italian leaders. A single State Department senior foreign service officer cannot meet the needs of 55 diverse African and European leaders and governments; consequently, military planners have to rely on close working relationships with individual ambassadors and defense attaches.

In lieu of the senior diplomat, State should assign two junior foreign service officers to serve in the plans and current operations cells at USARAF. Their experiences, ability to communicate with U.S. embassies in the region, and contacts with other State Department entities will enhance USARAF’s understanding of State Department activities and objectives on the continent and facilitate coordination. The addition of extra staff members from the State Department will enable USARAF to dedicate a uniformed member to serve in Washington, DC, as a member of the Africa Bureau to facilitate mission planning and synchronization at that planning node. These personnel realignments better distribute planning and operational expertise across the organizations tasked with accomplishing U.S. policy objectives in Africa.

USARAF currently has adequate planning procedures in place to plan, synchronize, and execute activities effectively on the continent, but the failure to apply these procedures is the largest obstacle to achieving its yearly mission. USARAF planning procedures stipulate that its annual order be published in July and distributed to AFRICOM, FORSCOM, the regionally aligned forces, and State Partnership Program partners; however, in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 the order was not published until late September. Late production of the order caused State and military planners to delay execution of activities until funds became available, which resulted in many countries having no productive interaction with the U.S. until November. The delay also limited many American multi-component units’ capacities to support activities in Africa because they commit to a training plan well before the beginning of the first quarter of a fiscal year. The order should serve as a synchronizing tool for DoD’s database of record, G-TSCMIS, but the system of record is frequently inaccurate because planners wait to
update the database until the order is published. G-TSCMIS data has not been updated for Africa until well into the first quarter for the last four fiscal years. While the USARAF staff does a good job of planning, the failure to publish an order within a window of time in which it can be executed renders the order ineffective.

A technique to mitigate the negative impacts of late orders production is to publish the order, at whatever level of fidelity in which it exists, by 15 July—a full 75 days prior to the beginning of the next fiscal year. Quarterly fragmentary order (FRAGO) production to add, delete, or edit activities or their sequencing can then be produced in August, December, March, and June as per USARAF’s published policy. Using the FRAGOs to meet emerging opportunities or command initiatives would more effectively enable the commander to synchronize his staff and adjust priorities throughout the fiscal year and enable the team to better react as situations on the continent evolve.

Conclusion

USARAF executes over 400 activities annually on the continent in coordination with the Department of State, AFRICOM, and other planning entities. Many of these activities support the commander’s intent to facilitate positive change in Africa, but administrative and mission command and planning obstacles are preventing USARAF from maximizing the change it can make. Assigning State planners instead of senior diplomats will better mitigate the issues resulting from the different lenses through which the departments see Africa and provide more robust interagency opportunities for foreign service officers early in their careers.

Additionally, current Army force allocation policies unnecessarily insert FORSCOM into the mission planning and execution cycle between USARAF and its one allocated RAB, which has resulted in several delayed missions and created tensions between country teams and their hosts on the continent. It also negatively impacts the mission planning and preparation for Soldiers from the RAB. A simple reallocation of the force to USARAF will solve this issue, but it will require the Army and FORSCOM to trust the theater army commander.

Finally, USARAF can do a better job by executing its planning procedures in a timely manner instead of waiting for a perfectly coordinated interagency solution that is dependent on a DoD-level synchronization process with the State Department. Initiating action with mutually supporting activities will make both departments more effective throughout the entire fiscal year while Congress, DoD, and the State Department finalize departmental coordination through the end of September of any given year.

USARAF is an effective laboratory for operational-level interagency planning and coordination. The organization is small enough to observe issues and challenges and make adjustments as required, but it is large enough to have an impact that can be measured. Departmental-level attention to these issues and commitment to solve them may provide data that can inform future interagency coordination discussions. IAJ

NOTES


3 Barack Obama.
There is no Silver Bullet and Other Lessons from Colombia

by Stuart Lippe

Colombia has always had large, ungovernable areas where the authority of the central government was often tenuous or non-existent. Colombians seemed to prefer to focus on their home regions, leaving the vast hinterlands to fend for themselves. Fifteen percent of the country’s then 1,100 municipios (equivalent to U.S. counties) had no national government presence. In many case, there had never been any.

For much of its history, other than the loss of territory to independence movements, this failure of the central government to establish its authority was of little consequence, and there were always small groups of bandits and political groups in the back country. Usually they could be ignored, except of course by their victims. It was only the growth of the drug industry that provided the most vigorous, best organized, and long-lived of these lawless groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and, to a lesser degree, the National Liberation Army (ELN) the means to grow and pose a serious threat to the national government.

That this happened should have come as no surprise. In 1964, Gerry Sutton, a junior political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, sent an airgram, “Violence in Colombia: A Case Study,” that analyzed Colombia’s problems. (Airgrams were “think” pieces prepared on typewriter and air-pouched to Washington in the days before computers). Drawing on all civilian and military sources, Sutton describes Colombia’s ungoverned areas and the extensive rural poverty, as well as the origins of Colombia’s pervasive culture of violence, engendered by Conservative-Liberal political strife going back to the previous century. Colombia’s strong regionalism and the lack of central

The views in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the U.S. government.

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government authority allowed rural fighting to flourish. In a preview of what actually happened 35 years later, Sutton predicted that this would continue until Colombia addressed its national authority problems, and that the U.S. could help by providing intelligence, mobility (helicopters), and training. The airgram also emphasized the need for Colombia to attack the basic causes of violence. And indeed, Colombia made some progress under the 1964 “Plan Lazo”; however, these and later efforts fell far short of what was really needed. In spite of the broader and more generous financing of Plan Colombia, it is still not certain that sufficient resources are available to finally resolve the core problems of rural violence, poverty and neglect, and institutional weakness, but there has been progress.

Over the last few years, there have been numerous efforts to distill lessons learned from helping Colombia, generally seen as a foreign policy success, and applying them to challenges elsewhere. Colombia’s remarkable recovery from its low point in the late 1990s makes it an important case study. In spite of its challenges, Colombia benefited from a generally competent national government with effective leadership through several administrations (Andrés Pastrana, Alvaro Uribe, and Juan Manuel Santos) and strong public support for their programs. These two critical factors allowed Colombia to mobilize and effectively use international assistance, particularly that of the U.S., which viewed Colombia as a dedicated and convinced national partner. U.S. civilian and military cooperation and interagency unity provided an object lesson in how to bring all elements of power—diplomatic, military, public relations, economic, and intelligence—to bear to help resolve the Colombian crisis.

By the mid to late 1990s, Washington was increasingly concerned that Colombia might
collapse and become a narco-state. Then Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department Thomas Pickering was approached by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger in late summer 1999 to “pull together the U.S. government” and see what it could do about the worsening situation in Colombia. Pickering emphasized that both purpose and process would be fundamental for success. Purpose being what we intended to do to pursue our national interest and process how we organized to do it.

In addition to the two governments being ready to cooperate, six unusual circumstances combined to affect how the U.S. addressed Colombia’s situation:

- A small defensive-minded Colombian Army, which had little mobility, poor logistics, and inadequate intelligence, was losing battalion-sized encounters with the FARC. The prospect of a major Latin American country falling to a narcotics-fed insurgency/terrorist group sent geopolitical chills up the spines of the foreign policy establishment in Washington.

- Coca cultivation was about three times what had been previously thought and growing.

- There was a crack cocaine epidemic in large American cities.

- It was an election year (2000), ensuring that both political parties would respond to the drug issue. Neither wished to be seen as unconcerned. There is ample evidence that Republicans intended to raise the Clinton Administration’s alleged lack of concern over drugs, while the Democrats were not going to allow themselves to be outflanked on this issue.

- The discredited Ernesto Samper had been replaced by Andrés Pastrana, who recognized the challenges he faced and quickly asked for improved relations with the U.S. and support for his vision to rebuild Colombia.

- With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were no other international issues (save the perennial ones in the Middle East) to distract policy makers.

In response to President Pastrana’s request for assistance, State asked him to develop a plan that would tie together the various programs he wanted to implement and identify where he thought the U.S. could help. In addition to senior-level meetings with the Colombians, there were more detailed working discussions that included State, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), DoD, and the Department of Justice. Pastrana’s National Development Director Jaime Ruiz authored Plan Colombia. Because Ruiz purposely did so in English for easier presentation to the U.S. Congress, some claim it was written in the U.S. and that the focus was then shifted from social development and peace with the FARC to strengthening the counterterrorism/counternarcotics elements. This assertion overlooks what the Colombians themselves wanted from the U.S.—support for a broad-based effort to address much more than drugs and guerrillas. The plan’s full title: “Plan Colombia: Colombia’s Plan for Peace, Prosperity and Strengthening of the State” might be a more accurate description of Colombia’s goals.

Plan Colombia contains only general outlines of Colombia’s goals and the following...
ten pillars that identify what needed to be accomplished:

1. **Economic.** Generate employment and strengthen Colombia’s capacity to collect taxes and offer economic support to counter narcotics trafficking.

2. **Fiscal and financial.** Adopt severe austerity measures to promote economic activity and recover Colombia’s traditional standing in international financial markets.

3. **Peace.** Seek agreements with the guerrillas based on territorial integrity, democracy, human rights, and strengthening the rule of law and the fight against narcotics trafficking.

4. **National defense.** Restructure and modernize the armed forces and police.

5. **Justice and human rights.** Reaffirm the rule of law and ensure equal and impartial justice for all.

6. **Drug enforcement.** Combat narcotics trafficking in association with the other involved countries.

7. **Alternative development.** Promote agricultural and other economically profitable activities.

8. **Social participation.** Seek a collective concientización (raising of consciousness).

9. **Human development.** Guarantee adequate services of health and education to vulnerable groups.

10. **International support.** Confirm the principles of co-responsibility, integrated action, and balanced treatment.

Plan Colombia was the result of a complex, three-way interaction between the two countries’ executive branches and the U.S. Congress. Dr. Alvaro Mendez wryly notes that his paper, “Negotiating Intervention by Invitation: How the Colombians Shaped U.S. Participation in the Genesis of Plan Colombia,” contradicts the views held by some of his academic colleagues that the U.S. imposed Plan Colombia on the Colombian government. Dr. Mendez convincingly argues that the power asymmetry notwithstanding, it was the smaller state that took the initiative. This is an important distinction, because it shows the Colombians were ready to respond strongly to Pickering’s basic question of “what was Colombia prepared to do?” on its own behalf. The question of Colombian “ownership” was never in question, and it did not become a “U.S. war.”

When the U.S. announced its support for Plan Colombia, purpose (what can we do about the worsening situation in Colombia?) became policy, which has endured to this day through continuing follow-on programs, even though Plan Colombia itself has long since been completed.

Once Colombia’s commitment became apparent, U.S. planners moved to the second of Pickering’s questions, “In what way could the United States organize itself to help Colombia reform and rebound successfully?” by identifying issues and mechanisms for providing support to Plan Colombia. Their efforts were originally called the “Colombia Initiative,” a title that never really caught on. Inevitably, perhaps, it became known, simply, as Plan Colombia, which may have contributed to the confusion on the part of some that it was a U.S. plan.

In fact, the U.S. did not announce its intention to support Plan Colombia until some three months after Colombia’s invitation was delivered by President Pastrana to President Clinton in September 1999. The Clinton Administration submitted a proposal to Congress on January 11, 2000, for an “urgently needed, two year funding package to assist
Colombia in vital counter-drug efforts,” but it would also include “assistance for economic development, protection of human rights and judicial reform.”

Of course there were strong debates on many aspects of the proposal, from what kind of helicopters to buy, to human rights concerns. Working closely with the interested Congressional leadership of both parties, but especially Republican Speaker Dennis Hastert, the Democratic Administration requested $1.3 billion. With bipartisan support, it was approved and became law on July 13, 2000.

As the legislation to implement the policy worked its way through Congress, the Executive Branch got ready to manage what was a quantum increase in U.S. funding, from under $200 million (in primarily counternarcotics programs) to over $1.3 billion for Colombia and another $300 million for neighboring countries in just the first two years. Lead agencies for implementation were State, USAID, Justice, and DoD. Others with significant roles included ONDCP, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DEA, National Security Council (NSC), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Department of Commerce, Coast Guard, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Treasury.

Central to success was an interagency group that met at the Assistant Secretary level and later their designees, co-chaired by State and DoD, under the authority and broad guidance of the NSC. Although called the Colombia Initiative Working Group (CIWG), it was, in fact, the standard interagency process of Assistant Secretaries reporting to the Deputies’ and Principals’ Committees. This is important because Assistant Secretaries are at the crucial junction where they receive working-level expertise from below, while also managing political concerns from above, and they are responsible for day-to-day supervision and policy.

Public Law 106-246 describes Plan Colombia, as instituted by the administration of President Pastrana to “combat drug production and trafficking, foster peace, increase the rule of law, improve human rights, expand economic development, and institute justice reform.” It was, in effect, a long-delayed effort by Colombians to develop a strategy that would allow the country to exercise national authority throughout its territories. U.S. policy was to support Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs as both countries developed a whole-of-government approach. U.S programs provide training, equipment, and funding to the government of Colombia, civil society, international organizations, and NGOs in the areas of counternarcotics and counterterrorism; alternative development; law enforcement; institutional strengthening; judicial reform; human and labor rights; humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and victims of violence; local government; conflict management and peace promotion; demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child soldiers; humanitarian demining; and preservation of the environment.

Because of the large and rapid growth in program funding, the CIWG was given a standing Colombia Initiative Task Force (CITF) to serve as its secretariat. The CITF was led by former Ambassador James Mack and consisted of full-time, working-level members from State’s Western Hemisphere Affairs and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement bureaus; DoD’s Division of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; USAID’s Latin America and Caribbean bureau; and a CIA
analyst. Other agencies provided personnel as needed, as did State’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor/, Population, Refugees, and Migration, and Political-Military bureaus.

The CITF existed from April 2000 through February 2001 and shepherded the process from legislative approval through acquisition and the beginning of implementation. The task force tracked over 100 line items funded by the Plan Colombia legislation. These included Black Hawk and Huey-2 helicopters, glyphosate for aerial spraying of coca, mobile police units, rule of law and economic development projects, additional staff to help with an increased workload and direct support to the Colombia Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as many other programs to expand its activities. The CITF also met with human rights and other interested organizations, responded to Congressional concerns, and answered press and public questions.

One real innovation came about when agencies or individuals sought more senior guidance. The Assistant Secretaries would “adjourn” as the CIWG and “reconvene” as an Executive Committee (ExCom) with Tom Pickering as the chair. Issues that could not be resolved by the ExCom were to be referred to the Deputies’ Committee. In fact, the ExCom easily resolved the few issues that were not settled at lower levels. It did report occasionally to the Deputies’ Committee, but only to ensure it and the Principals’ Committee were up-to-date on progress. The CIWG and the CITF were often also referred to as the Plan Colombia Working Group and Plan Colombia Task Force.

State and DoD worked almost seamlessly together in what could be a model for “jointness.” Still, having the decisive call in the hands of State’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs ensured that State’s voice was strong at a time when DoD’s sheer resources, especially in terms of manpower, might have been overwhelming. DoD and other agencies always had the option of insisting on going higher, but this option was never exercised. A broad agreement on overall policy and goals meant there was no significant dissent from within the government, not even from the OMB, whose job was to crunch and control numbers. Generous Congressional bipartisan support continues, even to this day.

There was also no real opposition from outside, aided by the fact that the FARC had almost no Colombian public or international support. Most Colombians rejected the FARC’s ideology, and because of the U.S. emphasis on human rights and economic development, there were never more than sporadic and sputtering protests. Not all in Congress or the NGO community might agree with this, but their concerns were a priority for attention.

In 2000, in another innovative step, the U.S. sent a small interagency team to Bogota to assist government of Colombia (GOC) planning. Over the next few months, this team and the GOC produced a lengthy “execution plan.” Even more useful than the plan itself may have been the process of forcing the GOC ministries and agencies to work together and to continue after the U.S. team left. Another benefit was that both sides developed personal relationships that were maintained for years, especially as working-level colleagues advanced to more senior positions.

While both the Clinton and Bush
administrations called for the development of overall “implementation” plans, they were drafted but never finalized. Eventually, the Deputies’ Committee agreed that the annual reports State prepared for Congress adequately addressed planning needs, even if they did not include all the metrics and outputs that some thought essential.

Of course, there were always a fair number of complications to be addressed and resolved including the following:

**Counternarcotics versus counterterrorism**

Counternarcotics provided the essential focus for the U.S. government and the Colombian National Police. It was also the strongest reason Congress approved getting involved. While there was early recognition by many that counternarcotics and counterterrorism were inextricably intertwined, Congress was focused on the counternarcotics aspect, and it was clear it would not finance a fight against the FARC. Yet, there was no way to differentiate between drugs and terrorism when the primary actors were one and the same. Other voices feared the U.S. could find itself on a “slippery slope,” not unlike Vietnam, and they would not allow it, even as Executive Branch leaders protested this was not in anybody’s plans. In conversations with Congress, the administration made clear it would respect those views, and so the focus remained on counternarcotics for the first years. Congress also enacted three measures that seemed burdensome at the time but, in retrospect, were essential to maintaining public support and contributed to success:

1. No U.S. combat troops in Colombia, only trainers, further reinforcing Colombian ownership.

2. A limit on total numbers of military personnel, which Congress agreed to vary over time based on needs.

3. Strong human rights conditions before any aid could be provided to the Colombian military.

Later and with experience, there was a growing realization by all that counternarcotics and counterterrorism could not be treated separately. The Administration was in the process of discussing with Congress an amendment to the Plan Colombia legislation that would allow support to Colombia’s “…unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, organizations designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and other criminal or illegal armed groups….” It passed easily after 9/11. That legislation also required Colombia to increase the amount of funding it was providing, which it did.

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**The Colombian Army and human rights**

Related to the counternarcotics / counterterrorism discussions were deep concerns about the Colombian Army’s human rights record and its reluctance to become involved in “police business.” When designing Plan Colombia, the GOC and the U.S. recognized that narcotics trafficking organizations and illegal armed groups formed combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals by law or the police. Suppressing these groups required a stronger response. That response was clearly military, but the U.S. could not support the Colombian Army through State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, nor could DoD. There was, in fact, not a single army unit eligible to receive...
U.S. equipment or training under the Leahy Amendment, which prohibits U.S. assistance to security forces, police, or military, unless they have been “vetted” for human rights concerns. As a result, the GOC agreed to stand up a totally new unit, the Counternarcotics Brigade of the Colombian Army, with a strong aviation (helicopter) element. Every soldier and officer in its three battalions was vetted for human rights concerns. Some did not make it. In one case, Pickering himself vetoed the assignment of a doubtful captain, showing how mindful he was of Congressional and NGO concerns.

The brigade’s role was to undertake counternarcotics operations and provide perimeter security for police counternarcotics efforts, including aerial spraying. The brigade also provided a model for reforms within the Colombian Army. Since then, many units of the Colombian military have become eligible to receive U.S. support in accordance with the Leahy Amendment and are capable of providing the security needed to undertake counternarcotics/counterterrorism operations.

The Colombian effort that rescued 15 high-profile hostages, including three Americans, on July 2, 2008, was a spectacular demonstration of the greatly improved capability of the armed forces. Full responsibility for the brigade and its helicopters including funding has been turned over to Colombia.

There are other points worth noting: (1) In spite of its reluctance to become mired in “police work,” the relation between counternarcotics and counterterrorism became clearer over time, and the Colombian Army was increasingly willing to embrace it as an effective tool to further weaken the FARC; (2) Human rights were a central focus of U.S. efforts. To emphasize its importance, the U.S. revoked the visas of five prominent generals and other visas were not renewed. Even though progress was not as rapid as hoped and there were some notable hold-ups and reverses, overall the trend was in the right direction; (3) U.S. military personnel from SOUTHCOM and Special Operations Forces reinforced this message at every opportunity. This contrasts with the days when Military Assistance Advisor Groups and the Defense Attaches would argue human rights was an unnecessary diversion from their real work, some going to the point of vigorously defending Army officers whose crimes are now being prosecuted in Colombian courts.

“Defense is from Mars. State is from Venus”

Differing outlooks held by State and DoD are both needed for effective policymaking, and this classic U.S. Army War College paper is an essential guide.4

Role of NGOs

Information provided by human rights NGOs was recognized and welcomed. In addition, during the course of Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs, the U.S. supported the Office of the OHCHR with some $5 to $6 million to expand its efforts throughout Colombia. The U.S. did not always agree, either with the OHCHR or all the NGOs all of the time, but never minded criticism that was critical and tough, as long as it was accurate. (In my own listing of the ten worst massacres in Colombia, the Colombian Army always denied it was involved. In fact, in eight of those ten cases when the truth eventually emerged, it was as the NGOs had correctly charged).
**Congressional oversight**

Congress was more often than not a helpful partner in implementing Plan Colombia, just as it was essential for crafting the original legislation funding U.S. programs. But Congressional support also came with numerous reports and restrictions beyond the three mentioned earlier. In addition to many reporting requirements that were levied each year on specific concerns, there were a number of ongoing quarterly and annual reports. Congress also wanted bimonthly (and then quarterly) reports on the number, location, activities, and lengths of tour for U.S. military and civilian contractors in Colombia. State provided 52 such reports before Congress abolished the requirement.

Most significant, however, were the annual certifications on progress in human rights by the Colombian military before a certain percentage of its funds could be released. This certification was the result of discussions between human rights NGOs, Congressional staff, and the State Department after all three were unsatisfied with the original legislation, which allowed the President to waive the human rights requirements. Of the six or seven original conditions, State was only able to certify that the Colombian Army had complied with two of them, the rest were waived. Nobody was happy doing that, not State, not the NGOs, and not Congress. The new legislation allowed no waivers but provided a “carrot and stick” approach. Most of the funds appropriated to support the Colombian military were released (the carrot), with the remainder held until certified (the stick). As was only to be expected, State saw the glass as half-full and certified that there had been progress, which it believed to be the case. The NGOs and Congress responded that it was half-empty or worse. As with the previous method, nobody was happy with this situation, but in spite of everything it worked. The certification was prepared by State’s Western Hemisphere and Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor bureaus, in conjunction with the Embassy.

**Role of intelligence**

On December 21, 2013, the *Washington Post* published a lengthy article titled “Covert Action in Colombia” by veteran reporter Dana Priest that explained how the U.S. and Colombia cooperated in the exchange of intelligence and establishing an “Intelligence Fusion Cell.” FARC leader Timochenko was recently quoted as admitting the organization had been “weakened,” attesting to fact that intelligence was a central element in overall success, albeit barren without all of the other aspects of Plan Colombia.

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...from fiscal year (FY) 2000 through FY 2014, the U.S. government will have spent about $9.5 billion to support Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs.

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**The budget and “hard” vs. “soft” side**

Originally, Plan Colombia envisioned expenditures of only $7.5 billion: $1.3 billion from the U.S., $4.5 billion from Colombia, and the remainder from the rest of the world. By the end of Plan Colombia’s six years in 2005, the U.S. had spent $4.0 billion; Colombia $7.0 billion; and the rest of the world about what it had promised. This number includes both “hard” side (counternarcotics and counterterrorism) and “soft” side (human rights, rule of law, economic development, and social programs, including support to refugees and other vulnerable groups). Over the longer run, from fiscal year (FY) 2000 through FY 2014, the U.S. government will have spent about $9.5 billion to support Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. Of this, about 80 percent is from State Department...
funds and the remainder from DoD. Of course, Colombia continued to provide the major share for Plan Colombia. For example, between 2000 and 2006, the GOC spent $20 billion on the military and police (not including pensions and other non-military expenditures), while the U.S. provided $3 billion. More important, however, than the size of the investment, U.S. support was an essential element to kick start the whole process by providing equipment and training the Colombians did not have and also to assure Colombians they were not alone. In 2000, the percentage of gross domestic product Colombia devoted to the military and police was only about 1.9 percent; by the end of the decade, that had increased to over 4 percent. In the early years, the “hard” side accounted for about 75 percent of U.S. support, with another 25 percent going to the “soft” side. Today, the programs are about evenly divided between “hard” and “soft” sides.

**International support**

Contrary to widespread belief, the international community did step up to the plate. After a slow start, the European Union, individual countries, the UN, Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank have provided programs that more than equal in value the economic and social programs supported by the U.S.

Recovery did not come overnight. President Pastrana’s quest for peace with the FARC at all costs vexed U.S. policymakers, but he was elected on that platform. His failed attempt can now be seen as necessary to convince Colombian voters and the political elites to try a more confrontational and vigorous approach. When Pastrana finally accepted that peace talks with the FARC were not working and ended them, U.S. programs with the Colombian military and police were already beginning to take hold. Pastrana laid the groundwork and Plan Colombia accelerated during the first term of President Alvaro Uribe (2002—2006). Most importantly, Uribe and his advisors developed a coherent counterinsurgency strategy based on taking and holding territory, protecting local populations, controlling key geographic corridors essential to drug trafficking and supply and mobility for insurgents, and demobilizing the paramilitary forces that threatened democracy and state authority as much as did the FARC. Uribe’s hard-line approach has generated some criticism, but it was widely supported by Colombians tired of the FARC’s depredations. This strategy—“Democratic Security”—correctly identified the sovereignty gap as the central problem in Colombia. Strengthening legitimate state control was the response. This policy was adjusted over time and has continued into the administration of President Juan Manual Santos (2010).

“Democratic Security” was the critical driving force behind the success of Plan Colombia and follow-on programs; however, security could not do it all. Human rights, rule of law, and economic and social development programs were necessary to solidify this progress. The U.S. and Colombia now increasingly support programs to expand state presence in those rural areas where the poverty, violence, and illicit crop cultivation originally described by Gerry Sutton converged.

Plan Colombia’s comprehensive approach recognized that problems of economic growth, social equality, poverty reduction, and strong political and social institutions depend upon security and peace, defeating illegal armed groups, and choking off narcotics trafficking. Violence is down significantly, narcotics...
trafficking groups are weakened, economic growth is up, and poverty rates are declining. Colombia has undertaken far-reaching judicial reform. With the implementation of Plan Colombia, the U.S. shifted its primary focus from counternarcotics to support for Colombia’s unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist groups and then to increased social and economic programs.

Building on his predecessors’ successes, President Santos has been able to maintain the counternarcotics/counterterrorism effort while expanding social and economic programs. Coca cultivation decreased 53 percent between 2007 and 2012. Pure cocaine production has declined to an estimated 175 metric tons in 2012. There are hopeful peace talks with the FARC, although it is too soon to predict their outcome this time.

In spite of Colombia’s extraordinary progress since 1998, it still faces serious challenges from violence, corruption, social inequities, and a continued urban-rural split in the benefits of economic growth. Whether the resources dedicated to these efforts are sufficient is still an open question. Colombia has yet to resolve its serious challenges, especially in dealing with the large and growing displaced persons population and it still needs to address human rights and inequality problems. High levels of poverty, crime, and government corruption still plague the country, as does a weak judicial system. Moreover, drug cultivation continues, though at reduced levels.

President Santos’s focus on changing the country’s basic landscape with programs to take advantage of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement and addressing land reform and victims’ compensation will hopefully enhance Colombia’s continued progress.

**Lessons**

- The U.S. had both purpose and process, and even though its goals did not align perfectly with those of the GOC, there was enough overlap to pursue similar goals and work out differences.
- People do matter. The U.S. benefitted from effective leadership at the highest levels; excellent mid-level (assistant secretary) coordination among State, DoD, Justice, and USAID; and strong working-level support. Exceptional ambassadors in Colombia managed a large country team and were able to work closely with Washington agencies and SOUTHCOM. Anne Patterson, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia from 2000–2003, played an essential role in getting Plan Colombia off the ground and was a brilliant example of how an outstanding ambassador can shape relations with the Congress and the country. One Congressional staffer who was often critical of U.S. efforts said “she is your best,” and that reputation on the Hill cannot be overvalued. Congressional leadership was pivotal on both sides of the aisle. Presidents Pastrana and Uribe and current President Santos proved able partners. Pastrana’s vision for Plan Colombia, to Uribe’s strong implementation, to Santos’s broadening of goals could not have been more fortuitous had they been planned in advance. Colombia benefitted from talented
and dedicated leaders with experience in working with the U.S.

- U.S. agencies provided military, civilian, and contractor personnel who had cultural understanding, language ability, and a persistent, long-term presence. There are just too many people to mention at State, DoD, ONDCP, and USAID; however the following contributions should not be overlooked:

  - 7th Special Forces Group (A)’s multiple training deployments.

  - Department of Justice’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division) Mary Lee Warren’s insistence on the need for judicial reform.

  - Paul Vaky’s implementation of a basic transition in the Colombian judicial system from written to accusatory.

- Congressional support was critical and maintained. Even the seeming restrictions of human rights concerns, a personnel ceiling, and a no combat rule turned out to be helpful. The U.S. recognized that having strict human rights goals would contribute to a more effective, professional Colombian military, and leaders worked with Congressional staff to encourage and strengthen this policy. Congressional support is not automatic, it required many briefings on the Hill for Senators, Representatives, and especially staff, but it is an essential part of making policy understandable and workable. The seemingly endless number of reports to Congress may have contributed as well.

- The U.S. did not take ownership of Colombia’s war. Funding was preponderantly Colombian. The U.S. provided specific items (helicopters and intelligence) and training. Even with a large U.S. personnel footprint, the Colombians considered the U.S. a partner in its efforts.

- Colombian public support was strong. Colombian political will and leadership were critical, as was buy-in from the general public. Eventually, Colombia’s rich minority agreed to a “wealth tax” to help fund the effort and then over-subscribed it. Good design is important, but in the end, there is no substitute for host country dedication and funding.

- The Washington interagency process was clear. With senior-level interest and guidance, all agencies agreed on broad goals.

- Plans must evolve to confront change, often quickly. The U.S. government’s cumbersome bureaucratic and appropriations processes sometimes made it difficult.

- Plan Colombia proved that while development and social inclusion programs require secure environments, security gains can only be sustained and institutionalized through the success of those programs.

- Social and economic development programs require continuing support over many years for what is a slow process, even under the best of circumstances. Active participation by the beneficiaries, security, and state presence are keys to success. Partners must have a strategic vision to illuminate the long haul.
• And finally, as Ambassador Patterson noted early on, there is no silver bullet, just a lot of hard work. *IAJ*

**NOTES**

1 Airgram A-649, April 6, 1964. Airgrams were “think pieces” sent by air pouch to Washington in the days before computers. This airgram is available at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, University of Texas, Austin TX.


After Benghazi:  
*Security Operations for Transformational Diplomats*

*by Marques Bruce*

The State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security has evolved significantly since it was established following the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. Likewise, the establishment of the High Threat Programs Directorate (HTP) following the September 11, 2012, attack that resulted in the deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. government employees further advanced the bureau’s evolution. While the Department of State (State) has implemented many of the recommendations from the Benghazi Accountability Review Board—convened in the aftermath of the attack—it still needs to acknowledge that security and diplomacy are symbiotic. To do so, State must establish an Under Secretary for Security and place a higher priority on planning security operations, capturing lessons learned, and distributing the results throughout the department. Additionally, the tragic events of Benghazi will recur if State continues to disregard the significance of planning and fails to learn from its mistakes.

**Analysis and Discussion**

The Accountability Review Board’s Interim Progress Report for the Members of the House Republican Conference regarding Benghazi is a scathing indictment of President Obama, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and senior officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for their lack of support and foresight. The findings of Chairman Howard P. McKeon, Representatives Ed Royce, Bob Goodlatte, Darrell Issa, and Mike Rogers assert that if any of the aforementioned people had reacted appropriately, this tragic event might never have happened. What the report lacks is a realistic critique of the leadership and decision-making process of the most knowledgeable U.S. representative in Libya at the time, Ambassador Stevens.

The President appointed Stevens on June 7, 2012, to represent U.S. interests in Libya. Under the direction of the President, the general supervision of the Secretary of State, and the support of the appropriate regional assistant secretary, the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is in charge of the entire U.S. diplomatic mission and all of its activities. Those responsibilities include the
Were he alive today, Congress would have ruthlessly cross-examined Stevens for approving the mission to Benghazi. He would have to justify the essential mission that placed him, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, considering the threat he routinely communicated through official cables to Washington. Also, he would have to accept ultimate responsibility for the safety of the personnel who resided with him—he was responsible for everything U.S. Mission Libya did or failed to do. Neither response would be germane to the underlying issues in the Benghazi tragedy though and would fail to answer the remaining question: how is State, specifically the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, going to ensure that something like this does not happen again?

While Stevens had the authority to decide whether or not being in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, was mission essential, the responsibility for planning the security for the trip resided primarily with the Regional Security Officer (RSO). The RSO is an essential member of every diplomatic mission and responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. All diplomatic posts operate under security policies designed and maintained by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, but implemented by RSOs. RSOs typically serve at posts overseas for two to three years and at high-threat posts for one year.

The RSO in Benghazi, on September 11, 2012, had only been in country a few months and had only minimal area knowledge or situational awareness to advise the ambassador regarding the threat and security environment. Planning security operations in Libya, especially in Benghazi, would be difficult for anyone. It requires months to truly understand the threat level no matter how many intelligence reports one has read. To imply that the RSO staff did not have the appropriate training or access to intelligence reports to plan a trip to Benghazi, all of which indicated an increased level of violence directed toward foreigners, would be inappropriate and categorically false. The RSO in Benghazi, having only spent a few months in the country, was responsible for planning the overnight trip to Benghazi and likely had a profound amount of respect for Stevens’ assessment of the security threat, considering the Ambassador’s vast in-country experience.

He may have objected heavily to an overnight trip to the embassy’s special mission compound in Benghazi because the previous RSO deemed security measures inadequate. These concerns were supported by three factors: multiple requests for additional security personnel were routinely denied by State; the intelligence community had reported increased levels of violence highlighted by recent attacks on the British ambassador and International Red Cross members; and a recent bombing of the special mission compound itself just weeks prior to the

Were he alive today, Congress would have ruthlessly cross-examined Stevens for approving the mission to Benghazi.
The disconnect between career diplomats and diplomatic security agents does not only exist at overseas posts.

The September 11, 2012, attack resulted in a gaping hole in the perimeter.7

Even the RSO’s staunchest objections to Stevens would have only served as a recommendation. If the RSO vehemently disagreed with going to Benghazi based on the threat or felt he lacked the adequate resources to mitigate the risks, he had several courses of action: (1) attempt to persuade the ambassador to schedule a day trip instead of remaining overnight; (2) arrange a meeting in a more secure venue at a different time; and (3) elevate his concerns to the regional director in the Diplomatic Security office in Washington. The regional director could engage the ambassador directly, but he would more likely elevate the concern to the Deputy Assistant Secretary or the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. If overruled, the RSO could ultimately write his objections in a declination statement and have the ambassador sign the document, which would place the RSO in a difficult position.

The disconnect between career diplomats and diplomatic security agents does not only exist at overseas posts. The genesis of this problem is in Washington with the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security falling under the Under Secretary for Management. The State Department should establish an Under Secretary for Security, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence that combines the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security, Counterterrorism, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, and Intelligence and Research. Diplomatic Security warrants its own Under Secretary considering the size of its budget and scope of responsibilities. It supports over 260 posts with more than 2,000 agents, 35,000 contracted security personnel, and an extensive number of technical support personnel and resources. However, security operations today require input and expertise from multiple bureaus within State, and those bureaus should be subordinate to an Under Secretary for Security Operations. This is even more important with the move to “transformational” or “expeditionary diplomacy.” The Secretary of State and President deserve non-politicized security assessments from a professional regarding all security matters.

On January 18, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave a speech at Georgetown University on “transformational diplomacy” that signaled a shift in how the U.S. conducts diplomacy. In the aftermath of World War II, as the Cold War hardened into place, the U.S.
turned its diplomatic focus to Europe and parts of Asia. State hired new people, taught them new languages, and gave them new training. The U.S. partnered with old adversaries in Germany and Japan and helped them rebuild their countries. Diplomacy was instrumental in transforming devastated countries into thriving democratic allies, allies who joined with the U.S. for decades in the struggle to defend freedom from communism.

Transformational diplomacy requires the U.S. to move its diplomatic presence out of foreign capitals and to spread it more widely across countries in order to work on the front lines of domestic reform as well as in the back rooms of foreign ministries. There are nearly 200 cities worldwide with over one million people in which the U.S. has no formal diplomatic presence. This is where the action is today and this is where the U.S. must establish a presence. To reach citizens in bustling new population centers, the U.S. cannot always build new consulates beyond a nation’s capital. A newer, more economical idea is the American Presence Post (APP). The idea is simple. One of the best diplomats moves outside the embassy to live, work, and represent America in an emerging community of change.8

America needs to be bold in its diplomatic efforts to secure its interests abroad—promoting peace and maintaining stability throughout the world. With the push toward a more far-reaching diplomacy, diplomatic security requires an unfiltered and prominent voice at the highest levels of the State Department to ensure support for the nation’s diplomatic initiatives. In the aftermath of World War II, President Truman appointed General George C. Marshall, the architect of the Allied victory, to be Secretary of State. General Marshall understood the necessity for security and maintained 3.6 million Allied soldiers in Germany at the end of World War II. Today, diplomatic security agents do not have the luxury of operating under post-WWII conditions in high-threat posts. To meet today’s call for “transformational diplomacy,” State must jettison old diplomatic security approaches and embark on bold new initiatives to address new approaches to diplomacy.

A change of this magnitude would not likely be welcome in an organization as steeped in tradition as the American Foreign Service. One diplomatic security agent equated Ambassador Stevens’ authority as a Chief of Mission to that of an army general expressing a desire to walk the streets of Fallujah wearing nothing but his uniform, an inherently dangerous proposition. While the analogy is approximately right, it does not begin to address the stark contrast between the State Department and the Department of Defense. The first difference is that a general owns most of the assets responsible for providing his security. A division commander can task a brigade to set the conditions for that visit. The Ambassador has his RSO, contracted security, potentially a small Marine security guard detachment, a local guard force, and the protection of the host nation government security forces. The reliability of the local guard force varies from post to post based on the threat and political climate of the host nation.

A second difference is that the general has an entire staff dedicated to planning operations. Currently, the high threats program office has one diplomatic security agent dedicated to future and contingency operations planning. An RSO office can range from one to 14 agents at most posts and up to 80 at contingency operations posts such as Kabul or Baghdad,
which are responsible for both planning and execution. In comparison, a general has scores of planners and thousands of soldiers to execute security operations.

The third reason is a common argument made by diplomatic security agents; the aforementioned general has nearly 30 years of planning and operational experience and understands the burden to his staff and soldiers when he tasks them with a mission. This makes the general uniquely qualified to assume and mitigate security risk in high-threat environments. Ambassadors do not have the operational experience that senior combat leaders accumulate over decades. As such, comparing generals to ambassadors should be limited to responsibilities and authorities, not operational experience, especially when it comes to mitigating risk with potentially deadly consequences.

Moving out of a foreign capital to an APP is a simple idea, but not one based on the realities of operating in highly unstable cities like Benghazi, especially when securing these facilities is oftentimes an afterthought. While the intent was not to establish APP’s in places like Benghazi, Special Mission Compound Benghazi was a “more economical” alternative to advance national interests in Libya.

In 2004, Secretary Rice commissioned an Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy that included some of the finest legislators, diplomats, and business professionals from across America, including former Senator John B. Breaux; Thomas Pickering, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; U.S. Air Force General Richard Meyers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Kenneth T. Derr, retired Chairman and CEO of the Chevron Corporation. This committee identified six areas necessary to transform the State Department, and advance future U.S. diplomatic efforts: (1) Expand and modernize the workforce; (2) Integrate foreign affairs strategic resources; (3) Strengthen the country’s ability to shape the world; (4) Harness twenty-first century technology; (5) Engage the private sector; and (6) Streamline State’s organizational structure. Most notably absent in the final report was how to meet the security requirements associated with transformation. If State intended to send its best diplomats to “emerging communities of change” to advance U.S. interests, then the advisory committee most certainly owed it to them to have an independent and unfiltered voice advocating for security concerns. Having an Under Secretary for Security Operations on the committee could have been that voice.

Following the events of Benghazi, the President elevated the importance of embassy security within the National Security Council (NSC) by listing it as one of his top national security policy priorities. As part of this elevation, the embassy security portfolio on the NSC was transferred from the Strategic Planning Directorate to the Counterterrorism Division, and the first-ever Diplomatic Security Special Agent was assigned as a Director for Counterterrorism to oversee and direct embassy security. With this level of visibility in the aftermath of Benghazi at the NSC, it would make sense for State to establish an Under Secretary for Security Operations.

Advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy will always be the primary mission of the State Department, and diplomatic security agents will continue to be the ambassadors’ security diplomats. International security agreements,
such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, are the cornerstones to conducting diplomacy. However, some countries ignore these agreements, particularly during times of crisis. As such, security agents must serve as the ambassador’s diplomats for security by establishing strong relationships with host nation and even regional security forces.

The attack on the U.S. Embassy Pakistan highlights how fragile security agreements can be, placing diplomacy on hold. On November 20, 1979, a Saudi Arabian extremist group raided and seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that Americans were behind the attack, a claim that Pakistani news outlets broadcasted repeatedly. This sequence of events led the Pakistani security forces protecting the embassy to not only stand idly by during the ensuing riots (there were reports that they even escorted busloads of protestors to the U.S. embassy). The protest resulted in the deaths of a Marine security guard and a foreign service officer and the evacuation and destruction of the embassy.9 This event highlights the fragility of security agreements with a host nation treaty-bound to secure diplomatic missions and emphasizes the importance of cultivating strong relationships between diplomatic security agents and host nation security forces. These relationships are as vital to the success of diplomatic efforts as the daily engagements held by the ambassador.

Contrasting the events in Pakistan in 1979 with the September 11, 2012, attacks makes the decision to be in Benghazi on that day even more confusing. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations clearly outlines that the host nation is responsible for the security of foreign diplomats operating within its borders.10 With the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, Libya had no centralized government, particularly in Benghazi, the birthplace of the revolution. As a result, the U.S. established security agreements with local militants and warlords for the protection of the special mission compound and embassy personnel, which is not an uncommon practice.11 However, the tacit nature of the security arrangement with these state-financed but unofficial security forces should have been cause for the ambassador and RSO to place minimal faith in the militias’ willingness and capacity to secure their overnight stay in Benghazi. If the Pakistani Security forces in 1979 could absolve themselves of their clearly outlined security responsibilities per the Vienna Convention based on an accusation of U.S. impropriety, why should militias in Benghazi be expected to secure U.S. diplomats in the midst of a revolution based on informal agreements?

Relying on militias for security purposes is not an unusual practice and in some cases is required. Relying on militias for security purposes is not an unusual practice and in some cases is required. With the shift to transformational or expeditionary diplomacy, operating in countries with transitional governments is becoming more common. Today diplomats operate or prepare to operate in fragile countries like Libya, Tunisia, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. The decision to rely on militias to secure Ambassador Stevens in a non-standard diplomatic facility is perplexing. The special mission compound in Benghazi did not even meet the minimum security standards established by the Overseas Security Policy Board or Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999. These standards include 100 meters of setback (the standoff distance from the outer wall to the chancery building) to limit the impact of explosive
devices; anti climb security measures; forced entry and blast resistant windows, walls, and doors; and a myriad of other technical and physical security.

Overseas Security Policy Board and Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism standards greatly enhance the safety for State Department employees overseas. However, embassy personnel routinely assume risk when they travel beyond embassy walls in the interest of advancing diplomacy. To mitigate this risk, the RSO must establish clear standards for conducting travel; the Mission Travel Policy at each post details these procedures. The Benghazi compound was not an embassy, consulate, or APP. Just two cleared U.S. citizens and a local guard force secured the Special Mission Compound Benghazi just prior to the attack.12 Most posts have, at a minimum, a host nation security element, a local guard force, contracted security forces, a marine security guard contingent, and the RSO office to conduct security programs of an embassy or consulate. The most important of these elements are the local guard force and sufficient host government security support.

While the decision to overnight at Benghazi may have resided solely with Stevens, the compound’s security posture was the responsibility of the RSO, and the Ambassador’s personal protection was the responsibility of the five Assistant Regional Security Officers assigned to him. The general consensus of people who have seen official footage of the Benghazi attack is that the personal security detail’s posture was relaxed. Assuming the detail was aware of the declining security environment in Benghazi, one could hypothesize two conclusions: they had confidence in the local security forces assigned to protect the compound, or they lacked the requisite training or experience to assess the immediate security environment properly and plan to mitigate any threat. The former is rather evident, likely a byproduct of a lack of experience considering the five agents assigned to protect Stevens had a combined total of six years operational experience, were on temporary assignment to Libya, and only one had successfully completed the Basic Regional Security Officer course. The second point regarding a lack of security assessment and planning is highly likely given the junior nature of Stevens’ personal protection detail on September 11, 2012.

All diplomatic security agents must attend the Basic Regional Security Officer course prior to an assignment overseas. This course trains agents on numerous subjects including a block of instruction on how to analyze mission requirements and develop courses of action to mitigate potential threats. The process for doing this is referred to as the Deliberate Planning Process. Developed over the last three years by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, this process is the civilian equivalent to the Army’s troop leading procedures and military decision making process—a step in the right direction that will develop future agents’ capability to analyze and mitigate risk.

Currently, the newly formed Operations Planning Staff at the bureau headquarters consists of one security agent and three military officers. Having military planners in the security bureau’s headquarters benefits the military significantly. Each officer will leave with an extremely relevant set of experiences and greater understanding of how diplomatic security and the State Department operate. Despite their collective experience in planning operations,
these military officers cannot effectively plan diplomatic security operations, as they do not have the obligatory training and experience of a career agent. However, they can assist in planning and integrating military resources, act as a conduit to the regional military command, and apply their new knowledge to military operations after leaving the bureau.

The practice of capturing and sharing best practices is essential and potentially lifesaving for U.S. foreign mission personnel. On September 13, 2013, the consulate in Herat, Afghanistan, was the target of a complex attack involving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device followed by an insurgent assault attempting to gain access to the consulate compound. The Operations Planning Staff drafted an after-action review (AAR) of the attack by compiling the history of Consulate Herat and documenting the mitigation efforts of the four RSOs who had served there in the years prior to the attack. The AAR was then presented during the diplomatic security’s High Threat Programs RSO Workshop. Many in attendance expressed a desire to have access to the AAR so they could share the lessons learned with their respective staff members back at their overseas posts. As of the date of this article, the brief remains unreleased due to the close-hold nature of State. The tragedy of this anecdote is an all too common practice where security concerns inhibit learning and more effective operations across the diplomatic security service. The routine argument is, “What happens if this information gets leaked? How will this make the Bureau look?” and a favorite, “Does this pass the Washington Post test?”

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

Many of the post-Benghazi review board recommendations warrant an increased emphasis on planning at the executive level within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The “new normal” is an interagency effort to ensure collaboration between DoD, State, and other federal agencies in providing security assistance to U.S. foreign missions in dangerous environments and in times of crisis. The renewed emphasis on collaboration after Benghazi is absolutely essential. DoD cannot plan operations in support of foreign missions effectively without consulting the ambassador or chief of mission. As such, combatant commands like the Joint Special Operations Command and Africa Command have diplomatic security agents on their staff as liaison officers to help identify requirements needed to provide adequate and timely support and coordination. Several senior military leaders recognize the importance of planning and coordinating with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in this “new normal” environment. However, the newly formed operation planning staff at the Bureau’s headquarters has neither the manpower nor the appropriate training needed to formally plan and coordinate the volume of requirements.

As it stands today, Diplomatic Security has yet to publish the firsthand account or debriefing with the RSO in Tripoli concerning the death of Ambassador Stevens. Four U.S. citizens died in Benghazi because Stevens placed too much trust in the local militias and failed to plan sufficiently in order to mitigate the existing threat. The power to change this dynamic resides in Bureau of Diplomatic

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The “new normal” is an interagency effort to ensure collaboration between DoD, State, and other federal agencies in providing security assistance to U.S. foreign missions in dangerous environments and in times of crisis.
Security today. It would start with officially debriefing the RSO assigned to U.S. Mission Libya in Tripoli during the September 11, 2012, attack; compiling a formal AAR; and distributing it along with the review of the defense of Consulate Herat to RSOs around the world. It would also include a significant expansion of the operations planning staff at Bureau headquarters and training on the deliberate planning process in the Basic Regional Security Officer course. Finally, the State Department, White House, and Congress must recognize that establishing an Under Secretary for Security Operations is in its best interests and critical to the future success of diplomatic security and security of U.S. Foreign Service personnel.

These changes would be contrary to the existing culture for many stated reasons, but if the deaths of four Americans in Benghazi and the subsequent political turmoil are not enough to warrant them, then what will? IAJ

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5 Ibid.


7 Interim Progress Report.


11 Eric Nordstrom, 3:00–3:45.

Evolving Band-Aids to Global Crisis:
For Want of U.S. Leadership

by Mark Sweberg and Allan Childers

Change is in the wind for the U.S. Army. Indeed, it is in the wind for all the Services as the strategic focus of the U.S. shifts from Europe to the Pacific and as the military adjusts from its engagement in two regional wars. This article focuses on the Army’s future. Iraq and Afghanistan are virtually military history. So what’s next? That seems to be the $572 billion question.

In an article recently published in USA Today, Tom Vanden Brook talks about “smaller military plans for a nimble, expeditionary future.”\(^1\) His article outlines what might be in store for the Army after the leadership was told to plan for a force that is 100,000 Soldiers smaller than it is today. A smaller force and realigned capabilities bring into focus a need for closer and more synergistic collaboration with global friends and allies.

Against this backdrop, the world is witnessing a resurgence of Cold War-type political-militancy through major power direct and indirect activism. Between them, Russia and China are redrawing established geopolitical and internationally recognized land borders in Eastern Europe. China, for its part, is actively working to change or modify the rights and responsibilities of other nations in the South and East China Seas, respectively, as it takes unilateral actions to establish ownership or dominance over island groups and potential riches in oil and minerals in these areas. Policymakers and strategists design bilateral, multilateral, and multinational solutions using regional agencies. The UN calls for calm and restraint in each area of rising tensions, neutered by the failure of the U.S. and major powers to prescribe any UN peacekeeping or peacemaking actions.

In the past, a number of presidents have acknowledged the need for the military to work closer with the UN in responding to international crises. This has not happened. While the military, and especially the Army, have traditionally resisted such collaboration, it may be time to revisit the

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U.S. military’s contribution to global defense strategies. Several years ago, the Department of Defense (DoD) learned force reductions were coming, and the U.S. would no longer maintain forces large enough to wage stability operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq. America’s policymakers and strategists are seeking to fill the gaps that will occur by calling on regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to strengthen their capabilities for defense, diplomacy, and development responses to crises.

White House policymakers have not specified how the Army should be configured to deal with various conflicts. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel wants an agile force equipped with the latest technologies. History has shown that conflicts rarely occur in the places or under the circumstances the Army expects or plans for. The swing to the Pacific seems premature with NATO’s apparent inability to respond to the annexation of Crimea and further Russian instigations in Ukraine and other eastern European nations. At the same time, it seems the swing may be too late for current ASEAN capacities to respond to China’s apparent attempts at “annexation” of islands and territorial waters in the South China Sea.

President Obama said several years ago that the Army would no longer support stability operations; however, in his 2014 State of the Union address he said, “our leadership is defined not just by our defense against threats, but by the enormous opportunities to do good and promote understanding around the globe—to forge greater cooperation, to expand new markets, to free people from fear and want.” These statements support a comprehensive approach that combines all the elements of national power—the 3 Ds of defense, diplomacy, and development—in a mix optimized to each individual situation. Included in this mix should be a clear plan and intent to cooperate with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) on future conflicts and crises.

America is failing to participate in the most important period of conflict mitigation evolution of the twenty-first century. Despite resistance from isolationists, Americans regularly support global diplomacy and development processes and programs. However, America risks its global superpower status by not participating in the entire comprehensive approach that commits defense alongside development and diplomacy to global stability and security structures. Without increased U.S. collaboration in the defense portion of a comprehensive approach, global conflict mitigation structures have fallen to their weakest point since the end of World War II. This is evidenced by the disarray of responses to conflicts in the Middle East and Asia and global terrorism—but particularly in addressing multiple violent conflicts in Africa.

The intensity of current conflicts is not diminishing despite contrary claims. Over 214,490 international soldiers are engaged in international peace efforts focused more on cross-border terrorism than on wars between states. More than 89,000 UN-sponsored soldiers and over 121,000 soldiers from organizations other than the UN are currently deployed. There are 23 active UN missions, such as stabilization missions MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti) in Haiti.

At the time of this writing, there are a total of 17 U.S. military personnel globally supporting UN peacekeeping operations as liaisons, observers, and staff officers. That is 17, not 1,700, not 17,000. Countries prefer to see UN-mandated missions in crisis areas.

The UN is not the “flavor du jour” because it has neither the resources nor the authorizations to conduct all operations, so other organizations, such as the OSCE and the EU become involved. In probably the most troubled region in the world, the African Union (AU) is increasingly taking the lead. But the AU is challenged by the reality that member nations are among the poorest in the world whose armies lack the capacity (equipment and training) to be effective.

In the twenty-first century, regional threats and responses are more violent and genocidal. While this is not wholly a result of America’s reticence to lead multinational combat power projection or offer significant troop contributions to multinational efforts, the fact that the U.S. is not involved is a factor. The U.S. has chosen instead to provide overwhelming U.S. force via a cobbled-together collection of forces from traditional allied nations where strategic interests are clearly identified or threatened (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan). In crises that demand an international military response, the U.S. offers money and conditional support to other nations who participate in military coalitions under the UN flag. On those rare occasions when the U.S. involves itself more directly, it seeks to do so in coalitions with its NATO allies or other coalitions of states where the U.S. can lead or significantly influence.

On September 11, 1990, President George H.W. Bush envisioned a new world order—“a world where the United Nations, freed from Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders.” Eleven years later Al Qaeda’s terrorist attack on America prompted his son, President George W. Bush to launch the Global War on Terrorism. While the senior President Bush outlined his vision, American interests in supporting a new world order were viewed as both American imperialism and the beginning of the end of the U.S. as imposed by “a tyrannical collectivist system run by the United Nations.”

American policymakers adroitly lead, participate in, and share the country’s abundant resources in international diplomacy and development forums affecting humanitarian needs everywhere around the globe. But in the arena of international peace operations, the Nation remains wedded to sharing its enormous military capabilities only when a specific scenario directly affects national security interests or to train another country’s military forces on a bilateral or multilateral basis. American military strategists and planners remain inadequately prepared through policies,
America missed several opportunities to lead a global renaissance for stability based on collective security. The UN does not maintain its own military. It must rely on the support of its members to provide military forces when the UN Security Council (UNSC) approves their use. The attempt to restructure international borders at the end of World War II and the subsequent war on the Korean peninsula in 1950 offered immediate opportunities for American forces to become part of a UN-led international military force. The UN Charter gave the UNSC de facto authority to use member military forces “to maintain or restore international peace and security” and protect populations from aggression.3

Members of the UNSC, particularly the “Permanent Five” (U.S., Russia, China, Great Britain, and France), allowed their national interests and national prerogatives to take precedence over the need to collectively confront international crises and flash points of conflict. Their leadership or participation in international military force operations became suspect to the point where participation virtually ended. For the next 40 years, military force devolved to peacekeeping by a collective of smaller, less-developed nations who were ill prepared and ill equipped to perform the mission.

The next opportunity occurred when the U.S. joined the international UN military response in the Persian Gulf War of 1990. However, the zeal to gain a peace dividend through reduction of military forces in America and Russia saw the opportunity for collective security through a permanent international military force to again disappear.

Since then, U.S. policymakers have recognized the need to reintroduce a concept from World War II—a standing UN Rapid Deployment Force. This concept reemerges regularly among academics, former officials, and security experts concerned with the need for a standing, rapid-response UN force. In 2001, the House of Representatives introduced the United Nations Rapid Deployment Act;4 however, in the end, the idea died, and the U.S. decided to perform collective military operations through the NATO structure.

In the meantime, UN policymakers deployed peacekeepers—the number in Africa reaching the highest levels in history. Routinely the number of uniformed peacekeepers easily exceeds 100,000. The U.S. and European nations provide billions of dollars each year to support them.

So why are U.S. policymakers and strategists not building the capacity and capabilities of the UN to respond to current regional crises? The UN has no shortage of integrators for defense, diplomacy, and development response. The UNDPKO’s role is to provide “political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates.”5 UNDPKO is the integrator for UN defense and diplomacy operations.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs “facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors” by establishing humanitarian civil-military coordination structures.6 Still, UN forces often fail to prevent violence because the nations often are ill equipped and totally ill prepared to...
conduct the mission. Training standards differ widely among contributing countries despite efforts by UNDPKO to standardize them, and equipment is often incompatible among participating military forces within a UN operation. There are also often incompatible rules of engagement (ROE). Some country forces are proscribed from using deadly force regardless of circumstances, and others are more flexible.

Unlike a time when a contributing country sent soldiers and officers who had no uniforms, equipment, or shoes, there have been significant improvements. Units now show up equipped and fairly well trained. However, richer nations remain satisfied to send money, uniforms, and the most basic of equipment. As a result, internal conflicts continue to boil, as thousands of civilians are killed and hundreds of thousands more are displaced. Worse, the underlying causes of crisis and conflict are not addressed, and people continue to die or become homeless and displaced. The evolving geopolitical response to current crises in Africa is to send troops mostly comprised of soldiers from Africa and developing countries such as India, Pakistan, and Fiji. Although the U.S. and Europe pledge financial and equipment support, they often neglect to follow through on their pledges. The missions are hobbled by the lack of adequate resources and conflicting national definitions of the ROE. The defense mission is further complicated by the inability of too many Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) to fully appreciate or understand the military realities they face. These SRSGs may have military advisers and military force commanders, but they themselves are political animals who lack military experience.

So, as U.S. reduces its military force structure, why would its leaders commit the country’s superpower military force to international stability in support of UN operations? The Realpolitik answer is for selfish reasons. The U.S. military needs to learn lessons and gain UN expertise by engaging in these type missions so its forces can better mitigate the conflicts that affect national security interests in the future. Participating in UN military operations is about participating in the evolution in global events. For this reason, America must engage comprehensively and globally more often through internationally-sanctioned operations rather than unilateral action. The U.S. military already participates in developing doctrine and other UN military guidance documents, regulations, and operations plans. A U.S. general officer, who also serves as Director, J5, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, represents the U.S. on the UN Military Staff Committee (MSC), whose role is to plan UN military operations and assist in the regulation of armaments. In reality, the MSC was emasculated during the Cold War and never met the original goal.

Many nations around the world, including developed nations, will not send their forces beyond their borders unless they are under the auspices of the UN. Many nations also focus their military training on UN-inspired capabilities in order to be prepared to serve in UN peace operations. The U.S. military is disconnected because it does not train for UN operations and is not prepared to work in harmony with military forces from these countries.

UN missions have evolved from peace operations to peace enforcement, to peacekeeping, to robust peacekeeping, to
humanitarian crisis and conflict prevention. The two most recent robust peacekeeping and crisis/conflict prevention operations occurred during the past 15 years and are the genesis of a call for increased U.S. military forces participation. In 2000, the Brahimi Report referred to the need for “robust peacekeeping forces” to prevail in situations like Rwanda and Srebrenica when UN peacekeepers observed rather than stopped humanitarian crises driven by warring factions. Now the majority of UN peacekeeping resolutions authorize UN forces to use all “necessary means to protect civilians when under imminent threat of physical violence.”

What is the option available between today’s approach and increased U.S. leadership? The answer appears to be mercenaries. The UN turned increasingly to contracting private military and security companies to provide the defense leg of the comprehensive approach to stabilizing nations where host countries are unable to provide security. The solution is problematic because of the lack of global regulation, oversight mechanisms, accountability for human rights violations, and a host of other factors. It must be difficult for U.S. military leaders to swallow a solution that finds mercenaries preferable to military forces when upholding American ideals through active participation in UN operations.

Africa remains a low priority politically in the U.S. and in Europe despite platitudes to the contrary and despite watching millions die and the continental turmoil increasingly threatening U.S. interests. The UN was established sixty-six years ago, and the world community still cannot agree on what role the world organization should and can play where instability and conflict reigns. Rather than lead the mobilization of global stability through the UN, U.S. policymakers still want to play only in those sandboxes defined as national security interests rather than recognizing that global stability managed through a world organization supports—not challenges—American national security interests. Unless U.S. policymakers define an international conflict as directly and immediately impacting American interests, they will not commit U.S. forces to a response. Most other wealthier nations of the world do the same.

Everyone wants to distance themselves from Africa. So when the UNSC determines something must be done, it sends UN-sponsored military forces comprised of forces usually from developing countries. They invariably arrive with not enough troops, not enough equipment, a vague or weak mandate, and leadership that must first turn to their own home governments for guidance before going to the UN.

What should amaze every U.S. and UN policymaker is that more UN peacekeepers are not killed. The main reason can probably be attributed to the leadership of mid-level (e.g., battalion) commanders from the contributing countries. UN policymakers charge these commanders with carrying out their missions while keeping their troops alive. There are plenty of exceptional commanders among the forces provided to UN missions despite the challenges they face. U.S. military policymakers should yearn to learn from this type of leadership during a period of reduced resources.

But a commander’s capacity to keep his troops alive does not denote mission success. UN missions fail for the most part because U.S. leadership is lacking in the UNSC, and U.S. military participation is lacking on the front lines. Strong leadership throughout the chain
success. Success breeds further success.

Success means preventing crises in this century from derailing the lessons learned from previous centuries. International integration of ideas, communications, technologies, economies, and an array of other sophisticated concepts have brought stability and prosperity around the globe. It seems, therefore, that U.S. policymakers and strategists should lead, not eschew, the international integration of diplomacy, defense, and development through UN, not regional, structures. 

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Pacific Command: 

Attacking the Nexus of Emerging Threats

by Jan Schwarzenberg

With conflicts winding down in Southwest Asia and the accompanying retraction of U.S. forces overseas, the U.S. may once again direct its attention globally. While troops engaged in open combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, commitments elsewhere in the world did not lag or wane. In fact, nefarious elements may have taken advantage of the situation to advance their illegal activities or ideologies. However, with the President’s declaration that the U.S. will once again “pivot” to concentrate on the Pacific, it is time to assess where and how the country will focus that attention in the Pacific arena, especially in an era of reduced resources.¹

This article examines issues in the Pacific that have warranted long-standing U.S. attention and remain of concern today. In addition, it will explore emerging networks in Asia that threaten national security. Expenditures to counter this threat will require reducing funds for other programs. For example, for almost 25 years, the Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) has focused on just the illicit narcotics trade. The rising criminal syndicates in Asia have developed a sophisticated industry of networks to move illegal goods of all kinds, not just narcotics. Focusing attention on those networks, regardless of their political or criminal aim and irrespective of what items they illegally transfer across borders, will prove to be a more economical expenditure of public funds. Pursuing entire networks for elimination will be a greater return on investment than attempting to interdict just narcotics, weapons, false document providers, or warehouse-shippers.

The Asia Pacific Counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Device) Fusion Center (APCFC) is Pacific Command’s (PACOM) executive agent for all matters related to the counter-IED fight (C-IED), including IED network analysis. Thus, expanding APCFC’s capabilities will enable the Pacific Command to bring appropriate law enforcement authorities to bear on the full spectrum

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of network threats. In an era emphasizing joint operations to spread limited resources across the widest area, JIATF-W can no longer limit its mission to just the illicit narcotics trade.

**PACOM Today**

PACOM is responsible for engaging 36 countries in Asia that encompass 51 percent of the earth’s surface. PACOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) stretches from the west coast of the U.S. to India. Whether rendering assistance in humanitarian crises such as typhoons, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions or responding to a military contingency, PACOM forces face the “tyranny of distance.” At normal speeds, it can take a ship almost a month to travel from San Diego to the mouth of the Hormuz Straits. Within this area are five of the seven nations with whom the U.S. has treaty alliances, three of the world’s largest economies, the most populous nations of the world, and the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. In addition, several of the world’s largest militaries are resident in the Pacific arena. U.S. forces assigned to PACOM comprise approximately one-fifth of the total U.S. military establishment, including three-quarters of the Navy’s ships and two-thirds of the Marine Corps.²

While PACOM is a military command committed to maintaining military superiority in all domains, it follows principles enumerated by the Secretary of Defense following the President’s January 2012 guidance. Among these principles are international rules governing shared space (sea, air, and cyberspace) and resolution of disputes without force; strengthening alliances and partnerships; enhancing an enduring presence enabling engagement with partners; and contributing to U.S. whole-of-government resolutions for regional security.³

In pursuing these principles, PACOM clearly steps beyond pure military interests and enters into foreign policy as it attempts to avoid initiating conflict by establishing and maintaining healthy relationships. In so doing, PACOM is committed to supporting regional international bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). PACOM also entirely funds the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), which brings foreign military and civilian officers to Hawaii to discuss and explore resolutions to regional security challenges through executive education and workshops. U.S. support of ASEAN and APCSS enhances relationships for future international cooperative efforts, such as pursuing and prosecuting transnational criminals and terrorists. Since 2011, the U.S. has served as the co-chair to the Indonesian-led ASEAN Defense Ministerial Plus sub-committee on counterterrorism.⁴ This position has offered the U.S. a unique ability to assist partners in a multi-lateral rather than bi-lateral environment, reducing any accusation of U.S. hegemony in the area.

**Pacific Threats**

Threats to U.S. national security in the Pacific are termed strategic, low-intensity, and emerging.⁵ Strategic threats can trigger state-on-state wide-area conflict and the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, especially in regards to China’s growing hegemony and ongoing disputes with Taiwan and support for North Korea.

Low-intensity threats are very local in nature, although violent and deadly. These
include piracy and smuggling, both of which can upset government economies. Smuggling of narcotics, weapons, terrorists, and terrorist tools all demand coordinated international law enforcement cooperation.

Emerging threats are a result of transnational terrorism based in Islamic extremist ideology. More disturbing than the national terrorism of the past, this form of Al-Qaeda-affiliated and sponsored terrorism spans national boundaries and attacks government institutions, not to gain concessions, but rather to destroy existing governments and replace them with Islamic extremist governments.

In addition to terrorism, a growing criminal services sector plies its trade. Indeed, the terrorists could not pursue their ideological goals without this criminal support. These criminal elements provide weapons, smuggle people, warehouse gear, lodge terrorists, expedite fund transfers, provide false documentation, and facilitate communications.

Dr. Sheldon W. Simon notes that terrorism and transnational crime feed off each other, with the proceeds of criminal activity funding terrorist activities. This relationship drives the need for law enforcement to embed with military counterterrorism forces. The most important asset that law enforcement can bring to the fight is sharing local intelligence across borders. Cooperation among regional intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and military forces is essential to the effective apprehension of criminals and terrorists.

Insofar as all nations suffer the scourge of crime, including the terrorism that it supports, law enforcement cooperation among countries is more politically palatable than military-to-military engagements. Military establishments, even when charged with internal security, are nonetheless limited in their authorities. Further, deploying armed troops into other territories always raises questions of sovereignty. Law enforcement officers are often perceived as being less threatening, as they seek mutual goals almost everywhere they go. Furthermore, it is most often law enforcement that has the jurisdiction to pursue, apprehend, and prosecute criminals and terrorists within its own territories.

For myriad historical reasons, many ASEAN member countries jealously guard their sovereignty. They are ready and, in some cases, eager to enter into bi-lateral agreements with the U.S. but draw back at the suggestion of multi-lateral agreements with neighbors. In working with such partners, PACOM officers must safeguard information shared in confidence and not inadvertently divulge facts from one country to another. As a body of resolution for regional challenges, ASEAN is a non-threatening forum in which issues such as transnational crime and terrorism can be openly discussed and joint international avenues can be explored without seeming to interfere in domestic affairs. In May of 2002, the ASEAN states agreed to enhance information sharing and coordinate legislation to eliminate safe-havens for criminals and terrorists. With Singapore in the lead, the U.S. was able to promote a declaration to combat transnational terrorism. This was followed the next year by Malaysia sponsoring, again with U.S. support, a program of intelligence sharing and mutual border control among Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia. That these three countries in particular should openly cooperate with each other directly, instead of through...
a bi-lateral intermediary such as the U.S. or Australia, was an enormous break-through.⁷

Though painstakingly slow in its process—ASEAN policy to cooperate in counterterrorism came two full years after the 9/11 attacks—this cooperation eventually led to a permanent ASEAN sub-committee on terror and crimes such as piracy, money laundering, and arms smuggling.⁸ Support and more importantly active participation in ASEAN by the U.S. arguably has led to greater advances in U.S. national interests than if the U.S. had acted independently. The collective energy of the ASEAN body and its open forum of discussion facilitate an easier path for achieving desired goals than attempting to shuttle an agreement between capitals individually.

**Strategic Prioritization**

While the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have long been considered strategic weapons that can threaten U.S. interests in the area, debate is currently under way within the Department of Defense (DoD) as to whether terrorists’ use of IEDs throughout the region is equally strategic.

Some argue that in the absence of any U.S. forces or interests being threatened by IEDs in the Pacific area, they are not a strategic weapon. This opinion ignores two essential elements. First, that there are approximately 100 IED incidents occurring each month in the Pacific area.⁹ Whereas missiles in silos are indeed a threat, they are exactly that, just a threat. IEDs are actually being deployed and killing innocents on a near daily basis. This realization leads to the second element. The Al-Qaeda-influenced bombing of a commuter train in Madrid in 2004 that killed 190 persons was accompanied by the demand for Spanish troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. This bombing and subsequent demand caused the defeat of the incumbent political party in national elections three days later. The opposing party was swept into office riding a three-day old campaign promise to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq.¹⁰ This one IED incident most definitely strategically influenced the government of Spain and shaped its foreign policy through the plebiscite to accede to terrorist demands. Whereas political discourse with states such as China and North Korea always carries the threat of aggression, the very real threat surrounding the bombing in Madrid was a repetition of the attack should the Spanish state not comply with the demands of the terrorists. A report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies contends IEDs “can be strategic, not just tactical, weapons, by sowing fear, lowering troop morale, limiting freedom of movement, and undermining public support for combat operations.”¹¹

Narcotics trafficking and the War on Drugs are two areas in the Pacific that have had attention since the Reagan administration. JIATF-West combats drug-related transnational crime in the Asia-Pacific region and focuses on the precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamine. JIATF-West fights trafficking and organized crime in the Asia-Pacific region by sharing information with law enforcement agencies and partner nations.¹²

JIATF-W, a subordinate command of PACOM, is headed by a U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral and physically located within the PACOM compound. DoD is currently in a five year plan (2012–2017) with $15 billion budgeted for counternarcotics efforts. This budget includes just over $40 million for operations at JIATF-West and JIATF-South. (JIATF-South is

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**Narcotics trafficking and the War on Drugs are two areas in the Pacific that have had attention since the Reagan administration.**
located in Key West, FL, with responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean).\textsuperscript{13}

After an initial trial period lasting several years, APCFC is in the Army’s base budget for 2015. Although collocated with and supported by U.S. Army Pacific, APCFC reports to PACOM as the combatant command’s executive agent for joint C-IED actions across all the services. As a result of the Global War on Terrorism, a component commander is imbued with the combatant commander’s authority to manage a particular issue. To the point, the analytical tools developed by APCFC to discern and uncover illicit IED networks are easily applicable to any network. As its name implies, the APCFC was founded to fuse the three mission goals of defeating explosive devices, training forces, and, most importantly, attacking terrorist networks facilitating IEDs.\textsuperscript{14} As time progresses, defeating devices will become a matter of greater concern for research laboratories such as the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Division, and training troops in C-IED awareness will fall more to the services. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have created an incredible capability and specialty in network analysis with unique methodologies for uncovering linkages among seemingly disparate groups. These systems of network analyses can be applied outside the C-IED realm and just as easily define insurgent, criminal, smuggling, and narcotics networks.

Analyzing networks, however, is highly dependent on information collection and assessment. This is particularly problematic when the networks to be identified are operating in foreign territory and subject to varying degrees of government oversight and interdiction. Success in this vein is highly dependent upon coordinated partnering with foreign nation military and law enforcement and understanding that the jurisdiction covering internal security in other countries alternates between military, para-military, ministerial police, customs-border police, and local law enforcement.

There is a fine line between cooperative assistance and over-bearing hegemony. Engaging partner nations for the mutual purpose of combating activities that are harmful to both the partner nation and the security of the U.S. can easily be misinterpreted as hegemonic colonialism if not approached delicately. PACOM espouses sensitivity to this distinction in its strategy statement: “We will modernize and strengthen...alliances by enhancing our ability to train and operate together, jointly developing high-tech capabilities, expanding information sharing....”\textsuperscript{15} DoD’s strategic guidance states: “For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary.”\textsuperscript{16}

Rather than attempting to establish bilateral cooperative agreements with each country in the Pacific, PACOM wisely gains a positive foothold via international bodies. To this end, PACOM’s active support and participation in ASEAN portrays a regional partnership with simultaneous achievements across multiple countries. Applying itself in a regional forum...
such as ASEAN encourages cooperation across the region and is much more productive in achieving such goals as information sharing.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus membership and active contribution to ASEAN becomes a bridge by which PACOM can enlist other agencies of the U.S. government to move toward the same goal of attacking threat networks in foreign countries. Realizing that other federal departments besides Defense have far greater authorities and means by which to prosecute subversive threats, PACOM’s participation in ASEAN opens the door to introduce U.S. federal law enforcement to other countries suffering the same scourge of destabilizing networks. In addition, introducing civilian law enforcement is much less offensive than the sight of foreign troops moving about the countryside.

PACOM’s strategy is to “work as part of the U.S. interagency effort with regional partners to monitor and counter non-state threats and ensure that local governments and communities are inhospitable to violent extremism. . . enhance interoperability with allies and partners and develop the capacity of partners to cooperatively address regional challenges. . . work with regional forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and encourage multilateral relationships that build trust, prevent misperceptions that can lead to conflict, and reinforce international norms of conduct.”\textsuperscript{18}

PACOM’s even greater underwriting of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) does much to support ASEAN’s successes. The mid-grade officers selected to attend courses at APCSS will eventually rise within their own organizations, be they military or civilian. They frequently become the senior officers attending the ASEAN meetings where they help shape their countries’ interests vis-à-vis neighboring countries’ interests. These officers’ backgrounds in interactive cooperation with neighbor countries as well as the U.S., combined with their exposure to divergent cultural approaches, help to make the approaches to ferreting out criminal networks all the more effective.

**PACOM’s participation in ASEAN opens the door to introduce U.S. federal law enforcement to other countries suffering the same scourge of destabilizing networks.**

**PACOM Future**

Dealing with the strategic threats of China and North Korea will remain a constant. While continuing to attempt to reach agreement and rapprochement, ignoring their potential aggression in the current environment would be folly. But the status quo is itself not a constant, as is evidenced by the evolving emergence of other violent actors. Consequently, those who would turn a blind eye to any discussion not involving Chinese or North Korean issues do the Nation a disservice. The only real constant in the international political chess game is that the political landscape is constantly changing.

In the same vein, the illegal narcotics industry has itself changed. What were once small and individual syndicates smuggling narcotics across borders have become international conglomerates with production facilities, warehouses, and delivery systems spanning several countries. In addition, rogue regimes conduct wholesale delivery and distribution of narcotics items, both finished products and precursor chemicals.

JIATF-W’s goal of sharing counterdrug information among Pacific nations has served a purpose over the last twenty years. The skill set of peeling apart networks in combat zones
transfers to analyzing any network attempting to avoid scrutiny. Being able to employ the same analysts to simultaneously study terrorist and narcotics networks and the criminal networks supporting both puts all those enterprises on one map. Narcotics activity is intertwined with terrorist activity. One element cannot be investigated without delving into the other as well. Access to the required sources of information necessary to this analysis is derived from U.S. partnership with ASEAN countries. Seeing the benefit to rooting out these elements within their own borders, partner nations occasionally seek out U.S. experts to analyze this information. Additionally, APCSS graduates encourage their national leadership to join the community of nations that together can halt the plethora of real threats attacking their citizenry.

As resources dwindle, it is economically prudent to apply skill sets in an efficient manner as to derive the greatest benefit. Maintaining duplicative staffs that exploit the same information but narrowly focus on just one target set—narcotics, terrorists, or organized crime—is wasteful and indefensible. Differences between narcotics purveyors, terrorists, and transnational criminals are becoming exceedingly blurred.

JIATF-W should transfer its budget to expanding the network analysis tools and capabilities of APCFC while maintaining its information-sharing outlets with foreign nations. APCFC should utilize that funding to expand its analytical team and authorities to include all criminal elements. By absorbing JIATF-W into APCFC, PACOM can use a portion of JIATF-W’s funding to continue its support of APCSS. As APCSS strengthens its partnership with ASEAN to collectively attack threat networks of any kind, APCFC will become a hub to respond to any partner nation’s request for assistance.

The most important and over-riding element to any investigation and prosecution of threat networks by PACOM and its subordinate commands is commitment. Confronting other networks, such as terrorism and organized crime, will be a generational effort. Eradicating the impetus for terrorist or criminal networks to emerge will command attention from many parts of government in terms of aid, assistance, and partnership. Here again, ASEAN is a doorway for U.S. law enforcement and humanitarian aid to enter partner nations in a less threatening manner.

Detractors will argue that such network analysis and concern for organized crime falls outside the Title X requirements to staff, train, and equip the services for military missions. Committing to investigating and prosecuting threat networks comes with the realization that such network analysis is both a result and contributor to joint operations, carrying the concept of joint throughout the agencies of the government.

The deeper pockets and personnel rosters of DoD can open network analysis conducted by APCFC to all the agencies of the U.S. government. Those agencies can also join in mutual prosecution of threats via the much broader authorities under their jurisdictions. APCFC’s existence as an asymmetric force-multiplier can be further justified in the information services it provides to agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Treasury, and State. Rather than stepping in the way of
other government agencies, PACOM can use the APCFC to support furthering the goals of those agencies. Presenting a united governmental front to assist partners in all facets of their challenges, from border security, to customs tariffs, to enacting effective legislation by which to prosecute threats, will demonstrate that PACOM’s participation in ASEAN goes far beyond military support.

Conclusion

Where previously there had been only one prevailing threat network in the Pacific arena—narcotics trafficking—the expansion of Al Qaeda has spawned affiliate networks around the world. Some of these have found their way into PACOM countries, causing grievous mayhem with bombings and other attacks.

JIATF-W has been in operation for over twenty years with not much appreciable decline in the drug trade. In fact, if anything, drug traffickers have become more sophisticated, establishing inter-relational networks combined with criminal organizations to move their precursors and final product across national boundaries.

Pursuit of Al Qaeda networks in Iraq and Afghanistan created a sophisticated methodology to analyze and identify terrorists. Regardless of whether these individuals were importing IED components, moving funds, exporting narcotics, or establishing suicide cells, the network analysis successfully led to their neutralization. The APCFC was established at PACOM to bring these methodologies to bear upon PACOM-based terrorist networks.

The ASEAN organization provides a forum through which multiple agencies of the U.S. government can partner multilaterally with foreign nations for coordinated attacks upon transnational networks that span borders. Working through ASEAN saves the effort of establishing relationships with each individual country in turn while also obviating the need to negotiate agreements between two neighboring countries. ASEAN offers a neutral environment allowing such international agreements to blossom.

Consequently, folding JIATF-W’s efforts and funding into an expanded APCFC will not only continue JIATF-W’s charter but likely lead it to greater successes. The same APCFC network analysis methodology can be utilized to identify drug traffickers operating within larger criminal organizations that also derive income from servicing terrorist networks. Going beyond just that, APCFC will continue to identify terrorist cells as well as criminal organizations, thus closing the loop full circle. IAJ

NOTES


5 “PACOM Strategy.”


7 Simon, p. 25.


11 “Countering the IED Threat,” p. 2.


15 “PACOM Strategy.”


17 “PACOM Strategy.”

18 Ibid.
House Passes Cybersecurity Legislation

The House of Representatives passed three bills in late July aimed at strengthening efforts to combat cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure. These efforts include increased information sharing, advancing cyber technologies, and improving the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) cybersecurity workforce.

H.R. 3696, the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection (NCCIP) Act of 2014, establishes the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center as a federal civilian information sharing interface to provide shared situational awareness and share cyber threat information among federal, state, and local government entities, as well as private entities. According to Subcommittee Chairman Patrick Meehan (R-Pa.), the NCCIP Act “will help us responsibly coordinate our cyber defenses and strengthen their civilian leadership while protecting Americans’ privacy and civil liberties.”

H.R. 2952, the Critical Infrastructure Research and Development Advancement (CIRDA) Act of 2014, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to relay to Congress a strategic plan for research and development of cybersecurity and physical security technologies. The CIRDA Act also calls for reports on DHS’s use of public-private research consortiums.

H.R. 3107, the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Boots-on-the-Ground Act, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop classifications for cyber expertise used in the department and make those classifications available to other federal agencies. The bill also requires the Secretary to conduct an annual assessment of the readiness and capacity of the DHS workforce to meet its cybersecurity mission.

Stimson Center Reports on U.S. Drone Policy

The Stimson Center recently published a report on U.S. drone policy. *Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on U.S. Drone Policy* represents a preliminary effort to respond to President Obama’s May 2013 call for constructive new approaches to thinking about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), often referred to as “drones”.

In response to the president’s call, the Stimson Center created a distinguished 10-member task force on U.S. Drone Policy. Task Force members drew on their experience in the military, intelligence, foreign policy, and legal communities, and also sought recommendations from experts in technology, human rights, and business.

The Task Force’s report examines the military and national security benefits of using UAVs, and offers eight detailed recommendations for UAV strategy. Among Stimson’s recommendations are charges to improve transparency and develop more robust oversight and accountability for UAV use in targeted strikes. The report also calls for increased interagency research and development,
which should advance U.S. national security interests while flagging any legal, ethical, and strategic implications of emerging UAV-related technologies. *IAJ*

**Report Addresses Cyber, Terror Threats**


According to the commissioners, the U.S. fight against terrorism has entered “a new and dangerous phase,” with Al Qaeda-affiliated groups gaining strength throughout the Middle East. The report also cites foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq, resistance to counterterrorism reform among members of Congress, and “counterterrorism fatigue” among U.S. citizens as growing concerns. On the cyber front, the commissioners assert that cyber readiness lags far behind the threat, saying that the U.S. is “at September 10th levels in terms of cyber preparedness.”

Proactive counterterrorism measures are needed to deter these threats, and the commissioners make many recommendations in this report. Included in their recommendations are the sustainment of counterterrorism authorities and budgets, increased transparency with the American public, and Congressional legislation to address and counter cyber threats.

The commissioners also recommend that future Directors of National Intelligence should focus on coordinating the efforts of the various intelligence agencies and advancing interagency information sharing, especially counterterrorism information sharing throughout the Intelligence Community. *IAJ*

**Cyber Exercise Improves Interagency Cooperation**

In July, 550 participants engaged in Cyber Guard 14-1, a two-week exercise designed to test operational and interagency coordination in the event of a domestic cyberspace incident. Participants included elements of the National Guard Reserves, National Security Agency, and U.S. Cyber Command, as well as individuals involved in U.S. government, academia, and industry.

During the exercise, Cyber Guard participants demonstrated their support to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI responses to foreign-based cyberattacks on simulated critical infrastructure networks. The exercise acted as a “test drive” of operational capabilities and interagency coordination between DoD components, the FBI, and DHS.

Officials stated that in the event of a domestic cyber incident, federal agencies have specific, complementary roles. Greg Touhill, deputy assistant secretary of homeland security for cybersecurity operations and programs, stressed the importance of interagency preparedness, saying that “Practicing as an interagency team is essential to ensure national response to cyber events produce results that are effective and efficient.”

The event was executed by Cybercom and hosted by the FBI at the National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. *IAJ*
Simons Center Meets with Federal Executive Board

On July 17, the leadership of the Simons Center and the Command and General Staff College Foundation met with leaders from the Kansas City Federal Executive Board and the heads of regional federal agencies at the Kauffman Foundation Conference Center in Kansas City, Mo. The event was co-hosted by the Kansas City chapter of Business Executives for National Security.

Participants included representatives from Business Executives for National Security, FBI, FEMA, USDA, Terrorist Early Warning Center, the U.S. Secret Service and the Kansas City Federal Executive Board. The group discussed challenges and possible solutions to cyber threats, as well as cybersecurity and the security and compliance needs of federal agencies and large corporations.

The purpose of Thursday’s meeting was to consider what topics related to cybersecurity would be the most advantageous and relevant to incorporate into the CEO roundtables the Simons Center will be hosting later this year. IAJ

Better Collaboration Needed Along Southwest Border

In June the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report reviewing collaborative efforts among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other interagency partners along the U.S. southwest border. The report, GAO-14-494, describes how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security efforts. The report also examines the extent to which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas.

GAO reports that the collaborative mechanisms used by DHS in Arizona and South Texas include the Joint Field Command, the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, and the South Texas Campaign. These mechanisms aided and enabled DHS and CBP in coordinating various border security efforts, including information sharing, resource targeting and prioritization, and leveraging of assets. For example, the Joint Force Campaign maintains an operations coordination center and clearing house for intelligence information, an asset in coordinating information sharing, while interagency partners target individuals and criminal organizations through the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats. The South Texas Campaign leverages assets of CBP and interagency partners through resource distribution and by conducting joint operations.

GAO also found that DHS and CBP have established performance standards and reporting processes for the Joint Field Command, the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, and the South Texas Campaign. However, GAO believes there are opportunities to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms. GAO suggests that the collaborative mechanisms can be strengthened through assessing results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. IAJ
Interagency Partnerships Crucial to Safeguarding Infrastructure

During the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association cyber symposium in June, Navy Adm. Michael S. Rogers stressed the importance of building partnerships among the federal government, the private sector, and academia for the defense of critical infrastructure.

In his keynote address, Adm. Rogers described cyber as “the ultimate team sport.” He continued, saying “There is no one single organization that has all the answers. There is no single technology that will solve all of our problems [and] meet all of our challenges. This is a mission set that does not know clearly defined lines.”

Adm. Rogers discussed a recent meeting with the secretary of homeland security and the FBI director, citing the meeting as an example of his efforts to create partnerships and relationships that help the U.S. government apply its capabilities to support the broader civil sector. Rogers also expressed his opinion that U.S. Cyber Command should assist its civilian counterparts in understanding how the federal government is organized to provide them cyber support.

“In the end, it’s about that broader set of partnerships,” Rogers said in his address. “They’re going to be the key to our success.”

Adm. Rogers assumed duty as director of the National Security Agency and commander of U.S. Cyber Command in April 2014. IAJ

2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Published by DHS

In June the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published its second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The original QHSR, published in 2010, answered the question “What is homeland security?”, and outlined the vision, mission areas, goals, and objectives for homeland security.

According to Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, the new QHSR “sets priorities for homeland security over the next four years based on risk, and charts a path forward to proactively address rapidly evolving threats and hazards.”

The 2014 QHSR focuses on working toward a more collaborative, unified Department, and recognizes the important charge DHS shares with their partners across federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well as those in the private sector and other nongovernmental organizations.

The 2014 review also renews the Department’s commitment to their five mission areas:

• Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security,
• Secure and Manage Our Borders,
• Enforce and Administer Our Immigration Laws,
• Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace, and
• Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience. IAJ
Report Recommends Improved Transportation Collaboration in Disaster Response

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in May of this year assessing the collaborative efforts made by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during Hurricane Sandy. The report, GAO-14-512, focuses on DOT and FEMA’s efforts to in emergency transportation relief during and after the October 2012 disaster.

The report assesses the progress made by DOT in managing Disaster Relief Appropriations Act surface transportation funds, and compares the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) new Public Transportation Emergency Relief program to FEMA’s and the Federal Highway Administration’s emergency relief programs. GAO also examined the extent to which FTA and FEMA have implemented their memorandum of agreement to coordinate their roles and responsibilities when providing assistance to transit agencies.

According to GAO, while FTA and FEMA have a memorandum of agreement for assisting transit providers during emergencies, they are limited in their ability to delineate specific roles and responsibilities for future disasters due to differences in their funding. FTA and FEMA also have not determined how collaborative efforts will be monitored, evaluated, and reported, relying on informal communication instead.

GAO had previously advocated for a means to evaluate the results of collaborative efforts between the FTA and FEMA, and GAO reiterated that recommendation in this report. GAO has proposed that DOT and the Department of Homeland Security direct FTA and FEMA to establish specific guidelines to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of collaborative efforts—including their communications program and protocol as contemplated in their memorandum of agreement. 

DOJ/DHS Partnership Curbs Cybercrime

In early June, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported on the success of its partnership with the Department of Justice (DOJ) in containing the spread of the Gameover Zeus botnet. Gameover Zeus is a sophisticated piece of malware that steals banking information and other credentials from the computers it infects. This information is then used to initiate or re-direct wire transfers to overseas accounts controlled by cyber criminals. It is estimated that nearly $100 million have been lost through these transfers.

The DOJ led effort to curb Gameover Zeus requires the collaboration of many partners from around the world, including government agencies and the private sector. Recently, DOJ has filed criminal charges against the alleged botnet administrator, and is working to identify affected computers and criminal operators.

DHS’s U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team is coordinating with DHS partners at the FBI to notify those affected by Gameover Zeus and provide them with technical assistance in removing malware from their computers. The DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center is also responding to the threat by providing assistance and information to information system operators, known victims, and the broader community to help prevent further infections.
President Calls for Interagency Group to Address Unaccompanied Child Immigration

President Obama issued a memorandum in early June calling for a unified and coordinated U.S. government response to the influx of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) across the U.S. southwest border. The presidential memorandum was directed to heads of executive branch departments and agencies, and calls for the formation of an interagency Unified Coordination Group to ensure unity of effort in responding to the humanitarian aspects of the UAC situation.

Obama chose Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson to establish the Unified Coordination Group, and Johnson chose Federal Emergency Management Agency administrator Craig Fugate to coordinate the group of agencies. The Unified Coordination Group will include representatives from the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, State, and Defense, as well as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the General Services Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. They will also work closely with the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador to counter the recent surge in migrant children.

According to Cecilia Muñoz, director of the White House Domestic Policy Council, the number of UAC crossing the U.S. border has increased more than 90% compared to last year, with most of these children coming from other Central American countries. Increasing violence in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras is one of the driving forces in the increase in child migrants.
CALL FOR PAPERS

Simons Center Announces a special edition of the InterAgency Journal:
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Interagency

The Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation announces a call for papers for a Spring 2015 special edition of the InterAgency Journal. This special edition will focus on the interagency challenge posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The InterAgency Journal seeks thoughtful articles that provide insight and fresh thinking in advancing the knowledge, understanding, and practice of interagency coordination, cooperation, and collaboration.

Deadline for submissions is Friday, January 9, 2015.

- Submit an unclassified, original paper examining any aspect—broad or specific—of the topic. Papers should be between 3,500 and 5,000 words in length.
- Previously published papers, papers being consideration elsewhere for publication, or papers submitted to other competitions still pending announced decisions are ineligible.
- Manuscripts should be single spaced in Microsoft Word format using Times, 12-point font. All graphs, charts, and tables should be submitted as separate files in the format they were created.
- Submissions will receive blind peer review in accordance with standard professional academic journal practice. Submissions will be evaluated on the basis of originality, substance of argument, style, and contribution to advancing the understanding and practice of interagency cooperation regarding WMD.
- To facilitate review, include a cover sheet with full name, institutional affiliation, email, telephone, mailing address and an author biography not to exceed 50 words. Do not, however, include identifying information on any other page of the manuscript.
- Along with their manuscript, writers must agree to the Simons Center copyright transfer agreement, which is detailed online at www.thesimonscenter.org/contribute-content.
- Manuscripts can be submitted on the Simons Center website at www.thesimonscenter.org/contribute-content or emailed to editor@thesimonscenter.org with the subject line “WMD Special Edition” by January 9, 2015.

The guest editor for this special edition is Dr. John Mark Mattox, Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Director of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Graduate Fellowship Program.

For more information contact the Simons Center at editor@thesimonscenter.org or call 913-682-7244. IAJ
Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century

Edited by Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner


- Assistant Professor
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century provides a forward-looking perspective of public management to help professionals and academics understand the challenges of maximizing the effects of government.

Editors Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner organized the book into three parts and relied on 15 subject matter experts from government, academia, and privately funded research organizations in determining the focus of individual chapters. Part 1, “Framing the Intergovernmental Debate,” describes the governmental interagency systems through an historical lens of how our government was established, developed, and evolved due to the influence of technology and external factors such as world trade, finance, war, and social rights. Part 2, “Testing the Intergovernmental System: Issues and Challenges” provides a multitude of topics – homeland security, education policy, welfare reform, Medicaid waivers, and climate change policy – in showing the complexities of issues and resolutions. Finally, Part 3, “Issues of Governance in the Intergovernmental System”, explains how government manages or responds to problems, as the editors conclude the book by discussing how to manage complex problems in the establishment, maturation, and evolution of our government.

In part 1, the authors indicate that early federalism led to a federal government with restricted powers that would be influential in time of war, but have only limited influence over domestic issues, because the states were expected to provide government for their citizens. The narratives focus on how early regulation was introduced across various states to help grow and manage commerce and compares this to a later time (1980s) when America started focusing more on social programs to help Americans. The authors insinuate that one must look closely at how government grows to determine what leadership or management approach by the intergovernmental specialist works best. Finally, the authors ask if a global economy, ever-changing technology, and an integrated world finance system overwhelm government’s ability to manage and adapt to change.

“Testing the Intergovernmental System: Issues and Challenges,” comprises part 2 and reflects on developing a national Homeland Security system, new directions in education policy and management, welfare reform, Medicaid waivers, and regionalism and global climate change policy as examples of newer stresses on the management of intergovernmental programs. The
need for orchestrated federal, regional, state, and local solutions to problems of governance are discussed as the writers talk of the dysfunction wrought by the lack of strategic coordinated efforts in all cases. Policies developed during the formative years of our nation become obsolete as government struggles to keep up with changing social and national security demands. The Department of Education provides an example of how the knife cuts both ways regarding the viability and relevance of a federal agency. An author cites a 1995 Republican led effort to abolish the Department of Education and compares this to a Republican president, former President George W. Bush, touting the “No Child Left Behind” policy and the influence of the Department of Education in implementing the accompanying educational strategy. The exploration of welfare focuses on the roles of local authorities, state officials, and federal policy, and the evolution of control from the states to the federal government and the current pendulum swing back to regional or local responsibility. Federal-to-state block grants, a state’s role, and historical federal oversight are discussed as the various ways intergovernmental managers responded to poverty. Medicaid is introduced as a challenge, given the United States is the only industrialized nation without a comprehensive national health care program.

Part 3, “Issues of Governance in the Intergovernmental System,” addresses the evolution of the information age, performance management, block grants, and opportunistic actors, then provides several approaches in leading or managing intergovernmental agencies or programs. For example, the authors believe that the federal government should do more research or provide increased oversight when it relies on state and local jurisdictions to implement federally-funded policies. Several examples are provided to show how relevant government research helps to report on a program’s efficacy or impact on citizens. Performance management within a government construct provides an example of complexity due to overlapping governmental responsibilities and the difficulty in making quantitative judgments from qualitative data. The Government Accountability Office and other government watchdogs are presented as a mechanism, albeit imperfect, in ensuring the federal dollar is properly spent. The discussion of block grants focuses on both liberal and conservative Presidents trying to reduce government by pushing funding, accountability, and responsibility to states, counties, and cities and the difficulty of measuring effectiveness. The opposite of the block grant—the mandate—is exposed as a relatively easy executive or legislative action, but much harder to inspect, manage, or again, measure. Local entities interpret mandates as they see fit, forcing the legislator or the intergovernmental manager to write them in more detail then probably needed. Interest groups are presented as wild cards that over time have negatively altered the landscape of policy development and service provision to constituents.

The authors conclude with a discussion on how the political process impacts intergovernmental management and how the paradigm has shifted due to opportunistic actors, specifically lobbying groups, special interest groups, and other external entities who are more concerned about their ability to influence and make money and less concerned about America and its citizens. The narrative then ends with a transition to three faulty or misleading assumptions: (1) states will always oppose the federal government’s attempt to dictate policies and programs; (2) local citizens favor state, county, and city government over federal control; and (3) people tend to favor the entity they are controlled by and are less concerned about others’ problems. The authors conclude that these false assumptions may unduly influence how leaders manage intergovernmental agencies, since federal government growth and reach over time has diluted the power and influence of states, counties, and lobbying groups (corporate, private, and special interest).
The editors of *Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century* do a good job of identifying separate and disparate issues, but the shotgun approach of assembling 15 different voices has a drawback in that the reader is left wondering what management and leadership approaches work best with most of the issues. *IAJ*