A New Strategic Framework: Development as an Instrument of American Power

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Many of the wars of the 20th century were about oil, but wars of the 21st century will be over water.

— Isamil Serageldin, World Bank Vice President

INTRODUCTION

Rapid economic globalization and urbanization have created an international security environment that has radically altered the calculus of the national security of the U.S. Economic globalization has changed the lives of virtually every resident of the planet, through rapid access to information, goods, services, resources, and, perhaps most importantly, expectations. As a direct result of economic globalization, urbanization has simultaneously increased demand on the world’s natural resources and exacerbated an imbalance in the distribution of the world’s natural resources. Combined, economic globalization and urbanization have significantly increased the risk of future conflict.

When demand for natural resources outstrips the supply of natural resources, the risk of conflict increases. On a global scale, rapid urbanization is causing just such an imbalance in supply and demand. Such resources as water, food, energy, and even immunizations against disease are essential to urbanizing regions. And yet, these resources are simply not available in the amounts required in the most rapidly urbanizing areas of the world. The result is extreme poverty, malnutrition, competition for limited resources, and potential conflict.

In turn, globalization has accelerated urbanization, thereby propelling developing nations toward potential conflict. The economies of the world’s developed nations require the raw materials, inexpensive labor, and lax regulation of undeveloped nations. Globalization in the form of information technology and economic transparency facilitates the ability of wealthier nations to access the resources of poorer nations. In the process, the populations of the poorer nations urbanize to concentrate resources (especially labor) where those resources will be most efficiently
utilized in economic terms.

If conflict over limited resources is more likely in an era of rapid globalization and urbanization, what are the implications for U.S. national security policy? If history is an accurate guide, the implications are clear. The U.S. will need to develop a comprehensive strategy to address numerous small-scale international conflicts. Whether the U.S. elects to participate directly or indirectly in them, these regional conflicts will affect U.S. interests, and thus will require a response. Historically, the U.S. has either acted as a direct participant (e.g., Somalia) or through partners (e.g., Mali). As a nation, its role has typically been significant and very costly.

U.S. policy options are not limited to responding to such regional crises with military power after the crisis has occurred. Another option is conflict prevention through development, a new instrument of national power. U.S. security policy would be well served if the U.S. was able to invest a fraction of the cost of conflict response in efforts toward conflict prevention. Such a policy would help avoid the costly repercussions of outright conflict, in both lives lost and financial resources. Such notable defense policy experts as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have been proponents of conflict prevention as a less expensive approach than conflict resolution.² Conflict prevention in the context of globalization and urbanization suggests the use of development as an instrument of the nation’s overall national security strategy.

Most practitioners consider the four instruments of national power to be diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—sometimes referred to as DIME.³ The U.S. has wielded each of these instruments in various proportions over decades of foreign policy and during multiple conflicts. The results to date have been arguably quite good, as the U.S. has generally enjoyed sustained prosperity, growth, and influence over its more than two centuries of existence. Globalization and urbanization in the twenty-first century require that the U.S. consider adding to the traditional four instruments to create a fifth element—development.

Since the implementation of the Marshall Plan, development has been a component of the diplomatic instrument of national power, left to the State Department (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).⁴ However, modern history shows us that development activities are not the exclusive domain of State or USAID. Due to the nature of conflicts and areas which are not readily accessible to civilians, the Department of Defense (DoD) has assumed a much greater role in the planning and implementation of development projects, executing as much as 22 percent of U.S. official development assistance.⁵ As a result of these trends, the U.S. development enterprise is undergoing a fundamental change on a scale not seen since the Marshall Plan.⁶

Global trends and whole-of-government approaches to development activities suggest that the time has come for development to be elevated to the status of an instrument of American power in its own right. As a properly synchronized and integrated instrument of American power, development will promote conflict prevention by reducing competition for natural resources, reducing the likelihood of humanitarian crises caused by poverty, and integrating developing nations into the world economy, while simultaneously promoting democratic values and global economic prosperity.

In addition to the four traditional instruments of national power, the President articulated a vision of eight tools of American power in his 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS): defense, diplomacy, economic, development, homeland security, intelligence, strategic communications,
and the American people and the private sector. His inclusion of development clearly shows that it has the potential to be an instrument of national power, as it is sufficiently distinguished from the other instruments.

USAID describes “U.S. foreign assistance” as having a “twofold purpose of furthering America’s interests while improving lives in the developing world.” According to USAID, its mission is to: promote economic prosperity; strengthen democracy; improve global health; advance food security and agriculture; improve environmental sustainability; promote education; help governments prevent and recover from conflicts; and provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural and man-made disasters. Succinctly USAID’s mission is to prevent conflicts by assisting emerging nations develop resources, institutions, and democratic systems that contribute to stability and security. Successfully implemented, development can prevent conflict.

Before discussing development as an instrument of national power, it is essential to understand the existing four instruments and how development will support them.

**The Four Traditional Instruments of National Power**

Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, describes the four traditional elements of national power and defines them as: “All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military.” For the U.S. to achieve its national security objectives as described in the NSS, all of the instruments of national power must be coordinated and exercised in a complementary manner for maximum effect. The President achieves this coordinated outcome by exercising the interagency process, primarily through The National Security Council.

The traditional role of DoD is the military instrument of national power. However, DoD has also played a supporting role in the other instruments of national power, in varying degrees. For instance, DoD provides Defense Attachés to support the various embassies throughout the world who provide valuable support to diplomatic efforts by serving as the ambassador’s principal advisors on matters pertaining to the host nation’s military capabilities. Similarly, the National Security Agency plays a key role in collecting and protecting critical information necessary to the execution of the NSS.

The diplomatic instrument of national power is the traditional domain of State. The economic instrument of national power is traditionally the domain of the Department of the Treasury, although the Department of Commerce also plays a significant role. The information instrument of national power is a coordinated effort, usually led by the President and the White House Staff. There are overlapping responsibilities in the use of each of these instruments.

**The Eight Tools of American Power**

In the NSS, President Obama advances a “whole of government approach” to implementing the strategy and describes eight tools of American power. While the NSS is silent as to the relationship among the traditional four instruments of national power and the eight tools of American power, there is obvious overlap. For example, the diplomacy, defense, and economic tools most certainly overlap with the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of national power. Likewise, intelligence and strategic communications clearly invoke a subset of the informational instrument of national power, and, arguably, fully encompass the intent of that instrument.
The President identified development as a tool of American power in the NSS. In the past, development has been viewed as a subset of diplomacy and, therefore, within the ambit of the diplomatic instrument of power. Thus the NSS signals a shift away from traditional thinking on the role of development in national security matters. By separately identifying development as a tool apart from diplomacy, the President has laid the groundwork for elevating development as a separate instrument of national power.

Notwithstanding the similarities between the traditional four instruments of national power described in Joint Publication 1 and the eight tools of American power described in the NSS, there has been no proclamation that the eight have replaced the four. Nor has there been any serious analysis suggesting it was the President’s intent to make such a substitution. The eight tools appear to reflect the President’s efforts to describe the sources of American power as they pertain to the NSS.

**Development as an Instrument of National Power**

The elevation of development to the status of a tool of American power was indeed a signal of things to come. On the heels of the May 2010 NSS, State published the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The QDDR provides State with the same type of guidance that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides the DoD.\(^\text{16}\)

The title of the QDDR further signals the evolution of development as a separate instrument from diplomacy. By distinguishing development from diplomacy in the very title of the QDDR, the Secretary of State was sending an unambiguous message that the two facets of foreign policy are separate State missions. The fact that they are different disciplines and are finally being recognized as such is a significant evolution in policy.\(^\text{17}\)

The QDDR signals further changes. Chapter 3 is titled “Elevating and Transforming Development to Deliver Results.” Citing President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, former Secretary Clinton describes development on a co-equal footing with diplomacy and defense.\(^\text{18}\) The Presidential Policy Directive, published in September of 2010, articulated a framework of diplomacy, development, and defense—the three “Ds”—as the three pillars of foreign policy.\(^\text{19}\)

The evolution of development from subordinate to diplomacy to its own tool apart from diplomacy and subsequently to one of the three pillars of foreign policy has set the stage for it to become its own instrument of national power. Before that can happen, it must be understood and defined in the context of an instrument of national power.

Development as a pillar of foreign policy has its roots in the post-World War II Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was conceived and implemented by one of the greatest statesmen in U.S. history, General George C. Marshall. A soldier and diplomat, Marshall understood the nexus between development and peace in Europe after the ravages of war. The Marshall Plan invested nearly $13 billion in U.S. funds to rebuild Europe and was widely successful in promoting a lasting peace on the continent.\(^\text{20}\)

In 1961, President Kennedy created USAID as the development arm of U.S. foreign policy. Since its creation, USAID has played a critical role in U.S. foreign policy, leading development efforts to prevent and recover from conflict—Vietnam, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Africa, to name
but a few. However, development has always been a component of diplomacy in the instruments of national power.

More than a decade of war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world has left the U.S. budget and fiscal climate strained. While national interests have not declined, wielding the diplomatic and military instruments of national power has become very costly. The military instrument of national power has become a particularly expensive instrument.

The relative decline in the desire of the U.S. to project military power has come at a time when the world has come to better understand the twin trends of globalization and urbanization. The ability of social and physical scientists to understand the effects of globalization and urbanization has also evolved. Scientists agree that the speed of globalization and urbanization represent serious threats to prosperity and peace.

To further complicate matters, the U.S. does not have a comprehensive strategy to cope with the problem of fragile states. The U.S. needs a development strategy that is preventative in nature. The development instrument of national power provides a platform for just such a preventative strategy.

The time has come for development to be a separate instrument of national power. Development is an exportable commodity, providing markets for U.S. goods and services throughout the world. Development also provides the best opportunity to promote efficient and fair use of natural resources, ease global poverty, promote global prosperity, and promote democratic values and human rights. Perhaps most importantly, development as a conflict prevention tool is less expensive and less resource intensive than conflict resolution.

Development Reduces Competition for Resources

Competition for resources has been the source of many conflicts throughout history. Demand for energy resources in the form of oil has played a central role in many modern conflicts. In the future, the world will focus on other natural resources, such as arable land, forests, food, and water.

Access to water resources for drinking, sanitation, and irrigation is one of the most fundamental needs of humankind. Humans have established cities on rivers and other water bodies since time has been recorded, in part due to the abundance of fresh water. As a result, fresh water has also been at the root of conflict. In modern times, water scarcity has become such a significant security issue that many predict it will take the place of oil as the natural resource over which people fight wars.

Some estimates project that the gap between global water supply and demand may reach 40 percent in the next 20 years. This gap will be most pronounced in the most rapidly developing areas of the world, including the Middle East and North Africa, where the gap could reach 50 percent. The World Bank estimates that 90 percent of the world’s future population growth will occur in developing nations, where globalization and urbanization are most pronounced. According to the World Health Organization, 884 million people worldwide lack access to clean drinking water and 2.5 billion people lack adequate sanitation. As a result of inadequate access to clean drinking water and sanitation, 1.8 million people die every year. Without development to improve access to water resources, conflict will result from competition, and the international community will look to the U.S. for a response.
Another natural resources issue involving water is drought. A lack of access to water for irrigation results in inadequate food supplies, which perpetuates poverty. As rapid urbanization and population growth occur in developing nations, the scarcity of food will cause significant friction over natural resources. Development is required to address drought and avoid conflicts in affected regions.

There are detractors who argue that water wars are unlikely. While acknowledging the risk of conflict over water, they assert that water sharing is a success story, recounting the many neighboring countries that cooperate on water issues. However, this analysis does not take into account the projected water gap in the rapidly developing regions of the world. Nor does this view take into account economic factors, such as trade in oil and grain, which have a dramatic effect on the water gap problem and will grow in influence in the future. Development is the instrument of national power with the potential to solve the water gap problem.

The availability of arable land and fuel resources also presents opportunity for conflict. As urbanization, climate change, and desertification change where people can live, competition for land will cause friction. Deforestation, a result of unsustainable harvesting of wood for fuel (or to create more arable land) in developing countries, contributes to climate change and desertification. Drought, desertification, and food shortages led to the collapse of the Sudan. As an instrument of national power, development addresses these conditions and can avoid the likely resulting conflicts.

At its core, development is about helping populations learn how to create and manage natural resources by developing the social capital needed to achieve societal goals. Typical development projects involve teaching populations how to manage clean drinking water, find new sources of water, develop sustainable farming practices, manage human waste, and reduce the likelihood of disease. Development also focuses on education, to improve local understanding of public health and to foster a sustained approach to solving development issues. Development is the instrument of choice to address the world’s natural resource conflicts.

**Development Promotes Economic Prosperity**

Poverty is a daily part of the lives of people in many developing nations, affecting more than half of the world’s population. Poor sanitation, infectious diseases, malnutrition, and infant mortality disproportionately affect people living in poverty. A high mortality rate is one factor responsible for rapid population growth in developing countries, because families have many children expecting some to die young. This places further stress on natural resources. Poverty is also disproportionately present where there is a lack of economic opportunity.

Development is a key tool in worldwide efforts to fight poverty. Education, economic development, and infrastructure programs teach valuable skills needed for the global economy. Economic development and infrastructure programs create sustainable jobs, leading to local economic growth and global economic integration for the nation. Integration into the global economy attracts jobs and investment, raising the standard of living and allowing local populations to lift themselves out of poverty. U.S. development aid programs in South Korea following the Korean War were so successful that South Korea now provides development to other countries.

Development also reduces the risk of disease. Public health programs provided through development—including immunization, education, and improved sanitation—improve the health of a population and reduce the mortality rate of a nation, thereby making the existing residents
more productive. Better public health has the added benefit of reducing the likelihood of pandemic infectious disease, which in a globalized world is not restricted within a single nation’s borders. As evidenced by the progress of the nations that have graduated from U.S. aid programs, development is a key investment that promotes economic prosperity. These once poverty-stricken nations are now key contributors to the global economy, driving growth and innovation. South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, Botswana, and other countries have all realized prosperity as a result of U.S. aid programs.

**Development Promotes Liberal Democratic Values and Human Rights**

People who are living in relative prosperity are much more likely to live in peace, with democratic institutions and respect for human rights guiding civic life. In contrast, people living in nations with extreme poverty are susceptible to authoritarian rule by warlords, despots, and religiously intolerant ideologues. Such has been the case in Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Korea. These nations, some of which are failing or failed states, had no democratic institutions. In addition, they are among the worst for human rights abuses.

The NSS states that one of its key objectives is to promote democracy and human rights abroad. As one of its key national security goals, it is imperative that the U.S. make every effort to realize this outcome. Development is key instrument in this aspect of the national security strategy.

Development promotes democracy and human rights abroad through incentives, transparency, education, and the elimination of poverty. By providing economic opportunity, promoting the rule of law, and holding aid partners accountable, the U.S. succeeds in achieving this key national security objective. Although diplomacy and defense can influence these initiatives, development drives success in the promoting democracy and human rights.

**Development Prevents Humanitarian Crises**

A number of things, among them failed states and extreme poverty, can cause humanitarian crises. Often these two causes occur simultaneously, as they did in Somalia. The effect is the same—large populations of people suffering in extreme conditions, resulting in international calls for U.S. intervention.

Humanitarian crises have played a significant role in U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Globalization and resource competition have brought about new conflicts, hidden beneath decades of Cold War standoff. Rapid urbanization, resource competition, climate change, and rampant corruption have provided the catalysts for crises to occur, and once they do, difficult conditions become catastrophes. In such circumstances, the protection of U.S. national interests has led to military interventions in humanitarian crises. Military operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo are examples of these humanitarian crises.

A primary objective of the exercise of national power is to protect U.S. national interests. In some cases, the prevention of humanitarian crises is in America’s national interest, and development is the instrument of national power most able to prevent humanitarian crises that threaten these national interests.

As an instrument of national power, development is best suited to prevent regional crises by reducing competition for natural resources, promoting global prosperity, and promoting democracy.
and human rights. A successful development program will set the conditions to avoid circumstances that lead to humanitarian crises. Adequate natural resources, prosperity, respect for the rule of law, and strong democratic institutions all work to prevent the types of humanitarian crises that can result in U.S. military intervention.

**Development Prevents Conflict**

Nations plagued by poverty are more likely to be failed or fragile states with vast ungoverned or under-governed regions. States where extreme poverty is prevalent are more than two times more likely to fail than states without extreme poverty. Chronic resource competition and depletion, poverty, hegemony, and human rights atrocities contribute to an environment of lawlessness. These conditions allow transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, and religious extremists to flourish. These are the nations that foment conflict. Fragile states in particular pose the most vexing problems for international security.

Failed and fragile states represent two of the greatest national security threats to the U.S. in the twenty-first century. Fragile states pose significant challenges to international security, as well as the security of the people who live in these states. Countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan/South Sudan, Congo, and Haiti all pose continuing threats to America’s national interests. Each of these countries is in the top ten of the Failed States Index for 2012.

Failed states are the breeding grounds of threats to U.S. national interests. Terrorists and transnational criminal organizations capitalize on lax immigration and border controls, weak governance, and lack of financial oversight to establish bases of operations. The disenchanted, poor masses in these countries are fertile recruiting centers for transnational terrorist groups. More importantly, these states create safe havens for training, operations, organizing, and financing terrorist and criminal enterprises. Al Qaeda has used Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia for just such purposes. Recently, France conducted military operations to reverse the tide of Islamic extremists taking control of Mali, the once prosperous West African nation that is home to the famous city of Timbuktu. Mali was the most recent victim of Al Qaeda-linked groups taking advantage of under-governed states.

Development offers an alternative tool to avoid a failed state condition. A well-funded development program can turn the tide of crime and poverty and help a state improve governance and trade. A development program synchronized across the interagency has a high potential for success. Development can prevent violent conflict.

An example of multiagency U.S. development success preventing and resolving conflict is the Republic of Colombia. In 2005, Colombia ranked 14 on the Failed States Index. Since 2005, Colombia has succeeded in its efforts to drive the insurgent narco-terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), to near extinction. Colombia has been successful largely due to significant U.S. development assistance. For example, USAID has worked closely with rural farmers to supplant the coca crop with crops that do not support the illicit drug trade, and by proxy the FARC. Likewise, State, through its Narcotics Affairs Section, has worked closely with the Colombian National Police to professionalize the force, provide resources, and root out corruption. DoD has undertaken numerous activities, through U.S. Southern Command, to equip, train, and resource the Colombian armed forces. In addition, U.S. Southern Command has commissioned various studies through its humanitarian assistance programs to support improved
governance by correlating infrastructure investments with income to target capital investments in areas that are under-governed. As a result, Colombia has fallen to 52 on the Failed States Index in 2012. Development can be the cure for the fragile state problem.

**Development in Practice**

Today a lack of unity of effort plagues the development activities of the U.S. The delivery of development aid requires a united effort among State, USAID, DoD, and other departments. Military doctrine for the employment of the instruments of national power specifically identifies unity of effort as essential to success. However, no such comparable doctrine exists for civilian agencies, such as State and USAID. Unity of effort is essential to the development mission.

Worse than a lack of doctrine is the myriad of statutory programs governing development assistance. The Foreign Assistance Act includes 247 directives affecting 12 departments and 25 agencies. The statutory framework is further confused when DoD is involved, requiring the intermingling of defense funding (Title 10) and foreign relations funding (Title 22) to achieve at least a coordinated program of development assistance.

The absence of unity of effort is not a recently discovered phenomenon. It is an accepted condition. While USAID is subordinate to State, albeit in an executive role, it is common knowledge that their efforts are not well coordinated. As State focuses on grand strategy, USAID focuses on operations and tactics without much consideration as to how those tactics support the grand strategy.

Like elevating development to the status of instrument of national power, the time has come to address a lack of unit of effort in the world of U.S. development assistance. If development is going to be effective in preventing conflict, the U.S. must coordinate the delivery of its development aid with an emphasis on unity of effort. Unity of effort requires clear lines of authority to coordinate development activity, with resources that allow that authority to be exercised.

An Assistant Secretary of State, who leads the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), currently coordinates development efforts. This bureau is not an interagency office. Its mandate is to coordinate the efforts of State and, to some degree, the independent USAID. This arrangement falls far short of the unity of effort needed to be successful in the delivery of development assistance.

The lack of an interagency coordinating office is especially disconcerting since the former Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which was located in State, has been dismantled, with many of its functions transferred to CSO. Following its creation in 2004, S/CRS was tasked through National Security Presidential Directive 44 to coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities across the interagency. DoD and State made great progress in the integration of staffs in an interagency environment under this construct. The disappearance of S/CRS is a step backward in interagency integration.

It is important to start with an understanding that a major overhaul of the statutory framework for foreign assistance beyond S/CRS is highly unlikely in the current political environment. The creation of a new Department of Development, on a scale comparable to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, is highly unlikely.

In addition to a lack of unity of effort, Congress has chronically understaffed State and
USAID, especially in contingency operations. This understaffing is a symptom of systematic underfunding, even as demands have grown on State during the contingency operations in a post-9/11 environment. Such chronic understaffing has a deleterious effect on development efforts. Funding and thus staffing are unlikely to improve in the short term, with a challenging fiscal climate in Washington. Meanwhile, the role of DoD in providing security assistance has continued to grow, in part due to the inability of civilian agencies to deliver development assistance and in part due to the lack of security in environments where it delivers assistance. While there are many advantages to using DoD to deliver development aid, there are also many disadvantages.

Since a new Department of Development is not in the making, the executive branch must demonstrate initiative to improve unity of effort by implementing several recommendations to elevate development to its new role as a co-equal instrument of national power. First, internal to State, development efforts must be led by a senior official with the authority to direct the development activities of State and USAID, as well as U.S. interaction with nongovernmental organizations and international institutions. Second, the President should form an interagency task force to coordinate development activities across the various government departments and agencies that have a hand in development. Third, State and USAID must create doctrine to institutionalize the way development assistance is delivered, especially in contingency operations. Fourth, the President should align the geographic combatant commands of DoD and the geographic bureaus of State. Finally, State and USAID should align and prioritize development efforts across the development enterprise.

Strong leadership by State is essential. An Assistant Secretary of State with a bureau dedicated to development is not adequate to provide the leadership necessary for development to perform its function. A Deputy Secretary (or at the very least an Undersecretary) is the level of leadership that is warranted. A Deputy Secretary will have the authority to coordinate across departments and within State to achieve desirable development outcomes. An individual of that caliber will also have the institutional authority to lead internal State efforts as well as those of USAID. Such a plan has already been proposed by the Society of International Development.

The President should direct the creation of an interagency task force and provide it with the executive authority to coordinate development activities. There are several models to consider when looking for an example on how to establish unity of effort on an interagency basis. One example in the highly compartmentalized intelligence world is the Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) organized within the Defense Intelligence Agency and staffed by multiple agencies. Another example is the National Joint Terrorism Task Force organized within the Department of Justice and likewise staffed by multiple agencies. If secretive and competitive intelligence and law enforcement agencies can cooperate for a higher purpose, surely diplomats can as well.

The development community does not need to look to the intelligence and law enforcement communities for examples. The organization of the U.S. combatant commands provides some very instructive examples. Likewise, the organization of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan provide some interesting examples, albeit on a smaller scale.

The DoD's combatant commands are moving to a model of having civilian deputy commanders who are career diplomats on loan from State. The civilian deputies coordinate regional foreign policy (serving as a foreign policy advisor [POLAD]) and serve as the interface between the
combatant command and the interagency. To date, U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Southern Command have civilian deputies. Although U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Northern Command do not have civilian deputies, they each have an ad-hoc J9 section that is responsible for interagency coordination/partnering and typically have representatives from other departments and agencies assigned. For instance, Pacific Command calls its J9 section the Pacific Outreach staff section.

Another example on the other end of the organizational scale is the formation of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The PRTs are integrated interagency teams comprised of representatives from State, DoD, and reconstruction experts. In Afghanistan, a military officer with a civilian deputy leads the PRT. In Iraq, a State Department official with a military deputy led the PRT. These examples demonstrate that a working interagency organization is possible.\(^{65}\)

A new Deputy Secretary of State for Development should lead the Interagency Task Force on Development. The Interagency Task Force and USAID should collocate to ensure they focus on development, not on the inner workings of State. The staff of the Interagency Task Force should be the career development officials of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, which should be renamed the Bureau of Development Assistance. Like other interagency task forces, personnel from other federal departments and agencies on loan for a stabilized period of time should be assigned to supplement the Interagency Task Force. These personnel will provide advice and perspective in their domains of expertise and coordinate the interface between the task force and their home agency. The President should direct the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and Treasury to supply supplemental staff to the Interagency Task Force. The Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Interior would supply subject matter experts on an as-needed basis.

The Interagency Task Force on Development would assume responsibility for coordinating development aid with all of the nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, multilateral development banks and financial institutions, and private development efforts.\(^{66}\) While USAID personnel in the host nation will coordinate with these organizations on the ground, the Interagency Task Force will coordinate funding, policy, and interagency programs. This will lighten the administrative burden on USAID.

The Interagency Task Force will also coordinate the activities of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, another U.S. development agency. Although the board of directors of Millennium Challenge includes the Secretary of State and the USAID administrator, day-to-day coordination should rest with the Deputy Secretary of State for Development. This is the only way to ensure unity of effort in the use of the development instrument of national power.

USAID, under the direction of the Deputy Secretary of State, would execute aid programs without the need to concern itself with interagency coordination issues. It would continue to coordinate closely with the military through its Office of Civilian Military Cooperation, but the focus of that office would shift from coordinating with the Pentagon to coordinating with the combatant commanders in their delivery of security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and related military programs. In turn, USAID would dispatch development experts to work in the J9 Interagency Partnering section of each combatant command headquarters, a newly standardized staff section in all combatant command headquarters designed to coordinate all interagency initiatives. Working together in this context would provide USAID and military personnel with a
The Chief of Mission of each country where development is occurring and the corresponding geographic combatant commander would form interagency development teams. These interagency development teams would be created using the PRT models of Iraq and Afghanistan, with the lead agency being chosen on the basis of whether the security environment is permissive (State lead) or non-permissive (Defense lead). As a practical matter, leadership will change as the security environment changes. These teams would be task-organized to address the unique aspects of each country’s program, but will always include an interagency composition with State and Defense representation to ensure coordination.

In addition to coordinating with the geographic combatant commander, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) should also provide experts on military civil affairs to both the Interagency Task Force and the interagency development teams. Recently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff realigned all theater special operations commands under SOCOM. As the proponent of all civil affairs Soldiers, the interagency task force will require SOCOM participation to ensure seamless coordination.

The geographic bureaus of State should be aligned with the combatant commands of the DoD. Without prejudging which department has the right alignment, it is imperative that the staffs of State and Defense coordinate more closely with the staffs of the combatant commands. Coordination between State and Defense and with the Interagency Task Force will facilitate comprehensive and synchronized delivery of development assistance.

The entire national security enterprise should synchronize their development efforts, not just State and Defense. A systematic approach is required to integrate the efforts of all agencies involved in the development instrument of power. Development aid should be targeted to at-risk countries to achieve the goal of preventing conflict. While the U.S. should direct its development assistance to a wide range of international partners, it should prioritize development assistance for countries most at risk of failure or conflict.

Some key participants in the development community will disagree with any proposal to organize development efforts along military lines, especially when DoD is playing such a prominent role in development activities. For instance, the International Nongovernmental Organization Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) commented that the military’s current prominent role results in the militarization of development aid. The inclusion of traditional development activities in the NSS offends some in the development community. They would prefer instead to maintain development as a tool for the elimination of poverty and suffering. These groups are unlikely to support any recommendation to formalize the delivery of aid along military lines, and will resent a more formal role for the military.

These opposing views ignore the realities of the national security environment in the twenty-first century. The current national security environment is one of declining fiscal resources and increasing asymmetric threats, exacerbated by rapid globalization, population growth, and urbanization in developing countries. These conditions require the U.S. to find ways to improve the delivery of development aid. In short, the development enterprise must become more efficient and effective if the U.S. is to prevent conflict.
**Conclusion**

Globalization and urbanization have created conditions that threaten the national security interests of the U.S. Rapid globalization has presented opportunities and challenges for the developing world, raising expectations of prosperity and integration into the world economy. Urbanization and rapid population growth in the developing world have strained the availability of resources, creating tension over such fundamental needs as water, food, energy, and land. As tension over these resources increases, so does the potential for conflict. Poverty is at the root of this increased potential for conflict.

Traditionally, the U.S. has relied on four instruments of national power to protect its national interests: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. These four instruments have served U.S. national security policy well. However, emerging threats to our national interests in the form of humanitarian crises and failed states require the U.S. to consider adding a new instrument of national power—development.

Development, as an instrument of national power, can prevent conflict. By preventing conflict, the frequency with which the international community asks the U.S. to resolve conflicts through military means will decrease. Development is less costly than military intervention, both in terms of lost treasure and lost lives.

Development prevents conflict in many ways. Development reduces competition for natural resources, thereby reducing the likelihood of humanitarian crises. Development reduces poverty and increases prosperity by raising the standard of living in developing nations through integration into the global economy. Finally, development promotes liberal democratic values and respect for human rights throughout the world.

Several bureaucratic obstacles currently hamper the U.S. development enterprise. State and USAID cannot deliver development aid efficiently due to a lack of unity of effort, adequate resources, and executive emphasis. Due to these bureaucratic inefficiencies and the nature of conflict itself, DoD has assumed a much greater role in the delivery of development aid. If the U.S. does not address these factors, development will not be successful as an instrument of national power.

In the absence of a fundamental redesign of the way the U.S. delivers development assistance, which is unlikely in the current political and fiscal climate, the development enterprise should be reorganized to create unity of effort, while improving efficiency and effectiveness. State should create a Deputy Secretary of State for Development, providing executive leadership to reshape the development community. The President should create a new Interagency Task Force on Development, which would be led by the Deputy Secretary of State of Development. This new task force should coordinate development policy, procedures, doctrine, and priorities—synchronizing development with diplomacy and defense. Combined with further reforms to improve the delivery of development aid, this new development enterprise will provide the foundation upon which to wield the newest instrument of national power.

Globalization and urbanization have changed the way the U.S. perceives its role in the international security environment. While the traditional instruments of national power have been successful, the time has come to consider a new strategic framework that relies on conflict prevention as the cornerstone of America’s national security strategy, instead of conflict resolution.
This new strategic framework calls for development to be a separate instrument of national power, with a specific goal to prevent conflicts in the future. The time for development as an instrument of national power has come. IAE

ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 99.


11 Ibid.


16  Clinton, cover letter.
18  Clinton, p. 75.
23  Morrissette and Borer, p. 87.
24  Ibid.
26  Morrissette and Borer, p. 86.
27  Peterson and Posner, pp. 32–33.
28  Ibid.
29  Morrissette, p. 93.
33  Rice, pp. 76–80.
34  Rice, p. 81.
35  Clinton, p. 79.
36  Rice, pp. 79–80.
37  Rice, p. 81; Clinton, p. 79.
38 Rice, p. 78.
39 Obama, p. 37.
40 Gennip, p. 57.
41 Rice, pp. 77–78.
45 Rice, p. 78.
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48 “Failed States Index.”
50 “Failed States Index.”
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55 Sarkar, pp. 5, 7–8.
57 Ibid., p. 218.
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