U.S. Military Sustainment Assistance Following North Korean Regime Collapse

by Edward K. Woo

North Korea will achieve nothing by threats or by provocations. North Korea knows its obligations, and it must take irreversible steps to meet those obligations. On this, the United States and the Republic of Korea are absolutely united... It is in none of our interests to see tension and instability in the region [or to see] a nuclearized peninsula.¹

President Obama

U.S. government interagency planners are no strangers to analyzing armed conflicts and regional instability. Most planners will profess that there is no simple formula to solve the intricacies of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. These types of deliberations oftentimes induce an unwieldy and complex environment interlaced with parallel threads, ambiguous relationships, interrelationships, and national and institutional affinities in a multiplex of dynamic ecosystems.²

The U.S. has and continues to have a long-standing adversarial relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—North Korea’s official name. Although presidential administrations change, U.S. policy on the DPRK remains largely unaffected because of DPRK’s unpredictable, volatile, and, oftentimes, erratic behavior. Because of the abusive dictatorial regimes of Kim Jong Un and his predecessors, the current U.S. administration aims to exercise multilateral pressure on the regime to relinquish its nuclear option.³ The DPRK isolates itself from the rest of the global community and its communist ideals, military provocations, and brinkmanship tactics⁴ have damaged ties with its neighbors. Historically, these provocations have led to hunger, famine, malnutrition, and the violation of human rights.

Despite the DPRK’s volatile behavior over several decades and in the midst of a struggling economy and extensive hunger, the transfer of command from father to son was seamless.⁵ After the transition in December 2011, Kim Jong Un appears to have an active stranglehold on the agencies of power and the populace. Studying a potential DPRK regime collapse is important because of its disastrous centralized economy, decrepit industrial sector, deficient agricultural base, underfed military and populace, and budding nuclear program.⁶ A sudden leadership change could prove
destabilizing and unpredictable. An inadequate response to regime collapse could lead to serious consequences and a broader regional conflict.

As the political, diplomatic, economic, and social atmosphere changes in the Asia-Pacific region, the impetus to study the sustainment capabilities on the Korean peninsula is significant. A sustainment architecture that befits all quantifiable and doctrinal metrics to support these operations is a daunting, albeit, obligatory task for any sustainment planner.

This paper examines the sustainment units and equipment required to support the military forces and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a DPRK regime collapse scenario. The analysis will enable planners to determine how to dependably support and sustain the Republic of Korea (ROK)—South Korea’s official name—in the best political, economic, and strategic interests of the U.S.

**BACKGROUND**

The Fifth Republic of Korea saw the end of military influence. In 1987, the Sixth Republic of Korea elected leaders by popular vote. Since 1987, the ROK’s relationship with the U.S. blossomed, while the DPRK adopted a *Juche*—self-reliance—ideology necessitated by the previous century’s amalgam of despair, turmoil, and grief.

Originally, Kim Il Sung adopted Maoist concepts, such as the idea of self-regeneration. “The notion of Juche...started to develop in the mid-1950s during [a] dispute with the Soviet Union [and] formed the ideological basis of Kim Il Sung’s totalitarian system” Juche ideology, independence or self-reliance based on a very strong cadence of nationalism, is derived primarily from Marxist-Leninist theory. Other factors, such as trauma from embittered Japanese colonial rule and arrogant communist allies imposing their development models onto the DPRK, contributed to the Juche ideology.

*Juche* was the foundation of the Five-Year Plan of 1956–1961, which led to numerous DPRK reforms. The goal of the Five-Year Plan was swift economic progress and the development of a large industrial base. The DPRK’s plan mirrored the Soviet Union’s five year plan of 1928. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the DPRK was real and substantiated by partnership and open communication. After the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1972, *Juche* replaced Marxism-Leninism in the revised DPRK constitution.

After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which at the time was the DPRK’s greatest economic partner, Kim Jong-Il abandoned Marxism-Leninist ties and incorporated the Songun (army-first) policy into *Juche*. Over time, the communist North’s centralized economy precipitately declined requiring significant international aid to stave off wholesale starvation. While the regime accepted these handouts, it did not modify its bellicose and often erratic behavior on the world stage. As a result, global and economic partners diminished. When coupled with the self-reliance tenets of *Juche* that acquiesced to overconfidence and stubbornness, the DPRK evolved into an impoverished warrior state.

**ROK’s Developing Policies and Economic Trends from 1990 to Present**

In 1997, all of the dominant Asian markets suffered through what is commonly referred to as the International Monetary Fund crisis. The ROK’s banking sector was over weighted with non-
performing loans as its largest corporations funded aggressive expansions. Hasty expansion and overleveraging by conglomerates worsened the ROK economy and its ability to compete globally. Many businesses failed and excess debt led to major takeovers. In November 1997, Moody’s lowered the ROK’s credit rating from A1 to A3, the Seoul Stock Exchange fell 7 percent, and the Won dropped from 1,700 to 800 per U.S. dollar. Despite this significant decline, by 2006, the ROK’s economy stabilized, began expanding to overcome the financial crisis, and eventually flourished. Today, the South enjoys strong diplomatic ties, strong global economic presence, enhanced information capabilities, and highly technical industries.

**Impending North Korean Regime Collapse**

The DPRK is a failing state experiencing political instability and a morbid economy. Starvation is commonplace. "North Korea is experiencing lots of rebellious behavior in the forms of refugee flows into China, major black market activities, graft and corruption by DPRK authorities, and even reported attacks on North Korean leaders."11

China is the DPRK’s only treaty ally and provides the impoverished nation with half of its sustenance, three-quarters of its trade, and virtually all of its crude and refined oil. China’s relationship with the DPRK mirrors the U.S. relationship with ROK. The DPRK’s memory of the Western world—Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, Japanese colonization during 1910-1945, and the Korean War—is fresh and remains antagonistic.

The DPRK’s focus on nuclear proliferation is evident as it seeks “to be recognized as [a]
nuclear-armed [state]. In response, the U.S. and its Asian allies have signaled that North Korea cannot expect business as usual.”

While economic instability and socio-political volatility create an environment leading to regime collapse, the DPRK continues to employ nuclear threats as extortionist tools to survive in a sophisticated global economy. “There is thus an imperative to use all tools of persuasion to stop North Korea’s nuclear-development program before it becomes more deadly.”

Without a full diplomatic resolution, the DPRK will fall into an imploding series of events that invite various actors and non-state actors to swarm the DPRK, creating an impending, complex, and erratic operational environment. “Neither a North Korea backed into a corner, nor forced regime change, will serve the region or the world well. The consequences of either of these outcomes for the people of North Korea would be brutal.”

Despite numerous claims of non-aggression, DPRK rhetoric and provocations remain prominent. In 2013, the DPRK claimed that the U.S. is the sworn enemy of the Korean people justifying further threats of nuclear strikes and testing. “Nearby nations are waiting to see whether and how well Kim [Jung Un] consolidates his power base, the expected alternative being domestic instability in North Korea.”

Prison camps are abundant in the DPRK as a psychological instrument to control the population and official belief systems. DPRK propaganda induces a nationalistic atmosphere for its leaders.

A regime collapse is imminent from a diplomatic, informational, military, social, and economic standpoint. Over the past decade, several experts have predicted a regime collapse, but the DPRK remains sovereign. The potential of a unified Korea has U.S. policy implications as well as other impacts, such as the possible intervention of China, Russia, and Iran. A regime change will stimulate an economic revolution in East Asia, albeit a catastrophic one. “Reform of the North Korean economy would have two profound effects: first, there would be a significant increase in exposure to international trade...; second, changes in the composition of output could be tremendous, involving... millions of workers changing employment.”

As long as diplomatic, military, and economic turbulence occurs in the DPRK, U.S. military professionals should remain alert and plan for the right amount of responsive support based on the DPRK’s most likely course of action. In Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, sustainment is “the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion. Sustainment in joint operations provides the Joint Force Commander flexibility, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach.” Because of the interplay of armed conflict and refugee assistance, planners must develop an effective sustainment plan to support actions that advance U.S. interests and initiatives.

**Sustainment Architecture and Analysis**

As the ROK’s economy and security capability has increased, the U.S. military presence on the peninsula has decreased to fewer than 20,000 personnel. Correspondingly, the size of the U.S. sustainment architecture has decreased. The U.S. currently operates an expeditionary sustainment command with a wide variety of capabilities and assets. Many other key organizations supplement the command to include an Army field support brigade, supply centers, transportation control centers, maintenance units, distribution units, and port activities. The current structure supports the current U.S. force but operates in a combined environment alongside a similarly structured ROK
The U.S. expeditionary sustainment command headquarters operates on the peninsula, whereas its higher headquarters, the theater sustainment command, is located in and operates from Hawaii supporting the entire Pacific theater of operations. This higher theater command supports and enables execution of sustainment operations on the Korean peninsula during armistice, crisis, and war. The sustainment organizations on the peninsula have been in place for decades, participating in numerous conferences, combined exercises, training events, and multinational cooperation activities with allied nations.

Overseeing the in-place sustainment commands are senior staff proponents of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), a four-star command responsible for military operations in Korea. The senior logistics officer on the staff of this headquarters is a one-star general who oversees logistic planning activities in conjunction with the commanding general of the expeditionary sustainment command. Together, the leadership conjoins complex military planning through doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities.

All sustainment planners aim to support the USFK mission during armistice, crisis, and contingencies through policy management and procedures for transportation, munitions, petroleum, logistics readiness and planning, mortuary affairs, maintenance, and medical. More importantly, sustainment planners cooperate with ROK partners to prepare, coordinate, and negotiate international agreements and provide wartime host nation support. This cooperation has allowed the U.S. and ROK to improve the theater’s joint sustainment architecture, focusing primarily on road networks, port facilities, and airfields. Despite the myriad of improvements, challenges remain. “Within the Korean theater for the last 20 years, there have been significant inefficiencies and complexities that have contributed to redundancies and competition for scarce resources.”

**POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION ESSENTIAL TASK MATRIX**

Military sustainment planners analyze a logistics challenge by classes of supply, such as food, fuel, ammunition, building material, repair parts, etc. The classes of supply enable measuring excess or shortfalls based on daily requirements and available distribution capabilities. The planner uses established planning factors to anticipate, by each class of supply, consumption quantities based on daily requirements measured in short tons, flat racks, or other distribution capabilities. For example, a sustainment planner required to provide water for 5,000 people, calculates a total daily requirement of 16,700 gallons of water using a consumption factor of 3.34 gallons per person per day. Sustainment planners also consider whether bulk water or packaged (bottled) water is more appropriate. Typically, a hybrid solution of both bulk potable and bottled water requires the planner to analyze distribution methods with available transportation resources and capabilities.

Planners that identify a shortfall have a responsibility to raise the issue to higher headquarters and figure out a solution, while simultaneously extending operational reach, prolonging endurance, and sustaining momentum of the military force.

Responding to the complexities the U.S. faced after the fall of the ruling regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, the State Department led an expansive interagency working group that developed a *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix (ETM)* to serve as a tool for government and
non-government planners in post-conflict environment. It contains a series of tables cataloguing short-, mid-, and long-term tasks essential to support countries transitioning from conflict to a sustainable stability. The tasks are organized around five technical sectors—security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. Within these five sectors are individual tasks that force planners to reference other sectors.

- **Security.** Seven sub-constructs exist within the security construct: disposition of armed forces, intelligence services, and belligerents that emphasize cessation of hostilities; enforcement of peace agreements; disposition and constitution of national armed services; disarmament; demobilization; reintegration of combatants; and disposition of national intelligence services. Security is organic to a U.S. military sustainment planner’s objectives. The military sustainment planner considers logistics of the armed forces, IDPs, and other commodities required to sustain momentum.

- **Governance and participation.** Governance concentrates on national constituting processes, transitional governance, executive authority, legislative strengthening, local governance, transparency, and anti-corruption. Participation focuses on elections, political parties, civil society, media, and public information. The sustainment planner considers logistical requirements to achieve strategic victory through local elections and legislative strengthening. Planners may need to procure transportation, construction supplies, and/or office supplies to facilitate the legitimacy of a newly established government.

- **Humanitarian assistance and social well-being.** Several sub-constructs exist within this construct including the prevention of population displacements and providing refugee assistance, IDP support, and camp security. Food security, another sub-construct, includes tasks focused on famine prevention, emergency food relief, and food market response. Sustainment planners incorporate subsistence planning including prevention of looting of rations. Shelter and non-food relief that highlight non-food relief distribution and shelter construction may require the sustainment planner to consider agreements with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Medical planners consider potable water management, waste management, medical capacity, public clinics and hospital facilities, health policy, health funding, prevention of epidemics, nutrition, reproductive health, and environmental health. Human resources managers plan for personnel services and apply skill sets on the development of fundamental schools, universities, literacy campaigns, and core curriculum planning.

- **Economic stabilization and infrastructure.** Economic stabilization concentrates on fiscal policy and governance, economic policy, imports and exports, market economics, job creation, and the social safety net. The sustainment planner considers economic impacts to the flow of supplies coming into ports or airfields. They also plan and anticipate construction or barrier materiel to support infrastructure, such as municipal services, through coordination with other organizations and providing engineering and contracting support.

- **Justice and reconciliation.** The sub-constructs are the interim criminal justice system, indigenous police, judicial personnel and infrastructure, adjudication of property, legal system reform, human rights standards, corrections, war crime courts, truth commissions and remembrance, and community rebuilding. The sustainment planner supports justice
and reconciliation by planning for the subsistence of any prisoners of war in accordance with international law.

The matrix encourages cross sectoring when conducting a comprehensive analysis, but purposefully avoids any dialectical or counterproductive cross-referencing that would otherwise become a cumbersome planning tool.\textsuperscript{20} The interrelationships are key to this design, as planners likely will find that one technical sector dovetails naturally to other technical sectors or individual tasks. The linkages intrinsically are dyads that lead to triads as subsequent analysis provides fruitful, interesting, enlightening, and sophisticated conclusions or arguments.

The ETM forces military sustainment planners to analyze scenarios that are initially not priorities. Numerous studies and research papers have employed the ETM, and it influenced the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3-07, \textit{Stability Operations}.\textsuperscript{21} The RAND study, “Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues,” used the ETM framework to analyze deployments to the U.S.-Mexico border, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Army operations in the Balkans. The Atlantic Council of the United States’ program on international security used the ETM to study NATO and its stabilization operations.\textsuperscript{22}

The ETM can help identify gaps in capabilities, especially sustainment capabilities, to ensure that the required capabilities are either developed within the U.S. government or sought out.\textsuperscript{23} The matrix employs a common language that captures stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Technical Sector} & \textbf{Initial Response} & \textbf{Transformation} & \textbf{Fostering Sustainability} \\
\hline
Security & Establish a safe and secure environment & Develop legitimate and stable security institutions & Consolidate indigenous capacity \\
\hline
Governance and Participation & Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation & Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes & Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes \\
\hline
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being & Provide for emergency humanitarian needs & Establish foundation for development & Institutionalize long-term development program \\
\hline
Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure & Respond to immediate needs & Establish foundation for development & Institutionalize long-term development program \\
\hline
Justice and Reconciliation & Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances & Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation & Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{ETM Goals (Five Technical Sectors in Three Phases)}
\small{(Source: Thomas Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. 17.)}
\end{table}
This matrix has the necessary components and sequencing of tasks to examine the sustainment architecture on the Korean peninsula in a DPRK collapse scenario.

**Applying the ETM Analysis to Sustainment in North Korea**

The Korean theater of operations (KTO) hosts the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). As the KTO transitions to offensive operations and refugee assistance, the prospect of split-based sustainment operations is essential. The ROK and U.S. may be the only national support elements in the KTO, as other nations might band together to deploy sustainment capabilities. For example, in Bosnia, all troop-contributing nations used their national logistics stovepipes to support their own forces, with the chief of sustainment synchronizing efforts across the command, other agencies, and NGOs to achieve strategic objectives. The sustainment planners in USFK and Combined Forces Command must be cognizant of the support structures of other nations that may deploy to the KTO under U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) directives and be prepared to operate from a split-base configuration.

The U.S. government relies on contractors, especially during conflicts and stability operations, and sustainment planners must plan for contractor and related logistical support arrangements for military use to ensure continuity of service in a hostile environment. The use of contractors during a DPRK regime collapse is inevitable and should be welcomed to insure fidelity of resources and the capability to fill any sustainment gaps in a complex operational environment.

The ETM technical sectors displayed here prove that a sustainment planner must consider all facets of the instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. Sustainment planners can no longer just be concerned with just the tactical mission. Sustainment functions, such as resourcing and providing life support, also further U.S. governmental objectives.

The KTO has ports in Busan and an air base in Osan that act as central ports of embarkation and debarkation. After combat and stability operations, the KTO sustainment architecture will expand north to Pyongyang. Sustainment planners must consider the prospect of developing ports north of the DMZ to promote economic activity and regional stability. An example of a prospective port improvement program during the final phases of post-conflict reconstruction is the port of Nampo.

Disarming North Korea is critical to sustainability as the ROK military assumes broader nation-building efforts; however, the ROK will require significant support from the international community to disarm the DPRK. Since an organization to streamline diplomatic or military processes does not exist in the KTO, the Six Party Talks could effectively act as the beginning of a more structured multilateral agreement treaty in the USPACOM area of operations.

Organizations such as the World Food Programme and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies conclude that humanitarian logistics are crucial to performance and serve as a bridge between disaster response and distribution with the military. A successful sustainment operation is the key to defining success or failure in DPRK regime collapse.

The U.S. military has the right command structure to command and control the sustainment architecture and shortfalls in commodities and manage the sustainment required to support a DPRK regime collapse. With organizations such as the U.S. Transportation Command, Air Mobility Airlift Command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and Military Sealift Command, the U.S. military has the right industrial base to support deployment and force projection.
So long as the U.S. military provides the security for NGOs to work in dangerous situations, the solution to an insecure environment is to provision humanitarian aid from the core responsibility of security.\textsuperscript{29} Preparations to support DPRK regime collapse should take the form of training the U.S. and ROK militaries and interagency, multinational, and other strategic sustainment planners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Supply</th>
<th>Planning Factor</th>
<th>Daily Requirement</th>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Excess / Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>3 x Meals/Person/Day</td>
<td>9,000,000 Meals/Day</td>
<td>Organic military support companies or non-divisional truck companies</td>
<td>Shortfall; The U.S. Military will require an additional 15 Transportation Medium Truck Cargo Companies (40-Ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (Bulk)</td>
<td>0.907 Gallons/Person/Day</td>
<td>2,721,000 Gallons/Day</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shortfall; The U.S. Military will require an additional 65 Quartermaster Water Purification and Distribution Companies or 12 Transportation Medium Truck Cargo Companies (40-Ton) with Compatible Water Tank Racks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (Packaged)</td>
<td>3.34 Gallons/Person/Day</td>
<td>30,060,000 Gallons/Day</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shortfall; The U.S. Military will require an additional 114 Transportation Medium Truck Cargo Companies (40-Ton) or 103 Transportation Medium Truck Companies (PLS) (Local Haul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III(B)</td>
<td>1,362 Gallons/Truck Company/Day</td>
<td>386,808 Gallons/Day</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shortfall; The U.S. Military will require one Transportation Medium Truck Company (POL) (7,500 gallons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>.19 Pounds/Person/Day</td>
<td>570,000 Pounds/Day</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shortfall; The U.S. Military will require one additional Transportation Medium Truck Cargo Company (40-Ton)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: There is one non-divisional transportation company on the KTO. The planning factor for the IDPs is 3 million personnel. The Operational Readiness Rate is 93 percent, which assumes 7 percent of the U.S. military equipment is unable to conduct sustainment operations.

Table 2: Logistics Situation of Three Million IDPs
(Source: Author)

SUSTAINING DPRK REGIME COLLAPSE: WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

As evidenced in the support of an offensive operation, the U.S. military has enough organic capability, given the commodity stocks (ammunition, fuel, water, etc.), to support the fight for a brigade combat team. The challenge in planning successful sustainment to achieve U.S. national objectives is to ensure the U.S. government prepares itself for the humanitarian crisis that will accompany a DPRK regime collapse.

Because of the shortfalls outlined in Table 2, many sustainment tasks will require the application and synchronization of interagency support. The whole-of-government approach is essential and relevant to a period of constrained resources.

Clearly, DPRK regime collapse is not solely a U.S. military problem. As the first responder,
the U.S. military can set the parameters for success. Other actors alleviate and lessen the burden of sustainment. To avoid the U.S. military failing in long-term sustainment, other state and non-state actors must involve themselves in delivering supplies, improving infrastructure, facilitating elections, establishing new ports, analyzing new imports and exports, and sustaining new economic sanctions.

**FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND MULTINATIONAL (JIIM) INTEGRATION AND UNITY OF EFFORT**

The U.S. national posture on the KTO greatly improves the capability to respond to DPRK regime collapse. There must be a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts to mobilize and involve all available U.S. government assets in the effort. An early and often-communicated policy can alleviate most of the consternation of a sustainment planner.

The existing force structure on the KTO is limited and will have shortfalls. The numbers required to sustain a brigade combat team against a DPRK threat are substantial but sustainable because of each BCT’s organic assets. The real challenge lies in distribution capability shortfalls. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) can help alleviate the burden and satisfy requirements. NGOs can also provide the same types of assistance.

Of the available non-divisional companies, any permutations used to create a task organization for 3 million IDPs ultimately will prove limited. As the first responders, the U.S. military will absorb the initial mission. If, over time, the ROK does not have a sufficient plan in place to distribute and store commodities, the U.S. military will culminate early.

The shortfall of the 142 transportation medium truck cargo companies (40-ton) the military requires to transport water, subsistence, fuel, and medical supplies to three million IDPs is staggering. To mitigate shortfalls, multinational cooperation, especially with the ROK, is essential. Of the 142 transportation medium truck cargo companies (40-ton) required, the U.S. military can reasonably support 5 to 10 percent by deploying several transportation companies. The other 90 percent of required distribution capabilities must come from the host nation and interagency partners.

DPRK regime collapse will require heavy interagency support to gain leverage and win the confidence of the North Korean constituents. The U.S. government must coordinate LOGCAP services, leverage ROK assets through sustained partnership, involve the U.S. Agency for International Development, implement a Joint Interagency Coordination Group, and synchronize of the whole-of-government approach to ensure IDPs are provided required sustenance.

Sustainment planners should provide transparency for all the logistics, personnel services, and health services support data gathered from JIIM environments in the KTO. Sustainment planners should translate sustainment intelligence into terms that make sense to commanders who will make the decisions required to achieve national objectives. The principles of war and the principles of joint/multinational sustainment are a start to achieving the common language required for a base understanding of the shortfalls and achieving momentum. Sustainment planners welcome interworking relationships with unanticipated partners. Unity of effort is critical to achieving desired effects.

Scenarios in the yearly training exercises should challenge sustainment planners with the
fidelity in supporting three million IDPs in unimproved terrain. Sustainment planning should include facilitating the buildup of IDP sites, securing commodity stocks, building sustainment common operating pictures to support stability operation, training with partners, and building key relationships with the JIIM community. Successful integration of all key JIIM actors includes using a common language and terms, early planning, and sharing information on sustainment tasks.

ROK President Park Geun-hye is pursuing a principled policy that conditions economic benefits to provide DPRK meaningful change. This policy requires the ROK to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK while promoting economic and social benefits. Although the U.S. and ROK military are the first responders to such a crisis, in the JIIM environment, international aid organizations can determine the level of emergency food aid necessary. A key component is to deliver the supplies directly to the needy rather than providing supplies to legacy DPRK leadership. Concurrently, the ROK should think of leveraging its alliance cooperation and bilateral agreements with the U.S. and other allies to bolster the ROK’s off-peninsula contributions to project global influence in the international community, thus enhancing its profile and credibility.

The U.S. must recognize that the reconstruction of DPRK involves reunification, which will also impact Korea’s economy. Current budgetary constraints limit the amount of resources sustainment planners can use in the KTO. The only way to successfully monitor and achieve the strategic end state is the collective involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), NGOs, and international partners.

Each analysis of regime collapse is unique to the given researcher and regional study. Synchronization and integration of the JIIM environment facilitates successful sustainment during regime collapse. By applying lessons learned, a DPRK regime collapse has the potential to be a resounding and comparative success. The ability to sustain a post-regime collapse reconstruction effort is critical to the security of the U.S. and its allies. IAE

ENDNOTES


6 Bruce W. Bennett, *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, p. 68.


11 Ibid.


13 Ibid., p. 12.


15 Lim, p. 565.


24 Ibid., p. 371.


26 Ibid.


Army Major Edward K. Woo is currently serving in Eighth Army in the Republic of Korea. Major Woo graduated with a B.S from New York University and a Masters of Military Art and Science (MMAS) from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
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