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FEATURES

WORTH NOTING

WORTH NOTING *(cont'd)*

BOOK REVIEW

Afghanistan Army Development:

What Went Wrong

by Tommy J. Tracy

In the summer of 2009, after an abrupt International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) leadership change from General McKiernan to General McChrystal, preparation for a surge of forces and a fresh approach toward Afghanistan's security situation ensued—ironically not one designed to ensure victory over an insurgency, but rather one to execute a graceful U.S. departure from Afghanistan.[1] Although the surge, which peaked in 2011, achieved a number of successes to include increasing the number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Afghan National Army (ANA) remains ineffective and incapable, which will likely lead to a rapid erosion in Afghanistan's overall military security situation if the NATO-backed ISAF totally withdraws from Afghanistan. As this article will illustrate, this foreboding forecast, based on the early-on approaches taken by the international coalition toward establishing ANA capacity during the critical 2009–2010 period, will likely be accurate. The failure of properly conducting the surge during its initial phases has had lingering effects, as the Pentagon admits that the ANA remains incapable of autonomous operations and plagued by the same problems that surfaced during the 2009–2010 period.[2]

One of several issues that this article will address is the relative indifference displayed by all actors—from the highest-level strategic leaders down to the operational uniformed officers—when it came to executing strategic and operational objectives designed to ensure Afghanistan's future security. The indifference partly resulted from the ISAF mission being purposely under resourced, while America, the lead nation in the coalition, shifted its focus toward an insular domestic agenda. In *Obama's Wars*, Bob Woodward seems to point out that U.S. strategic leaders wanted to initiate a temporary limiting surge, popularized earlier as the way to achieve military success in Iraq—designed to give notice to Afghan leaders that they had a brief window of opportunity to take charge of their destiny as the U.S. led coalition readied for a withdrawal from the region. This was called the "leverage option."[3] On the ground and in advisory meetings, the surge translated into a U.S. exit strategy to the Afghans, and in reality, that is what it was. Despite a seemingly oblivious

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Congress that thought the surge was designed to win the war, McChrystal was embarking on a journey that called for executing a campaign with inadequate forces and resources. He found himself sandwiched between varying groups of hostile adversaries and a corrupt central Afghan government, dealing with embarrassing coalition mishaps and trying to develop a relationship with a suspicious U.S. ambassador.[4]

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By 2009, the American military, with many of its leaders having endured seven years of war, was fatigued and dealing with a new Commander-in-Chief, who was intent on gracefully finding a way out of Afghanistan but dragging out the departure to first close out the more unpopular war in Iraq. In the summer of 2009, ISAF, although staffed with civilian and interagency members, was in a dismal resourcing state. Its entire ANSF force rebuilding mission rested within a single two-star command—U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A's advisory and organizational staff was well-below strength and had a single subordinate operational command, Task Force Phoenix.

Since 2003, the international coalition slowly built up ANA troop strength, from 1,750 soldiers in March 2003[5] to 60,000 soldiers by the spring of 2008. With newly instituted and accelerated growth goals, ANA numbers now increased rapidly but in an uncontrollable fashion. In the fall of 2009, an across-the-board monetary pay package was to serve as the catalyst for accelerated ANA growth. The package was primarily staffed by CSTC-A and later approved and financed by the international community (IC). Senior Afghan military leaders were also involved in the process. However, the U.S. insistence on maintaining an all-volunteer, federated ANA failed to account for the political and ethnic cultural challenges that existed in Afghanistan. Ironically, although the monetary package was significant (a new inductee now earned nearly two to three times the country's per capita), it was nevertheless modest in comparison to what was possible.

Afghan leaders demanded that the IC limit the across-the-board pay raise amounts and delete all bonuses except for locality pay (as a means to incentivize assignments in the volatile southern regions). The Afghans feared select bonuses and staggered raises would lead to greater internal corruption practices. As a donor state with no developed internal revenue system, the Afghan military leaders wanted a more modest across-the-board pay raise rather than a larger unsupportable one because they knew that one day the central government would have to pay the hefty personnel costs or risk a massive reduction in force. Feedback for the pay package was solicited from the U.S. Embassy economics officer, who obtained occupational salary data in order to ensure that the pay raise did not cause a damaging jolt to the economy. The pay package debate lingered on for months but was rolled out with great fanfare in the late fall of 2009.

The pay raise was necessary because although ANA strength was steadily increasing, having surpassed 90,000 in June 2009, it actually stalled and decreased throughout the summer and early fall. With the new ANA growth goal of 134,000 men by October 2010 (revised from December 2011), something had to be done to stimulate growth in the federated ANA. With the surge in December 2009, CSTC-A's newly named command NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) in

Kabul quickly executed an accelerated ANSF growth plan designed to build capacity. Across town, ISAF's Joint Command (IJC) focused on enhancing capabilities as it wanted ANA forces involved in immediate combat operations—starting in February 2010. The 30 percent increase in soldier strength occurring over such a short annual period caused problems for the ANA, as it would for any Army.

Simultaneously, the international command structure changed. CSTC-A expanded into a three-star NATO Training Mission command (NTM-A/CSTC-A). TF Phoenix now fell under IJC. Expanding both commands took an inordinate amount of time to complete, especially resourcing staff and advisory billets and building the infrastructure needed to support the two expanding organizations. At the same time, the commands were trying to grow the ANSF and build the accompanying infrastructure to support such a force. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of additional coalition forces were rotating into and out of theater, and Taliban forces were conducting some of the most intense fighting since December 2001. Something had to give. Consequently, the mission of building ANA capacity was executed in a hasty and uncoordinated and unplanned fashion. Although a campaign plan was supposedly developed, little of it seemed transparent to those executing the day-to-day advisory mission. Although the military commands and the U.S. Embassy conducted interagency coordination at least weekly, the relationship between the two, newly-formed, three-star commands seemed icy at best. Prior to CSTC-A and TF Phoenix merging, they conducted monthly ANA assessment and coordination conferences that covered both Afghan training and operations; now, the two separate, bifurcated commands held no sanctioned meetings, which resulted in worsening stovepiped efforts as each organization, collocated within Kabul, orchestrated its own separate ANA training and separate operational missions.

This situation impacted ANA force development. Afghan infantry battalions were formed from recruits that received only 8 weeks of basic training (reduced from 10 weeks). Recruits were issued and trained on the impractical M16 rifle and given poorly designed uniforms and unsuited military hardware. In terms of ANA growth and development, the mission was about quantity and meeting performance metrics, not quality or imparting enduring capabilities. For example, the ANA was issued high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) instead of the simpler, easier to maintain former Soviet model wheeled vehicles. Afghan soldiers could not repair or even safely drive HMMWVs, which resulted in high numbers of accidents. As noted in a recent *Washington Post* article, to this day, Afghan units cannot care for and sustain their issued equipment, which degrades combat readiness and effectiveness.[6] In order to prevent

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mass defections, the newly formed Afghan battalions—*kandaks*—would be deployed from training centers with no prior notice and in total secrecy of their anticipated assigned locations, which was more often than not hotly contested combat areas throughout the southern and southeastern portions of the country. Absent without leave (AWOL) and other attrition rates reached alarming levels especially in the 205th Corps's provincial southern area, as deployed homesick soldiers were assigned far from their families to unfamiliar, ominous settings where

they resided in poorly constructed billets or waited for hardened billets to be constructed.

The enabling organizations—engineers, intelligence, aviation, demining, and logistics—needed in any army remained underdeveloped, in part because of the low literacy rate among ANA soldiers and the difficulty in obtaining the sophisticated equipment needed to support these types of organizations.. With robust efforts by the coalition to educate Soldiers to an elementary level,[7] illiteracy in the ANA is decreasing; however, attaining literate soldiers remains a problem. The more sophisticated combat-type units, such as engineer and artillery, must be staffed with enlightened soldiers and require expensive hardware, longer training periods, and extensive sustainment. All this takes time to develop and quality equipment donations.

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Although considered coalition partners, the ANA is not an ally. So what force structure should the Afghans have in relation to other militaries in the region? Because of the continued concern of green on blue attacks, trust between the ISAF and ANA is often questioned. When confronted, a senior ANA general admitted that there was no effective vetting process to ensure that the Taliban would not infiltrate the ANA. Some express the belief that Taliban sympathizers who join the ANA and experience the benefits of shelter, pay, and meals, plus a robust literacy program will align with the federated army. This is too often not the case. Even though every recruit provides biometric measurements and local tribal and religious leaders vouch for new enlistees, green on blue attacks continue to plague the relationship between the ISAF-led coalition forces and the ANA.

Soldiers stationed far from home and led by officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from different ethnic affiliations, high casualty and injury rates, and drug availability contributed to high AWOL and desertion rates and a decrease in reenlistments. As ANA soldiers complete their initial enlistments, this increasing reluctance to reenlist will become a major problem. In addition, maintaining a proportional Army (18 percent officers and 32 percent NCOs) is difficult. The accelerated growth created severe shortages of capable, mid-grade NCOs and officers. Potential officers and NCOs were available, but constricting ethnicity requirements imposed on the Afghans prevented combat seasoned (former Mujahidin) Afghans from rejoining the ranks With initial-entry soldier strength exceeding 100 percent capacity, required leaders in the deployed units was alarmingly low. The situation was so dire that enlisted soldiers were sent to holding camps at the training centers because deployed units refused to accept them. Finding junior leaders was difficult since selection was based on literacy. The imbalance in leaders within the units came to a breaking point in the spring of 2010 when soldiers with only one year's service and a clean record were automatically authorized for promotion to NCO. Meanwhile IJC was forcing the Defense Minster to deploy units—inexperienced as they were—to participate in immediate combat operations in the Kandahar region.

On the positive side, in the period 2009–2010, an established, standardized training system was in place to train Afghan recruits. Enlistees received basic military and literacy training. Although inexperienced, some of the more enlightened enlistees received additional training and assumed NCO roles. Most officers were being assessed through an Officer

Candidate School program. Officers graduating from the military academy are well-educated and trained. Left to their own devices, the ANA often took practical approaches to getting things done. Graduates from the national military academy and medical school, considered the most educated and elite members of Afghan society, were equitably assigned across the army through a lottery system devised by Afghans. The intent was to prevent graduates from seeking out favorable assignments in the Kabul area or obtaining cushy jobs far away from the fighting. The Afghans also have great pride in their commando forces, which are, admittedly, the best combat-ready forces in the country. Additionally, through the efforts of tireless advisors and contractors, Afghans tacitly decentralized and streamlined promotions and reenlistments and developed a rewards and retirement system, with the intent of slowing down attrition and allowing for a merit-based leader promotion system. The Afghans also fielded a computerized, personnel-management system, managed by select educated Afghan soldiers, many of whom were lured into the service by the increased pay. The ANA issued every trained soldier a military identification card and an electronic transfer banking account card; however, the use of non-Afghan contractors–Indian in many cases–to manage the program leaves the ANA open for possible personnel identification theft and espionage.

High attrition numbers, in part induced by high casualty rates, poor camp conditions, and safety-related incidences, continue. Units sent to the hinterlands have only impractical means of getting soldiers home during vacation periods. Many soldiers spend weeks trying to find safe ways to and from their homes and units. Transportation across the country is lacking. For example, soldiers congregated by the hundreds for days and weeks near the airport in Kabul trying to hitch a ride back to their units on hard-to-come by military flights. Railroad traffic is non-existent, and no formalized transportation infrastructure exists. New recruits show up to the training center after hitching rides, walking, or catching a cab. In a country where few own automobiles, the ANA lacks the resources to support the needs of their soldiers, which inadvertently adds to the AWOL rate.

> **...ethnic requirement restraints placed on the ANA hinder growing the force.**

In addition, ethnic requirement restraints placed on the ANA hinder growing the force. The 2001 Bonn Agreement is the source that lays out the organization and staffing of the ANA and the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Staffing should be based on individual merit and in accordance with accepted principles of balance among the different ethnic groups. Based on the 2001 United Nations population census of Afghanistan, proper ethnic balancing for military and civilian accessions into the ANA and MoD must be based on the following percentages (plus or minus 5 percentage points):

- Pashtun: 44 percent
- Tajik: 25 percent
- Hazara: 10 percent
- Uzbek: 8 percent
- Other: 13 percent

On December 1, 2002, a Presidential decree provided reforms to create an ethnically-balanced ANA using the following percentages:

- Pashtun: 42 percent
- Tajik: 27 percent
- Hazara: 9 percent
- Uzbek: 9 percent
- Other :13 percent [8]

Interestingly, the actual text of the December 2001 Bonn Agreement does not address the requirement to ethnically diversify ANSF, but it does require the "reintegration of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security and

> **The ANA has made great strides in increasing its overall strength. Maintaining that strength and having the enduring capabilities to secure the Afghan people from internal and external enemies remains to be seen.**

armed forces."[9] However, the contrary occurred. Both the Afghan leadership and coalition forces insisted on adhering to an ethnically-diverse army force, which was not the case for the police force. Hundreds if not thousands of former mujahidin fighters (mostly non-Pastun) tried in vain to reenter the Army, but could not, as many were Tajik, which is over-represented in the ANA. Unfortunately, many Pashtun, especially those from the southern regions, are resentful of a federated Afghanistan military. On the other hand, thousands from other ethnic groups desire to join the ANA but are unable to do so. In the case of the officers, primarily Hazara and Tajik, many were kept in the officer holding *kandak* near Kabul for months, with no job or unit assignment simply because of the constraints placed on and by the Afghan central government and supported by the coalition to ensure diversification across the ANA. The severe shortage of willing Pashtuns resulted in a musical chairs game of pulling Pashtuns out of the operational force in order to ensure that newly formed units were ethnically diversified, while stranding fully trained (mostly Hazara and Tajik) military personnel, who were getting paid, but doing nothing and having no place to go. The only time that ethnic diversity is

assured is when a newly-formed unit deploys upon completion of its initial training or upon refitting after combat operations. Ethnic diversification among the units is bound to collapse as enlistment contracts expire, leaving units without experienced leaders. Too much emphasis is placed on ethnic diversity. Even the Bosnian Federation Army is not held to that standard, where ethnic diversity occurs at higher brigade echelons while battalion and smaller organizations remain ethnically pure (Serb, Croat, or Muslim.)[10] Seasoned experienced soldiers stationed in the contentious eastern and southern parts of the country reenlisted at lower rates as casualties increased and AWOLs, especially in the southern provinces, spiked. Pashtun recruits remain difficult to assess resulting in ethnic imbalances across the force. In 2010, recruiting in the southern, ethnically Pashtun Kandahar region accounted for less than 5 percent of all Afghan recruits. In addition, those that are joining from the other regions are being assigned to the unpopular southern areas of the country. In fairness, Pashtuns are joining the army, but are doing so at great peril. Many are migrating north to Kabul to enlist in the Kabul region. They then risk their safety by serving in the contentious Pashtun, non-Dari-speaking southern provinces. In the summer of 2010, two *kandaks* were rotated; the one rotating to the south saw a spike in AWOLs once word reached the unit.

As the across-the-board pay increase was enacted and Afghan soldiers started streaming toward recruiting stations, the coalition lost an opportunity to turn the human tide of the conflict against the Taliban. By announcing the pay increase at the start of the non-fighting wintery 2009–2010 season, potential recruits swarmed into recruiting stations only to be turned away because coalition trainers, training sites, and logistical units had exceeded capacity and simply were unable to equip and train the human surge. This was much to the consternation of

senior Afghan military leaders who finally saw an opportunity to deplete the Taliban of recruits for the following fighting season. In November 2009, there were 2,300 new recruits. After the pay raise, the following month saw a two-fold increase in recruits, and during the month of April 2010, 8,000 recruits processed through ANA recruiting stations.[11]

The ANA has made great strides in increasing its overall strength. Maintaining that strength and having the enduring capabilities to secure the Afghan people from internal and external enemies remains to be seen. ISAF should remain engaged in supporting Afghan forces and complete its mission by building enduring capabilities in the ANSF. Personnel growth numbers in the ANA exceeded expectations; however, the coalition and the Afghans must address the shortages of experienced military leaders, solve ethnic imbalance issues, build more infrastructure support, fix military equipment problems, develop sustainment strategies for equipment, and resolve morale issues so the ANA can be effective and more able to ensure the security of its people. *IAJ*

NOTES

1   Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, Simon and Shuster, New York, 2010, pp. 261–262, 295, 301, and 303.

2   Tom Bowman, "Pentagon: Afghan Army Has Come a Long Way," National Public Radio, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=207209846>, accessed on November 8, 2013.

3   Woodward, pp. 295 and 301.

4   General Stanley McCrystal, *My Share of the Task*, Penguin Group, New York, 2013, pp. 288, 291, 331, 339, and 340.

5   Author's journal notes while deployed to Afghanistan.

6   Kevin Seiff, "A Fix It Problem for Afghan Soldiers," *Washington Post*, October 18, 2013.

7   Edwin Mora, "U.S. Working to Raise Literacy of Afghan Forces to 3rd Grade Level Before 2014 Turnover," cnsnews.com, May 31, 2011, <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/us-working-raise-literacy-afghan-forces-3rd-grade-level-2014-turnover>, accessed on November 7, 2013.

8   Author's historical files, July 6, 2010.

9   "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," UN Security Council, <http://peacemaker.un.org /sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_011205_AgreementProvisionalArrangementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf>, accessed on November 7, 2013.

10   Author's conversation with a Bosnian Army Captain in October 2013 at Fort Lee, VA.

11   Author's historical files.

The Looming

Crisis

in Afghan Local Government

by Daniel R. Green

While much of the debate about the war in Afghanistan focuses on troop levels and the pace of the drawdown, a similar reduction of the U.S. civilian interagency may have more far-reaching consequences. Although located primarily in Afghanistan's capital of Kabul, members of the U.S. Department of State (State), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and other agencies also live and work in the country's isolated districts, rural provinces, and burgeoning towns.[1] These personnel conduct a variety of activities from coaching, teaching, and mentoring local Afghan officials, to partnering with civil servants to facilitate service delivery, to troubleshooting tribal disputes.[2] In many cases, their advice, resources, and, presence provide support to officials attempting to govern a semi-feudal society and serve as the connective tissue for Afghan administrators to their districts, provinces, and national government.[3]

As the military drawdown continues, a similar effort of transitioning and closing sites focused on good governance, development, and reconstruction activities such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and district support teams (DST) is taking place. These teams, some which have existed since 2002, have played an essential role in empowering local Afghan officials. Removing these resources precipitously will lead to a crisis in Afghan local government. In many respects, the good governance efforts of the U.S. and its NATO partners have masked the critical structural shortcomings of Afghan local government, inhibited capacity development, and papered over crucial weaknesses in Afghan governing, programs, and implementation at the local level.

As the U.S. presence diminishes, these shortcomings will become evident as a mix of tribal and factional rivalries, lack of capacity, weak institutional connections among different levels of government, and a democracy deficit strengthens the powerful often at the expense of the weak and creates opportunities for the Taliban. All told, an impending crisis in local governance is on the

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horizon in Afghanistan and with a development drawdown that is not conditions-based, it is likely that past progress in good governance at the local level could be undone. While decision makers still have time to thwart some of the more devastating effects of a precipitous governance drawdown, absent bold thinking, structural reform, and a willingness to embrace risk, a crisis in local governance will take place, which will further enable the Taliban to reassert their control over the country.

A Brief History of Local U.S. Good Governance Efforts

Once initial combat operations ended in Afghanistan and efforts turned to development and good governance initiatives, the ability of the civilian interagency to operate in Afghanistan's countryside was significantly hampered by a lack of logistical and security support for sustained operations, as well as by the programmatic ability to influence local events ostensibly through national-level programs.[4] A robust field presence was required. In 2002, the first PRT was established. This civil-military team was comprised of a civil affairs unit, life support, force protection, and interagency advisors who focused on good governance, development, and security.[5] These small teams were frequently located in provincial capitals and closely partnered with local officials to extend the reach of the central government, mentor government officials, and help establish governance structures while addressing the humanitarian needs of the population. These teams quickly spread throughout Afghanistan, and in 2009, the DST was created to supplement the work of the PRTs. A DST was a smaller element comprised of State, USAID, and USDA representatives located in key districts to focus on the same goals as the larger PRT. These teams brought a variety of skill-sets and resources to the "non-kinetic" fight, including development dollars and expertise; diplomatic skills, including

conflict resolution and cultural understanding; technical expertise in the fields of agriculture, construction, and engineering; political skills, such as fostering government institutions and mentoring leaders; and management and policing skills.[6] In many respects, these various capacities that focused on empowering local Afghan officials became a crutch that fostered a culture of dependency and masked substantial structural, political, and capacity weaknesses in Afghan institutions.[7] The sheer ability and energy of well-intentioned U.S. and coalition force civil-military teams prevented the Government of the Islamic Republic of

> **Once initial combat operations ended in Afghanistan ...the ability of the civilian interagency to operate in Afghanistan's countryside was significantly hampered...**

Afghanistan (GIRoA) from facing the tension between a highly-centralized government with weak local institutions and its decentralized, village-based opponent. As the U.S. presence in Afghanistan diminishes, navigating this process of reducing U.S. good governance efforts while empowering Afghan officials as they fight the Taliban insurgency holistically will assume even greater importance. However, before such an endeavor can be attempted, it is important to achieve a better understanding of the structures of Afghan local government and to gain a more practical perspective on the substance of its work.

Afghan Local Government

One of the central challenges of Afghanistan has been building a viable government at the provincial, district, and village levels that can compete with the Taliban's political program.[8]

While security conditions have long been a limiting factor to the establishment of an effective government in many parts of the country, good governance efforts have been further hindered by Afghanistan's high illiteracy rates, formidable terrain, and lack of trained civil servants.[9] While the state is quite weak in many areas, it is too strong in others where the central government has so much authority that local initiative is often stymied because provincial officials must secure the central government's approval for actions that should rightfully fall within the discretion of community leaders.

> **Afghanistan's "democracy deficit" at the provincial level also inhibits the creation of a dynamic government able to address the concerns of the people.**

Afghanistan's "democracy deficit" at the provincial level also inhibits the creation of a dynamic government able to address the concerns of the people. Because provincial governors are appointed by the central government and are, thus, indirectly accountable to the people and often lack direct budget authority and the ability to hire and fire local officials, they are ever mindful of maintaining political connections in Kabul and do not have to be overly concerned with local sentiment. To a lesser degree this is also true of Provincial Councils.

Originally elected in 2005 and then again in 2010, the councils have democratic legitimacy, but because their membership is based on the highest recipients of votes, small tribes are always excluded from political power. Additionally, they lack the legislative basis to compel provincial governors to act and are unable to prompt provincial directorates to respond to their requests. Provincial Councils are democratically legitimate, politically weak, and frequently ignored. The Afghan people often turn to the Taliban to address injustices or to "right the balance" of accountability and representation at the local level because they are frequently unable to hold corrupt or ineffective provincial officials responsible. Furthermore, this system of government encourages corruption because accountability and responsibility are disconnected, and lacking a viable judiciary and a political party system, local residents have no realistic way of addressing complaints.

Because no formal political party system exists in Afghanistan, an informal network of personal, tribal, factional, and regional groups operate not only within the formal GIRoA system, but also around it to exercise political influence. This informal dynamic is much more agile, better-informed, and capable than the bureaucratic processes of the Afghan State. Similarly, it is far more capable of exercising political influence than most U.S. government agencies ostensibly focused on good governance efforts.

Afghan Good Governance Efforts

The military successes of the Taliban have been due in large part to a lack of security forces in the Afghan countryside.[10] But the armed element of the insurgency was simply, as author Bernard Fall described it, "a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest and that, no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale." The goal of the GIRoA and the coalition was to create this counter-political rationale for the people by building viable local governments. Community support for the Taliban was due not only to coercion, but also by the natural outgrowth of the lack of a viable, positive, and enduring government program that secured the loyalty of the people. Because the GIRoA was so undeveloped in Kabul and many coalition

efforts were focused on building central government capacity from the start of the war, local government capabilities were largely non-existent, embryonic, or imperfectly mentored. The Taliban took advantage of these weaknesses and stepped into the governance vacuum with their own political program. Additionally, a warlord strategy, adopted in many parts of the country early in the war, alienated the population. Neither the GIRoA nor the coalition addressed corrupt and abusive behavior in a sustained manner, and some portions of the population either sided with the Taliban or tolerated its presence. A new approach that focused greater resources and attention on local governance issues was needed.

Beginning in 2007, the GIRoA created a directorate focused exclusively on empowering sub-national governance to address abuses and to build local government capacity. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance, which answered directly to the President of Afghanistan's office, originally only evaluated provincial and district officials and removed those who were corrupt, abusive, or incompetent and nominated replacement candidates for these positions. It also incentivized good behavior through performance funds and training programs.

As part of the general effort to expand and improve GIRoA's presence in the countryside, President Karzai signed a directive in February 2010 giving the Independent Directorate of Local Governance the authority to coordinate the central government's ministries to provide sustained services through a fully-staffed district government. To support this effort, international donors provided additional funding and redirected their social service programs to support GIRoA's efforts. The mechanism through which this was to occur was the District Delivery Program which was an effort to expand the number of civil servants at the local level, provide them the means to deliver services, and construct the physical structures they needed to undertake their responsibilities. While conceptually sound, the program suffered from a number of difficulties during implementation in terms of coordinating Afghan and U.S. efforts and was not able to fulfill all of its expectations.

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In 2010, the GIRoA also adopted a new sub-national governance policy that tentatively devolved some budgetary and administrative powers both to the governors of the provinces as well as to their Provincial Councils. While the government continued to be highly centralized, this relaxation of authority incrementally empowered local institutions. The end goal of these various efforts was to create a legitimate, capable, and effective government that would blunt the appeal of the Taliban's shadow government.

The Taliban's Shadow Government

Although the Taliban's strategic goals of uniting the Pashtuns, ejecting foreign military occupation, and imposing sharia law are well known, their tactical political program is less well understood and its popularity among many Pashtuns even more so.[11] The Taliban have carefully crafted a political strategy that taps into Pashtunwali traditions; takes advantage of U.S., coalition and GIRoA mistakes; and capitalizes on the weaknesses of the Afghan state in the villages.[12] Though the U.S. has expended substantial efforts to promote good governance in the provinces, its efforts

have been unequal to the task, cumbersome, bureaucratic, and sometimes counterproductive. The Taliban's positive political program has at least five aspects: (1) justice, (2) micro-politics, (3) reconciliation, (4) laissez-faire, and (5) tribal democracy. While the Taliban will impose their will on villagers if required, and they often do so violently, they also have a positive agenda that seeks to entice supporters.

> **Though the U.S. has expended substantial efforts to promote good governance in the provinces, its efforts have been unequal to the task...**

In the face of corrupt and/or murderous government officials, a non-functioning judiciary, and the perversion or suspension of Pashtunwali traditions, the typical villager has a limited ability to seek justice for murder, theft, assault, rape, and land and water disputes. For the Taliban political agent, this vein of discontent is rich and can be mined by appealing to the structures of justice created by sharia law. While the villager may not be inclined to support sharia law in its totality, he is likely to do so in the absence of a viable alternative. Because the Taliban agent is sitting in the villager's home, solicits his grievances, and then quickly seeks to remedy them, the villager is hard-pressed to support a government that is often distant and abuses its authority.[13]

Along these same lines, the Taliban practice micro-politics to a remarkably high degree of sophistication. The Taliban political agent will find any problem that a village or individual may have and will make it his own. If a village is hoarding water from a stream causing a down-stream village's crops to fail, the Taliban will enlist with the aggrieved party. If a tribe

has been abused by GIRoA, the Taliban will join with them to seek justice. This political granularity stands in marked contrast to the frequently inept, ineffective, and insouciant efforts of the Afghan state and sometimes counterproductive work of the coalition. The Taliban's political program is also furthered by their "do-no-harm" approach to the central drivers of local politics and economies. If a farmer wants to cultivate poppy, the Taliban allow it; if he once worked for or supported the GIRoA, he is allowed to reconcile with the Taliban; if a tribal leader wants his authority respected, the Taliban will do so if it furthers their agenda. Additionally, if villagers feel that "their" government does not represent them or has unfairly attacked their interests, then the Taliban preach inclusion, grievance, and justice. Against this well-crafted, flexible, dynamic, and pervasive program, U.S., coalition, and Afghan efforts have lagged significantly.

The Taliban's Political Warfare Strategy

If a determined effort is not undertaken to ease the transition out of coalition good governance efforts, while facilitating Afghan control, the Taliban will attempt to re-assert their control. The chief targets of their overtures will be marginalized tribes that have been excluded from political power at the local level. Lacking the ability to either get elected to a Provincial Council or compel the attention of local governments through elections, legislative action, or judicial efforts, these tribes will find the Taliban's message of tribal inclusiveness particularly appealing. Coalition good governance efforts have frequently served as an outlet for grievances for these tribes, and coalition members often intercede with government officials to prompt them to be more inclusive of these political participants. When these efforts no longer exist, the structural disconnect among appointed governors, elected but weak

Provincial Councils, and central government-run directorates will become readily apparent. When it comes to Afghanistan's terrain, Afghan officials are as limited in their movements as coalition officials, so they have come to rely on the air and vehicle assets of NATO and the U.S. While Afghans can assume more of these types of responsibilities, absent an active partner encouraging them to do so, many will cease their activities because they lack the ability to visit more distant districts and villages.

Local governments have also grown to rely on both military and civilian interagency development funding, which has inhibited their ability to understand and use the Afghan budget processes to gain financial support. The PRTs and DSTs have also served as neutral ground for tribes, factions, and villages to air grievances against GIRoA. The Taliban may fill this vacuum. While local GIRoA capacity has also improved, highly specialized skills sets, such as agricultural advice, engineering support, rule of law, and construction, within the PRTs/DSTs have become indispensable for local government officials. Afghan officials will still need to make human capital investments at the local level to establish or continue to deliver services to the Afghan people.

Taliban information operations against GIRoA will continue, and the efforts of PRTs/DSTs to blunt these negative messages will need to continue as well. This holistic approach to confronting the Taliban's political strategy must continue, and coalition forces must have the enduring capability to support GIRoA in its efforts to defeat the Taliban.

A Strategy of Foreign Internal Governance

As GIRoA assumes greater control of its sovereignty and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan diminishes, the ability of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to exercise positive political influence within GIRoA and with the Afghan people in support of good governance will greatly diminish. This trend is exacerbated by the fact that those elements of the U.S. government that do exercise political influence, such as PRT/DSTs and their civilian enablers, will either disappear or see their presence greatly reduced.

> **Since the Taliban insurgency will persist for some time, the need to confront their political arm as much as their military arm will continue for SOF...**

Since the Taliban insurgency will persist for some time, the need to confront their political arm as much as their military arm will continue for SOF into the future. SOF's flatter organizational structure, constant contact with the Afghan people, and ability to leverage personal relationships to exercise influence enable it to work with the GIRoA at all levels. Even though SOF do not have the same amount of development dollars, diplomatic rank, or sheer mass as the U.S. civilian interagency or conventional forces, they do have a robust tradition of working by, with, and through indigenous institutions. While many of the skill-sets for coaching, teaching, and mentoring indigenous security forces are distinct from those required for working specifically with the political institutions of host governments, there are far more similarities than differences. The ability to build and leverage relationships with both security and government officials within the GIRoA to further the goals of stabilizing Afghanistan will assume greater importance in the next few years. What is required is a new and complementary approach to foreign internal defense (FID) called foreign internal governance (FIG) that seeks to use an integrated influence initiative to prompt GIRoA to defeat

the insurgency's political arm more effectively. This strategy would allow GIRoA to make needed reforms as the shortcomings of local government are revealed. A FIG approach would only require a modest increase in resources because its greatest emphasis is on how U.S. forces are organized in Afghanistan to maximize influence with the Afghan population.

> **What is required is a tightly-organized, vertically-integrated, influencing initiative that seeks to maximize GIRoA performance...**

While much has been accomplished with respect to building the Afghan state, the ability to conduct politics within U.S. good governance efforts has consistently been erratic and more focused on the machinations of political players in Kabul rather than those at the local level most likely to confront the Taliban's political program.[14] The U.S. interagency's approach has proven to be incomplete with respect to prompting the optimal performance of GIRoA, and so a new, complementary effort must be undertaken. Much of the U.S. approach to stability operations has been about doing what bureaucracies are comfortable with, rather than dealing with the problem of insurgency on its own terms. A significant portion of U.S. strategy has been capital centric, biased toward formal government institutions, focused on long-term development versus stabilization, and imperfectly partnered with the U.S. military. In the face of an opponent that blends civil and military approaches seamlessly, is strongest in the countryside, has a nuanced engagement strategy with the local population, and is not suffering from any manpower shortage, one should not be surprised by the problems in implementing a good governance strategy.

However, thinking beyond the limits of bureaucracy and embracing a new approach that institutionalizes state-building programs and puts them on a more sustainable path for long-term development will do much to ensure that the sacrifices of the U.S. military in Afghanistan will not have been in vain. Politics, good governance, and development are too important to be left solely to the civilian interagency in Afghanistan especially as it withdraws from the countryside; it is time for SOF to assume a more central role.[15]

What is required is a tightly-organized, vertically-integrated, influencing initiative that seeks to maximize GIRoA performance, especially with respect to defeating the Taliban's local political program, as well as leverage Afghan informal networks that also shape government behavior. This initiative must be able to reach as many villages as possible, continually liaise and embed with government officials, conduct political action, and exercise persistent presence and performance. The current SOF strategy of using an integrated village stability operations (VSOs) approach of District Augmentation Teams, Provincial Augmentation Teams, and regional Village Stability Centers up to the national level is a basic structure which, if strengthened, could provide a light, lean, and long-term capability to undertake the essential non-kinetic tasks that provide stability to rural Afghanistan. A FIG strategy to complement a FID approach through VSOs will provide a means of exercising consistent and positive political influence at all levels of government within Afghanistan. A FIG approach will not replicate the state-building efforts of State and USAID, but it will seek to exercise political influence through embedded mentoring with GIRoA officials, shape GIRoA policy and programmatic outcomes through relationships, and address local drivers of instability through focused attention to the countryside. In many respects,

the organization of civilian and military efforts is the greatest hindrance to how the U.S. operates in Afghanistan, and an integrated approach of this kind will address the incoherency of current good governance efforts. If the U.S. government can improve its organization and then supplement this improvement through better resourcing, it will have done much to stabilize its state-building program as well as ensure that it can marshal a more robust political program to defeat the Taliban. General George C. Marshall commented on his support for putting one military service under the command of another: "We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we can make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles." An integrated approach to exercising consistent and positive influence by, with, and through the GIRoA must be better organized and resourced. It will have to blend, as seamlessly as possible, a detailed understanding of the Afghan human terrain with a political action arm able to influence Afghan officials with diminished assets in theater.

Inverting the Development Drawdown

The U.S. government should rethink its current development drawdown strategy of transitioning or closing PRTs and DSTs in outlying areas to eventually collapse their activities upon a small number of regional consulates in major cities. Coalition good governance efforts should persist in less developed areas and transition to Afghan control in more politically mature areas. The principal reason the development drawdown is proceeding in its current form is due to a perceived lack of logistical support for a more decentralized effort. If the drawdown's structure were reversed and civilian interagency personnel were embedded with SOF in more isolated areas, a more prolonged partnership with Afghan officials faced with the greatest difficulties of capacity building will continue, and the GIRoA will be better placed to handle a successful transition in areas where it has the most capabilities. Similarly, a FIG strategy will require some degree of civilian interagency support. The U.S. government should consider formalizing a relationship with SOF wherein dedicated interagency advisors from State, USAID, and USDA are assigned to SOF units to provide, at minimum, development, good governance, and agricultural advice but also some programmatic support. This approach will require revising some force protection requirements promulgated by the U.S. embassy, but it will result in a smaller but more highly focused effort to defeat the Taliban's political program in manner that is highly integrated from the village level to Afghanistan's capital.

Conclusion

An enduring U.S. presence in Afghanistan that is light, lean, and long-term will require not just U.S. military personnel focused on mentoring and assisting Afghan security forces but also a dedicated effort to exercise positive political influence within GIRoA in support of local good governance efforts. With the civilian interagency focused on a non-conditions-based drawdown, a new effort is required to continue to resource good governance and development efforts with a more agile, better-organized, and integrated-influence initiative for the long term. A FIG effort in Afghanistan will reduce the painful and possibly cataclysmic adjustment of Afghan local institutions to autonomy and self-sufficiency from a precipitous non-conditions-based withdrawal of U.S. mentoring efforts. While it will not be as well-resourced as prior governance endeavors, such as PRTs, it will be situated to exercise influence through existing Afghan structures by leveraging personal relationships versus using development dollars, diplomatic rank, or strictly technical expertise.

This more fiscally sustainable approach that reaches from the central government to the villages will allow local Afghan officials to continue to benefit from U.S. expertise but in a way that clearly puts Afghan officials in the lead. This effort will also allow the U.S. to continue to confront the Taliban's political program and to keep U.S. decision makers both in Kabul and Washington apprised of local developments. As the U.S. continues to draw down its forces in Afghanistan and the Taliban begins to reassert their influence against an Afghan government increasingly on its own, a dedicated security and good governance effort must be made that is light, lean, and long-term that does not abandon the Afghan people. **IAJ**

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Addressing a Spectrum of

Threats:

Interagency Challenges to Mitigating Threats and Safeguarding Liberties

by Harry Phillips

"In my judgment the most important political rules are: never relax vigilance; expect nothing from the magnanimity of others; never abandon a purpose until it has become impossible, beyond doubt, to attain it; hold the honor of the state as sacred. The time is yours; what its fulfillment will be depends upon you."

Karl von Clausewitz

The relevance of Clausewitz's admonition has never been more relevant to the security of the U.S. With myriad threats both overseas and at home, it is vital for national security efforts to encompass the spectrum of threats, both domestic and international. The realities of the modern, global security environment warrant incorporating complementary strategies for securing national security interests at home and abroad. This article explores the growing complexity of threats to U.S. international and domestic security interests as they relate to the need for integrated information sharing while simultaneously protecting the civil liberties of U.S. citizens.

U.S. national security interests face a wide range of threats both at home and abroad. Many of these threats overlap and interact with, as well as influence, each other. The activities of transnational organized crime groups, international drug trafficking organizations, terrorist groups, and homegrown violent extremists have the potential for intersecting in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. Cyber events, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities combine to challenge U.S. national security and law enforcement capabilities. Rapidly changing threats where nation states and non-state actors are capable of inflicting harm on vital

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U.S. interests warrant the ongoing development of interagency intelligence information-sharing systems. These activities are critical to the future security needs of the U.S. in terms of proactive information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies responsible for protecting U.S. interests at home and abroad.

> **From national-level capabilities to those at the local level, cohesion has never been more important...**

In an era of increasingly diverse and complex threats to the homeland, the U.S. needs an enhanced interagency coordination mechanism to detect and prevent terrorist attacks on the homeland. The integration of the capabilities available to all levels of jurisdiction (federal, state, and local) is necessary for an effective counterterrorism program. From national-level capabilities to those at the local level, cohesion has never been more important in terms of securing America's national security interests. Success requires the interaction among agencies at all levels to be coordinated, proactive, and when necessary disruptive to those intending to harm U.S. interests at home and abroad. Drawing on the capabilities of agencies at every level forges the ability to adapt to a rapidly changing threat environment in a cohesive manner. Improving the ability of the interagency to detect and disrupt threats is integral to U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Improving interagency cohesion by integrating state and local agencies serves to facilitate predictive intelligence in support of mitigating terrorist threats and facilitates decision making and determining resource allocation. Conversely, the reluctance to share information inhibits leveraging cross jurisdiction capabilities and limits the ability of a key

component of the interagency counterterrorism effort, state and local law enforcement agencies. Inhibiting access to intelligence information degrades the ability of state and local agencies to provide for the public's safety. Sharing intelligence information in a proactive manner enhances the ability to coordinate all levels of jurisdiction and facilitates:

- Proactive engagement with local communities to identify threats.

- Intelligence analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence.

- Deliberate planning vice working in crisis action mode.

- Effective integration of operations with intelligence.

At the heart of the challenge for the U.S. interagency is an inherent unwillingness to share investigative information among agencies. The ability to identify and quickly respond to emerging threats requires agencies across all jurisdictions to share information. By doing so, they serve the needs of an entire community, rather than the parochial interests of a single agency. Preventing attacks such as those on September 11, 2001, and at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, requires an integrated national security strategy and intelligence-sharing capability. Creating such a capability is an imperative in the face of increasingly complex threats that are adapting and changing more rapidly than at any time in history.

Enhancing national intelligence information-sharing capabilities that integrate federal, state, and local law enforcement may potentially alleviate the gaps in knowledge that challenged counterterrorism efforts in the past and facilitate greater situational awareness about potential threats. Threat information shared across jurisdictions is vital to enhancing

the ability of agencies at all levels to detect and disrupt potential threats. State and local law enforcement agencies would benefit from having federal information and vice versa. Such information, in turn, could help to facilitate focusing resources at the right place and time in the effort to disrupt a potential threat.

The challenge for the U.S. interagency is to integrate overlapping domestic and international security strategies into a cohesive national endeavor. The threat environment today impacts U.S. interests globally, with a view toward undermining its Constitutional foundation. International threats include terrorist organizations, rogue states, instability in key regions, international drug trafficking organizations, and non-state actors and rising peer competitors on the global stage. Domestically, law enforcement agencies work to disrupt violent gangs, crimes against children, drug traffickers, transnational organized crime, home grown extremists, and domestic terrorists. Both sets of threats, which at times may overlap, combine to influence national security decision making. Today's threats require the interagency to understand how overlapping threats impact both domestic and foreign policy within the context of an overall national security strategy.

In a speech before Norwegian government officials on July 8, 2014, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the issue of individuals traveling to Syria to fight and then returning home intent on conducting terrorist acts in their home countries.[1] Holder's remarks served to underscore the importance of international cooperation to combat increasingly complex international threats to domestic security. In his speech Holder stated, "…we need the benefit of investigative and prosecutorial tools that allow us to be preemptive in our approach to combating this problem." He emphasized protecting the privacy of U.S. and non-U.S. persons, noting recent information-sharing agreements with the European Union

prioritize adhering to data privacy principles. He encouraged nations that share fundamental views about privacy to act collaboratively in the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence, with a view toward protecting individual privacy.

> **The challenge for the U.S. interagency is to integrate overlapping domestic and international security strategies into a cohesive national endeavor.**

In his speech he went on to outline a multilateral strategy for countering violent extremism. The four elements of the strategy include:

- Ensuring laws are in place to allow governments to effectively police threats.

- Using law enforcement investigative tools that protect individual rights.

- Strengthening information sharing to facilitate disrupting threats.

- Integrating public engagement and community outreach.

Holder's Oslo speech referenced the "Rabat Memorandum of the Global Counterterrorism Forum." He quoted the memorandum stating, "Because terrorism often transcends national boundaries, timely and effective international cooperation is indispensible to a criminal justice response to terrorism." The Rabat Memorandum outlines practices for effective counterterrorism, which by their nature fit with U.S. interagency counterterrorism protocols.[2] These practices include:

- Protecting individuals involved in counterterrorism cases.

- Encouraging cooperation among domestic counterterrorism agencies.

- Providing legal frameworks and measures for counterterrorism investigations.

- Adopting incentives to induce cooperating in counterterrorism investigations.

- Enacting measures to protect sensitive information on terrorism cases.

- Providing for lawful pre-trial detention of terrorist suspects.

- Providing professional development for individuals involved in terrorism cases.

- Developing and using forensic evidence to identify those involved in terrorist acts.

- Encouraging international cooperation.

[The QDR] puts forth the notion that the best way to disrupt threats is to prevent them from happening.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel commented on the enormity of international threats in his June 18, 2014, testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee. Hagel stated, "With this budget, we are repositioning the military for the new strategic challenges and opportunities that will define our future: new technologies, new centers of power, and a world that is growing more volatile, more unpredictable, and in some instances more threatening to the United States."[3] His statement conveys the complexity of threats emanating from the international arena with respect to the mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) to deter those threats in support of U.S. interests both at home and abroad.

In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DoD identifies the three strategic pillars of its national security strategy. The first is "defending the homeland."[4] The QDR emphasizes Hagel's concerns about a "rapidly changing security environment."[5] The QDR highlights two areas essential to the interagency counterterrorism effort—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and counter terror and special operations. It also recognizes threats are increasingly enabled by technologies that were once the purview of nation states and identifies the need for the U.S. to adapt more quickly in the face of the ever-growing complexity of threats originating from around the globe. The rapidity of change to global security concerns will be compounded by how threats "intersect and influence one another."[6]

The QDR asserts "the homeland is no longer a sanctuary…and we must anticipate the likelihood of an attack on U.S. soil."[7] It puts forth the notion that the best way to disrupt threats is to prevent them from happening. To do so requires the U.S. interagency to respond proactively with a diversified, collaborative, and networked counterterrorism effort of its own. As the QDR states, DoD will collaborate with its interagency partners to "sustain a global effort to detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorist plots."[8]

Similarly, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey articulated the necessity for partner engagement during his November 14, 2013, testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Comey stated, "These diverse threats illustrate the complexity and breadth of the FBI's mission and make clear the importance of its partnerships. We cannot do it alone. To accomplish its mission, the FBI relies heavily upon its partners around the globe." He went on to say that the Bureau

has built partnerships with just about every federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agency in the nation, and its agents and staff work closely with law enforcement, intelligence, and security services in foreign countries, as well as international organizations such as Interpol.[9]

Like Sparta's warriors of old, U.S. military and law enforcement professionals are rugged, highly-trained experts in their fields. They come from all backgrounds and serve the U.S. through their efforts every day. The myriad threats each must be ready to face are diverse and global in scale. It is not unusual for FBI personnel to be deployed into military theaters of operation. It is also not unusual for military and DoD personnel to work with FBI Special Agents in support of mitigating threats across the U.S. There is a complementary synergy among the military, Departments, the FBI, and the rest of the U.S national security establishment. Law enforcement working in collaboration with the military strengthens America's ability to protect its interests both at home and abroad.

The synergy between domestic law enforcement and the military creates opportunities for leveraging each other's capabilities against increasingly complex domestic and international threats. National security strategy should include domestic security considerations along with those in the international arena. The U.S. should enhance interagency efficiencies by implementing reforms that create a holistic national security strategy that addresses the spectrum of threats facing the U.S., both within its borders and at the far reaches of the globe.

Statements by Holder, Hagel, and Comey convey the complexity of the threats to the U.S. and the need for a cohesive interagency coordinating mechanism to address those threats across federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Threats in the international and domestic realms may overlap in a manner requiring proactive interaction among federal, state, and local agencies. Information developed by the DoD on an issue overseas may have implications for a local police department somewhere in the U.S. In this regard, tactical or operational information developed in a foreign land may have consequences of a strategic nature here at home. Given these circumstances, proactive interagency coordination among federal agencies, international partners, and state and local agencies is an imperative for protecting domestic security interests. In doing so, there is also an imperative for ensuring such coordination upholds the liberties of U.S. citizens as guaranteed by the processes articulated in the Constitution.

> **From the earliest beginnings of the U.S., the issue of providing for its security has been addressed through the lens of civil liberties.**

From the earliest beginnings of the U.S., the issue of providing for its security has been addressed through the lens of civil liberties. In *Federalist Paper No. 3*, John Jay wrote, "Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first."[10] This basic notion of providing security spans today's interagency from the vantage point of both domestic and international security concerns. Whether it is a drug cartel planning a shipment of heroin, a self-radicalized individual intent on doing harm, or a foreign-government-backed entity writing code to hack into the U.S. banking system, the range of threats necessitates cohesive interagency coordination for purposes of identifying and disrupting threats before they can impact the safety and security of U.S. citizens.

As the Founders of the Republic began their discourse on what constitutes security, they debated the need for security relative to safeguarding liberty. In *Federalist Paper No. 51*, James Madison wrote, "In forming a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the place oblige it to curtail itself."[11] Madison understood the need for a government to exert its power in its efforts to defend the security of its citizens. He also realized the potential for those same powers to be abused and as such argued for placing limits on the extent the government could impose itself over its citizens. The issue is just as important today with respect to how to conduct interagency coordination and information sharing without infringing on the rights of the people. In short, the dilemma is how to balance the need for security while simultaneously safeguarding constitutionally guaranteed liberties.

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Maintaining vigilance is an essential function of the U.S. interagency.[12] From combating gangs and violent criminals through the use of local and regional task forces, to monitoring terrorist organizations and destabilizing international events, a cohesive interagency approach is necessary to identify, evaluate, and mitigate threats. The imperative for doing so should be undertaken with a view toward protecting life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The government's power to protect includes understanding a threat to security is a threat to liberty.

In a letter to James Monroe in July of 1790, Thomas Jefferson wrote, "Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our peace."[13] This statement underscores Jefferson's understanding of national security relative to those liberties ingrained in the Constitution. He understood the preeminence of the federal government to both the protection against physical threats as well as safeguarding liberty. Within the context of U.S. interagency coordination, the issue importantly comes to light with respect to intelligence gathering and information sharing. The better integrated intelligence programs are at all levels of government, the better they can serve the imperative to support and defend. When performed in a manner that complies with legal restrictions necessary to safeguarding liberties, the more they facilitate the interagency mandate to protect against all enemies foreign and domestic.

The relationship of security to liberty is perhaps best explained through the manner in which technology supports both. In the U.S., where individual freedom is considered paramount, the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press. Individuals and entities intent on attacking U.S. interests at home and abroad use the same technologies available to law-abiding citizens. The open networks enjoyed by U.S. society at large are vulnerable to exploitation by the nefarious actors intent on causing harm to the U.S. These technical capabilities are being exploited by criminal groups, individual extremists, rogue states, non-state actors, and others in their efforts to damage vital U.S. national security interests. An important interagency consideration is the notion modern technology will serve to simultaneously enhance society, facilitate threats, and impose technological limits on national power. To this end, successful interagency coordination requires mechanisms in place to ensure the proactive exchange of information without infringing on personal

freedoms.

28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 23, "Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies," ensure criminal intelligence systems are "utilized in conformance with the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals."[14] The CFR provides a template for creating an integrated system that could serve the needs of U.S. interagency counterterrorism efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. 28 CFR, part 23 recognizes criminal activities "often involve some degree of regular coordination and permanent organization involving a large number of participants over a broad geographical area."[15] A criminal intelligence system is defined as "the arrangements, equipment, facilities, and procedures used for the receipt, storage, interagency exchange or dissemination, and analysis of criminal intelligence information."[16] The operating principles for such a system include:

- Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

- No inclusion of 1st Amendment information.

- Identification of a criminal predicate.

- Adherence to federal, state, and local laws.

- Dissemination of information based on need to know.

- Adherence to information handling safeguards.

- Does not limit disseminating information when there is danger to life or property.

- Incorporates safeguards and audits to insure against unauthorized use.

- All retained information has relevance and importance.

- Information is not used to interfere with lawful activities.

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) is a collaborative effort led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI.[17] It represents a type of program which, if properly integrated, could serve U.S. interagency counterterrorism efforts across all jurisdictions. The NSI helps "law enforcement and homeland security agencies in preventing terrorism and related criminal activities by establishing a national capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing terrorism related information."[18] Other similar systems include the FBI's e-Guardian[19] and Law Enforcement Online (LEO)[20] programs, which facilitate sharing state and local information with federal agencies. LEO also provides for the exchange of unclassified information from the federal to the state and local levels. A similar initiative by the DHS is the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).[21]

> **The rapid invention and application of new technologies offer a wide range of avenues for both legitimate and criminal enterprise.**

The rapid invention and application of new technologies offer a wide range of avenues for both legitimate and criminal enterprise. Free market enterprise and healthy market forces ensure the continued evolution of information technology into smaller and increasingly more powerful devices. The ability to transmit and receive information on a global scale is unprecedented and promises to increase with the development of new, more powerful technologies.

Just as technology enhances society, so to it provides opportunities for nefarious actors both at home and abroad. Information technology

is both a boon and a bane with regard to how the U.S. interagency addresses the challenge of protecting national security interests and civil liberties. In order to be successful, the interagency must go beyond leveraging technology in support of its traditional ways of identifying and responding to the broad range of threats it is responsible for monitoring. It must determine the best manner to remedy the main interagency coordination problem of how to proactively address threats while safeguarding liberties.

> **Instead of relying on segregated systems based on agency-specific applications, a comprehensive, integrated, and unified system could serve to enhance understanding of the relationships between threats at home and abroad.**

The interagency must work to develop a unified system with the potency to identify, evaluate, and mitigate threats. It must do this within the constraints and limitations imposed on it by constitutionally-based legislative restrictions. Establishing a unified interagency network permits law enforcement and defense agencies to maintain autonomy in an integrated manner. This in turn facilitates decision making at all levels while facilitating operational and tactical coordination both at home and abroad. Such integration provides for rapidly identifying, evaluating, and mitigating all manner of threats across the security spectrum. Implementing such a network would serve to enhance interagency responses by facilitating the provision of resources in a timely manner.

A unified interagency technical construct could theoretically enhance joint coordination between law enforcement and defense agencies.

It could serve to enhance situational awareness, providing increased fidelity in support of emergency-response operations. Instead of relying on segregated systems based on agency-specific applications, a comprehensive, integrated, and unified system could serve to enhance understanding of the relationships between threats at home and abroad. Through an integrated system, inclusive of federal, state, and local agencies, the interagency could better prepare for and respond to threats more rapidly.

Despite the opportunities such a system presents for identifying, evaluating, and mitigating threats, there remains the need to protect civil liberties. There are vulnerabilities and risks associated with such a system, yet the potential for greater interagency cohesion is an advantage worth advocating for. By enhancing knowledge-based interagency coordination to leverage the instruments of national power, the U.S. stands to better protect its national security interests, while simultaneously protecting civil liberties. A cohesive and coordinated interagency information-sharing network will provide advantages for confronting the wide range of threats both domestically and abroad. The traditional forms of information sharing along agency-specific lines would be enhanced, allowing for greater awareness and more proactive responses to ongoing and emerging threats.

The benefit gained by technically integrating interagency coordination includes enhanced understanding of threats at home and abroad and their relationships. The interagency would benefit through a more thorough understanding of the threats and the ability to more rapidly share actionable intelligence. It would have the means for enhancing intelligence gathering and information sharing in a number of areas.

The pervasive nature of the threats at home and abroad requires the U.S. to have a proactive approach to deterring those threats. Proactive, well coordinated intelligence gathering and

information sharing across multiple jurisdictions will facilitate the ability to mitigate and monitor threats. Combining such a capability with stringent oversight for following applicable laws and statutory guidelines to protect civil liberties will ensure compliance with constitutionally-mandated processes.

Leveraging the capabilities of federal, state, and local agencies into a combined platform to enhance situational awareness supports threat mitigation efforts. Policy at the federal level should strive to integrate state and local capabilities, where applicable, in support of thwarting domestic threats. Often state and local agencies have a better understanding of threats their federal partners may not be attuned to. As such, incorporating state and local agencies into such a system should become a priority for the interagency.

By implementing a cohesive, interagency-coordinating system that includes federal, state, and local agencies, the U.S. stands to benefit in the following areas:

- Proactively allocating resources to intelligence gathering and information sharing.

- Gaining synergies through integrating agencies across multiple jurisdictions.

- Rapidly identifying, evaluating, and mitigating threats.

- Facilitating decision making.

- Integrating strategic, operational, and tactical considerations.

- Ensuring the protection of constitutionally guaranteed liberties.

Using federal resources to identify potential threats and providing information to state and local law enforcement promises to produce long-term dividends, especially if the information facilitates engagement with local communities. Through state and local outreach efforts, federal information can be used to solicit information about potential threats. By doing so, local law enforcement can integrate even the most remote community into the hunt for potential threats. Such an effort would give federal, state, and local law enforcement an advantage with respect to the amount of lawful opportunities they would have to detect and prevent a terrorist attack. The interagency would in turn benefit by taking advantage of the community engagement resources of state and local law enforcement.

Integrating a cohesive interagency counterterrorism capability across all jurisdictions will enhance the effectiveness of coordination and promote the ability to detect and disrupt threats, which would have been very useful in the prelude to the September 11 and Boston Marathon attacks. Failing to proactively share information may result in terrorist events taking place that otherwise may have been prevented.

By enhancing the manner in which interagency coordination is conducted in relation to intelligence gathering and information sharing, the U.S. will be better positioned to address long-term threats both at home and abroad. Such an effort would benefit the interagency through more focused decision making with respect to how to resource efforts against specific threats. Creating a cohesive interagency coordination system that protects civil liberties will contribute to operational and tactical effectiveness in interagency efforts against a wide spectrum of threats impacting the U.S., both at home and abroad. *IAJ*

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Disaster Response:
Lessons Learned from the
May 2007 Greensburg Tornado

by Bradley Jenkins

On May 4, 2007, severe weather ravaged the midwest United States, wreaking havoc throughout the state of Kansas. As night fell on Kiowa County, a tornadic supercell developed, creating the conditions for a catastrophic tornado to form near the small town of Greensburg. At 9:45 p.m., an EF-5 tornado struck Greensburg, leveling the rural town.

Many Americans watching reports from the Greensburg area were shocked to see the destruction, and a flood of aid from across the nation began pouring into Greensburg. Helping hands, financial assistance, and a myriad of products and services offered by individuals and private businesses alike provided much needed assistance to the devastated town. This aid, in cooperation with the efforts of various state and federal agencies, would become a key component in Greensburg's response and recovery.

Through analyzing the coordinated response to this tragic event, this article will examine how well local, state, and federal agencies worked with each other and with volunteer and non-governmental organizations to respond to and prepare for the recovery of Greensburg. By analyzing the response to the Greensburg tornado, this article will draw parallels that can be used to strengthen interagency cooperation and serve as a vital learning tool for agencies during future disaster events. The lessons learned can provide critical insight to what can be done to strengthen communities' resilience and build cooperation among the many agencies that play critical roles in disaster response and recovery.

Emergency Management Past to Present

In the U.S. and around the world, communities are experiencing an increase in man-made and natural disasters.[1] This increase is due to many factors including increased urbanization and population density, the occupation of hazard-prone areas, and changes in global weather patterns.[2]

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Governments and societies must change how they prepare for and respond to these hazards.

In previous decades, a splintered system dominated the emergency management landscape, leaving each community, county, and state responsible for preparing for the hazards it faced.[3] This fragmented system often created significant risk exposures to communities, and limited resources resulted in significant loss of life and property. Acknowledging that this broken system was no longer acceptable, the U.S. government has taken steps to help communities across the nation better prepare.[4] By adhering to a standardized set of policies, it is hoped hazard risks can be minimized, allowing communities to quickly and efficiently recover with minimal disruption, loss of life, or damage to property.[5]

In the 1970s, the National Governors' Association, acknowledging the need for a more comprehensive and systematic method for addressing emergencies and hazards, developed a method for managing emergencies that included a four phase approach. In 1978, the National Governors' Association, in concert with other entities, requested that President Carter reorganize federal emergency preparedness programs, which subsequently became the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).[6] Shortly after the agency's creation, FEMA adopted the all-hazards approach to emergency management as suggested by the National Governors' Association.

The all-hazards approach has evolved and developed over time and is widely recognized as the most appropriate method for dealing with hazards and emergencies. The approach divides emergencies and hazard events into four phases:

1. **Mitigation** is any sustained action to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects.[7] Mitigation activities include but are not limited to land use regulations, building codes, and insurance programs.

2. **Preparedness** is a state of readiness to respond to any emergency or disaster.[8] Examples of preparedness include contingency planning and creating mutual aid agreements between agencies and localities. Additionally, preparedness includes the use of drills and exercises to prepare for a hazard event.

3. **Response** is a phase in the emergency management cycle that involves activities to meet the urgent needs of victims during or immediately following a disaster.[9] This phase includes activities like search and rescue, evacuation, emergency medical assistance, and firefighting.

4. **Recovery** is a phase in the emergency management cycle that involves actions that begin after a disaster, once emergency needs have been met.[10] During recovery, communities and governments must determine how to restore basic services, rebuild the community, and bring back a sense of normalcy.

Tornado Hazard Data

Tornadoes are one of the most frequently occurring major hazard events in the U.S., occurring approximately 1,253 times per year, claiming an average of 77 lives per annum.[11] When comparing the frequency and number of annual casualties caused by other natural disasters in the U.S., it becomes apparent that special attention should be taken when planning for tornadoes, especially in the Midwest and South-Central regions of the country known as "tornado alley."

Historical data obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) indicates that approximately 57,099 tornadic events occurred in the U.S. from January 3, 1950, through December 22, 2011.[12] Of these tornadoes, 3,842 (or 6.72 percent)

occurred in the state of Kansas, with 58 (or 1.5 percent) of Kansas tornadoes occurring in Kiowa County.

These tornadoes have had a tremendous impact, causing significant monetary losses to individuals, governments, and businesses. It is estimated that losses due to tornadic events are in excess of $1 billion per year in the U.S. alone. A notable example of the damage caused in a single event is the EF-5 tornado that struck Joplin, Missouri, in 2011, killing 158 people, injuring over 1,000, and causing an estimated $2.2 billion in damage.[13]

> **Eleven people lost their lives as a result of the Greensburg tornado, and another 60 were injured. Estimates place the total damage in Greensburg at more than $250 million dollars.**

The Greensburg Tornado

A pattern of severe weather was experienced in the central plains region between May 4 and 7, 2007. During this time, NOAA received over 100 reports of tornadoes and 429 reports of damaging hail, as well as reports of high winds.[14] As this severe weather system moved through the plains on May 4, a supercell thunderstorm formed, causing four tornadoes in the state of Kansas. An EF-5 tornado formed in Comanche County at approximately 9:00 p.m. and moved northeast 28.8 miles, approaching Greensburg at 10:05 p.m.[15]

Prior to the storm arriving in Greensburg, local weather spotters radioed the Kiowa County Sheriff's Office informing them of their observation of an impending tornado. The first tornado sirens were activated at 9:15 p.m., and residents began seeking shelter. Additional

tornado warnings occurred in Greensburg at 9:19, 9:36, and 9:41 p.m., and officials urged residents to take immediate shelter.[16] Four minutes after the final tornado warning at 9:45 p.m., an EF-5 tornado hit Greensburg, cutting a 1.7 mile-wide path through the city.[17]

The primary tornado remained in or near Greensburg for between 15 and 20 minutes and destroyed an estimated 95 percent of the city's infrastructure.[18] The tornado destroyed 961 homes in Kiowa County and damaged 172 others. Additionally, three schools were destroyed, 24 businesses were critically damaged, and 110 businesses were damaged beyond repair.[19] Electrical service to the city was knocked out, natural gas service was impeded, landline phone service was inoperable, and cellular phone service was severely limited.[20] Eleven people lost their lives as a result of the Greensburg tornado, and another 60 were injured.[21] Estimates place the total damage in Greensburg at more than $250 million dollars.[22]

City and County Level Mitigation

The city of Greensburg's small size did not allow for the city to employ its own emergency services (fire, police, ambulance, etc.), which were instead provided by the county.[23] As such, Greensburg did not have a formal plan—beyond the utilization of warning sirens placed throughout the city, as required by federal law—should a hazard event occur within its city limits.

At the time, Kiowa County employed a part-time emergency manager who was responsible for the county's overall emergency plan. According to Kiowa County Emergency Manager Ray Stegman, prior to the May 2007 tornado, the county relied solely on an informational pamphlet from the early 1990s as its emergency operations plan. According to Stegman, the pamphlet was generic in theme and content, providing inadequate preparation for a significant hazard event. (This pamphlet was

lost in the May 4, 2007, tornado and cannot be located for examination or consultation.) While the county had several people well versed in the fundamentals of emergency response, little formal county-level planning and no mutual aid agreements were in place at the time of the tornado.

State Level Mitigation

In order to comply with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA), the state of Kansas utilized a detailed standard operating procedure to outline policies and requirements for cities and counties regarding mandatory and voluntary mitigation and preparedness actions. Under the Kansas Hazard Mitigation Plan, dated November 2004, stated that "mitigation be addressed in the required comprehensive emergency management plan developed by each county."[24] This requirement was not met by Kiowa County, and no enforcement action was taken by the state to ensure compliance.[25]

In order to comply with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, also known as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, the state of Kansas established the Kansas Commission on Emergency Planning and Response (CEPR).[26] CEPR was initially established by Kansas Statute Chapter 48, Article 9, to ensure adherence to the EPCRA and was specifically focused on addressing dangers related to hazardous industrial materials emergencies. Since establishment, the commission has expanded to become a more comprehensive emergency management agency. Today, the Kansas CEPR promotes utilizing local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) to address most community hazards, including both man-made and natural hazards.[27]

Federal Level Mitigation

Federal preparedness falls mainly under the jurisdiction of FEMA, although exceptions do exist. While the policies that govern federal actions during major disaster events are ever-changing, the primary policy that has governed federal emergency response during the past decade is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, as amended, which is the statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities, especially those associated with FEMA. The DMA also governs federal emergency response.

> **Under the DMA, Congress requires state and local governments to create and adopt a hazard mitigation plan in order to receive disaster-related funds from federal programs.**

Under the DMA, Congress requires state and local governments to create and adopt a hazard mitigation plan in order to receive disaster-related funds from federal programs.[28] DMA regulations establish criteria that must be met for a state or local mitigation plan to be approved by FEMA, the agency responsible for administering the DMA.[29] Although the federal government cannot mandate the creation of mitigation plans by the states, the requirement that such a plan be adopted as a condition of funding eligibility is a significant incentive to do so.

Under the DMA, Section 322, local plans must: "(1) describe actions to mitigate hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities identified under the plan; and (2) establish a strategy to implement those actions."[30] Additionally, the DMA requires that states "(1) identify the natural hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities of areas in the state; (2) support development of local mitigation plans; (3) provide for technical assistance to local and tribal governments for mitigation planning; and (4) identify and prioritize mitigation actions

that the state will support, as resources become available."[31]

This vague policy leads to equally vague hazard mitigation plans, which meet the requirements under the DMA but are far from helpful in the case of an emergency.

As previously stated, Congress enacted the EPCRA in October of 1986, requiring the governor of each state establish a State Emergency Response Commission, which subsequently required the creation of LEPCs.[32] While this law does not apply specifically to natural hazards and disasters, it creates the basic structure in which citizens, businesses, and governments work together to facilitate cooperative emergency planning within a community. In many communities today, LEPCs exist to provide an all-hazards approach to planning and serve as the cornerstone of many community emergency management programs.[33]

...there were no designated tornado shelters in Greensburg available for public use, nor was there a formal evacuation plan in place at the time of the 2007 tornado.

County Level Preparedness Strategies

According to numerous reports from FEMA, as well as information contained in situation reports from the event, there were no designated tornado shelters in Greensburg available for public use, nor was there a formal evacuation plan in place at the time of the 2007 tornado.[34]

At a Kiowa County meeting with cities and communities on May 3, 2007, just 31 hours prior to the tornado, Stegman informed the Kiowa County Commission Chairman of the lack of preparedness that existed and the dire position of the county and, subsequently, the cities within its jurisdiction. During this meeting, Stegman requested the county's emergency manager position be upgraded to full-time.[35] At the conclusion of the meeting, it was decided to retain the position as part-time, and no headway was made regarding emergency preparedness. While their approval of such a request would have done little to prepare for the coming tornado, the incident serves as a poignant reminder of the important role subject-matter experts play in disaster preparation and mitigation.

Federal mandates require that counties be compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and maintain an LEPC, but at the time of the Greensburg tornado, Kiowa County was not in compliance with these mandates and no LEPC existed.[36]

State Level Preparedness Strategies

Resting under the umbrella of the Kansas Adjutant General, the Kansas Department of Emergency Management (KDEM) is the state entity that oversees state-level response to disasters. Under the direction of the KDEM, the Kansas Hazard Mitigation Plan outlines preparedness strategies to be utilized by all state agencies.[37] Additionally, various state agencies with post-disaster roles, such as the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT), the Kansas National Guard (KNG), and the Kansas Department of Health, each have documents regarding preparedness strategies; some conduct formal and informal exercises and others run full-scale simulations to prepare themselves for emergency and disaster-related events.

At the time of the Greensburg tornado, there were many programs and opportunities for municipalities and counties to coordinate joint exercises with state agencies, but neither Greensburg nor Kiowa County had participated in such activities.[38]

Federal Level Preparedness Strategies

Federal level preparedness falls under the purview of many agencies, each charged with addressing a different set of needs should a hazard event take place. These government agencies include but are not limited to FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Centers for Disease Control, Food and Drug Administration, Federal Communications Commission, and the Departments of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Labor.

Each agency sets its own standards for training exercises and conducts simulations and other preparedness activities, including community outreach programs, on its own. These programs vary from agency to agency based on several factors including budget restrictions, federal guidelines, and the state of awareness or concern of the public at large.

With the 2007 Greensburg tornado occurring on the heels of Hurricane Katrina (the worst natural disaster in U.S. history), there was increased awareness and demand to minimize the effects of natural disasters quickly. As a result, emergency response agencies were more proactive in their response actions.

Initial Response

Many of the counties surrounding Greensburg shared radio frequencies for emergency services. As information about the impending tornado was broadcast, neighboring counties began preparing the aid that would be needed. Prior to the tornado's arrival in Greensburg, individuals like Mark McManaman from Pratt County were already en-route to and staging outside the city.[39] As the tornado made its way out of Greensburg, McManaman entered the city and began rendering aid.[40]

Within moments of the tornado touching down, Stegman and Kiowa County Fire Chief Jay Koehn responded to the county courthouse located in Greensburg.[41] During the initial response, Stegman, recognizing that he was a victim as well as the initial response authority, decided that it would be prudent to have an outside responder—in this case the Pratt County Kansas Administrator—act as the initial Incident Commander (IC) until a better assessment of the damage could be made.[42]

> **With the 2007 Greensburg tornado occurring on the heels of Hurricane Katrina (the worst natural disaster in U.S. history), there was increased awareness and demand to minimize the effects of natural disasters quickly.**

After learning of the possibility for a major incident in the Greensburg area, Matt Mercer, the Southwest Regional Coordinator for the KDEM, began his trek from Dodge City, Kansas, approximately 45 miles away, and was able to arrive prior to the roadblocks being set up around Greensburg.[43] Stegman reported that the first calls to KDEM were made by Mercer, who is quoted as saying to KDEM officials, "I think I'm standing on Main Street in Greensburg. It's all gone."[44] Although he lost communication with KDEM shortly after making this statement, staff in Topeka received his notification and began to deploy resources within minutes.

Immediately after the initial touchdown, citizens, first responders, and others began searching the debris and rubble for the trapped, injured, and deceased. The initial search and rescue effort was led by community members, local police, and fire officials, as well as people from neighboring communities who responded before formal assistance could be requisitioned and transported to the Greensburg area. Their

efforts were disorganized due to the magnitude of the damage, but as the IC and other command staff gained control of the event, the response effort became more organized. Responders faced severe weather throughout the night, including a second tornado that touched down shortly after the EF-5, hampering initial response efforts.[45] As dawn approached on May 5, 2007, the city had been thoroughly searched twice and almost completely evacuated.[46]

Local jurisdictions dispatched emergency responders to Greensburg to provide critical assistance in search and rescue operations, as well as triage activities.[47] Initial responding agencies included the Pratt County fire department and Ford County fire and emergency

> **Within the first 24 hours, a plethora of local and municipal agencies converged on Greensburg...**

medical services.[48] Upon their arrival, Pratt County set up triage in the local grocery store parking lot, while Ford County became actively involved in the search and rescue efforts that were already underway.[49]

At approximately 9:45 p.m., less than 45 minutes after the EF-5 tornado hit Greensburg, the State of Kansas Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was brought to Level 4, full-scale activation, and began directing critical services to the stricken area.[50] At approximately 12:32 a.m. on May 5, 2007, Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius declared a state of emergency for Kiowa County.[51]

The first major deployment of resources to Greensburg came at approximately 2:30 a.m. when the KNG was ordered to respond.[52] By 3:00 a.m., resources from as far away as Topeka, located approximately 250 miles away,

had arrived in Greensburg and were providing critical assistance in victim triage and search and rescue.[53]

Within the first 24 hours, a plethora of local and municipal agencies converged on Greensburg to provide critical assistance while formal state and federal resources were being requested.[54] The FEMA Damage Assessment Team also arrived, providing critical resources to assess the level of destruction and the necessary information for the issuance of a Presidential Disaster Declaration. The first 24 hours also yielded a request from the Kansas State Governor's Office for a presidential declaration and FEMA's Level II activation of the Regional Response Coordination Center to aid in the coordination of assistance and supplies to the area.[55]

The American Red Cross established temporary shelters in neighboring Haviland, providing 300 beds within hours of the tornado touching down and opened an additional 300 beds before 24 hours had passed.[56] Shelter was also established in the city of Mullenville within hours of the tornado.[57]

Emergency support functions (transportation, communications, emergency management, mass care, resource support, search and rescue, hazardous materials, public safety, and external affairs) had also been transferred to or initiated by state agencies within 24 hours.[58] Personnel from a variety of local, state, and federal agencies were tasked with providing immunizations, mental health services, protective equipment, and supplies. At approximately 7:30 p.m. the day after the tornado, after activating the Regional Response Coordination Center, the Region VII Administrator deployed an Emergency Response Advance Team to Greensburg.[59]

Recognizing the significance of the event, FEMA responded proactively, staging supplies outside the city limits in anticipation of a presidential declaration.[60] This action allowed

for the quick dissemination of necessary supplies and resources once the declaration was issued.[61]

During the initial response period, which lasted only 72 hours, government agencies and private enterprises made great strides, which set up the critical infrastructure needed to mount effective response and recovery efforts.

Long-Term Response Actions

After the initial 72-hour, critical response period, the 15 government agencies involved in the response effort came together to regroup and address the needs of the community. The multitude of agencies created a command area around the Kiowa County Courthouse that allowed for most of the agencies involved to operate from a single location, facilitating timely dissemination of information and allowing greater interaction among agencies. The shared location for the agencies allowed for more effective cooperative efforts than would have been possible if each agency had a separate operating base.

The massive debris removal was accomplished over the course of several weeks. Several agencies inspected the city, and questionable locations, items, and structures were marked for further investigation by specialists before debris removal began. Special attention was taken to ensure that landfills were not tainted with hazardous materials and that questionable materials were analyzed and disposed of in accordance with applicable regulations.[62] This process included FEMA, Environmental Protection Agency, KNG, Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Centers for Disease Control, City of Greensburg, Kiowa County, and various other outside agencies and resources, as well as the business owners and citizens in the area. Over the course of the response and subsequent recovery phase, it was reported that over 800,000 cubic yards of debris were removed from Greensburg.[63]

The multitude of agencies created a command area around the Kiowa County Courthouse that allowed for most of the agencies involved to operate from a single location...

Radio Interoperability and Communications

Early on, agencies recognized the need to communicate with the citizens of Greensburg, and they collaborated to keep the lines of communication open. As most citizens were no longer in the area, officials utilized AM radio broadcasts, as well as several forms of written communication to disseminate vital information to the public. Collaboration with the Federal Communications Commission, KDOT, and other entities yielded the resources needed to expand the AM range of towers so that more people could be reached via radio.[64] Printed flyers and a website were also used to pass information along to the public.[65] The agencies were able to quickly and effectively communicate important information to the citizens of Greensburg because of their forward-thinking, coordinated effort.

Counties surrounding Greensburg shared radio frequencies, which allowed them to monitor the status of the approaching weather system and facilitate the allocation of resources before they were requested from Kiowa County and Greensburg. While no mutual aid agreements requiring neighboring communities to render aid in the event of a disaster were in place, the shared radio frequencies allowed responders near Greensburg to prepare. Though the city of Greensburg had no hazard mitigation plans, the surrounding communities were able to stage resources in and around the city prior to the tornado's arrival.

Record Keeping and Transfer of Command

Available incident action plans (IAPs) indicate that many transfers of command occurred in the weeks following the Greensburg tornado. During this period of time, leaders from various agencies assumed the role of IC during the recovery efforts, and it appears that this responsibility was transferred without significant issue. Daily IAPs were created and disseminated throughout the agencies involved, and documentation was generally kept up-to-date. However, changes in command also led to changes in content and format, information gaps in the official record, and differing levels of detail in the daily IAPs.

> **The Greensburg tornado provides an opportunity to examine how agencies across the federal government interact when their combined efforts are required to address a disaster.**

These changes in the format, amount, type, and detail of information provided in the daily IAPs left gaps in reporting and critical details were overlooked, omitted, or obscured. For example, the first IAP dated May 6, 2007, and several dated May 31, 2007, and beyond contained detailed information regarding communications made, briefings that occurred, as well as situation reports from the various active ESF functions. However, many IAPs between these days lacked this level of detail—detail that is useful when reconstructing the events that occurred and how agencies cooperated during the event. The level of detail in the individual IAPs varied greatly from reporting period to reporting period, with some IAPs only including the most basic of information

and detailing to great length the activities that transpired over the reporting period.

Additionally, these IAPs were not retained in a central repository for future analysis. Instead, Stegman housed the available IAPs, and they were not complete. Other agencies involved did not retain such records after an initial period of time, leaving gaps in the official record of the response to the event.

Observations and Recommendations

The Greensburg tornado provides an opportunity to examine how agencies across the federal government interact when their combined efforts are required to address a disaster. The need for local, state, and federal agencies to cooperate in the aftermath of the Greensburg tornado was exacerbated by the small rural community's inadequate disaster planning and lack of a response and recovery framework.

Inadequate disaster planning is not acceptable public policy. Prior planning minimizes the devastating effects of hazard events, preventing greater loss of life and damage to property. Mitigation planning also enables city, county, state, and federal entities to better respond to such events, allowing greater coordination and cooperation. What follows is a series of recommendations to improve future disaster preparation and response.

Hazard Mitigation Planning and State Enforcement

While laws existed requiring hazard mitigation plans, they were not actively monitored or enforced by the state of Kansas, which resulted in many counties, including Kiowa County, having inadequate plans, if any. This lack of planning left the Greensburg community ill-prepared to respond to the devastation. Initial response and rescue efforts were ad hoc, and without clearly defined roles, responsibilities, or leadership. Also, although

residents were advised to take shelter, the City of Greensburg did not have shelters designed to resist tornadic winds and debris at the time of the incident.[66]

Prior planning would have better facilitated response and recovery efforts and minimized confusion. Earlier planning would have also provided for public tornado shelters and better disaster communication capabilities.

In the future, all counties should compile comprehensive hazard mitigation plans, regardless of federal and state regulations, ensuring the safety of their communities. State-level systems should be leveraged to ensure compliance with applicable laws pertaining to hazard mitigation planning at the county level. Furthermore, submitted county plans should be analyzed for feasibility and comprehensiveness. Incentives should be provided to counties who are not otherwise able to fund the research and preparation of hazard mitigation plans, ensuring that equality in planning exists among counties of all sizes and economic situations.

Communications and Record Keeping

It is significant to note the level of cooperation that occurred within the community in the wake of the tornado, especially with the absence of prior planning. Responding agencies went to extraordinary lengths to communicate with the people of Greensburg, keeping them up-to-date on the response efforts. However, there is still room for improvement.

Emergency management components of cities, namely police, fire, and emergency medical services, should not be ad hoc arrangements cobbled together in the exigency of a crisis. Instead, these entities need to establish compatible communications systems to enable rapid and wide-spread communications during emergency situations and exercise them routinely. Additionally, operational channels of surrounding communities and counties should be monitored so that the immediate needs of surrounding communities can be anticipated and resources allocated before formal requests for assistance are made. This would shorten initial response times, reducing the impact of hazards on communities.

Similarly, more organized record keeping would also enable communities and agencies to better respond to future disasters. As mentioned earlier, frequent changes in command led to gaps in the official record of the response efforts. The IAPs are the seminal documents recording the response efforts in Greensburg, and as such should have adhered to a strict format employed by all leading agencies.

The NIMS utilizes template-type forms, such as the IAP, to record events, decisions, and activities. However, detailed supplemental materials should be created to guide the IC and other leaders as to the type of information that should be included in such documents. These supplemental materials may include checklists to ensure continuity in reporting as command is passed from one individual to another. Periodic training and certification for those likely to become ICs during a hazard event would help to ensure that each IC is prepared to fulfill the duties of this position including completing forms, recording activities, and maintaining continuity of information in the official record.

Mutual Aid Agreements

Kiowa County had no mutual aid agreements in place at the time of the Greensburg tornado; nevertheless, it had significant response from neighboring communities, both in physical and personnel assets. While the ad hoc response from neighboring communities was beneficial, pre-existing agreements would increase the effectiveness and timeliness of the response.

The state should enact requirements mandating all localities determine what services and resources neighboring communities have that could be leveraged during a major incident and negotiate agreements to share them during

a disaster or other major incident. Mutual aid agreements can be used to streamline the process of requesting assistance from neighboring jurisdictions and would allow immediate access to resources needed before state- and federal-level resources can be activated for a community. By having prearranged agreements, it is possible to reduce response times, thus saving lives and minimizing property damage.

Exercising Plans

Because there were no formal hazard mitigation plans, no training exercises took place in which city or county emergency agencies were provided an opportunity to respond to a simulated disaster. Such exercises allow emergency responders, governing bodies, aid organizations, and private enterprises to practice their roles and responsibilities, better preparing them for a disaster. Without training exercises, agency, individual, and procedural strengths and weaknesses were never identified and modifications could not be made.

To better prepare for future disasters, the state should enact legislation requiring counties and cities to exercise their hazard mitigation plans on an annual basis. State emergency management officials should monitor these exercises and help identify and address shortcomings revealed and lessons learned. Such a requirement will strengthen the resiliency of the state as a whole.

Conclusion

In the absence of a formal plan, communities are able to come together in an ad-hoc fashion to mount a response in order to save lives and minimize property loss. Although agencies, public and private, were able to mount a major response, communities cannot take for granted this level of response. Had the disaster event occurred in a more populous area, without shared radio frequencies and available resources, the results could have been far different with significant loss of life and property being a credible possibility.

Although significant policy and regulations were in place regarding community preparedness, failures by agencies tasked with oversight resulted in a gross lack of planning in Greensburg. The immediate response of neighboring communities was a reactive, ad-hoc response to an eminent threat and was not the result of pre-planning or preparedness by Greensburg. This situation highlights the need for sound policy as well as enforcement of such policy to ensure the coordinated effort to a major disaster event in order to mitigate threats to life and property. *IAJ*

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USAID:

What You Don't Know

by Vashaun Wrice

The interagency (IA) relationship between the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other government agencies is an important one. As such, the following article will examine a way of bridging the gap of IA coordination between such agencies, specifically that of USAID and the Department of Defense (DoD). This article serves as a response to comments taken from those with firsthand experience working with USAID. While some of this information may seem trivial, it remains unknown to many that work with USAID and who undoubtedly play a role in USAID's inter-relational dynamics with DoD and other IA partners. Additional this article hopes to uncover the context that helps to explain why USAID operates the way it does. In doing so, the ultimate goal is to provide a more broad-based approach to improving the working relationship between USAID and DoD by providing a better understanding of USAID.

Analysis and Discussion

First, this is not an analysis of how to improve or enhance development-military cooperation as already described by Benjamin D. Kauffeld, a USAID Foreign Service officer, in his work "USAID & DOD: Analysis and Recommendations to Enhance Development-Military Cooperation."[1] Nor is this an attempt to recommend how USAID and DoD can integrate security and development in a particular country as discussed by G. William Anderson in his work "Bridging the Divide: How Can USAID and DoD Integrate Security and Development More Effectively in Africa."[2]

While some of the discussion points lend themselves to the culture of USAID, other points are merely information but nonetheless important. The intent is to provide a reference of ten takeaways to assist those who will work with USAID either as a liaison officer, military fellow, battlespace owner collocated with USAID programs, or person transitioning from the military looking to work with USAID as a U.S. government civilian or contractor.

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The importance of IA cooperation and coordination cannot be understated as evidenced through the DoD partnerships with multiple government agencies over the last 13 years during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as the Army's continued Senior Service College fellowships within the IA community and its recent establishment of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Interagency Fellowship. And though the U.S. government is drawing down in Afghanistan, IA cooperation will remain critically important, especially as the U.S. government engages in more decentralized operations such as those associated with the Army's regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept and the Marines and Special Operations Forces continued deployments to hot spots around the world.

Without question, a vital link in this IA cooperation and coordination is communication. In fact, communication is arguably the most important skill in life and is critically important when working outside one's parent organization. At the heart of communicating effectively is listening, as it allows for true understanding. The late, great author, Stephen Covey, said it best when he maintained that one of the most important habits of highly effective people is to seek first to understand, then to be understood.[3] Thus, in order to continue to improve the relationship between USAID and DoD, each must understand the other organization's roles and responsibilities, what it does and does not represent, and the culture that drives it. Ultimately, failing to understand any of these will undoubtedly affect the fluidity of the relationship.

Being aware of each takeaway is equally important to truly understanding the USAID organization when seeking to minimize any potential conflict due to misunderstandings and striving to continue to work on the relationship given the ever-increasing need for IA coordination. Generally speaking, these takeaways are not exhaustive, but serve as an adequate start.

1. USAID is not a non-governmental organization (NGO).

Contrary to public opinion, USAID is not an NGO. While it does provide foreign assistance similar to many NGOs operating throughout the world, USAID is, indeed, a government agency. It was formed on November 3, 1961, by President Kennedy when he signed the Foreign Assistance Act into law. Though he penned the act into law, its seminal workings date back to the Marshall Plan when the U.S. gave Europe $13 billion to assist in building its economies following World War II[4] and through President Truman's Four Point Program of 1949, which provided $25 million in 1950 and 1951 for international technical assistance to developing countries.[5] In short, USAID is not an NGO, but an independent U.S. government agency that currently provides foreign assistance to over 100 countries.

...seek first to understand, then to be understood.

2. USAID is not the same as the Department of State (State).

Seemingly trivial to some, the distinction is nonetheless important if you find yourself working with or for USAID. The mission of State is to "shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere."[6] On the other hand, USAID's mission is to "partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity."[7] Thus, it is easy to see that each is its own agency, and to call USAID the same as State is akin to considering the Marines and the Navy one and

the same.

However, the confusion is understandable given that USAID does take its foreign policy guidance from State, works closely with State on strategic and program planning, and has its budget vetted and recommended for approval to the President and Congress by the State Department. Interestingly, the Navy and Marines relationship parallels that of State and USAID, as each has its own leadership structure and carries out its own day-to-day operations, but the policy directives and budget for the Marines and USAID are determined by the Navy and State respectively. And, just as the Marines will undoubtedly correct anyone who charges they are the Navy, USAID is not part of State.

> ...the Navy and Marines relationship parallels that of State and USAID...

3. USAID's budget is less than 1 percent of the federal budget.[8]

That is, funds appropriated to USAID and any other government agencies funded for foreign aid comprise slightly more than 1 percent of the federal budget. This is in stark contrast to the common belief that the U.S. government spends more than 25 percent of its budget on foreign assistance.[9] To think USAID implements programs that focus on poverty reduction; broad-based sustainable growth; strong, stable, and just institutions through programs focused on agriculture and food security; human rights and governance; economic growth and trade, education, environment, and global climate change; gender equality, global health, science, and technology; water and sanitation; and crises and conflict on less than 1 percent of the federal budget is rather impressive. So, despite the general perception, USAID's (and the federal government's) spending on foreign aid is not out of balance. In fact, to put it in perspective,

USAID spent $17.2 billion in fiscal year 2013,[10] which, surprisingly, is less than three times what the nation spends each year on Halloween-related purchases ($6.9 billion).[11]

4. USAID does more than humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

For some, this is not new, especially those who worked with USAID in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Prior to Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the DoD partnerships with USAID (less the Special Operations community) occurred in the wake of foreign disasters primarily through the Navy and Marine Corps, with some assistance from the Army and Air Force. However, as the operating environment continues to evolve, there will be more opportunities for DoD and USAID to partner outside the area of humanitarian assistance and work jointly in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, Latin America, or the Caribbean.

The notion that DoD will increasingly work with USAID in a more developmental or "deterring" environment cannot be overstated, especially when the Secretary of Defense's strategy in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review directs DoD to build security globally along with protecting the homeland and projecting power and winning decisively.[12] So, as the Services continue to build security globally through concepts like the Army's RAF, it helps to understand where USAID and DoD might interact. For instance, in addition to working with USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the office responsible for the U.S. government's disaster assistance overseas, military leaders down to company level could find themselves working with USAID teams from the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), or the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation (CMC).

OTI works to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance that targets key political transition and stabilization needs in order to create and foster the political space that leads

to longer-term development in places like Afghanistan and other countries where similar conditions exist.[13] CMM dedicates itself to helping people in the developing world find lasting solutions to the problems of conflict, instability, and extremism.[14] As troops continue to deploy to places like Africa or Romania in order to deter further aggression, it helps to know that they may work with a CMM team as it analyzes the causes and consequences of violent conflict, or as it conducts a follow-up assessment in preparing for its annual Alert List of worldwide rankings for countries most vulnerable to fragility and at risk for instability.[15] Additionally, if assigned as a combatant command staff officer, it helps to know that CMC's senior development advisors work with DoD liaison officers in Washington, D.C., aligning development and defense to leverage the unique capabilities of USAID and DoD to achieve better development outcomes.[16]

5. USAID is a planning organization.

Though many think otherwise, USAID does plan. In fact, the nesting of DoD and USAID planning strategies and policies are very similar. Military policy and planning derive from the President's National Security Strategy by way of the Defense Secretary's National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Chairman's National Military Strategy.[17] Similarly, USAID planning and policy also derive from the National Security Strategy through Presidential Policy Directive 6 (PPD-6) by way of the Secretary of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).[18] And, just as the Chief of Staff of the Army ties his vision and priorities to the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy through the five objectives of Waypoint 2,[19] the USAID administrator outlines his vision and strategic priorities for the agency through seven core development objectives in the USAID Policy Framework.[20] In short, USAID does plan, and it does so by nesting its priorities and objectives at the department and national levels, just like that of the Army and the other Services.

6. USAID operates bottom up, not top down.

USAID is a bottom-up organization. This is in stark contrast to DoD, which is without question top-down. Granted, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced DoD, especially the Army and the Marines, to grant more autonomy at lower levels, but both are still top-down run organizations. Coming from a top-down run organization, it is easy to see how some cognitive dissonance may surface when working with an organization that operates with a completely different paradigm. Such frustration was overwhelmingly obvious in those with experience in working with USAID, but if examined closer, the rationale for USAID's use of a bottom-up process becomes clearer. That reason being the same as the Army and

> **...the nesting of DoD and USAID planning strategies and policies are very similar.**

the Marines giving company-level leaders more autonomy in Iraq and Afghanistan because the person on the ground knows better than anyone else what is required to be successful. Or, as General Colin Powell posits in *The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell*, "the commander in the field is always right and the rear echelon is wrong, unless proved otherwise."[21]

That "commander" in USAID is the mission director, who with staff assistance, works with the host country and other U.S. government agencies and donors to develop a five-year, country-development cooperation strategy (CDCS) that aligns with PPD-6 and the QDDR and feeds into State's Integrated Country Strategy by setting achievable development results that shape the country's overall stability

and prosperity.[22] In short, the CDCS is the operational plan that measures the success of each USAID mission, and it all begins at the country level. So, without question, USAID is bottom-up, and while it will frustrate some DoD personnel, in order to be effective serving the interests of the host country, USAID has no choice.

7. USAID does have a decision-making process.

Many of the comments directed at USAID allude to the notion that it does not have a decision-making process. Though not as detailed and descriptive as the troop-leading procedures or the military decision-making process (MDMP), it does have a decision-making process with the following sequence: (a) agency policy and strategies, (b) country development cooperation

> ...to effectively accomplish its work, USAID cannot operate autonomously and relies heavily on its implementing partners and other donors.

strategy, (c) project design and implementation, and (d) evaluation and monitoring.[23] Receiving the development objectives in the USAID Policy Framework parallels step one in the MDMP. Although, there is no step 2 equivalent, the development of the CDCS and project design parallel steps 3–5 in the MDMP, while the final approval of the development strategy and project implementation mirrors MDMP steps 6 and 7. Lastly, the evaluation and monitoring step directly corresponds to step 8, supervise and refine. Unlike DoD, each USAID decision-making process seeks enduring and stable solutions. In fact, most USAID decisions regarding development are based on goals set for 3–5 years from now. So, once a country begins the decision-making process, it does so with the

intent that its results govern the next 3–5 years of development. Compare this to the military where the decision-making process is initiated for every major mission with no guarantee that today's mission will be tomorrow's. Therefore, it is not that USAID does not have a decision-making process, it does; it is just executed less frequently.

8. USAID is consensus driven.

Though this takeaway is akin to number 6, there is a slight difference. In takeaway 6, the focus is on how USAID operates at the macro level, while the focus here is more on the micro level. In other words, takeaway 6 describes USAID planning, while this takeaway describes how it operates day-to-day. To understand what drives an action, you must first understand the context. Recall that USAID operates in more than 100 countries, and that it currently implements thousands of programs in eight major development areas. What is often overlooked is that it does so with slightly more than 9,600 people, 30 percent of whom are based in Washington, D.C. That leaves approximately 6,700 people overseas to carry out and provide oversight of all its programs. So, in order to effectively accomplish its work, USAID cannot operate autonomously and relies heavily on its implementing partners and other donors. As such, one should understand why USAID uses a consensus-driven approach, given a fair share of its work is executed by highly competent people outside of its organization. Even Harvard Business Review leadership expert, Daniel Goleman, suggested in his article "Leadership That Gets Results" that a democratic style of participatory leadership is often the best type given this situation.[24] However, Goleman also warns that there will be times of seemingly endless meetings where ideas are mulled over, consensus remains elusive, and the only visible result is scheduling more meetings.[25] Unfortunately, USAID is no different. Military personnel working with USAID will occasionally experience the frustration of striving for the seemingly elusive

consensus to little avail. However, one must keep in mind that every leadership approach has its advantages and disadvantages, and the two cannot be separated. So, USAID partners must understand the drive for consensus is merely a negative consequence for the participatory style of leadership needed to effectively work with and through its implementing partners.

9. USAID programming takes time.

While this particular takeaway had more relevance when DoD still executed Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund projects, it could easily become relevant in the future if DoD operates in an area where USAID is soon to follow, such as in Iraq. Once USAID began programming in Iraq around 2005 and 2006, there was some friction as DoD continued to use CERP funds to work urgently needed reconstruction projects as USAID began its programming. This friction centered around one central issue, the immediacy of results. There was a push from higher echelons to see results in rebuilding schools and clinics within a three to four month span. Rightfully so, commanders at all levels wanted to see progress not only for the betterment of the Iraqi people but to also show the progress achieved once they began the transfer of authority to the incoming commander. Obviously, all involved wanted to see progress, but the issue stemmed from USAID's programming cycle. Generally speaking, it takes anywhere from 3 weeks to 6 months for a USAID project design to be approved and then another 2 to 4 months for the project to be awarded.[26] There are some exceptions to this, but most projects being implemented follow this timeline. While it seems nonsensical for programming to take this long given the immediate need to ameliorate current conditions, the extra time does allow for the conduct of proper analysis to ensure cross-cutting factors vice a single need are considered. It also allows for the proper solicitation of those bidding for the project, an evaluation of past work of those applying for the project in order to avoid rushing to failure, and the awarding and

actual completion of the project. However, no commander will wait ten months to implement a program if he or she sees an urgent need, so when possible, the commander should work with USAID to find a solution that seeks to solve the problem given the DoD expectation of immediate results, while also considering

> **...when DoD is requested for humanitarian assistance, it is primarily because of its organic assets and resources.**

the USAID perspective given it will remain in the country long after DoD departs. If this not feasible, then at least there is an understanding of why there is a delay in USAID project implementation.

10. USAID needs military resources not leadership.

First, consider that the context of this takeaway is one of humanitarian assistance. Oftentimes when DoD assistance is requested, the belief is that it is because the situation requires strong leadership. After all, leadership is the bedrock of the military. However, when DoD is requested for humanitarian assistance, it is primarily because of its organic assets and resources. This is reinforced by Secretary of Defense guidance stating the military is not to be used as an instrument of first resort for humanitarian response but supports civilian relief agencies.[27] Additionally, there are conditions that must be present before the military can get involved: (a) the military must provide a unique capability (i.e., vehicles and helicopters); (b) civilian response capacity is overwhelmed; and (c) civilian authorities request assistance.[28] Thus, when tasked to support USAID in a humanitarian assistance mission, DoD must understand that the request is more for its resources than its leadership and should be prepared to assume a support

role during the effort. These and other DoD expectations are aptly covered in the two-day Joint Humanitarian Operations Course taught by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster and Assistance.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In sum, interagency operation is the new norm and while the focus here was on the partnership between USAID and DoD, there is commonality that exists regardless of the interagency partnership. That being the case, each organization should have a broad understanding of and an appreciation for what the other organization does and brings to the table. Ideally, it would be nice to have a list of ten things you should know about the organization with which you are working, but unfortunately that will not be the case. Therefore, when engaging in interagency operations, understand there will be challenges, so seek to gain an appreciation for what your partner offers. Furthermore, be ever mindful that no on e agency or department is more important than the next. All government agencies are key stakeholders in ensuring national security, and each has a critical role to play if it is to coordinate actions and communicate the information needed to accomplish the diplomacy, defense, and development of our National Security Strategy. And, while executing an effective National Security Strategy is an extremely daunting and imperfect task, it requires communication to gain the appreciation and understanding of the other agency in your partnership. Underestimated by many, communication across agencies will go a long way in fixing a number of the problems that exists within IA operations. As such, when engaging in IA partnerships, remember to seek first to understand, then to be understood. *IAJ*

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Filling the Gap:
A Strategy to
Harmonize
Joint and Interagency Planning

by J. "Spyke" Szeredy

How can providing a new planning strategy exert influence, align objectives, and harmonize activities between the Joint and Interagency environments? A simplified strategy for the integration of planning across the joint (Department of Defense [DoD] and integrated service components) and the interagency communities would create a greater whole-of-government approach, bridge planning requirements, and bring planners together to achieve a desired end state for all types of environments and situations. A whole-of-government approach should focus efforts to create a cohesive, unified strategy that is synchronized and executed across the range of operations.

Over the past two decades, DoD has codified the joint operation planning process (JOPP). This process works well within the military environment where planners have operational experience; however, a lack of established planning procedures, understanding, education, and integration among communities creates disconnects within the interagency and intergovernmental environments.[1] To succeed in any complex environment, joint and interagency planners must synchronize the planning process. Joint interagency doctrine discusses JOPP, but expects interagency and intergovernmental planners, with little education, exposure, or experience, to comprehend the process.[2] Subject-matter experts in both DoD and the Department of State (State) acknowledge the difference between military planning and planning within the joint, interagency, and intergovernmental environments. To achieve a productive and successful end state among all entities, planners need a simple method for situational analysis and the ability to work through deliberate and crisis action events. This method requires focused attention and harmonized planning across agency boundaries. Evolving

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asymmetric warfare environments, destabilized regions, and other crises are changing the strategic- and operational-level objectives, which require joint and interagency planners to focus on non-kinetic effects and options prior to and after conflict. Joint, interagency, and in part, the intergovernmental and multinational partners must have the ability to quickly assess a situation and start planning to task and execute plans capable of achieving a successful end state.

In the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), equivalent to DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), State highlights that it needs a single planning process for conflict prevention and resolution.[3] The QDDR also outlines the need to create new methods and frameworks for working with the military to prevent and resolve conflicts, counter insurgencies and illicit actors, and create safe, secure environments for local populations. The document specifies which disconnects between the communities must be resolved to successfully support future operations. Currently, the only planning process inherent to State is via the Humanitarian Early Warning Service and is focused on humanitarian relief.[4] In the dynamic global environment of irregular warfare, this process is far from adequate. The significance in providing a new planning strategy, a level above JOPP, will fill the void outlined by State and bring the two organizations closer, greatly enabling interaction on all levels.

The proposed planning strategy highlighted in this article contains the following steps: situation, objective, perception, story, means, feedback, and termination. This informal strategy has been in active use for a number of years by information operations planners, specifically those working influence operations (deception, military information support operations [psychological operations], and operation security) at the military operational levels. The process is applicable to any situation, deliberate or crisis, across the continuum of operations. Providing and codifying this strategy can create a synergy to open discussions for planners and policymakers to analyze and bring the joint and interagency communities together. Bringing the communities in focus against any given situation will result in reduced reaction time and smarter discussions during crises or when planning for deterrence and steady-state theater cooperation plans. The ability to create an efficient common language between the joint and interagency will enable division of effort and enhance the level of cooperation during execution.

> **The ability to create an efficient common language between the joint and interagency will enable division of effort and enhance the level of cooperation during execution.**

This article employs an exploratory case study framework to examine current and proposed planning strategies to harmonize the activities of joint and interagency communities. Providing a background on current planning methods will expose disconnects between joint and interagency planning methods and, consequently, enable a second discussion of a new strategy process that harmonizes the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments. The second discussion (problem/solution framework) will use the U.S. response to the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan (Operation Tomodachi) as a case study.[5] The operation's real world data and hypothetical discussion support exploring the new model proposed in this article.

Background

The 1998 Rife and Hansen paper "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus" exposed the changes to the global activities in a post-

Cold War environment and the effects to DoD and State.[6] The changing landscape forced these two communities to develop programs to achieve foreign policy goals.[7] However, though both departments take orders from the President, they interpret and execute those orders quite differently. DoD is still the "800-pound gorilla in the room," but military and interagency community integration is a key requirement when the lead agency may not have the preponderance of resources to complete the mission. Both communities, really all departments of the government, must be more cognizant of the others' abilities to plan and execute specific missions.

> **Integrated efforts between civilian and military personnel are essential to the success of complex operations involving the whole-of-government approach to a situation.**

Integrated efforts between civilian and military personnel are essential to the success of complex operations involving the whole-of-government approach to a situation. DoD has different levels of established policy and doctrine to support military interaction with interagency entities or agencies. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations* (the basis for integrating the military and interagency communities) identifies stability operations as a core U.S. military mission for which the Services should be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.[8] This instruction lays the groundwork for military forces to conduct these operations throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including combat and non-combat environments, even if another government agency is in the lead.

Military forces must be capable of supporting operations led by other U.S. government departments and agencies

The Joint Staff works within the national strategic level of the government to support operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01C, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs* enables the "behind the scenes" integration among the DoD, military forces, and the interagency. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and Homeland Security Advisory Council.[9] CJCSI 5715.01C establishes how the Director of the Joint Staff will work with all the staff directorates to support integration and also identifies the Director of Operations as responsible for providing advice on the execution of military operations and accompanying the Chairman to interagency meetings and dealings.[10] The DODI and the CJCSI are generally focused at the strategic level of policy and national strategy and support the planning and execution of assigned missions.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interagency Coordination* helps commanders and planners prepare for operations with interagency partners.[11] JP 3-08 illustrates how DoD should conduct coordination across a range of operations and provides some background into operations and working with different communities of interest and their structures. Successful DoD and interagency plans require flexibility and provide a common understanding to facilitate unity of effort.[12] The proposed strategy outlined below will enable these factors to exist and achieve a whole-of-government effort in any given situation.

A number of policy and doctrinal documents support the joint military community in conducting planning from the strategic and operational to the tactical level of operation.[13] Doctrine and handbooks are readily available; however, it is difficult to discern if the

Strategy Model			
Strategic Planning	**Ends**	**Ways**	**Means/Risk**
Joint Operation Planning Process	Orders Production	Initiation, Mission Analysis	COA Processes
IASC Process	Implementation	Preparation/ Analysis	Response Planning
5 Paragraph Format	Mission/Execution	Situation/Mission	Execution/Admin/C2
Proposed Strategy Model	Feedback/ Termination	Situation/Objective/ Perception	Story/Means

Figure 1. Planning Strategy Models[15]

interagency community has invoked any type of policy or doctrine directly linked to military planning policy and doctrine. The desire to link the communities together is evident in State's QDDR, which seeks to create a plan for interaction, and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) planning constructs, which are similar to those of the joint community.[14]

Planning Frameworks

There are a number of different planning processes employed by various federal departments and communities. This article reviews the military process and three interagency processes and then proposes a new planning process. The joint and interagency processes focus mainly at the operational level of planning and are situation dependent. The informal proposed process also focuses on the operational level of planning, but has greater applicability at the operational-strategic level, where military and interagency planners dissect a situation or problem and seek solutions tied to the overall strategic model of ends, ways, means, and risk. Upon completing the analysis of a situation, the proposed solution will support dividing the efforts among the various entities before they head to their respective departments or groups to finalize plans for their respective pieces of the operation. As Figure 1 illustrates, the proposed strategy does not remove any of

the processes for the organizations; rather, it helps the different agencies obtain a common framework from which to start their own planning. Paramount to achieving mission success is the need for planners to understand the overall strategic and operational end state of an operation, as well as how each process achieves desired effects.

Joint Operation Planning Process

The JOPP consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations used by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises.[16] This planning process enables commanders and planners to link national security and military strategies to deliberate and crisis plans to achieve desired effects and end states. Through these planning activities, commanders identify ends, ways, means, and risk to achieve these goals with flexibility and economy of force.[17] The staff uses JOPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, identify resources, and identify and mitigate risk.[18]

The seven steps of the JOPP enable planners to proceed from the receipt of a mission (planning initiation step), through an analysis of the environment and adversary (mission analysis), to identifying and evaluating courses of action (COAs) (best plan and mitigation of risk), and finally plan and orders production. This process

allows planners to identify centers of gravity, lines of operations, and key branch and sequel points to support the overall operation. The JOPP process is identical to the U.S. Army's Military Decision Making Process, U.S. Marine Corps's Marine Corps Planning Process, and the U.S. Navy's Navy Planning Process.

Interagency Processes

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released the first QDDR in December 2010.[19] One of its benchmark outcomes was to build civilian capacity to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict and give the military the partner it needs and deserves.[20] Though planning processes and strategies are inferred in the QDDR, it took another year to see headway. In December 2011, State released a message to all members of the agency titled, "Introducing New Strategic Planning and Budgeting Processes," but the message was more policy than process and execution.[21] Two of the highlighted areas of the message for new strategic planning processes are the Joint Regional Strategy and the Integrated Country Strategy. In 2008, State released their Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to support planning efforts. But unlike Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Operations*, the ICAF does not cross reference the JP, where the opposite exists to ensure the DoD is prepared to work with other communities and agencies. This example highlights a continued breakdown in communication between the different communities supporting operations across the whole-of-government.

In 2009, DHS released the Integrated Planning System (IPS), the department's initial steps in creating a planning policy to support its operations. The IPS provides a structure to create plans but provides no direct strategy or process to achieve results. It provides guidelines versus a methodical process to achieve a solid end state and produce an executable plan. Though the IPS links directly to the joint planning environment, it does not help with overall processes, nor does it provide a strategy on how to step through planning.

International Interagency Process

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (Sub-Working Group on Preparedness) Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS) is an interagency partnership project aimed at establishing a common platform for humanitarian early warnings and for natural hazards.[22] This United Nations-sponsored website has a number of U.S. institutions providing services and sources of information. Interestingly, State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have focus areas on humanitarian relief, but the IASC website is focused at international and non-governmental organizations.[23]

The IASC website provides an interagency contingency planning online toolbox divided into four main sections: preparation, analysis, response planning, and implementation. Much like JOPP's first step of initiation, the preparation section focuses on forming a group and defining the scope of the problem. The analysis section, much like JOPP's mission analysis, defines risk and hazards and identifies planning assumptions, triggers, and early warning indicators. Similar to JOPP's mission analysis and course of action development, the response planning section defines objectives, roles, coordination, and agreements and identifies the response plan and outputs. The implementation section focuses on execution, evaluation, and updating plans as required.

Proposed Strategy

Several years ago, military planners developed a process to better understand and craft operational plans utilizing the perceptions of adversary leaders and countries U.S. military forces might have to face in the future. [24] The

SOPSMF/T (situation, objective, perception, story, means, feedback, and termination)) process is taught within the Joint and Air Force military deception courses and is most often used in planning the influence elements within Information Operations.

The SOPSMF/T process, as initially designed, supports operations planning and execution through the ability to adapt outputs from planning into the five main sections of adaptive planning and execution: situation, mission, execution, administration, and command and control.[25] In the SOPSMF/T process, situation, objective, and perception link to the initiation and mission analysis steps of JOPP and the "ways" portion of the larger national strategy process. The next steps of the process—story and means—link to the course of action (COA) steps within JOPP and "means" and "risk" portions of the national strategy process. Lastly, feedback and termination support the orders production of JOPP and the "ends" portion of the national strategy process. Figure 1 shows the linkages across the various processes discussed in this article. The proposed strategy seeks to harmonize and support all joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planning.

SOPSMF/T

As each step in the proposed SOPSMF/T planning process and strategy is explored, it will be compared to both the JOPP and IASC processes. Additionally, at each planning step, this article will examine Operation Tomodachi from a hypothetical and factual perspective. Operation Tomodachi was a joint, interagency, and multinational crisis event where planning across the cultures, socially and governmentally, of the different players might have caused problems. Discussing this doctrinal and real-world event offers the ability to determine how and at what level the SOPSMF/T planning concept can be applied with success.

Situation

Situation is defined as "position with respect to conditions and circumstances."[26] Situations can be "long low-boil" events that take time to hit a culmination and cause a large amount of damage. Such events provide an opportunity for planners to create an engagement strategy that keeps the event from becoming critical. Other situations provide no warning. These range from humanitarian relief and disaster assistance to insurgencies and coups. During this step, planners determine the lead agency. The situation is the trigger from which planning and execution grows.

Situation ties into the initiation and mission analysis steps of JOPP and the preparation phase of the IASD process, where planners determine what has taken place and how they plan to address the situation. Planners bring in subject-matter experts and seek to structure and facilitate handling the situation. These processes

> **The proposed strategy seeks to harmonize and support all joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planning.**

are focused on their respective cultures and are not always understood by an outside group.

On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred 81 miles to the east of Sendai, Japan.[27] The earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused extensive damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plant. In this situation, a natural disaster led to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.

Established in 1951, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the heart of the U.S. and Japan Alliance, resides in the collaborative work undertaken by the U.S. Military and the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF).[28] The treaty and disaster event in Japan frames the situation and

support for the nation from the U.S. Standing agreements allow planners to start the planning process and frame the way ahead to achieve a desired end state. The U.S. and Japan launched Operation Tomodachi to handle the crisis.

Objective

Objective relates to the desired end state of the mission or event. Within the objective step, commanders will provide their guidance, intent, and mission focus to support planning efforts. This step starts to frame how the mission will unfold. In many cases, this step determines how planners want the leader or adversary group to act or not act in support of mission success. In the case of building partner capacity or humanitarian relief, the objective supports enabling the host nation to take over and run a self-sufficient operation once the overarching U.S. and coalition nations withdraw support.

> Understanding the perceptions of the various audiences can help planners create the plan with the proper messages, activities, and images to support their efforts and counter negative activities...

Objective links to the mission analysis within JOPP where planners start framing the environment within the guidance and intent of the commander. In the objective step, planners analyze the information central to the planners who are looking at the proper elements to achieve the objective when applying assets to execute the mission. Within the IASC process, the objective step links to the analysis section where planners examine assumptions, risks, and triggers. All three processes link the same concepts together in seeking to analyze and prepare for the desired end state.

In Operation Tomodachi, the main objective was to support Japan in recovering from the disaster. Non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, support to a nuclear disaster, and infrastructure issues were a number of sub-objectives. Beyond just the planning and end state aspects, there was the issue of "lanes in the road."[29] Part of analyzing the situation and reaching a point where a solid objective is mapped out, planners must be aware of who is involved in executing the mission and their responsibilities in resolving the situation. In the case of Operation Tomodachi, Japan and host nation assets, State, U.S. Pacific Command and assigned forces, Department of Energy, and other non-governmental and international organizations were all involved.[30] All of these various groups would look to the military for support in executing their portions of the operation.

Perception

When establishing the plan and how it will be executed, understanding the perceptions of the leaders, military, and public within the environment is paramount. Perceptions may include those of the U.S., coalition, and host nation; direct and potential adversary; local populace, either for or against the local government or adversary; and the international community. In understanding perceptions, there is also the point of culture and how the audience perceives information, messages, and images via the different mediums of access to information.

Understanding the perceptions of the various audiences can help planners create the plan with the proper messages, activities, and images to support their efforts and counter negative activities by outside influences and the adversary depending upon the environment. In the context of both JOPP and the IASC processes, perceptions fit within the analysis block. Additionally, understanding the biases and cultural differences and perceptions among

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planners, can cause greater issues within the planning effort.

The perceptions affecting U.S. and Japan during Operation Tomodachi were focused around the possibility of any inappropriate activity. In the case of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, most governments and people are receptive to the support of the nation. In this case, the long-standing relationship between U.S. military forces within Japan and interactions between the nations made dealing with perceptions a minor factor in planning the missions. During Operation Tomodachi, interaction between the joint and interagency was hampered by differences in language, which led to problems associated with explaining problems, planning operations, and requesting information.[31] Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational must work from a single codified process and lexicon to support planning efforts.

Story

The story is the statement regarding the observable elements of the operation and is integral to the plan. The story is the marketing campaign for the operation and supports the internal, local, and international audiences. Verbal and non-verbal actions and activities reinforce the messages and actions being released to the media and global information environment and include the right use of language, colloquialisms, and images. Planners need to be cognizant of how language and images are interpreted and absorbed within the region of the activity. There is more than one story; therefore, planners must be prepared to counter quickly any negative story capable of hindering an operation.

The story supports the "means" within national strategy and runs parallel to the COA step within the JOPP. COAs must be flexible enough to answer any shifts in the environment.[32] Information operations planners create informational-flexible deterrent options as part of the COA, and these options become the story. In the IASC process, the story fits within the planning response step.

During Operation Tomodachi, media reports about U.S., Japanese, and international support for the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief received different reviews. U.S. efforts through public affairs officers were seen on the Yokota, Pacific Air Force, and Kadena Air Force Base websites and were echoed via the main Air Force website. These stories and photos show troops from the U.S. and JSDF supporting the humanitarian assistance and relief efforts.[33] The other side of the story focused on the local populace.[34] The Japan Probe website expressed gratitude, while the Japan Today site expressed a negative response to the operation.[35] No matter how much positive press the U.S. can produce, the local and international audience will both support and negate the story

> **Planners need to be cognizant of how language and images are interpreted and absorbed within the region of the activity.**

Means

The means is the "who" of the operation, from strategic to tactical planning. Planners develop and evaluate COAs and identify units, organizations, and agencies to complete the specified tasks assigned. In preparing for the means, planners at the operational and tactical levels ensure missions and units are capable of supporting the operations. This step will divide and match tasks among military, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets. Additionally, logistical lines will be established

to support the units and organizations performing the missions.

Means fits within the COA development of the JOPP and planning response of the IASC process. Depending upon the size and scope of the operations, units are assigned to the operations to perform specific tasks to achieve mission success for the commander.[36] Civilian organizations typically do not fall within the force deployment packages established by the military during this step in planning.[37] However, if interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets receive tasks as part of the mission, each organization's planners will determine how to get a unit in the area (part of the orders production element of JOPP).

> **Feedback was apparent when the Japanese locals spelled out *Arigato*, Japanese for thank you, on the beach outside of the town of Sendai.**

During Operation Tomodachi, most of the U.S. units participating were already based in Japan. Special Operations units training in the Republic of Korea, supporting the Foal Eagle Exercise, were redeployed for a brief time to support the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by re-opening the Sendai airport, critical for relief operations.[38] Additionally, the Department of Energy deployed teams to support radiological measuring and support the government of Japan in dealing with the damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plant.[39] The Air Force also deployed radiological teams from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to support radiological monitoring within the country.[40] All of these means, identified as requirements by the commander, supported achieving the desired mission success.

Feedback

Feedback comes in many different forms. Feedback from the performing unit is considered a measure of performance. The unit accomplishes the specified and implied tasks which provide the commander the status of the operation. A series of successful measures of performance lead to an overall operational measure of effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness on an adversary's effectiveness are received from intelligence channels, local community media reporting, and face-to-face interaction.

Feedback supports the "ends" of strategic planning and is considered during mission analysis within the JOPP. In an environment with limited resources, understanding how to measure the success of an operation is paramount to completing and terminating them. During mission analysis, planners discuss the current situation with the intelligence planners and work with them to establish feedback criteria and set up parameters for collecting and reporting for all phases of an operation.[41] In the IASC process, feedback is contained within the planning response processes. Feedback also supports branch and sequel plans within the operation.[42]

Operation Tomodachi feedback mechanisms were embedded within the responses from the Japanese people. U.S. forces measures of performance and effectiveness were apparent in the ability to reopen the Sendai airport nine days after the tsunami. Working by, with, and through the Japanese government, the U.S. and JSDF returned the airfield to normal operational levels.[43] The reopening of the airport allowed military and commercial air carriers to support the relief efforts. Feedback was apparent when the Japanese locals spelled out *Arigato*, Japanese for thank you, on the beach outside of the town of Sendai.[44]

Termination

Termination for any operation is identified at the onset of planning. Termination supports the "ends" of a strategic plan. While creating the objective of the operation, planners should determine how to terminate the mission. Some termination criteria may take place before the operation, i.e., if there are not enough assets to perform the tasks, then the operation will terminate. Operations may terminate in the middle of the plan if the adversary does not act or react to the plan the way the commander desires. Termination for an operation can also take place when all the success criteria mapped out in the plan are achieved. In stability operations, the ability for the local government to take over and succeed is a reason to terminate. Termination covers how units and agencies will extract their assets. Public support can affect the termination of an operation. If support is high, operations continue; if support is poor or excessively negative, termination can happen sooner.

Terminating within JOPP is part of mission analysis and COA development. The termination concept is part of orders production and redeployment process. Termination is part of determining limitations within the operation.[45] In terminating an operation, a story is provided to the information environment stating success or other conditions, which leads to the end of an operation. Termination criteria ensure forces are not endangered or the effectiveness of the force or mission compromised.[46] Termination in the public eye can be done via exposing the whole plan or parts of the plan to support operational security issues.

Operation Tomodachi might have a number of different terminating criteria. A terminating event may be linked to the environment, such as weather conditions, which would hamper humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Planners may need to terminate due to a lack of assets and forces to support the mission. A third termination criterion would have been if the Fukushima nuclear plant goes critical and the whole site explodes in similar fashion to Chernobyl in the Ukraine. Termination could have come from the local community in a negative response to the use of U.S. resources to support the local governments in clean up or the international community reacting negatively to the operation. The coordination between the U.S. and Japanese government entities ensured public support for the operation would not lead to an early termination. Termination for Operation Tomodachi came as the Japanese

> **Public support can affect the termination of an operation. If support is high, operations continue...**

government and life were returned to normal.[47]

The SOPSMF/T strategy above enables planners to encompass a situation, determine the objective, and provide direction to reach mission success. It takes into consideration perceptions of the local and international community, develops stories to support the operation to ensure people know what is happening and why, measures operational performance and effectiveness, and provides feedback mechanisms and methods of reporting. Lastly, it envisions and considers termination points.

Conclusion

In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz states: "The first of these three aspects [of war] mainly concerns the people; the second, the commander and his army; the third, the government. The passions are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people."[48] In planning for a crisis, military, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planners tend to look at the

adversary without fully understanding the need to work as an integrated and synchronized team to ensure success. These communities are capable of understanding their own respective strategies and processes, but typically they are not educated and trained to cross the tribal lines required for successful operations.

Over the past thirty years, numerous articles have addressed lack of unity between interagency communities during execution. A strategy must be capable of crossing all the communities and providing guidance just above each agency's respective planning process. Planners being tasked to work within a joint interagency coordination group, task force, or intergovernmental and multinational environment must have a common planning language and lexicon.

The SOPSMF/T process will bring different cultures and agencies to the same table to plan and execute operations. For the process to work, agencies must be willing to learn the process and socialize the concept during exercises and operations. Incorporating the SOPSMF/T process into policy and doctrine and practicing it during exercises and operations will level the knowledge across all joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational communities.

Recommendations

Using the proposed SOPSMF/T approach to higher-level planning strategy requires open discussions among the senior leadership of each department. These discussions should support the cadre of doctrine writers and educators and facilitate adopting a simple concept to support all interagency planning. The lack of an effective National Security Council (NSC) decision-making process continues to plague interagency coordination efforts during pre- and post-war planning.[49] Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, several State and DoD agencies were frantically piecing together a detailed Phase IV (post-war) plan.[50] The lack of a cohesive planning strategy at all levels continues to be a detriment to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planning. Recommendations for correcting the issues highlighted in this article include the following:

1. In the National Security Strategy, codify a Principles Committee (PC) to chair strategic planning for the whole-of-government approach affecting national security. The committee would have joint, interagency, and intergovernmental representation. The PC would establish a unified planning construct to support communications across agencies and departments.

2. In DoD, State, and other departments or agencies, codify education to be either functional or regional planners. Educate on the concepts of planning across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments using the proposed strategy.

3. Within the national security policy process (NSC and interagency system), establish the SOPSMF/T process for all joint and interagency parties. Incorporate guidelines within annual reports to the NSC and committees.[51]

4. In both joint and interagency doctrine and handbooks, establish a singular planning strategy that crosses all departments and organizations. This planning strategy must support the operational and strategic levels of planning and execution for a commander (military or civilian) against a given threat or event. Linking the SOPSMF/T process back to the National Security Strategy demonstrates a unified effort. Use the same language in the doctrine and handbooks.

5. Personnel assignments within DoD, State, and other agencies should expand to ensure planners work in and have an understanding of different agencies and departments. This increased participation in other agencies will facilitate a better understanding of the intricacies and requirements of the other communities and build a network of planners to leverage when a crisis arises.

6. To ensure a unified planning strategy, agency and department exercises should encompass all elements of planning and execution across the range of military and governmental operations. Ensure all agencies and departments have a chance to observe and participate in these exercises.

For SOPSMF/T to be successful, agencies and departments must establish a top-down unified effort among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments. Recommendations to unify the planning strategy must come from the top and reach from strategy to tactical application. Harmonizing across the community is paramount for success in an environment of dwindling budgets and work force and increasing dynamic, asymmetric threats. *IAJ*

NOTES

1   Colonel Pat Pihana, United State Air Force, Special Operations Force (SOF) Chair, National Defense University and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Michael Bennett, United States Army, SOF Liaison, Joint Forces Staff College, in discussions with the author expressing their personal experiences of working with the interagency and the issues that exist with planning and execution.

2   Ibid.

3   In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released the QDDR for the Department of State. Due to her experience with the Senate Armed Service Committee, Secretary Clinton understood this document was critical to State's future. Clinton understood that working in a global environment where the whole-of-government effort is critical to achieving national security and desired end states, State and DoD must learn to work together.

4   IASC–HEWS website, 2012, <http://www.hewsweb.org>, accessed on February 4, 2013. The group and service is dedicated to responding to the hazards of floods, storms, locust, volcanoes, earthquakes, weather, and other hazards.

5   Requests for Operation Tomodachi data was sent to USPACOM and State. No information was provided at the time of writing. Information referenced in this paper is open source searches on the Internet.

6   Lieutenant Colonel Ricky Rife and Rosemary Hansen, "Defense is from Mars, State from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 1, 1998. Rife and Hansen were National Security Affairs Fellows at Hoover Institute, Stanford University, California. The paper highlights communication differences between the two cultures.

7   Ibid., p. 1.

8   Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, Washington, September 2009, p. 2, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>, accessed on February 8, 2013. This document is the basis of DoD support for stability operations and the need to integrate joint and interagency communities. The instruction points to stability operations as a core military mission. The

military must be prepared to conduct these missions and may be the supporting versus supported effort.

9   Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01C, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs*, Washington, January 18, 2012, p. 3, <http://www.dtic.mil /cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5715_01. pdf>, accessed on February 12, 2013.

10   Ibid., p. 2.

11   Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, Washington, June 24, 2011, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf>, accessed on February 11, 2013. This document should be available to everyone working in and around the military from any of the various departments. It helps provide the lexicon for common language.

12   JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Department of Defense, Washington, August 2011, Chapter II, p. 1 and Chapter IV, p. 24 state a COA must be feasible. The doctrine also highlights that plans should have different flexible deterrent options to counter adversary activity.

13   The joint community has released several handbooks supporting joint participation in interagency activities.

14   The QDDR seeks to create a link between State and the rest of the interagency and DoD organizations.

15   Figure 1, created by the author, uses information from JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, p. xi and Chapter IV, p. 1; JOPP; IASC HEWS website; CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System*, September 2012; and the informal proposed strategy process.

16   JP 5-0, p. xi. Planning is the basis for commander's activities from theater engagement plans and building partner capacity to crisis action and the range of military operations.

17   Ibid. Ends, ways, means, and risk are outlined within JP 5-0 and link the national strategy to the operational planning process for planners to nest operations with the desired end state from higher headquarters.

18   Ibid., p. x.

19   The QDDR is on parallel with the QDR and recent policy and strategy initiatives out of the DHS. The QDDR supports the evolution and changes within Sate and USAID.

20   Ibid., p. 3.

21   On December 17, 2011, State released a follow-up message to staff, provided direction, and created a number of strategies supporting operations. The overarching strategies link to joint practices.

22   IASC–HEWS website.

23   The IASC HEWS website focuses on the ability of international, non-governmental, and United Nations participants and organizations to monitor humanitarian issues globally and a provides a basic critical thinking page with a process for planning.

24   Stimer and Associates devised the planning strategy to support analysis and planning and transitioned the products into the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) format for plan creation. Colonel (retired) Rich Stimer was in the Air Force Checkmate element and supported the planning for Desert Storm.

25   APEX replaces JOPES in accordance with CJCS Guide 3130, April 30, 2012.

26   Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, definition #4.

27   The National Bureau of Asian Research, *Chronology of Operation Tomodachi: Amidst Trial, Ties That Bind: Enduring Strength in the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, 2011. The bureau conducts advanced independent research on strategic, political, economic, globalization, health, and energy issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia.

28   Ibid., p. 1.

29   Operations can be divided so that each agency, department, or organization has the capability to achieve the desired end state of the commander or lead group. Among the cultures of departments, there may be turf wars over who is in the lead and who is supporting a specific activity.

30   Operation Tomodachi and interagency and multinational participants are discussed within 18th Wing and Team Kadena's history of the event. It is also echoed in Stowe and Hale's briefing on nuclear response to the issues at the Fukushima nuclear plant.

31   Major Jaime Stowe and Major Alan Hale, "DOD's Response to Fukushima—Operation Tomodachi," paper presented at the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference, Inc., St. Paul, MN, 2012, <http://www.nationalrep.org/2012Presentations/Session%208_DoD%27s%20Response%20to%20Fukushima_Stowe-Hale.pdf>, p. 10.

32   JP 5-0. COA development highlights the requirement for information flexible deterrent options as part of planning.

33   Google search on Operation Tomodachi reveals a plethora of stories regarding the operations during the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The actions taken by U.S. forces within the region would be within the rules of engagement set forth between the nations after the disaster struck and the U.S. went into action to support Japan and the treaty.

34   Japan Probe website, April 2, 2011. This article offers an impression from a Japanese journalist, Yuko Ando, who visited a number of locations with U. S. and JSDF and highlights the mutual support and respect between the nations. The Japan Today website, April 23, 2011, echoes the gratefulness expressed by Prime Minister Naoto Kan in the *Washington Post*. The article continues to expose arguments against the operation stating Japan will end up paying in the long run for the operation.

35   Japan Today is a website covering news outlets and activity relating to the country.

36   JP 5-0, Chapter IV, p. 8.

37   DODI 3000.05, p. 10.

38   18th Wing History, p. 5.

39   Ibid.

40   Stowe and Hale.

41   JP 5-0, Annex D, p. 3.

42   Ibid.

43   18th Wing history, p. 15.

44   Ibid., p. 19.

45   JP 5-0, Chapter III, p. 37.

46 Ibid.

47 18th Wing, p. 17.

48 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, p. 101. Clausewitz describes war as an extension of politics. To plan for any situation, the different tribes need to be on the same sheet of music, following the same plan.

49 Major Julio Arana, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. Owens, and David Wrubel, "Strengthening the Interagency Process: The Cause for Enhancing the Role of the National Security Advisor," Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, August 2006, p. 1. The paper focuses on the advisor, but can also include getting the interagency to agree to a planning process.

50 Ibid., p. 1.

51 Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System," National Defense University, Washington, August 2011.

Worth Noting

Compiled by Elizabeth Hill

Executive Orders on Immigration Encourage Greater Interagency Cooperation

President Obama recently announced a set of initiatives and Executive Orders to address immigration. The purpose of these actions is to reduce the strain on the current U.S. immigration system, which the President describes as "broken." The new policies effect undocumented immigrants, communities, businesses, and employers.

The executive actions also encourage increased interagency cooperation, and call for the creation of an interagency working group made up of the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Labor, and other related government agencies and groups. The working group will focus on promoting worker cooperation with enforcement authorities while ensuring employers do not use federal agencies to undermine worker protection laws.

Additional initiatives include the allocation of immigrant visas and increased and expanded work authorization for immigrants. *IAJ*

Obama Calls for Interagency Review of Hostage Policy

In late November 2014, the White House announced that President Obama has ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. policy concerning American hostages held overseas. The decision to review the policy comes after an increase in Islamic State militants capturing and detaining U.S. citizens, including journalists and aid workers.

Historically, U.S. policy has not allowed for hostage negotiation with terrorists. However, policy reform during the Bush administration made allowances for ransom payments under certain circumstances. National Security Presidential Directive 12, which was signed in 2002 and is still in effect, dictates the roles and responsibilities of various related U.S. government agencies and was also the nascence of the "hostage working group."

The proposed review, according to a letter from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth, will focus on several areas related to hostage cases, including family engagement, intelligence collection, and diplomatic engagement. Wormuth also stated that the review will "seek to integrate innovative and nontraditional solutions to result in recommended actions to improve interagency coordination and strengthen the whole-of-government approach" led by the FBI and Department of State.

White House National Security Council spokesman Alistair Baskey said in a statement that, while the Obama administration could not reveal all the details surrounding efforts to free U.S. hostages, "we will continue to bring all appropriate military, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic capabilities to bear to recover American hostages." *IAJ*

House Committee Reviews Multi-Agency Ebola Response

On October 24, 2014, experts and representatives from several U.S. departments and international organizations spoke at a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Ebola response hearing. In their prepared statements to the Committee, the experts reviewed current measures taken to combat the Ebola epidemic, missteps and areas of mismanagement, and new protocols and procedures that are or will be implemented.

Panelists included The Honorable Nicole Lurie, M.D., Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); The Honorable Michael Lumpkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD); Major General James M. Lariviere, Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs (Africa), DoD; The Honorable John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Deborah Burger, RN, Co-President, National Nurses United; and Mr. Rabih Torbay, Senior Vice President, International Operations, International Medical Corps.

When questioned about the U.S. military's role in West Africa, Lumpkin stated that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which is leading the efforts to contain Ebola, approached DoD for support because of DoD's experience with disaster response missions. Lumpkin also stated that DoD's involvement is an "interim solution" until international community can better mobilize to respond to the Ebola outbreak.

During questioning, Lariviere assured the committee that the U.S. military personal would not be in contact with those infected with Ebola, and stressed that the U.S. military was taking every precaution to ensure the health and safety of America's service men and women.

Roth's statement included a review of an audit of DHS's pandemic preparedness supplies. The 2014 audit found that DHS had mismanaged its preparedness program, with Roth citing poor management and inadequate storage of pandemic supplies, as well as a lack of proper record keeping. DHS also did not conduct a needs assessment before purchasing pandemic supplies, leaving DHS unsure of whether its protective equipment stockpiles are adequate for responding to a pandemic.

Lurie spoke about the steps HHS and other agencies have taken since the outbreak in West Africa, and highlights the efforts underway to prepare an Ebola vaccine. According to Lurie, the U.S. is well situated to respond to the Ebola epidemic due to the collaborative efforts of HHS and their many interagency and public- and private-sector partners. Lurie also spoke about changes and lessons learned from previous health emergencies.

Burger and Torbay spoke of the needs of health care workers responding to the epidemic in the U.S. and West Africa, with Burger citing various concerns of nurses in U.S. hospitals and Torbay focusing on the responsibilities and hardships of heath care workers treating Ebola patients in West Africa. *IAJ*

DHS Secretary Reviews 21st Century Border Security

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson recently spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on the subject of U.S. border security in the 21st century. His remarks were centered on the U.S. southwest border. In his address, Secretary Johnson voiced his commitment to increased transparency about U.S. border security, and reviewed expanded security measures along the southwest border. Johnson also discussed two major efforts aimed at curbing illegal entry into the U.S.

The risk-based strategy focuses on "risk areas" where larger numbers of illegal border crossings take place. Johnson stated that DHS and the agencies working to secure U.S. borders needed to be flexible enough to move as risk area locations change, saying "We need to go further in this direction, so that we can focus our resources where our intelligence and our surveillance tell us the threats exist."

The Southern Border campaign plan is an initiative that coordinates the assets and personnel of Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Coast Guard, and other resources within DHS to better address illegal immigration into the U.S. Included in the campaign goals are the effective enforcement and interdiction across land, sea, and air; the degradation of transnational criminal organizations; and to maintain the unimpeded flow of lawful trade, travel, and commerce across U.S. borders. The campaign also includes the establishment of three new DHS task forces that will enable more effective, efficient, and unified homeland security and border security efforts. *IAJ*

Johnson Encourages Further DHS/DoD Cooperation

On October 14, 2014, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson spoke at the annual Association of the U.S. Army's conference. Johnson spoke about past, current, and future collaborative efforts of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, and encouraged increased cooperation between all branches of U.S. government. Johnson stated that DoD and DHS have "intersecting missions," and that "More and more, these missions need to align."

In his remarks, Johnson noted that the American people were "anxious" about the current crises in the world, and that better collaboration in government could assuage these fears. Johnson also discussed the importance of keeping the American public informed of threats as well, saying that "…we owe the public responsible dialogue. We owe the public responsible messaging — the facts, not speculation and rumor that will feed the flame of anxiety and fear."

Among the major threats discussed in by Johnson are the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the actions of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other extremists. *IAJ*

State Issues Nonproliferation Compliance Report

During the summer of 2014, the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance issued the 2014 compliance report. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments was released in July, and provides a detailed assessment of the adherence to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments of the U.S. and other nations.

The compliance report is made up of four parts: U.S. compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments; compliance with treaties and agreements concluded bilaterally with the Soviet Union or its successor states; other nations' (including successor states') compliance with multilateral agreements; and other nations' (including successor states') compliance with their international commitments.

The section of the report that addresses U.S. compliance provides a short background on the processes and controls across executive branch agencies that ensure U.S. plans and programs remain in compliance with their international obligations. This includes interagency reviews that are conducted as appropriate. *IAJ*

State, Interagency Partner to Counter Terrorists

On September 10, 2014, acting Deputy Coordinator for Homeland Security and Multilateral Affairs Hillary Batjer Johnson addressed the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security to discuss the threat posed by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorists with Western passports.

In her remarks, the deputy coordinator stated that the State Department remains "gravely concerned" by terrorist activity in Syria and Iraq. She went on to discussed cooperative efforts between the Departments of State and Homeland Security (DHS) and other interagency and foreign partners. These efforts include border screening efforts and global aviation security efforts between State, DHS, the Terrorist Screening Center, and foreign partners.

State is also leading interagency efforts to engage in terrorism prevention. These efforts include facilitating information exchanges with foreign partners, building partner capacity, and developing shared objectives focused on addressing the foreign fighter threat. *IAJ*

FEMA Releases National Protection Framework

During the summer of 2014, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) released the first edition of their National Protection Framework. The National Protection Framework is one of five National Planning Frameworks which cover the five preparedness mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Each Framework describes whole-of-community efforts to address the mission areas.

The National Protection Framework describes what the whole community should do to safeguard against acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other threats or hazards. It describes the core capabilities, roles and responsibilities, and coordinating structures that facilitate the protection

of individuals, communities, and the Nation.

The National Protection Framework's eleven core capabilities include:

- Planning

- Public Information and Warning

- Operational Coordination

- Access Control and Identity Verification

- Cybersecurity

- Intelligence and Information Sharing

- Interdiction and Disruption

- Physical Protective Measures

- Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities

- Screening, Search, and Detection

- Supply Chain Integrity and Security

The National Protection Framework recognizes, values, and leverages existing coordinating structures, and coordinates protection capabilities through existing partnerships at all levels of government and with the private sector and NGOs

The National Prevention Framework, National Mitigation Framework, and National Response Framework were released in May 2013. *IAJ*

FEMA Issues Federal Interagency Operational Plans

In July 2014, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) released the Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs). The FIOPs describe how the federal government aligns resources and delivers core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal, which is "A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk."

FIOPs have been developed to build upon four of FEMA's five mission areas outlined in the National Planning Frameworks – prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery.

- The prevention FIOP is meant to facilitate an effective federal law enforcement, investigative, intelligence, and operational response to threatened or actual acts of terrorism within the United States, and is focused on federal departments' and agencies' use of prevention core capabilities to resolve imminent threats and prevent attacks and follow-on attacks against the United States.

- The mitigation FIOP is directed toward federal agency operations, but is not limited to disaster-focused authorities and capabilities. The FIOP establishes a joint system for supporting local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area partners and delivers public resources in a coordinated, effective, and proficient manner.

- The response FIOP is built on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and utilizes the whole community concept, which incorporates a full range of stakeholders—including individuals, families, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal governments—in national preparedness activities.

- The recovery FIOP provides the overarching interagency coordination structure for the recovery phases of Stafford Act incidents. The recovery FIOP is an all-hazards plan that provides guidance for the implementation of the National Disaster Recovery Framework, and while the FIOP is primarily intended to provide guidance to federal departments and agencies, other governments, NGOs, and public or private sector organizations will also find this recovery FIOP useful.

The fifth FIOP on protection will be released at a later date to ensure it aligns with emerging national protection policy. *IAJ*

DoD Updates Strategy for Countering WMDs

In June 2014 the Department of Defense (DoD) released its strategy for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This new strategy rescinds and replaces the 2006 National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and seeks to ensure that the United States and its allies and partners are neither attacked nor coerced by hostile actors with WMD.

DoD's WMD strategy lays out four objectives that focus on shaping the environment, cooperating with partners, and prioritizing early action in countering WMD. These objectives are:

- to reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD;

- to increase the barriers to WMD acquisition, proliferation, and use;

- to manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states and safe havens;

- to deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered, integrated defenses.

These objectives are achieved through the strategy's three lines of effort, which include preventing the acquisition of WMD, containing and reducing WMD threats, and responding to crises.

The strategy emphasizes the importance of cooperating with DoD partners, including other U.S. government departments and agencies, allies, and international bodies. The strategy recognizes the important role DoD's interagency and international partners play in countering WMD, focusing on cooperative efforts to shape the security environment, and relying on the intellectual capacity of these partners to maintain and expand technical expertise. *IAJ*

DoD, Partners Part of U.S. Strategy to Combat ISIL

Navy Rear Admiral John Kirby, Department of Defense (DoD) Press Secretary, briefed the press Friday, August 22, on the U.S. strategy to confront the threat of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorists.

Kirby assured the press that "You're not going to see the answer to all ISIL problems through a military lens," saying that DoD will be working with partners in support of Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and that DoD will wouldn't be the "only tool in the toolbox."

According to Kirby, DoD will play a part in an interagency and international approach that involves "supporting, advising, assisting, helping Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces blunt the momentum" of ISIL. DoD will also have a role in protecting U.S. personnel and facilities.

Kirby also touched on the situation in Ukraine during his briefing. ***IAJ***

Recommendations and Report
of The Task Force on U.S. Drone Policy

Task Force Co-Chairs Gen. John P. Abizaid,
U.S. Army, Ret., and Rosa Brooks

The Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., 2014, 77 pp.

Reviewed by Col. Joe Judge III, U.S. Army, Ret.
- Assistant Professor
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

The battle zone use of "drones" or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) or unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has increased exponentially in the last decade. The Stimson Center global security think tank created a distinguished ten member task force to address the importance of UAV oversight, transparency, legality, and accountability, but most importantly, the strategic implications and concern of an increased U.S. reliance on lethal UAVs outside the traditional or "hot" battlefield.

Former United States Central Command Commander General (Ret.) John Abizaid and former Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Rosa Brooks co-chaired the task force. In their June 2014 report, they found that the "Obama administration heavily relies on targeted killings as a pillar of its U.S. counterterrorism strategy" yet unintentionally causes an increase in extremist lethality and influence, as well as an "erosion of sovereignty norms, blowback and risks of a slippery slope into continued conflict or wider wars." The task force report dispels some UAV fallacies and concludes with eight comprehensive recommendations. They advise our national security leaders to consider whether their U.S. UAV policy is both strategically sound, in keeping with our core democratic values, and that our policy does not erode our international legitimacy.

The report states the Obama administration has consistently used the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as its legal basis for U.S. targeted strikes outside of "hot" battlefields, such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. Though the report falls short in deliberating on its legal meaning of a modern battlefield, combatant, or hostility, it correctly reflects this controversy will only worsen as lethal UAV attacks against terrorists occur where there are no U.S. ground troops or openly engaged combat. "The administration's interpretation of the AUMF is extraordinarily broad — and even many former executive branch officials question whether Congress intended to authorize such an unbounded conflict when the AUMF was passed in 2001." The old nation-state concepts of warfare may be gone; therefore many of the legal protection and restrictions may no longer apply.

Many argue these strikes saved lives, but the downsides to these strikes are significant and disconcerting. In May 2013 the Obama administration stated no UAV strikes are authorized outside of hot battlefields unless there is "near certainty no civilians will be killed or injured." Yet, there

have been civilian casualties. The report cited analyst Sarah Krebs, a former Air Force officer now on the Cornell University faculty, "…of the estimated 465 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones." The resultant community anger understandably increases anti-U.S. sentiment and is a "potent recruiting tool for terrorist organizations." As retired Army General and former ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal has stated, "The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes…is much greater than the average American appreciated. They are hated on a visceral level…and create a perception of American arrogance that says we can fly where we want, we can shoot where we want, because we can." The fact that the administration has minimally disclosed the details to past years targeted killings has exacerbated concerns for accountability and transparency. We may view the use of force as justified when our allies or partners do not. The report exclaims the ease of lethal UAV killings "may create a slippery slope" into wider conflicts and wars as well as set a dangerous precedent for other countries using the same justifications.

The report recommends an improved transparency and accountability to both Congress and the American public. "While secrecy may be required before and during each strike, strikes should be acknowledged and information released after the fact, including the legal basis for the killings." It also seeks a transfer of responsibility for carrying out lethal UAV strikes from the CIA to the military, citing the "CIA should focus on intelligence collection and analysis."

The report calls for a "rigorous" strategic review and cost-benefit-risk analysis since the impact of a lethal UAV obviously impacts myriad factions. If the lethal UAV attacks are supposedly helping protect our homeland yet increasing anti-U.S. extremism, one could easily argue we are heading down a more deadly path. Are we creating more terrorists than we are killing? Transparency, hot battlefield clarification and definitive lethal UAV oversight is thus imperative.

Unfortunately, the report stated early on it would not focus on the use of lethal targeting of U.S. citizens, yet this is a pivotal concern to both the international community as well as U.S. citizens. This report was released at the same time as a release of a redacted version of the memo supporting the legal killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Muslim cleric and terrorist, but also an American citizen. Since the evidence to support the killing remains redacted, how can the United States question any other country (hmmm, Russia?) using similar lethal UAV attacks outside of its own "hot" battlefield?

There are many strategic concerns and recommendations in this valuable report – a legal distinction between traditional and "hot" battlefield is not just one of the many crucial issues for our U.S. strategic leaders – but our international leaders as well. *IAJ*

A Dangerous World?
Threat Perception and U.S. National Security

Christoper A. Preble and John Mueller, Editors

Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., 2014, 390 pp.

Reviewed by James A. Stever
- Professor Emeritus
University of Cincinnati

In October, 2013, a group of academicians and security institute representatives met in Washington, D.C. at the Dangerous World Conference. The intent was to determine whether the world in which the United States exists is indeed all that dangerous. Their deliberations produced a consensus that can be described as the "Don't Worry, Be Happy" approach to American national security. Sixteen of the attendees took the next step and codified their presentations at the conference into article form. A Dangerous World? subsequently emerged as a book-length manuscript.

The reader has only to read the title to understand the book's thesis. The presence of the question mark at the end of the title conveys their conclusion that the dangers of the twenty-first century have been oversold. The intent of the book is to pierce the veil—to unmask the charlatans who are scaring us for their own personal or institutional gain. The subtitle, "Threat Perception and U.S. National Security," conveys a similar conclusion—that the putative dangers of the twenty-first century are more perception than substance.

It is unreasonable to expect a book that is a compendium of conference presentations to present the reader with a well-crafted national security theory. Yet, throughout the sixteen articles there are several unifying themes. First, the majority of articles conclude that the security delusions that pervade the twenty-first century are propagated by a core group of villains. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the poster child of a military establishment intent on frightening taxpayers into funding new and exotic weaponry as well as burgeoning military programs. Next up are those academicians and politicians who cling to the outmoded idea of pervasive, world-wide threats. One article criticizes paranoid talk show host Glenn Beck for manufacturing unfounded threats. Cold War Warriors as well as unipolar, and bipolar thinking are passe. Equally noxious are those who believe the United States is exceptional. Promoters of this delusion believe the United States has a special obligation to build a global, hegemonic state capable of keeping peace throughout the world.

Second, most articles in the book celebrate pluralism and condemn "rational-comprehensive" thinking. In this vein, Benjamin Friedman speaks for the majority of his peers by condemning leaders who use sweeping generalizations about national security to gain followers. In his words: "The theory elaborated here sees leaders' tendency to purposely mislead the public as the main cause of national errors about threat. The theory comes from pluralism, not the rational-comprehensive model." National security analysts in this pluralist tradition believe they live in a complex, disjointed world where no single set of dynamics or rules apply. Any attempt to impose a world-wide scheme of analysis or world-wide set of values is flawed and dishonest. Flowing from this pluralist premise is the ethic of tolerance.

Joshua Shifrinson explains to us what should be the cash value of an ethic of tolerance: "... the United States should reduce its political and military presence abroad to devolve responsibility for maintaining the commons to regional actors sharing American interests." This point of view believes that working with regional partners such as India would not only afford the United States the luxury of smaller military budgets, but it would produce more global stability: each regional set of state actors content to operate in their own sphere of influence.

However, none of the authors who counsel this pluralist ethic provide a good answer to the most pressing national security question of our time: What do we do when a state or a rogue group denounces the constraints of tolerance, embraces absolutism, and uses terror, aided by lethal technology to advance its particular ends?

The dynamics of publishing being what they are, tolerant readers might conclude that the bulk of the thinking behind this book occurred late in 2013 and early 2014. And, the indulgent reader might even concede that the authors simply could not have foreseen the national security meltdown that occurred in late 2014. However, such indulgence is misplaced. There were a cacophony of national security threats prior to 2014 that the authors of this book willfully ignore.

For example, despite new advances in nuclear technology and the legitimate fears associated with suitcase bombs and dirty bombs, Stephanie Rugolo assures us: "Furthermore, it is unlikely that terrorists will be able to obtain nuclear weapons." In the same vein, Francis Gavin declares: "But any notion that terrorist groups will come up with nuclear weapons, even if they wanted to and tried hard, looks extremely unlikely."

Beyond terrorism, the new threat of Chinese and Russian expansion was evident far in advance of 2014. Yet, regarding the Russian threat, Lyle Goldstein counsels restraint:

> Hawks in Washington will undoubtedly attribute the Kremlin's aggressive behavior to an alleged failure of leadership and a general lack of toughness by the Obama administration. But a more sophisticated analysis of the Ukraine situation reveals that American power and influence are finite, and there is little opportunity to affect that complex situation positively.

Regarding the China threat, Goldstein attempts to deflect our attention by declaring that a multitude of interests are "poised to profit" from the myth that China is a significant threat perhaps even greater than Russia. Not to worry: "China has not resorted to any significant use of force in more than three decades, it has no foreign bases, and it remains rather weak (compared with U.S. forces) in the domains of power projection and nuclear war fighting."

As every college professor knows, controversy sells books and it keeps sleepy students awake in class. Rather than condemn this book as unserious, the more balanced observation is that this book embraces an iconoclastic counter argument. It provides a useful foil against which more reasoned analysts can array and display their skills. The book is deliberately provocative.. In better times, such an approach would be entertaining. But, in the current grim national security environment, this approach seems strangely out of place—diverting our attention away from some very serious security problems throughout the world. Because this book is anachronistic, it is not likely that the "Don't Worry, Be Happy" approach will be given serious consideration. **_IAJ_**