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*InterAgency Journal*

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The State Department: No Longer the Gatekeeper

by Edward Marks

After the Second World War, the United States led the world in the reform of global governance. It also articulated and implemented a grand strategy to cope with the bipolar order that the war had brought into being. Confronted at present with a comparable crisis in global governance amid massive shifts in the global distribution of wealth and power, the United States has yet to articulate a vision, lead reform efforts, or reformulate its global strategy. This lapse from leadership reflects changes in the U.S. political system that reinforce a militarized approach to foreign policy and make it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to formulate strategic initiatives or to implement them through diplomacy and other measures short of war.

Foreign Affairs Ministers no longer hold a monopoly over foreign affairs, as the process of international relations now includes domestic agencies and important non-state actors as major participants. This process, beginning early in the 20th century, became more dominant after the Cold War when the bipolar political and economic architecture of that period fractured into disparate interests and great fluidity in international relations.

Today, with a multiplicity of economic, social, and ideology factors in addition to the traditional competition for political influence, ministries of foreign affairs are no longer the exclusive channel for international contacts. In most governments important domestic agencies have their own direct foreign contacts, and in specialized international fora conduct their own dialogue. Further complicating the conduct of international relations has been the rise in importance of non-state actors: international companies, non-governmental organizations, global crime and political networks, and...
even individuals.

For the United States the challenges of the Cold War required involving the full panoply of federal government agencies, and especially the world’s largest military establishment, in the conduct of foreign affairs. American uniformed personnel and military organizations were on the ground throughout the world, requiring a complex network of formal and informal bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Procuring and managing these security arrangements became a major theme of the warp and woof of American foreign policy. The result was a reversal of the traditional American practice of sharply distinguishing between peace and war. Prior to World War II, the State Department exemplified the peace situation and its role waxed and waned in alternation with the Departments of War and Navy.

Responding to the challenges of the Cold War, dramatic changes were soon made in the organization of the national security structure of the U.S. government. The National Security Act of 1947, created the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the unification of the military services in the Department of Defense (DoD). The National Security Act reforms, which largely focused on the military and intelligence fields, prevented the traditional post-war return to prominence of the Department of State. In the atmosphere of the Cold War, DoD gradually became *primus inter pares*, in practice if not formally. This time the military did not return to their barracks

The Department of State has accordingly been involved in a constant effort to define its role as the concept of “foreign affairs” was replaced by the broader concept of “national security” in which the role of diplomacy—State’s traditional role—was diminished. While it might seem obvious to most observers that diplomacy is a component of national security, the U.S. Congress apparently does not. In February 2011, for instance “the House Appropriations Committee decided that foreign policy is not part of the “national security budget”.

Over the years, State has attempted by various means to redress this problem. While the assumption of tasks such as economic development and public diplomacy have made a difference, State’s marginalization has continued and even mandated by Congress and the White House, moderated by periods where major figures such as Henry Kissinger has been appointed as Secretary of State. The most challenging challenge has been that of adjusting to the now permanent presence and involvement of other agencies, and most especially DoD, in the day-to-day management of foreign relations.

The National Security Structure and the Department of State

The long-standing organization of the U.S. federal bureaucracy is characterized by Congressionally-created departments with statutorily assigned missions, often referred to as “stovepipes. This complex bureaucratic community is supposed to be managed and led by the President. The NSC was created to provide the President with an interagency coordinating body but at the insistence of President Truman it was constituted as a purely advisory body. Since its creation, the NSC itself has played various roles depending on the desires of the incumbent president while the NSC staff has played an increasingly important staff role in helping the President manage the interagency process at the strategic level.
However the 1947 National Security Act reforms did not alter the structure of the underlying bureaucracy—except for the unification of the military services in the Department of Defense. As the Project on National Security Reform’s 2008 report Forging a New Shield put it: “A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole…” The specific problem is the inability of the President to delegate executive authority for integrating the efforts of departments and agencies. While the White House and the NSC staff enable the President to direct the federal bureaucracy at the strategic level, the “stovepiped” character of the bureaucratic structure makes coordinated policy implementation difficult at the operational and tactical levels. This has led presidents to deploy various expedients such as “Czars” or special representatives, interagency committees, and “lead” agencies. None have proved completely satisfactory.

The challenge was especially serious for the State Department. If not the “gatekeeper”, then what is the role of the Department of State among a collection of specific interest agencies (e.g. defense, finance, intelligence, commerce), all theoretically operating under the overall policy direction of the White House?

**Growth of a Parallel Foreign Policy Structure**

While almost all departments and agencies of the federal government, have learned to engage in “foreign affairs”, they have pretty much done so within the traditional diplomatic structure of the nation-state system, as members of the Country Team within American embassies. The military, however, while also continuing to participate in embassies as defense attaches and military assistance teams, have also created a parallel inter-governmental system.

Following observation of British practice, the U.S. created the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure and then the first unified military command in the Pacific arena: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific or CINCPAC as it was known until it became U.S. Pacific Command in the first decade of the 21st century. Over the years of the Cold War, the geographic command system was expanded until—with the creation of Africa Command in 2008—every regional area had its own geographic combatant command. In addition there is a Special Operations Command which has a global combatant mission. This network of operational bureaucracies constitutes a parallel foreign policy establishment practicing daily bilateral and multi-lateral diplomacy.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reform of the defense community consolidated the geographic commands as operational organizations, and confirmed that U.S. military activity outside the U.S. territory was no longer a sporadic activity, confined to wartime, but now a normal activity pursued everywhere in the world. This activist role was then expanded further after the September 11, 2001 attacks with the decision to treat countering the terrorist threat as essentially a military task. The resulting two long-running wars then morphed into military occupations involving counter-insurgency, post-conflict reconstruction, nation-building, and economic development.
authority as well as the perspective of the geographic combatant commander is regional as well as bilateral while that of an ambassador is essentially local. With the existence of these two parallel “foreign policy” bureaucracies, coordination is heavily dependent on personal relations or very high-level coordination in Washington.

The process works “pretty well most of the time” but is under increasing pressure due to the prominent operational role of the military services as they have increasingly become the default option for U.S. government action and response. As one political analyst put it: “Over the nearly six decades that separate us from Truman’s great moment, the Pentagon has become a far more overwhelming institution... it has swallowed up much of what once was intelligence, as it is swallowing up much of what once was diplomacy.”

This situation has fostered and been driven by the resource disparity in the federal bureaucracy, a disparity that has grown since 9/11. The wealth of the military services—in money, personnel, and equipment—stems of course from the undeniable resource requirements of war fighting. A number of other problems and challenges—such as natural disaster emergencies, post-conflict reconstruction, and nation-building—also require the extensive use of resources. Unfortunately the fact that many of these new missions are essentially non-military tasks does not trump the temptation to use existing DoD resources to provide a quick response. That the military may not be the most appropriate organization to perform these tasks is irrelevant; they exist, are available and can react quickly. Once they are engaged they tend to continue as it is difficult and time consuming to transfer the responsibility to civilian organizations ill-equipped or non-existent. Bureaucratic as well as political inertia takes over.

The combatant commands have essentially two “bundles” of tasks or portfolios: the first is the obvious mission to plan and fight wars. The other portfolio is composed of military-to-military relations and cooperation with other countries and military forces in “peacetime”. These activities—training, military equipment sales, etc.—are generally referred to as “engagement” activities and occupy much of the time, staff, and resources of the geographic combatant command headquarters, especially when they are not managing a war. Justified by an elaborate policy rationale related to potential war planning and fighting, well-funded bi- and multi-lateral engagement programs often appear to have a make-work character. In any case, well-funded engagement budgets lead to much activity because they can be done, not always because they should be done.

Commanders making high visibility visits during which they announce new or additional security assistance and exchange programs are common phenomena. “The military commands, with their forward presence, large planning staffs, and various engagement tools are well equipped for those roles and increasingly welcome them. Today they routinely pursue regional-level engagement by playing host to international security conferences, promoting military-to-military contacts, and providing military presence, training, and equipment to improve regional security.”

Unfortunately this activity of the geographic commands militates against effective whole-of-government programs and therefore coherent foreign policy. First of all, the “stovepiped” organizational structure and perspective of the
federal bureaucracy is an obstacle in itself to a comprehensive interagency approach. Among the federal government stovepipes, DoD stands out for its action-oriented bureaucratic culture and the disparity of resources compared to other agencies. This disparity is reinforced by the unfortunate tendency for our political leadership to consider the military services the default mode in national security. The Defense Department’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review formally called for this expanded role with a concept called “shape-respond-prepare” which in addition to the capacity to fight and win wars called for “greater emphasis on the continuing need to maintain continuous overseas presence in order to shape the international environment.”

When called upon, the Defense Department—with the geographic commands as its agents—responds with alacrity if not always enthusiasm and in doing so, tends to sweep aside other agencies and departments. This is true even when senior political leadership does not consciously direct a unilateral military approach.

In any case, with the combination of a broad mission, broad discretion, and vast resources, the senior four-star combatant commanders bestride their “Areas of Responsibilities” like viceroys. Compared with the essentially low key operations of American ambassadors and even senior official visitors from Washington, the highly visible presence of these commanding figures, who tour their areas with extensive entourages has contributed much to the imbalance in U.S. government official representation. As a Canadian Prime Minister remarked in a different context, it is difficult and dangerous for a mouse to share a bed with an elephant, even a well-meaning elephant. In essence, DoD and its community of geographic combatant commands constitutes a separate “foreign affairs” organization which interacts directly with foreign governments at the highest levels in parallel with the Department of State and its embassy structure.

### Political Factors Tilting the Balance

Some traditional American political and cultural factors also play roles in the militarization of American foreign policy. American culture has always exhibited a passion for the “man with the gun”; from Minutemen to cowboys, the soldier and now the spy. The American public increasingly came to the view that international problems or challenges can be best met by an energetic use of force. The phrase “Nothing is off the table,” threatening the use of direct military power, has become an almost obligatory commitment by American leaders when discussing major international challenges, for instance Iran and its nuclear program.

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Especially after the Korean War, the concept of “national security” took on this tone of “military activism” and focus. The conventional wisdom in Congress is that while voters understand defense spending, international assistance and similar international civilian expenses remain mysterious, wasteful, and somehow irrelevant.

Domestic political constituencies have been another factor in the allocation of department roles in foreign affairs over the years. Departments (and the Congress) keep a careful eye on the interests of and advocates of domestic programs and sectors. Every department or agency has a section of the American body politic and economy with a direct collective interest in its mission: from Commerce to Labor to mine safety. That of the Department...
State deals in the external aspects of almost all elements of public policy but without a specific, unilateral responsibility for any—except a very broad responsibility for representing the country on the international scene.

Unfortunately, there is one department without a meaningful political constituency: the Department of State. This is not surprising, as State deals in the external aspects of almost all elements of public policy but without a specific, unilateral responsibility for any—except a very broad responsibility for representing the country on the international scene. Given this very general and undefined responsibility, State inevitably is in the position of brokering compromises between the more focused constituencies and their interests. This is not generally a popular position, and one constantly buffeted by the to-and-fro of politics.

In addition, the State Department suffers from a traditional American dislike and distrust of foreign affairs and consequently of the department responsible for it. Commentators have long noted that the Congress would rather ignore the outside world than recognize it and that therefore, as Teddy Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay said in his memoirs, the Congress “really seems to think that the State Department has no function but to provide their friends with offices.”

Of course State does have, at least theoretically, one very important constituent: the President of the United States. Or at least it could have but the history of the relationship between Presidents (and the White House) and State is a rocky one. John F. Kennedy reportedly asked, with some asperity, the respected diplomat Charles “Chip” Bohlen, “What is wrong with that department of yours, Chip?” and received the reply, “You are, Mr. President, you are.”

State’s Response

After the end of WWII, the Foreign Service was reorganized and greatly expanded. Possibly the most important development concerning the role of State was the development of the “Chief of Mission” authority and the accompanying “Country Team” concept.

By 1948, as a Department of State message later put it: “No clear and enforceable guidance existed to coordinate local U.S. policy in countries such as Greece, where three independent U.S. Missions—Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Aid—pursued their own agendas.” In 1949, former President Herbert Hoover’s Report to President Harry Truman concluded that ambassadors should have “the ultimate authority overseas with respect to the foreign affairs aspects of program operations”. This concept was adopted and expanded over the years by succeeding presidents finally culminating in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (Public Law 96–465, October 17, 1980) during the Carter administration:

“Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country: (1) shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander).”

The so-called “Country Team” is the organizational structure through which chief of mission authority is generally exercised. A specific Country Team is composed of the different organizational representatives who serve under the direction of a specific
ambassador/chief of mission and are subject to that chief of mission’s explicitly delegated Presidential authority for “integrating executive branch activities within his or her geographic domain.” Actually, there still is no statutory or regulatory basis for its composition and functions. However, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 essentially conceives the “Country Team” concept by requiring the President to “assure coordination among representatives of the [U.S. government] in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission.”

From the beginning there has been some ambiguity in the interpretation of the extent of the executive authority being delegated. Other departments and agencies sometimes dispute what constitutes an applicable chief of mission directive, requiring on-the-ground disagreements to be sent up respective chains of command, ultimately to be resolved when necessary by Cabinet level or Presidential authority. This has been especially true with those departments that also conduct extensive foreign operations: the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chief of mission authority is country specific, provided to ambassadors assigned to a specific country. This complicates any given ambassador’s relationship with departments and agencies with regional as well as country-specific responsibilities, especially DoD and its regional combatant commanders, and some intelligence agencies. The ambassador’s relationship with intelligence agencies is also complicated by their concern for protecting sources and methods, the disclosure of which they often claim, through a self-serving interpretation of relevant legislation, lies outside the responsibility to the chief of mission.

The turf question, especially with DoD and the Central Intelligence Agency, has become exacerbated since 9/11 and the inauguration of the “War on Terrorism”. Even before 9/11 there were problems with aggressive military operations, as for example when members of the “military liaison element” in Paraguay whose presence in the country had not been made known to embassy officials were pulled out of the country after killing an armed robber who had attacked them. There were reports of other deployments made without embassy or State Department involvement. With its interest in more “operational flexibility” against terrorists, for instance, by the new Special Operations Command and the dramatic expansion of DoD responsibilities in areas such as post-conflict reconstruction, new questions of operational authority are raised.

Most, if not all, observers recognize that there is a gap between a chief of mission’s de jure and de facto authority given the tendency of other agency representatives to independently pursue their organization’s equities. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, for example, commented in his final 2009 Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience report that “agency personnel always report to their department heads in Washington,” which will “inevitably exert a countervailing force on interagency coordination”.

Nevertheless most observers believe that the chief of mission and Country Team model works well enough most of the time in most embassies. However this judgment refers essentially to the “tactical” level and to bilateral relations and not
to the increasingly “functional”, “regional”, and “global” character of international relations.

State itself has recognized this problem by greatly expanding the number and role of the geographic bureaus. These bureaus do not have a simple bilateral worldview and are intimately connected with other departments and agencies with similar substantive responsibilities.

So State has come some way along the road to a whole-of-government role, and no other department has a responsibility for as wide a range of U.S. government interests as does State. The American embassy is arguably the only formal whole-of-government institution in the U.S. government besides the White House. Yet State shares interest and responsibility for all of these interests with other departments who each have the advantage of focus and constituency support. State is in a sense responsible for managing the traffic flow, but a traffic cop without arrest authority—and no one really likes the traffic cop.

Can a New Balance Be Found?

If all of these factors have indeed produced an imbalance that does not serve our national interests, what can be done about it? Efforts to reorganize are often dismissed as moving around the deck chairs on the Titanic, although this is too easy a criticism as some comparatively minor changes on that ill-fated ship would have made all the difference. Despite natural skepticism about the potential for change, it is worthwhile remembering that the National Security Act of 1947 reconfigured U.S. national security institutions and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 successfully introduced “jointness” into the military services.

One effort to emphasize the leadership and coordinating role of the State Department was the Department of State’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), subtitled ”Leading Through Civilian Power,” in 2010. Unfortunately, the QDDR’s primary recommendation relating to the role of State in the interagency process lacks specificity. Emphasizing the important role of the ambassador does not necessarily make it so, especially since the authority in question has actually been around a long time.

What Might Be Done: Mandate Professional Positions

State’s current structure and personnel system lacks a clear, firm role for its Foreign Service professionals. A sober study of the situation was released in April of 2015 by the American Academy on Diplomacy, American Diplomacy at Risk:

“A strong State Department based on a strong Foreign Service and a strong Civil Service, is a critical component of America’s security. But America’s diplomacy—the front line of our defenses—is in trouble. Increasing politicization undermines institutional strength; almost no career officers serve in the most senior State positions, while short-term political appointees penetrate ever deeper into the system. The Foreign Service lacks the professional education and standards to meet its current heavy responsibilities and to create its necessary future senior leaders. The Civil Service is mired in an outdated system with limited coherent career mobility. Some State Department officials seem intent on nullifying the Foreign Service Act of 1980, and its merit-based personnel system by bureaucratically seeking to blend the Foreign and Civil Services. This creates..."
needless friction and diminishes both services. Our national interest requires our immediate recommitment to the law and to strengthening our professional Foreign and Civil Services. State needs to comprehensively review and modernize its entire system of workforce management and budgeting.”

Even when senior Foreign Service Officers are appointed to senior positions, the process is helter-skelter and high personalized. There is no place for senior Foreign Service Officers to serve as professional leaders and role-models, in the way the members of the military service chiefs do. The Counselor of the Department of State and the Director-General of the Foreign Service once played that role, but both positions have long since been downgraded; the latter into a clerical head of personnel (now called Human Resources) and no one today knows quite what the Counselor does. From the perspective of the political level, on the other hand, there are no institutional arrangements to provide the sort of professional advice for which the military chiefs are responsible in their area of expertise. The absence of this institutional input means that the longer-term, professional diplomatic perspective is absent from policymaking.

Among the recommendations of the American Academy of Diplomacy’s report is a legislative mandate that the following positions must be filled by career Foreign Service Officers, preferably for fixed terms:

- One of the Deputy Secretaries of State
- The Under-Secretary for Management
- Counselor of the Department
- The Director-General of the Foreign Service
- The Director of the Foreign Service Institute

**Also: Exporting the Chief of Mission Authority**

The State Department’s QDDR notes the need to “Empower and hold accountable Chiefs of Mission as Chief Executive Officers of interagency missions,” in essence repeating what has been the traditional view since the days of President Truman.

Another way of putting it is that, under this authority, the ambassador is supposed to perform the role of the Chief Executive Officer of a multi-agency mission. As the QDDR points out, “the best ambassadors play that role effectively”. However it is no secret that the executive authority of ambassadors as chiefs of mission has often been challenged and restricted in the interplay of bureaucratic competition and policy debate. In addition, the managerial expertise of ambassadors as chief of missions has varied widely with little thought and effort by the State Department to provide background and training.

**...the managerial expertise of ambassadors as chief of missions has varied widely with little thought and effort by the State Department to provide background and training.**

Even if successful, however, enhancing the role of ambassadors in the field can only go so far in enhancing the State Department’s role in regional and global policy. Therefore consideration might be given to arranging for intermediate levels of oversight and coordination. As the Project on National Security Reform report pointed out, in the foreign affairs arena at least, there are no cross-agency oversight or management authorities between the President/White House and resident ambassadors with chief of mission authority. The existing authority
provides a model for how to deal with the challenge of managing multiple department programs overseas by creating an intermediate management level at the under or assistant secretary level of a significantly restructured Department of State.

The objective would be to strengthen the lines of authority across the stovepipes by “importing” the chief of mission authority into the Department of State itself, and specifically granting it to what ought to be the key intermediate management level: the Regional Assistant Secretaries. An operational oversight chain of authority would therefore be created running from the President through the Secretary of State and Assistant Secretaries of State, which would oversee and reinforce at each level the integrating role that chiefs of mission are responsible for exercising in their Country Teams.

The thus empowered Regional Assistant Secretaries would provide a middle level in the chain of management to ensure that policy and resources are integrated and coordinated at the policy level and then flow down to Country Teams, rather than going directly through numerous discrete bureaucratic and authority stovepipes. With this authority, the State Department could provide for integrated management and oversight of all U.S. government civilian and political-military international operations.

Horizontally, an Assistant Secretary (possibly elevated to the Under Secretary level) with “chief of mission” type authority would provide a Washington-based mid-level coordinating point for all concerned departments and agencies. Operating as a regional interagency team, the various U.S. government interests and programs could be coordinated at the operational level analogous to the manner in which (at least in theory) the Country Team coordinates the various departments at the “tactical” level.

This arrangement would not extend to geographic combatant commanders or their assigned forces in combat operations or other Title 10 missions assigned by the National Command Authority. However while the combatant commands would continue to prepare and review war plans through their existing military chain of command, the State Department Regional Assistant Secretaries would provide assistance in developing the plans developed at the geographic combatant commands for pre- and post-conflict activities to include training, military-to-military cooperation, liaison arrangements, and humanitarian relief.

Thus, these Regional Assistant Secretaries would fulfill the long expressed desire of the military for an effective civilian counterpart to their geographic commanders. Having the close relationship between the relevant geographic combatant commander and Regional Assistant Secretaries would ensure a strong relationship between peacetime engagement and deterrence and preservation of a stable steady-state situation in the regions.

In sum, the whole Department of State would be re-organized as the “Department of Foreign Affairs Coordination” where policy and resource integration directed at the White House or Cabinet level would be implemented in a coordinated fashion at the Regional Assistant Secretary level, and then at the Country Team level.

Finally: Resizing the Geographic Combatant Commands

The existing military structure also requires reorganization. The problematic parallel foreign
policy system has arisen with the growth of the post-Goldwater-Nichols combatant command structure.

The geographic commands have essentially two tasks: war planning and fighting; and intra-government military engagement. Both tasks remain, and will always remain, DoD and the military services’ responsibilities. However, while the war planning and fighting responsibility is obviously uniquely a duty of DoD and the military services, the government-to-government military programs no longer can be handled as a discrete military activity. In today’s world, U.S. military commanders can no longer be permitted to operate as “policy entrepreneurs” except as part of the overall U.S. government; as part of the total team. The so-called “nexus” of security challenges—terrorism, narcotics, smuggling, international criminal networks, etc.—can no longer be managed as single agency programs but must be integrated into whole-of-government programs.

But if the geographic combatant commands as robust bureaucratic organizations contribute to this imbalance, what could replace them, or how could they be reorganized? After all, these responsibilities must be performed in some manner by someone. Perhaps another way to pose the question is to ask: Could much of the workload done at the combatant commands be accomplished more efficiently through a reallocation of labor between the Joint Staff, Service headquarters, and the separate four-star commands?

This approach suggests it might be possible to separate the two portfolios: war planning and fighting mission would stay with the current combatant commands (perhaps downsized some) while intra-government military engagement mission would be reassigned to a unified support organization, located somewhere in the U.S. but preferably in the Washington area under the authority of the Join Staff and in close proximity to the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the intelligence community and other pertinent parts of the U.S. government. Within DoD this “engagement command” (Foreign Military Sales, foreign military training, etc) would report directly to the Joint Staff while operating downstream in support of beefed-up military representation in American embassies.

In today’s world, U.S. military commanders can no longer be permitted to operate as “policy entrepreneurs” except as part of the overall U.S. government; as part of the total team.

This arrangement would recognize the essentially bilateral character of military engagement programs while providing for greater integration with coherent, overall foreign policy. All of the present range of military engagement activity—from military education exchanges to training teams to liaison and medical and dental teams—would be planned and implemented by military members of our individual embassy Country Teams and would, therefore, from initiation to completion be an integral part of our overseas operations and relationships. Interagency coordination—whole-of-government operations—would be a more natural result if it were the product of operators in the field, and not the product of two distinct higher headquarters.

**Conclusion**

If the perspective of the State Department as a uniquely “Presidential” department is accepted, then the effectiveness of State depends to a large degree on it being used appropriately. The record is mixed. The periods of high and effective usage obviously match the incumbencies of the “great” Secretaries of State: people like Dean Acheson,
Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz. In each case, the most notable aspect of their success was their relationship with and support of their President as the Secretary of State is not an independent actor. But these situations are heavily personality driven. Despite occasional recoveries by especially strong Secretaries, the long-term trend has produced the present situation which many feel suffers from an imbalance in our management of our foreign affairs; an imbalance which does not serve us well in today’s world. There is no one cause for this situation, and some of them are unavoidable aspects of a changing world.

Pending further developments this situation leaves the U.S. government in a difficult position vis-à-vis its management of its foreign policy obligations. As noted earlier, governments deal with each other across a multiplicity of contacts and subjects, across a bewildering network of department relationships. This cannot be changed; there is no going back to the “gatekeeper” situation. But some order is required. In the U.S. governmental bureaucracy the President is the obvious single point of overall authority and direction, but any president is limited by time and space. The only other point of formal overall, comprehensive management is in U.S. embassies with chief of mission authority, despite its practical limitations. In-between is constant bureaucratic warfare.

The major outlier to this system is the Department of Defense. While it reports to the President at the top, from then on it operates a parallel foreign policy system that maintains a separate U.S. government relationship with foreign governments. It is true that DoD interacts with the Department of State at various levels in Washington, and that the deployed geographic combatant commanders interact with embassies across the globe. However this is a coordination relationship between two systems, not an integrated governmental system.

The three organizational changes discussed in this article—providing for an institutional role for the Foreign Service, empowering State to operate as a mid-level implementation chairperson, and shifting a significant amount of operating authority away from the combatant commander—would inevitably lead to greater integration. Until we go at least some way down these roads the United States will continue to wrestle with a bifurcated foreign policy bureaucracy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once commented that he had no telephone number with which to call Europe. How fortunate the other countries of the world are then, that they have two telephone numbers with which to call Washington. IAJ
Notes


7. Robert Oakley and Michael Casey noted that the core problem with Country Team management was that “Other agencies often view the Ambassador as the Department [of State’s] representative, rather than the President’s.” For these and other reasons, there remains a significant chasm between the Chief of Mission’s formal authority and his ability to exercise it. See Oakley and Casey 2007.

The two quotes above are indicative of a cultural fault line that exists between national command authorities and senior military advisors over the decision to employ military force for matters of national security. General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted this fault line as a significant barrier to effective communications between civilians and military. Political decision making involves embracing ambiguity and requires flexibility, whereas military planning is usually synoptic and attempts to “plan away” any and all ambiguities. Exemplar of the latter, the first paragraph of joint planning doctrine states: “Planning begins with the end state in mind, providing a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused.”

Despite the many articles written about the need for more collaborative planning among the various agencies of the U.S., few suggest that an overhaul of the joint operational planning process should be considered as a solution. This article recommends just that. I contend that most of the strategic and operational lexicon of the U.S. military was born out of the tactical level of warfare. As I stated in a previous InterAgency Journal article, the optimal way to overcome...
interorganizational differences is to find couplers that allow each culture to operate intact. It is usually counterproductive to try to change a culture, as it brings to the situation a unique set of intricately intertwined skills. In this article, I am arguing that the lexicon and approach of the Department of Defense (DoD) should change to better work within the national security arena.

**The Clausewitz-Huntington Paradox**

Among U.S. national security professionals, the Clausewitz aphorism that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means” is generally accepted as a truism. However, the situation is more contentious among national security professionals when accepting the basic premise of the Huntington model of civil-military relations. This premise states that military professionals have a monopoly on the appropriate application of violence to protect a country’s interests, and that once policies (political objectives in war) are set, the military professionals should be left alone to achieve those objectives without meddling from civilian authorities. When juxtaposed, these two ideas— that war is continuation of policy but military officers should be given autonomy once the goals of a conflict are set— are seemingly contradictory. That is, if war is merely the continuation of policy, then should not it and its execution also be equally susceptible to the ever changing and ambiguous character of a political environment? U.S. military joint doctrine does not adequately explain this paradox and, contrary to reality, embraces such definitive concepts as termination and termination criteria, national strategic end state, and military end state.

As a nod to the possible paradox, joint doctrine admits that conflict and war are dynamic and changing, and that there is a requirement to assess and learn during plan execution and to adapt and update those plans to ensure they contribute to the strategic end state. However, this referencing of constant change, learning, and adaptation provides only broad guidance that one should constantly assess the environment, plans, and situation. This article offers a way ahead in providing terms and doctrine associated with military strategic and operational planning that embrace, rather than ignore, the ambiguous and often changing world of policy, which is the main purpose for military actions. Joint doctrine must embrace the ambiguity inherent in the strategic and operational levels of war to ensure the best opportunity to protect and further American interests no matter the situation.

**First Things First**

Culturally, it seems most of the concepts associated with strategic and operational planning are directly derived from the tactical realm. In addition, military officers spend most of their careers at the tactical level, and it is most often tactical success that gets one promoted to general officer. This focus on tactical issues, despite rhetoric to the contrary (Clausewitz 101 so to speak), means the American military tends to view military operations as a more apolitical undertaking than it should. As such, it appears many terms and concepts that have worked well in the tactical level of war have been inappropriately applied to the strategic and operational levels as well.

The adjustment of terms and concepts required to ensure current doctrine accounts for the differing dynamics and environments in the various levels of war is slow to arrive. For example, the Joint planning community is...
The military should stop using the term and concept of “end state” at the strategic and operational levels. Time does not end...

In addition, while doctrine addresses some critical aspects of military operations, such as ensuring outcomes endure and preserving advantages gained, the outdated language it uses acts as a constraining element in conceptual understanding. A case in point: The military should stop using the term and concept of “end state” at the strategic and operational levels. Time does not end, and looking at a very finite moment to define either the focus of the operation or its success is short sighted. Instead, the military should adopt terms that reflect reality.

The military should accept that its efforts are only able to set the conditions for an environment that is more acceptable to the interests of the U.S. and cannot create a terminable environment. In addition, it should understand that any problem addressed will most likely not be completely solved but will require some sort of maintenance (either by the military or some other instrument of national power) to ensure resources are not wasted.

All Military Operations Lead to the Theater Campaign Plan Road

The combatant commander’s theater campaign plan is the primary means through which the military supports achieving or protecting the national interests of the U.S. The theater campaign plan details a range of steady-state military activities (security cooperation, military engagement, deterrence, etc.) that when coordinated with activities from the other instruments of national power should avert major conflict. However, because the international environment is a complex, adaptive system, there are times that despite the best efforts of the U.S., it fails to protect and further national interests.12

When steady-state activities can no longer protect American interests, the military instrument of national power is often called upon to create a more favorable environment for America. During any increased use of power, the goal is to reach the position wherein steady-state activities are able to protect and further American interests. “Plans developed to respond to contingencies are best understood as branches to the overarching global campaign plan or [theater campaign plan].”13

Joint doctrine and the interagency understanding of it should be updated to reflect the reality of the strategic and operational environments. However, if the joint planning community perceives new doctrinal terms as too radical, then, at the very least, the doctrine should be rewritten to modify the definitions of current terms to acknowledge the transitory nature of the strategic and operational environments.

Figure 1 (page 19) offers changes to current doctrinal terms that should be replaced. These new concepts and terms are required if the DoD wishes to move forward in creating a more realistic and adaptable planning culture.
Changeover and Changeover Criteria

Within doctrine, the terms “termination” and “termination criteria” include a robust focus on the transitional aspects of terminating any military operation. However, for all concerned, continued use of the expression “termination” is confusing and creates a mental paradox that does not reflect reality. Joint doctrine should ban the term “termination” because the situation never terminates, it transitions to another state. However, the term “transition” is used continually in other contexts throughout military culture, so to avoid confusion, I propose using the term “changeover.”

To terminate means to bring to an end.

Using “changeover” provides a necessary way of viewing all military operations and will set the conditions for the proper mindset when planning. For example, although Operation New Dawn did end, the U.S. did not terminate its military operations in Iraq in 2011, but instead changed over to the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq. Thinking in terms of changeover will focus current and future commanders on a better understanding on how to changeover operations instead of how to terminate operations and leave the changeover for others to consider.

Supporting Military End State

When General Tommy Franks, briefed President George W. Bush on the operational approach for Operation Iraqi Freedom, he noted two things that would signal the end state of the operation—“weapons of mass destruction removal” and “regime change.”

General Frank’s briefing slide did not annotate whether the end state shown was military or strategic. Suffice it to say, it was neither. Depending on one’s view of the operation, the two signals were either intermediate military objectives or a military end state.

In other words, they were specific, desired results that should have only facilitated a much more robust political vision. In fact, if all military operations are only a continuation of policy, then there is no such thing as a military end state, only military objectives that support policy.

As such, if doctrine deleted the idea of a military end state and replaced it with the idea of a supporting military end state, it would advance and inculcate the concept that military action at the operational level should directly support political vision, and, more importantly, it would send a message to civilian authorities that the use of military power is not an end unto itself.

Enduring State and Options

Once again, the concept of an end state, in this case a strategic end state, contradicts reality. This affinity for annotating a final end state most likely stems from tactical military planning culture. In tactical planning, the end state is usually an achievable and measurable objective. Definitive tactical objectives such as “take that

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<tr>
<th>Current Doctrinal Term</th>
<th>Suggested New Term</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Changeover</td>
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<td>Termination Criteria</td>
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<td>Military End State</td>
<td>Supporting Military End State</td>
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<td>Strategic End State</td>
<td>Enduring State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courses of Action*</td>
<td>Strategic Options</td>
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*The term “courses of action” would still be viable; “strategic options” would substitute for it at the combatant commander level and above.

Figure 1. Doctrinal Terms
...doctrine should focus on having the military develop and provide options instead of courses of action at the combatant commander and higher level.

number of refugees, and regional overflow of the problem. These situations necessitate flexibility from civilian leadership that is completely incongruent with the culture of military planners who want to plan to an end state. To resolve this problem, doctrine should focus on having the military develop and provide options instead of courses of action at the combatant commander and higher level. Strategic options will provide an expected result emanating from the military action taken, thus leaving a wide array of results open for civilian leadership to consider, courses of action are normally developed based on a predetermined expected result.

Joint doctrine does refer to “providing options,” but does not provide a clear picture of exactly what that means. For example, doctrine states: “The planning staff uses [the Joint Operation Planning Process] to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options....” It goes on to state: “Strategic Guidance. This function is used to...formulate concepts and strategic military options....” It also describes “Flexible Response Options” in Appendix F. The ambiguous multi-referencing of the term does not provide appropriate guidance to Joint planners as to what exactly comprises an option. To further add to the confusion, Joint doctrine also uses the term “options” to denote developing branches within a course of action and even states insomuch that “options” is another word for “branches.” The idea of strategic options as presented here has been explored at the Basic Strategic Art Program given at the Army War College.

One of the functions of the combatant commander is to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in his advisory role in informing the President and Secretary of Defense about military options to help them form national strategy and guidance. Strategic options are not courses of action. Strategic options assist the senior leaders in the use of military force in the context of all instruments of national power. Likewise, strategic options are not accomplished as an afterthought during planning, but rather are addressed as a precursor to planning efforts. They are theater centric and require the involvement of the combatant commander.

An illustrative example may help to understand the concept of strategic options. In 2002, the Secretary of Defense asked the Central Command (CENTCOM) combatant commander for military options to remove Saddam Hussein from power. What CENTCOM provided was a summary of a completed plan with significant detail developed from a desired end state. The Secretary of Defense, however, viewed that plan as just one method of removing Hussein from power and wanted additional options, which were not forthcoming. However, if the CENTCOM commander presented some options, along with the assumptions and risks that came with the options, the Secretary of Defense would have been in a better position to advise the President in forming the national strategy. Options presented to the Secretary of Defense may have included seizing the southern
oil fields to increase economic pressure on the regime, arming the Kurds and/or Shia tribes, escalating Operation Northern and Southern Watch, or working with Iran to increase pressure on the regime. These are widely varying options, with different timelines for achieving national objectives, different kinds of risks, and certainly different resultant missions for the military. Figure 2 summarizes the stark differences between strategic options and courses of action.

Communication of a strategic option must be in a format and use language that is easily understood by civilian leaders and policymakers. Though there is no standard for a strategic option, each strategic option should contain the following elements:

- Conditions and assumptions upon which the option is based.
- Desired changeover conditions.
- A description of the concept with emphasis on the use of military actions in the context of the use of other instruments of power.
- A general description of the resources required.
- A general timeline for how the option would play out.
- The strategic and operational risks entailed in this option.

In crisis action planning, combatant commanders engage early with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in providing analyzed military options to help shape the national strategy and guidance. Again, the various strategic options presented by the combatant commander will likely result in different missions for the command. There are many ways that the combatant commander can communicate strategic options, as there will likely be a high level of interest in the crisis by senior leaders. One way is through the formal crisis action planning messages. A combatant commander is expected to provide a commander’s assessment as early as possible during the situation development phases of crisis action planning. He should describe the options for military activity in this assessment. The commander and staff can and should follow through with continued development of the options as time allows and demands.
guidance and direction to enable the command to focus on the mission it must execute. However, the command must continue to keep in mind the other possible options for the use of military force as the situation changes.

There is also a need to consider and communicate strategic options during execution. Commanders and staffs must acknowledge that the dynamic environment will likely require strategic reassessment and adaptation during execution. They, therefore, must be prepared to present options to adapt the strategy and potentially the policy to react to the changing environment. This requirement for change might be due to unforeseen successes, failures, or other circumstances. It is especially important for the commander and staffs to look at the holistic national strategy to determine the need for and the impact of changes to the military approach to adapt to the circumstances.

A Changed Culture

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a list of desired leader attributes that include things such as recognize change and lead transitions, anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty, and understand the environment and the effect of all instruments of national power. Joint doctrine changes offered within this article can be a catalyst for creating a culture that thrives on those attributes and facilitates critical communications between civilian and military leadership. It is time for the Joint community to embrace the dynamic reality of the political employment of the use of force and train and plan for the uncertainty of the strategic environment in order to achieve those attributes so definitively outlined by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
NOTES

1 Janine Davidson, “Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, Issue 1, pp. 129–145. Davidson artfully detailed this phenomenon. The first quote was a running joke during the Clinton presidency as to the military response anytime the use of force was considered, and the second quote was by a former member of the National Security Council.


7 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.


11 If it is not considerably different, then why change at all?


13 Ibid., p. II-23.


16 Many thanks to Dr. Kidder, U.S. Army War College, who provided extensive review and input of not only the entire article but most particularly the section on options.

17 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, pp. xvi and I-5.

18 Ibid., Appendix F.

19 Ibid., p. III-36.

Five Lessons for Strengthening Interagency Relationships

by Thomas M. Kreutzer

Most Americans know Okinawa only through the lens of history. Students of modern geopolitics, however, understand that in addition to being a tropical paradise the island plays host to members of the American military who honor the nation’s treaty obligations to Japan, while helping to ensure peace and stability in the Asia/Pacific region. The Department of Defense (DoD) is well represented on the island. All four branches of the armed forces are present, as is the Department of State via its Consulate General near the prefectural capital of Naha. Naturally, in line with its different role in the alliance and its different relationship with the people of Okinawa, each of these organizations runs its own public affairs office.

The Public Affairs Office at Consulate General Naha as it exists today was established in the 1990s. Its primary mission is to explain U.S. policies, while presenting American society in all its complexity so that others can understand the context of U.S. actions. In addition, it creates and administers educational and cultural exchange programs to increase understanding between the people of Japan and the U.S. To accomplish this, the consulate’s public affairs office must maintain strong ties with both the Okinawan community and its interagency partners. It has, over the years, been extremely successful in this regard.

As a relatively new public affairs officer tasked with managing such a solid program, I initially assumed that there would be little I could do to improve upon the many successes of my predecessors. That assumption, however, was wrong. Over the course of my three years on Okinawa, I learned that individuals, even ones as inexperienced as I had been at the outset of my assignment, can have a real impact on even the strongest of programs. That is because most formal, professional relationships, especially interagency relationships, are actually driven by personal relationships.
This article details some of the many ways in which I worked to strengthen the interagency community during my time in Okinawa. Astute readers will note that the public affairs community on the island is small in comparison to other interagency environments, and that all of the elements are primarily focused on helping to explain American policy and actions to the Japanese public. I have since gone on to use many of the same methods to help build solid interagency relationships during follow-on assignments. I believe certain fundamentals are universal. The intent of this article is to spur thought and discussion on the subject of interagency relationships and cause others to bring their own considerable talents to bear on the subject.

**Lesson One: Actively Develop Your Counterparts’ Staff Members**

The Department of State (State), like the U.S. military, frequently rotates its officers among assignments, and, as a result, it takes more than a few months to build a network of strong, dependable contacts. Fortunately, no one starts from scratch. Local staff members, usually foreign nationals who are hired locally and remain with the mission for the duration of their careers, are incredibly important to State’s overseas missions. Usually well-educated and well-connected, they help new officers navigate the environment, introduce them to the right people, and serve as the institutional memories of the organization.

Anyone who has worked with local staff understands just how important it is to a mission. The best officers are constantly on the lookout for ways to develop the members of their local staff because they know that, done right, the extra investment builds institutional strength that pays dividends for the mission over the long term. It is a symbiotic relationship. By helping staff members develop to their fullest potentials, officers help themselves and their missions. What they often fail to think about, however, is the fact that they can also help build the skills, abilities, and reputations of the people who serve on interagency colleagues’ staffs as well.

The concept may seem foreign. The development of a counterparts’ staff is, after all, generally outside of their purview, and because they seldom work directly with them, they rarely think about them. They often serve as note-takers or observers, blend into the background, and are easily overlooked. Given their true importance, however, they deserve a seat at the table, and, in the interest of interagency institution building, public affairs officers should be thinking of ways to bring them to the fore.

In Okinawa, my office instituted a program called the “Study Meeting.” It began as a series of lectures for members of the local media, and the program proved so popular that it soon became a quarterly event. The Consulate’s public affairs office would select a topic, request a speaker, and organize the event. My contribution was to expand the program by inviting interagency colleagues and their staff members to attend as well. I had two reasons for doing this: (1) additional exposure to members of the media would help my counterparts build stronger relationships with the local reporters, and (2) helping counterpart staff members develop their own relationships with reporters further strengthened the interagency effort on Okinawa. Those seats at the table allowed the members of my colleagues’ staff to become full participants in the meeting, and the interactions...
they had with the speaker and their counterparts in the media added to the success of the program.

Over time, continued invitations to the Consulate’s programs had another benefit as well. It gave the members of my staff a chance to see and learn about their interagency counterparts, and soon people who had previously been only peers became friends. In turn, those friendships led to better communication and a more cohesive interagency community that could be called upon to mobilize when agencies needed special assistance.

Finding balance is an art, but done right, awards motivate people to do their very best and builds their reputations among their peers.

**Lesson Two: Use Awards to Develop Interagency Ties**

Awards are a sensitive subject. In some agencies, awards are so preciously guarded that a person may see one or two over the course of an entire career, while other agencies print so many they are as worthless as Confederate money. Finding balance is an art, but done right, awards motivate people to do their very best and builds their reputations among their peers.

Awards given across interagency boundaries can be doubly difficult. To begin with, unless it has been agreed upon in advance through a memorandum of understanding, there is usually no awards committee to vet a nomination, no money to award, and, usually, no way to add an interagency award to a person’s employee record. Additionally, some managers may balk at having their employees receive awards they had little input into writing.

However, interagency awards can be an important tool in building strong interagency teams. Awards can be official, which usually means coordinating with one’s interagency colleagues to establish a formal process, or unofficial such as certificates of appreciation that can be made in-house and passed to the awardee’s supervisor. Because they are seldom expected, I find that, despite the fact that they carry no money or other agency-specific benefits, these awards can carry a great deal of weight with the people who receive them. How you make the award, however, is important.

In Okinawa, I used awards to thank interagency colleagues and their staff members for significant contributions to agency programs. Signed by the Consul General, the award became a visible token of my office’s appreciation and helped to build a person’s reputation. To give the Consulate’s awards real weight, the awards were always for a specific contribution to a specific program that truly went above and beyond what was expected.

I presented an award by making an office call on the awardee’s supervisor and spoke in very specific terms about why the Consulate had decided to issue an award. Usually, my counterpart had been involved in the program as well, which is why his or her personnel had been tasked with lending their support, and, in every case, they agreed to accept the award, most often passing it along to their staffs during a meeting or a general awards ceremony.

These awards enhanced the reputations of those who received them and served to further strengthen already close interagency ties.

**Lesson Three: Facilitate Staff to Staff Interaction**

Most people understand the power of inclusiveness in their personal lives, but with schedules filled with meetings, projects, and deadlines, it is something that is easily overlooked in official roles. Smart people know, however, that personal relationships matter as much in their professional lives as they do in private and make it a priority to cultivate
personal professional relationships. Good leaders expand upon this by also making it a priority to help their staff members create personal professional relationships as well. Done right, this can dramatically strengthen interagency relationships.

Agencies are large, unwieldy organizations that often do not fit together easily. Personal relationships can make all the difference. The stronger the personal relationships, the more naturally information flows between organizations and, as we all know, information flow is the key to real interagency cooperation. Sometimes, creating the right environment for this to flourish can be as simple as doing something nice.

One of our important contacts with the U.S. Marine Corps’ Public Affairs Office was the Okinawan spouse of an American service member. Although she was not an especially high ranking member of their team, she was someone with whom my office frequently worked in order to coordinate schedules and arrange official meetings. This woman’s son attended one of the DoD high schools on the island. When he heard that my office was facilitating the visit of NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, astronaut, aviator, and Marine Corps Major General, to an Okinawan high school, he told his mother he was envious of the Japanese students. She casually passed those remarks on to my senior staff member who mentioned them to me.

Our mission limited how my office could use resources. We could, however, invite a number of Americans to representational events. After looking at the guest list for the Bolden reception, we found we were able to extend a personal invitation to our contact, her son, and a small group of Okinawan students. This “personal invitation,” strengthened the bond between our contact and my senior staffer. People learned that we did more than just talk about helping interagency colleagues, when we could, we took action as well.

Lesson Four: Every Agency is an Asset

Upon landing in Okinawa, I was surprised to discover that DoD actually had five different public affairs offices on the island. Given the military presence there, the first four were expected. It was the fifth office, the DoD Dependents’ Schools (DoDDS) that came as a surprise.

DoDDS is an unusual interagency partner for a consulate or an embassy. Very few of the countries in which State works have military bases with large populations of American students that can be used to support intercultural exchange programs and, as a result, the interagency potential often goes untapped. DoDDS, however, turned out to be a wonderful partner, and as our relationship developed, I turned to them frequently for help. The educators and professional staff were all top notch and always willing to engage. The trick, though, was ensuring that the programs offered enough educational content to make it worth their while.

Cultural exchange through sports is a common method of youth outreach, and when I arrived on Okinawa there were already successful programs built around basketball and baseball. Most schools, both American and Okinawan, already had working teams, complete with professional coaches and good facilities, and adding a cross-cultural exchange tournament at the end of the season was a good capstone to the regular intermural seasons. But, after looking at the students who participated in these programs, I realized that we were missing out on other avenues of exchange.

Because the main focus of the State’s
public affairs efforts must be directed toward the local population, including American citizens in programs is always subject to detailed regulations. The types of programs and the numbers of participants must be carefully considered, and if a program skews away from cultural-exchange, it is not valid for the State’s purposes. From the DoDDS’s perspective, it is the opposite. Cultural exchange is a good thing, but if a program skews away from education, then it is not valid for its purposes either. Careful planning and compromise are necessary.

The ultimate goal of interagency cooperation should be to create a synergistic effect in which the combined power and reach of all U.S. government programs in a given area exceeds what each could accomplish individually. On Okinawa, the various public affairs offices proved to be excellent interagency partners and frequently shared their resources in pursuit of shared goals. The military had facilities and manpower, my office had prestige, solid contacts with influential members of the local community, and an experienced staff who had an almost uncanny organizational ability.

Perhaps the best example of this was the Okinawa/American High School Basketball Tournament. It was an enormous event to organize and coordinate and involved a steering committee with members of my staff, the Marine Corps Public Affairs Office, the Marine Corps Morale Welfare and Recreations Office, the Department of Defense Schools, and the United Services Organization. For many Okinawans, this was one of the few opportunities they had to meet and mix with the Americans on the island and visit an active military base.

**Lesson Five: Aim for Synergy**

The ultimate goal of interagency cooperation should be to create a synergistic effect in which the combined power and reach of all U.S. government programs in a given area exceeds what each could accomplish individually. On Okinawa, the various public affairs offices proved to be excellent interagency partners and frequently shared their resources in pursuit of shared goals. The military had facilities and manpower, my office had prestige, solid contacts with influential members of the local community, and an experienced staff who had an almost uncanny organizational ability.

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**Conclusion**

The high level of interagency cooperation that existed on Okinawa was already well established by the time I arrived in 2007. I assumed leadership of an office that was well connected to both the Okinawan media and interagency counterparts and also benefited from a local staff that was highly placed, well connected, and fluent in both the Okinawan and American cultures. Many of the small improvements my office was able to make in the interagency relationships on the island were only possible because of the solid foundations that my local staff and predecessors had laid.

While Okinawa offers a unique interagency
situation, in which several organizations are tied together in pursuit of a common mission, I believe that the lessons I learned while serving there are applicable across the full spectrum of government. After leaving Okinawa in 2010, I used many of the same techniques I used in Okinawa to help found two programs at State’s Buffalo Passport Agency, both of which required a great deal of interagency contact and support.

Managing interagency relationships is something that everyone in government service should think about. I hope other interagency partners will consider some of these programs as starting points to examine their own programs and their connections to the larger, interagency communities. We are always stronger when we stand together. IAJ
The Use of Special Operations in Conflict Resolution: Assessing the Value of Peace Warriors

by Spencer B. Meredith, III

Special Operations Forces (SOF) can serve as conflict resolution experts in places civilian peace practitioners cannot go. While to some this may seem like a controversial claim given the potential recourse to violence as SOF engage in an area, several factors show an important similarity to traditional peace efforts. One of these factors is the methods by which each group approaches its tasks. Comparisons indicate that SOF can perform peacemaking functions that seek to remove the longer-term causes of conflict and, thus, operate in ways beyond more traditional, military peacekeeping aimed primarily at the cessation of hostilities. This article offers a general overview of SOF and how their conflict resolution methods are similar to traditional peace efforts. It concludes with an assessment of the effectiveness of using SOF in peace operations.

Special Operations

Militaries use SOF for a variety of purposes, not least of which is increasing offensive capabilities for themselves and allied nations. Many countries develop these units for counterterrorism operations, often in conjunction with and through training from the U.S. As one of the primary founders of these “special” soldiers and missions, the U.S. trains and conducts joint operations with partner nations around the world. That breadth does not depend on a singular focus for those missions, however, as SOF have a diverse portfolio, something also taught to allied special units.

In particular, the U.S. military has several branch commands under a unified Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the largest of which is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). USASOC’s main efforts rest on small groups, averaging 6–12 personnel who conduct irregular warfare. This type of warfare is a hallmark of Army special operations forces (ARSOF), as it focuses on asymmetrical contests between state and non-state actors; the range of operations breaks down further as a function of regime change and/or stabilization. Special Forces (SF), commonly known as the Green Berets, form the basis for ARSOF’s small unit missions, and while the command has unofficial direct action options by specialized teams (so called “capture/kill”
strategic strikes), the primary purpose of SF is to conduct operations with indigenous forces either in opposition to what the U.S. government labels a “hostile” regime or occupying force or to aid a regime supported by the U.S. As such, SF missions run the gambit of local conflict resolution and training and security development, to joint operations against enemy targets.

In addition to the SF, USASOC houses Military Information Support Operations (MISO), commonly referred to as psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA) commands. These two commands have distinct areas of operation that focus primarily on engaging locals regarding, 1) perceptions of the host nation/rival forces/U.S.; and 2) infrastructural needs such as access to water, school/road/bridge construction, medical care, and disaster relief. These typically grassroots-based U.S. policy assessment and humanitarian missions make up a significant portion of the goals for MISO and CA units, and as such, they can stand on their own in host nations. They also show the long-term potential for peacemaking operations through the pursuit of positive peace by meeting basic human needs, restoring infrastructures to provide those in the future, and promoting reconciliation between disputants with the goal of preventing future conflict.

MISO and CA also support the warfighting capabilities of the SF when combat operations occur; this includes missions to overcome enemy forces, as well as through the establishment of negative peace, whereby hostilities cease, even if temporarily, for negotiations to begin. Accordingly, whether through propaganda or alliance-building, one central goal of these units remains identifying enemy combatants in and around friendly areas. This takes the form of building trust with village elders so they point out new arrivals without connections in the community. This does not inherently foster xenophobia, but more practically identifies potential insurgents who take up residence in abandoned homes or on the outskirts of the village. It can also include information campaigns designed to show local populations the “real” side of groups opposing the U.S. and its allies.

The U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) brought these SOF missions to the forefront of U.S. policymaking abroad. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq showcased the potential to change hearts and minds through village stabilization operations and coordination with local militias and national security forces, but it also revealed some inherent limits to those efforts. In particular, the Sons of Iraq represent a complex case of classic, unconventional warfare (working “with and through” a local resistance movement) to achieve tactical success, but also one in which the longer-term goals of reintegration and reconciliation did not occur. More so, the resurgence of the Taliban, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) amidst growing sectarian divisions in Iraq, lingering cross-border conflicts around the Afghan-Pakistan border, fracturing political settlements between federal centers and local power brokers, and the ever-present corruption in governments all show the weakness of SOF—their small size. SOF have enormous potential to change specific aspects of the security environment, but as neither an occupying force, nor with missions that can be easily handed over to regular military units or non-governmental organizations, SOF cannot sustain themselves for long periods of time without support, both in terms of warfighting capabilities and logistics.
Neither can they endure without the support of host nations and/or local populations. Yet this mutual dependence is also one of their greatest strengths in conflict resolution in general and countering and preventing violent extremist narratives specifically.

**SOF are by nature joint operators requiring effective communication, coordination, and cooperation among allied and host nation counterparts. Equally importantly is their reliance on U.S. government agencies...**

SOF are by nature joint operators requiring effective communication, coordination, and cooperation among allied and host nation counterparts. Equally importantly is their reliance on U.S. government agencies, notably the Department of State (State) for input on where to operate in-country and how those operations should mesh with larger political goals and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for long-term project support once SOF leave. That jointness can obviously hinder efficiency given the expected bureaucratic infighting over budget resources and policy priorities, but it can also make SOF effective cultural experts, analysts, and project managers. Inherent to those attributes are conflict resolution skills that are part of the “human domain,” a key element of USSOCOM Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations and USASOC’s Campaign of Learning, which emphasizes the need for awareness of cultural norms, historical relationships, power dynamics across social levels, and language proficiency as central to success. Understanding the human domain requires many of the same skills found in more traditional conflict resolution efforts.

**Commonalities in Conflict Resolution**

Across common conflict analysis tools, ranging from basic contradiction-attitude-behavior approaches, through escalation/de-escalation curves, to greed-grievance models of conflict transformation, two core elements remain: 1) mapping the causes and courses of problems, and 2) reconciling people, interests, and values at multiple levels using multiple disciplines. This multitrack focus on statism (“top-down”) through grassroots (“bottom-up”) efforts offers more insight into complex systems of conflict than do single-level approaches that can easily turn into methodological conflicts themselves. However, analytical richness also adds to the perennial banes of limited research resources and pressing time constraints in either preventing or containing a conflict. Making matters more challenging, disputants can initially welcome conflict resolvers as activists for peace, advocates for their side, or even just as referees helping cooler heads to prevail. However, that can quickly change if either side begins to see them as biased, unsympathetic, or having their own agenda.

Interventions complicate this problem by introducing additional actors, interests, methods, and underlying norms that either support nonviolent conflict resolution markers among the disputants or harden positions preventing resolution. Compounding this, even with the horrendous potential increase in genocide, decisive military victory may produce longer-lasting peace than negotiated settlements, including those after intervention. Obviously, different types of action and the timing of the intervention, as well as the makeup of the interveners (multinational, regional, local; UN, African Union [AU], NATO, etc.) affect these outcomes by shaping the perception of the legitimacy of the intervention among different groups. Humanitarian relief generally gets more support from all sides than does more
controversial regime change. In addition, these are deeply political decisions. Introducing the intervention along the timeline of conflict prevention, through the phases of negative peace/cessation of violence, all the way to positive peace building and reconciliation adds additional complexity to the conflict resolution endeavor.

SOF share these analytical hurdles when assessing, implementing, evaluating, and reorienting their mission goals and methods. David Maxwell describes this process in the area of unconventional warfare (UW), the SF mission of working with groups to bring about regime change or remove hostile occupying forces in a host nation. He emphasizes the continuous process of assessment before, during, and after missions. In addition to U.S. assets, those assessments include the potential for friendly, local forces to defend themselves, engage the population with a message that communicates legitimacy, and partner with the U.S. to bring down the opposing power. From a methodological standpoint, because of these rigorous procedures, SOF have more in common with the traditional, nonviolent, conflict resolution field than they do with multilateral, conventional peacekeepers. ARSOF 2022 makes this clear by stating that expanded opportunities for military personnel to pursue graduate degrees at both military and civilian institutions are essential for gaining more than the content knowledge of the areas of operation. SOF must learn the tools of scholarly analysis to handle the complex uncertainties present in conflict environments.

SOF unconventional warfare also shares an essential conceptual element with traditional conflict resolution. SOF base their actions on a breakdown of trust between the state and its people. This lack of trust in the state can stem from overt hostility, abuse, negligence, or the failure to provide basic protection to the populace in the face of other predatory forces. In addition, a critical element of UW focuses on keeping “fence-sitters” out of the conflict. This strategy involves conflict prevention measures such as strengthening civil society and rule of law, mechanisms that highlight SOF efforts to resolve structural injustices by assisting business start-ups, and working with U.S. government agencies and international organizations on aid packages.

Yet despite some meaningful commonalities, comparatively little has been written about the potential for SOF to engage in the “peace and justice” field. This may be a result of a lack of awareness of what SOF bring or an understandable reticence among civilians to engage with the practitioners of war when working with vulnerable, violated, and victimized populations. This article seeks to challenge that lack of information and the perception of incompatibility by showing several examples of what SOF have done in what can be considered traditional areas for nonviolent conflict resolution and analyzing several cases and the implications—both positive and negative—of using SOF in conflict resolution, specifically to counter violent extremist narratives.

**Peace Warriors**

Twenty years ago peacekeeping literature dealt with the fallout of the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of intrastate conflicts. Debates about international relations theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism attempted to define and justify intervention in sovereign states for human rights’ needs, while placing...
Unfortunately, the requirement of a strategic vision for SOF conflict resolution has eluded U.S. planners...

Last correctly identified the need for outside military forces to act neutrally in mediation and assist with building common ground between the parties. He also identified one of the lingering problems facing these kinds of operations—the absence of international and national strategic goals that filter down to the country-wide operational and on the street tactical levels. The ad hoc nature of some of the Cyprus missions and decisions on the ground minimized the benefits of lasting peacekeeping forces and led to myopic mistakes by commanders doing their best with limited big-picture knowledge. Anthony Marley picked up that point as it relates to SOF specifically, arguing that U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) planners and policy advisors in the 1990s generally opposed peacekeeping operations. During an era of budgetary contractions, they resisted spending resources on non-vital security interests or tying down DoD personnel and assets in a bottomless pit of funding that other aid providers would assume upon and host nations would require indefinitely. Marley proposed SOF as an alternative to large force operations as in Bosnia, although he prefaced that with the need for clear strategic goals that translated down to the tactical level.

He suggested that if that condition could be met, PSYOP teams could be effective in selling the peace process and settlement terms to local populations, while SF could assist in disarming and retraining former combatants to participate in local and national defense forces. Humanitarian assistance, in coordination and cooperation with local and international NGOs, would fall to the CA personnel, who would focus on medical care and repairs and construction of utilities and transportation systems, and the development of governance norms at the local level. While Marley did not mention it explicitly, these efforts also have application at the national level as a function of connections senior SOF have with host nation government officials.

Unfortunately, the requirement of a strategic vision for SOF conflict resolution has eluded U.S. planners, a point Linda Robinson raised, although in different terms than Marley. While the latter focused on a general lack of awareness of what SOF could do, in large part due to the conventional forces holding sway during the Cold War, current misunderstanding of SOF tends to overestimate their capabilities. Rather than having to force their way into the planning...
sessions, SOF now gets called upon for missions that require a longer political will and deeper budgetary pockets than the U.S. government is usually willing to devote. As a result, Marley’s accurate identification of concern within the DoD that resources will be overused and misallocated now applies to SOF. What then can SOF do in the wake of costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while still facing long-term threats from quasi-state groups like ISIS—to say nothing of the continued presence of al-Qaeda and affiliates—and increasing challenges from rival nations?

Forman and Danan picked up that thread by reviewing phases of military conflict resolution operations after the Cold War, concluding that the prevalence and nature of current conflicts require something more nuanced than previous peacekeeping operations and something longer-term than the stabilization efforts of the past decade. Their premise that greater complexity requires greater U.S. interagency coordination and cooperation, combined with greater understanding of the conflict participants, their interests, norms, and goals, point to the use of SOF as leading agents for U.S. presence in conflict zones. Their recommendations include:

- Strategic planning around available resources compared to foreseeable mission requirements.
- U.S. government institutional development with the goals of conflict prevention and reconstruction.
- Expanding international partnerships to emerging powers facing regional threats (even if they also ignore localized ones in their own countries).
- Developing and implementing greater coordination with private and public sector investments to decrease fragility in host nations’ social, economic, and ultimately, governmental structures.

Such a model takes the same “human domain” approach fostered by USSOCOM and USASOC in particular; it also resonates with complex, interdependent, holistic peace practitioner models, as can be seen in three anecdotal but generalizable examples from the SOF community.

**Case Studies**

During the mid-1990s conflict between Ecuador and Peru, U.S. SOF participated in a confidence-building operation under the auspices of the Organization of American States, whose members served as the guarantors of a previous treaty demarcating borders and ceasing hostilities 50 years earlier. A military-observer mission deployed to the contested region and established its value in preventing further conflict and when incidents occurred, preventing escalation and the resumption of fighting. SOF performed strategic reconnaissance in two key incidents that could easily have brought the belligerents back to war. The first occurred when Peruvian air defense batteries mistakenly targeted an Ecuadorian helicopter on a routine and mutually-approved observation flight over the buffer zone; the second occurred when Peruvian naval vessels moved toward an Ecuadorian port. In both instances, U.S. intelligence gathering and dissemination of that information to both sides helped calm nerves and reassure both parties that compliance with the ceasefire had not been violated. Search and rescue missions for both sides added to the perception of SOF neutrality.

SOF also performed extensive humanitarian services to the local inhabitants that included dental exams; inoculations against yellow fever and rabies; constructing housing and sewage systems with, primarily, local labor; and in-kind and monetary support for the local orphanage. PSYOPs played a role in local and international relations as well, with local grievance sessions and media coverage of peace projects in the region. These latter missions correspond with...
a key aspect of SOF missions—to engage with civil centers of gravity in a community, what could also be called social networks, and their key actors. Comparable to terms found in theories of social network analysis (e.g., hubs, bridges, cliques, cohesion, and density), centers of gravity look across several factors in the political, economic, military, and social arenas, as well as within each to find vulnerabilities.10 Those vulnerabilities range from practical concerns about safe drinking water, to normative aspects of identity formation.11

More recent civil affairs missions in the Oruzgon region of Afghanistan addressed many of those vulnerabilities through daily interactions with community leaders and members.12 One particular team had responsibility for projects in the province and coordinated with multinational provincial reconstruction teams as well as local NGOs to assist with critical infrastructure development and governance training. Efforts centered on the power system for the local bazaar in a central village. Working with local elders and laborers, the CA team and its non-military partners replaced the dilapidated, car-powered generators with sustainable ones that ran off existing irrigation canals. The project also included new power lines, a building to house the generators, and a new learning center. Throughout the project, local input shaped more than the goals for the project, as consultation and elder decision making reinforced community norms. The CA personnel were able to parlay the success of the local project into goodwill toward conciliation across villages as well as within them. Medical, dental, and veterinary assistance added legitimacy to SOF efforts in those areas, thereby reinforcing norms of cooperation.

Civil affairs also engaged in security assistance as part of the state building phase of postwar reconstruction. Addressing part of the challenge of building legitimacy during transitions from civil war,13 SF teams in the Wardak province of Afghanistan recruited and trained military-age men for local defense units to link the local community and the Afghan National Army and Police forces, while also filling geographic gaps in the defenses of the region.14 The supporting CA team liaised with the corresponding Turkish provincial reconstruction team and district government officials, as well as village elders, to increase integration of security goals, methods, and responsibilities. This kind of focus on centers of gravity at the local level, with efforts nested in the larger regional and national conflict resolution work in Afghanistan, is also a part of what SF call “phase 0” operations—relationship-building over the long term and with long-term goals in mind.

Such missions have been used in many countries as part of regular engagements with host-nation special operations units. U.S. SF teams conduct Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises, as well as classroom instruction to reinforce key civil-military norms, such as respect for civilian leadership, protection of civilian populations, interagency cooperation, and conflict resolution.15 While these kinds of engagements are not a guarantee that host nation forces will follow those norms, they occur predictably and thus allow for expectations of a continued relationship not only between U.S. and host nation SOF, but also as part of ongoing dialogue about norms, security needs, and government capacity. The annual Flintlock Operation in North Africa does this by focusing on counterterrorism in the region and bringing

**Working with local elders and laborers, the CA team and its non-military partners replaced the dilapidated, car-powered generators with sustainable ones that ran off existing irrigation canals.**
together multinational forces to train and fight against groups like Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{16}

The similarities between peace practitioners and SOF was most evident in the village stabilization operations in Southern Afghanistan. SOF missions sought to prevent and counter violent extremist narratives in rural communities. SOF planners and units approached the villages as both vulnerable and resilient: vulnerable in terms of security and resilient in terms of ideological disconnects to Taliban interpretations of Islam. Whether the result of tribal identity overriding religious doctrine or simple pragmatism, SOF experiences found that rural communities would align themselves with those who, 1) provided security, 2) respected their identity and norms of behavior, and 3) enabled them to meet their basic needs for food and water.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, in order to counter Taliban extremist narratives, SOF did not wage a “war of ideas” directly. Rather, SOF prepared the ground for inculcating international human rights norms and proto-democratic governance procedures by meeting the villagers where they were, listening to their concerns, replicating their values whenever possible, participating in community security, and helping their daily livelihoods improve. In essence, they lived among them to close the “self-other” gap. As with the methodological rigor found in SOF conflict assessments, these efforts have important similarities to traditional conflict resolution practices.

**Conclusion**

Conflict resolution studies break down efforts into multiple phases, actors, and methods but generally contain common norms undergirding practice in the field. SOF share many of those same norms and practices, albeit with complications resulting from the inherent presence of violence in their operations and the use of U.S. government funds that can enable larger projects than civilian NGO programs, but which also carry the challenges of politicization of methods and goals. This article has argued for a closer look at SOF conflict resolution in order to assess its costs and benefits. Accordingly, the promise of SOF conflict resolution can be summed up as, 1) access to hostile environments where traditional peace practitioners cannot usually go without their own security forces, which can be costly and highly politicized in their own right; 2) access to greater resources compared to non-military conflict resolution; and 3) access to a wide range of parties involved in the conflict resolution process making them akin to social network hubs (centers of influence) and bridges (connectors between networks).

The similarities between peace practitioners and SOF was most evident in the village stabilization operations in Southern Afghanistan.

The pitfalls of SOF conflict resolution can also be summarized as politicized intervention that can sacrifice local needs for U.S. interests, unsustainable missions without U.S. political will that is easily subject to the winds of popular discontent, and stigma, as warriors whose inherent potential recourse to force may give disputants an easy out rather than sticking to the negotiating table.

As a result, the assessment of SOF conflict resolution remains as conditioned on factors outside their areas of responsibilities as it does for their civilian counterparts. Yet SOF retain the ability to use many of the tools found in traditional peace practices in places where only they can go. That gives them opportunities to assist vulnerable people for their betterment, work across the three tracks of conflict resolution simultaneously, and shape U.S. policymaking through interagency cooperation “down range” and in DC. While some may dismiss the notion of Peace Warriors, SOF see themselves as soldier...
diplomats, a union of the best of American military and political culture. That may sound like a cliché, but in the end, SOF have proven their value to more than U.S. interests—they have helped hurting people and trained others to help them as well. In the end, that is a lasting legacy beyond the political reasons that sent them there, one that will continue to develop as SOF conflict resolution efforts become more clearly designed and more broadly implemented.

**NOTES**


4 This option exists but requires significant coordination between CA/SF and Department of State/USAID at the logistical level. Embedding interagency personnel in specific permissive (low conflict) areas, as well as increasing education for SOF on business planning and execution models add to the potential success of these efforts. See Rufus Phillip, “Breathing Life into Expeditionary Diplomacy: A Missing Dimension of US Security Capabilities,” working paper, *National Strategy Information Center*, Fall 2014, for ways to address this from the State side.


11 The U.S. National Defense University’s Joint Special Operations Master of Arts program at the U.S. Army’s JFK Special Warfare Center and School engages those latter issues in the areas of security and regional studies and conflict resolution strategies.


14 Ziglar.


16 See <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/25/us-chad-military-idUSKBN0LT1BI20150225>, for a brief overview of the program.

Empires do not decline gracefully. While commentators may debate whether the U.S. is declining in absolute or only relative terms, China is undoubtedly on the rise; that rise is perhaps the single most important security issue for the U.S. this century. The U.S. national security apparatus should devote sufficient attention and resources to effectively shape and manage America’s relationship with China.

As an entering assumption, on balance, the U.S. would probably rather avoid open warfare with China. Classic international relations balance-of-power theory highlights the threat of force to moderate the actions and reaction from all nations.1 In that same vein, the foreign policy reorganization suggested here assumes that America would rather attempt to marshal its governmental organs to avoid a war rather than plunge into an avoidable conflict. This discussion is not a substantive weighing of competing policy goals for the U.S.-China relationship, such as the debate between containment and engagement. What follows instead is a discussion about process, a proposal to alter the interagency process to better implement whatever China policy and desired end state America’s duly elected political leaders pursue.

The U.S. should employ a whole-of-government approach to better shape its current and future relationship with China. To effectively shape U.S.-China relations, a single senior official should be assigned the sole task of coordinating the whole-of-government with respect to China. This senior official would synchronize diplomatic, informational, and economic civilian government agencies with the military to unite them in a common purpose across the government and internationally.

The Risk of the Status Quo Abroad

China is a rising power that alternates between quiet build-up and pointed, muscular standoff. Paired with the opacity of the Communist Party system and the sheer size of the Chinese populace,
its rise is a marked challenge to American power and, perhaps, to regional or global security. Worse still, American bureaucracy is famous for stove-piping, allowing bureaucratic hurdles to prevent the synergies that the multiple levels of the American government should provide. Taken together, China’s rise and America’s bureaucratic inertia offer ample opportunities for inadvertent major power war.

Whether looking at economics, military construction, or maritime delimitation, China is rising on many fronts. Disputed islands in the East and South China Seas are at once the most visible and most fraught examples of China’s muscular rise. As it has with increasing regularity since the 1990s, China is now challenging the claims of the Philippines and Vietnam, among others, to a large handful of islands in waters that could plausibly be claimed by any of several nations. Because Chinese defense policy changed from primarily defensive to regional power projection in the mid-1980s, the current rising tensions seem of a piece with the longstanding Chinese goals of military expansion, economic expansion, or both. The term “hundred-year marathon” has come into use in Chinese policy circles in the last few years, referring to the 100 years since the Communist Party’s ascendance in 1949; under this concept, China is supposed to rise to become the world’s preeminent nation by the Party’s centennial.

While China’s expansionist aims seem clear enough, the motivations of Chinese leaders and the people are perhaps less clear. Predicting this rise years ago, Huntington pointed to Chinese history and culture inevitably leading to an expansionist policy. A recent Economist piece opines that the Chinese people want continued prosperity, while the leadership wants domestic stability and international respect. A more circumspect view of decision making by nation states might parse the differences between the goals of elite Chinese with the working and middle classes, contrasting as well the process strictures of the Communist Party, the military, and civil bureaucracy.

In short, Chinese expansion is a several-decades-long project that shows no signs of slowing anytime soon. It is likely to be kept in perpetual motion through a combination of economics, demography, culture, and key stakeholder interests.

The Risk of the Status Quo within the U.S. Government

With so many possible drivers of Chinese aims, the U.S. government must put to work its broad spectrum of governmental tools—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to shape a future with China. However, given organizational stove-piping and a dearth of cabinet-level coordination across agencies relating to military and foreign affairs, no person or entity short of the President is able to direct a response across the whole of government, and the result is often confused organizational responses.

Interagency tools, or applying the “whole of government,” is nothing new. Military doctrine discusses the desirability of a whole-of-government approach to “facilitate [U.S. government] engagement with [non-U.S. government] stakeholders, fostering a broader comprehensive approach to security.” Such close coordination across governmental entities, however, is more often than not aspirational.

In theory, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is supposed to insert itself between military commands and civilian other governmental agencies (OGAs) that might perform specialized, related tasks. The
Recent military and OGA interactions with China are, at best, confused.

We may be there already. Recent military and OGA interactions with China are, at best, confused. Consider the 2013 incident between the USS Cowpens and warships escorting China’s new carrier. Soon thereafter the U.S. Navy (hopefully with input from PACOM) rewarded China’s dangerous maneuver at sea by inviting the Chinese Navy, for the first time, to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise, the largest international naval exercise in the world. Meanwhile the Philippines begins arbitration against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the U.S. sits on the sidelines, providing seemingly tardy and only indirect support to the Philippines despite clearly mutual interests. As for OGA engagement with China, the Justice Department recently indicted senior Chinese officials, Treasury and Office of the Comptroller of Currency continue to take no action on China devaluing the yuan, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is conspicuously silent on China’s recently announced air defense interdiction zone. It is a veritable potpourri of agency actions and inactions, with no seeming synchronization whatever.

This situation may result in inadvertent signals and unintended consequences. For example, while the National Security Council (NSC) plays a key role for synchronizing defense-related issues across the interagency, Treasury and the FAA are not necessarily on the NSC’s agenda when thinking about long-term strategic goals. As Allison and Zelikow explain in a different context, each agency cataloged above has its own separate reason for action or inaction, each of which likely makes sense in isolation. Taken as a whole, however, they create a confused jumble with no theme of engagement. A Chinese party official cannot predict whether the next initiative will result in a trade embargo or a shrug. The situation is untenable, and America cannot rely on serendipity to avoid mixed signals that might ignite a crisis.

Those mixed signals present a risk of near-peer conflict. Rather than clearly choosing to oppose or acquiesce to a rising China, America will likely try to do some of both, as it has so far. Combining China’s rise with the mixed signals emanating from a stove-piped U.S. government risks stumbling into a war with China, as Huntington warned years ago. Left to its own inertia, there is no reason to think the U.S.-China relationship will tend toward understanding and peace. To further that end, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic levers of power should be coordinated.
How to Fix the Interagency Process Regarding China

Given the trajectories of China and the U.S., the relationship between the two should be given special priority within U.S. foreign policy, to include diplomatic, military, and OGA actions. The best way to leverage the interagency to shape relations with China is to appoint a single, senior civilian official to manage that relationship by setting a course of action and coordinating across the U.S. government and internationally.

Used correctly, the interagency process can be very effective. Military doctrine spells out how the interagency process should work to coordinate between DoD and OGAs. After five years of war in Iraq when the previous military commanders and civilian diplomats could not work together to apply the tools of national power, it took a concerted effort by Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus to force the issue. Beginning in 2007, they required their staffs to work together and achieved an unprecedented unity of effort. Similarly, coordination between DoD and OGAs set the conditions for the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in the late 1990s. Interagency coordination with respect to China should be both inward and outward looking. Inwardly, this coordination should bring to bear the whole of government, as happened in Iraq and Bosnia. Outwardly, regional powers such as South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and other maritime nations should be able to talk with a single point of contact to balance a rising China.

The official described above, having a single-issue, broad scope of authority is reminiscent of the “tsars” that have been in vogue over the last several presidential administrations; it is a model that has already worked. Lieutenant General Lute was the “war tsar,” the individual who kept the domestic national security establishment engaged and supporting the war effort in Iraq.

Inward Looking

This interagency coordinator for China will be the President’s representative within the U.S. government. Perhaps, like the former “war tsar,” this individual should be a deputy national security advisor (though perhaps “Mandarin” would be more a fitting shorthand in this context) and placed on the NSC, allowing U.S.-China policy to inform U.S. foreign policy writ large. Regardless of title, the individual should be a “tsar-plus” with authority to steer policy within the government and to represent the U.S. abroad.

“Mandarin’s” Placement and Authority

The “Mandarin” would not head any new agency, but instead have coordination responsibility and “tie-breaking” authority within the government. Like a traditional JIACG or any other interagency process, the Mandarin will get players from disparate organizations moving in the same direction. Unlike a typical JIACG, the Mandarin should be empowered to resolve internecine disputes. If, for example, Treasury wants to investigate Chinese currency manipulation, while State is adamantly opposed, the Mandarin should decide which agency preference best follows the President’s foreign policy guidance and so instruct the affected secretaries. A disappointed Secretary can go over the Mandarin’s head, but the position should be structured so no one other than the President can overrule the Mandarin’s decision. This process would set incentives for the Mandarin...
and agencies to work together to implement the President’s goals, holding in reserve the ability to go to the President only for the most important disputes.

Outward Looking

Unlike most other tsars, the Mandarin should have an international role as the face of U.S.-China policy. The U.S. ambassador to China and the PACOM commander should both be designated as special advisors to the Mandarin and strongly encouraged to coordinate China policy and plans with the Mandarin. While the Mandarin cannot direct the Ambassador or the PACOM commander to take any particular action, the Mandarin’s unique role within the government will require cooperation from PACOM and the ambassador to China in particular, so special advisor status would be appropriate.\(^{25}\) That key advice will better enable the Mandarin to keep the President informed and facilitate implementing the President’s strategic and foreign policy goals.

The Mandarin will be something of an ambassador-at-large, able to represent views of the U.S. government to Seoul on one day and Manila the next. The Mandarin will be able to address different nations’ concerns, and with the advice of PACOM and the ambassador to China, the Mandarin will have the credibility to work directly with U.S. ambassadors to other nations in East Asia. Unlike those ambassadors in the region, the Mandarin will have leverage within the U.S. government to address problems within the bureaucracy.\(^{26}\) Unlike the PACOM commander, the Mandarin will have actual (rather than \textit{de facto}) authority to be the public face for U.S. national security relating to China.

For a model of the Mandarin, imagine combining the domestic governmental focus that Lieutenant General Lute brought to the Iraq war effort with the international work performed by Senator George Mitchell on the Northern Ireland conflict. The former “war tsar” shepherded resources and agencies to support America’s war in Iraq, tamping down the inevitable turf wars that result when different agencies touch the same problem. Sent by President Clinton, Senator Mitchel facilitated negotiations of the intractable conflict in Northern Ireland, working effectively with embittered and embattled factions to deliver the Good Friday Agreement.\(^{27}\) The Mandarin will need to combine the best of both those inward- and outward-looking models for governmental collaboration.

Picking a Mandarin

With this dual-hatted role, both inward- and outward-looking, the selection of the Mandarin would be a very important choice. History shows that interagency cooperation is very personality dependent.\(^{28}\) The background and nature of the Mandarin would therefore be a key consideration, and the importance of interpersonal relationships within the administration and throughout the Pacific region probably cannot be overstated. Considering the need to interface with civilian officials in the U.S. government and senior officials and diplomats abroad, a uniformed officer may not be the best individual for the job. On the one hand, General Petraeus successfully implemented a whole-of-government counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. On the other hand, Petraeus did so as the senior military leader in theater. husbanding the Chinese relationship will require diplomacy and bureaucratic wrangling, and, in any event, is not a shooting war demanding the focus of a seasoned military commander. (Should a shooting war break out, of course, America would properly focus on a military response.) While many general and flag officers may have the credibility and interpersonal relationships for the job, it would be problematic if America’s ambassador-at-large for its Chinese relationship were perceived instead as a super combatant commander, akin to a neo-proconsul. Instead, a senior diplomat, perhaps a post-cabinet
A secretary or former ambassador, would provide the Mandarin position with the experience and credibility within the Beltway and on the world stage and avoid the appearance of further militarizing American foreign policy.

Counterarguments

The following counterarguments cut against the Mandarin proposal and bear examination:

- **The status quo is fine.** The communist party has ruled China for over half a century, and America has managed to avoid a shooting war so far. Why does America need to drastically overhaul its foreign policy over the fears about just one country? Arguing for the status quo ignores the reality of what China is trying to accomplish in its economic and territorial expansionism. By attempting to carve up the South and East China Seas, China is attempting to exert heretofore unknown drilling rights in international waters, asserting sovereignty over vast swathes of ocean. As discussed above, China is now continuing its arc of actions that started decades ago, and will probably end with China carving up the ocean at least. Meanwhile, as a whole, the U.S. government dithers. Some agencies react to deter China, others are more inviting, and still other agencies do nothing. This variegated approach is bound to confuse China and is likely to lead to the kind of misreading of intentions that can spark an unnecessary conflict. The status quo is unacceptable because it is not static. The status quo is Chinese expansion with no coordinated response from the U.S. The status quo sets China on a collision course with the U.S., and an official like the Mandarin can perhaps prevent the collision.

- **Bureaucratic problems are only exacerbated when bureaucracy is added.** There is already a cabinet, an NSC, and multiple interagency groups. How can we cure bureaucratic bloat with yet more bureaucracy? The Mandarin is not another bureaucrat. There will be no Department of Mandarins created by this proposal. The Mandarin is an individual official who would likely have a very small staff. The Mandarin’s ability to accomplish policy goals will come not from his or her own office staff, but from the Mandarin’s ability to harness other departments and agencies to work together and bring foreign players to the table. It establishes a chief deputy under the President to shepherd the whole-of-government response to China. This is not more bureaucracy, it is purposeful delegation.

- **This won’t work because the interagency process is broken beyond repair.** This is a fallacy. The interagency process can be fixed and has been fixed in both the Bosnian and Iraq war efforts. The difficult piece, and what sets the Mandarin concept apart from previous tsars, is combining the tsar’s internal focus with an international purview, simultaneously serving as an honest broker among U.S. agencies as well as between the U.S. and foreign governments, all to better shape the Chinese relationship.

Conclusion

The interagency process is unwieldy. Taking the framers’ separation of powers to its absurd end, the spread of power among DoD, Department of State, and other OGAs almost perfectly precludes a coherent American foreign policy on any particular issue. Apart from acute crises, such as Serbia or the Iraq war, no governmental official other than the President can marshal the whole of government in a cohesive manner.

The rise of China presents ample
opportunities for the U.S. to send mixed signals. As these mixed signals could lead to avoidable war, they should be avoided through an orchestrated, whole-of-government approach to U.S.-China relations. A senior official, a “Mandarin” with the President’s mandate, appropriate seniority, and regional credibility is required to marshal the U.S. governmental response at home and abroad. It could be difficult to fill the role given such high expectations. Nevertheless, getting the relationship with China right may be essential to prevent great power war this century.

The Mandarin, this key official for managing U.S.-China relations, should be a senior civilian, former diplomat, or cabinet-level official. As Clemenceau understood, war was too important to leave to the generals. In our day, maintaining peace in the Pacific is too important to leave to the admirals.

NOTES


4 Huntington, pp. 228–229.


7 Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 2011, p. I-6.


10 Holmes.


15 For risks of such miscalculations, see Allison and Zelikow.

16 Waltz.


21 Waltz.


23 The best method to implement the Mandarin—whether by statute, executive order, or other method—is beyond the scope of this paper.

24 While perhaps simple enough in theory for domestic OGAs, this would have to be carefully coordinated with DoD, Central Intelligence Agency, and other security and defense agencies to avoid delegation not allowed by Article II of the Constitution.

25 See U.S. Constitution, Article II (special authority between president and ambassadors and president and military commanders).


Outsider:

The Army Interagency Experience at the Department of Commerce

by Samuel T. Fuller

"Holding to a supposed ideal that national security decisions ought to be 'above' politics, personalities, and organizational interests... constitutes an academic dereliction of duty by failing to prepare officers for the realities they will encounter."

—Dr. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College¹

A U.S. Army strategist’s core competency is the ability to take an executive-level concept and turn it into an order. This order will move or manage personnel, equipment, and effects between military formations in line with the commander’s intent. The term “strategist” merely describes a functional area. To that end, a strategist is not on some higher plane of thinking as compared to his peers. In fact, today’s strategist began as stopgap. The essential command function of turning guidance into action in large headquarters had atrophied from certain force design, generation, and management realities. Now fifteen years on, strategists have become the stewards of this function. In a sense, they serve as fixers for the larger Army and Joint headquarters.

If a strategist can turn guidance into orders reliably, they can practice strategizing and start working toward the earned-title aspect of their craft. Strategizing is keeping a strategy sturdy, yet adaptive. In the absence of a strategy, a strategist will collaboratively develop one—that is strategizing as well. Using the sparsest terms possible, a strategy is a living-document process that military formations can hold on to in good faith while they undertake their respective or collective missions. Naturally, the strategy always belongs to the commander—the strategist does not own the strategy. Woe to the strategists who believe they own anything.

That does not mean that the strategist does not lead. Rather, how the strategist goes about leading a given headquarters to believe in and adhere to a strategy is just as important as what that headquarters accomplishes. This is the critical aspect of strategizing: the proper design and

Major Samuel T. Fuller is a U.S. Army officer from Naperville, Illinois. He earned a Bachelor of Art in Political Science from the University of Illinois – Chicago via DePaul University, a Master of Art in Public Administration from Webster University, a Master of Science in Business from University of Kansas, and a Master of Military Art and Science in Operational Planning from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies.
management of a strategy serve to better motivate and inspire a formation toward the commander’s goals. In a way, an elegant strategy literally animates the Army’s mission command philosophy. When executed properly it builds *einhheit*, or the mutual trust necessary to conduct distributed operations. Elegant strategies make risk easier to articulate up and down the chain of command. Any witness to this kind of candor can speak to its power.

In large, non-profit business, interagency, or political settings, processes substitute for orders when turning guidance into action. The military term “strategy,” with all its semantic implications, becomes an organization’s strategy, although there is typically no stated adversary. That is the only real difference; everything else is cosmetic. In fact, one can only hone the technique of strategizing through its practice in diverse environs with different combinations of inputs and outputs. To this end, each strategy has a unique culture and history. Building a portfolio of multiple strategies in different environments and over time is critical to recognizing patterns and developing the mental models that equate to strategic experience.

When building this experience, organizations that value strategic scanning to determine what the environment is trying to tell them and then practice performance management to gather feedback after an action thrive in times of turbulence. This is the essence of discretion and deliberation in strategy. At what level that deliberation occurs is the key question of educating the reflective strategist.

As Gary Klein famously stated, “...novices tend to deliberate about which option to select, whereas experts deliberate about what is really going on in the situation.” This passage profoundly outlines the target of organization development—turning the headlights on and harnessing latent expertise to produce favorable outcomes.

**The Problem**

All too often, strategists tend to flit among the clouds, galloping like a fox at the “strategic” or “policy” level of a given organization and scrunch their noses at mere mentions of “tactics.” Some become downright nauseated at the mention of “process” or “procedure.” This approach damages the brand and, even worse, the resident organization. Only through the act of zooming into and out of micro-tactical situations can one truly learn what is going on in an organization and begin to understand its basic culture.

> **In large, non-profit business, interagency, or political settings, processes substitute for orders when turning guidance into action.**

The idea of poking one’s head into the janitor’s closet in a 47,000-person organization to check for cultural artifacts may seem absurd. However, examining these very types of artifacts in relationship with the espoused values of an organization can reveal both how and why strategies succeed or fail. Consider a strategist’s career progression and development: apprentice strategists frequently start developing their commander’s strategies by sketching out success criteria first. Only journeymen know to observe as much as they can about an organization’s culture, because they recognize that only through the continuous practice of cultural appreciation will they build a strategy that sticks. Masters can construct and manage multiple strategies at the same time. Experts know when a strategy should be disposed of completely, an all too rare talent borne from lifelong honing of strategic “knack.”

Military strategists should be considered apprentices until they have had a difficult planning job, and journeymen when they
“come up for air” in a broadening assignment to understand how non-military organizations practice strategy. Most important in this broadening assignment is the consideration of what the military strategist can bring back to the Army. Those that use a broadening assignment as a flourish to their promotion packets or to pad their curriculum vitae are fouling both the Army and the gaining partner. The central thrust for applying to a broadening program should be to create understanding and relationships for the Army’s use. In the spirit of service, a strategist must work hard everywhere, and working hard breeds trust in the gaining partner’s eyes.

Reading is fundamental. Strategic training and education are vital. However, diverse experiences with multiple organizations’ cultures, means of development, and practices of strategy are the real keys to building an effective strategist who is recognized and called upon for expertise in the field of strategy. It takes time and a breadth of experience. These experiences build tacit knowledge, which is why it is so hard to describe what strategy is and is not. Examples are best; a specific departmental experience suited to describe a strategy and a culture from context to detail and back is fitting.

The Environment

Only the Department of Interior could hope to rival the Department of Commerce in terms of the diversity and federation of bureaus and responsibilities in the executive branch of the U.S. government. From the Patent and Trademark Office to the National Weather Service, the Department of Commerce has a suite of missions and capabilities spanning at least twelve chapters of Title 15, U.S. Code.3 It can affect many more, depending on one’s definition of economic well-being in relation to national security.

In a sense, deductive reasoning does not work when approaching such a complex organization. There are too many tendrils in other parts of the international community—the U.S. government itself, business, and private citizenry. As such, outsiders who succeed in harnessing the Department’s latent policy and technical expertise use inductive reasoning. Lacking a thread at the start, they consult with a coach to find the person or office they need to begin the process of asking the right questions… As the forefather of cybernetics Norbert Wiener would say, “Whether we entrust our decisions to machines of metal, or to those machines of flesh and blood which are bureaus, and vast laboratories and armies and corporations, we shall never receive the right answers to our questions unless we ask the right questions.”4 This can be problematic, depending on one’s perspective.

From a pathological perspective, part of the job of a policy advisor is to be aware of barracudas looking for data points contrary to the department’s narrative or strategy. As the saying goes in Washington: “If you are not at the table, then you may be on the menu.” There is a lot on the surface in terms of hierarchy and process in government, but at the end of the day, the city is not so big and the varying sectors of administration are not either. The President can only distribute approximately 3,200 of his party’s Schedule-C appointees. They will help execute the President’s vision with the remainder of the federal government’s civilans, of which there are just over two and half million worldwide. Therefore, the political operators are easy to
spot. That is because personal relationships matter, as does the political organization of the country. It can be hard to resist a call from the many halls of power coursing about. One’s reputation as a collaborator may be on the line. The system rewards its survivors and eventually grows to revere them.

From an ecological perspective, one only needs to look at how the law has shaped government organization charts. As they have been for centuries, these laws and charts are transparent to the public and the press. Their purpose is in clear view, and there are means to amend them, if not at a rapid pace. Today, one can use the internet to look up the positions and pay grades of every appointee and civil servant working for the federal government, call almost any office, or can go as far as to petition the White House for his or her individual, highly-tailored cause.

Through the Freedom of Information Act and statutory requirements (such as Circular A-11 from the Office of Management and Budget), every executive department and agency must publish an annual or semi-annual strategy and a report that determines funding levels for the next years. Even the President must clearly articulate his cross-agency priority goals for the Executive Office of the President. In addition, the President must show where congressionally-allotted funding is being spent and report on its performance. Few, if any, governments in the world are as transparent. This transparency only serves to prove that our country’s governance of power comes from its citizenry, as accounting is the essence of legitimate, democratic rule.

Since there are many subtexts at play in this realm, one would be sensible to point out that a political discussion is unbecoming of a commissioned officer. While it would be imprudent to ask appointees or elected officials to explain their actions or motivations regarding a specific activity or effort, it is not hard to figure out after a few months’ worth of exposure to their culture. Commissioned officers, especially field grade ones, must learn to differentiate between “capital-P” Politics that consist of endlessly repeated gaffes and politics as the system that enlivens the nation’s and the free world’s government.

The following points are essential to understanding how to divine a strategy from politics in the President’s Cabinet, particularly at the sub-interagency policy committee level.

The sub-interagency policy committee level is where the vast majority of Army officers and strategists will interface with civil control of the military. Of the many organs of the Executive Office of the President, they will find themselves primarily within the National Security Council’s structure. One may ask why the strategist should care about power at the highest levels of the government, as the strategist is only supposed to turn ideas into orders. The answer is plain: policy limits strategy with constraints and restraints. This scoping is a very good thing for the strategist and can be a great thing if there is room for dialogue. In short, a strategist had better know that politics is the name of the organ that decides what would be politically acceptable in terms of expending capital to accelerate or defend a narrative.

As the saying goes in Washington: “If you are not at the table, then you may be on the menu.”

For example, the administration may ask a question from the Executive Office of the President to build political momentum toward a certain goal. This could be to drive public perception, to answer a statutory requirement, or to advance an ideological conversation. These are just a few reasons why; the question of how one flow of power streams through this country is beyond any one explanation. However,
the manifestations can become concrete. In terms of the Department of Commerce, these manifestations may come via the National Security Council, the National Economic Council, or the Council on Environmental Quality, from the executives themselves, or even from other branches of government. With so many mechanisms generating movement throughout the Washington, it is dizzying and difficult to stay focused.

Some Manifestations

Depending on which office of the Department of Commerce is calling for information, recommendations, actions, decisions, or above all, appropriations necessitate different responses. Military minds may read this as parochialism, but politicos would call this a “narrative,” the essential currency of modern politics in America. The next time someone asks the Department of Commerce what it is doing in a particular area, these immediate actions become the core narrative. There are flourishes on any given narrative, stemming from a simple line of inquiry. For example, if certain named agencies and departments are “at the table” in a sub-interagency policy committee, what started out as an effort to boost aid to the heavy machinery sector can become critical to U.S. export and cyber security. The administration will start to see threats against exports using “big data” and will want to protect this data with a cyber-electromagnetic safeguard. Different combinations of agencies or departments would have resulted in different narratives. Policy has defined the parameters and grammar of the conversations.

In terms of common interest between the U.S. Army and the Department of Commerce, there are literally thousands of potential narratives. U.S. Code decrees:

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of:

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
(2) supporting the national policies;
(3) implementing the national objectives; and
(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.\(^7\)

The law in this case is purposefully broad. Just as many joint and service chiefs have said in the past—the military can do anything its asked. A few short years ago, during the base realignment and closure process, the Department of Defense’s Office of Economic Adjustment worked closely with program managers from the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration to help ease economic depression from base closings across the country. This indubitably helped allay fears for dozens of communities and garrisons.

In other areas, such as advanced or industrial manufacturing, the Departments share supply-chain, risk-management techniques, which could be institutionalized in the future. In this vein, in March 2015, the White House announced a supply-chain initiative to help combat fragility and vulnerabilities across a myriad of different national security and economic manufacturing interests. Considering it takes at least decade to launch a major military platform, this is good

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news for the Army and even better news for the Air Force and Navy, where development of aircraft and ships can take a generation or two. The V-22 Osprey is a perfect example of the evolution of a complex and intricate supply chain over time: its production plants in Pennsylvania and Texas certainly had federal grant money available, if not applied in total. As in theme with federal distribution, accessible money is only a narrative away—one that is sorely lacking for the Army’s Future Combat Systems. There are countless areas of common interest between the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce.

**Practicing Strategy in this Context**

These departments can learn much from each other in terms of culture and process, as well through the practice of strategizing and the subsequent creation and implementation of strategies. Strategy in this context would be knitting together the multiple entities from the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense around a narrative. The most effective way to accomplish this knitting is through the simple construct of boards, centers, cells, and working groups (BCCWG). Often overlooked in Army academic settings, the BCCWG step of the military decision-making process is arguably the most important aspect of the orders briefing. It answers the question of how the headquarters will implement the order and how it will manage and lead people through activities. Usually, the staff displays the BCCWG schedule on a slide as “battle rhythm” before the “Guidance?” slide in an orders briefing. The commander and staff have hit diminishing returns in terms of the ability to process new information or make decisions. The journeyman strategist knows this and knows that the orders briefing template in doctrine allows for re-ordering if information that is more important warrants it. The journeyman strategist also knows that when bringing doctrine to a non-military environment, one brings the sentiment and the footnotes, not the exact language or the book itself.

Beyond process sharing, there are many opportunities for collaboration and partnership between the Departments of Defense and Commerce. The main friction here is that the federal government will do little to address a problem until it must be addressed. From a pathological perspective, this reads as stodgy inaction. From an ecological perspective, this reads as a conservation of resources. In fact, the military would call it “economy of force,” which happens to be a principle of war. So therein lies the rub for many interagency efforts: it is hard to justify unfunded requirements, especially with the Office of Management and Budget strategic vision and performance management models in effect. In a way, a given department or agency’s past successes reinforce the next year’s strategy. While the Office of Management and Budget has proven effective to the nation’s Congress and therefore its citizenry, no organization is ever fit for purpose. Its designers work in a static environment and the world, especially at the political level, is ever dynamic.

**Now and in the Future**

If we continue to design organizations cyclically with budget lines, we lose the ability to adapt quickly. Whether or not the government is better off being less reactive and oh so deliberative is an argument for a different forum. One would be wise to remember that if the nation really needed something addressed, the President could use executive authority to
address it. The U.S. does pretty well during terms of national crises, especially in comparison to other countries around the world.

The government is certainly capable of action on many fronts. One issue on the horizon is that of disaster response: the citizenry has increasing expectations from the federal government in this area. Since the disaster space and particularly resilience is so broad, there are many opportunities to harness Defense Department capabilities with those of the Department of Commerce and by extension, the National Security Council. Of course, this would be in concert with the Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, and Interior to name just a few. The list can get even more expansive, again depending on the narrative.

On that note, the definition of force generation is in a constant wrestling match with etymology, although most military theorists have settled that it is different from force employment. In modern times, that distinction is increasingly blurry: we go to war with the military we have. This begs the question of how far down the roots of force generation grow? Is it an activity that is, ultimately, reliant on a robust and resilient economic base that supports a large standing force, or is it better measured by the energy potential of a given economic system? At the less philosophical level, will global dynamics allow for a warming-up period prior to the start of a conflict or must capability development hinge on rapid deployment? Up until this point, the U.S. government has been able to generally influence global security where and when it wants. The strategist should be wary that this kind of freedom is not a given, and the narratives of boundless reach likely accumulated via civil-military dialogue in all past cases. In a way, the nation has deployed force where it could and not where it should.

Regardless, there is a tie between economic and national security, and the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce certainly have many areas of common interest, now and in the future. What they both lack is the capability to navigate each other’s bureaucracies and cultures, and sadly the strategists that can do this—those who have matured past journeyman status—are in short supply. To that end, there are a smattering of politicos, civil servants, officers, and strategists that “get it,” and “getting it” requires diverse experiences on top of the training and education efforts that the military is already addressing. Other government institutions do not have the institutional float to afford it, so it is natural that the military would lead the effort. Also, consider what Dr. Tami Biddle at the Army War College recently asked, “Does the Army owe the nation some degree of readiness to do messy jobs it would rather avoid but might be ordered to do?” Most officers and especially strategists would resoundingly answer in the affirmative, because a lot of them have been there when the military missed something. It does not happen all that often, but when it does, it is hard to forget. A good strategy and, by extension, good strategizing is an armor against bad assumptions.

Strategizing is not the sole purview of the Defense Department, it can and does happen at many levels and throughout many sectors, and not just in government work—our bustling economy proves that. The nation has many strategists. The U.S. government can help shape getting these people into a room in a crisis, but can do little other than sponsor small-scale programs like fellowships that will one day grow strategic masters. These programs build einheit at the institutional level, which is priceless in building a governmental “no wrong door” approach to national prosperity. It is the absolute best that the military can manage in the current system, which has proven to be—in context—pretty well suited to the global environment, despite what capital-P Politics may contest, particularly in an election year. IAJ
NOTES


One Day
One Action
One Goal

by Zurab Elzarov

Background

A wise man said that all great things start from small beginnings. Global partnership for effective cooperation can only be achieved when all actors at the grass-roots level share common goals and take united action on a daily basis.

Zam Zam Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Darfur provides shelter to more than 100,000 people. While the number of IDPs continued to grow rapidly due to violent clashes in various parts of Darfur, the camp had only four medical clinics run by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and supported by the World Health Organization and the North Darfur State Ministry of Health.

A fire incident destroyed one of the clinics that had been operating since 2007, providing infant care, improving maternal health, and offering pregnancy follow-up. The destruction of the clinic created a large gap in the provision of medical care to IDPs. Therefore, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was requested to provide temporary accommodation for medical personnel in order to enable IDPs to receive uninterrupted health services until the construction of a new clinic. The situation demanded an urgent intervention to bridge the humanitarian gap affecting health conditions of vulnerable displaced persons.

The project represented a successful model of collaboration among UNAMID, United Nations (UN) agencies, the government, and the local NGOs in bridging a critical humanitarian gap in a rapid, collaborative, and cost-effective manner through construction of a new emergency health clinic at Zam Zam IDP camp in Darfur.

Zurab Elzarov has been working with the United Nations over the past 19 years to promote post-conflict stabilization, recovery, and peacebuilding in post-conflict areas in Eastern Europe and Africa. Currently serving with the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, Mr. Elzarov provides leadership in coordinating the Mission’s activities for protection of civilians, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the conflict-affected population in Darfur.
**Interagency Cooperation in Project Implementation**

UNAMID, the Government of Sudan, the UN, and national humanitarian partners adopted a participatory approach to the project implementation. A UNAMID project team provided leadership in coordinating the project implementation among different stakeholders, including the Mission Support Division, UN agencies, civil society organizations, and the line ministries of the Government of Sudan.

Upon receiving a request, a UNAMID Humanitarian and Recovery Assistance Unit in North Darfur state, under the overall guidance of the Head of Office, started consultations with relevant Mission components (Sector North Senior Administrative Officer and the Mission Support Centre), humanitarian partners (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Health Organization [WHO], United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], Humanitarian Aid and Development Organization [HAD], and Sudanese line ministries (State Ministry of Health)).

UNAMID verified the fire incident and assessed the present conditions and needs on the ground. Based on this assessment, it was agreed that the provision of two tents by UNAMID to temporarily accommodate the clinic would be the most effective solution to the situation until humanitarian partners could secure funding for building a new clinic. The initial idea to develop a quick impact project was abandoned due to the urgency of the request and time.

A second technical site assessment visit to the camp was organized with participation from the UNAMID Engineering Section. Engineers assessed the ground and selected the most appropriate place to install the tents. A UNAMID project team invited all relevant partners to discuss the results of the assessments. Project partners were asked to agree on project implementation modalities, timeframes, contributions of each partner, coordination mechanisms, and the division of roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder.

Following the official approval of the project, UNAMID allocated, transported to the site, and erected two tents. In its turn, the State Ministry of Health deployed medical personnel. WHO supplied medicines and equipment, and HAD provided furniture and took over the overall management of the new clinic.

The success factors of this medium-scale project (but with significant and rapid humanitarian impact) are cost-effectiveness and teamwork. In fact, the Mission did not spend any funds from the budget, but rather utilized the available resources to provide timely and effective humanitarian response to the people of concern.

The provision of two tents from available assets not being used served as an effective way to bridge an emergency humanitarian gap that affected the health conditions of the displaced population.

In addition, by working together, UNAMID, UN agencies, the government, and NGOs have had larger impact in the most cost-effective way by complementing each other’s activities...

...by working together, UNAMID, UN agencies, the government, and NGOs have had larger impact in the most cost-effective way by complementing each other’s activities...
of the project, and maximized the collective input. The participation of local partners from the outset was essential to ensure the national ownership and sustainability of the project.

The project constituted a swift and efficient response to urgent humanitarian needs of IDPs. The impact of the fire incident was alleviated, and the provision of health services to the IDP camp residents went on uninterrupted. The new clinic currently serves up to 3,000 patients per month. One tent is now being used as a clinic for daily consultations and patient treatment, while arrangements are being made to use the second tent to provide pregnancy consultations, labor and delivery, and other essential health services.

Many IDPs, as well as local doctors and nurses working in the clinic, expressed their satisfaction with the project. According to Alawiya H., a camp resident and a young mother displaced from Tarni, she has been relying on the clinic, which is a 20-minute walk from her shelter in Zam Zam. She added that she was happy that her baby would now receive adequate medical care.

This small-scale, cost-effective, and cast-to-the-need project increased trust and fostered UNAMID relationship with the local and international stakeholders (State Ministry of Health, WHO, and the local NGO). In addition, it had a significant impact on the local community (displaced population) and contributed to a better UNAMID perception by the authorities and the IDPs. The innovative approach bypassed the lengthy procedures required for approving and implementing a quick impact project and provided a timely response to an emergency situation.

Conclusion

Several important recommendations could be made based on the success and the lessons learned from the project. At the UNAMID level, containers, tents, or other similar assets that are available but not used could be effectively utilized for emergency humanitarian purposes in a swift and cost-effective manner. An interagency approach involving regional government agencies, international aid organizations, and NGOs should be adopted systematically to maximize the collective impact on the humanitarian situation in Darfur. Taking into account the significant humanitarian gaps and needs in Darfur vis-à-vis the limited funding, a recommendation was made to continue devising innovative solutions to improve the humanitarian situation in the region.

At the global level, the successful experience of UNAMID in implementing joint interagency humanitarian projects could be replicated by other UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) field missions operating in similar context. In addition, DPKO field missions should be encouraged to participate, as much as possible, in similar joint and collaborative projects with relevant actors. Doing so provides an immediate response to a humanitarian emergency situation, strengthens international and national cooperation at the grass-roots level, and serves to foster trust building with the local communities. IAJ
Cognitive Dissonance and Religion in Military Stability Operations

by William B. Scott

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God...I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature would "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.

—Thomas Jefferson

The United States of America is a Christian nation...The less we emphasize the Christian religion, the further we fall into the abyss of poor character and chaos in the United States of America.

—Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice

Introduction

Cognitive dissonance is a psychological theory about how the mind resolves conflicting beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors held simultaneously. For many Americans, it is important to “emphasize the Christian religion,” while maintaining a “separation between Church and State.” Although the two statements above would seem to conflict, many Americans preserve these understandings of the nation by rejecting the inconsistency and convincing themselves that no conflict really exists. In military stability operations, cognitive dissonance toward religion can skew policymakers’ perceptions, when they need to remain objectively neutral.

The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States decrees: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

Major William B. Scott is East Africa Region Desk Officer in the Security Cooperation Division for United States Army, Africa. He is a recent graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and attained a B.S. from New Mexico State University and a M.A. from Vanderbilt University. During his career, he had two operational deployments to Iraq as a Military Intelligence Officer.
The Establishment Clause refers to the phrase “no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” of this amendment. This clause means that Congress or any government body, such as the military, cannot institute a national religion or prefer one religion over another. The intent of this article is to highlight the importance of acknowledging widespread Christianity in all aspects of life due to its effects on military stability operations. The time-honored wisdom from Sun-Tzu is still valid in the modern world:

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.\(^4\)

Cognitive Dissonance

In 1957, Leon Festinger developed the Cognitive Dissonance Theory. He proposed that people seek to maintain a cognitive consistency in any situation, including situations with conflicting beliefs and attitudes. When two or more of such beliefs and attitudes clash, it creates a state of tension and can cause irrational and sometimes maladaptive behavior.\(^5\)

The knowledge that religion plays a key role in stability operations existed in the Chaplain Corps for years. In 1998, Chaplain Timothy Demy wrote a thesis, “The Impact of Religious Belief in Military Operations Other Than War,” in which he states that “neglect, dismissal, or confusion about religion can be extremely detrimental to the legitimacy of the operation.”\(^6\)

While this knowledge has been around for some time, most Americans, tend to deal with the issues connected to religious diversity by simply not acknowledging the problem.\(^7\) Although U.S. military doctrine acknowledges religion as a factor to consider, its importance is highly underemphasized. Although it has been argued that religion affects political, military, economic, and social issues,\(^8\) religion is not discussed well in Army doctrine. Current Army doctrine reference publications state that “religion is often a central defining characteristic in some forms of government and cannot be discounted by external actors,”\(^9\) but it does not provide further guidance on religion.

For the U.S. to be the beacon of religious freedom, it needs a consistent policy as viewed by the world in general toward religion. Cognitive dissonance is also a force to change and grow when the roots of the inconsistencies are acknowledged and a conscientious decision is made to change personal beliefs and attitudes, but only after the discrepancy in attitude and behavior is confronted.\(^10\) In stability operations, religion should be one of the first considerations to define the operational environment of the host nation. Other considerations should include the attitude of the U.S. in general, as well as the personal religious beliefs of the policymakers. Once officials confront the religious actors, they will better apply cultural awareness of religious

Although U.S. military doctrine acknowledges religion as a factor to consider, its importance is highly underemphasized

If applied to military stability operations, one could surmise that ignoring the driving religious factors in the U.S. military ensures failure in stability operations in other regions with strong religious cultures.

A stability operation in a foreign land is often a delicate art. Religion is an important cultural factor during stability operations on both sides, as the outside world may perceive the U.S. to have religious motivations, and ignorance of the religious motivators involved will often result in defeat.

Cognitive Dissonance

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minorities throughout the world to include inside the U.S.

Veneer of the “Sacred Canopy”

A “sacred canopy” is a term coined by sociologist Peter Berger. A “sacred canopy” exists when the myths, traditions, and convictions of a religion envelop a society and form a pluralistic environment in which the constructed nature is tacit and concealed.11 Approximately three-quarters of Americans are Christians.12 Some Americans would point to this fact as evidence of the nation’s strength of moral leadership and righteous actions, while others would deny the influence that Christianity holds over the government. But when a nation ratifies laws and regulations with bases that are solely the myths, traditions, and convictions of a religion, they fortify the sacred canopy.

Blue laws, which restrict public behavior and commercial sales on Sunday, originated as religious measures to encourage church attendance. Despite the religious origins and intent of these laws, many states continue to enact and enforce them,13 while the courts provide secular justification rather than declaring them unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.14

The military relationship to Christianity is no different. As noted by the Officers’ Christian Fellowship: “Christian officers actually have an advantage in achieving the best results” because basic concepts of leadership align with the Christian faith.15 Additionally, during combat deployments and initial entry training, alcoholic beverages are contraband items and consumption is against General Orders; a common exception, however, is a small draught of red wine that service members may take during communion worship services. The Christian religion continues to dominate the social and moral fiber of the U.S. to include the military.

The sacred canopy of the Christian religion envelops many social fibers of America and the military, and it is sometimes difficult to differentiate the religious-based customs in a foreign culture. In order to properly navigate social issues, policymakers, therefore, need to reflect on their own culture and religion when constructing strategies to be implemented in an idiosyncratic foreign environment.

Religious Ethics in Stability Operations

Most international issues concerning religion focus on terrorist acts and the resulting military responses, with little focus on diplomacy influenced by religious convictions protected by the sacred canopy in regards to stability operations. Many military commanders, however, will find themselves in the midst of various religious challenges while conducting stability operations. Commanders must ensure they do not create an appearance of favoring a particular religion while engaging the local nation’s senior military leadership, government officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organization officials, and national religious officials.16 This is especially the case where many NGOs and local host nations put a religious spin on every aspect of life.

Religious fundamentalism is characterized by the certainty that one has access to the absolute truth. This belief leads to prejudice against other religions and members of any other religion, and while there is much research between the internal relationships of religion and domestic social issues, there is relatively little analyses devoted to comparable international issues.17

Often stability operations are rooted in faith-
based advocacy networks pushing Congress for human rights initiatives, especially in locations that oppress Judeo-Christian beliefs. Since “morality” usually emerges as the justification for advocating such policies, many advocates believe in a “higher calling” and resist leadership that deviates from the religious standards. An unfortunate side effect is the significant social impact that zealous believers and advocates have because of their need to purge sin from their lives and the world in general, heedless of the fact that those actions may restrict the civil liberties of minority groups.

Religiously righteous sentiments do not exist solely at the policymaking levels of government, they exist at the tactical levels of the military as well. Some service members have been told by chaplains and the chain of command that their fight is “a religious one against the Muslims and their false, evil, and violent religion.” Although officially unsupported, this behavior continues to thrive because the American ideologies of business leadership and military command are founded in a Christian value structure, including but not limited to the Ten Commandments. For many Americans, the personal interpretation of the “will of God” is powerful in influencing views of moral and social issues, which is stronger than General Orders and an open, interfaith policy to all religions that is enforced with mediocrity.

Unfortunately, the social significance of America’s beliefs and attitudes toward Christianity’s relationship to other religions is often overlooked. Just as a sacred canopy of Christianity exists in America and the U.S. military, a sacred canopy of Islam exists in Muslim nations. While in the U.S. there is a concept of the separation of Church and State, Islamic nations practice Sharia law, where religion is integrated and embedded in politics and other parts of society and culture. Thus, officials and citizens of Islamic nations view many aspects of political activity through a religious lens.

Often missing from considerations during stability operations is the impact religious humanitarian organizations have when engaging marginalized demographics. These organizations do not operate with religiously sterile attitudes. They are populated with donors and individuals who initiate programs, host discussions, sponsor classes, support missionaries, teach people to sing, promote volunteering, and many other things. Many represent religious priorities that vary among congregations, often overlooked by military and national policymakers. Any military operation in support of a movement supported by such religious organizations shows support of the religion and by extension can easily be perceived as supported by America as a whole.

Military commanders can find themselves in a tug-o-war regarding religious politics. Due to the integrated nature of Sharia law in Islamic cultures, a coalition task force in Afghanistan found that the “Muslim Chaplain was particularly helpful in connecting with the Muslim community both among contractors of Muslim countries and Local Nationals.” A chaplain’s understanding of the two nations’ sacred canopies allowed him to bridge operations in more ways than expected. Influence from politicians with religious-centric agendas and the personal beliefs of many commanders make it difficult to examine religion objectively with professional detachment, but understanding how the host nation’s sacred canopy interacts with the American sacred canopy is critically important.
in stability operations.

**Integrating Other Religions**

Commanders and policymakers with an unwitting conviction to a sacred canopy fail to address religion’s possible negative influence on military stability operations in operational environments saturated with a different and separate religious sacred canopy. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, some mosques were designated military areas; these religious structures were cordoned off by concertina wire with signs stating: “On order of the MNC-I commander, this location is off-limits to U.S. personnel.”

Ironically, strategic policymakers consider this as being culturally sensitive to the host nation, but what message does a cordon with sharp wire, as if in disdain, send? Although allowing *kafir*, non-believers, to defile it may have outraged fundamentalists, a stronger image would be to allow Islamic service members to care for the mosques, use them in reverence, and respect them the way the host nation intended. If an Iraqi partner expressed the idea that Americans should not enter the mosque, perhaps the official was under the impression that the U. S. is, in fact, a Christian nation, and there was no evidence to change that interpretation. A similar recommendation was raised by the Unit Ministry Team for Combined/Joint Task Force 101 in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom IX. Team members believed that “chaplains should assess the condition of mosques on their Forward Operating Bases and coordinate with Muslim Lay Leaders to keep them maintained and resourced.”

After operating in a Muslim country for eight years, service members of the Muslim faith received a recommendation from a religious support leader to maintain the mosques inside the camps.

The representation of different religions in the Chaplain Corps, however, is unmistakably skewed. As of 2013, most of the approximately 2,900 chaplains throughout all the services were Christian, with a few representing the Jewish religion. There were only five Islamic, one Buddhist, and one Hindu chaplain to represent all other faiths. This fact is often overlooked because a chaplain is supposed to provide spiritual and moral support to the troops regardless of religious affiliation and without proselytization, to protect the religious practice of the soldiers without inviting legal challenges under the Establishment Clause. The irony is that not all religions are represented within the Chaplain Corps. In an address regarding interfaith practice, President Barack Obama said:

...as we go forward, it’s going to take all of us, Christian and Jews, Hindu and Muslims, believer and non-believers to meet the challenges of the 21st century...while we might not all believe the same things, and we don’t have to, we can certainly agree that together we can make a difference... that the values that unite us as Americans are far more powerful than those that divide us.

This spirit is growing in the military as well. Since 2010, the military has become more religiously diverse, to include admitting bearded Sikhs in the Army through special waivers and recognizing Wiccans. There is great power in the diversity of the U.S., and all religions should be equally recognized in the nation’s fighting forces to leverage the full American might.

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Conclusion

United States policymakers have slowly but surely actively progressed forward in creating an open, interfaith environment for U.S. service members, but this does not change the fact that many perceptions continue to be skewed by the sacred canopy of Christianity that is commonplace in America. Although the government, including the military, would contend that an interfaith community is the correct course of action, the fault lies in how much of Christianity is taken for granted, and what is the perception of non-Christians observing the actions of the U.S. government.

The military can implement changes in doctrine to facilitate future success in operations. The Chaplain Corps can reflect the demographics of religious belief within the services as well as the predominate religion within the locations of important stability operations. Ethics training for all services members should include the knowledge of religious myths, traditions, and convictions taken for granted under the sacred canopy in the U.S., to include concepts of marriage, sin, and death. To ensure that an interfaith community exists in the military, all major installations should have Jewish synagogues, Muslim mosques, and, when possible, even Pagan groves and temples to other faiths such as Buddhism, Hindu, Sikh, etc. These changes would ensure a military dedicated to the understanding of all religions beyond a tacit acceptance of other religions.

Only by seriously considering the impact of the religious beliefs of both the enemy and friendly forces can commanders truly gain a full understanding of the operational environment needed to achieve success in stability operations. To accomplish this task, a deep understanding of the religious beliefs is mandatory along with an honest assessment of what impact religious beliefs have in American culture. This understanding will facilitate an open, interfaith community, but more importantly, it will assist the military in stability operations at locations that have historically been religiously tenuous.

NOTES


10 Festinger.


12 Multiple sources vary. The percentage of Christians in the U.S. range from as low as 70 percent to as high as 82 percent depending on the source.

13 As of December 2014, 12 states forbid the sale of alcohol on Sunday, while another 19 states permit county and/or local legislation to restrict the sale on Sunday.


19 Merino.


21 Brint and Abrutyn, pp. 328–350.

22 Merino.

23 Ibid.


25 Personal witness during a rotation in support to OIF.

26 Hensley. FOB is short for Forward Operating Base. They are temporary military encampments in forward deployed locations.


Compiled by Elizabeth Hill

Simons Center Director, Founding Officer and Trustee Retires

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Raymond D. Barrett, Jr., founding director of the CGSC Foundation’s Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation, has retired from his position after five years with the Center and 10 years total involvement in the CGSC Foundation. The CGSC Foundation board of trustees and staff, along with the Simons Center staff and advisory council, wish Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Barrett a fond farewell.

Barrett has been the guiding force for the Center since inception and has grown the reputation and reach of the Simons Center throughout the interagency partner community. Under his leadership the Simons Center has conducted important cybersecurity initiatives focusing on the interagency aspects of the problem. In addition, Barrett’s oversight of the Simons Center’s publications series have garnered the Center a great reputation as a major influence in helping build the body of knowledge in interagency operations, leadership and cooperation.

In his leadership role with the Simons Center, Barrett has been personally recognized as an interagency subject matter expert by the Department of State, the Diplomatic and Consular Officer Retired association, the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Foreign Service Institute.

See http://www.cgscfoundation.org/simons-center-director-retires/ for the full story and photos from Maj. Gen. Barrett’s time with the Foundation/Simons Center. IAJ

Dempsey Touts Whole-of-Government Cooperation

Before his recent retirement, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Martin E. Dempsey conducted an interview in which he discussed the importance of a whole-of-government approach to issues facing the U.S. and the world. Dempsey has repeatedly pushed for solutions integrating economic, diplomatic, law enforcement, energy, and military instruments of power during his tenure as chairman.

During the interview, Dempsey noted that people are beginning to understand the importance of the whole-of-government approach, saying that there is a greater understanding that conflicts have underlying issues that the military alone cannot address. In these instances, said Dempsey, “The phrase whole-of-government is not just desirable –it’s actually imperative.”

According to Dempsey, experiences in Iraq have helped shape the whole-of-government approach, as the mission in Iraq needed help from several different agencies, including the FBI and intelligence community, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the departments of State, Treasury, and Energy. Dempsey also spoke on the roles of diplomacy, economic advisors, and law enforcement. IAJ
USAID-NASA Partnership Bolsters Development

On Sept. 17, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials met in Washington, D.C. for a town hall on a joint USAID and NASA venture to improve environmental decision-making abilities for officials in developing countries. USAID Associate Administrator Eric Postel and NASA Administrator Charles Boldor were joined by two astronauts who had recently returned from the International Space Station – Terry Virts of NASA and Samantha Cristoforetti of the European Space Agency.

The officials and astronauts discussed the SERVIR program, which is a joint venture between the agencies that provides state-of-the-art, satellite-based Earth monitoring, imaging and mapping data, geospatial information, and other products to help manage challenges in the areas of food security, water resources, land use change, and natural disasters. (The name SERVIR is derived from a Spanish word meaning “to serve.”) SERVIR has already began activities in more than 30 countries, developed over 40 custom tools, collaborated with over 200 institutions, and trained more than 1,800 individuals, improving the capacity to develop local solutions.

Dan Irwin, Director of the NASA SERVIR Coordination Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, spoke of the USAID-NASA partnership in a panel discussion, saying the two agencies joined together to work on SERVIR because of “the unbelievable synergies that we could develop as two very different but complementary agencies.” He went on to say that “As NASA develops new Earth-observing capabilities and USAID advances food security and other related issues, we’re really bringing to bear the best assets of both agencies.”

FEMA Collaboration Reviewed by GAO

In early September the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report assessing the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) disaster logistics efforts with interagency partners. GAO examined FEMA’s ability to deliver goods to disaster survivors, focusing on how well FEMA collaborated with federal partners and with state and local stakeholders.

GAO found that FEMA has taken actions described in the National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function #7 Logistics Annex, to work with its federal partners in a manner that reflects leading practices for interagency collaboration. GAO also found that FEMA has taken similar steps to collaborate with state and local stakeholders.

However, GAO noted that FEMA “could employ effective program management practices to strengthen the implementation of its Logistics Capability Assessment Tool (LCAT),” which is designed to help state, local, and tribal officials identify strengths and weaknesses and improve logistics processes and procedures using a standardized approach and measurement criteria.

GAO recommends that FEMA identify the resources needed to implement the LCAT, and establish and use goals, milestones and performance measures to report on the LCAT program implementation. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with the recommendations.
DoD to Set Up New Center for Interagency Information Sharing

The Department of Defense announced in September that it will establish a new center to promote information sharing on space operations between the military and intelligence community. The Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) will involve the U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and the intelligence community, and will ensure data fusion among DoD, intelligence community, interagency, allied, and commercial space entities.

The new center will have the capability to develop, test, validate, and integrate new space system tactics, techniques, and procedures in support of both DoD and intelligence community space operations, and will improve the nation’s ability to protect and defend critical national space infrastructure in an increasingly contested space environment.

DoD expects to begin operational experimentation and testing for JICSpOC in October. Completion of the initial experiments is expected by January 2017. Initial funding for the JICSpOC was provided by DoD and intelligence community stakeholders, and future budgets have yet to be decided.

JICSpOC will be located at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colo.

FEMA Reports on Progress After Katrina

This August marked the tenth anniversary of the catastrophic 2005 Atlantic hurricane season that devastated the gulf coast region. On Aug. 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall, followed shortly by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma in September and October. Ten years into the recovery and rebuilding efforts, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has outlined the progress made supporting communities and families affected by Hurricane Katrina.

In the years following Katrina, FEMA has significantly improved its ability to assist communities in responding to and recovering from disasters. This progress is bolstered by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, which gave FEMA clear guidance on its mission and priorities. The Act also provided the legislative authorities needed to better partner with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments before, during, and after disasters. Other improvements include:

- improved ability to provide support to states and tribes ahead of a disaster;
- development of a National Disaster Recovery Framework;
- establishment of incident management assistance teams;
- improved search and rescue capability;
- establish the regional emergency communications coordination working groups;
- enhanced partnerships with the private sector; and
- support for the inclusion of people with access and functional needs.

FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate spoke proudly of FEMA’s progress, saying “Today, FEMA has the authority necessary to lean forward and leverage the entire emergency management team in response and recovery efforts… This team includes not only government but also the private sector, non-profits, and citizens themselves. We support survivors and this holistic approach emphasizes the importance of working as a team to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.”
DHS Secretary Praises New NCCIC Leadership

In early August, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson announced leadership changes at the Department’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). The NCCIC is the U.S. government’s 24/7 hub for cybersecurity information sharing, incident response, and coordination, and has been without permanent leadership for nearly a year.

Dr. Andy Ozment, Assistant Secretary of the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, will assume overall and direct responsibility for the NCCIC, while Mr. John Felker, former Director of Cyber and Intelligence Strategy for HP Enterprise Services, will run day-to-day operations. “Dr. Ozment and Mr. Felker will provide a combination of operational experience, leadership, and strategic insight needed to take the NCCIC to the next level for our cybersecurity,” said Johnson in a statement.

The NCCIC analyzes private sector cyber threat information, and issues warnings to both government organizations and private companies. It is expected that the volume of data the NCCIC processes from the private sector will increase in the near future. IAJ

GAO Reviews State Bureau Collaboration

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in July that assessed interagency collaboration between the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism and other government entities. GAO’s report evaluates progress made by the Bureau to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination since it was elevated to bureau status in 2012.

During their review, GAO looked at coordination on two Bureau programs, Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Finance. The reviewers looked for key practices of effective collaboration, such as efforts to define outcomes and accountability, bridge organizational cultures, and establish written guidance and agreements, and found the Bureau was generally in line with key collaboration practices.

GAO found that the Bureau generally has laid out the intended outcomes of coordination efforts in interagency agreements, and that both the Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Finance programs included interagency cooperation in planning and executing initiatives.

The report also examined the Bureau’s staffing and performance. IAJ

State Releases 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report

This July the State Department released the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report. This is the 15th year the report has been published, and it is also the 15th anniversary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.

On July 27, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewell spoke at the roll out for the report, saying the report is “widely regarded as the gold standard for anti-trafficking information.” According to Sewell, “Not only do foreign governments look to its recommendations on how to improve, civil society relies on these pages to guide their efforts as well.”

The trafficking in persons reports examine how well governments, including the U.S. government, respond to human trafficking, and the 2015 report “places a special emphasis on
Whole-of-Government Needed to Counter ISIL

In July, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Honorable Christine E. Wormuth spoke at the Center for Strategic & International Studies on the need for whole-of-government collaboration to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

In her remarks, Wormuth stressed that combating ISIL is not strictly a military issue. Instead, Wormuth stated that “we won’t have a lasting defeat of ISIL unless we leverage all different parts of the U.S. government and coalition governments.” This whole-of-government and international effort would include countering ISIL’s financing, defeating its messaging, and stopping the flow of foreign fighters.

Wormuth also provided an update on the Defense Department’s efforts against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and answered questions from the audience.
Gordon and Murray have pulled together a number of prominent scholars and practitioners of U.S. statecraft and public diplomacy to address the causes and effects of the increasing role the U.S. military is playing in what traditionally has been the domain of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The authors assert that the Department of Defense (DoD), with its massive size and budget, has evolved into the default organization for executing noncore missions. It is precipitously providing military advice on political matters and is notably influencing foreign policy and national security strategy. The U.S. seeks to assist 150 weak and failing states with their militaries, through training, professionalizing, and mentoring them in an effort to build partnership capacity to prevent future conflict. This mounting tendency began with the Cold War and has since accelerated during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gordon and Murray further believe that this evolution will persist for the foreseeable future since the U.S. has now prioritized security over governance and development activities.

The imbalance between State and Defense is readily apparent in a number of striking ways. Most western countries have parity between military and diplomatic spending, whereas in the U.S. DoD has a budget twelve times the size of its diplomatic and aid agency counterparts. Personnel ratios are even worse. The DoD has over 100 personnel for every person working within the State Department, and 600 deployed personnel for every 25 deployed from State and for every person deployed from USAID. Over the last 10 years the military has also experienced a surge in development assistance funding, a budget now comparable to that of State and USAID combined.

Whereas, there is a statutory requirement going back 30 years for the military to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review to assess strategies, programs, and resources in meeting the national security strategy, the State Department and USAID initiated their first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review in 2010 on their own initiative. State and USAID have evolved into too many specialized departments, bureaus, agencies and offices for effective coordination. They collectively lack a common voice, vision, and set of priorities. This incoherence has led to poor funding of State and USAID programs by Congress. USAID’s budget and personnel numbers have continued to shrink since the Cold War. With personnel shortages, USAID has been relegated to glorified contract managers of non-governmental organizations and private sector companies who now carry out much
of their mandated functions—that which is not done by the military.

In sharp contrast, the DoD has developed a huge advantage in resources and planning capacity, and it speaks with one voice. It is organized, determined, and ready to execute. Another plus for the military is that it inherently produces more tangible results that play well with Congress in justifying its budget. The military has even another fundamental advantage over the State Department with Congress. Foreign policy does not resonate well with voters as much as defense does. Congress is more than happy to accommodate DoD, and along the way, protect their districts defense industry and military installations for economic reasons.

Further addressed in the book is the growing concern that Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) operating within the unified command plan are increasingly treading on the political authority of in-country ambassadors. Through its GCCs, the military has evolved into a separate foreign affairs organization, parallel with the State Department and embassies. This perception is fueled by the simple fact GCCs have a large number of personnel at their disposal, along with the funding and equipment to execute U.S. foreign policy/diplomacy through military means, an option increasingly favored by Congress but not the military.

The book is laid out into three broad categories: 1. The Institutional and Political Context; 2. Observing the Militarization Trend; and 3. Implications of Militarization. Within these comprehensive topical areas are individually authored, interwoven chapters. The breadth and depth of each contribution is purposeful and noteworthy in richness and relevance. The contributing authors’ historical perspective and descriptions of the evolution of events that have led to the current situation are striking. Much of their work is clearly quantified through plainly illustrated tables, charts, and figures. Their collective argument is compelling, telling, and thought-provoking. The scholarly research and professional experience depicted resonates throughout the book. Finally, the authors collectively reinforce the book’s thesis, and draw well-supported conclusions and make sound recommendations.

Some of the more salient outcomes and points depicted are as follows. The military is not well-suited to serve effectively in the diplomacy realm. It lacks appropriate expertise and is facing force reductions and budgetary pressures that will challenge its ability to meet core missions let alone noncore missions going forward. Congress has to rebalance the budgets of the State Department, USAID, and DoD. The military has recognized the need for rebalancing between defense, diplomacy, and development and has even asked for increases in State and USAID personnel numbers and funding. The Department of State needs stronger leadership, a unified position, and well-articulated objectives in order to effectively battle for its relevance to Congress. If it fails to do so, the authors contend, its capabilities and significance will continue to erode. Unfortunately, real change may only come in the form of system shock from an outside source or event. If so, the rebalancing may prove difficult to address effectively without significant adverse fallout.

This book is a must-read for political science, public policy, diplomacy, and international security/affairs professionals and scholars, those involved in state-building, government policy makers, and senior military professionals. Anyone else interested in learning about the importance of having a well-balanced and interconnected defense, development, and diplomatic structural apparatus to executing foreign policy and national security strategy in achieving strategic objectives will also find this book an informative read. IAJ