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Features

3  Demystifying the Interagency Process and Explaining the Ambassador’s Role
   Ronald E. Neumann

10  Disrupting the Foreign Fighter Flow: Interdiction and Prosecution
    Jan Schwarzenberg

23  Interagency: Nice to Talk About… Hard to Do
    David Eaton and Gus Otto

32  Whole-of-Government Teaming Through Collaborative Construction: NRO/NSA Synergy
    Leilani DeWitt and Bob Dillinger

39  Moving Toward Improved Strategic Planning in U.S. Foreign Policy
    Jeffrey Grieco

47  Understanding Nations: New Ideas to Analyze Foreign States
    Tom Pike, Nick Long and Perry Alexander

57  Optimizing a U.S. Communications Strategy through Structure and Design
    Sharon Engelmeier

Worth Noting

64  Anti-ISIL Strategy to Include Civilian and Military Agencies

64  Updated National Military Strategy Released

64  Report Examines Cybersecurity Bills

65  White House Establishes Interagency Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell

65  USAID Updates Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy
Worth Noting (cont’d)

66 Simons Center Hosts Cybersecurity Roundtable
66 State, USAID Release 2015 QDDR
67 DoD Releases Cyber Strategy
67 CSIS Reports on DHS Unity of Effort Initiative
68 U.S. Provides Humanitarian Assistance to Nepal

Book Review

Demystifying the Interagency Process and Explaining the Ambassador’s Role

by Ronald E. Neumann

“He’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.”

— President Truman after Eisenhower was elected

This article is designed to be an introduction to the interagency process and its application in the field for those unfamiliar with the subject.

Characteristics of the Process

One great obstacle to understanding the interagency process is the tendency, particularly in the U.S. military, to refer to “the interagency.” To be a fussy linguist for a moment, when “interagency” is used as an adjective to describe a “process,” for example, how paper is handled and decisions are made, it suggests to the unwary or uninformed that there is a thing called the interagency that can be identified as separate. There is no such thing. Grasping that is the beginning of understanding.

In fact, there is not one process but many—formal, informal, and personal. There are a great number of actors in this process, too many for any sort of effectiveness. Cabinet departments, agencies, divisions, and services will all want to play in any discussion that somehow touches on their interests. Everyone wants a hand on the steering wheel, and most want a foot on the break, which is to say they insist their group must concur in order for action to happen. Only a few drivers will be trying to use the gas pedal to get things done.

Membership in the interagency process is flexible depending on the issue at hand, so it cannot be depicted on an organizational chart. Sometimes those new to this area are surprised to discover
that the interagency process also includes them. If you are in the U.S. government and your issue is part of an interagency decision, then you or, more accurately, your parent agency is part of the process.

One characteristic [of interagency decisions] is that the process is far better at reaching consensus than at resolving disputes. Because there are so many potentially involved in any interagency decision, the process tends to have certain characteristics. One characteristic is that the process is far better at reaching consensus than at resolving disputes. If everyone agrees, then the organizations can act. But if there is disagreement among cabinet departments, then no one is in charge or able to resolve a dispute unless the issue goes to the President. Since cabinet secretaries dislike referring their disputes to the President, they do not raise many issues and the issues simply linger.

Additionally, many arguments are not among cabinet agencies but within them. State Department organizations will argue with each other. The organizations within the Department of Defense as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have an enormous ability to fuss with each other and prevent reaching a decision on its own position even before it tries to coordinate with others.

Often one will hear calls to “put someone in charge,” and sometimes a central coordinator or “czar” will be appointed to move some issue along faster. This solution almost never works because such appointed czars are really only coordinators and lack control over agency budgets. Since they do not control the money, they cannot control the action. As a result, one is left with a process that is slow and made for indecision unless the President personally drives an action. But presidents have many issues to worry about, and the number of interagency coordination or policy issues they can handle is very limited.

Terms and Definitions

Several terms come up in discussions about the interagency process; therefore, it is useful to define them. A meeting of the principal cabinet officials, often with a few others included, is called a National Security Council (NSC) meeting if the President is chairing it. A so-called Principal’s Committee meeting is the same group without the President. Usually a Principal’s Committee will be chaired by the National Security Advisor.

The next rung down is the Deputy’s Committee (DC). Sometimes it is really the deputy secretaries of the cabinet departments who attend. Often the members, depending on the subject, will actually be at the undersecretary level, occasionally lower. The role of the DC is to shape issues for decision above, but it often fails to do so. The DC can ratify a consensus but not make a decision when there is disagreement. Hence DCs, which often require extensive paper preparation and staff time, frequently do not resolve to do more than have another meeting. The problem is not new. As the late Under Secretary of State Kantor said many years ago when briefing the staff on a just completed DC, “That meeting was as feckless as it was indecisive.”

Many proposals have been made to reform the NSC, particularly after the Iran-Contra scandal when the NSC ran illegal actions, and currently when it seems to overshadow State, Defense, and JCS. The problem with most proposals for reform legislation is that they ignore the fact that every President reshapes the NSC to suit his preference and, to some extent, that of his National Security Advisor. This is unlikely to change. However, one can be
fairly certain that the current NSC has been so criticized that the next president will change its organization. Whether that will make it better or just different is another question.

The Embassy’s Central Role in Interagency Coordination

There are now more than thirty departments and agencies of the U.S. government operating overseas. The number of deployments, programs, and the sheer size of the U.S. government, plus the lack of a single decision maker below the President, make it essentially impossible to achieve real interagency coordination in Washington. For that reason the role of the embassy becomes key for interagency coordination abroad, and the U.S. ambassador has particular authority to play a central role.

Embassies should be understood as platforms hosting every civilian and many military representatives of the U.S. government in a particular country. Often the State Department contingent will be a minority of the staff. Somewhat oversimplified, the embassy’s mission is to manage all aspects of policy. It is often said, sometimes somewhat dismissively, that State Department officers’ main role is to “observe and report.” This is true, but may miss the point that reporting is an active, not passive role in two senses. In one sense, reporting focuses not just on what is happening on the ground, but also on whether policies are working. If something affects policy success, including military operations, it is appropriate for embassy reporting. This can be a point of friction with some military officers who feel that it is their “lane.” The counter argument, as I once discussed with General George Casey in Iraq, is that losing a war has policy significance. General Casey agreed. In another sense, embassy reporting is also a base and vehicle for recommending policy change, both fine tuning it and suggesting major alterations. This is different from just analyzing information for policy makers. Reporting is part of what makes an embassy a player in the policy formulation process. It is a significant and historical role for diplomats.

One significant point about embassy work is that its mission never ends. Some individual tasks will be completed; however, managing relations with the host country and addressing the many multinational issues that the host nation may be involved in are a continuing operation. Embassy work has no defined end state because relations among states are ongoing. Military deploying to a particular country must understand that the embassy will be there before they arrive in country and will remain after they leave. That may well make the embassy’s perspective on a given mission different from a deployed unit’s perspective.

A small matter of language may be worth a note. Military briefing charts and slides often refer to a Foreign Service officer as the Department of State representative. Like their military counterparts, Foreign Service officers hold their commissions by act of Congress and represent a separate service. They are properly referred to as FSOs or embassy liaison officers or representatives. Although true, one would never see a United States Marine Corps liaison officer referred to as a United States Central Command representative on a briefing chart.

The Ambassador

The ambassador in his or her country of assignment has a particular importance in interagency coordination and the broadest grant of authority in the federal government. Whether
a career FSO or a political appointee, the ambassador represents the President and not the Department of State. Since the administration of President Eisenhower, a newly arrived ambassador receives a letter of instruction from the President that grants him or her authority over all U.S. government personnel, including military, not under authority of a combatant commander.

Note that the distinction is not military versus civilian, but in the chain of command. A defense attaché reporting to the Defense Intelligence Agency is under ambassadorial authority as is a temporary military mission sent by the JCS. Only those in a combatant commander’s direct chain of command are outside ambassadorial authority. And just to add further confusion, some positions may be dual-hatted and fall into both. Thus the head of an office of military cooperation, responsible for overseeing military sales and training to a foreign nation, would fall under the ambassador’s authority but might be dual-hatted by the regional commander as the senior defense representative at post. A certain amount of dexterity and common sense is required of anyone in this position of having multiple commanders.

It is this grant of authority and the ambassador’s position of being the President’s representative that form the basis for coordinating all aspects of U.S. government policy in his or her country of assignment. Not surprisingly, this is more complicated than the statement alone would suggest. Every agency and even many sections at an embassy must pay attention to some higher headquarters, in addition to the ambassador. Electronic communications make such cross-cutting instructions easy to deliver and agencies still control their own budgets.

Nevertheless, a good ambassador has a strong hand to play. Ambassadors can expel someone from the country or deny entrance of U.S. government employees but not private U.S. citizens. The ambassador is authorized to see all instructions and communications of every section and agency in the embassy (with some CIA exceptions). While most ambassadors have neither the time nor the wish to read the vast flow of communications with a post, the authority to do so is a hedge against hidden programs.

But the real tool of the ambassador is the increased visibility over what happens in country compared to the vast bureaucracy of the federal government in Washington. However large the group of agencies and departments at post—collectively called the country team—they are smaller and more unified than their headquarters in Washington. Most embassies will have a weekly “country team meeting,” essentially a staff meeting of all agency heads and section chiefs. This is a chance for the ambassador to catch up on what everyone is doing and provide direction. Such meetings can be boring show-and-tell occasions or seminars on the major policies and priorities the ambassador and country team are pursuing. Whether they are boring or spirited will depend largely on the ambassador.

Relations with a Combatant Commander: How to Wage War While Keeping the Peace

The major exception to the ambassador’s authority over U.S. government personnel is the separate authority of a combatant commander over all those in the chain of command. Thus wherever military personnel or units are present under such authority, there will be two chains of
command. This situation is frequently lamented, and many ideas have been offered to improve it, but absent legislation and for the foreseeable future, it is likely to remain unchanged.

Because there is no single individual in charge until one reaches the President, cooperation and coordination between the ambassador and the combatant commander and their staffs is absolutely essential. Ultimately, this becomes a function of personalities. However, understanding a number of points can help.

While authorities for decision are different, there are no separate “lanes” or areas where the other authority does not need information and, importantly, does not have a right to a particular point of view. In Afghanistan, I understood that General Karl Eikenberry (then Commanding General of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan) was entitled to a point of view on areas such as the justice sector and economic development or governance, because if those areas were handled badly, the results would be felt directly in military operations. By the same logic, I was entitled to express views on the security sector, operational-level military operations, and even some tactical operations because they affected what I could do politically. Anyone who has dealt with the friction about night raids in Afghanistan will understand that the issue is simultaneously political and military. Whatever views prevail over a specific issue, the answer should never be that “this is a military (or civilian) matter and none of your business.”

In a situation where there are many deployed forces, it is important to interagency cooperation to note the differences in the lengths of the chain of command. While the military generally delegates more, its chain of command is frequently much longer than that of a civilian counterpart. For example, in a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Afghanistan, the PRT’s military commander would likely report to a maneuver commander, who would report to a divisional or regional commander, who would report to the International Joint Command (IJC) at Bagram. The IJC reported to the commanding general of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), who in turn reported to NATO. Each level of command has a staff whose many tasks rarely include increasing the speed of passing information. By contrast, the FSO providing political advice in the PRT had a chain of command that ran only through one intermediate office before being passed to the ambassador or his deputy. If the ambassador reacted to some adverse development quickly, the commander of the ISAF could easily be surprised, and the PRT commander at the low end of the chain could get “burned” as a result. This becomes even more the case if the ambassador passes information to Washington in a way that produces fallout on the commanding general before he is aware of the issue. The answer is not to try to control information but to be aware of the differences and manage how information is used to enhance cooperation.

Because there are so many situations and so few established procedures for resolving differences, the role of personalities is critical. Civilian and military officers must work to understand the view point of the other side. They must be flexible in trying to find pragmatic solutions over assertions of unilateral authority. And when they disagree, they still need to stay civil.
Cultural Differences

Getting along and reaching agreed solutions can be easier if each side understands a bit more about the culture of the other. A frequent criticism from the military is that civilians are too slow to get to action. The civilians respond that the military is determined to rush to failure. Each may be right in a given situation, but there are real reasons for the culture each brings to a discussion. In an oversimplified sense, a military officer is trained to identify a problem, solve it, and move on to the next task. Defining the desired end state is often critical to getting the solution right.

As of this writing, if there is again a need for a rapid civilian augmentation in a conflict or post-conflict situation, the probability is that the need will not be met.

The civilian background is frequently one of dealing with issues that have no end state. Economic development, encouraging democracy, or bilateral relations of the U.S. with another nation are all examples of things that continue indefinitely. There is no mission completed point. This background conditions civilians to see many problems as things to be managed rather than solved, such as trying to prevent relations from moving into conflict and looking more to incremental progress than to single solutions. Both approaches have value. There are times when the civilians really do need to get something decided. And there are times when forcing a decision may create more long-term difficulties than it is worth. Neither approach has a total monopoly on virtue.

A frequent problem, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, was the slow pace of getting enough civilians into the area. There are many reasons for this, including Presidents who did not ask for resources and Congresses that did not provide them. Here I want only to note the small size of the State Department staff. Although it has expanded nearly 50 percent since 2006, it still numbers only 13,860 Americans of all ranks. Of these, only 8,039 are FSOs. They are deployed in 275 posts in 190 countries. Additionally, it is important to understand that aside from a small number in training, State personnel are fully deployed. There is no reserve that can be fielded in an emergency.

Despite several years of discussion, the idea of a deployable reserve in a Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization has led to only a small increase in planning staff available for short-term deployments. As of this writing, if there is again a need for a rapid civilian augmentation in a conflict or post-conflict situation, the probability is that the need will not be met.

Two other cultural differences are worthy of brief note. One is the use of planning and mission statements and the other is the post-Benghazi problem of security. Planning is a major part of military operations, and it is a very strong tool. It is closely allied with delegation in mission accomplishment. Neither is true of the State Department or, for that matter, most civilian organizations involved in the interagency process. Embassies and domestic State Department organizations are tiny by comparison with military staffs. There are very few people available for planning and not much takes place in a formal sense.

The culture is also different with respect to the use of planning. There is no civilian counterpart to the mission statement or, at least in theory, to the delegation given to military organizations to carry out a mission. The speed of communications, the Washington tendency to micromanagement, the pace of change, and the short chains of civilian command have combined to create a culture in which broad
goals too often give way to tactical direction from Washington. There are a great many things wrong with this, but it is important to learn how to work within the system as it is, rather than to spend too much time bemoaning the fact that it is not different.

The vehemence and length with which the investigation of Benghazi has gone on has had a paralyzing effect at senior levels in Washington. Fear of casualties has reached new heights and led to instructions to embassies to avoid risk. This is not a function of Foreign Service culture. In a recent survey, over half of active-duty State Department employees believed that post-Benghazi it is more difficult for employees to effectively engage overseas. There is some push-back, but until the political atmosphere calms, change will be difficult. This, too, may cause friction in interagency collaboration in the field when embassy officers are prevented by their security rules from leaving the embassy or a military base to do a job.

**Conclusion**

Virtually everything about interagency collaboration and process is frustrating in practice. Some are the inevitable result of being a large government. Many processes have been built up over time and are deeply embedded in agency and bureaucratic culture, both military and civilian. Various changes have been discussed, some for years. Until there is change, effective policy and bureaucratic action requires mastering the process as it is, just as successful military action has to deal with terrain as it is. Success in either requires study. This article may be a small starting point for those new to the issue. **IAJ**

**NOTES**

2. The article is adapted from a lecture delivered to the U.S. Army’s Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, GA, March 2, 2015.
Disrupting the Foreign Fighter Flow: 
Interdiction and Prosecution

by Jan Schwarzenberg

U.S. persons travelling to other lands to become foreign fighters are a threat to domestic security in the U.S. Numerous reports over the past decade note the presence of foreign fighters arriving in conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria to take part in extremist violence. Over time, the reported number of foreign fighters has continued to mount, with alleged fighters arriving from an increasing number of countries. Extremist groups urge these fighters to continue their extremist violence when they return home and recruit others to their cause. Preventing both their travel overseas and the promotion of violent extremist activity inside the U.S. is essential to maintaining domestic security.

This article focuses on the extent of the foreign fighter problem, and examines the legal challenges to counter that problem. This effort is based on the assumption, which will be demonstrated to be correct, that returning foreign fighters continue their violent practices and seek to spread extremist ideology. The article will conclude with a recommendation to use existing legislation to address the absence of a national strategy dealing with American foreign fighters.

The U.S. lacks an overarching strategy to deal with foreign fighters. Presently the U.S. deals with individual cases as they arise without developing a program to halt extremist recruitment of Americans for terrorist causes. Policymakers have three challenges in confronting the issue of foreign fighters: 1) possessing the legal authority and grounds to identify the would-be foreign fighters and prosecute them before their departure; 2) establishing the extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute returning Americans for terrorist actions committed outside the U.S., if not outwardly preventing their re-entry; and 3) resolving these challenges within a constitutionally-protected framework.

Under current existing legislation, law enforcement agencies have the authority to uncover
and identify potential foreign fighters. In order to obtain convictions, investigations must carefully follow the dictates of recently created counterterrorism laws. Related authorities can also be used to prosecute those who have returned from actually committing terrorist acts overseas. While similar to criminal investigations, there is sufficient difference in the guidelines of counterterrorism procedural rules as to cause cases to be dismissed, if not strictly applied.

Is There Really a Foreign Fighter Flow?

Combatting the flow of foreign fighters must start with understanding the scope of the problem. The criminal nature of foreign fighter activity drives the perpetrators purposefully and intentionally to avoid detection, making analysis difficult, at best.

The International Police organization INTERPOL created a Fusion Task Force in 2002 consisting of counterterrorism officers from thirteen countries. The task force has focused on the threat posed by foreign fighters flowing to the Middle East conflict zones to gain combat experience and training.¹ Since early 2013, INTERPOL has identified over 500 foreigners fighting in the Middle East. INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble said there is enough evidence to demonstrate that foreign fighters are coming from America, Europe, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.²

In this same timeframe, INTERPOL has issued 812 color-coded notices specific to foreign fighters. INTERPOL notices are alerts sent to all 190 member countries; the color defines what information is being sought on a particular individual. The three countries with the highest number of notices issued referencing foreign fighters are Azerbaijan (210), the Netherlands (94), and Belgium (89.) The remainder emanate from twenty-nine other countries, including the U.S.³

According to Gilles de Kerchove, anti-terrorism chief for the European Union, more than 3,000 European foreign fighters have joined the extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. This statistic, along with an estimate from the Central Intelligence Agency of up to 31,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq alone, prompted the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution compelling members to prevent their nationals from becoming foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.⁴

Countering Foreign Fighters via Law Enforcement

Relying upon multiple sources and cobbling together authorities originally created by other issues produces a multidisciplinary response to the problem. Previously-created laws, intended to target other criminal acts, can now be utilized in this venue. In addition, a series of recently-created laws are also being put to the test to arm law enforcement with the ability to counter terrorist threats. Specifically, several titles under the USA PATRIOT Act (PATRIOT Act) have been instrumental in permitting law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information. This legislation allows law enforcement to access personal records with relaxed warrant regulations and to waive Fourth Amendment protections without any judicial oversight.

FBI Director James Comey called Syria a safe haven and training ground for Westerners, who emerge with “the worst kind of relationships and the worst kind of training.”⁵ To prevent terrorist recruitment, becoming a foreign fighter must be treated as a crime, and law enforcement must be free to investigate and prevent the
departure of would-be extremists. Returning foreign fighters, despite seeing themselves as supporters of a higher cause, have engaged in illegal activities while abroad. Besides holding them responsible for their foreign illegal activities, prosecution upon their return reduces the risk of their continued terrorist activity in the U.S. When they are treated as criminal suspects and not enemy combatants, they are subject to U.S. law. Consequently, law enforcement must ensure interdiction activities strictly adhere to the rules of criminal procedure to lead to successful prosecution and conviction of foreign fighters who are, ultimately, threatening to attack other residents and institutions of the U.S.

Particularly challenging for law enforcement is the apprehension of foreign fighters who have seemingly committed no crimes within the U.S. Activity restricted to conduct in a foreign land, especially in ungoverned, lawless, or stateless areas beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement, creates jurisdictional and procedural challenges. Topping the list is simply the ability to discern what their activities were in a foreign area. Building such information for eventual prosecution necessarily involves the assistance of intelligence agencies that have their own bin of legal challenges. It was the enactment of the PATRIOT Act in 2001 that permitted enhanced sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement regarding U.S. persons. Such information had previously been severely restricted, leading some authors to argue it led to the information gaps that contributed to the attacks of 9/11. The aim is to ultimately hold the foreign fighters accountable for their overseas activities in order to prevent any continuation or resurrection of their actions back in the U.S.

**The Threat Among Us**

The issue of foreign fighters is more than a theoretical threat. The White House recently acknowledged Americans had indeed traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the terrorist group Islamic State (ISIS), and some of them had already returned. This elevated official concern for an ISIS-style attack being conducted within the U.S. by these terrorist veterans. At the time of the statement, since expanded, it was believed approximately 100 Americans had joined forces with ISIS. “It is … believed that some 40 of those who left this country to join up with [the Islamic State] have now returned to our country,” said Representative Timothy H. Bishop, New York Democrat.

According to FBI Special Agent Jim Davis:

A Minnesota man recruited to fight for ISIS was killed in Syria last month, five years after his high school friend died fighting for the terror group al-Shabaab in Somalia. Still another Minnesota man was apparently killed fighting for ISIS last month, this time in Iraq. As many as 40 other young men from Minneapolis have joined Islamic fighters after they were pulled in by jihadists through social media.

Reportedly, the extent of foreign fighter training and movement is significantly increasing. During the entire decade of the 1990s, according to the Congressional Research Service, between 1,000 and 2,000 Americans traveled overseas to fight for extremist organizations, winding up in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.

Although an insignificant number when compared to 300+ million residents in the U.S.,
the impact of the actions of even such a small group can significantly surpass any other threat. The nineteen hijackers of 9/11 launched the U.S. into a decade-plus of war and altered our way of life forever. In 2011, four attackers in London killed 52 people and injured another 700. Finally, the 2004 simultaneous Madrid bombings, which killed 191 persons and injured an additional 1,800, occurred just three days before national elections, and the opposing party was swept into office on the hastily-composed promise of withdrawing Spanish troops from the western coalition fighting in Afghanistan. The threat of additional bombings by Spanish Al Qaeda supporters was enough to alter the strategic direction of the Spanish government.

The Tsarnaev brothers who perpetrated the Boston bombings in 2013 were inspired by extremist propaganda, specifically the Al Qaeda on-line English-language magazine. Disaffected Muslim immigrants, the Tsarnaev brothers grew to hate the U.S. for what they perceived to be war crimes committed in the Middle East by the U.S. military executing national policy. Based upon a desire to seek revenge, the brothers planted two bombs detonating seconds apart. Three people were killed immediately; a fourth person, a campus police officer, was killed later during their escape attempt. Another 264 people were injured in the blasts, some severely, suffering traumatic limb amputations. Though acting alone, their actions completely shut down the city of Boston for days. Schools and businesses were closed, public transportation was halted, and residents were restricted to a curfew and were told to “shelter in place” while police hunted the brothers. The far-reaching impact of their actions, motivated by politico-religious beliefs, severely shook the nation.¹²

**The Threat of Foreign Extremism to Us**

Each of these four examples independently demonstrates what very small groups of radicalized extremists, two to twenty people, can do to our nation. Furthermore, communications in the modern age allow extremist groups to extend their message and recruitment globally. Via the internet, they can reach across the globe, soliciting funds, materiel, and recruits from sympathizers. By the same means, they can encourage followers to open new fronts of violence in their own countries, attacking the same institutions or enemies. Beginning around 1999, Osama bin Laden was already writing that Al Qaeda needed to recruit westerners, particularly Americans, who could move freely around the world with their U.S. passports, mainly to deliver Al Qaeda communications and manage financial transactions for the group.¹³

Recent events demonstrate the effectiveness of anti-American propaganda streaming from terrorist organizations overseas inspiring individuals here. Ali Mohammed Brown is charged with murdering a New Jersey teenager. His own statement to police said the act was vengeance for the millions killed in Iraq and Syria by the American government.¹⁴ There is no clear evidence that this act was supported by any particular terrorist group. However, there is a general, overarching message promulgated by terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda and ISIS, to seek out American-based followers to attack American institutions and citizens in retaliation for the policies of the American government.

Representing a more direct link to terrorist ideology and support, the perpetrator of the
The fact that the FBI thinks anywhere from forty to one hundred foreign fighters have returned from war zones is more than enough to wreak havoc in U.S. cities.

Americans who couple ideology with violent acts perfected and honed through combat experience create a “clear and present danger” to the safety and security of the U.S. Although U.S. municipal police are increasingly becoming militarized, they can easily be unprepared for a well-orchestrated, military-style attack by a dedicated, trained, and experienced unit of extremists. Police SWAT teams would eventually win the day, as is usually the case in active shooter instances, but the initial attack would be devastating and effective. The Navy Yard shooter in Washington, D.C., in 2013, killed twelve persons and wounded four others before police killed him. During the 2013 terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, it took a combined police and military response four days to sweep through the complex, during which time 67 people were killed by terrorists. The fact that the FBI thinks anywhere from forty to one hundred foreign fighters have returned from war zones is more than enough to wreak havoc in U.S. cities.

Given the potentially deadly consequences, with the 9/11 attacks as evidence, even just forty war-zone experienced and radicalized Americans is too many. Those already returned must be apprehended, and those planning to go must be halted.

U.S. Persons Prosecuted Supporting Terrorism

“Since 9/11, the Department of Justice has prosecuted more than 500 terrorism cases.”

Realizing the reality of the threat, the U.S. government has not been idle in addressing foreign fighters. Using a two-pronged approach, the government has sought to both prevent potential fighters from departing and apprehend those returning. Its success is unfortunate testimony of the dramatic size of the problem.

American citizen Adam Gadahn was indicted for treason in 2006. The first American to be so indicted since World War II, Gadahn had converted to Islam and moved to Pakistan. Once there, he joined Al-Qaeda and became an active English-language propagandist for them. Converting to Islam and even travelling to Pakistan, depending upon one’s intent for moving there, arguably, does not meet the tenets of treason. However, actively providing support to Al-Qaeda to further its message and attempting to recruit other non-Arabs to its cause clearly transcends the line between mere thought and actual action. The fact that the U.S. was engaged in active combat with elements of Al Qaeda cements the charge of treason against Gadahn.

Shannon Conley of Colorado was convicted in September of 2014 of supporting a terrorist organization, specifically the Islamic State. Yet to be sentenced, she faces five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Though warned to desist via repeated interviews with FBI agents, she was arrested while boarding a flight leading her, ultimately, to Syria. Conley’s stated goal was to fight with the extremists in Syria. If prevented...
While there might be an attempt to halt the influx of extremist ideology via the internet under the label of inciting hate crimes, an individual’s access to such material is protected.

The First Amendment protects an individual’s thoughts, opinions, readings, and access to information. While there might be an attempt to halt the influx of extremist ideology via the internet under the label of inciting hate crimes, an individual’s access to such material is protected. In the case of Proctor v. Oklahoma, the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma opined that a mere thought (mens rea) cannot be prosecuted, as it is an individual’s right under the First Amendment to freely possess ideas. Implementing that idea, however, (actus rea) is the point at which a criminal violation may occur. An important distinction is that a criminal act itself need not occur. Steps taken that are influenced by the thought, in this instance extremist ideology, that lead to a criminal act suffice to meet the parameters for prosecution. Therefore, accessing or possessing extremist materiel is not itself a crime. However, taking steps to put into action any recommendations urged by the extremist materiel can be considered a crime.

Treason is the only crime specifically mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. Article III, Section 3 states, “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving

from that, her secondary goal was to apply her skills as a trained nurse’s aide administering to wounded extremists.\textsuperscript{21}

Typical of what extremist organizations seek to recruit, the cases of Colleen LaRose and Jamie Paulin Ramirez demonstrate the tested validity of exercising jurisdiction over acts committed by U.S. citizens outside the country. Both women had travelled to other countries to commit crimes; yet, they were successfully prosecuted for those crimes in the U.S. LaRose was convicted in 2014 and sentenced to ten years in prison for her part in an Al Qaeda plot to kill a Swedish artist who had published a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed. LaRose had also recruited another would-be jihadist, Ramirez, who was sentenced to eight years. Ramirez traveled to Ireland to marry a Tunisian jihadist she had been introduced to on-line by LaRose. What drew particular attention to these cases was the fact that neither woman fit the popular image of an Islamic extremist terrorist. Both women converted to Islam late in life. Both grew up in the U.S. in communities that had no interaction with Muslim refugees. Their immediate friends and families had no idea either had any interest in Islam.\textsuperscript{22}

Legal Challenges to Halting the Foreign Fighter Flow

There are three concerns centered on the flow of foreign fighter: 1) preventing a U.S. resident from departing to participate as an armed combatant in a foreign conflict area; 2) intercepting and apprehending that U.S. person upon his or her return from having fought in a foreign conflict area; and 3) prosecuting them for violations of U.S. law perpetrated while in the foreign conflict area.

The operational and a legal sides of these concerns must be addressed simultaneously. Discovering the foreign fighter’s intent, movement, or actions can each individually and severally establish a criminal predicate for investigation and prosecution; however, any one of these can be challenged by the constitutional guarantees accorded to persons under U.S. jurisdiction. Satisfying the legal challenge to discovery and intent of the individual solves the operational challenge of interrupting, arresting, and prosecuting that individual.
...while subscribing to terrorist magazines or accessing terrorist websites is not itself a criminal activity, it can be used as the basis to obtain warrants from a FISA court for further investigation.

To “adhere to the enemy” and provide “aid and comfort,” as delineated in the second clause, sufficiently meets the parameters of treason. The Constitution’s definition of treason is codified under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, paragraph 2381, emphasizing that the aid and comfort rendered may be equally within the U.S. or elsewhere. This is further supported by Title 18 of the U.S. Code, paragraph 2339, which criminalizes support to a designated foreign terrorist organizations. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. 2339 extends jurisdiction over U.S. citizens anywhere such support may have been rendered, including extraterritorially.

In discovering and identifying persons rendering aid to foreign terrorist organizations, Title II of the PATRIOT Act expanded previously limited surreptitious surveillance authority of law enforcement agencies. Under the PATRIOT Act, mere suspicion of supporting terrorism or engaging terrorists is sufficient grounds to seek a warrant via the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to review e-mail and phone records. The same reference within the PATRIOT Act also authorizes an FBI agent to issue a National Security Letter, without recourse to the courts, to obtain financial and other personal records of individuals suspected of involvement with terrorism.

Thus while subscribing to terrorist magazines or accessing terrorist websites is not itself a criminal activity, it can be used as the basis to obtain warrants from a FISA court for further investigation. Factors, such as association with known radicals, espousing radical beliefs in the workplace, or denouncing government policies toward the Middle East can all serve as grounds for further surreptitious surveillance. The goal for law enforcement is to discover an individual’s intent to either join an extremist organization or at least materially support it from the U.S.

Prior to passage of the PATRIOT Act, a warrant could be obtained from a FISA court only to search for further evidence of foreign intelligence activity already known to be in existence. Because the activity concentrated on foreign agents aiming to harm the U.S., as opposed to criminal activity, a lower standard of proof was permitted by FISA courts to issue a warrant, as opposed to criminal warrants over-riding Fourth Amendment guarantees. A significant change authorized by the PATRIOT Act, however, is the issuance of a FISA warrant to discover if foreign intelligence activity is being conducted. Terrorism based upon extremist ideology stemming from the Middle East is considered a subset of foreign intelligence activity. This gives rise to determining whether lower-standard FISA warrants or stricter criminal warrants should be issued to conduct invasive surveillance of individuals suspected of supporting terrorism.

The second challenge lies in preventing a foreign fighter from re-entering the country. Arriving at a U.S. port of entry possessing a U.S. passport or residency card, the foreign fighter is returning “home.” The question is by what authority may a customs or border patrol officer
The most important aspect to halting the flow of foreign fighters is the prosecution of individuals who in fact supported foreign terrorist organizations by joining their ranks. Gathering evidence against the individual who has not yet departed the country is relatively simpler than doing so in the case of a person overseas. However, the greater issue is driven by the question of by what authority may the U.S. hold an individual accountable for his or her actions outside the country? The answer lies again in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, in article 2339B. Article 2339B is a sub-section of the article prohibiting support of a foreign terrorist organization, in which support is unaffected by whether or not the U.S. is actively engaged in conflict with the terrorist organization.

Supporting terrorism anywhere at any time is the crime; it does not need to be a terrorist group attacking Americans or American interests. This definition opens the door to assisting partner nations suffering a terrorist problem even though the terrorism is locally confined and not threatening the U.S. in any way. Article 2339B does not specify only foreign terrorist organizations attacking U.S. persons or interests; it simply states foreign terrorist organizations, intentionally implying any terrorist organization anywhere.

Article 2339B also delineates the difference in its application toward U.S. and non-U.S. persons. The article is careful in its wording; extraterritorial authority extends to U.S. persons, both citizens and permanent resident aliens, no matter where they are in the world conducting the activity that establishes the offense of supporting terrorism.

U.S. citizen John Walker Lindh was captured in Afghanistan and taken into custody after the prisoner riot that killed former Marine and CIA case officer Michael Spann. American born and raised, Lindh was returned to the U.S. for prosecution. Lindh embraced Islam as a young teenager, learned Arabic, traveled to Yemen and then Pakistan to study. He crossed into Afghanistan in early 2001 to join the Taliban. At no time did Lindh commit any potentially criminal acts within the U.S., yet he remained subject to U.S. jurisdiction for all of his activity in Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Accused of terrorism, treasonous acts and supporting those who attacked America, Lindh accepted a twenty-year sentence in a plea bargain that dropped the terrorism charges and avoided a trial. He is due for release in 2019.

Article 2339B also extends jurisdiction over
supporting terrorism by non-U.S. citizens if they should be brought to or found in the U.S., no matter that the offense occurred at some time in the past and “…even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States.” 

This clause can therefore justify extradition of any individual of any citizenship to the U.S. from any country in which they might be hiding, so long as the U.S. has a pre-existing extradition treaty with that particular country. It can also be used to prosecute an individual who has otherwise taken up peaceful legitimate residence in the U.S., perhaps having sought political asylum as a refugee from a conflict zone.

An example of exactly this capability was the conviction in 2011 of Waad Ramadan Alwan of Bowling Green, KY. Alwan immigrated in 2009, claiming asylum, fearing persecution if he remained in Iraq. Yet after a year-long investigation, his fingerprints were found to match those lifted earlier from an unexploded improvised explosive device (IED) targeting U.S. soldiers in Iraq. At the time that Alwan constructed and emplaced the IED, he had no connection to the U.S. He only became a legal resident alien some years after that incident. He also admitted to having placed ten or eleven other IEDs attacking U.S. soldiers and to having fired weapons at U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Because his previous act constituted the offense of supporting a foreign terrorist organization and he was now in the U.S. and subject to U.S. law, the conviction under Article 2339 held.

Alwan came to the attention of law enforcement because he recruited other Iraqi immigrants in Kentucky. He purchased what he thought were sophisticated, though secretly inert, weapons that were then shipped, he thought, along with thousands of dollars in cash, to insurgents still in Iraq. Alwan was sentenced in 2013 to 40 years in prison with supervision for life after his release. He escaped the life sentence handed down to his co-defendant only because he assisted the investigation and prosecution against his co-defendant. 

Counterterrorism versus the Constitution

As demonstrated above, there presently exists sufficient means for law enforcement to investigate and prosecute American residents supporting foreign terrorist organizations. Laws are already in place that, while not specific to any one group or organization, have kept pace with the evolving face of terrorism sufficiently in their generic application to cover most instances. Legislation created in the U.S., however, only applies to persons brought under its jurisdiction. This jurisdiction has been successfully applied based not on locus but status, in that U.S. persons anywhere in the world can be held liable to U.S. law extraterritorially.

Not addressed in this equation is the non-U.S. person conspiring or conducting, terrorist activities against the U.S. from outside the country. How and where does that person fall under a legal system of prevention? If made known to that country’s government and law enforcement agencies, the terrorist’s activities might be just as quickly interrupted. This is partially the function of the INTERPOL colored notices mentioned earlier. The notices serve to alert member countries that an individual resident in their country has been suspected or openly implicated in illegal activity elsewhere in the world.

The notices alone, however, are not sufficient to the task of interrupting foreign fighters. To equally address terrorism transnationally,
nations must develop international conventions. It serves no purpose for the U.S. to develop encompassing laws regarding the flow of foreign fighters if other countries do not have similar laws that can be equally enforced. The U.S. can enter into bilateral negotiations with individual countries which, even inadvertently, are supporting foreign fighters, be it with safe passage or assembly. Proposing resolutions through international bodies such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the Association of South East Asian Nations reaches a much larger audience, rewards the effort exponentially, and creates a unified blockade globally.

President Obama recently addressed the United Nations Assembly to propose a resolution aimed specifically at halting foreign fighters. The resolution imposes a global travel ban on persons intent upon engaging in combat in foreign areas. Through this resolution, each member country is obliged to halt or prevent the transit through its territory of anyone, of any nationality, enroute to being a foreign fighter. The resolution also calls on the UN to freeze monetary assets of foreign fighters maintained by any signatories to the resolution.28

The challenge in such a resolution lies in its enforcement. Each nation would need to create and enact new laws and subsequent regulations to comply with the resolution. The interpretation and application of the resolution would be subject to local culture and societal mores. One avenue under discussion is to apply economic sanctions against countries that do not comply with the resolution or alternatively fail to enforce the laws.29

By spreading the responsibility of halting foreign fighters around the globe, the aim is to disrupt the cycle: radicalization at home, travel to a conflict zone in support of a terrorist organization, and then returning home again. Each UN member nation signatory to this convention must assume responsibility within its own jurisdiction to take steps to disrupt that cycle. These can include efforts to counter the radicalization of the youth, prevent travel to conflict zones for the purpose of supporting terrorist organizations, and capture those returning from conflict zones trying to innocently or surreptitiously re-enter their home nations. According to National Security Adviser Susan Rice, the resolution “will increase the obligations on states to try to prevent and deter the flow of foreign fighters. It will also place new emphasis on the challenge of countering violent extremism in one’s own domestic context.”30

Subsequent to President Obama’s appearance and presentation before the UN, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution. UN Secretary-General Ban complimented the resolution’s quick passage. Citing statistics from the UN’s own Al Qaeda-Taliban Monitoring Team, Secretary-General Ban noted over 13,000 foreign fighters from more than 80 member states had joined ISIS since the eruption of fighting in Syria.31

Conclusion

We live in a dangerous world that demands that policymakers think critically and anticipate challenges presented by those would seek to do us harm. Today’s terrorist groups have developed extremely sophisticated public messaging. They have proven themselves to be very adept at utilizing social media. They manage to reach out across the world to Muslim communities in most countries. Like

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It serves no purpose for the U.S. to develop encompassing laws regarding the flow of foreign fighters if other countries do not have similar laws that can be equally enforced.
any international conglomerate advertising to a global market, they have succeeded in swelling their ranks by recruiting Muslims around the world to join them. In essence, the radicalization of erstwhile moderate Muslims is done in advance via the web. Extremist groups no longer need to take time to cultivate recruits from among their own populations. Via online radicalization, recruits are motivated at home and arrive ready to commit themselves to the terrorist causes.

International foreign fighters bring exponential advantages to the terrorist leadership. Even those unskilled in terrorist activity bring a passport and, in some cases, an ethnic background with features not normally associated with Middle East terrorists. Following adequate training and experience, these foreign fighters can join the front lines in the Middle East, causing confusion to established forces combating the terrorist ranks. However, Al Qaeda and ISIS would prefer they return to their home states, passing easily through immigration and customs controls as returning residents, there to initiate asymmetric warfare pulling that state’s attention and resources away from the front line fight in the Middle East. This attacking in the rear, so to speak, can deliver huge dividends to the terrorist movement by evincing public emotion which, in turn, can influence the government to alter its foreign policies and withdraw from areas the terrorists are contesting.

Without access to terrorist personnel rosters, it is difficult to determine the exact national origin of many foreign fighters. This can only be discerned by collective information sharing among countries banding together to halt terrorism. Having done so, conservative estimates support there have indeed been U.S. persons joining terrorist ranks in different conflict areas. Worse yet, the practice has existed for such time that many of those U.S. foreign fighters have now returned to the U.S. and to varying degrees are unaccounted for. Being in some cases unknown and un-located, their continued communication with and support of extremist groups remains hidden. Whether their continued support is restricted to shipping funds and materiel, recruiting new foreign fighters, or actively plotting attacks within the country remains an open question.

The threat of the foreign fighter to the homeland can be halted with aggressive law enforcement functioning fully within the dictates of constitutional law. At all levels, the cycle of a foreign fighter can be interrupted. De-radicalized returned foreign fighters, like former gang members turned community outreach counsellors, can disabuse would-be terrorist supporters of any romantic or ideological notions associated with their favorite terrorist organizations. Existing legislation cloaks federal investigators with the authority to uncover potential foreign fighters and establish their intent to support terrorism versus merely discussing the terrorist movement as a political debate. Such information is now sufficient to halt a foreign fighter’s planned departure to join a foreign terrorist organization. As has been shown, legislation is in place to extend jurisdiction to the extraterritorial acts of U.S. persons, holding them accountable for terrorist support outside the country and prosecuting them upon return for those activities.

The next step to halting foreign fighter flow is for countries around the world, particularly those most affected by their citizens becoming foreign fighters, to implement the UN resolution at the national level to halt the departure of their
citizens to become terrorists. Countries that presently act as transit routes for foreign fighters need to implement laws that differentiate between the occasional tourist and those bent on evil intent and purpose. The sharing of information extends as well to terrorist acts committed in third countries, so that independent nations may prosecute and incarcerate their citizens upon return.

Successfully dissuading persons from succumbing to the extremist propaganda, halting the departure of would-be foreign fighters, punishing them for their acts upon their return from conflict zones, and working in close collaboration with partner nations together all enhance the domestic security and international security by breaking the cycle of the foreign fighter flow, preventing further terrorist acts from being committed. IAJ

NOTES


9 “Colorado Teen Shannon Conley’s Support of ISIS.”


11 Ibid., p. 2.


20 Ibid.

21 “Colorado Teen Shannon Conley’s Support of ISIS.”


23 Proctor v. Oklahoma, 176P. 771, 1918 OK.

24 There are seven exceptions to the requirement for a warrant to invade a person’s privacy. They include instances such as pursuant to an arrest, impounding of a vehicle, the immediate safety of an officer, and so on. Nothing that applies at a border crossing.

25 19 USC §1582

26 18 USC §2339B.1.C


28 Boyer and Swarts.


30 Ibid.

Interagency: Nice to Talk About… Hard to Do

by David Eaton and Gus Otto

"It’s amazing what you can accomplish if you do not care who gets the credit.”

Albert Einstein

The interagency concept is not a new paradigm, nor can it be considered the panacea to every problem set. Recent articles in the Simons Center’s InterAgency Journal explain well the considerable challenges present within interagency operations and interagency education. Interagency briefs well. It presents a holistic approach to solving complex problems by integrating and synergizing efforts and expertise from across the whole-of-government. Sounds great doesn’t it? Sure it does. The National Defense Strategy of 2008 articulates the interagency intent:

We will continue to work with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, state and local governments, partners and allies, and international and multilateral organizations to achieve our objectives. A whole-of-government approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals.
Despite all the talk and insistence on tackling problems using an interagency approach, issues still plague the overall effectiveness of interagency partnerships. For example, in his article, “Team of Rivals: Building Civil-Military Synergy in the Interagency,” Jeffrey S. Han identifies several enduring interagency noncongruencies: “A majority of the civilian U.S. government representatives at the embassy had a difficult time understanding the role of military personnel assigned to a country outside a combat zone.” And Han accurately points out that “after the WiKiLeaks scandal, the State Department removed access to all of its diplomatic cables from the secure Defense Department SIPRNet. He also notes U.S. policymakers are well aware of interagency dysfunction stating: “Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO.), a critic of Iraq war policy, said that interagency cooperation was an ‘utter, abject failure’ and that government divisions worked at cross-purposes, forming a ‘circular firing squad’.”

There is no shortage of anecdotal and scholarly efforts scrutinizing the efficacy of interagency cooperation. Often within these literary stabs comes the recommendation or statement asking, “Why don’t we just legislate interagency like we did for jointness in the Goldwater-Nichols Act?” In “Is it Time for an Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act?” Sean Roche argues several possible architectural courses of action, both evolutional and revolutionary in legislative nature, toward a Goldwater-Nichols Act II-type solution. He concludes:

Adopting portions of the GNA [Goldwater-Nichols Act], passing legislations to reinvent the CSO [Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations], and enforcing this legislation would lead to the emergence of an operational level for planning and action to provide the interagency, for the first time, the ability to reconcile policy decisions with the necessary action to achieve them.

There are places where the U.S. government is deliberately integrating and synchronizing efforts across the federal, state, local, and multinational domains, but few where such efforts are working well. The dominance of organizational culture and parochial management emanating from constrained resources are hindrances to achieving truly effective interagency partnerships.

Interagency History, Culture, Evolution and Change

There are numerous examples of interagency failures. Some of the more recent, highly-visible failures question the need for interagency. At the federal level of the U.S. government, agency versus agency rivalries have existed since their creation. For example, on June 13, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 69 transferring the existing office of Coordinator of Intelligence to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (the prelude to today’s Central Intelligence Agency). Executive Order 69 also appointed William “Wild Bill” Donovan as Director of Strategic Services. During World War II, the OSS collected and analyzed strategic information required by the War and Navy Departments and planned and operated such special services as may be directed by those departments. This new office and appointment was not received well by either the Army or Navy and, more importantly, loathed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI, established in 1908, was a powerful and well-established institution. FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover personally disliked Donovan and the idea of OSS, and with the strength of the FBI, he actively subverted Donovan and his OSS organization throughout the duration of the war. In *Wild Bill Donovan*, Douglas Waller, describes Hoover’s level of dislike for Donovan:

The sleaziest attack came from J. Edgar Hoover, whose Federal Bureau of Investigation had spied on Donovan and his OSS as if they were Nazi agents…[Hoover] had an FBI agent pass along to Truman a vicious rumor that Donovan was sleeping with his daughter-in-law, Mary.⁹

Needless to say the OSS-FBI relationship languished. Similarly the military Service attitudes towards OSS were less than cordial throughout WWII.

Today relationships between CIA and FBI are significantly improved. That is not to say the improvement and changes to policy to better enable the interagency partnership over time have not come without challenges

Are interagency partnerships more likely to be formed because of orders from a higher headquarters or as an extension of stakeholder friendships and mutually favorable relationships? Which partnership is more likely to be effective? Some argue a main reason for interagency collaboration and, at times, the interagency ineptitude of today resulted from the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Within the 9/11 Commission Report Executive Summary, several findings and recommendations suggest enhancing the interagency approach, for instance:

- Determine, with leadership from the President, guidelines for gathering and sharing information.
- Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach.
- Build unity of effort across the U.S. government.
- The “need to know” should be replaced with a system of “the need to share.”¹⁰

Understandably some organizations, like people, need a crisis as a catalyst for real change. As a result of the horrible effects of the attacks of 9/11, agencies were directed to move toward interagency as a perennial model rather than one suited for addressing crisis situations, with the hope of getting ahead of the enemy and achieving better outcomes in the future.

It cannot be understated that agencies were directed toward an interagency approach rather than experiencing a natural evolution of relationships into true partnerships. Each organization or stakeholder entering into the interagency partnership has its own culture and is uneasy with other organizational cultures. In *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Edgar H. Schein, a leading expert in organizational culture states: “The most useful way to think about culture is to view it as the accumulated shared learning of a given group, covering behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements of the group members’ total psychological functioning.”¹¹

Could these agency-centric attitudes entering into a prescribed interagency partnership, each adding its own expertise and capabilities toward solving complex problems be considered a positive synergy rather than a risk-filled negative? Is the glass half-empty or half-full? Does each agency add to the combined interagency collective capacity or
only contribute to the clashing of cultures. If we believe the glass is half full, can we support it? History more often paints the interagency clashing cultures rather than advancing efficiency. Correspondingly, the various personalities and cultures within an interagency partnership are more likely to be incongruent rather than analogous. For example, not unlike the early conflicts between OSS and FBI, similar culture and attitudinal clashes continue among law enforcement agencies and other local, state, and federal agencies. While there is no active organizational subterfuge, the sharing of information, jurisdictional authorities, and the cloak of investigation are among the regular impediments to true interagency cooperation.

However, we must first consider what the interagency model asks law enforcement agencies to do. Interagency asks law enforcement to move away from their traditional approach and into an uncomfortable and risky partnership with little upfront benefit. The law enforcement officer and agency believe they take all the risk, do all the work, and are evaluated on the number of arrests and conviction rates. Additionally, they believe sharing their hard-earned information within the interagency approach may risk confidential sources and important prosecutions may be jeopardized. Indeed, a greater good can be achieved with an interagency and sharing approach. However, the interagency approach asks law enforcement to share what they risked their lives and worked hard for. In return the interagency promises and delivers very little. For example, the interagency construct gains valuable insight derived from law enforcement. They then exploit it, analyze it, and develop a classified, comprehensive product that cannot be shared with the originator in the law enforcement community.

William J. Davis, Jr., in “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along: Overcoming Personal Barriers to Inter-organizational Effectiveness,” identifies with Edgar Schein and states: “Those who have become invested in an organization have been taught the correct way to perceive, think, and act, so not only are they wary of any other way, but they also consider any other way of doing things as just plain wrong.”

This assertion is certainly not a revelation, and yet its truth remains hard to overcome regardless of how much one believes in the interagency concept. Why must an effort within the interagency be based on setting aside or compromising personal or organizational beliefs? Why not change the narrative and expectations of interagency partners and embrace the various approaches and beliefs recognizing they are value added. One does not need to fully understand a culture or point of view to respect it and accept it as valid. Diversity of beliefs, diversity of culture, and diversity in what can be accepted as right within the interagency is its strength and not its weakness.

On February 11, 2014, in an interview with CNN Chief National Security Correspondent James Sciutto, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno answered a question related to the U.S. Army moving into the future:

Well, it is interesting. Now, the one thing—so the one thing I will say is the one thing I think we’ll see in future warfare is a couple of things. And you’re aware of this, but I don’t really—it would have to be something very grave for us to do something completely independent. I really believe everything we do, it’ll be done in a joint context, obviously, an interagency,
Despite our nation’s highest leaders’ advocacy for the interagency, does lower leadership buy-in exist elsewhere at agency and institutional levels? Does your organizational leadership buy into the interagency? If not, what’s the “so what”?

Organizational culture and architecture are two reasons leaders resist the interagency model. For instance, is organizational staffing and budgeting capable of supporting an interagency construct? Is existing building space architecture adequate or is expansion or modifications necessary? Can present information technology support the blending of different and varying levels of required access and security? If the answer is “no” to any of these questions, are we still moving forward and by whose authority, under whose direction? And by the way, how are we going to pay for all the necessary modifications?

Furthering hindering leadership buy-in for interagency partnerships is parochial fiefdom management—the attitude that in a declining resource environment the best option is to hold on to what we have and hope we survive the next round of cuts. In fact, the promotion system rewards this behavior. At any mention of interagency partnerships, organizations or its leaders only hear the word “change,” and change is harder than the status quo. Some argue any change during economic volatility can spell demise. Additionally, leaders could be thinking a move toward interagency might limit their access to top stakeholders. An example that demonstrates this rationale is in the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. This “unifying effort” was one of several directed changes resulting from the 9/11 Commission. As a result, CIA was, at best, not warm to the idea of a separate Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and like Hoover years before, actively challenged the office. Subsequently, the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence caused much confusion throughout the intelligence community, impacted access and influence with the President, and only recently reached the level of efficacy for which it was created.

Leadership resistance to an interagency partnership can also emerge from questions of uncertainty on authorities. What authority will I and my organization have over personalities not from within my own organization? Will I or my organization be reduced in responsibility or scope? What authorities will other organizations have over my own people? What are or what will be the supervision and rating chains? Will I or any other of my people be “matrixed” into a nebulous existence within the interagency partnership? Are there statutes and other legalities that must be addressed? Are memorandums of understanding or memorandums of agreement already present that clarify these questions, or do we need to create and codify them before we even begin the interagency partnership? These are very important questions that deserve viable and accountable answers.

A fresh start to answering the interagency conundrum could be setting aside the requirement to understand, subjugate, or change
the aspects of the varying beliefs and cultures within the interagency and simply agree to respect the diversity of all.

In his book *Organizational Change Theory and Practice*, W. Warner Burke, a recognized expert in organizational culture and change, asserts “you don’t change culture by trying to change culture.” He further explains: “Culture is ‘the way we do things around here’ and concerns deeply held beliefs, attitudes and values. Taking a direct, frontal approach to changing values is fraught with difficulty, resistance, and strong human emotion.”

It could be argued the 9/11 Commission Report, in its admonishments and directed recommendations to government agencies, though well-intended, attempted to direct culture change and, as a consequence, stoked the perennial fires of interagency discourse. Nonetheless, interagency dissonance (and unique expertise within its diversity) can and should be harnessed into a bigger cultural and psychosocial equation focused on individual and organizational attitudinal shift toward a true appreciation of the interagency approach.

Interagency collaborations can and do work better than any blending of agency silos of excellence ever could. It worked in tactical fusion centers in Iraq and Afghanistan during the most crucial and dangerous of circumstances and can work well in more steady-state military and domestic efforts. Importantly, interagency partnerships can and do work at all local, state, federal, and municipal levels, and it all starts with respect toward all members of the partnership. Can it blatantly be stated interagency works? Some of the why behind such a bold statement starts with the current workforce. For example, many of those working within the U.S. intelligence community started working there after the attacks on 9/11. In general, they are younger, well educated, well-traveled, and not personally encumbered by some of the negative characteristics of deep-seated organizational culture. Additionally, interagency collaboration works because “you don’t know what you don’t know.” You start to find out what you do not know when the interagency partners enable those learning opportunities. More and more, problem sets such as combating transnational organized crime are global in scope, and the interagency model fosters the relationships that aid in the understanding of existing statute, jurisdiction, and authorities.

Examples where people and their organizations are achieving this attitudinal shift toward interagency as the model vice the exception can be seen in an effort led by the Texas Department of Public Safety. Even with leadership buy-in, adequate resources, and the best of intentions, achieving true interagency is dynamic and remains hard to do and harder to maintain.

Over the past few years the State of Texas has been in the national spotlight during several high visibility events. Examples include the recent migrant surge across the U.S. southern border, the 2009 and later 2014 Fort Hood shootings, and the ongoing effort to stem the flow of drugs and violence into the U.S. from Mexico.

Captain Jaeson Jones from the Texas Department of Public Safety 2014, guest lecturer to the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center’s Command and General Staff College, shared the following insights in a June 5, 2014 Fort Leavenworth Lamp article:
First, it is not just the sharing of information but the persistent person-to-person collaboration that makes the difference between “talking” interagency and actually “doing” the interagency approach identifying and solving problems.

Second, it all starts with trust. Start with small projects and exchanges and build trust between stakeholders.

Third, it’s not the mission or vision statement that makes the interagency—it’s people. From the top leaders down to individuals in each organization, it is the day-to-day and face-to-face due diligence that enables true interagency cooperation. It makes no difference if people are from the local state or federal level. Leaders must embrace, embed, insist on and reward the interagency partnership. Stakeholders at all levels need to find ways to incorporate and institutionalize the interagency approach within their day-to-day activities.

Fourth, an interagency approach is more an attitude toward a new way of doing business than a capitulation. Interagency work is hard work. It’s a long-term persistent uphill battle against existing personal and organizational comfort zones, fortified paradigms and declining resources. Once interagency cooperation is established, the relationships need constant attention and reintroductions resulting from changes in leaders and missions. The attitude must be interagency—it is hard but the benefits make it worth the efforts.

Finally, interagency enables everyone and every agency to become better at what they do, what the Department of Defense calls “synergy.” Despite the upstart costs in manpower, personal egos and institutional prestige—interagency works and by doing so more organizations are successful and more mission are accomplished.16

**Conclusion**

Being on the ground together is paramount. Operational tempo, schedules, and technology can distract from the interagency process; however, being there in person speaks volumes toward commitment and trust. In his graduation speech to Command and General Staff Officer Course class 2014-01, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth Lieutenant General Robert Brown emphasized several aspects of trust and teamwork: “This is a complex environment out here that demands cooperation and collaboration to succeed... If we don’t work together, we are going to fail.”17 Trust is the foundation of all relationships and interagency partnerships especially so. Relationships are strengthened through shared experiences. Trust one another and start with small efforts and manage expectations with hard but constructive honesty.

Show up every time with something you can contribute to the overall effort. Be willing to break away from your own organizational paradigms and adapt others. An example from Texas Department of Public Safety was a legacy of over-reliance on the 1930 Uniform Crime Report. Today’s operational and criminal environment in and around Texas is not accurately captured in the Uniform Crime Report and does not accurately reflect all the data and nuance relating to criminal activity. The Department of Public Safety adapted
and now uses several variations of data and reporting to collect, analyze, assess, and respond to all safety-related activities throughout Texas and neighboring states. Send the right people to represent your organization; send the best and you get the best, send the worst and everyone knows it. Take the time to properly vet the people that will represent your organization. Send the people into the working groups who understand the importance of the interagency approach and ensure, when the timing is right, those with decision-making authority are in the room. Nothing says “we don’t care about this effort” louder than a liaison officer or working group member saying, “I have to take this information back to my higher for a decision.” Interagency partnerships, not unlike personal relationships, are better if initiated and maintained through a natural outpouring and shared interests and outcomes.

Interagency successes are not like single organization successes. The attitudinal shift needed for personal and organizational expectation management in this arena is “success for one is success for all.” The majority of time no single individual or organization will be able to stand up and say, “We did this and we should get all of the credit, we should be allocated more resources or we should be more in charge of this whole effort.” When interagency participants change within the partnership, it is crucial for these reintroductions to be on a personal as well as professional level. And nothing says the interagency partnership is over louder than failing to backfill a vacant working group partner when he or she changes out.

The interagency approach enables synergy at every level but can be costly. Recruitments, evaluations, and promotions driven by collaborative success will help codify the concept of synergy and therefore make “the juice worth the squeeze.”

NOTES


3 Han, p. 13.


8 Ibid.


15 Ibid.


Whole-of-Government Teaming Through Collaborative Construction: NRO/NSA Synergy

by Leilani DeWitt and Bob Dillinger

Each member of the Nation’s Security Agency Community is defined by the distinct responsibilities, competencies, and capabilities it contributes to the national intelligence mission. The melding of the unique overhead information processing of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with the related production proficiencies of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) has created a unique and enduring whole-of-government teaming. This paper describes the substantive joint-agency ownership of multi-intelligence (multi-INT) fusion tools that meld NRO capabilities and competencies to advance NSA’s national and tactical missions to include support to military operations. This decade-long collaboration, focused on joint system “construction,” efficiently and effectively advances the mission of each agency.

NSA leads the U.S. government in cryptology, which includes foreign signals analysis and related services for intelligence and counterintelligence missions. NSA’s information assurance (IA) products combined with its enabling of computer network operations affords decision advantage for the U.S. and its allies. NSA’s core values include accountability, innovation, and collaboration.

NRO designs, builds, launches, and maintains highly technical overhead collectors. NRO contributes unique information and perspectives regarding early warning of missile launches, signals intelligence, and imagery for U.S. forces in support of national defense missions. By design, NRO is a hybrid organization with stated objectives including “collaborate to deliver intelligence capabilities” to increase “the value of collected data through multi-INT fusion at its source... enabling mission partners and end-users to meet their mission objectives.”

Jointly, these two agencies have created common multi-INT fusion information (MFI) capabilities, which after a decade of collaboration, significantly contribute to both agencies’ strategic objectives. Through the operation of MFI, NRO improves overhead data utility and NSA increases situation awareness in accomplishing its mission objectives. Creating a common...
capability “owned” by neither organization is a distinctly unique approach to cross-agency collaboration. This paper examines this unique methodology (a whole-of-government collaborative construction success) from the historic, cultural, and organizational structure perspectives.

**Historic Perspective of Cross-Agency Teaming**

Interservice and interagency teaming traces back to 1942 with the establishment of joint intelligence centers (JIC) in several World War II theaters of operations, spawned from a need to address fragmented intelligence, duplicate and conflicting assessments, inadequate dissemination, and an increasing number of data sources. Joint intelligence staff leveraged integrated intelligence products to assess enemy strength, capabilities, and intentions and, as a result, came to the conclusion that “neither Army nor Navy Intelligence is complete without the other.” Joint intelligence improved support to military and national decision makers while reducing operational expenditures.

Post WWII, JIC component services expressed parochial concerns leading to the quick dissolution of the measurably successful JICs. Reasons for dissolution included concerns that single component needs would neither be met nor valued appropriately and that JICs would produce redundant assessments to those planned for production by component agencies. As a result, all JICs were disbanded by 1947. While failed attempts were made to resurrect the joint intelligence construct during several international crises, the concept lay dormant for the next 40 years.

Today, examples of cross-agency teaming include Joint Intelligence Agency Task Force –South which Munsing and Lamb describe as the “gold-standard” for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion. Lessons learned from this success include the necessity to overcome the parochial and cultural barriers within the team.

**Cultural Perspective of Cross-Agency Teaming**

Organizational “birth marks” impact the culture and, thus, behavior of an organization. In the 1930s, Max Weber matured a theory that organizations work best as hierarchical structures with clear boundaries and impersonal focus to achieve competitive advantage. Within this construct, oversight, governance, and incentives flow downward through the vertical arrangement. Accountability for results flow upward through the structure. Maintaining clear boundaries defining the organization increases group survival probabilities. Growth within and by the organization itself can be achieved by competing for budgets and staff. Reaching across organizational boundaries is viewed as not only threatening, but also counterproductive to organizational objectives. As a result, any cross-agency teaming will inevitably dissolve over time to reflect the established component boundaries due to the numerous forces at work consistent with the “birth mark” of hierarchical bureaucratic organizational structures.

**A Model for Cross-Agency Teaming**

The first law of thermodynamics states that energy injected into any system delivers potential to alter the natural state of that system. Thus, should one agency contribute resources and energy toward teaming with another, the
natural steady state of “adversarial democracy” between agencies can, theoretically, be altered. There are a number of reasons one agency might contribute resources toward cross-agency teaming, even under parochial state conditions of equating collaboration with threat. Impetus may include advancement of capabilities, improvement in relevancy or timeliness of products, and an increase in efficiencies through the melding of multi-agency resources, and competencies.

A literature survey of interagency teaming is summarized in Figure 1 to facilitate discussion and demonstrate fundamental concepts. Vertical (hierarchical structures of component agencies) and horizontal (team execution efforts across agencies) elements of interagency teaming are separated for clarity, revealing the perpendicular sub-systems for independent evaluation and to enable understanding of their interplay. Successful integration of horizontal and vertical elements in collaborative team efforts result in capabilities “greater than the sum of the parts,” achieving efficiencies superior to that which can be achieved through component agencies alone.9

As witnessed by the swift dissolution of the JICs after WWII, we note that fundamental to cross-agency teaming is a willingness to cooperate—to reach across organizational boundaries in a positive, productive, and non-threatening manner respectful of the autonomy and validity of each component agency. Discord among agencies is the norm, as each agency has its own culture, biases, focus, objectives, hierarchy, and perceptions. Unity of effort results from the trustful melding of the individual agency core competencies and core capabilities while assuring the autonomy and viability of each component agency. Unity of effort has been described as harmonization of diverse elements working to minimize the dissonance.10 The vertical element of the interagency team provides the fundamental advantages of hierarchies including speed of decision-making. Disadvantages of this element can include tendencies toward sclerosis (bureaucratic over-growth) and inability to avoid long-term risks.11

With the establishment of foundational unity of effort, the real work of horizontal integration cross-agency collaboration can now begin. Two keys to this horizontal networking are people and process. People provide the resource labor and innovative energy of the collaboration. Process, among other things, refers to the division of
labor in the teaming—the unique melding of the characteristic strengths of each agency to achieve capabilities far greater than can be achieved by either component alone. Dysfunctional performance of teams can be impacted by changes to people, processes, or labor division. Replacing team members or processes causing dysfunction with team members or processes that can contribute to interagency productivity optimizes cross-agency team performance. This horizontal sub-system of the interagency team exhibits advantageous characteristics including adaptability and resilience to changes in environment or mission. Disadvantages can include lack of focus or control of the team, as well as short-term risk produced by people or processes disharmony.¹²

This simple model illustrates that fundamental to cross-agency teaming is the ability to reach agreement among vertical organizations in order to then reach out horizontally across boundaries in a non-threatening way to achieve common goals and efficiencies. Reality, however, proves that the agreed-collaboration of vertical agency organizations is extremely hard to achieve and is, thus, described as an “elusive goal” of the interagency process.¹³ History shows that the propensity to revert to the competing-agency state rather than teaming is more the norm than not.¹⁴

**Unique Endurance of this Teaming around Joint “Construction”**

If hierarchical, bureaucratic, natural forces pushing agencies toward the steady-state of non-collaboration have been in play for the decade during which NRO and NSA have been in joint-partnership on MFI, why have these forces not been successful in breaking these two agencies apart? The answer to this question lies in the understanding of the vertical and horizontal elements of the interagency partnership and the interaction between the two.

In 1999, NSA Director Michael Hayden pressed NSA to seamlessly integrate its operations with those of the larger defense and intelligence communities. He expected corporate behavior such that: “All NSA organizations must recognize and embrace the fact that competencies necessary to them exist in other organizations (both internal and external), and leverage those capabilities, rather than trying to build their own organic, but redundant, capabilities.”¹⁵ Under General Hayden’s leadership, MFI began deploying in 2004, catalyzing the “vertical element” teaming of NRO and NSA organizations.

**In 1999, NSA Director Michael Hayden pressed NSA to seamlessly integrate its operations with those of the larger defense and intelligence communities.**

Enduring interagency horizontal partnership efforts between NRO and NSA built MFI, ensuring the system “construction” would best address mission needs of NSA while honing NRO’s needed advanced multi-INT data fusion techniques. The partnership, over the years, resulted in a system upon which NSA now depends for certain missions and NRO requires for its objectives. A partnership originally forged from national corporate responsibility has evolved to be one of mutual collaborative benefit and efficiency.

Numerous studies document that advancements in technology introduced within an organization will actually impact organizational structure.¹⁶ As NSA came to depend on these advanced capabilities, it altered its internal organizational units and processes to leverage and, thus, reflect key capabilities provided by NRO. Successes in the
resultant advancement of multi-INT data fusion is reflected within the NRO organization as it continues to contribute significant resources to further advance and sustain this and other related systems toward its mission to assure efficacy of data collection. So while, theoretically, the bureaucratic forces of “adversarial democracy” should have detrimentally affected this interagency relationship, successes stemmed from anchoring a collaborative “jointly owned” constructed system have driven the organization toward even deeper codependence on these advancing capabilities, increasing resource efficiencies for both organizations. Achieving “elusive” unity of effort through vertical integration enabled horizontal teaming across agencies. The advancement of capabilities from horizontal teaming further conjoins this vertical partnership and codependency.

Another reason for this decade-long enduring collaboration stems from the fact that this “jointly owned” system positions each agency as a “hybrid leaderless organization” from the vantage point of the program. Brafman and Beckstrom document that “leaderless” organizations generate innovative and collaborative energies, as well as lower-cost technological successes, atypical of bureaucratic hierarchies. In other words, failure to sustain this capability and safeguard inherent technological gains and efficiencies made through this program would increase not only costs but also technological challenges to both agencies in future data-integration technology advancements.

Although “whole-of-government” may be a national strategy, there exists a void in its realization. Figure 1 helps define elements as well as catalysts, such as consistent and well-defined policy and regulations across agency boundaries. For example, the jointly-constructed NRO/NSA MFI has to satisfy both agencies’ infrastructure security regulations. The system is thus constructed to be “doubly compliant.” This “double” compliance example also points out the frailty in the collaboration—if policy is ill-defined in either one of the agencies, this system will suffer disproportionate impact. Process, poorly defined, can thus be an inhibitor to interagency collaboration and efficiencies.

The dominant challenge over time, however, is found in a lack of clarity of government policy combined with social-cultural issues derived from personnel turn-over and lack of interagency training. Without training or hand-picked-selection for interagency participation, as emphasized by Wilder in defense community cross-agency exemplars, new team members and those with parochial mindsets may find themselves ill-prepared to provide positive contribution to this non-parochial cross-agency partnership program. The need for interagency training is acknowledged by the Department of Defense and demonstrated by its recurring efforts to “hand-pick” and provide interagency training for cross-agency missions. At this time, no consistent institutionalized cross-agency training exists within the NRO and NSA sectors associated with this MFI program.

Conclusions

Cross-agency teaming over a decade to “construct,” evolve, sustain, and leverage a multi-INT fusion information system has
resulted in technical advancements applied to both agency missions. The enduring cross-agency collaboration between NRO and NSA over a decade is historically noteworthy. Over time, the collaborative capability and technology advancements are now reflected in internal structures and processes within each organization. This collaboration has provided significant cost efficiencies for both agencies over this decade achieving the Presidential objective of whole-of-government functionality. This technique to achieve “elusive” unity of effort through partnership of two independent agencies is unique. By anchoring each agency in this vertically-integrated partnership through joint dependency on a common “owned by neither” system, each agency moves into horizontal partnership productivities to collectively address “wicked” problems. Enablers for this example construction-based interagency teaming validate known catalysts, including well-defined and consistent policy across agencies and interagency training for all, especially new personnel joining this interagency team. Achievement of “elusive” unity of effort, cross-agency teaming, and resultant whole-of-government approach through joint construction of common capabilities provides a stable anchor for this teaming and, thus, uniquely, results in an enduring partnership, as well as increased capabilities, efficiencies, and technology advancements.

NOTES


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


12 Ibid.

13 Severance.

14 For example, per note 6, above, the four decade JIC gap ended in the late 1980s, after numerous failed attempts, as a result of concerted effort (passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act) and alignment of geopolitical, fiscal, and military factors.


16 Radaphat Chongthammakun and Steven J. Jackson, “Extending Virtual Organizations in the Public Sector: Lessons Learned from CSCW, STS, and Organizational Science,” IEEE Proceedings of the 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2010. This example study discusses the most obvious technology that can impact organizational structures—information technology (IT). When organizations change work processes with the introduction of IT, organizational structures (organizing man-power resources) will change to reflect the resultant changed work flows.


18 Severance.


Moving Toward Improved Strategic Planning in U.S. Foreign Policy

by Jeffrey Grieco

“Futures Analysis” Grows Unevenly in Importance within Principal U.S. Foreign Assistance Institutions

In 2005, the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) undertook a detailed program with over 24 civilian, counterpart, federal agencies entitled “Project Horizon.” Project Horizon, inspired by USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios, looked at various “world scenarios” using trend and futures analysis and focused on what capabilities the U.S. government maintained to deal with those scenarios. Project Horizon even went so far as to conduct scenario planning exercises and strengthened U.S. interagency coordination. After two years of implementation, the U.S. government partners were likely overcome by other pressing requirements (i.e., Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan earthquake response, famine in the Sahel, etc.) and abandoned the exercise.

In November 2011, a new, focused exercise was launched looking exclusively at international development with a partnership between USAID; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; National Defense University (NDU); and the Wilson Center (WC). The goal of this exercise was to host a definitive international symposium on “Futures Analysis” so as to provide an “over the horizon view of development.” Given Project Horizon’s fate, this was a bold undertaking. On November 4, 2011, the “USAID Symposium on Future Development Challenges” (SFDC) was held in Washington, D.C., at the Wilson Center. It was divided into three main sessions: Evolutions—using traditional trend and futures analysis; Revolutions—looking at events and shocks to the system that produce game-changing effects; and Vision 2025—exploring combined visions of what development will look like in 2025 using various alternative future scenarios.

The program introduced four cross-cutting themes within each of the three sessions to help
focus discussion: populations, science and technology, politics and economies, and environment.

The SFDC dug deeper into emerging trends and unknown challenges not easily assessed through past events or more linear causal thinking. For the Obama Administration, this likely affirmed (from an institutional standpoint) that global development was changing quickly, and USAID and U.S. foreign assistance needed to adapt or become less relevant.

For USAID, the SFDC meant it could take its current 3–5 year “Country Development Strategies” and dramatically expand their trajectory by identifying characteristics of future trends in development looking out 10–15 years.

Prior to the SFDC, the USAID Policy Framework (2011-2015) identified the following key future trends:

- Globalization and the global economy are growing at multiple speeds.
- Population and demographic trends are making development harder.
- Freedom of access to education is growing rapidly as connectivity explodes globally.
- Humanitarian, political, economic, and other “shocks” are reverberating more speedily and with more dispersion.
- Democratic governance is expanding but not necessarily steadily or evenly.
- There seems to be a new “development ecosystem” where new partners and new models and approaches are being used quickly.

The National Intelligence Council and the 2012 Global Trends 2030 Report

In December 2012, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published the fifth installment (now completed every four years) of its series Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds. It was one of the more collaborative research exercises, engaging all organs of the U.S. government involved in foreign policy, national security, and related disciplines. It expanded its reach overseas to include input from 20 countries so as to convey the most accurate ideas and trend analysis. The NIC held meetings in more than ten U.S. states, established a public blog to receive input from experts on key themes in the draft report, and marshalled writers and analysts from inside and outside the NIC.

This exercise was a whole of government effort and was not focused on international development or foreign assistance only. The Global Trends Report is intended to help the U.S. government think about the transformative aspects of the world today—characterized by rapid geopolitical change. The NIC did not seek to be predictive of the future, but to instead provide “a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.” It differs from the USAID Futures Analysis Project (and its predecessor Project Horizon); they were focused on identifying future international development scenarios and tackling how a government should respond from a policy and program perspective.

The NIC identified three major pillars of change that will impact the international system. Within each pillar it identified major influencers of future impact through 2030:
Megatrends:

- Individual empowerment: accelerating, poverty reducing, growth increasing.
- Demographic patterns: 60 percent of world will live in urban areas, lower arc of instability.
- Food, water, and energy nexus: Demand to grow substantially as will related problems.

Game-Changers:

- Crisis-prone global economy: Greater resiliency from multi-polarity or crisis?
- Governance gap: Can governments adapt or will they be overwhelmed?
- Potential for increased conflict: Will intrastate and interstate conflicts now arise?
- Wider scope of regional instability: Will Middle East and South Asia instability spillover?
- New technologies: Impact on population growth, urbanization, and climate change?
- Role of the U.S.: Can the U.S. help reinvent the international system?

Alternative Worlds:

- Fusion: China and U.S. collaborate on a range of issues.
- Nonstate world: Nonstate actors use technology to solve global challenges.

The Impact of the Symposium and the Follow-on Book
The Future Can’t Wait

Was there an “Over the Horizon View on Development”? Well, maybe yes, but not just one view but several plausible interpretations were discussed. For example, Steve Radelet, now Professor in the Practice of Development at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and former Chief Economist at USAID, posited that there are at least three possible scenarios concerning development’s future:

Scenario 1:

Continued progress toward rapid global development as has occurred in the last twenty years. More trade and investment (both global and regional) will yield more growth and further political, economic, commercial, military, and skill development.

Scenario 2:

Increased instability and global conflict will bring greater strains and economic uncertainty and increased tensions between competing elites and populations. As Professor Radelet said: “In short, the world goes to war. Those who think this is far-fetched need only remember that the last great era of global development, the expansion of Europe and the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, ended abruptly with the descent into the first World War, followed shortly thereafter with the Great Depression and World War II…”

Scenario 3:

Increased pressure on the planet earth. There will be rising populations and diminishing incomes from a slowdown in global growth (or recessions in major developed countries) combined with greater demands (perhaps by China and India) on energy resources, water supplies, precious minerals, and air quality. These pressures could bring the global economy to a breaking point or at least bring us
to Scenario #2 above.

However, I feel the likeliest scenario, a combination of all three, was not discussed. The next ten to twenty years in the developing world are likely to see continued globalization and growth but at sometimes sizable cost to populations, economies, and environments. The developing world will likely see increased conflict and instability as governments fall and fragile democracies rise up while terrorism and extremism spread across and within borders. There will also likely be no let-up in China’s or India’s thirst for natural resources to sustain their growth or in developing countries aspirations to rapidly industrialize and doing so in an environmentally harmful way. Planning for these scenarios seems the most realistic.

The real argument should be focused on how the U.S. government accomplishes that mission. Unfortunately, since the SFDC occurred in November 2012, and the book was published in September 2013, the Futures Analysis Program and U.S. government’s strategic partnership has dissolved. USAID has opted to move forward with several small, limited “futures analysis” by engaging targeted USAID missions and regional programs. In short, the Futures Analysis Project of 2011–2013 seems to have suffered the same fate as its predecessor Project Horizon in 2005. Below are some ideas on how to better align this effort with established institutional systems and planning.

**Did the SFDC and subsequent book *The Future Can’t Wait* effectively address how the U.S. government should deal with future scenarios and the challenges they represent?**

I should begin by recognizing that “futurists” tend to be more focused on identifying trends and offering foresight. They are not offering predictions but merely identifying where things are moving and perhaps why. They prefer to stay away from policy promulgation or program and strategy prescriptivism. However, the SFDC and its follow-on book laid out a powerful and highly readable contribution that did just that. Ten essays by leading development thinkers, political and social scientists, aid practitioners, and foreign policy wonks helped to explain several trends and then laid out multiple ways the U.S. government should consider preparing for and managing those trends. Some of scenarios require policy and program development beginning immediately. For example, nanotechnology, additive manufacturing, telephony, connectivity, and robotics will all change tomorrow’s foreign policy and development landscape. Realizing that nonstate actors will control and implement more of this change in the future will require re-wiring traditional thinking about growth and development. The government will need new ways to collaborate both diplomatically and development wise. Institutions must be better at adaptability, flexibility, and accepting
change—not the hallmarks of traditionally staid, bureaucratic enterprises like State and USAID.

Richard Cincotta provided several demographic research methods that can be used as tools to support improved program planning and country-level strategy development by both USAID and State. His analysis of Age-Structural Transitions and the impact of these transitions on the political demography of nation-states is compelling reading for the development expert. In addition, Dan Runde’s discussion was timely as to how USAID must become more innovative and creative in its development approaches especially with regard to middle income nations (i.e., Colombia) and working in a more fiscally austere foreign aid environment.

**Recommendations for Strengthening the Futures Analysis Process in Support of U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy**

Having attended the SFDC and participated in numerous U.S. government interagency policy planning efforts, I feel we have an obligation to better integrate futures, trend, and/or foresight analyses into the work plans of diplomats, soldiers, and development experts. More specifically, how can we better build futures analysis into State and USAID strategic planning, thinking, and training? As one expert noted at the SFDC: “USAID must analyze how traditional activity areas such as human rights, agriculture, nutrition and health, workforce development, disease prevention, and environmental protection relate to the ongoing global revolutions that are creating new challenges and opportunities across the world.” To assist in improving this process, my recommendations follow.

**Recommendation One:**

The Futures Symposium and its dynamic strategic partnership should be institutionalized as part of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) process. This policy and planning is led by State and USAID. It would be appropriate that the NIC Global Trends Report, the State-USAID Futures Symposium and Report, and the QDDR research process be dovetailed to provide a thorough and complete understanding of current global trends looking out 5–15 years. The QDDR has a five-year window, and future and trend analysis has a 10–15 year window which should offer important and perhaps strategic insights to policymakers. For example, policymakers need to better understand trends that show how Al Qaeda has perfected the ability to transition their terrorist movements across continents, regions, boundaries, and communities and begin developing implementable, long-term (5–10 years), pro-active, and sustainable solutions focused at vulnerable communities. In addition, adding a section at the back of the QDDR entitled “Over the Horizon Issues” could house an abbreviated NIC Global Trends Analysis to help State and USAID commit to a process that synthesizes these trends into policy and practicum responses as communicated through the QDDR.

**Recommendation Two:**

The Futures Analysis methodology should be more widely integrated into State and USAID Foreign Service Officer (FSO) training programs, especially for mid-career professionals who have gained enough insight and on-the-ground experience to more easily identify trends and help capture them quickly for institutional reporting, analysis, and future...
foreign policy and foreign assistance program development. I recommend a regular “Futures Analysis” training course be designed and offered at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute for both State and USAID FSOs. These officers can be just as helpful in identifying longer-term trends and implications as they do shorter-term developments. This is one of the fundamental problems the strategic planning process is having trouble recognizing. The Departments of State and Defense are largely short-time horizon focused organizations. USAID is not.

In order for U.S. foreign assistance to show demonstrable impact, it needs sustained and focused investments of 5–10 years...

In order for U.S. foreign assistance to show demonstrable impact, it needs sustained and focused investments of 5–10 years in developing countries and especially in vulnerable communities. For example, from 1951 to 1971, U.S. foreign assistance implemented in India helped to establish approximately 20 agricultural research schools and institutes that today are one of the leading reasons why India can feed its own people. USAID also helped fund more than ten engineering and technical schools that are now helping to drive India’s technology revolution. In short, it is important to have diplomats, soldiers, and development experts all in agreement on what needs to be done and how long it will take, so that short-, medium-, and long-term programmatic interventions will be more effective, and the public will see its precious tax dollars used in the most effective and efficient way possible in support of national security and foreign policy interests.

Recommendation Three:

The State Department utilizes an archaic yet robust “cable” system to disseminate its own political, economic, cultural, and other diplomatic analyses. State generates this information from its diplomatic network based on its in-country strategic findings. With its ear to the ground in every host nation, State is perceived as being more attuned, sensitive to, and knowledgeable of what U.S. interests should be, what trends are developing on the ground, and how our government should respond based on those assessments. It is these assessments, combined with inputs from various State and USAID offices, as well as the professional staff at the NSC and other relevant agencies, that help to shape foreign policy and foreign assistance program responses And therein lies the problem: these actions tend to be very short term in scope; they are focused on the here and now and can sometimes tether policy and program responses to short term, risk averse, or even least effective responses. Institutional leadership seeks to “get something done” in order to be seen as relevant. This process is in need of change. The government should create new incentives for FSOs to identify trends/threats/future scenarios that are likely to impact security and foreign relations.

In short, U.S. diplomats need new training, better information systems, and expanded diplomatic and development assets to support their ability to execute short-, medium-, and long-term planning and analysis. They are being prevented from understanding broader, fast moving, global trends because old systems are too linear, too host-state centered, and, perhaps, just too inflexible. Also, while the current approach may ascribe great weight or importance to the political, economic, and basic on-the-ground experience of diplomats and development experts, these same diplomats and experts are not sufficiently trained to integrate other strategic influences which may be broader,
Current information systems serving senior levels of government are generally sufficient (although not always) for planning for the short term. They are absolutely deficient for long term planning. At their current capacity, they are incapable of tracking the transition of events from prospective to actual. More so than ever before, trends are transitioning more rapidly, and possible events are becoming occurring events in the blink of an eye. These types of transitions have the potential to overwhelm the adaptive capacities of our governance system—presenting major challenges that mature at a rate far in excess of the rate at which we might adjust. America could be badly damaged by a powerful emergent development recognized too late for effective repositioning.”

**Recommendation Four:**

Expand the reach and audience for futures analysis so it is more widely understood, accepted, and integrated into the U.S. government’s interagency Policy Coordinating Committees and their subcommittees. For futures analysis to survive, it is critical to expand the futures analysis “partnership” to include the Department of Defense (NDU, J5, and the combatant commands); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Department of Health and Human Services; Millennium Challenge Corporation; Overseas Private Investment Company; Export Import Bank; U.S Trade Representatives; Trade and Development Agency; Treasury Department; and other foreign assistance implementing agencies. One idea would be to collaborate with the NIC and its *Global Trends Report*, so this research could be better integrated; yet, still recognizing that the two efforts have different objectives.

**Recommendation Five:**

Just as the NIC included more than 20 foreign countries in its research and networking for the *Global Trends Report*, State and USAID futures analysis will be strengthened by having peer review committees composed of leaders from developed and developing nations. Understanding future trends and foresight means being able to understand the international system and how nation-states perceive their self-interests vis a vis the U.S. Gaining their input regarding important trends, foresight, and threats should only strengthen the resultant analysis.

In closing, I am happy to report a positive trend for futures analysis. Even the UN, an organization not known for institutional foresight, has committed to bringing “strategic foresight” into the international development discussion. On May 16, 2014, the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development held its 17th session in Geneva and overwhelmingly approved two themes for the 2015 development agenda: “Strategic Foresight for the post-2015 Development Agenda” and “Digital Development.” These themes will help shape future discussions and inform the Millennium Development Goals post-2015 Conference agenda. **IAJ**
NOTES

1 Steven Gale and Sarah Jackson (eds.), *The Future Can’t Wait*, USAID; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; National Defense University; and the Wilson Center, September 2013.


3 Steven Radelet, “Can Global Development Progress Continue? Three Future Scenarios and What They Depend On,” in Steven Gale and Sarah Jackson (eds.), *The Future Can’t Wait*, USAID; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; National Defense University; and the Wilson Center, September 2013.

4 Richard P. Cincotta, “The Future Out to 2030: According to Demography,” in Steven Gale and Sarah Jackson (eds.), *The Future Can’t Wait*, USAID; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; National Defense University; and the Wilson Center, September 2013.

5 Dan Runde, “Beyond Traditional Foreign Assistance: USAID’s Future Role with Middle Income Countries,” in Steven Gale and Sarah Jackson (eds.), *The Future Can’t Wait*, USAID; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; National Defense University; and the Wilson Center, September 2013.

6 Leon Fuerth, “Strategic Vision: Foresight Research for Development,” in Steven Gale and Sarah Jackson (eds.), *The Future Can’t Wait*, USAID; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; National Defense University; and the Wilson Center, September 2013.
How humans understand the world drives the actions they take. This truth has literally changed the course of history. Galileo put the sun in the center of the solar system and altered humanity’s view of its place in the cosmos. Einstein showed time and space are not two separate phenomenon but really different sides of the same coin. These developments allowed for exponential development, as people leveraged new understandings to make incredible breakthroughs. Every great revolution is the result of changing a shared understanding, and U.S. foreign policy and military strategy are no different. The U.S. government’s approach to analyzing foreign nations assumes the Westphalian notion of foreign states as single entities. Although it is essential the U.S. government and all governments continue to treat nations as single entities, it is critical to realize this assumption fundamentally flaws U.S. analysis when trying to understand these nations. This is particularly true when the nation has collapsed, and international efforts...
are being made to stop the ensuing conflict and stabilize the area. To understand the true nature of a nation, its behavior, and the incredible dynamics that can emerge within it, we must use a more effective lens than a seventeenth century treaty. Complex adaptive systems or complexity theory provides such a lens. Similar to an ecosystem with its plants and wildlife forming a complex web of relationships, nations are the embodiment of their interdependencies and competitions. Accepting this perspective allows for a critical examination of current U.S. government frameworks and shows how the assumption of a single state entity can lead to poor understanding. However, it is not enough to throw stones at existing frameworks; the same ideas critiquing the current approaches must be usable in crafting new frameworks. To show the viability of these ideas, we roughly apply them to an analysis of Pakistan. The behavior of a state is a result of the interdependencies and competition within it; accepting this perspective will fundamentally alter how the U.S. understands foreign nations.

The importance of the perspective the U.S. government adopts when understanding a problem is overwhelmingly obvious in the U.S. experience in Iraq. At the beginning of the conflict, the Secretary of Defense would not allow the term insurgency, even as it became obvious large portions of the population were actively supporting armed resistance against coalition forces and the Iraqi government the coalition was trying to establish. Military units seeing the attacks as perpetuated by “terrorist elements” built large, heavily-protected forward operating bases (FOBs) and focused on seek and destroy missions. This perspective and the subsequent actions were counterproductive to success based on known best practices of counterinsurgency. When the Secretary of Defense changed and leaders such as Generals Mattis and Petreaus emerged, they allowed and advocated for a counterinsurgency approach. This new, shared understanding fundamentally altered the daily decisions of coalition members from the private on the ground to the senior leaders in Iraq and Washington. With a counterinsurgency perspective, it became critical to engage the population and get out of the FOBs. Local Iraqi leaders became allies who needed to be part of the solution, and the leadership placed new emphasis on not just finding the insurgents but understanding the people. Regardless of whether or not one believes counterinsurgency was the right perspective, the point is still clear, leaders altering their organization’s shared understanding fundamentally changed the daily decisions and behavior of that organization. This makes the perspective the U.S. government uses to understand foreign populations an issue of strategic importance.

Accepting the importance of perspective begs the question: What perspective provides the greatest ability to understand the dynamics of foreign nations and subsequently craft policy to achieve U.S. goals? Complex adaptive systems theory provides a rigorously-tested, conceptual lens developed specifically to find the underlying laws governing everything from the earth’s environment, to populations, to the human brain. As credence to selecting this particular lens, complexity theory is already providing the basis for current military doctrine and is seen across the government through the emergence of terms like feedback loops, non-linearity, and wicked problems in everyday lexicon. But what is complexity theory? One proposed definition is “Complexity arises when
Complexity theory provides the best current thinking to understand foreign nations...

The next component complex adaptive systems theory is the “adaptive.” Businesses, individuals, organizations, and governments all change or adapt based on the pressures they face within their environments. Every person experiences this in his or her life. Develop skills for a certain career, and that has a significant impact on income level and a whole array of other choices. If the environment alters, say a new technology comes along and makes those skills obsolete, drastic change (adaptation) must occur to survive. A macro example of adaption is the U.S. economic system of capitalism. Every day, different businesses compete for profits, and this competition drives the adaptions of the companies as they constantly seek to maintain or gain market share. This competition then drives the behavior of the market. Those who find successful models or products are able to thrive and are emulated, while those who are unable to get enough market share or unable to change their approaches as their market share dwindles, go out of business. Somewhat simplified, competition drives adaption. This fact leads to the second criterion for analysis, “Does the framework account for the competition of the key groups?” Armed with these two criteria of assessing interdependencies and understanding the competition, it is now possible to examine current U.S. government frameworks through the lens of complexity.
As the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (State) are the two major entities engaged in U.S. foreign policy, we will focus on these two departments and how they seek to understand foreign nations. The current perspective of the DoD is outlined in its joint intelligence doctrine, which describes the process the DoD uses to understand and interpret the environment. The process is known as Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) and is based on systems analysis. To analyze the operating environment, JIPOE uses the acronym PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure). The intent of the methodology is to effectively find the key interdependencies within the operating environment using PMESII as a common way to characterize different aspects of the system (see Figure 1). This meets the first criterion; JIPOE does account for the interdependencies within the system. Yet, applying this methodology to an operating environment produces an immediate divergence from what complexity would suggest. As it examines the whole system, the critical quality JIPOE assumes away competition within the foreign system. Since the competition within the system is the essence of how the foreign system will adapt and hence how its behavior will change, exclusion of this criterion is detrimental to complete system comprehension. If the purpose of foreign policy is to alter the behavior of a foreign government, eliminating competition from the analysis eliminates understanding the underlying dynamic driving the government’s behavior. The Defense framework accounts for the interdependencies aspect of complex adaptive systems but fails to account for the adaptive part.

Before analyzing the framework of State, it is important to understand that State has a fundamentally different culture than Defense. The military, with its planning culture and established processes, provides documentation on how it generally analyzes the environment. State does not have comparable planning and synchronizing efforts. Diplomats must maintain dialogue indefinitely and so must often obscure their intent to keep open the possibility of future diplomatic relations. This position is most clearly articulated by State’s philosophical leader Talleyrand, the famous French diplomat, who extorted “Above all, not too much zeal.” Yet after more than a decade of conflict, State has recognized the need for diplomats and others to offset a purely military approach and to engage when appropriate. In addition, as the U.S. government looked to improve the effectiveness of its actions, State was empowered to lead the whole-of-government approach to help stabilize countries in conflict. State’s effort to try and develop a more effective whole-of-government approach has led to a new element within the department.

In 2012, Secretary Hillary Clinton established the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), solidifying its existence and making its core principles innovation and agility. The CSO is working to find better ways to analyze, surge, and conduct operations to stabilize conflict-ridden areas, to include leveraging tools from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Currently, the most prominent tool of the CSO is the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), used as a common guide to determine the underlying drivers of conflict. The ICAF was originally developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under the direction of
then Director Andrew Nastios. Director Nastios created the beginnings of CSO’s framework by leveraging the field experience and knowledge of USAID’s FSOs.\textsuperscript{14} Although it is a small and emerging bureau, CSO represents the most developed efforts by State in developing a whole-of-government approach. The CSO ICAF tool provides a comparable composition to JIPOE to assess State’s current understanding of analyzing foreign nations, specifically those in crisis or facing an impending crisis.

The ICAF goes further than the JIPOE and acknowledges the competition of groups in foreign populations and seeks to diagnose conflict through four steps. Critical to the ICAF is identifying the core grievances the different groups have and whether or not they feel there are social institutions to address these grievances. The outline of the ICAF is located in Figure 2. Available ICAF reports to date include Liberia, Tajikistan, Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, and Mindanao, Philippines.\textsuperscript{15} Each of these reports provides exceptional insights into the views of the population and the common narratives circulating throughout the various groups used to justify the rightness of their position. At first glance, the ICAF meets both criteria. As Figure 2 shows, the ICAF examines
the interdependencies within the society and how they link key actors and groups. It also examines the grievances of various groups and the reasons they feel they cannot get those grievances addressed. This seemingly answers the competition piece of the assessment criteria. However, when put into practice, this setting does not describe the foreign population in terms of the key competing groups. Instead, the framework focuses on grievances of the population and looks at the social institutions as broken pieces of equipment, which when reformed can address the grievances. The challenge with this is that official institutions in the government are created and run by competing groups and often ignored by other groups who instead are using their own social mechanisms. These institutions are an integral part of the competitive dynamic, not a separate piece. The ICAF does go further than JIPOE and acknowledges competing groups and through its applications provides crucial insights. Despite this, the ICAF still does not meet the competition criterion because competition is not prominent enough to be a key driver of adaption.

Assessing the analytic frameworks of Defense and State reveals they both overlook the importance of competition within foreign systems. JIPOE focuses on the foreign system as the competitor and, in doing so, misses any opportunity to understand the internal competition within the environment. The ICAF does a much better job of identifying the competing groups but takes an idealistic view of governing institutions, as opposed to understanding those institutions as adaptive elements within the system that shape the action of competing groups, and are exploited and shaped by them. Taking this analysis of both DoD and State, it is possible to create a rough framework more consistent with the science of complex adaptive systems that more effectively understands the dynamics of a foreign country.

As our evaluating criteria, we know the two concepts of interdependencies and competition are essential pieces of any complexity-based framework; however, the essence of any complex system is not these ideas by themselves but how they work together. A web of interdependencies

![Figure 2. The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework](image-url)
with its different elements adapting in order to compete more effectively gives rise to truly complex behavior. This dynamic is the same as in any ecosystem; different species connected through a web of interdependencies cooperate and compete over scarce resources. A healthy system allows life to diversify and flourish and find a type of homeostasis. Nonetheless, over time, the system’s homeostasis may become unbalanced, or invasive species may appear and overwhelm the system effectively killing it off. The goal of this framework is to try and describe the ecosystem of the nation. What are the dominant groups and their critical interdependencies, and how are they competing and cooperating over the scarce resources in order to perpetuate and ensure their survival? Unlike the JIPOE and ICAF, this approach assumes the governance structure both shapes the competition of the different groups and is a result of the competition as different groups manipulate the governance structure to aid their group’s survival. As such, a group with enough power can fundamentally alter the government to solidify its position, while a resilient system prevents any group from completely seizing control. Describing nations as ecosystems or an interdependent web of competing groups is a nice thought problem, but can it be applied in practice? Pakistan, as a strategically important as well as a confusing and often misunderstood country, represents an ideal opportunity to apply this approach.

A rudimentary description of the Pakistani ecosystem includes four primary groups with the economic system representing the scarce resources over which the groups are competing. The first group is the dynastic political parties, epitomized by the last two leaders, Zadari of the Bhuttos and Nawaz Sharif. The second group is the military, which forms an undeniably strong and somewhat insulated group. Third are the local leaders and kinships groups, which provide a fluctuating base that the military and dynastic parties seek to leverage in order to enhance their particular positions. The kinship groups are not powerful enough to gain national power on their own, but their support is necessary for the military or dynastic parties to gain and maintain power. Fourth are the bureaucrats, the educated elite, who still maintain the governance systems handed down from British colonialism. These English-speaking professionals compose the various ministers, their ministries, the lawyers, and the judges, and they control the official record. These four groups compose an intricate system that creates the Pakistani ecosystem.

The dynastic political parties are perhaps best illustrated by the Pakistan Peoples Party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), and the Awami National Party. The parties are old (in relation to the age of country), and leadership often passes via family lineage. The dynasties seek to build and retain power through a patronage system that provides postings, favors, resources, etc. to those families or kinship groups that provide the support necessary to rise above one’s competition. Through these promises of patronage, the dynasties gain power, control the government, and distribute the wealth the controlling government provides to those who support them. Yet over time, the governments are typically unable to keep their promises to those local leaders and/or kinship groups and ultimately lose the base necessary to retain the government.

The military is different than the political parties and subject to a different set of economic resources. Within the Pakistani political system, the military can be seen as both a stabilizing
factor and a manipulative entity capable of removing any democratically-elected leader that falls out of favor. The military, having its own internal social welfare system and ideological paradigm, is able to somewhat insulate itself from the patronage system the other political entities suffer from; however, the military cannot insulate itself completely. Once in power it becomes subject to the same need to dole out patronage. The three military leaders of Pakistan’s history, Ayub Khan, Zia Al-Huq, and Perez Musharraf have all tried in different ways to alter this dynamic. In each case, these reforms were unsuccessful, particularly in the case of Khan and Musharraf, where the civilian leaders swept away all the reforms in order to restore their prestige. Ultimately, the military suffers from the same competitions as the other political parties and is unable to provide the requisite patronage to maintain power.

The local leaders and kinship groups ultimately provide the base from which the political parties derive their power. The local leaders and kinship groups pool together to create the coalitions necessary to win national elections. Promises are made by the larger, dynastic political parties that form the skeleton of the patronage system required to reimburse the local leaders. The promises provide local leaders and kinship groups an advantage over other groups; however, they are also subject to the ability of those large political parties to continue to provide those rewards to them. Control of the government gives local leaders advantages in ensuring disputes with their neighbors go their way; they receive the valuable water rights, business licenses, or better energy services. By aligning themselves with a losing or less powerful party, local leaders and kinship groups run the risk of a net loss of power relative to other similar groups.

The bureaucrats are key to control when in power. The bureaucrats represent the governing institutions, such as official judicial, records, and law enforcement systems, which the elected political party can exploit to its advantage, negatively affecting adversaries and complicating the lives of their opponents. At a local level, the judicial system is unwelcome, decidedly ineffective, un-Islamic, and fundamentally British. Additionally, much of the promised patronage comes from ministerial and ambassadorial postings, making the bureaucratic system a method to strengthen one’s powerbase and pilfer state resources to pay one’s client base. The result is many kinship groups continue to use informal judicial systems to settle their disputes, as the official system is primarily a tool of the governing party. The bureaucrats are the educated elite who control the governing institutions, and the group that controls the government is able to exploit this group to pay its client base.

The economic system is the pool of resources within the country the various groups use to survive. Bureaucracy is the key aspect of the economic system and provides any group that controls it a competitive advantage in gaining and exploiting the available economic resources. Since the military maintains its own economic resources, it is partially insulated from the politics of the government. However, as Pakistan is an interdependent web, the military is not completely insulated, and government decisions will affect its economic resources. There may be times when the actions of bureaucrats and other elements within the government have a detrimental effect on the military, prompting it to adapt to protect itself and potentially wrest power from the government. This is a solid example of systems adapting to compete over the finite resources of a complex system.

The ecosystem in Pakistan is a unique complex adaptive system. Dynastic political parties vie for power by promising rewards or patronage to local actors, leaders, and kinship groups. The military is capable of and often
actively meddles in the affairs of politicians to maintain its quality of life and protect against both explicit and inferred existential threats. The bureaucratic and economic systems are shaped and exploited by those same political and military elites to retain and/or gain power and often have an unforeseen effect on the general population of Pakistan. Interestingly, Pakistan is in a type of equilibrium where one group’s attempted change may undermine the status of other groups, and these groups may then actively work or adapt to maintain the status quo. Musharraf saw this as he tried to address the significant problem of the unaccountable police by bringing them under the locally-elected council versus under the bureaucrats. The councils did not have the power, experience, or capability of taking responsibility for or administering the police. As a result, the police simply took no action in the face of any crisis out of fear they would have to take responsibility if something went wrong. This situation led to several embarrassing events of local police collapsing in the face of a Taliban attack. It will be difficult to change the strong balance within the Pakistan ecosystem.

The Pakistan case study provides a rough example of how to use the concepts from complexity theory to more effectively analyze a foreign nation. The challenge is how do we prove this as a more effective framework? Like any adaptation, its effectiveness will be determined through use and application, but the logic supporting this approach is sound. Foreign nations are complex adaptive systems, and complexity theory delivers the best, rigorously-tested understanding available to more effectively analyze them. Nevertheless, complexity also shows us that the approach presented here is just another adaptation; to survive it must prove its utility through application.

When trying to understand foreign nations, the most prevalent assumption in the U.S government is that each is a single entity. The Westphalian notion of states as entities has proven very useful in facilitating international relations and law, much like making a corporation an entity. Unfortunately, in trying to explain why a country behaves the way it does, this view is fundamentally flawed. The JIPOE effectively analyzes the interdependencies of a foreign nation but ignores the competing groups within it, providing a false understanding of why the nation is acting the way it is. The ICAF identifies both the interdependencies and the competing groups but looks at the governing institutions and those individuals in them as not subject to the competing groups around them. Complexity theory argues against both approaches because interdependencies and competition are critical in understanding the behavior of foreign nations. When these aspects are taken together, analyzing nations becomes very similar to analyzing ecosystems. In the very quick analysis of Pakistan, we see the key dynamics of its ecosystem which, despite its many frustrations, has proven relatively resilient. Adopting a complexity-based understanding of foreign nations, which seeks to understand the interdependencies and competition within it, will improve U.S. understanding of foreign nations and in doing so improve U.S. foreign policy.

NOTES


7. It is important to note the U.S. government is much more complex than just those three branches, and there are checks and balances throughout the entire system from local to national levels. Oversimplifying the effectiveness of the U.S. government into a simple maxim of three branches, separate but equal, is a fatal mistake which ignores true complexity of the U.S. government.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., pp. 68–69.
Optimizing
a U.S. Communications Strategy
through Structure and Design

by Sharon Engelmeier

Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until compelled to do so for the purpose of defense.
—Sir Halford John Mackinder, British Strategist and Geographer

Background

The endurance of Syria’s Assad regime, Russia’s defiant maneuvering in eastern Ukraine, and the Islamic State’s encroachment on Iraqi territory stand as staunch reminders to those within U.S. government strategic communication fields that they remain deficient in comparison to their adversaries’ savviness and enhanced influence capabilities. These entities display their abilities to harness and maximize information effects tactically and strategically through deliberate, agile, and focused information operation campaigns, while the U.S. struggles within its antiquated bureaucratic system. As the communication environment becomes more integral and complex, the need increases for an advisory council that is able to develop focused strategic communication plans and is empowered to synchronize the multitude of U.S. government communication entities.

This article discusses one possible organizational structure for optimizing the U.S. government’s external counterterrorism (CT) communications. It is by no means the perfect solution; however, discussions must begin to improve the U.S. government’s ability to promote and preserve its interests abroad by shaping and leading the discourse of local and regional narratives that comprise...
the mega-narrative. So often quoted as the war of ideas, the U.S. government’s diminishing ability to project influence and confidence in its moral values and ideals has affected its ability to maintain its interests abroad. This article proposes that the government regain focus through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). However, as the article will illustrate, CSCC, housed within the Department of State, needs to be further empowered to allow it to develop and adjust integration of information plans and then disseminate to implementing partners to achieve strategic aims.

Current Situation

Strategic communications and information operations should be integrally linked in the growing effort to counter extremist ideology, narrative, and recruitment. In this arena, words must be tied to actions lest they remain empty and meaningless. This linkage requires planners that are extremely knowledgeable on specific, regional, historical biases and culture. Currently, the U.S. government does not have a coherent, regionally-focused, communications strategy nor deliberate mechanisms to coordinate and synchronize operational messaging to leverage and deconflict numerous communication specialists within the Department of State (State), Department of Defense (DoD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the supporting United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Yet these departments and agencies operate in relative autonomy with minimal cross contact and cross-stimuli among experts.

At the strategic and operational levels, the U.S. government needs a systematic bridging mechanism across departments and agencies that forces departments to cross contact in order to strengthen messaging campaigns. The Strategic Communications Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) that feeds in to the National Security Council (NSC) lacks the direct feedback and insight necessary to understand how policy directly affects operational plans. Too often, provided strategic guidance falls short of achieving intended political aims because it is not informed by regional cultural and historical considerations. The NSC cannot make detailed CT communication plans without the experts who possess experience and knowledge of the Department resources necessary for extended creative planning. Approval time for State and DoD CT themes is too long. These messages could to be approved at lower levels if all departments and agencies were provided broad latitude and parameters within strategic communication aims.

The Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya in 2013 serves as an example of how the U.S. government missed an opportunity to discredit al Shabaab’s narrative and contest its statement that a retaliatory attack was justified. Terrorist organizations’ legitimacy thrives on public understanding based on perception, and their narrative promotes their actions as justifiable against an oppressive and overbearing adversarial government. However, with a lack of intimate knowledge of the regional conflict, dynamics, and biases, the young embassy public affairs officer and regional bureau desk representative at State were left to develop messages that failed to exploit the fact that Kenya had supported the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISON) only due to growing unrest created by al Shabaab. The public was then left to believe that this horrific attack might perhaps be justifiable, as al Shabab was only lashing out against the oppressive Kenyan...
government. Another missed opportunity to counter extremist rhetoric occurred several months later following the prisoner exchange involving Sergeant Bergdahl. In that case, the U.S. government messaging was nonexistent toward Afghan and Muslim audiences, which subsequently allowed the Taliban to promulgate their messages uncontested. In either situation, the pro-U.S. government or counter extremist narratives would have benefited immensely from a CT communications council expert to craft and advise on the appropriate dissemination platforms and venues. Particularly in the Sergeant Bergdahl case, the NSC and White House Communications Office would have benefited by having a CT communications expert to highlight the need to address Muslim audiences pertaining to the prisoner swap. With uncontested messages, both the Taliban and al Shabaab were once again able to elevate their mega-narratives, further justifying their actions against what they voiced as Western infringement in the Muslim world.

Refuting Older Models

Currently approval of themes and messages are restricted or significantly delayed by higher echelons within the U.S. government. The bureaucratic system is often and rightfully perceived to lag behind in its ability to counter the extremist ideology, narrative, and violence that perpetuates itself on social media. This is perhaps why some academic scholars and current practitioners long for a simpler time in U.S. government policy and strategic planning. During the Cold War, the U.S. national grand strategy provided clear guidance that allowed all government agencies to plug-in and support. A prime and iconic example was the United States Information Agency (USIA), which was devoted to informing and influencing foreign publics in promoting the national interest through public diplomacy. Its main mission was to promote America’s perspectives, while weakening the Soviet’s. The USIA model proved itself extremely effective; nonetheless, the model of a sole proprietor able to streamline information no longer fits a manifold of competitors. Additionally, while USIA developed communication programs, it did not develop communication efforts for the other agencies and departments to follow and execute because the multitude of factions and nation states requires a U.S. government response that harnesses and deconflicts information through an interagency collaborative approach.

The USIA model used a broad brush approach that would not be as effective in today’s complex environment. In addition to nation state threats, globalization and technological advancements have enabled smaller networks and regionally-specific nodes to reach unprecedented audiences globally.

A successful campaign in today’s communication environment requires multifaceted communication advisors...

A successful campaign in today’s communication environment requires multifaceted communication advisors familiar with implementers and capabilities housed within the government’s departments and agencies. Consequently, inclusion from all components of the interagency spectrum—State, DoD, USAID, Broadcasting Board of Governors, and, most certainly, the intelligence community—is required for successful and deliberate influence campaigns.

Today there is a conglomerate of agencies and organizations within the U.S. government, as well as on the periphery, that is integral in developing and promulgating pro-U.S. narratives and countering extremist ideology, narrative, and recruitment. In today’s fast-paced
The overall effectiveness of U.S. government messaging has diminished over the past decade despite increased budgets and personnel. Without concrete strategic aims that are measurable through subset objectives, strategic planners and operators work tirelessly without clear goals. State and DoD have unique bureaucratic challenges and cultures that set them distinctly apart. Identifying and acknowledging both organizations’ strengths and weaknesses allow for more deliberate, focused, and agile U.S. government counterterrorism messaging. State possesses more regional cultural expertise at the operational level but often lacks strategic planning capabilities. Concurrently, due to personnel changes and remoteness of geographic commands headquarters, DoD communication and information operation experts rarely possess the same cultural expertise but are well-educated in counterterrorism applications and strategic planning.

A successful interagency communication organization must utilize each departments’ strengths to foster collaboration and harness agencies’ resources. The players who are advising and messaging within State are U.S. embassies, regional bureaus, and the CSCC. DoD’s assets available for specifically countering extremist narratives at the combatant commands and theater special operations commands are public affairs, military information operation teams, civil affairs, special advisors, and training and equipping teams. Both departments maintain liaisons from the other department, as well as a handful of other agencies, typically in advisory capacities. However, partnered and directed communications across each department are not expected to coordinate and inform others on multitudes of programs and projects despite the obvious benefits and opportunities to pool and maximize resources toward a desired strategic aim. The challenge is that broad and overarching counterterrorism themes that are not revisited or evaluated consequently become insufficient to long-term planning efforts. Due to daily tasks and mission requirements, cross-pollination, and collaboration between both departments is personality-driven, depending on planner and operator knowledge and expertise.

The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication

Arguably by sheer purpose, the CSCC, housed within State, was designed and given the mandate to fuse the different elements within government to best counter extremist ideology and narrative in the interests of America. The genesis of CSCC, under the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, occurred under Executive Order 13854 to fill national security goals to proactively shape the narrative, counter violent extremist voices, discredit, and delegitimize al Qaeda by empowering credible voices. Inadvertently CSCC stands as a case study on bridging the...
gap between counterterrorism communicators, the intelligence community, and academia. This is accomplished through an interagency office comprised of foreign service officers, foreign service contractors, military officers, and members of the intelligence community. CSCC’s organizational structure has several features that enable it to collaborate; however, an optimal strategic communication advisory council must be able to synchronize national assets.

Components of a Successful Hybrid Communications Organization

CSCC already maintains some key structural and organizational components that have allowed it as a fledgling office to succeed within the past three years. However, if the overall goal is to have an entity capable of developing and synchronizing the implementation of a communication strategy, challenges to facilitate synchronization across the spectrum of key communicators within the current system are pervasive.

Currently housed within State, CSCC lacks the leverage and mechanisms to provide guidance and synchronize counterterrorism strategies across a multitude of government departments and agencies. The office needs a direct feed from NSC subcommittee meetings to discuss collaboration and integration of actions and words that together resound to create strategic effects that protect U.S. interests.

Key structural and design components of a successful interagency communication organization focused on multiple regions should be able to synchronize, de-conflict, and leverage assets to counter extremist ideology, narrative, and recruitment. The following characteristics build upon the innovative Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) structural and organizational principles required for a forward-leaning, cross-agency, and cross-disciplinary office within government.4

• **Remain small, flexible, and flat.** A two-level system allows for maximum collaboration while avoiding military hierarchy. The clearance process within State fosters more collaboration among agencies and bureaus but should remain more as an informative function rather than impede rapid dissemination. The size of the organization certainly allows for more timely responses and mitigates stove-piping ideas that are cross functionally relevant.

• **Relative autonomy and freedom from bureaucratic impediments.** Empowerment of strategic planners and practitioners is critical in dealing with current threats to national security interests. Meeting similar challenges, the Army has implemented the concept of mission command to enable disciplined initiative to empower agile and adaptive operations that will allow the exploitation of initiatives and create favorable conditions. The natural instinct within all levels of government is to maintain control of the information dissemination by waiting for higher authority concurrence for release. In many cases the higher authority is unaware of the capabilities that the subordinate commands possess. Consequently, stagnation plagues planners as they wait for approval for dissemination of minor products from higher authority who are often preoccupied by other events. Due to its leadership, CSCC is generally more empowered than other State or DoD offices but not to the extent necessary to quickly and effectively counter extremist messages. Additionally, due to its location within State, CSCC is unable to effectively synchronize with other departments to deconflict and maximize efforts.

• **Hiring continuity and change while maintaining mix of connected collaborators.** Rotation of fresh thinkers
The dynamics of regularly exchanging ideas, lessons learned, and future opportunities for integration are a challenge for any organization with a multitude of interests and partners.

• **Orientation to innovative trends and breakthroughs through a connected approach.** In CSCC, strategic planners and intelligence analysts are encouraged to seek multidisciplinary knowledge by attending symposiums and forums. This opportunity allows planners to combine scholastic insights on current trends and possible future investments with the realities of diplomatic and military organizations. Additionally, CSCC maintains its own Seminar series for its community of interest that invites leading international scholars and thinkers.

• **Situational awareness.** An advisory council must have purview to current and future plans and policies. Aware that actions beyond those managed by communication professionals have value and impact, the two spheres of policy that direct actions and CT strategic communications need to overlap more than current practices.

**Recommendations**

Enable CSCC as lead advisory office to disseminate and synchronize strategic communication plans as envisioned by Executive Order 13854. It is hard to imagine that the current “Think Again Turn Away” social media campaign run by CSCC was what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta envisioned when they approached the President to create the counterterrorism office. One of the setbacks, of course, is that adjacent departments and agencies must be willing to plug-in to the overall operational guidance reflective of their own capabilities to reach strategic aims, similar to the military’s overall operational command. This can be accomplished by either taking CSCC out of State and assigning it under the NSC or, perhaps more feasible, granting CSCC a permanent seat at the Strategic Communications Interagency Policy Committee (IPC). The Strategic Communications IPC is currently the main forum for deliberations and coordination relating to communication issues. Without CSCC presence at the IPC, the policy planners are not systematically aware of rising issues and lack the expertise of the CT communication planners and practitioners. Without CSCC’s presence, there is no mechanism for the communications community of interest to timely address key concerns prior to issuance of new policy.
Secondly, maintain career planners and analysts from DoD, State, and the intelligence community to retain institutional knowledge from these organizations. As strategic planners and not merely liaison officers, these representatives have a clear understanding of their own organizations’ actions. They can facilitate synchronization and deconfliction and bring their own CT communication expertise as contributing members. Additionally the development and synchronization of operational plans would benefit by the inclusion of a strategic planner from the USAID at CSCC. This would pay dividends in supporting USAID’s CT relevance, as the agency is responsible for developing foreign nations’ communication platforms. USAID inclusion would assist in ensuring wider dissemination of proposed CT communication programs and ensuring USAID is part of the CT communications plan.

While the structure and organization of CSCC has facilitated and allowed the organization to overcome typical problems that hamper interagency organizations, there are a few challenges that are not as easily overcome. Bridging these gaps will allow future communication organizations to operate at peak performance.

First it is a distinct challenge for a small organization such as CSCC to foster and thrive. Due to its composition—foreign service officers, State contractors, DoD, and intelligence community augmentees, by its nature, CSCC is integrated at the basic level. Naturally due to CSCC’s existence within State, planners have developed relationships with U.S. embassies and coordinated with existing communicators within the Beltway on a regular basis. This network, however, needs to continue to expand, and CSCC must then provide CT strategic communication to these organizations. The dynamics of regularly exchanging ideas, lessons learned, and future opportunities for integration are a challenge for any organization with a multitude of interests and partners. Unlike typical DoD organizations, CSCC planners are more inclined to nurture and cultivate relationships, DoD’s culture is to collaborate for specific missions, not merely to exchange ideas. Despite having strategic planners within CSCC, DoD organizations typically have not fully realized and capitalized on the strategic benefits of cultivating and maintaining stronger ties with CSCC. This sporadic collaboration needs to improve to allow for the optimization of U.S. government CT communications through resource sharing.  

NOTES


Worth Noting

Compiled by Elizabeth Hill

Anti-ISIL Strategy to Include Civilian and Military Agencies

President Obama met with military and civilian leaders on July 6, to discuss the strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The strategy includes multiple elements of American power, including military, intelligence, diplomacy, and economic development.

The President acknowledged that countering ISIL will be a long campaign, and noted that in many areas ISIL is “dug in among innocent civilian populations,” and that “It will take time to root them out.”

The American strategy against ISIL will require coordination among multiple U.S. government departments and agencies, as well as international partnerships. According to the President, “Partnering with other countries, sharing more information, strengthening laws and border security allows us to work to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Syria as well as Iraq… And working together, all nations are going to need to do more. But we’re starting to see some progress.”

Updated National Military Strategy Released

The Pentagon recently released a new National Military Strategy. This is the first update to the National Military Strategy since 2011, and follows the release of the 2015 National Security Strategy in February, as well as the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The updated strategy reflects the new global security situation, which includes threats from both traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey noted in his introduction of the document that “Since the last National Military Strategy was published in 2011, global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode.”

The strategy specifically calls out Iran, Russia and North Korea as aggressive threats to global peace, and also addresses concerns about U.S. technological superiority and terrorist groups like the Islamic State. The new National Military Strategy focuses on the importance of partnerships to maintain the delicate security balance around the globe, highlighting interagency and international cooperation, and stating that “Timely interagency planning and coordination also will be leveraged to develop holistic options that serve to integrate all elements of national power.”

Report Examines Cybersecurity Bills

In mid June the Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report comparing three bills that address information sharing and related activities in cybersecurity. The bills, two from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, are the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA, H.R. 1560 as passed by the House), the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of
2015 (NCPAA, H.R. 1731 as passed by the House), and the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA, S. 754).

According to the CRS report, all three bills focus on information sharing among private entities and between those entities and the federal government. The bills also address the structure of the information-sharing process, liability risks for private-sector sharing, and privacy concerns related to information sharing.

The bills limit the use of shared information to purposes of cybersecurity and law enforcement. The bills also limit other government use, and potential misuse, of shared information, and include provisions to shield information shared with the federal government from public disclosure.

White House Establishes Interagency Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell

President Obama announced the completion of the review of U.S. hostage policy on June 24. The review has been under way for over a year, and was originally announced in November 2014.

The U.S. hostage policy has been heavily criticized by government officials, members of the U.S. military, and the families of American hostages. Among the complaints are dissatisfaction with a “dysfunctional” bureaucracy and a lack of interagency cooperation. Families of the U.S. hostages also reported feeling threatened by the agencies that had been tasked with the safe return of their loved ones.

The President announced that he had issued a new Presidential Policy Directive aimed at returning American hostages and supporting their families, signed a new Executive Order that would ensure better coordinated hostage recovery, and that the full report on the hostage policy review would be released. The President also announced that a senior diplomat will be designated as a Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs and the creation of an interagency Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell.

The Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell will include the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, as well as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Representatives from other agencies may be added as needed. The fusion cell is currently “up and running” at the FBI, and aims to improve how the government develops hostage recovery plans, tracks developments in specific cases, shares information with families, and provides information to Congress and the media.

USAID Updates Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy

In early June, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released their updated Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy. The new policy builds on the previous policy, which was issued in 2008.

The 2008 Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy established the foundation for cooperation between the USAID and the Department of Defense (DoD). The 2008 policy also established civilian-military cooperation as fundamental to a whole-of-government approach to contemporary national security challenges.

The updated policy builds on the 2008 policy’s foundation, and incorporates what USAID has learned from working with DoD, including lessons learned from experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan,
On May 14 the Simons Center hosted the CEO Cybersecurity Roundtable at the Kauffman Foundation Conference Center in Kansas City. The event was presented in partnership with the Kansas City chapter of Business Executives for National Security (BENS) and the CGSC Foundation, the Simons Center’s parent organization.

The roundtable provided a forum for discussing cybersecurity threats, challenges, and resources for senior business executives, and was attended by leaders representing 32 companies and organizations from the Kansas City area, including UMB, Sprint, AMC Theaters, H&R Block, Commerce Bank, and KU Medical Center. Interagency organizations including the Kansas City offices of the FBI and Secret Service were represented along with the U.S. Attorney’s office.

A highlight of the roundtable was a case study presented by Mike Brown, Chairman/CEO of Euronet Worldwide, in which Brown discussed his company’s experience with a criminal security breach of its computer systems in 2011. Brown’s presentation was followed by remarks from Rick Harris, from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, and by three panels which focused on cybersecurity threats, protection, and attack response.

The Simons Center plans to follow up the roundtable with an after action review that can serve as a “CEO Cybersecurity Handbook” for planning and response in the event of a security breach.

The U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have released the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), Enduring Leadership in a Dynamic World. The review was launched in April 2014.

The 2015 QDDR builds on the previous edition, focusing on priority reforms that are crucial to enhancing the effectiveness, agility, and innovative spirit of U.S. diplomacy and development. The QDDR is meant to be the “blueprint for the next generation of American diplomacy,” and centers around four global policy priorities for State and USAID:

1. Preventing and mitigating conflict and violent extremism;
2. Promoting open, resilient, and democratic societies;
3. Advancing inclusive economic growth; and
4. Mitigating and adapting to climate change.

In his executive summary, Secretary of State John Kerry said that State and USAID are mobilizing dynamic partnerships, building broad coalitions, and leading interagency and international teams in confronting current global challenges and fulfilling the missions of both State and USAID.

The QDDR also sets out priorities to support State and USAID staff.
DoD Releases Cyber Strategy

Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced the release of the Defense Department’s new cybersecurity strategy on April 23, while speaking at Stanford University. The new guidance builds on DoD’s original strategy, which was released in 2011.

According to Carter, the DoD response to cyber threats “is similar to what we do about more conventional threats.” Carter also stated that DoD has three missions in the cyber domain:

1. To defend DoD networks, systems and information;
2. To defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. national interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and
3. To provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans.

The updated DoD cyber strategy lays out goals and objectives for the next five years, and focuses on building capabilities for effective cybersecurity and cyber operations. These cybersecurity activities include information sharing and interagency coordination, as well as building relationships with the private sector and international partners, and will require the commitment and coordination of multiple leaders and communities across DoD and the broader U.S. government. 

CSIS Reports on DHS Unity of Effort Initiative

In early April, the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) released a paper analyzing the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) “unity of effort initiative.” The document is a follow up to roundtables hosted by CSIS to examine the DHS effort.

In late 2014, CSIS hosted two not-for-attribution roundtable discussions with subject matter experts to explore DHS’s efforts to implement Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson’s suggestion to “transparely incorporate DHS Components into unified decision-making processes and the analytic efforts that inform decision-making.”

Roundtable participants discussed challenges facing DHS efforts, including lack of mission focus, a perceived struggle to provide adequate training resources, and problems with career development. Participants also noted “cultural resistance” to cooperative, cohesive efforts among the DHS components.

The paper makes several recommendations to address these challenges, including exchange or liaison opportunities within the DHS component offices, private-sector rotations, more focused training, and other incentives to encourage talent retention. These recommendations aim to better DHS cooperation within their components as well as with other government agencies.
U.S. Provides Humanitarian Assistance to Nepal

The U.S. government and military actively assisted in disaster relief efforts in Nepal after the April 25 earthquake. The 7.8 earthquake and multiple aftershocks affected more than 8 million people and claimed over 8,700 lives.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) initially provided $12.5 million in funds. Since then, the U.S. government has provided over $62 million in assistance. USAID also sent a 129 person Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to aid in search and rescue operations and other relief efforts. The DART transitioned to a field office in June.

USAID, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and many other U.S. agencies and organizations coordinated their efforts to bring relief to the area. U.S. assistance to Nepal was a collaborative effort between the U.S., Nepalese, and other national governments and militaries.
Before addressing the Stimson Center report, *Partners in Prevention: Making Public-Private Security Cooperation More Efficient, Effective and Sustainable. Recommendations of the Task Force*, it may be worthwhile to review a few statistics to place the topic in context. U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Michael Froman, writing in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, provided some numbers to emphasize the importance of global export trade to the United States. “Last year [2013],” he wrote, “the United States exported a record $2.3 trillion in goods and services.”\(^1\) According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative website, this export trade alone “supported an estimated 11.3 million jobs” in the same period.\(^2\) Statistics on U.S. imports and related job figures are less easily isolated, but given the United States’ current balance of trade deficits, are likely to exceed export figures. Exports in the trillions of dollars and domestic jobs numbering more than 11.3 million underscores the significance of the global export trade to the United States. Protecting that trade from a variety of security threats is both a full-time job and the subject of the Stimson Center’s project.

*Partners in Prevention* summarizes the work of a panel of fourteen current and former leaders of government and industry deliberating on major security challenges facing their constituencies. The report begins by framing the challenge to the U.S. export business community: “A global economy has empowered criminals and terrorists on a global scale.”\(^3\) Similarly, Thomas Friedman in *The World Is Flat* and some of his other works argued that globalization has resulted in “super-empowered individuals.” Cohen and Blechman, authors of the Stimson Center report, have applied the same conclusion to criminal and terrorist networks.

Having established a broad view of the challenge; Cohen and Blechman argue that business and government must develop “a more integrated, proactive, network-like response.” The Stimson Center’s report provides the study group’s recommendations on how to structure that response.

The group’s recommendations are comprehensive. They include identifying “trusted exporters’ and rewarding them for pro-active security procedures; leveraging the expertise of logistics service providers to improve oversight of sensitive technology; modernizing information sharing technologies to enhance risk management; and improving terrorism risk insurance, among others. For each recommendation, the authors provide background to the problem and facts bearing on the
problem, providing a strong argument in each case.

_Partners in Prevention_ conceptualizes the process of improving security in the realm of U.S. global trade. From a security management perspective, however, the study group’s recommendations for security cooperation are long on concepts, but relatively short on concrete steps that would translate recommendations into actions. Having worked for a few years as a corporate security manager, my experience indicates that many of these recommendations would have a significant effect on corporate profits. This, conceptually, could undermine the very partnership the report seeks to enhance.

While it is likely quite true that resources expended to enhance protection as recommended in the report would prevent corporate losses in the long term, the corporate paradigm of making all aspects of operations into profit centers to improve the short term bottom line tends to limit security programs. Security managers, especially in small to mid-sized corporations, often have a difficult time selling security improvements if they cannot point to specific instances where an improved security measure prevented an incident. It is much easier to “sell” security enhancements after a loss has occurred, but by then it is too late.

_Partners in Prevention_ also seems to pay scant heed to the on-going efforts of professional organizations like the American Society for Industrial Security, International (ASIS) to develop industry-wide standards and “best practice” data bases for improving all aspects of security for specific industries. ASIS working groups focusing on manufacturing, transportation, logistics services, and other industries (broadly defined) provide specific actions, tailored to the needs of each industrial category. Many of the recommendations found in _Partners in Prevention_ have their antecedents in work done by these ASIS committees.

On the other hand, the Stimson center report is a conceptual document. One can argue that sound concepts, broadly shared, can lead to better actions and more comprehensive results. And, the report does a commendable job of framing the problem. As stated in the Foreword, the effects of globalization, specifically, “transnational threats to our physical and economic security,” require revision in the ways governmental and commercial actors approach security, broadly defined. Traditional approaches, by either governmental agencies or corporate security managers, no longer suffice; there must be an integrated approach. Given the focus of the report on security cooperation relating to transnational threats, its concentration on global import and export trade is certainly appropriate. The challenge, however, remains: translating these broad concepts into actions. Unfortunately, the transnational criminal and terrorist actors threatening U.S. global trade are not likely to await our revised approaches to integrated security. Alas. _IAJ_

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**NOTES**

1 “The Strategic Logic of Trade,” _Foreign Affairs_, November/December 2014, 111.


3 Cohen and Blechman, _Partners in Prevention_, 13.