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FOREIGN AID AND PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by
Susan Bartlett



CGSC Foundation's
Arthur D. Simons Center
for Interagency Cooperation

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Susan Bartlett is a Ph.D. student at the University of Kansas concentrating in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Her research interests include African politics, peace and conflict research, terrorism and political parties. She holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of Kansas, a Juris Doctorate degree from Louisiana State University's Paul M. Hebert Law Center, a Graduate Diploma of Civil Law from Louisiana State University's Paul M. Hebert Law Center, and Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of Maine. She also served as a Chemical Officer in the U.S. Army.

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Introduction

Despite experiencing several years of economic stagnation, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development¹ countries increased development aid to record high levels in 2013², which suggests the importance and resolve that economically advanced nations place on improving the plight of developing nations. While various forms of foreign aid target different social maladies, what seems true is that aid should not only benefit the targeted population, but should also achieve donor goals.

Despite the emphasis that states and international organizations and institutions place on the utility of foreign aid, there is significant debate about its benefits. The debate centers on the potentially deleterious or null effects that specific forms of aid can have on a recipient state.³ This view suggests that various types of foreign aid are, at best, benign and, at worst, undermine stability and development. In contrast, other researchers suggest that aid can reduce the prevalence of conflict,⁴ prevent the outbreak of conflict,⁵ or even reduce the incidence of terrorism.⁶ In short, the impact of various forms of foreign aid upon the development and democratization of recipient states is well studied, but unfortunately, it has also failed to answer the question about the efficacy of aid. Yet international donors continue to pour aid into developing regions, which makes it important to understand the impact of aid on more specific aspects of recipient states.

While previous research has attempted to determine the effect of foreign aid or military intervention upon developing states' democratization or development, the literature still has not specifically examined the effect that military aid and democratization aid have on building key types of democratic institutions. Key but often neglected institutions in these studies are political parties and party systems. While parties and their corresponding party systems are largely recognized as essential to democratization transitions and consolidations, there has been far less emphasis on the impact of various types of foreign aid on these key institutions, which is unfortunate because of the critical role and impact of party systems. For example, Bueno de Mesquita, et. al note that competitive party systems are essential to reducing human rights violations. In fact, these authors note that absent fully institutionalized party systems, government-orchestrated human rights abuses do not subside.⁷ Similarly, Huntington notes that institutionalized party systems reduce state instability.⁸ Others have found that institutionalized party systems reduce intrastate conflicts.⁹ Similarly, Carothers argues that democratization programs have in part failed because of the lack of emphasis on bolstering political parties.¹⁰ Thus, parties and party systems are integral components of democratization that critically impact important international concerns such as human rights, conflict, democracy, and state stability.

It is essential to understand the importance of aid on party systems for several reasons. First, party systems are key components for successful democratization to occur; only by understanding the impact of foreign aid on party systems can one truly understand the impact of aid on democratization. Second, institutionalized and competitive party systems reduce human rights violations;¹¹ therefore, analyzing the impact of foreign aid on recipient states' party systems provides key insight into core areas of international concern. Finally, institutionalized party systems have been associated with more stable institutions¹² and less intrastate conflict.¹³ While the impact of aid on democratization or conflict has been studied, the impact of aid on party systems has largely gone unexamined. In order to understand more comprehensively the impact of aid on democratization and stability, it is important to study how aid affects party systems.

This paper attempts to merge these research agendas by providing a broad initial examination into the impact that democratization aid and military aid have upon party system institutionalization. In contrast to the majority of research that solely examines democratization aid or other various forms of economic aid, this paper also examines military aid. The reason for this added emphasis is because military aid may

impart a different effect than democratization aid. In fact, it is possible that the two types of aid may undermine the purpose and goals that accompany the other. For example, while Savun and Tirone note that democratization aid can reduce civil conflict,¹⁴ other researchers have found that military aid does not reduce sub-state conflict or paramilitary activities¹⁵ and can actually worsen human rights

violations.¹⁶ Thus, each type of aid should be examined separately in order to disaggregate its impact. Further, this paper limits its focus to U.S.-based aid to Sub-Saharan Africa states that have assumed some *preliminary* degree of multiparty politics since the third wave of democratization in the 1990s.

Background

DEMOCRATIZATION AID

One of the central debates surrounding the utility of foreign aid rests upon the contention that aid increases democracy, which thereby produces diffuse results that are transferred into increased state stability as well as regional peace.¹⁷ Regional peace via diffused democracy is believed to promote intrastate and regional peace by reducing conflict and thus has been a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy.¹⁸ Beyond the international peace component of democracy promotion, however, is the belief that democracy promotion translates into regimes that facilitate greater political participation, accountability, and observance of human rights.¹⁹ Therefore, there are a number of reasons why the U.S. should pursue foreign aid aimed at democracy promotion. Unfortunately, despite theoretical arguments that support these efforts, there has been little consensus on the efficacy of many economic aid programs. Despite the widely held belief that widespread democracy generates peace, stability, and higher observance of human rights, there is less consensus on the ability of foreign aid to promote democracy.²⁰ In fact, some studies suggest that foreign aid actually undermines democratization efforts.²¹ In contrast, researchers have found that higher levels of foreign aid are correlated with a reduced incidence of intrastate conflict,²² lower incidence of terrorism,²³ and when foreign aid is aimed at democratization sectors, then countries also experience an increase in democratization.²⁴ These seemingly contradictory findings present a perplexing question, especially in light of aid distribution levels that reached record high levels in 2013.²⁵ Yet it cannot be forgotten that

democratization aid is not the only type of aid that foreign states render. In fact, despite the widespread debate over the utility of foreign economic aid, the impact of foreign military aid is also a central and disputed issue.

MILITARY AID

While development aid and democratization aid have received the bulk of criticism in the foreign aid debate, the impact of military aid is also a key aspect of many nations' foreign policy agendas. There is widespread criticism of the use of third-party military interventions but also the use of military aid itself. For example, higher allocations of U.S. military aid is correlated with higher incidence of personal security violations.²⁶ These findings are consistent with the bulk of research that finds third-party military interventions have a negative impact on both human rights²⁷ and extending the duration of the conflict.²⁸

While the impact of foreign economic aid, channeled through various sectors, has been thoroughly examined, there is little known research that examines the impact of foreign military aid on democratization efforts, except for the tangential impact of aid upon recipient states' human rights records. Furthermore, I know of no statistical research that examines the impact of U.S. military aid on party system institutionalization.²⁹ These are important and unanswered aspects of the aid debate because military aid has the potential for imparting significant consequences to the domestic populace and governmental institutions of the recipient states. This is especially true in many Sub-Saharan African states where leaders and politicians have

undemocratically sustained their power.

Many Sub-Saharan Africa states are infamous for tolerating long-standing autocratic leaders. While foreign military aid may not be directly responsible for perpetuating this phenomenon, the use of foreign military aid may facilitate state leaders maintaining control over the state and exercising violence that may not otherwise be available. In other words, it is possible for military aid to strengthen the hold that an autocrat has over the state. This means that a state that receives substantial foreign military aid has increased capacity to subdue internal dissent, prevent opposition parties, and exercise increased repression. This paper theorizes that military aid has the potential to decrease party system institutionalization by reducing the legitimacy of parties and the connectedness of parties with civilians, while simultaneously decreasing the rates

of party system volatility.³⁰

Hypothesis 1: Increased U.S. military aid is correlated with a reduction in legitimacy and roots in society.

Hypothesis 2: Increased U.S. military aid is correlated with a decrease in volatility.

To be clear, theoretical reasons for the decrease in legitimacy with increases in aid derive from the fact that parties and party systems are mere facades of democratic institutions that are constructed and tolerated by elites and leaders who are supported by military aid. In short, historically many Sub-Saharan African parties are vehicles for institutionalizing status quo corruptive practices rather than acting as representatives of the electorate. In contrast, party system volatility would decrease because there would be fewer turnovers in parties who are elected.

Political Party Systems

While research examining the impact of foreign aid upon democratic transition, consolidation, or physical integrity rights is consistently examined, there is scant attention paid to the impact of aid on parties and party systems. This is an interesting phenomenon because parties are often cited as key and essential components of stable state institutions and democratic consolidation.³¹ Furthermore, democratic consolidation is often tied to better adherence to human rights standards³² and because political parties are arguably a building block of democracy, the importance of foreign aid to the improvement of party system institutionalization should not be dismissed.

WHY DO PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS MATTER?

The importance of political parties cannot be overstated. In fact, they are often inextricably linked to successful democracy.³³ To be sure, theorists and researchers alike deem parties as an essential instrument for an “accountable responsible government.”³⁴ They serve as a link between citizens and government by “organizing voters, aggregating and articulating interests,

crafting policy alternatives, and providing the basis for coordinated electoral and legislative activity.”³⁵ These characterizations of parties are often used when describing the European and American democratic experience. When examining newly democratizing nations, the ability of political parties to fulfill these vital roles is more attenuated. Despite the importation of the Western party system model into newly democratizing nations, many of these countries do not have party systems that link governments and its citizens. It has been argued that this phenomenon is due to elites constructing political parties merely to serve their own self-interests, rather than parties manifesting from underlying societal organizations or interests.³⁶

Many African countries attempted to create viable democratic systems during the third wave of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. One mechanism utilized to achieve representative government during this time was the creation of political parties, a decidedly Western institution. In contrast to political parties in Western Europe, which emerged and evolved over long periods of time, African political parties were quickly created after colonial rule ended. Western European parties were able to

emerge and forge strong bonds with civil society, while many African parties did not.³⁷ In fact, it is often argued that, African parties are merely “copy and paste” shells of Western parties, with little ideological underpinnings and few linkages to civil society.³⁸

This is not to suggest that there are no Sub-Saharan political parties linked with civil society. While parties are often merely elite constructions with few connections to civil societies, there are states where political parties did emerge from civil society coalition.³⁹ Specifically, Randall notes that opposition parties in Zambia (the Movement for Multiparty Democracy), Mali (Adema), and Zimbabwe (the Movement for Democratic Change) are directly derived from civil society organizations.⁴⁰ It should be noted that what is at issue is not the existence of African civil society per se, but rather that political parties are largely not believed to be rooted in civil society or associational groups. The fact that parties are often elite constructions⁴¹ with few connections to civil society⁴² perpetuates pervasive “clientelistic” party systems. The danger of systemic “clientelistic” systems is that they can effectively deny representation to those outside the patronage network.⁴³

“Clientelistic”-based politics or patrimonialism is a practice whereby political leaders utilize individual and personal favors in return for political support.⁴⁴ To be sure, most nations are characterized by patronage politics; the difference in Africa rests upon its pervasiveness. The power of patronage in some African states is so ubiquitous that it has undermined state institutions and bureaucracy, even creating unofficial political and authoritative structures that are even more powerful than official state institutions.⁴⁵

The systemic use of patronage produced widespread corruption, which effectively sidelined political parties’ ability to engage in effective representation.⁴⁶ In fact, some sub-Saharan African nations have patronage so deeply engrained within its governance structures that specific subsections of the electorate are excluded from the political process, as they are not recipients of patronage rewards. The results of this pervasive patronage network means that the interests of certain ethnic

groups, women, and civil society organizations are not represented.⁴⁷ Arguably, this phenomenon means that parties and party systems are not fulfilling their primary functions of representation and accountability to the people, which renders the utility of party systems relatively nonexistent.

It should now be clear that political parties are essential ingredients to the successful consolidation of democracy and promote governmental stability because they act as citizen representatives and ensure governmental accountability; unfortunately, in many Sub-Saharan African states, parties have difficulty fulfilling these roles. Any sort of comprehensive analysis that examines the foreign aid, democratization, conflict nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa must necessarily examine the impact of aid upon party systems because they are an integral component of government and democratization efforts in the region that are inextricably bound to the occurrence of these phenomena.

To be sure, there is abundant literature that largely ignores the impact of African political party system because of patronage, corruption, and dysfunction; however, failing to analyze the impact of foreign involvement on African party systems neglects a core component of democratization, state stability, and intrastate conflict.⁴⁸

INTERNATIONAL PARTY ASSISTANCE

While foreign aid is generally aimed at increasing democratic consolidation or institutional competency and accountability, which tangentially has an impact on parties and party systems, there is also direct aid that is designated solely for international party assistance.⁴⁹ While the type of party aid that is administered can vary according to the identity of the donor country, the effective aim of party aid/assistance is to assist in the recipient state’s democratization and consolidation process.⁵⁰ As previously discussed in the context of Sub-Saharan African political parties, many developing states do not have institutionalized parties or party systems, which means they are often afflicted with corruption and high levels of volatility. Parties and party systems that are weakly institutionalized are thus arguably unable to fully fulfill their roles in consolidating democracy. International party

aid often aims at overcoming these party systems deficiencies, which in turn, are believed to result in improvements in the democratization process.⁵¹

While political parties are often cited as foundational institutional components for democracy and there is increasing academic and policy emphasis on the link between institutionalized party systems and good governance,⁵² international support for parties has not always been a popular or key aspect of foreign aid. For example, as recently as 2003, the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID)⁵³ has stated that party assistance was a new aspect of its foreign aid program. While there is widespread recognition of the utility of party systems in the democratization agenda, Carothers⁵⁴ notes that world-wide international party assistance is only about \$200 million (US). One reason that parties are viewed as essential to democracy but receive only a small proportion of democratization fund⁵⁵ may rest with the fact that donors are sensitive to the accusation that aid aimed at political parties or party development is foreign interference into the domestic affairs of the recipient state.⁵⁶ A second reason may be that the effectiveness of international party assistance is not easily ascertained and thus its utility is often questioned.⁵⁷

Rakner and Svasand did examine the impact of party aid from the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) to Malawi and Zambia.⁵⁸ Relying on case studies, these authors found that the international party assistance did little to improve political party institutionalization in these two states. Yet these authors note that changes may take a long time to achieve, and thus, empirical analysis may merely fail to capture the impact of party assistance.

More recently, Dietrich and Wright examined the impact of democratization aid on political party consolidation and transition in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁹ Specifically, they examined how foreign aid impacts the transitions to and the survivability of multiparty systems, electoral misconduct, and vote opposition. Their quantitative research program focuses exclusively on Sub-Saharan African states' transitions to multiparty politics and, thereafter, the consolidation of democracy via sustained

multiparty politics and a reduction in electoral misconduct. Their research findings conclude that economic aid supports democratic transitions but not consolidation, and that democratic aid supports consolidation but not transitions. These findings effectively suggest that the right type of aid at the appropriate time has the potential to effect change in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the aid must be targeted at specific democratic institutions.

Despite Dietrich and Wright's ground-breaking work, there are still a multitude of unasked and unanswered questions regarding the impact of party systems and its ties to democratization.⁶⁰ For example, how does foreign economic aid that is aimed to improve governance and enlarge civil society impact how citizens view their elected representatives? Does foreign aid encourage and improve the stability of governmental institutions such as political parties and encourage adherence to the rule of law? These are the questions that are inherently answered when examining political party institutionalization.

Hypothesis 3: U.S. economic aid targeted at improving governance and civil society has no impact upon party system institutionalization.

This research project attempts to fill this lacuna by examining the impact of U.S. governance and civil society aid and military aid on party system institutionalization in Sub-Saharan African democracies and semi-democracies. While this study contributes to the debates on the efficacy of foreign aid, it also extends this research examining the important but often overlooked aspect of democratization—party system institutionalization.

Empirical Analysis: Research Design, Measures, Data

VARIABLES

I evaluated the theoretical argument that neither U.S. economic aid nor military aid improves the democratization process of party system institutionalization through statistical analysis of foreign aid data.

- **Dependent variable:** The dependent variable is party system institutionalization. Party system institutionalization is an original index comprised of three components—roots in society, legitimacy, and the regularity of party competition.⁶¹ The indicators within each sub-index are averaged to provide a single score for each sub-index within the sample. The score for each sub-index is then added together to provide an overall institutionalization score for each state within the sample.⁶²
- **Independent variables:** I bifurcated the types of foreign aid into (1) military aid, data that is supplied by USAID’s Greenbook, and (2) economic democratization aid commitments, as supplied by AidData.org. AidData 3.0 captures foreign aid across a wider array of sectors than other datasets and thus is an ideal dataset for use in studying the impact of foreign aid.⁶³ I contained my analysis to U.S. economic aid commitments directed at government and civil society sectors during the years of 1990–2013. In keeping with previous research, aid commitments have been logged and scaled by capita in order to account for variations in state size.⁶⁴ The sample includes all Sub-Saharan African countries that were coded by Freedom House as democracies or semi-democracies a majority of the time from 1990–2013 and that have also held two consecutive multiparty elections from 1990–2013. These restrictions result in a sample of thirty Sub-Saharan states.

A number of control variables are included within the models in order to account for other factors that have been theorized to impact the level of

Benin	Malawi
Botswana	Mali
Burkina Faso	Mauritius
Cape Verde	Mozambique
Central African Republic	Namibia
Comoros	Niger
Ethiopia	Nigeria
Gabon	Sao Tome and Principe
Gambia	Senegal
Ghana	Seychelles
Guinea-Bissau	Sierra Leone
Kenya	South Africa
Lesotho	Tanzania
Liberia	Uganda
Madagascar	Zambia

Table 1: Sample of States in the Study

party system institutionalization including ethnic fractionalization;⁶⁵ democracy level, as measured by the average polity score for each state between the years 1990–2008 (Polity IV project); and the level of economic development and wealth as measured by GDP per capita (World Bank’s World Development Indicators).

METHODOLOGY

Several statistical models are used to test the theoretical argument that U.S. economic aid and military aid do not increase party system institutionalization. Ordinary least squares (OLS) models are used with the dependent variable changing from the entirety of the party system institutionalization to components thereof (e.g., volatility, legitimacy, and roots in society).

There is widespread recognition of the possibility of endogeneity of foreign aid.⁶⁶ Endogeneity in the aid context refers to the possibility that aid is directed at recipient states that are already exhibiting increased democratization or, in this case, increased levels of party system institutionalization. This type

	Institutionalization Index	Roots in Society	Legitimacy	Volatility
(Intercept)	4.29** (1.13)	1.59 (0.76)	1.52** (0.47)	1.18 (0.71)
U.S. Economic Aid	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Recipient GDP	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Population (naturally logged)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Level of Democracy	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
R ²	0.36	0.20	0.41	0.28
Adj. R ²	0.19	-0.01	0.25	0.09
Num. obs.	25	25	25	25
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05				

Table 2: Impact of U.S. Economic Aid on Party System Institutionalization

of endogeneity can bias the coefficients of OLS models and thus provide skewed results.⁶⁷

Two-stage least square models attempt to remedy endogeneity by substituting an instrumental variable for the endogenous variable. Throughout the aid literature, instrumental variable two-stage least squares are routinely utilized to account for endogeneity.⁶⁸ The idea is that the endogenous variable, U.S. aid, is substituted by a secondary or exogenous variable called the instrumental variable that does not predict the dependent variable, in this case party system institutionalization, but is uncorrelated with residual errors. I have selected three alternate instrumental variables: following Knack,⁶⁹ infant mortality is utilized as a measure of recipient need; similarly to Dietrich and Wright,⁷⁰ donor inflation is utilized weighted by distance between the recipient state and the U.S. (EUGene.org); the average S score is also used for the years 1990–2008, as provided by EuGene.org to measure the similarity of alliance portfolios between the recipient state and the U.S.⁷¹ Thus, models for both

OLS and two-stage least squares are presented.

RESULTS

Model 1 in Table 2 provides the base OLS model that examines the impact of U.S. economic aid on party system institutionalization. In accordance with Hypothesis 3, there is no impact on party system institutionalization or any of the sub-indexes.

Similarly, Table 3 (page 8) illustrates the effect of U.S. military aid on party system institutionalization and its component parts. Interestingly, in contrast to Hypothesis 1 and 2, there is no statistically significant impact of military aid.⁷²

Tables 4–5 (page 9) present the two-stage least square model results. Table 4 indicates that U.S. economic aid has no impact on legitimacy or roots in society. This means that while economic aid may be aimed at improving governance, government, and civil society, this aid has no impact upon how voters align and identify with parties (roots in society) nor respect for the integrity of elections or

	Institutionalization Index	Roots in Society	Legitimacy	Volatility
(Intercept)	4.98* (1.76)	1.98*** (0.18)	0.93 (0.72)	2.16 (1.07)
U.S. Economic Aid	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
GDP	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Population (naturally logged)	0.03 (0.10)		0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)
Level of Democracy	0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
R ²	0.36	0.23	0.43	0.34
Adj. R ²	0.19	0.06	0.27	0.16
Num. obs.	24	24	24	24
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05				

Table 3: Impact of U.S. Military Aid on Party System Institutionalization

laws governing parties (legitimacy). These are key aspects to democratic transition and consolidation, and the fact that aid specifically aimed at increasing these aspects of democratization failed to do so raises important questions about the utility of the aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly, the results also show there is a minor increase in volatility and institutionalization with an increase in aid. While not rising to the level of statistical significance, these models do suggest that parties elected into office become more stabilized as economic aid aimed at governance, governments, and civil society increases.

Table 5 adopts U.S. military aid as the independent variable with Models 1–4 illustrating the statistical results with legitimacy, roots in society, volatility, and party system institutionalization as the dependent variables in each of the respective models. The instrument used in these models is donor inflation.⁷³ Similar to the previous OLS models, U.S. military aid has no impact on party system institutionalization. Interestingly, these results are

in contrast to the hypothesized relationship that argued that volatility would decrease as would roots in society and legitimacy with increased levels of economic aid. The only control variable that reaches statistical significance is ethnic fractionalization.

Although two-stage least square models are common throughout aid research because of their ability to account for possible endogeneity, it must be noted that these models are not without their own flaws. Despite the utility of two-stage least squares in remedying potential endogeneity issues, using weak instruments may produce results that are even more skewed and biased than OLS. In fact, despite using instrumental variables in models in Tables 4 and 5 that have been utilized in previous research, using them in the instant project illustrates that they have an F statistic of less than 5 thereby cautioning against their use.⁷⁴ This is likely a result of the small sample size in the study, and future research should expand the sample size. Nevertheless, their results nearly mirror those of the OLS models and thus highlight that U.S. economic aid, specifically aid

	Legitimacy	Roots in Society	Volatility	Institutionalization
(Intercept)	1.51** (0.47)	1.59 (0.77)	1.13 (0.92)	4.23** (1.33)
Aid*	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
GDP	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Population	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.09)
Level of Democracy	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)
R ²	0.40	0.19	-0.19	0.12
Adj. R ²	0.24	-0.02	-0.50	-0.11
Num. obs.	25	25	25	25
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05		*Aid is instrumented with donor inflation (Dietrich and Wright, 2015).		

Table 4: Two-Stage Least Square Models describing z the impact of U.S. economic aid

	Legitimacy	Roots in Society	Volatility	Institutionalization
(Intercept)	2.34 (3.79)	2.53 (5.30)	4.39 (5.77)	9.27 (9.95)
Military Aid*	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
GDP	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Population	-0.01 (0.22)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.17 (0.33)	-0.21 (0.56)
Level of Democracy	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.08)
R ²	0.22	0.20	0.06	-0.01
Adj. R ²	-0.00	-0.02	-0.20	-0.29
Num. obs.	24	24	24	24
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05		*Military Aid is instrumented with donor inflation (Dietrich and Wright, 2015).		

Table 5: Impact of U.S. Military Aid on Institutionalization

directed at increasing civil society or governance or military aid has little to no impact on increasing party system institutionalization.

These results hold even if the instrument is changed. For example, following Knack, this study utilized infant mortality as an instrumental variable, to reflect recipient states' need for aid.⁷⁵ The results indicate that there is minimal to zero impact on party system institutionalization. In contrast, when alliance portfolios between the recipient or donor state were used as instrumental variables, the results indicate a decrease in party system institutionalization.⁷⁶ These results are replicated using U.S. military aid as the endogenous variable as well.

Conclusion

This study sought to determine the impact of U.S. economic and military aid on party system institutionalization in democracies and semi-democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990–2013. All results indicate there is minimal to no impact of these types of U.S. aid on party system institutionalization. By focusing on party systems, this study highlights a largely unexamined but important component of democratization. In this way, this study contributes to the aid-democracy debate and largely supports previous research that has found minimal to no impact of foreign economic aid.

While providing new insight into the foreign aid debate, it is important to heed caution when examining these results. That is, while the study largely discounts the impact of two types of aid, it does not assert that U.S. aid effects no change in the recipient state. This study is a preliminary attempt at examining aid and party system institutionalization, and future research should refine the analysis. Specifically, future research should enlarge the sample size as well as disaggregate the holistic impact of aid on institutionalization in order to examine whether there are any election-based trends. Nevertheless, this study represents a significant foray into further understanding the impact of foreign aid. **IAS**

Appendix 1

Table 1: Party System Institutionalization Index

Country	Legitimacy	Roots in Society	Volatility	Institutionalization Index
Benin	2.5	1	1.5	5
Botswana	2.5	2.75	3	8.25
Burkina Faso	2	1.5	1.5	5
C. Verde	2	2.5	3	7.5
CAR	2.5	2	2	6.5
Comoros*	1.5	1	2	4.5
Ethiopia	2	1.5	1	4.5
Gabon	1.5	3	2	6.5
Gambia	1.5	1.5	2.5	5.5
Ghana	2.5	1.75	1.5	5.75
G-B	2	1.5	1.5	5
Kenya	1.83	1.5	1	4.33
Lesotho	1.5	2	1.5	5
Liberia	2.5	1.75	1.5	5.75
Madagascar	2.5	1	1	4.5
Malawi	1.5	2.5	1	5
Mali	2	1.5	1	4.5
Mauritius	2.33	1	1.5	4.83
Mozambique	1.833	2.75	2	6.583
Namibia	2	1.75	3	6.75
Niger	2.33	2.5	1	5.83
Sao Tome	3	2.5	2.5	8
Senegal	2.5	2.5	1.5	6.5
Seychelles	3	1.5	3	7.5
Sierra Leone	2	2.5	1	5.5
South Africa	2.33	2.5	1.5	6.33
Tanzania	2.166	2.75	1	5.916
Uganda	1.5	2	1.5	5
Zambia	1	1.75	1	3.75

Appendix 2

Table 1: Economic Aid with Infant Mortality as the Instrument

	Legitimacy	Roots in Society	Volatility	Institutionalization
(Intercept)	1.53** (0.50)	1.51 (1.23)	1.19 (0.72)	4.23** (1.34)
Aid	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
GDP/capita	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Population (naturally logged)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.09)
Level of Democracy	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)
R ²	0.33	-1.08	0.27	0.10
Adj. R ²	0.15	-1.63	0.08	-0.14
Num. obs.	25	25	25	25
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05				

Table 2: Economic Aid with S score as the Instrument

	Legitimacy	Roots in Society	Volatility	Institutionalization
(Intercept)	1.62 (1.28)	1.90 (3.83)	1.24 (1.02)	4.75 (5.73)
Aid	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.43)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.65)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.14)
Capita/capita	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Population (naturally logged)	0.06 (0.13)	0.09 (0.40)	0.02 (0.11)	0.18 (0.60)
Level of Democracy	0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.35)	0.03 (0.09)	0.12 (0.52)
R ²	-2.90	-16.80	-0.29	-13.44
Adj. R ²	-3.93	-21.49	-0.63	-17.25
Num. obs.	25	25	25	25
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05				

Table 3: Military Aid with Infant Mortality as Instrument

	Legitimacy	Roots in Society	Volatility	Institutionalization
(Intercept)	1.53** (0.50)	1.51 (1.23)	1.19 (0.72)	4.23** (1.34)
Aid	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
GDP/capita	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Population (naturally logged)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.09)
Level of Democracy	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)
R ²	0.33	-1.08	0.27	0.10
Adj. R ²	0.15	-1.63	0.08	-0.14
Num. obs.	25	25	25	25
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05				

Table 4: Military Aid with S score as Instrument

	Legitimacy	Roots in Society	Volatility	Institutionalization
(Intercept)	4.82 (12.93)	12.74 (32.81)	3.19 (10.27)	20.75 (47.91)
Military Aid	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.06)
GDP/capita	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Population (naturally logged)	-0.15 (0.73)	-0.61 (1.86)	-0.10 (0.58)	-0.86 (2.71)
Level of Democracy	0.00 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.22)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.33)
R ²	-1.20	-6.38	0.28	-4.64
Adj. R ²	-1.81	-8.44	0.08	-6.21
Num. obs.	24	24	24	24
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05				

Endnotes

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- 61 Party system institutionalization is theoretically comprised of 4 sub-indexes: roots in society, legitimacy, regularity of party competition/volatility, and party organization/autonomy. Unfortunately, data limitations have often prevented researchers from including party organization/autonomy into the Sub-Saharan African institutionalization index. I am currently conducting doctoral research that focuses upon the organizational/autonomy sub-index which will further augment this index.
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- 72 It is important to note that while Tables 2 and 3 both reflect a complete lack of causal impact between the independent variable, "Aid," and various components of party system institutionalization, the actual statistical results do show a slight impact. However, this impact is so minimal that it effectively is a non-impact.
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