



The Simons Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

InterAgency Journal

Through the Looking Glass: The Reflectionism Theory of International Relations

Terron Wharton

The Impact of Worldviews on Training and Education in Iraq and Afghanistan

Ted A. Thomas and Seth George

“Out of Sync”—U.S. Africa Command and Recent Interagency Challenges

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West Africa: A “Ticking Time Bomb” or an Opportunity to Advance U.S. National Security Interests?

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Is the United States Ready for a Deadly Airborne Disease Outbreak?

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Ethics Committee Model for Humanitarian Operations Planning

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The Ethics of Espionage and Covert Action: The CIA’s Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program as a Case Study

John G. Breen

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From the Editor-in-Chief

The summer edition of the *IAJ* offers a variety of topics for readers. We begin with Terron Wharton asserting that the stalwart theories of international relations, Realism and Liberalism, fall short in predicting how States will behave. He proposes a Reflectionism Theory that postulates that a State's image is derived from its response to an anarchic system and that a State's image is the combination of tangible and intangible factors, influenced by culture, that determine how it sees itself and desires to see the international system. It is therefore, this image that drives a State's interests and behavior. If you can define the image, he believes that you can reasonably predict a State's behavior.

While most of us have come to understand that culture matters in international relations, we sometimes are unsure how to incorporate that knowledge when attempting to assist international partner security organizations. In our second article Ted Thomas and Seth George remind us that we cannot overlook the criticality of inspirational teaching when we are working with international partners.

AFRICOM – the model of interagency “all-of-government” cooperation, right? Maybe in its original conception and architecture. In our first of two articles on interagency cooperation on the African continent, William Denn, J.J. Williams, and Devanie Johnson discuss the interagency shortfalls and challenges AFRICOM continues to face. They conclude that the command has been a successful laboratory for interagency integration and that despite being often “out of synch,” AFRICOM has demonstrated that it is an adaptable organization that continues to meet challenges of the continent. Our second article regarding Africa, by Raymond Everhart, John Morris, and Mohamadou Amar, takes a different view and argues that in the West African region our response has not been adequate and we need a new approach.

In our fifth article Conrad Wilmoski and Meghan Muller argue that the United States should stand up and maintain the capability to address infectious disease outbreaks to include specialized air transport capability. They offer a good discussion on some of what happened during the recent Ebola outbreak.

Can you translate a clinical model to apply to real world humanitarian operations? Philip Ginder uses his expertise from the medical field to postulate that the principles of biomedical ethics can be translated into a framework that our government could use to determine how we might best address a humanitarian or disaster relief situation. He makes an interesting case. Particularly if you believe that before we commit our precious national resources to “help,” there should be a careful examination of the impact and benefits to all parties.

We conclude with an article on a subject that I find fascinating. Should we have a “Just Theory of Espionage?” John Breen asks this question. Logical and moral thinking might well lead one to believe that there should be. But what defines the parameters? Do the ends justify the means? Where does the threat cross over from probable to existing to existential? Add the topics of rendition, detention, and interrogation and the discussion of such a theory becomes intriguing.

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Through the Looking Glass: The Reflectionism Theory of International Relations

by Terron Wharton

Politics is a human endeavor, and like any human endeavor, it is impossible to predict or prescribe solutions with absolute accuracy. People will always surprise you. Consequently, political science postulates theories and models of human interaction at the State level that leaders and policymakers often use in decision making. While imperfect, these models have value in framing human interaction and establishing context.

Today, the two theories of Realism and Liberalism establish a broad foundation for international relations. In the early 1990s, Constructivism emerged as a new interpretation within the Liberalism tradition. It can be argued that every major international relations theory can trace its roots to Realism or Liberalism in some form or fashion and for good reason; the concepts of power and cooperation exist unchanged throughout human history. Both theories are repeatedly modeled in the real world and guide policy decisions. However, each theory falls short. Realism cannot account for true cooperation and non-rational calculus. Liberalism discounts violence and force as methods of guaranteeing security and long-term behavioral modification. Constructivism emphasizes the power of identities but fails in practical application. Each theory has a piece of the puzzle, but each fails to synthesize the whole.

I propose a theory of Reflectionism that reinforces the strengths and reconciles the differences of these three existing theories. Reflectionism theory postulates that a State's Image is derived from its response to an anarchic system. A State's Image is the combination of tangible and intangible factors, influenced by culture, that determine how it sees itself and desires to see the international system. It is, therefore, this Image that drives the State's interests and behavior. A State's survival is predicated on spreading its Image, and a State feels secure when it looks out and sees a world that mirrors its Image. The key question becomes defining a State's Image. If you can define the Image, you can reasonably predict behavior. I developed this theory while studying the U.S. government's foreign policy during the Iraq War. The Bush Doctrine, which served as the foreign policy philosophy

Major Terron O. Wharton is an active duty Army officer currently stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, with the Brigade Modernization Command. He is a recent graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is also the author of *High Risk Soldier: Trauma and Triumph in the Global War on Terror*.

of the George W. Bush administration, became the U.S. strategic approach for the Global War on Terrorism. It advocates Realist methods such as war, economic sanctions, and coercive diplomacy. However, the ultimate goal of the Bush Doctrine was not defeating terrorism but rather spreading American values throughout the globe, particularly in countries where terrorism thrived.

While Realism and Liberalism are not absolute “either-or” approaches, it is still odd to see such a jarring confluence of philosophies. A true Realist would say that Bush’s goals are foolish and pursuing them achieves nothing but draining the State coffers, leaving it weak with little tangible gain to show for it. The Liberal and Constructivist would admonish trying to spread our values through force and coercion instead of cooperation and understanding. Neither Realism, Liberalism, nor Constructivist, alone or in concert, offered adequate systemic explanations.

Reflectionism holds importance for two reasons. For academics, it reconciles Realism and Constructivism, linking Liberalism variables and goals to Realism methods. For policymakers, it provides an updated framework for the international system.

Reflectionism holds importance for two reasons. For academics, it reconciles Realism and Constructivism, linking Liberalism variables and goals to Realism methods. For policymakers, it provides an updated framework for the international system. The key question becomes defining the State’s Image. If a State can define its Image, it can reasonably predict behavior, consequently gaining a relative advantage over its adversaries.

As globalization brings competing Images

into contact more and more, understanding Images becomes more important in preventing and shaping conflicts and promoting cooperation. Image is a “total” concept. It encompasses geography, natural resources, and economic and military power, as well as religion, culture, history, ethnicity, and ideologies. As such, any attempt to spread or counter an Image must be undertaken as part of a whole-of-government approach. Without a holistic, unified approach, a State cannot hope to successfully propagate its Image.

Building Foundations

Prior to synthesizing Reflectionism, it is critical to understand the two underpinning theories of Realism and Constructionism. In *Theory of International Politics* and *Structural Realism After the Cold War*, Kenneth Waltz discusses the nature of the international system, the role and use of power, and the State’s role.¹ Equally important, though unintended, his critique of democratic peace theory shows that a State will always believe its Image is the “right one.” Finally, In *Man, the State, and War*, Waltz discusses his three “Images” of international relations.² Waltz’s examination of Images as levels of analysis, as opposed to an integrated, cohesive construct establishes Reflectionism’s divergence point.³ Alexander Wendt, in *Anarchy is What You Make of It*, illustrates the importance of identity in determining and interpreting actions. Identities are key to cooperation, and identities can change.⁴ Finally, Samuel Huntington, in his work *The Clash of Civilizations*, illuminates the role of culture in conflict. He describes how States determine allies and adversaries, and he lists important “intangible” factors that determine a State’s behavior.⁵ Despite their differences, each theorist offers a variation of the same concept: Identity is important, and it influences actions and can trigger conflict in some form or fashion.

While the theory of Liberalism is a

major pillar in international political theory, Reflectionism theory focuses on concepts more readily explained with Constructivism. Constructivism has a strong enough Liberal base to encapsulate the relevant theoretical underpinnings without having to examine Liberalism on its own.

To my knowledge, no one has attempted to reconcile Realism and Constructivism into an integrated, holistic approach. My goal is to provide a theory that fills in the gaps of each, thereby providing a new framework for policymakers.

Image

A State's Image is the amalgamation of tangible and intangible factors, influenced by culture, that determines how a State sees itself and, therefore, desires to see the international system. Tangible factors are objective and quantifiable: military power, economic development and output, geography, and access to or lack of access to natural resources are all examples of tangible factors. Intangible factors include political and economic ideologies, political and economic systems, rules and laws, and shared ideas and concepts. These tangible and intangible factors are all influenced by culture, which comprises shared ethnicity, religion, traditions, myths, language, history, and key events. Culture continuously influences how tangible and intangible factors are interpreted, and this interpretation generates the Image. The Image then determines a State's interests and drives how a State will pursue those interests in the international system.

Understanding how factors contribute to an Image is critical to Reflectionism, and it revolves around one key tenet: not all factors are equal in defining an Image. Culture assigns weights to various factors, and some are clearly more important than others. This "weight" is important in determining interests and actions and in reconciling potential contradictions. If Factor A

and Factor B come into conflict, and Factor A has greater weight, the State will act according to what Factor A dictates.

For example, during the Cold War, the U.S. government undertook several programs and actions that violated several aspects of the American Image, to include self-determination, freedom of expression, and due process. However, the utter rejection and complete opposition to Communism was, arguably, the most critical factor of the American Image at the time. As a result, the government could reconcile actions that would violate other parts of the American Image, as long as those actions opposed Communism.

A State's Image is the amalgamation of tangible and intangible factors, influenced by culture, that determines how a State sees itself...

Images are either inclusive and exclusive. There are many ways to fit into an inclusive Image or for that Image to reconcile with others. For example, State B sees itself as valuing free expression, freedom of ideas, freedom of religion, and liberal economics. Both the Muslim author who advocates pacifism, limited government, and strong social programs and the atheist who believes in strong centralized government and expansionist foreign policy fit into State B's Image. Each example matches a part of the Image. As long as a competing Image looks "more like me than not," an inclusive Image will accept or reconcile with the other.

Exclusive Images have narrowly defined factors that must be met in order for another Image to match or reconcile. State C sees itself as homogenously Caucasian; atheist, with zero tolerance for religion; and exclusively communist. Since State C sees its Image in

such narrowly defined terms, only another State with those factors will match States C's Image or reconciliation could only occur under very narrow circumstances. Ironically, depending on how State B weights its factors, State C could fit into its Image, but State B will never fit into State C's Image. However, one absolute applies to both Image types. Whether inclusive or exclusive, every Image has factors that are never acceptable. If one Image encounters another with those redline aspects conflict will almost certainly occur.

As a State develops amid anarchy, it will respond to the system around it to ensure survival.

History proves Images can change over time. European States existed as monarchies justified by Divine Right before they became democracies. Slavery is illegal in civilized society. Women, while not seen as equals everywhere, enjoy more opportunities now than during other periods in history. Images can and do change over time. As tangible and intangible factors fluctuate, the resulting interpretations will shift. Occasionally, a factor changes significantly resulting in a major reinterpretation that could shift the Image in profound ways. Conversely, while it is possible for Images to change, some portions (particularly cultural) are so fundamental as to be essentially immutable. Still, even those can change, though it takes a titanic, redefining event such as internal upheaval, external compulsion, or cataclysmic occurrence.

War Never Changes

Reflectionism follows the Realist view of the international system. The international system, anarchic by nature, is not "interpreted" this way like Wendt asserts. It simply is this

way and will never change. Every State is responsible for its own survival. There is no higher power to ensure order or an inherent conflict-resolution mechanism. States must ensure their own survival. If not, they will be subjugated or marginalized at best or, at worst, destroyed outright. The State's ultimate goal is to ensure survival, and every action taken in the international system furthers that ultimate end.

As a State develops amid anarchy, it will respond to the system around it to ensure survival. These responses during the development process eventually coalesce into the State's Image. Multiple models exist to explain State development; however, Reflectionism does not view one as more relevant or correct than another. It does not matter how a State develops. What matters is how it responds to an anarchic system to guarantee its survival.

For example, State A is in a desert environment where water and arable land are rare. It formed when bands of warring tribes from ethnic group (EG) A allied to protect these limited resources from outside raiders. Before its formation, EG A fought a series of internal tribal wars that were extremely costly, leaving it weak. EG B and EG C saw an opportunity to gain resources and invaded, decimating EG A and seizing most of the water and land in its territory. EG A was racked by famine, disease, and starvation. At a low point, Hero A emerged, united EG A, and led them to retake the homeland by driving out the invaders and securing the borders. After the war, Hero A, at the peak of his influence, transformed the tribal alliance into a permanent government structure and was unanimously declared the first leader. EG A was now State A. Under Hero A's leadership, State A became extremely prosperous, defended itself from EG B and EG C (now State B and C) multiple times, expanded its territory, and settled into stability. Centuries later, Hero A is venerated as a cultural and political legend.

So how does Image form and how does it

then determine interests and actions? State A now has an Image that says water and arable land are highly valuable, raiders are a constant threat, and it must protect its people from outsiders. Additionally, State A views States B and C as its main adversaries and is not inclined to cooperate with them or trust them. Based on the Image, acquiring water and arable land become a prevailing interest, and State A is willing to use force to acquire more of both or defend what it has from outsiders.

To reiterate, a State's Image coalesces during its formation and development based on how it responds to the anarchic system to ensure its survival. The only way the system changes is through perfect homogeneity, which is an utter impossibility. There are too many competing Images and cultures for a homogenous global system. Regional homogeneity is debatable, though still unlikely. The likelihood of regional homogeneity is inversely proportional to the size of the region. It is certainly theoretically possible to achieve local homogeneity (a single tribe, small town, etc.), but globalization and the democratization of information make even this remote possibility less and less probable. As stated before, the differences are real, and some are so ingrained as to be rendered effectively immutable and irreconcilable.

Movers and Shakers

States are and will remain the most important actors on the global stage because they are the only ones with sufficient power to impose Images on a global scale. Since no higher power exists to instill order, each State has absolute sovereignty. States will act unilaterally if necessary to preserve themselves by protecting and spreading their Images. Therefore, the State's Image determines how it will use force to shape the international system and accomplish those goals.

While States are Reflectionism's primary actors, there are other actors that affect the

international system. Ethnic nations, individuals, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) all fill critical roles. Each of these secondary-tier actors influences State behavior, Image formation, and Image spreading. Above all, they can instigate, exacerbate, or help resolve conflict. However, these actors do not play minor, supporting roles; they are forces pulling at a State from competing angles. Opportune States leverage these actors in pursuit of their own Images, while other States find themselves torn apart by the same.

Ethnic nations play a significant role in Reflectionism. Ethnicity is a critical part of culture, and culture interprets tangible and intangible factors to define the Image. In this way, the ethnic nation can have an outsized impact on determining or influencing a State's collective culture. In a State with a single ethnic nation, this influence could prove positive and produce an incredible level of internal solidarity, thereby generating a solid, unified Image. Conversely, multiple ethnic nations could prove disruptive and divisive, as multiple cultures attempt to assert dominance for the State's collective culture.

States are and will remain the most important actors on the global stage because they are the only ones with sufficient power to impose Images on a global scale.

In the best case, these disparate cultures reconcile and coalesce into a single, overarching State culture. At worst, multiple, competing ethnic nations in a single State can tear the State apart, devolving it into civil war and ultimate fracture. The ethnic nation puts forth a competing Image the State finds threatening to or irreconcilable with its own. By trying to establish a competing Image, the ethnic

nation triggers conflict.⁶ While religions do not follow ethnic lines, religion exerts tremendous influence on the Image. Therefore, it is arguable that sectarian and religious conflicts follow the same lines.

Individuals perform two functions in Reflectionism. First, because of their ability to spread an Image or an Image component, super-empowered individuals are influential. Karl Marx, Confucius, and John Locke all spread political ideologies that have influenced State Images for centuries. The Koch Brothers have influenced (or attempted to influence) the U.S. Image and associated domestic politics and policy through millions in donations to particular candidates. Every super-empowered individual has the potential to affect a State, whether to reinforce a particular Image, counter it, or put forth an alternative.⁷

States have repeatedly used humanitarian crises and human rights abuses to force the offending State to change its practices or, in extreme cases, its entire Image.

Ordinary individuals also matter in a different capacity. Ordinary individuals who subscribe to a State's Image are important. The State will act to protect and preserve those groups. However, individuals can be leveraged by one State as an excuse to impose its Image on another. States have repeatedly used humanitarian crises and human rights abuses to force the offending State to change its practices or, in extreme cases, its entire Image. Others have used mistreatment of a similar ethnic group as pretense for force. Such was the case when Russia used the auspices of protecting the ethnic Russian population to justify annexing the Crimea in 2014.

Finally, IGOs and NGOs are influential institutions for three reasons. Foremost, they

can help spread a State's Image. I agree with Waltz: IGOs do not exist to promote cooperation and prosperity for altruism's sake. They exist to advance the agendas of the States that create them.

A common criticism of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that its policies disproportionately benefit the Global North, whose States also hold the majority of the voting power within the IMF. The UN Security Council (UNSC), one of the most powerful bodies in the world, has, since its creation, acted as a dueling ground for competing foreign policy, particularly between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The UNSC draws its permanent membership from the World War II victors. Only the permanent members possess veto power, and just one veto can override the rest of the UNSC, even if all other members agree unanimously.

Second, IGOs and NGOs grant legitimacy to State actions by implicitly supporting the associated Image. Despite a professed belief in unilateralism, the U.S. still sought an international mandate for invading Iraq, via the UN, and Afghanistan, via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While States are sovereign, they will subsume their sovereignties if it helps to spread their Images. IGOs and multilateralism enable Image proliferation while conserving a State's resources and distributing risk.

Lastly, IGOs and NGOs can influence States to adjust their Images or take actions to preserve them through force or threat of force. Al Qaeda's 9/11 attack caused the U.S. to launch a global war in attempt to preserve its own Image, while attacking the Image espoused by transnational terrorists and their State supporters. In 2013, after nearly 70 years of fighting with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, the Columbian government agreed to land reform as part of the peace process. In both examples, NGOs forced a State to take action that protected or adjusted its Image.

So Why Reflectionism?

Realism alone fails to account for the influence non-tangible factors, such as history, religion, and culture, have on State decision making and corresponding actions in the international system. While rational calculus is important in determining State actions, States often take “non-rational” action. Words, ideas, and culture matter, and these intangible factors are just as important in determining action as rational calculus.

Conversely, Constructivism highlights the critical role that Images play in behavior, but misses the correct conclusion. Constructivism has it backwards. Images do not drive the system. The system drives Images. Images are not useful to change the system; they are useful in predicting behavior within the system. The international system’s anarchic nature is immutable. Despite understanding, some States will always choose force to advance their interests.

Reflectionism reconciles Realism and Constructivism. By reconciling these theories Reflectionism accounts for the influence of non-tangible factors on State actions in an anarchic system, thereby providing a framework to analyze why States will expend large amounts of power for little tangible or purely ideological gains. Reflectionism completes the picture and generates a new framework to understand the past, interpret current actions, and provide policymakers another framework for decision making. Reflectionism provides a solid, but still untested, theoretical structure for scrutinizing global politics, but the question remains: “How does conflict start, develop, and conclude in a Reflectionist world?”

Reflectionist Conflict Model

Reflectionism posits that States ensure survival by spreading their Image throughout the world with the goal of shaping the global order to

look like them. Conflict occurs when two Images come into contact and cannot reconcile their differences. This conflict is described through the Reflectionist Conflict Model (RCM).

The RCM has three stages: imposition, expansion, and contraction. While the stages may vary in length, every stage is present over the entire conflict. State A will use force to “impose” their Image on State B. Once the Image is imposed, State A will “expand” their Image within State B. Once the Image has taken sufficient hold in State B, State A will cease expending power in State B, “contract” to its own territory, and focus on rebuilding power for the next RCM cycle. Failure in the imposition or expansion stage will shift the State to contraction. Whether a State was successful or not, contraction always indicates the end of the cycle.

Reflectionism posits that States ensure survival by spreading their Image throughout the world with the goal of shaping the global order to look like them.

It is important to clearly define what constitutes conflict. Simply, a conflict is any kind of disagreement, argument, or clash of competing desires, interests, of world views. Conflict does not equate to war, and force does not equate to violence. A trade dispute, diplomatic disagreement, or competing messages are all forms of conflict. War or violent conflict is the extreme. Additionally, power and force are not the same. Power represents capacity to achieve an effect. Force is power applied for purposes of compulsion. Joint training exercises between two militaries, leveraging superior economic conditions in a trade deal, and establishing diplomatic relations are all examples of applying national power. A bombing campaign, trade

embargoes, and expelling diplomats are all examples of force.

Imposition's goal is removing the old Image and instituting a new one. Expansion creates compliance with the imposed Image and sets the stage for long-term commitment. Contraction establishes long-term commitment to the new Image, maintaining and consolidating earlier gains, while minimizing potential losses. Imposition and expansion rely primarily on hard power and, in general, require large expenditures of hard power over a relatively short period. Contraction, by contrast, relies chiefly on soft power.

While all Images are in competition they are not necessarily in conflict, and conflict does not automatically equate to violence.

States compete to spread their Image and use power to do so. While all Images are in competition they are not necessarily in conflict, and conflict does not automatically equate to violence. Inclusive Images compete to spread themselves but are more willing to settle for "good enough" as a way to avoid escalating conflict. Exclusive Images are less likely to settle outside of compulsion.

Stability is achieved as blocs (a grouping of States that share a common Image or whose Images have reconciled to each other) develop and achieve relative parity. States want the balance between blocs to be in their favor. This is where Reflectionism takes its name. A State feels secure when it looks at the international system, and it looks more like them than not. Ultimately, shared or reconciled Images bring security, not balances of power, institutions, or restructuring the system through mutual understanding. In short, Reflectionism looks for a "balance of blocs" instead of a balance of power or a balance

of threat.

There are two critical nuances with the RCM. The RCM does not mean a State will bounce from war to war while biding time to regenerate power in between. Indeed, if the target State immediately accepts the desired Image or the two Images can be reconciled, there is no need for conflict at all. The State simply moves directly to contraction and attempts to spread its Image again somewhere else or consolidates gains.

The second nuance deals with timing. The RCM is not a single, iterative process. State A does not go through the RCM vis-à-vis State B, recover, then initiate again with State C. Rather, the RCM occurs constantly, in various stages, across the international system. State A is in the imposition phase with State B via military invasion, inks a trade deal with State C to expand the Image there, and is finalizing a long term alliance with State D in a contraction phase. The model simply frames conflict between states (and other actors) as they occur constantly in a single cycle of a continuous, global process.

Methodology

So if according to Reflectionist theory, States use force to spread their Images, does the RCM accurately describe how they do so? The RCM provides a framework to examine how States use force and power in the international system. To explore the model, I will use the prosecution of the Iraq War as a case study. I believe the model will accurately depict how States use force in the international system and show the linkage between a State's Image and its geopolitical actions.

Choosing the Iraq War is important for three reasons. First, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was declared against a concept and worldview, not another State. While this occurred before when President Ronald Reagan declared a War on Drugs, there are three key differences. First, the War on Drugs did not result from a

deliberate, planned attack on the U.S. territory and its people. Second, while the U.S. conducted military action as part of the War on Drugs, it was relatively limited in scope and scale. Conversely, the GWOT resulted from a deliberate attack on the U.S. and spilled from the original target (Afghanistan) to a State not directly linked to the original attack (Iraq). Third, terrorism, unlike illegal drugs, incorporates a differing political, religious, and cultural worldview. Terrorism has many Image components, while narcotics trafficking, in and of itself, does not.

Second, the Iraq War can be interpreted as a “war of choice.” Despite not conducting the 9/11 attack themselves, the Taliban, as the Afghan government in power, gave sanctuary, aid, and endorsement to al Qaeda. Therefore, it can be reasoned that the Taliban, by proxy, provided the *casus belli* for U.S. invasion. With the Iraq War, no such act exists. While Iraq had violated several UNSC resolutions, historically that had not been an automatic pretense for military force. The *casus belli* rests entirely on factors the U.S. government determined to be contrary to its world view. As such, the Iraq War gives the opportunity to examine how a State decides to initiate the RCM.

Third, the U.S. government published three strategic documents, the National Security Strategies of 2002, 2006, and 2010 during the Iraq War that clearly outlined how the U.S. saw the world, how Iraq fit into it, and how it would use force in achieving its aims. These documents track connections between the U.S. Image and how the U.S. government attempted to spread its Image, if at all.

The case study’s sources draw from publically available government documents: Congressional reports, laws, UN speeches and resolutions, and declassified military documents. The chief sources are the National Security Strategies of 2002, 2006, and 2010, as these offer insight as to the U.S government’s strategic approach vis-à-vis the international system.

Additionally, I have looked at several speeches from Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, paying special attention to the language within the documents and accompanying military action during the same periods. Some may argue that most Presidential speeches, laws, and National Security Strategy (NSS) documents are political rhetoric; however, rhetoric holds value in Reflectionism theory, as it comes either from the State’s Image, is intended to appeal to the State’s Image, or attempts to spread the State’s Image abroad. Words mean things, and the language, nuance, and manner of delivery all are useful in determining a State’s Image and tracing linkage to State actions.

Words mean things, and the language, nuance, and manner of delivery all are useful in determining a State’s Image and tracing linkage to State actions.

The study’s one chief limitation is its reliance on open-source government documents (testimony, memos, meeting minutes, strategic documents, laws and resolutions, etc.). However, all policy and strategy formation is influenced by information that is not publicly available due to security classification, legal restrictions, or government privilege. While open source information put forth by the U.S. government can generally be considered reliable and credible, occasionally restricted information will contradict publically disclosed facts. As such, I have to assume that the facts and rationale presented in these documents are the *de facto* truth that influenced the U.S. government’s policies and strategies and proceed as such.

The Forever War

The Iraq War spanned two U.S. presidencies. While both administrations had very different approaches in advancing foreign policy, they

never deviated on the ultimate goal. Bush's foreign policy had strong neoconservative tendencies, while Obama's often leaned toward Liberal Interventionism. While seemingly divergent, both approaches are classic Reflectionism, in that each looks to promote the U.S. Image over others as the method for long-term stability. As such, the prosecution of the Iraq War is a discrete instance of the RCM.

The Iraq War can be divided into three distinct periods—invasion, surge, and withdrawal. The invasion covers the road to war from the initial invasion to post-invasion operations. The surge centers on the troop increase of 2007 and General David Petraeus's shift to a counterinsurgency strategy. The withdrawal period lasts from the end of the surge to the withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011.

Prior to delving into the RCM, it is critical to establish the U.S. Image leading up to 9/11 and 9/11's effect on that Image. In its simplest form, the enduring U.S. Image valued human dignity (life), self-determination (liberty), and free-market economics (pursuit of happiness). While this does not completely define the U.S. Image, these principles have remained at its core since inception.

...radical Islamic terrorists, wanted more than a change in U.S. policy; they sought the destruction of the U.S. as an entity. They wanted to extinguish the American Image and replace it with their own.

The events of 9/11 saw the U.S. attacked brutally and without warning. To make matters worse, the attackers, radical Islamic terrorists, wanted more than a change in U.S. policy; they sought the destruction of the U.S. as an entity. They wanted to extinguish the American Image and replace it with their own. The American

people and U.S. government saw themselves fighting an existential threat. As stated above, every Image has factors that are irreconcilable, and encountering a different Image with those factors will almost certainly produce conflict. Radicalism and terrorism were irreconcilable with the U.S. Image, triggering mutual, vehement abhorrence and thereby guaranteeing conflict.

Subsequent U.S. foreign policy centered around two broad goals: (1) defeating the terrorist Image, which birthed the GWOT, and (2) spreading the U.S. Image. The Bush Doctrine had four pillars: Non-distinction between terrorists and those who support them, unilateralism in pursuing terrorists, preemptive action against threats, and the Freedom Agenda.⁸ The first three centered on defeating terrorism, and the Freedom Agenda centered on spreading the U.S. Image. Codified in the 2002 NSS, the Bush Doctrine became the guiding foreign policy philosophy post 9/11.

The 2002 NSS had three focal points regarding the terrorist Image. First, radicalism and terrorism were irreconcilable with the U.S. Image. Second, the U.S. government would seek to eliminate the terrorist Image anywhere, whether that meant attacking terrorists directly or clashing with States that sponsored terrorist organizations.⁹ Finally, just destroying terrorists and their sponsors was not a long-term solution. The U.S. needed to spread its Image as well.¹⁰

The Invasion

In September of 2002, Bush spoke at the UN General Assembly and laid out rationale for war based on five critical points:¹¹ (1) Iraq supported terrorist organizations, violating United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373;¹² (2) Saddam Hussein perpetuated human rights violations, such as using chemical weapons against the Kurds; (3) Hussein sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and refused to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors; and (4) Hussein had abused the

“Oil for Food” program, using the funds to buy weapons. On October 16, 2002, Congress passed Public Law 107–243, authorizing military action against Iraq, laying out the same justification Bush gave the UN.¹³

On March 17, 2003, after four months of pursuing a diplomatic solution, Bush gave Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq.¹⁴ When Hussein failed to comply, the U.S. commenced military operations and coalition ground troops invaded Iraq. Coalition forces rapidly overwhelmed the Iraqi military, and on April 15, 2003, Bush declared Hussein’s regime was no more.¹⁵

After the invasion, the U.S. established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by Paul Bremer. Two of his first acts were to ban all mid- and high-ranking Ba’ath party officials from places in the new Iraqi government and to disband the Iraqi Army. The CPA would mastermind the establishment of a Western-style Democracy by overseeing the fledgling Iraqi government’s drafting of a constitution, writing election law, and holding state, regional, and local elections.¹⁶

The Surge

After overwhelming success in the initial invasion, the U.S. strategy faltered. While the U.S. was successful in imposing its Image, the Image was not taking root. Despite successful elections in 2005, the Iraqis, with heavy American sway and involvement, had yet to form a government able to establish the rule of law or provide basic services to the majority of its citizens. Several ministries, such as the Ministries of Health and Transportation were controlled by Sadrists, individuals with deep ties to Jaysh al-Mahdi, a Shiite insurgency group. These individuals used their positions to target Sunnis for kidnapping, intimidation, torture, and other human rights abuses.¹⁷

As Iraq teetered between chaos and order, one event tipped the balance for the worse. On February 22, 2006, al-Qaeda operatives bombed

the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, a mosque the Shiites considered one of their most holy sites.¹⁸ In October 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Nycki Brooks analyzed the growing Shiite-Sunni conflict as part of an advance team for III Corps. Her report, dubbed “The Perfect Storm Memo,” compared the Samarra Mosque bombing to “the Shi’a equivalent of our 9/11...” and assessed it as “...the catalyst for the current escalating violence.”¹⁹

Disbanding the Iraqi Army and de-Ba’athification provided insurgents large recruitment pools. Ethnic tensions erupted in response to the mosque bombing and exploded into widespread sectarian conflict. The U.S. government’s foreign policy was in danger of failing, and it needed a strategy to prevent failure, reinforce gains, and set conditions for long-term success.

NSS 2006...highlighted the terrorist Image as diametrically opposed to the U.S. Image.

NSS 2006 established that new strategy. Continuing the Bush Doctrine laid out in NSS 2002, NSS 2006 reinforced two key themes. First, it highlighted the terrorist Image as diametrically opposed to the U.S. Image. NSS 2006 explicitly states that: “From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and against their murderous ideology,” and “in the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas...”²⁰ Additionally, NSS 2006 states how the U.S. government defines radical Islam’s Image and, subsequently, gives a point by point refutation based on the U.S. Image.²¹ Second, NSS 2006 emphasizes that American security ultimately depends on spreading American values. Long-term security and success will come through the Freedom Agenda’s success.²²

NSS 2006 showcased the plan to expand earlier gains in Iraq, focusing on building institutions, security forces, and economic capacity to support the new Iraqi Image.²³ The Iraq War was no longer just about Iraq: “And the success of democracy in Iraq will be a launching pad for freedom’s success throughout a region that for decades has been a source of instability and stagnation.”²⁴ If the U.S. succeeded, its Image may well spread to the Middle East as a whole, greatly bolstering security in a long-troubled region.

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In order to set conditions for long-term commitment, Bush ordered “the surge” which contained both a military and political component. First, he authorized an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq, with five brigades sent to Baghdad. The added troops would clear insurgents, secure the neighborhoods and population from further attacks, and help build Iraqi security force capacity. General David Petraeus, the overall military commander, would introduce counterinsurgency (COIN) as the new military operational approach. With the security situation under control, the Iraqi government had the space to focus on building political capacity and developing an effective government.

Petraeus used the surge to help fully implement his new COIN doctrine. The central tenet of COIN doctrine was ultimate victory came from the political process, not military means. Building strong civil institutions, establishing the rule of law, and protecting the population would shift popular support from the

insurgency to the government. Insurgents relied on popular support for legitimacy, resources, and protection. Once an insurgency lost popular support, it would wither on the vine.²⁵

As a tank company executive officer in Baghdad, I saw a discernible shift in day-to-day operations. The emphasis changed from killing and capturing insurgents to “winning hearts and minds.” We were encouraged to spend money on projects and work closely with local leaders to resolve issues related to security and essential services. Most of all, we were focusing on perceptions. Information operations took on a new level of importance. We were supposed to be approachable and show ourselves as protectors and allies to the Iraqi people. Instead of focusing on establishing compliance to American authority, we focused on building commitment to the U.S. Image.

The Withdrawal

At the peak of the surge in November 2007, Iraq contained 165,000 troops, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) cost \$144 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2008.²⁶ Additionally, cumulative funding (FY 2003–FY 2008) for OIF to that point totaled approximately \$578 billion.²⁷ When Obama took office in January 2009, he inherited an economic disaster. The fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis was one of the worst since the Great Depression and wrecked the American economy. Rising unemployment, home foreclosures, and other serious situations forced a pivot to domestic issues. The U.S. government could not afford to continue to spend billions abroad with a crisis at home.

This “domestic pivot” is reflected in Obama’s 2010 NSS. Where NSS 2002 and NSS 2006 looked outwards first, NSS 2010 looked inward. In his introductory letter Obama advances that: “Our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home.”²⁸ He views American domestic strength as the bedrock for American power and influence, asserting “... what takes

place within our borders will determine our strength and influence beyond them.”²⁹ For Obama, American businesses, access to and quality of education, infrastructure, dependency on foreign oil, and the budget deficit are all just as critical to American power as military strength.

Rebuilding America domestically while advancing its interests abroad would require a different strategy. NSS 2010’s strategic approach comprises four avenues: (1) building the American foundation, (2) pursuing comprehensive engagement, (3) promoting a just and sustainable world order,³⁰ and (4) strengthening and integrating national capabilities. This new approach advocated soft power to pursue foreign policy objectives and viewed diplomacy as being “as fundamental to our national security as our Defense capability.”³¹ International institutions were the lynchpin of global order,³² and, as such, NSS 2010 advocates diplomacy, influence, and international institutions to maintain order and advance U.S. interests, while simultaneously allowing the U.S. to regenerate hard power.³³

Despite the domestic pivot, NSS 2010 agreed with 2006 on maintaining a long-term commitment to Iraq as a means to spread democracy throughout the region. The U.S. government still sought “...an enduring relationship with Iraq based on mutual interests and mutual respect,” and hoped that the drawdown in Iraq would provide “an opportunity to advance lasting security and sustainable development for both Iraq and the broader Middle East.”³⁴ While the U.S. planned to withdraw troops, end the combat mission, and transition the military to an advisory role, it simultaneously planned to increase the State’s role to increase the Iraqi government’s political capacity and capability.

Analysis

The road to war and invasion align with

the RCM imposition phase. The Iraqi and U.S. Images conflicted in substantial ways, and each point Bush laid out before the UN corresponded with redlines established in NSS 2002. Moreover, the U.S. viewed two points—support for terrorism and pursuing WMD—as existential threats. As a result, the U.S. expended hard power to impose its Image on Iraq, removing the old Iraqi Image and instating a new one. Iraq’s army was destroyed, its leader deposed, and former regime members banned from public office. Furthermore, the U.S. oversaw (and heavily influenced) the forming of a new Iraqi government, based largely on American, not Iraqi, values. What the U.S. could not change before the war, it imposed with near impunity post-invasion. Any trace of the earlier Iraqi Image was co-opted, modified, or removed if it would not reconcile with the American Image.

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Expansion’s goal is Image compliance, thereby setting conditions for long-term commitment. The surge marked the transition to expansion. Focusing on more than just security, COIN aimed to align the Iraqi people with the American Image (via the Iraq government), as opposed to the one offered by insurgent groups. The focus on “hearts and minds” aimed to change perception. Long-term success in Iraq would not come from killing insurgents. It would come from isolating and defeating the terrorist Image and replacing it with an Iraqi Image the American Image could reconcile with.

Contraction focuses on ensuring long-term commitment to the new Image established in the target State, while consolidating gains and rebuilding power for the future. During imposition and expansion, a State expends large

amounts of hard power to entrench its Image and set conditions for long-term commitment. States entering contraction are drained from the expenditures incurred during imposition and expansion. As such, a State will shift from resource-heavy hard power toward soft power options as it seeks to rebuild its strength while consolidating gains.

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In November 2007 (FY 2008), at the peak of the surge, Iraq contained 165,000 troops and OIF cost \$144 billion. Additionally, cumulative funding (FY 2003—FY 2008) for OIF to that point totaled approximately \$578 billion. In FY 2009, OIF costs fell to \$93 billion with troop levels around 135,000. While the troop decrease was only 1 percent from the FY 2008, the 36 percent decrease in funding was a significant indicator that the U.S. had transitioned to contraction. From FY 2008 until the final withdrawal in FY 2012, funding declined each year by 31, 28, and 58 percent, respectively. Compared to the invasion through surge period, cumulative funding during the withdrawal was only \$225 billion, a decrease of 62 percent.

All the cost figures for OIF include Department of State (State) allocations. Minus a one-time \$20 billion reconstruction allocation, State funding for Iraq never exceeded \$4 billion and remained relatively static throughout the whole war. However, in FY 2012, where overall OIF funding dropped 58 percent, State funding increased 206 percent from \$2.1 billion to \$4.7 billion. While small compared to Department of Defense (DoD) funding levels and those changes, the increase is noteworthy as State is the primary agent of U.S. diplomacy, a critical

element of soft power. Obama's approach and NSS 2010 repeatedly emphasized the importance of diplomacy, influence, and international institutions to maintain order and advance U.S. interests. Decreasing hard power usage, increased soft power mechanisms, and shifting back to a domestic focus all indicate the U.S. had entered the RCM contraction phase in Iraq.

The U.S. prosecution of the Iraq War encapsulates a single iteration of the RCM. The U.S. imposed the American Image on Iraq during the invasion, expanded the Image and gained compliance during the surge, and sought commitment before contracting back to face domestic issues. While execution and effectiveness can be debated, the foreign policy matches the model.

One Team, One Fight

I believe that Reflectionism provides a new, compelling construct for international politics with significant implications for foreign policymakers. Since State actions are determined by its Image, understanding the Image aids in predicting behavior. Policymakers can then focus limited time and resources on predicted actions instead of the white noise surrounding geopolitics. Also, this understanding allows policymakers to target the Image's critical aspects, thereby gaining relative advantage and preserving national power.

In addition to predicting behavior, Reflectionism emphasizes the need for a whole-of-government approach. Image is a total concept, and to successfully spread or combat an Image, a government must take a unified approach. Success cannot be achieved with unbalanced or unsynchronized applications of national power. All elements must work in concert to achieve success. An interagency approach is not just "useful" or "optimal" to State-level problem solving, it is an absolute requirement. Just like economic power and diplomatic influence, military power can only

spread one fact of the Image. Hard power may impose an Image, but soft power makes it last.

The U.S. government already has this framework—unified action; however, how successfully it is executed remains up for debate. Unsynchronized efforts, flawed execution, and misallocated resources have consistently produced interagency approaches often work mired in internal conflict instead of working in concert to achieve the State’s goals.

From the start, national strategy formation should possess an interagency approach in fact, not just in name. Mutually supporting lines of effort must incorporate all elements of national power. One agency’s actions should reinforce the work of others. Resources should shift appropriately from one line of effort and agency to the next, as the State makes progress toward its goal. There are no “lead agencies.” The lead comes from the decision-making apparatus, and proponenty does not equal leadership. The agencies simply execute their elements of national power, with none more important than others.

Finally, the RCM presents a potential revolution in targeting methodology. States should not enter armed conflict myopically focused on applying military power toward enemy troops, military hardware, and installations. Instead, any armed conflict needs a whole-of-government approach. The center of gravity is not the adversary’s military, economy, or government apparatus.

Armed conflict is simply the violent expression of Image competition. The center of gravity is **always** the adversary’s Image. Only by targeting the adversarial Image with all elements of national power can a State hope to destroy or displace an opposing Image and impose its own. Everything, whether military action, diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions, or information operations, is useless if it is not aimed at the opposing Image.

Mirror, Mirror, On the Wall

Reflectionism has its own flaws and shortcomings. Defining an Image is, to a large degree, subjective. What makes someone an American? Americans do not share a single religion, have an official language, or share common ethnicity. An American’s family could have arrived in 1760 or 2010. An American could be a Socialist, Free Market Capitalist, or an Anarchist. Americans are Christian, Muslim, Buddhists, and include nearly every other religious group. Yet, there is something that is undoubtedly an American culture, society, and Image. We could argue all day on what defines an American and achieve nothing but a long list of beliefs and descriptors that will, at some point, contradict each other. Defining the Image is the theory’s central concern, yet the hardest to achieve.

We could argue all day on what defines an American...Defining the Image is [Reflectionism’s] central concern, yet the hardest to achieve.

A second criticism of Reflectionism is that it is merely a reinterpretation of Constructivism. Constructivism says the nature of international relations is a historical and social construct, rather than inherent in the system, and, as Wendt says, depends entirely on the notion that State identities are intrinsically determined, not extrinsically imparted. Reflectionism rejects this notion. Identities are defined by the system; the system is not defined by identities and associated interpretations of other’s actions. Wendt says, “Anarchy is what we make of it.” Reflectionism says, “We are what anarchy makes us.”³⁵

Unlike Constructivism, Reflectionism says the system will never change. Wendt sees hope for us changing the system through mutual

understanding. While I agree that mutual understanding can promote cooperation and reduce conflict, it will never negate anarchy. Conflict is inherent in human nature, and while high levels of cooperation are possible, aggressive, predatory behavior will always exist, both at the individual and the State levels. Constructivism seeks understanding for peace, conflict reduction, and conflict resolution. Reflectionism seeks understanding for power and relative advantage. The Reflectionist does not seek understanding to deescalate conflict and foster cooperation with (potential) adversaries. He seeks understanding for domination.

Through the Looking Glass

The purpose of this article was to answer two questions: Why do States use Realist methods for Liberal aims? Subsequently, if Reflectionism answers question one, then how does conflict initiate, develop, and terminate in a Reflectionist world? I believe that Reflectionism provides a new, compelling construct for international politics, and that the RCM describes with relative accuracy the cycle of conflict.

The world we live in is anarchic, and States will ensure their survival above all. This will never change. However, how States look to their survival is always in flux. While rational calculus is important in determining State actions, States often take “non-rational” action. Words, ideas, and culture matter, and these intangible factors are just as important in determining action as rational calculus. The two must reconcile to gain a complete understanding of why States do what they do. Reflectionism provides that reconciliation, thereby providing a new lens for interpreting international politics. **IAJ**

NOTES

1 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, 1979, pp. 103–105.

2 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 16.

3 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 103–105.

4 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 394–395, <<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199221%2946%3A2%3C391%3AAIWSMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9>>, accessed on November 29, 2015.

5 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer, 1993, pp. 22–23, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045621>>, accessed on November 29, 2015.

6 The Yugoslav Wars, Turkey-PKK conflict, and the Nagorno-Karabakh War in Azerbaijan are all examples of ethnic nations influencing State behavior by triggering conflict through a competing Image.

7 An example of an alternative Image component is seen in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s efforts during the American Civil Rights Movement during the 1960s to establish equality for African Americans. Up until that point, the American Image saw African Americans as second class citizens and passed laws that projected that Image.

- 8 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, The White House, Washington, 2002, pp. iii–iv.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 5. “The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism.... The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.”
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. vi. “Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization.... Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.”
- 11 UN General Assembly, 57th Session, Summary Report of the 2nd Plenary Meeting, September 12, 2002, <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/586/90/PDF/N0258690.pdf?OpenElement>>, p. 8, accessed on May 31, 2016.
- 12 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1373, 2001, “On Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” September 28, 2001, <<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c4e94552a.html>>, accessed on May 31, 2016. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 was a comprehensive counterterrorism resolution passed unanimously in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The Resolution has four key provisions: (1) it requires all States to criminalize funding terrorism and freeze any assets associated with terrorism, (2) it disallows support for and harboring of terrorists and their organizations, (3) it requires States to restrict the movement of terrorists between borders, and (4) it mandates full implementation of previous standing international conventions and protocols relating to combatting terrorism. It is significant in the fact that the Security Council imposed the resolution on all UN member states, making noncompliance not an option. As a result, any country found violating UNSCR 1373 may be open to sanctions.
- 13 Public Law 107-243: Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H. J. Res. 144, 107th Cong., 2d sess, October 16, 2002: H116, <<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ243/pdf/PLAW-107publ243.pdf>>, accessed on June 1, 2016.
- 14 George W. Bush, “President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours,” speech, White House, Washington, March 17, 2003, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>>, accessed on March 27, 2016. “All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing.”
- 15 Raymond W. Copson, “Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview,” Congressional Research Service Report RL31715, Library of Congress, Washington, April 22, 2003, pp. 4–5.
- 16 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama*, Pantheon Books, New York, 2012, Kindle e-book, location 353.
- 17 *Ibid.*, location 20032.
- 18 *Ibid.*, location 3870.
- 19 *Ibid.*, location 14294.
- 20 George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, The White House, pp. 6 and 9.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

22 Ibid., p. 2. “America also has an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace. The ideals that have inspired our history—freedom, democracy, and human dignity—are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations throughout the world. And because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure.”

23 Ibid., pp. 12–13.

24 Ibid., p. 13.

25 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Washington, April 2009, p. ix. “COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels.... At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population. This support can be achieved or lost through information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear, or violence. This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the population. However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering and solving the population’s underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction with the current arrangement of political power. Dealing with diverse issues such as land reform, unemployment, oppressive leadership, or ethical tensions places a premium on tactical leaders who can not only close with the enemy, but also negotiate agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies and other nations, restore basic services, speak the native (a foreign) language, orchestrate political deals, and get “the word” on the street.”

26 Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service Report RL33110, Library of Congress, Washington, December 8, 2014, p. 10.

27 Ibid., p. 15.

28 Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010, The White House, Washington 2010, p. i.

29 Ibid., p. 2.

30 Ibid., pp. 9–11.

31 Ibid., p. 14.

32 Ibid., p. 40. “The United States will protect its people and advance our prosperity irrespective of the actions of any other nation, but we have an interest in a just and sustainable international order that can foster collective action to confront common challenges. This international order will support our efforts to advance security, prosperity, and universal values, but it is also an end that we seek in its own right. Because without such an international order, the forces of instability and disorder will undermine global security.”

33 Ibid., p. 3.

34 Ibid., p. 25.

35 Wendt.

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The Impact of Worldviews on Training and Education in Iraq and Afghanistan

by Ted A. Thomas and Seth George

As a civil engineer working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1986, I was assigned as the project engineer for building an F-16 airbase in Beni Suef, Egypt. The airbase was in the final stages of completion, and the heavy equipment was sent to other projects. We had a water line break and needed a bulldozer to excavate in order to repair the line. The Egyptian Air Force owned the base and had some heavy earthmoving equipment, so I decided to borrow it to get the work done. I went to the company commander who owned the equipment. He referred me to his battalion commander, who referred me to the next higher commander. Eventually, I had an appointment with the two-star general base commander the next day.

Neither of us spoke the other's language, but we met for four hours before I received permission to use his dozer. Why did I need to go all the way to the top to get permission, and why did it take four hours of pleasantries to get an okay? I just wanted to get the job done and move on. I had no clue what the general wanted. Reflecting on this experience, I think I know the answer and have an additional insight as to why we were not as effective as we could or should have been in training and working with the Iraqis and Afghans.

The purpose of this article is to develop a more effective approach to training and educating the Middle Eastern population by examining the differing worldviews of the U.S. and the Middle East. People from an "honor-shame culture" such as the Middle East are more collectivist oriented and rely on relational approaches to working together. People from a "guilt-innocence culture," such as the U.S. are highly individualistic, and that individualism is reflected in how it trains its personnel.

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The authors propose that understanding these differences in worldview can help develop relational teaching methodologies that use a more inspirational approach.

This perspective is absolutely necessary because practitioners, unlike scholars, often face matters of life and death and all the associated questions of organizational ethics and personal morality that follow from these encounters.

Three Worldviews

Much of the world is influenced by three major worldviews: guilt versus innocence, honor versus shame, and fear versus power.¹ Every culture contains elements of each of these worldviews, but the actual culture that emerges is based on the particular mixture of each view.²

Guilt versus innocence cultures tend to focus on right versus wrong. They are more rule, law, or regulation focused. They ask the question,

“What did I do wrong?”³ These cultures also tend to be individualistic.

Honor versus shame cultures are more relationship focused and tend to be collectivist or group oriented.⁴ They ask the question, “Is this honorable? Will it bring honor or shame to me, my family, or my tribe?”

Last is the fear versus power worldview which is more ritual based, may be superstitious, and is founded on power and trust. It is worried about surviving in an uncertain and unexplained world and asks, “Is this taboo or going to bring bad luck or get me killed?”⁵ Cultures in this environment tend to be collectivist as well.

This article will only examine the first two worldviews since they more reflect the broad cultural differences between the U.S. and the Middle East. The figure below depicts the interrelationships of the three major worldviews.




Figure 1. World Views

In guilt-innocence cultures, where individualism is more prevalent, people are not bound to groups, and each person is expected to look after themselves and their immediate family. In honor-shame cultures, where collectivism is more prevalent, people are integrated into strong, cohesive groups from birth. These groups provide lifelong protection in return for loyalty.⁶

In guilt-innocence (individualistic) cultures, speaking one's mind is considered a virtue and is looked upon as being honest and blunt. A clash of opinions is valued in trying to reach a greater truth or correctness.⁷ Language in individualistic cultures tends to be precise and explicit, while language in the collectivist culture is more poetic and implicit.⁸ Speaking bluntly in individualistic cultures causes uneasiness and discomfort among those in collectivist cultures.

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In honor-shame (collectivist) cultures, the personal relationship is more important than the task and must be established first. It is natural and expected to treat one's relations and friends better than others. Nepotism is an accepted way of life. Words are spoken in a manner to avoid bringing shame on another. The words "no" and "yes" are used differently. "No" is seldom used, and "yes" does not necessarily mean approval. "Yes" may merely acknowledge what the other person is saying to keep lines of communication open.⁹ The ambiguity and lack of clarity in language from collectivist individuals tend to cause frustration and impatience among those of individualistic cultures who desire clear cut answers.

The decision on whether or not to lie is a good way to illustrate the communication divide. Individualistic cultures value honesty and truth.

Telling the truth promotes innocence and is the right thing to do. In a collectivist society, if a lie is told for purely selfish reasons, it is dishonorable and shameful. However, protecting the honor of the tribe or family is a primary value, and lying to protect honor and avoid shame is the right thing to do. Right or wrong does not matter as much as preserving honor. Lying in one culture is bad and not acceptable, while lying in the other culture can be considered good and is expected.¹⁰

Understanding Assumptions

Determining why the Iraqi government struggled to succeed on its own after receiving extensive training and resources by the U.S. becomes easier with a general understanding of the differing worldviews of U.S. personnel and their Iraqi and Afghani counterparts. There has been much written about why success was so elusive in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹¹ It has been argued the effort was under-resourced in men, material, and infrastructure, and that publishing our exit strategy led the enemy to just wait us out. Others have blamed poor Iraqi and Afghani leadership; historical, sectarian, and ethnic issues; as well as corruption and morale issues.¹² What is missing from the discussion is the differing worldviews.

In order to guard against paternalistic or dehumanizing views¹³ of those we train, we must have an empathetic appreciation for different cultures.¹⁴ This process also requires an introspective approach to understanding how our own culture and values might interact within the operational environment of the Middle East. Overlooking this key aspect can easily expose personnel to the emotional toll of misunderstanding and frustration inherent within the operational environment.

For example, an aviation officer was conducting a training mission in which

Afghan aviators were operating as flight leads during a casualty evacuation. Twenty wounded Afghan soldiers were picked up by two helicopters and flown back to the hospital. One of the wounded had a head injury, prompting the U.S. leader to advise his Afghan counterpart to lower the altitude to maximize the chances of saving the soldier's life. Based on pilot's presupposition that flying higher was safer for the rest of those on board, the requests were denied. In this case, it led to the death of the soldier with the head injury. Nevertheless, the Afghan flight lead was elated that 19 lived and was seemingly unconcerned over the one who had died. The U.S. advisor was not only angry, but felt personally guilty and responsible for the death of that individual.¹⁵

Training situations like this one make deep impressions on personnel and often leave them with negative feelings toward working with Iraqi and Afghani partners. The minimal cultural training given before deployments was inadequate. Because of limited time and resources, and also because we struggle to understand our own cultural bias, little was done with the anthropological perspectives on worldviews.

Westerners tend to assume that all humans are essentially the same, and that we must focus on our commonality rather than our differences. We assume that focusing on differences might lead to division and dehumanization of the "other."¹⁶ Although it is helpful to recognize shared values,¹⁷ even our commonness is interpreted through dissimilar filters that can result in a totally different understanding of the same values, goals, or outcomes. An overemphasis on finding commonality has betrayed our ability to be effective trainers and educators and prevented us from acknowledging, respecting, and appreciating the differences in those we train.

U.S. Paradigm for Organizational Success

American paradigms for organizational success are based on a guilt-innocence worldview. We have systems designed to select the most qualified, experienced individuals for future leadership positions. We rotate individuals through key developmental positions for their future benefit, typically leaving them in place for two years. The U.S. relies on the diversity of its members for strength in problem-solving, new ideas, and understanding different situations and cultures.

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In a collectivist society, family and tribe are more important than competency and expertise, and there is little trust in diversity. In a society where grudges among different religions, tribes, and ethnicities can go back hundreds of years, we underestimate the level of distrust and dissension caused by creating diverse units. Nor do we truly grasp how loyalty to one's tribe or family would actually function when positions were given to those who could be trusted rather than to leaders with experience or qualification.

Our leadership is based on a small power distance between leaders and subordinates. It relies upon candid conversation and empowering subordinates. The doctrine of mission command relies on this small power distance. One clear example is the U.S. military noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. The U.S. military prides itself on a strong, professional, NCO corps. Many lieutenants were first trained by their platoon sergeants and told what not to do and

what to do in order to succeed. Command sergeants major provide unfettered advice to the commander. Initiative, mission orders, and taking prudent risk are all foundational concepts in the doctrine of mission command¹⁸ and are expected of leaders throughout the ranks.

Collectivist cultures tend to have a large power distance between leaders and subordinates. In other words, it is expected and recognized that power is distributed unequally. In this atmosphere, subordinates are highly dependent on their bosses and are unlikely to contradict or even approach them with an issue. Leadership methods that work in the U.S. will not work well in high power distance countries because they “presuppose some form of negotiation between subordinate and superior that neither part will feel comfortable with.”¹⁹ In a large power distance culture, strong mid-level managers are not expected or tolerated and are looked upon as a threat to the leadership. In the Middle East, power and decision making are held at the top levels. Staying in power is one of the signs of a good leader. Subordinates who have initiative and take risk are seen as risks. This behavior is highly frowned upon and will get the person relieved at best and killed at worst.

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Many U.S. organizations rotate their people in and out of the theater every three to fifteen months. By the time relationships are made and established with Middle Eastern partners, a totally new unit or leader comes into theater or leaders are rotated into different positions within theater. The U.S. assumes bureaucratic loyalty, and subordinates are loyal to whatever boss they have at that time.²⁰ This is a foreign concept to

someone in the Middle East, who usually work in the same area and with the same people for most of their lives.

Our worldview also applies to how U.S. organizations choose their leaders. We often use a board process, with senior leaders who promote the most qualified and those with the most potential. The right thing to do in this context is to promote the most competent. In the Middle East, promotions and assignments are made based on family, tribe, trust, and loyalty. When a sheik is asked whom he wants in charge, he will want the most loyal and trustworthy person available who is relationally connected to his family, tribe, or a close ally. Competency is a far lesser consideration than trust.

One recent study recommended greater cultural awareness on multiple levels and also recommended “a complete paradigm shift in how Afghan officers and NCOs are selected and promoted, such as by merit rather than through nepotism and graft.” While encouraging greater empathy for our counterparts, the study reinforces the stereotype of a guilt-innocence culture contraposing its values on an honor-shame culture.²¹

Training, Education, and Inspiration

Training, education, and inspiration are three methods of teaching. U.S. personnel are some of the best at training and educating, but addressing core beliefs and values fundamental to an inspirational approach to teaching is typically conducted informally through discussions of leadership and values. If we are to continue teaching Middle Eastern partners, we need to understand the importance of inspirational teaching and how worldviews differ in their appeal to values and the importance of relationships.

Training involves teaching what to think and how to perform. It is top down driven and shows people what to do and how to do it. It is centered on the way things are and has a correct answer.

Training is a teacher-centric method in which the instructor is right. Standards are measurable by time, distance, sequence, or result. It is more science than art and more management than leadership. Training involves an input or event followed by some action that has been rehearsed and practiced. After the action is over, there is time to reflect and review what went right and what went wrong. The sequence is input-action-reflection.

Education involves teaching people to think critically and to analyze and synthesize available information. It involves reflecting and thinking. It is centered on the way things can be and is more art or leadership driven. Education is student-centric and tries to achieve situational understanding, to ascertain how events will unfold, and how that will affect operations. It is harder to measure and is often accomplished after events have happened. When a new problem comes up, there may be many answers or solutions. As different solutions are tried over time, a technique or drill may evolve. The reasoning for education lies in teaching principles that can be applied to different situations to achieve a workable solution. In uncertain and ambiguous environments, the actions that work one day may not work the next day, or the actions taken in one area may not work in a different area. The goal of education is to have the intelligence and knowledge to reflect and determine what may work. After this reflection, the leader takes action. Since there is no approved solution, thinking and reflecting are necessary to solve these problems. The sequence is input-reflection-action.

The last of the three methods of teaching is inspiration. It begins with appeals to values and beliefs. This teaching is not necessarily done in a classroom setting. Inspirational teaching addresses why we think or believe certain things. It is based on values, core beliefs, feelings, and emotions. Instead of trying to become situationally aware or to gain situational

understanding, inspirational teaching tries to create the desired situation based on a set of specific values. It is measured one heart at a time and depends heavily upon relationships. Solutions are based on values consistent with a particular set of beliefs. Instead of an event followed by a rehearsed action for a training situation or an event followed by thinking and reflecting for a new situation requiring an education, inspiration starts with reflecting and thinking about the way things ought to be, and then taking action to bring it about. It is followed by looking at the results, reflecting on them, and then adjusting the next action to bring about the desired value or goal. The sequence is reflection-action-output.²²

Inspirational teaching helps explain the appeal of extremist Islamic groups such as Al Qaeda...

Inspirational teaching helps explain the appeal of extremist Islamic groups such as Al Qaeda, which spent years reflecting on how things should be according to their values and what actions should be taken to achieve certain goals such as an Islamic state.²³ Where they are in charge, their values are indoctrinated into followers by inspirational and relational teaching that fosters an extremist Islamic identity rooted in the collective honor of Muslims and resistant to Western values of individuality and diversity.²⁴

A Valuable and Necessary Investment

If U.S. personnel are to be successful in their mission to train local security forces, time and resources must be provided to prepare them to work closely with those who think and act in relational and collectivistic terms. In May of 2011, a study was commissioned to determine why at least 26 blue on green attacks in

Afghanistan were attempted since May of 2007. These attacks resulted in 58 deaths. According to this study, the U.S. personnel characterized the Afghans as dishonest, incompetent, corrupt, and having a lack of mid-level leadership.²⁵ Conversely, remarks from the Afghan personnel are peppered with statements that refer to the U.S. workers' actions and language toward them or other Afghan civilians as indecent and profane, causing them embarrassment and shame.²⁶ One observer was struck by the simple question asked by a number of Afghans, "How come the American Soldiers don't talk to us?"²⁷ It is significant that the study concluded that the growing fratricide-murder trend is a valid measure of the ineffectiveness of our efforts in Afghanistan, primarily because of cultural miscommunication rather than insurgent infiltration.²⁸

If the U.S. is to have a positive effect in future operations in the Middle East, it needs to reexamine the way it teaches others in order to minimize cultural miscommunication.

Investing the time to understand worldviews and expectations of those we train will help with internal security and mission success. Consider what an element of U.S. Soldiers experienced while training security forces of a local tribe outside Baghdad. A rival tribe killed two members of the local tribe and refused to return the bodies. While on a joint patrol, the local tribe recovered the bodies in a nearby community. Several members of the rival tribe were rounded up. The patrol leader was asked, "Mister, can we kill them?" To the satisfaction of both tribes he answered, "No, but you can take two vehicles."²⁹ By utilizing the *diyya* or "blood money," further violence was averted because the collective honor of both tribes

was maintained and neither were shamed. Furthermore, the training relationship developed into a wider network of relationships and greater security. Those who have been involved with training in the Middle East quickly realize these are highly relational endeavors in which developing tactical competency is but one aspect of the overall picture.

If the U.S. is to have a positive effect in future operations in the Middle East, it needs to reexamine the way it teaches others in order to minimize cultural miscommunication. No matter how good its training and education is, if it does not engage in conversation,³⁰ build relationships, and consider the comprehensive nature of values and worldviews, the U.S. will not achieve the security results it and its allies desire.

Success is possible, and many organizations have experienced it in terms of training and security. But success itself should be a cautionary tale. The ability of a diverse group of U.S. and Iraqi or Afghani people to overcome cultural barriers, develop mutual trust, and work together toward a common goal is a remarkable testimony to the human spirit. However, these accomplishments are often reported up the chain of command as story boards of success without realizing how success and cooperation can easily be viewed through dissimilar lens. We must consider that as important as it is for any particular organization to have success, linking the success of one trained Iraqi organization to another is beyond our control.

While our worldview and experience lead us to assume bureaucratic and national loyalty, the worldview and experiences of those we train in the Middle East do not. Rather, the relationship developed between a U.S. and Iraqi organization will only exist between those particular individuals and never transfer to a larger organization, be it Iraqi or American. Furthermore, we may view a successful unit leader as one that will accomplish the mission. For our partners, success may not require this at

all. Instead, remaining in charge, regardless of the action taken or results, may be their understanding of success.³¹

Conclusion

Understanding the extent of how honor, shame, and collectivism shape the expectations of everyone involved in training is imperative in order to understand what we can accomplish from the direct to the operational level. This understanding requires an investment of critical and creative thinking with at least four initial steps.

First, we must invest in conversation with those we teach in order to understand how to combine inspirational and relationship-based teaching with our ability to train specific individual and unit tasks. Second, cultural complexities must be navigated in real time without arbitrarily subjecting them to our routines, agendas, and worldview bias. Third, when briefing senior leaders and civilian authorities, we must resist the temptation to promise more than we can reasonably deliver given our cultural differences. A realistic assessment of how our partners understand the purpose of their training in terms of their worldview and subsequent relationships and loyalties is necessary. Finally, we must leave trainers in place long enough to determine how shame and honor may be understood as a measure of effectiveness for unit readiness, especially when financial resources are diminished.³²

Years later, I now understand that the young civil engineer of 30 years ago wanted to get a mission accomplished on a transactional basis. The two-star general wanted to establish a relationship before the transaction to make sure he could trust this young foreigner. I would have been much more patient and understanding and probably more successful if I knew then what I know now. **IAJ**

NOTES

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Out of Sync

U.S. Africa Command and Recent Interagency Challenges

by William Denn, J.J. Williams and Devanie Johnson

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the Department of Defense's (DoD) newest, geographic combatant command formed in 2007, exemplifies a bold, new experiment in whole-of-government interagency cooperation. Structured from the ground up to facilitate the integration of interagency partners, it was created with the best intentions of how twenty-first century U.S. government agencies could synchronize development, diplomacy, and defense objectives. Nine years later, however, there still exists problems in interagency policy synchronization and day-to-day coordination of operations. This article will highlight observations from some recent operations in Africa and propose recommendations for AFRICOM to continue to improve interagency coordination.

AFRICOM's Uniqueness: A Combatant Command Plus

Historically, the African continent remained a low priority in both U.S. foreign and defense policies. It was not until 1952 when several North African countries fell under the U.S. European Command portfolio that Africa was included in the U.S. military command structure. In 1983, under the Goldwater Nichols Act's restructuring of the geographic combatant commands, responsibility

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for Africa was divided among three different combatant commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

It was not until post-September 11, 2001, however, that Africa grew in strategic importance to U.S. national security interests. In March 2006, General John Abizaid, then CENTCOM Commander, noted in Congressional testimony that Africa remained “vulnerable to penetration by regional extremist groups.” EUCOM and CENTCOM, already taxed with the unique challenges of their areas of operation, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, assessed that the rising security and stability and challenges in Africa warranted a separate headquarters.

In 2007, President George W. Bush approved the creation of AFRICOM, generated initially from a command element from EUCOM and stationed in Stuttgart, Germany. According to career diplomat David Brown, the former Diplomatic Advisor at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, as a new headquarters, AFRICOM was shaped by four key imperatives: (1) an increased recognition of the interdependence of security and development; (2) a new emphasis on conflict prevention and stability operations rather than warfighting; (3) the emergence of the broader concept of human security and the “responsibility to protect” international norms; and (4) a growing need for whole-of-government approaches to interagency cooperation. The result of these imperatives structured AFRICOM with a broader soft power mandate aimed at building a stable security environment and sought to resource the headquarters with a relatively larger (compared to its peer combatant commands) personnel contingent from other U.S. government agencies. Within DoD channels, AFRICOM was described as a “combatant command plus” due to its augmented interagency design and mandate.

In addition to having a larger contingent of

personnel from other U.S. government agencies, the leadership at the top of AFRICOM was also structured to reflect an interagency perspective. The Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Engagement, the civilian leader in AFRICOM, was charged with plans and programs associated with health, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, security sector reform, peace support operations, and directing the J9 Outreach staff. Typically, a former ambassador with the two-star equivalent rank of Minister-Counselor, the Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Engagement brought regional expertise and diplomacy/development experience to AFRICOM.

The initial plan for the AFRICOM staff called for 25 percent of the staff to be sourced from U.S. government agencies other than DoD.

Whereas today, all combatant commands incorporate interagency partners at some level, AFRICOM sought to elevate integration to new levels. The initial plan for the AFRICOM staff called for 25 percent of the staff to be sourced from U.S. government agencies other than DoD. However, the realities of the U.S. government soon sunk in, and due to a lack of capacity, only 2 percent of the staff came from civilian agencies by 2011.

Another AFRICOM innovation was where the headquarters emplaced its interagency partners. From the start, AFRICOM sought to embed interagency partners within the various staff planning sections, in sharp contrast to other combatant commands. For example, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) emplaced all interagency partners in a separate joint interagency task force, JIATF-South, that focused mainly on SOUTHCOM’s

counternarcotic mission. PACOM, on the other hand, emplaced all interagency partners in the J9 (Outreach) section. While PACOM's and SOUTHCOM's strategies created one-stop-shops for interagency coordination, they had the effect of isolating the interagency from other staff sections. In contrast, AFRICOM emplaced interagency partners within the J3 (Operations), J4 (Logistics), J5 (Strategy, Plans and Programs), and J9 (Outreach) sections, as well as foreign policy advisors in service component commands such as U.S. Army Africa (USARAF).

...AFRICOM has recently faced challenges in interagency cooperation, specifically in policy synchronization at the regional level and in day-to-day operations coordination.

Despite these important initial choices in interagency organizational structure, AFRICOM has recently faced challenges in interagency cooperation, specifically in policy synchronization at the regional level and in day-to-day operations coordination. The following section will highlight two recent case studies: first, the synchronization of AFRICOM's countering violent extremism (CVE) strategy and the Department of State's (State) transnational organized crime (TOC) strategy will highlight difficulties in policy synchronization; second, AFRICOM's use of regionally aligned forces (RAF) and the 101st Airborne Division's response to the 2014 Ebola crisis will highlight recent challenges in day-to-day interagency coordination.

Challenges in Policy Synchronization

Despite AFRICOM and its Army service component USARAF current levels of interagency integration, they continue to be challenged with synchronizing missions

with State counterparts, particularly Counter Terrorism and the West African Bureaus.

In 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recognized in an assessment that there is an important need to increase the unity of effort between DoD and State in Africa. One particular problem was insufficient personnel from State aligned with DoD counterparts to manage the synchronization of strategic guidance in West Africa. While raw numbers do not reflect a complete understanding of how mismatches in personnel and problems affect synchronization, they do hint where challenges may arise. For example, AFRICOM's headquarters is staffed with approximately 2,000 personnel in Germany and approximately 9,000 personnel across the whole command. State's Africa Bureau, on the other hand, according to diplomat David Brown, is staffed with only about 200 personnel, of which 150 are foreign service officers and 50 are administrative support. Again, these numbers do not necessarily indicate differences in priorities or predict interagency difficulties, but it may cause problems when such mismatched personnel structures attempt to work and coordinate with each other.

Misalignments, however, have a significant impact on achieving U.S. national security interests in Africa. One recent 2015 GAO assessment specifically addressed the overlap of government defense missions, global health, and international affairs, particularly in West Africa. Fragmentation and duplication of national security programs only further disenfranchise DoD's and State's efforts within the region.

One particular example highlighting the misalignment and fragmentation between DoD and State in Africa centers on CVE strategies and TOC strategies. In 2011, AFRICOM sought to increase security in Africa through DoD's role in CVE. CVE is a comprehensive and sustainable strategy that seeks to address the entire "life cycle" of extremists from initial radicalization to ultimate acts of violent extremism. AFRICOM's

CVE strategy, particularly in West Africa, establishes exercises and security cooperation programs across the continent to help mitigate violent extremist activity, specifically targeting Boko Haram and Al Qaeda groups. For instance, AFRICOM routinely assists border security operations with multiple partner nations by way of security cooperation programs to prevent the flow of fighters throughout the region. AFRICOM also participates in various training exercises with partner nations to build partner capacity targeting counterterrorism and violent extremist activity.

Despite many of AFRICOM's CVE security cooperation efforts, violent extremist groups continued to rise in West Africa, especially in areas like Nigeria. In August of 2011, Boko Haram bombed a UN mission in Abuja, Nigeria, killing twenty-five, and injuring eighty more. This was just one of several major attacks that occurred against the Nigerian government between 2011 and 2014. There have been several other terrorist events in Nigeria which gained major public attention.

Simultaneous and separate to AFRICOM's CVE initiatives in West Africa was the State's role in combating TOC. The National Security Council defines TOC as the self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. State's TOC strategy initiatives attempt to raise international awareness about the reality of the TOC threat to international security; galvanize multilateral action to constrain the reach and influence of TOC; deprive TOC of its means and infrastructure; shrink the threat TOC poses to citizen safety, national security,

and governance; and ultimately defeat the TOC networks that pose the greatest threat to national security. TOC represents sophisticated and multi-faceted threats that cannot be addressed through law enforcement action alone.

AFRICOM also participates in various training exercises with partner nations to build partner capacity targeting counterterrorism and violent extremist activity.

The reality, however, is that CVE and TOC are innately linked. Regional extremist groups such as Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) use transnational crime to raise money, recruit, and facilitate logistics for their extremist operations. Consequentially, the TOC strategy can help combat terrorism but does not effectively nest or synchronize with AFRICOM's CVE strategy because of misaligned organizations pursuing separate and sometimes redundant policies and strategies. Ideally, the TOC strategy, while essential, would be more effective in West Africa if it merged its capabilities with defense initiatives. If it could feed intelligence to counterterrorism elements (both host nation and AFRICOM elements) or be synchronized with AFRICOM's efforts to build host-nation law enforcement and special operations units, then both TOC and CVE strategies could be more effective in combating these destabilizing challenges in West Africa.

In 2016, the White House Summit for Countering Violent Extremism addressed many of these synchronization and redundancy challenges to countering violent extremism, arguing that the efforts should widen the global base of CVE stakeholders. Since then, there has been progress at the strategic level; agencies focusing on TOC with foreign governments,

civil society, and the private sector are now working to weaken the legitimacy and resonance of violent extremist messaging and narratives, including through social media. This is a first step toward aligning U.S. policies and goals, but until these policies are synchronized by the regional organizations implementing them, there is still room for improvement.

Conducting separate core strategies to address symptoms of the same problem ultimately is an inefficient use of U.S. government resources. CVE and TOC strategies led by the DoD and State, respectively, represent an example of how poorly coordinated strategic initiatives can be ineffective despite regional organizations like AFRICOM with interagency integration.

...a lack of integration between AFRICOM and State also impacts day-to-day operations of ground units working at the tactical/field level...

Challenges in Day-to-Day Coordination

The previous section utilized the case study of CVE and TOC strategies to show how both DoD and State, despite interagency integration efforts at AFRICOM, still fail to effectively synchronize efforts to achieve unity of effort within Africa. Unfortunately, a lack of integration between AFRICOM and State also impacts day-to-day operations of ground units working at the tactical/field level as well. Problems in interagency integration have particularly affected U.S. Army brigades performing security cooperation missions across the continent and the 101st Airborne Division during the recent Operation United Assistance operation combating Ebola in West Africa.

RAF Support of AFRICOM

AFRICOM and its subordinate command USARAF partners with nations throughout the African continent through a variety of joint security cooperation efforts. Security cooperation, highlighted by a recent 2015 GAO assessment, covers a broad set of activities that promote U.S. interests, build partner nations' capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provides U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. Some examples of security cooperation activities include sending military liaison teams, conducting seminars and conferences, and training and equipping partner nations' security forces.

Security cooperation activities are planned and resourced each year in formal and informal dialogues among U.S. embassies, each country's Office of Security Cooperation, as well as USARAF and AFRICOM. USARAF attempts to hold several planning conferences a year to synchronize these activities across the continent, however, due to the sheer number of offices that USARAF must coordinate with, coordination is often less than comprehensive. Due to sometimes fragmented communication among embassies, Offices of Security Cooperation, and USARAF, incomplete orders are often passed to the tactical units tasked with executing the security cooperation activities.

The 2015 GAO assessment, "Regionally Aligned Forces: DOD Could Enhance Army Brigades' Efforts in Africa by Improving Activity Coordination and Mission-Specific Preparation," highlighted some of these coordination problems and the impact they have on AFRICOM's RAF, a brigade combat team in the U.S. tasked with assisting USARAF's activities. The first problem is RAF Soldiers are often unprepared or untrained to meet their activity objectives—which is a tremendous waste of government resources and can undermine U.S. regional objectives. According to the assessment, for

instance, one African country coordinated with the U.S. Office of Security Cooperation to host U.S. military mechanics to teach an equipment maintenance course; however, that USARAF did not communicate what type of equipment the Soldiers would train on. As a result, the Soldiers arrived in country unfamiliar with the equipment the host nation military used and ultimately the training had to be canceled.¹

A similar consequence of poorly communicated objectives between embassies and USARAF is that RAF brigades plan incomplete or improper training for host nation partners. Another example highlighted by the GAO report was an RAF unit who planned to conduct advanced artillery training for host nation counterparts without realizing the host nation soldiers lacked even basic artillery skills. Training quickly had to be revamped and altered.

Interagency confusion has resulted in cases where Soldiers experienced challenges and delays in obtaining official passports. USARAF and RAF brigades support State-coordinated and approved security cooperation, yet despite State being the passport approving authority, RAF units are unable to get passports for Soldiers that are conducting the security cooperation training. As a result of this lack of interagency coordination, primary trainers are sometimes replaced with lesser qualified alternate trainers or the activities themselves are canceled.²

A lack of interagency integration also undermines the quality of training that these RAF units receive. Security cooperation activities often involve small groups of Soldiers deploying, sometimes as pairs of individuals, squads, or platoon-sized elements. The diverse nature of deployments across such a large continent requires mature Soldiers, culturally attuned to the needs and unique challenges of each host nation. Since State is sponsoring and approving these activities, it would be beneficial to leverage State's regional expertise to help resource and design the RAF brigade's

regional and cultural training. Unfortunately, as several of the early RAF brigades experienced, they were on their own to design, resource, and execute cultural and regional training for their anticipated security cooperation activities. One brigade from Fort Lewis coordinated with a local university to design a short, condensed, regional familiarization with Africa. While that brigade's leadership deserves accolades for designing and resourcing the brigade's own training, it seems inconsistent with the importance of the RAF mission that brigade officers must find local experts on Africa to prepare for these deployments.

These four examples of problems for RAF brigades: (1) unprepared to meet objectives; (2) unaware of security cooperation activity details; (3) unable to secure passports; and (4) unable to leverage State's regional expertise for training and preparation for deployments are not simply communication issues but systemic of larger interagency coordination and synchronization failures between DoD and State on the African continent.

A lack of interagency integration also undermines the quality of training that these [Regional Aligned Forces] receive.

U.S. Response to Ebola.

The systemic, interagency integration problems between DoD and State were also apparent at the tactical and field levels during the U.S. military's recent response to Ebola in 2014 to 2015. In September of 2014, the White House, in response to a UN Security Council request for assistance, deployed a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to coordinate the U.S. government response and to assist the Liberian government. As part of the U.S. whole-of-government response, DoD deployed

the 101st Airborne Division headquarters to coordinate the over 3,000 soldiers sent to assist.

U.S. Army and Joint doctrine primarily empowers corps headquarters or joint task forces (JTFs) as the primary headquarters for large-scale, stability operations to integrate interagency cooperation. Interagency integration is accomplished at these headquarters through organizations such as joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) or civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), which are augmented and staffed with senior interagency partners in order to leverage the expertise of the interagency. Because of the size of the U.S. military mission in Liberia, a smaller headquarters (division) was tasked with managing the crisis. The unintended consequence resulted in a headquarters without a preferred level of training and with less staff resourcing and preparation to integrate a complicated interagency mission.

The 101st was simply unprepared, especially in the austere environment of Liberia, to establish an effective knowledge management process...

As Major General Gary Volesky, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, noted in a Center for Army Lessons Learned interview, “Few of the 101st Division staff members possessed experience in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions...”³ Fortunately, for the 101st, deployment was scheduled after a previously-scheduled training program for the staff at the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP). MCTP is a staff training program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for brigade, division, and corps staffs where they are tested in processes and systems in a simulated operational environment. The division staff J9 or

civil-military operations section, quickly pieced together a two-day Interagency Academics Seminar in conjunction with MCTP to bring together USAID, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, State, the UN, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. National Institutes of Health.⁴

There was a lot of risk, however, in the decision to send the 101st Airborne Headquarters because of its lack of experience in HA/DR missions. The newly-formed staff were training for a conventional operations deployment, called decisive action, a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Many on the staff had limited exposure to working and integrating with the interagency. If the MCTP training rotation had not been previously scheduled, it would be likely that the 101st Airborne would have deployed without its supplemental, albeit limited, two-day exposure to the interagency.

A lack of robust interagency integration mechanisms became all the more apparent after the headquarters arrived in Liberia. The USARAF commander, in charge prior to the 101st Airborne arriving, quickly grasped the reality that unity of effort among the many different partners on the ground could only happen if USARAF shared information on unclassified networks rather than the classified networks the staff was accustomed to.⁵ The USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division staff had primarily trained operating on classified Army and intelligence computer systems. If they were to openly share information with interagency and NGO partners, they would need tools like Google Earth rather than the Army’s Command Post of the Future. Likewise, interagency partners and NGOs needed computer and internet access. The 101st was simply unprepared, especially in the austere environment of Liberia, to establish an effective knowledge management process to not only give network access to interagency and

interorganizational partners, but also to share information across the network.⁶

The Ebola crisis was not a complete failure of interagency integration. Thankfully, early on in the response the DART assisted the Liberian government, specifically its Ministry of Health in forming a national coordination center called the National Ebola Command Center (NECC). The NECC served as the critical hub for all interagency, intergovernmental, and interorganizational coordination for the Ebola mission in Liberia. When the 101st Airborne arrived, the J9 actually made an excellent decision not to set up its own CMOC. Instead the 101st would provide liaisons to the NECC as well as augment the NECC with intelligence analysts to aid the coordination center in understanding the nature of the Ebola epidemic. In the end, because of interagency integration processes outside DoD channels, the mission could be accomplished. Not every stability operation, however, will have interagency partners that bring their own capability to set up a robust coordination center. In even more austere or dangerous environments, the U.S. military will likely be the lead agency; if so, is it prepared at the tactical level to set up a robust CMOC that gives all the interagency partners the ability to assist in planning and operational response? If it is a division headquarters, the Ebola case leads us to believe that the military would struggle to integrate all interagency partners.

The Ebola crisis also highlighted the organizational culture challenges that exist when integrating interagency partners at the tactical level. According to the Ebola after-action reports, U.S. Army leaders sometime had a difficult time being subordinate to civilian organizations, which resulted in damaged relationships between individuals and organizations.⁷ “[T]he U.S. Army has developed a Warfighter mentality that did not serve USARAF personnel well in a permissive environment (i.e., sovereign nation). This caused friction and

put into motion unnecessary assets, units, and capabilities.”⁸ In an interagency environment, civilian organizations often do not have clearly-defined, decision-making processes, which can be challenging to military organizations that are accustomed to making decisions and acting quickly.⁹ Organizational friction points caused by differences in culture consistently arise between the military and civilian agency communities; these cultural misunderstandings are only heightened in high stress environments. The 101st Airborne Division, accustomed to quickly solving problems, had to adapt by learning how it could support interagency partners without unnecessarily taking over and overtly militarizing a mostly civilian response to the epidemic. Over time, the internal conflicts eased through greater interagency exposure and coordination.

Both of these case studies, RAF in Africa and the 101st Airborne Division supporting the Ebola response in West Africa, are clear examples of how unsynchronized organizations can generate real and direct challenges for troops and civilians alike. The following section proposes several recommendations on how AFRICOM and State can alleviate some of these integration challenges for operations, planning, and policy.

The Ebola crisis also highlighted the organizational culture challenges that exist when integrating interagency partners at the tactical level.

Recommendations

Based on the previous case studies, we propose the following recommendations:

- **Empower lower-level staffs and subordinate elements to directly coordinate with interagency partners.**

While AFRICOM's staff may serve as a model for interagency integration, the effects of the integration are not being realized at the lowest levels of coordination. Specifically, interagency counterparts and USARAF are not integrated enough to reduce coordination problems for the RAF units implementing AFRICOM initiatives. AFRICOM should grant direct liaison authorizations for subordinate units, such as the RAF brigades, to allow subordinate staffs to clearly understand security cooperation objectives and provide for sufficient logistical coordination of personnel movement to Africa. RAF units should be free to reach out to embassies and Offices of Security Cooperation to decrease synchronization difficulties.

- **Re-examine advantages and disadvantages of interagency integration in JIACGs versus formal staff integration.**

JIACGs are the primary means for interagency coordination in other combatant commands like PACOM. One-stop-shops have advantages in simplifying interagency coordination but disadvantages in neglecting integration into other staff planning operations. Due to previous GAO critiques, AFRICOM has sought to improve coordination by maintaining integration across formal staff sections and, in addition, implement a monthly interagency working forum to bring all partners together to address coordination concerns. As AFRICOM continues to explore this reform, interagency coordination may improve as this process is institutionalized. However, it may be beneficial for certain high-priority missions (CVE, RAF, etc.) to form an *ad hoc* JIACG to address the interagency coordination and policy synchronization concerns.

- **Increase interagency integration to subordinate staffs beginning at the strategic level.**

Liaisons and political advisors are not as effective solutions as interagency staffs who are empowered to make command decisions. AFRICOMs subordinate commands, such as USARAF, should be empowered with the same level of interagency integration as AFRICOM in order to improve day-to-day coordination. This reform will require interagency partners to increase their personnel commitment to a higher level than two percent in AFRICOM. It is a worthwhile investment that will increase effectiveness of both the DoD and State within Africa.

- **Increase structures for information sharing between Defense and State in Africa.**

Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's January 2012 strategic guidance recognized the importance of sharing information and its cost if done poorly to achieve national security objectives. As shown, stove-piped information sharing within TOC and CVE strategies in West Africa undermines success. Lead organizations under both strategies should build information-sharing mechanisms to increase effectiveness of both strategies to counter extremist nonstate actors in the region. An assessment is needed to understand how to better increase unity of effort between both DoD and State for these similar efforts.

- **Long-term recommendation: Reform COCOM structure.**

While outside the scope of this paper, much has been written about potential "Goldwater-Nichols Part II" reforms. One such recommendation, articulated in a

2014 Atlantic Council study led by General James Jones, USMC (Retired), recommended reforming the COCOM structure by appointing a civilian head to the organization, reportable to the President, with a military deputy (for warfighting) and civilian deputy (for interagency missions). This civilian leadership position would focus whole-of-government strategies for each combatant command's region. This senior appointee position, likewise, would outrank country ambassadors in order to apply cohesive regional policies with all elements of national power. While this recommendation is currently not feasible because of a lack of political interest, it represents a "big idea" approach to solving policy coordination and synchronization problems across an entire region for the U.S. interagency.

Conclusion

Despite problems in interagency coordination, the recurring observation is that AFRICOM is an adaptable organization, open, willing, and responsive to change. Perhaps above all the other combatant commands, AFRICOM has served as a laboratory to explore new models of interagency integration. In the cases shown, despite occasional hiccups and problems, AFRICOM and its subordinate commands continue day after day to solve problems to accomplish U.S. objectives in Africa. None of the problems highlighted are insurmountable but only require small changes to organizational structure and increasing a spirit of cooperation among all U.S. partners operating in Africa. The authors are hopeful that AFRICOM will continue to be a testbed for new structures and methods to improve whole-of-government approaches to Africa's unique challenges. **IAJ**

NOTES

- 1 U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Regionally Aligned Forces: DOD Could Enhance Army Brigades' Efforts in Africa by Improving Activity Coordination and Mission-Specific Preparation" Washington, 2015, p. 18.
- 2 Ibid., 38.
- 3 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Newsletter Lessons and Best Practices No. 15-09, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater: Creating Conditions for Success in West Africa*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 2015, pp. 5–6.
- 4 Ross Lightsey, "Fighting Ebola: An Interagency Collaboration Paradigm." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 81, March 29, 2016, <<http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/702033/fighting-ebola-an-interagency-collaboration-paradigm.aspx>>, accessed on May 10, 2016.
- 5 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report 16-05, *101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Operation United Assistance: Lessons and Best Practices*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 2015, p. 33.
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- 7 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Bulletin Lessons and Best Practices No. 15-16, *Operation United Assistance: Report for Follow-On Forces*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2015, p. 7.
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West Africa: A “Ticking Time Bomb” or an Opportunity to Advance U.S. National Security Interests?

by Raymond Everhart, John Morris and Mohamadou Amar

As international relations expert Francis Fukuyama wrote, “Since the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order.”¹ The turmoil-ridden West African states are the result of a fractured legacy of colonialism, which has brought intractable, sectarian conflicts throughout the region over the past 50 years. As a former colonial region, West Africa did not become contested during the Cold War because of the lack of resources and influential powers within the area. The rise of militant, Islamic terrorism further shifted the focus of the U.S. and other leading powers to the Middle East and other regions of strategic interest. The void created by Western powers’ absenteeism and the consequential weakening of West Africa states left the region vulnerable to transnational terrorism, epidemic diseases, organized crime, and human right violations at the hands of the different political regimes.

The Sahel region, stretching in a band from west to east across the center of Africa, south of the Sahara Desert, garners little or no attention from the international community, despite years of terrorist activity from organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram. Furthermore, nations in the region lack the political will to take any action against terrorist organizations.² The uncontrolled borders and the vast lawless areas allow militant groups to move and act freely with little interference. The arid Sahel is now the breeding ground for trafficking illicit small arms and narcotics, terrorism, kidnappings, and assassinations. The AQIM attacks in Mali in November 2015, in Burkina Faso in January 2016, and in the Ivory Coast in

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March 2016 claimed the lives of 68 people, mostly civilians, including several foreigners.³ Additionally, AQIM's audacity to attack in the southern, Christian-dominated parts of the Ivory Coast might catalyze an outbreak of religion-based conflict given the country's recent history of civil strife between its Christian and Muslim populations.⁴

In the past year, Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2015, flexed its muscles and expanded its reach, attacking beyond its normal areas of operation in Nigeria and crossing into neighboring countries. These attacks prove, beyond a doubt, that the terrorist network is expanding in West Africa, facilitating the spread of international terrorism. In fact, the worsening security vacuum in the region increases collaboration among militant groups, which allows them to strengthen their forces in the West African region and increase their reach. Meanwhile, ISIS deepened its foothold in Libya. Unlike the situation in the Middle East where Al-Qaeda and ISIS are contenders, some of these terrorist branches in Africa are reportedly collaborating in arms procurement and training.⁵ Today, Islamic terrorist organizations and insurgencies have risen up and gained control of enough territory to establish *de facto* safe havens, and they are striving to dismantle regional governments and implement Islamic law, primarily in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.⁶

Another significant threat to U.S. security interests is epidemic diseases that spike in West Africa. In 2014, the outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD), which caused more than 11,000 deaths, created tremendous fear across the international community. The U.S. approached the EVD outbreak as a national security matter and took appropriate actions, deploying 4,000 personnel to West Africa to assist with the outbreak. Additionally, the fact that the EVD outbreak occurred in a conflict-driven zone with

terrorist organizations, such as Boko Haram or AQIM, present raised further concerns about bio-terrorism.⁷ As the U.S. Ambassador in Senegal noted, the next crisis in West Africa could be another epidemic or natural disaster calling for a humanitarian response or a terrorist threat calling for a different kind of response.⁸

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The U.S. Policy and Involvement in West Africa

The U.S. foreign policy in West Africa is not usually thought of in terms of a direct approach to security. In fact, the Obama Administration's Africa policy is based on U.S. "fundamental interests in promoting democratic institutions and good governance, peace and stability, and sustained economic growth..."⁹ The U.S. post-2001, anti-terrorism campaign in the Sub-Sahara is nearly a "hands off" approach that focuses on security cooperation through a combination of indirect military aid and joint, small-scale exercises to build capability and capacity with partner nations and regional powers. The U.S. security cooperation programs in West Africa include but are not limited to the Pan Sahel Initiative, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, African Crisis Response Initiative, African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Joint Combined Exchange Training, and Exercise Flintlock.¹⁰ Yet, all these efforts

failed to significantly improve the capabilities of partner nations' military and civilian institutions.

Capacity-building success is achieved by persistent, small-footprint engagements; investing resources in training partner nations; and developing educational institutions in concert with international partners.

The Need for a New U.S. Approach in West Africa

Despite all U.S. efforts in West Africa, generally referred to as failures by most pundits, the Sahel region continues to witness the degradation of the West African states. The degradation is leading to internal unrest fueled by multiple, interrelated, causal factors from poverty, human rights violations, and bad governance and corruption to ethnic tensions, narcotic trafficking, epidemic disease, and terrorism.¹¹ Previous U.S. efforts to counter insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan have achieved some appreciable success but only provided temporary solutions to abominable regimes and freely-operating, bad actors.

For more than a decade, the U.S. government has pursued a national security policy that has been prohibitively expensive in blood and treasure, but without credible allies in these regions, long-lasting stability and peace are hard to come by. The coordinated, small-scale footprint, enduring-engagement approach proposed in this article provides the U.S. national leadership with strategic options for advancing the interests of national security without committing large combat forces to costly, long-lasting, counterinsurgency operations.

The U.S. national interests in West Africa demand an enduring ability to build defense

capabilities of partner nations to counter regional security threats, respond to crises, and promote stability. Capacity-building success is achieved by persistent, small-footprint engagements; investing resources in training partner nations; and developing educational institutions in concert with international partners. High-quality training and strong educational institutions develop the human capital necessary for long-term capacity building. Sustained, small-scale engagements and capacity building facilitated through actions taken by the a joint, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIM) community assist partner nations in deterring and defeating transnational threats to promote regional security. The three-dimensional approach proposed in this article to diffuse the “ticking time bomb” of West Africa’s turmoil is low visibility, low risk, and low cost. It emphasizes capacity building through a combination of enduring engagement, patience, and coordinated efforts across the U.S. interagency.

Implementing High-Quality Training and Strong Educational Institutions

The U.S. must improve security force training with partner nations in West Africa by providing increased access to educational professionals and institutions. West African nations have benefited from a number of U.S. security programs designed to educate their militaries, including ACOTA, IMET, CTFP, and GPOI. However, most of these programs are limited to a few individuals (e.g., IMET) or tailored to a specific mission (e.g., GPOI intended to support UN peacekeeping missions). As a result, these efforts do not result in an increase of the overall effectiveness of West African militaries.¹²

In order to improve the effectiveness of these security programs, partner nation young leaders must have increased access to U.S. civilian and military educational institutions. Furthermore, the U.S. should explore the techniques used by

enemies such as ISIS to successfully train people of other cultures within West Africa.

The Department of State (State) currently manages the overall U.S. security assistance program funds through the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in concert with the Department of Defense (DoD), which executes the military programs. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages security assistance through five accounts: (1) foreign military financing; (2) peacekeeping operations; (3) IMET; (4) nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs; and (5) the Pakistan counterinsurgency capability fund.¹³ On the other hand, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command executes the U.S. Army's security assistance and foreign military sales programs for 145 different countries and agencies.¹⁴ The complexity of these programs, operating under multiple cabinet secretaries, requires a strong partnership, complementary in nature, between State and DoD to ensure they are adequately funded and effectively executed.

Increasing U.S. budget constraints and problems associated with deficit spending will continue to challenge the U.S. government's ability to implement security assistance programs. Therefore, the U.S. must take a more refined, targeted approach by incorporating effective lessons learned, and ensure it trains the right nation on the correct tasks. Over the past 35 years, there are a slew of successful partnering experiences to learn from, including operations in Colombia, the Philippines, and even Iraq.

The other side of building partner capacity is a targeted focus on the partnership region. One of the most important considerations is the stability of the nations the U.S. chooses to support and the commitment of their civilian and military leaderships. The U.S. assesses a nation's stability through its corruption index, democratic structures, civil-military relations, and influence of regional powers. The diplomatic, military, information, economic (DIME) concept can be

used as a model in assessing a nation's stability in those areas.

Next, assessing the nation's capability shortfalls will determine what capabilities they lack, their ability to improve those capabilities, and the ability of the U.S. to provide those shortfalls.

...the U.S. must determine where to partner or provide security assistance to each nation based on cultural similarities/ colonial history, technological capabilities, and logistical reach.

Finally, the U.S. must determine where to partner or provide security assistance to each nation based on cultural similarities/colonial history, technological capabilities, and logistical reach. In the case of the Ivory Coast, the U.S. could look to France, a former colonial power in West Africa, for both leadership in country training and cultural expertise. France may request U.S. logistical support and technical expertise. For instance, France provides the infantry trainers, while the U.S. provides trainers for aviation engine mechanics and transport aircraft for moving personnel.

As a result of limited space in educational institutions and shrinking defense budgets, the U.S. must revisit its options for providing highly-specialized training and partnership. Currently, foreign military students receive training at the Army's centers of excellence and military colleges (Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and the Maneuver Center of Excellence and the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security Studies [WHINSEC], both at Fort Benning, GA) under the IMET and other educational programs. In 2015, the WHINSEC trained 1,983 students from 24 countries, primarily from Western Hemisphere.¹⁵

Programs that train large numbers of students are not available in African nations. In the civilian arena, the U.S. should replicate current efforts underway in Middle Eastern nations, such as Qatar, where major universities, including Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, have satellite campuses in Qatar's Education City.¹⁶ While this may not be possible in all of West Africa, wealthier nations such as Nigeria could host pilot projects to institute a similar model that brings expanded U.S. quality higher education to West Africa.

Militarily, the security assistance/partnership model continues to follow the mantra, "Do more with less."

Militarily, the security assistance/partnership model continues to follow the mantra, "Do more with less." Consequently, barring an attack on the U.S., future military budgets will decrease or stagnate for the foreseeable future. Conversely, the military's role in Phase 0, shaping operations, continues to grow. One way to bring quality military education and training to a broader array of international partners is by leveraging technology. As connectivity grows, military training centers and colleges can exploit online training to provide a comparable quality of education to students in West Africa. U.S. military colleges currently employ similar models for students enrolled in distance learning.

Understanding the Enemy's Culture

Currently, despite a limited budget, ISIS is exporting its culture, tactics, techniques, and procedures and is effectively recruiting Muslims around the world to fight for its cause. On the eastern frontiers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia is currently able to convince and train parties sympathetic to

its cause inside neighboring NATO nations. In 2014, General David Rodriguez, former commander of the U.S. Africa Command, stated that ISIS was training and building the logistics capabilities with aligned groups in eastern Libya.¹⁷ ISIS also targets young, disenfranchised youth sympathetic to its message and looking to be part of a successful cause.¹⁸

Although the U.S. and allied nations successfully executed security force assistance over the past 50 years, they also made mistakes along the way. The U.S. must incorporate these lessons learned to build a targeted approach to future security assistance endeavors that must include methods that employ modern technology to allow increased access to U.S. military and civilian education and training institutions. Furthermore, the U.S. must look to the enemy for new techniques to train with fewer resources and focus training on the appropriate tasks.

Incorporating the Regional Aligned Forces and the National Guard's State Partnership Program

The U.S. in concert with partners has the resources and ability to promote regional security in West Africa through enduring and sustainable relationships involving regional aligned forces (RAF) and the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). The RAF are those Army units allocated to combatant commands and prepared by the Army for regional missions in specific geographical areas. They include the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army reserve. SPP is a joint DoD program executed by individual states and managed by the National Guard in coordination with the State Department. SPP is an innovative, low-cost, small-footprint, security cooperation program that links a state's National Guard with a partner nation's military/security forces in a cooperative, mutually-beneficial relationship that supports combatant commanders and U.S. embassy objectives.¹⁹

While Africa faces challenges due to poor governance, threats from violent extremist organizations, corruption, and poverty, there is a potential for democratization and economic development.²⁰ State spearheads the U.S. efforts to develop partner nations in Africa and advance national security interests in order to achieve stability and security in the region. The U.S. has embassies in more than 45 African countries that can synchronize a JIM approach to build partner capacity using a whole-of-government approach with all elements of national power (DIME).²¹ Since National Guard and reserve forces reside in the public/state domain, they are more capable to spread the diplomatic and military successes of the SPP within the U.S. and partner nations. Additionally, reconnecting the RAF can be the first step of a whole-of-government approach to building a long-term, mutually-beneficial partnership to secure a safe and stable West Africa. RAF creates an opportunity to deter and defeat potential transnational threats by allowing the governments of fragile, fractured, or failing host nations to partner with the U.S. military to train their security forces. This security force training, also known as security force assistance (SFA), is one of the U.S. Army's newest core competencies. RAF conducting SFA is a method by which the U.S. will do more with less to enable secure and stable West Africa.

SFA training through the RAF program allows West African nations to benefit by building capacity using a tailored plan coordinated through the Department of State. This program expands capacity-building efforts by employing conventional forces to conduct operations normally in the realm of special operations forces (SOF). SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to execute special operations core activities: direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency,

information operations, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations.²²

[Special Operations Forces] are the synchronizers who nest the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan within the ambassador's integrated country strategy and the security sector reform programs.

SOF are the synchronizers who nest the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan within the ambassador's integrated country strategy and the security sector reform programs. The integration of SOF ensures enduring engagement and the achievement of mutually-beneficial goals and objectives. SOF are extremely limited in number due to their specialty and selection criteria. RAF can now fill training gaps by training host nations on simplistic and more complex, mission command functions, freeing up SOF to conduct missions that fall more into their core competencies. This means RAF will be required to have some tailored regional and specialized training in order to transition into a JIM integrator. This does not mean SOF will not be utilized at all, it means they can use their core competencies to address the capability shortfalls of a fragile country in need. As with all U.S. forces, SOF is scalable as the mission and priority dictate. These new requirements and evolving relationships create new apertures to adapt and innovate forces to meet the demands of West Africa aligned with the interests of U.S. national security.

Should The Army Warfighting Challenges Be Integrated?

The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review, Quadrennial

Diplomacy and Development Review, and the Army Strategic Planning Guidance have an underlying, though not well articulated, message: You will work together. Integration and intelligence sharing will be the keystones for West African success as the U.S. adapts and innovates. The U.S. government has a responsibility to create the conditions to leverage the intelligence that support a secure and stable environment for the West African people. Intelligence, integration, and innovation have the ability to transform perspective and processes faster with more purpose and fluidity than operating within a specific branch of service. The 2016 Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfCs) are 20 first-order problems, the solutions to which improve the combat effectiveness of the current and future force.²³ AWfCs spur discussion and guide the Army's innovation process to answer evolving global security and stability challenges. AWfCs, such as shape the security environment, provide SFA, and ensure interoperability and operate in a JIM environment, provide the framework for intelligence, integration, and innovation to take hold in supporting the strategic objectives of Africa outlined in the 2015 NSS.

In order to efficiently and effectively innovate, there must be an existing environment where intelligence is shared and leveraged through integration.

Intelligence, integration, and innovation should be framed as such: In order to efficiently and effectively innovate, there must be an existing environment where intelligence is shared and leveraged through integration. Assessing the existing environment and providing intelligence to an integrated JIM approach will allow the U.S. to frame the issues affecting the current situation and provide innovative options to adapt and

mitigate complex, unforeseen situations. This ability to frame and reframe along the way are keys to understanding what will be required of a whole-of-government investment in West Africa. U.S. resources are limited, but ideas to design options are unlimited.

Shape the security environment (AWfC#2) is foundational to Africa's interests. State is the lead for a building partnership capacity objective that resides in DoD Phase 0 of the joint planning process construct. Phase 0 focuses on preventing conflict and shaping security environments. West Africa is a huge opportunity to highlight the ability to shape a complex security environment with RAF and consolidate gains through a modern peace-building approach. The continuous reframing of the operational environment through a JIM lens allows resources to be leveraged more efficiently by building partner capacity in Phase 0. The Army's "prevent, shape, win" strategy can be viewed as, "Win by successfully shaping the operational environment in order to prevent conflict." AWfC #2 can serve as the catalyst for successful gains using intelligence, integration, and innovation.

Ensure interoperability and operate in JIM environment (AWfC #14) vectors the JIM community to integrate to ensure unity of effort by creating a shared understanding through the seamless planning, coordination, and execution of operations. This resonates in Africa where so many different operations must be coordinated for a synchronized and lasting effect.

Provide SFA (AWfC #3) highlights RAF and their ability to increase local, regional, and host nation security force capability, capacity, and effectiveness to protect the people of West Africa. Having RAF as an effective means to provide SFA will be a step in the right direction to consolidate efforts in Phase 0.

West Africa, RAF and the AWfCs

The unrest in West Africa is becoming

a growing threat to U.S. national security. Historically, the U.S. has made positive impacts in the region using coordinated efforts through a whole-of-government approach. Similarly, for any security engagement to succeed, it must be coordinated across U.S. government agencies. The U.S. Army cannot operate independently and expect to build partner capacity in West Africa. Partner building capacity can be achieved through SFA by using the RAF in West Africa. Successful capacity building activities must look at all options and capabilities within all elements of national power.

As the lead agency for foreign policy, State must ensure U.S. goals and objectives in West Africa are communicated across the JIM community to blend all efforts in a whole-of-government approach. State should ensure foreign policy objectives are nested with the national security strategy and synchronized with DoD personnel deploying to West Africa. It is equally important to create a common goal by considering partner and ally goals and interests by analyzing conditions on the ground. Currently, RAF and the SPP provide the necessary means, but will the end state change and, therefore, require the AWfCs to be reframed?

The AWfCs are designed to address the constant and evolving nature of the problems the U.S. faces; however, there is no forum to collaborate on the joint warfighting challenges the U.S. faces in the current and future operating environments. The AWfCs need more “buy-in” and involvement across the JIM community in order address global security and stability challenges through collaboration. Collaboration will allow the JIM community to innovate faster than the perceived enemy can or will.

The U.S. current efforts in West Africa to build partner capacity are the result of lessons learned from past missions and will rely on efforts at the tactical level. Future U.S. engagements in West Africa must leverage every element of national power efficiently in order

to maximize a mutually-beneficial return on investment.

As the lead agency for foreign policy, State must ensure U.S. goals and objectives in West Africa are communicated across the JIM community to blend all efforts in a whole-of-government approach.

Conclusion

West Africa’s rising tide of epidemic diseases, poverty, organized crime, human rights violations, and an inevitable drive into transnational terrorism is a threat to U.S. national security objectives in the region. Despite the U.S. past commitment to consolidate peace and stability in West Africa, a new wave of challenges caused by global terror groups who want to impose strict Islamic law in portions of the Sahel region is creating a security crisis of epic proportions. Pundits continue to scrutinized U.S. efforts in the West Africa because of a lack of persistent engagement using a whole-of-government approach to address the wide range of issues. While enduring engagement using a whole-of-government approach seems the way of the future, it certainly is easier said than done.

Effective coordination or delivery of security assistance programs is often impeded by challenges related to the bureaucracy of U.S. government stakeholders. Furthermore, the inability of partner nations to endorse and sustain capabilities or their lack of shared security interests with the U.S. constitutes another roadblock to capacity-building activities. Success in security cooperation and capacity building is strongly correlated to partners with favorable contextual characteristics. For instance, the security assistance programs in

Colombia and the Philippines have succeeded and are widely described as models of effective capacity building thanks to the host nations' leadership commitment and enthusiasm. Conversely, the failure to replicate these successful models in Iraq and Afghanistan is, in part, related to the U.S. strategy to quickly develop security forces necessary to meet the pressing demands of an exit strategy without a mature government in place.

The solution is a hybrid approach that is more integrated and consolidated to fill the gaps in capacity by building the right mix of U.S. government interagency capabilities. The 2013 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 instructed national security agencies to improve, streamline, and better organize all U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts. PPD 23 success in West Africa will mainly depend on the willingness of the DoD and State to synchronize their efforts in executing security cooperation and building partner capacity. Historically, DoD and State have not had open lines of communication at the field or operational level. This chronic failure to communicate across the foreign policy stakeholders creates a divide that has led to frustrations on both sides and, too often, charges of building partner capacity failure.

State possesses the experience, placement, and diplomatic tools critical to advance U.S. national security interests, and it employs diplomatic efforts to strengthen alliances, treaties, and partnerships to facilitate enduring engagement with host nations. For instance, Senegal signed a defense cooperation agreement to ease access for U.S. troops, should they need to deploy to the West African nation in case of a security or humanitarian crisis, and to facilitate the continued presence of the U.S. military in Senegal. Such an accord is unprecedented between the U.S. and a Sub-Saharan country in Africa and comes amid heightened extremist threats in the region following major attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast.²⁴

State is also critical to addressing human security concerns such as food, water, health, education, and employment, which are root causes of regional instability, humanitarian concerns, and other transnational issues.²⁵ Furthermore, as chiefs of mission and direct representatives to the President, Ambassadors should serve as active coordinators for the security programs. State does not have necessary capabilities, such as personnel and funding, and the operational knowledge necessary to manage large-scale, capacity-building activities in West Africa. On the other hand, the DoD with SOF and RAF has the human resources and the know-how to effectively and efficiently conduct security programs in West Africa, but it lacks much of the cultural and linguistic capabilities.

In sum, the hybrid approach proposed in this article requires both the DoD and State to complement each other's capabilities in order to promote regional security and advance U.S. national security interests in the region. Both the DoD and State have doctrine to address capacity-building activities, but this proposed hybrid approach requires a unified way of thinking and executing security engagement. A shared doctrine crafted by the DoD and State to address a capacity-building strategy can be a good starting point.

Finally, the U.S. should work with major allies in the region to coordinate their respective foreign assistance programs. Countries such as France and Germany have been actively engaged in West Africa. Over the past few years, the French military has waged campaigns against AQIM and its allies in Mali, resulting in the country reestablishing control of its sovereign territory. France's luxury of having viable partners in this region facilitated its success. Therefore, the U.S. should provide support to France that complements its own security engagement in the region. **IAJ**

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Is the United States Ready for a Deadly Airborne Disease Outbreak?

Lessons from Recent Experience in Evacuating Patients
Exposed to Ebola from West Africa to the United States

by Conrad R. Wilmoski and Meghan C. Muller

In March 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention declared an Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa.¹ This was the most significant Ebola outbreak in history, with more than 10,000 Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases reported. Ebola is a highly-lethal, infectious disease transmitted through infected body fluids for which there is no vaccine or cure. Most of the cases were concentrated in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. Thousands of humanitarians and healthcare workers deployed to these countries; many were U.S. citizens.² Their work in the region put them at risk of exposure to the Ebola virus. To assure humanitarians would deploy to the region in response to the crises, the U.S. government offered a mechanism to assist them if they became ill. The U.S. Department of State (State) has a team of visionary healthcare specialists who developed a program to repatriate U.S. citizens exposed to Ebola. However, before State could evacuate an infectious patient, it needed adequate medical transportation and a hospital to admit them. This article discusses lessons from building capability, sustaining capacity, and gaining access to critical healthcare resources for evacuating EVD patients during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

During the crisis, the U.S. government provided foreign states and international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), access to a unique medical evacuation service. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 607, as amended, authorizes the U.S. government to provide assistance to foreign states and international organizations on a reimbursable basis. In addition to evacuating American citizens to the U.S., State assisted the WHO in the evacuation of humanitarians exposed to EVD to European hospitals with biocontainment capabilities. Thus, the WHO became the responding humanitarian's gateway into the Ebola evacuation system. The U.S. government and its partners developed many of the unique processes needed to conduct these complex medical

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evacuations after the Ebola crisis began.

The U.S. can prepare better for a public health crisis. A number of infectious disease experts have raised concerns on preparedness for infection control, patient isolation, personal protective equipment, and frequency in staff training to treat patients with these exotic diseases. In 2006, infectious disease experts suggested the U.S. develop a network of biological containment medical treatment units to prepare for an outbreak or other biological crisis.³ Further, experts proposed that the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) manage these units as a national resource in coordination with local authorities and health officials. This is not a novel idea because other nations have similar networks. However, it is an excellent idea to ensure the government is prepared to respond during a health crisis.

The European Union is prepared to defend against an exotic disease epidemic.⁴ The European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases is a network of hospitals with biocontainment for treating patients with deadly infectious diseases.⁵ The European Union's researchers collected data on hospitals reported to have special isolation capabilities and stratified them in a way similar to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's four biosafety levels. Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) refers to the deadliest diseases for which there is no known cure or vaccine. The researchers used a mail survey to collect data to calculate the biocontainment beds per population. Their network is extensive compared to the U.S.; however, the European Union struggled with a limited capacity to transport patients exposed to EVD via air ambulance evacuation. Moreover, it did not perform site visits to validate the capabilities, and the European Commission faces challenges regulating beds across member states.

Europe's thorough record of biocontainment and isolation beds has continued to improve since the latest 2013 update. The Ebola outbreak and

evacuation of humanitarians infected with EVD encouraged further investigation into Europe's capability. A separate group of researchers, on behalf of the Platform for European Preparedness Against (Re-)emerging Epidemics (PREPARE) consortium, surveyed hospitals in 38 European and West Asian countries via questionnaire to analyze their preparedness to care for patients infected with EVD. They found that 111 (47 percent) of the surveyed hospitals would admit patients infected with EVD.⁶ Their research identified gaps in preparedness and highlights how hospitals are training and preparing in response to the Ebola outbreak. One particular gap in preparedness is evacuating an infected patient from the field or other medical facility to a hospital with a biocontainment care unit.

In 2006, infectious disease experts suggested the U.S. develop a network of biological containment medical treatment units to prepare for an outbreak or other biological crisis.

In September 2014, the European Commission examined hospitals among their member states to gain an understanding of the European Union's bed capacity. The researchers surveyed the hospitals for isolation and biocontainment bed capacity for patients infected with EVD. Unfortunately, the report is not available to the public and remains sensitive in nature, protected by the European Commission. However, select WHO staff had access to the report in order to connect with hospitals potentially capable of admitting EVD patients. Interestingly, the report suggests the member states have a minimum of 253 isolation beds and approximately 82 beds available for patients with EVD. This suggests they are more equipped than the U.S. in regards to capacity and dispersion of resources to treat patients with

Ebola. The difference in data collection from the others is that the member state authorities allegedly provided input as to how many patients they would accept for admission.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks, the U.S. government developed the [Aeromedical Biological Containment System (ABCS)]...

Building Capability

Building relationships with institutions capable of caring for patients with unique, exotic, infectious diseases underpinned State's medical evacuation program. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention classifies EVD as a BSL-4 infectious agent, which requires the highest level of biocontainment. State explored hospitals that support high-level containment research laboratories as potential receiving facilities for patients exposed to EVD. Three of five potential hospitals (Emory University Hospital, Atlanta; National Institutes of Health, Bethesda; and Nebraska Medical Center, Omaha) agreed to participate in the program. Not only did State need to identify hospitals to admit patients with EVD, it also needed to determine the procedures and means to transport a potentially contagious patient from the airport to the hospital.

Transporting patients infected with the deadliest kind of disease is a unique process. The State's Office of Medical Services supervised the air and ground medical evacuation of American citizens with EVD from West Africa. In 2014, State repatriated eleven patients from West Africa exposed to EVD and moved two domestic patients via an Aeromedical Biological Containment System (ABCS) aboard a specially-modified aircraft. The ABCS is a chamber that

creates a negative pressure environment within the cabin of a mid-size aircraft, such as the Gulf Stream G3. The system maintains the highest level of infection control while providing the ability to deliver full spectrum care to the patient during evacuation. Unfortunately, this system can only transport one infectious patient at a time. Federal and local government authorities in coordination with the admitting hospital organized patient transfers from the aircraft to the hospital under the highest biocontainment conditions.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks, the U.S. government developed the ABCS as part of an initiative to provide a response to biological threats. The system supported the U.S. Army biocontainment program. With no biological threat materializing, funding was shifted, and the ABCS government contract expired in 2007, leaving the Department of Defense (DoD) without a biological containment aeromedical evacuation system. Therefore, DoD did not have the ability to transport patients infected with the deadliest contagious disease by air. However, the contractor wisely stowed the system for future use. Fortunately, at the beginning of the 2014 Ebola crisis, Dr. William Walters, Director of Operational Medicine at State, who was familiar with the ABCS system, reissued the contract.

Dr. Walters' actions underscore the important principle to prepare for a crisis before one begins. Having unique resources to select from enables a timely response during a crisis. The U.S. led the international community in responding to requests for assistance in evacuating humanitarian healthcare workers from West Africa during the outbreak. However, it had been quite some time since any federal agency had prepared for an operation under such unique circumstances.

By October 2014, State evacuated five U.S. citizens from West Africa and two patients infected with Ebola from Dallas, TX, to one of

the few U.S. hospitals with a biocontainment unit using the unique aircraft with the ABCS. The first few patient transfer operations from the aircraft to the hospital were similar to a successive comparison method. There was a consensus of goals, but policies and best practices were still to be determined. The key federal departments involved in the process were State, DHS, Homeland Security, and Transportation. State and local governments in the public health and safety sectors were instrumental in the local access and management of operations, such as receiving the air ambulance at the local airfield, planning and executing the ground ambulance transportation, and performing hospital admission responsibilities.

Local special ambulance teams, organized to transport infected and potentially infectious patients, conducted the ground transportation for these patients at receiving medical facilities. It is important to note that several months after the outbreak began and a number of evacuation missions had taken place, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began to provide substantial guidance for the special circumstances. It provided guidance on its website for Emergency Medical Services, medical first responders, and law enforcement responding to an incident involving a person potentially infected with EVD.⁷ The methods described here are for controlled movement of confirmed EVD patients. This is useful to fill the gaps in guidance for suspected EVD patient transfer to a medical facility to provide care in the highest level of biocontainment conditions. It is prudent to approach patient transports with the appropriate infection control precautions.

Transporting patients from the air ambulance to the hospital requires special techniques, equipment, and security. Category “A” diseases are classified similar to BSL-4 pathogens that lack cures, treatments, or vaccines. Because EVD is a hallmark Category “A” disease, ambulance teams employ the highest level of

infection control precautions when transporting these patients—the same precautions as if it were an airborne transmission disease.⁸

Special dedicated ambulance teams are the gold standard for transporting patients exposed to EVD.^{9/10} The DHHS is overall responsible for the ground transport. State has a supporting role, and at the beginning of the outbreak response, it significantly contributed to developing policies and procedures for the operation. Any plan to care for patients infected with Category “A” pathogens must include a ground transport capability and intensive care under appropriate biological containment conditions, such as a biocontainment unit.

Special dedicated ambulance teams are the gold standard for transporting patients exposed to EVD.

Teams transfer patients with EVD from the airport to the hospital using a regulated controlled movement process. State experts in the public health and safety sectors compiled a Biocontainment Ground Transport Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) as a guide for interagency procedures and biocontainment transport. Experts working for State, Grady Emergency Medical Services, and University of Nebraska Medical Center informed the procedures and protocols through best practices and action research. These organizations were leading the emergency medical transportation industry in developing industry standards. Therefore, experts in these organizations shared their knowledge with the ambulance service industry via academic publications.¹¹ The documents detail equipment and instructions for using items to protect equipment and personnel from contamination.

Ground ambulance operations for transporting a patient exposed to a Category “A”

pathogen take place through five general phases.

Phase one, planning and coordinating the transport with government and private stakeholders, begins with notification of an evacuation mission and continues throughout the operation. Each organization and state is different, so it is important to know the stakeholders and how to engage them.

Phase two, preparing the ambulance(s) and team(s) for transport, begins with securing an admission agreement with the receiving facility and ends when they receive the patient.

Phase three, patient transport from reception location to the biocontainment unit, begins when the ambulance team takes control of the patient and ends when the ambulance and crewmembers are at the decontamination site.

Phase four, equipment and personnel decontamination, begins when the ambulance team is in position for decontamination and ends when all personnel and equipment are decontaminated, and medical waste is secured in accordance with local biohazard waste management protocols.

In October 2014...DoD, in coordination with other government agencies, began an initiative to develop a biocontainment unit capable of holding multiple patients during transportation on select U.S. Air Force transport aircraft.

Finally, phase five includes health monitoring of high-risk personnel, preparing the ambulance and other necessary pieces of equipment for the next mission, procurement and reconstitution of supplies, and other administrative activities. This phase begins immediately after decontamination and ends when the next mission begins or the incubation period has passed.

Ground ambulances transport patients

from the evacuation aircraft to a hospital with a biocontainment unit for definitive care. These special, medical care facilities provide definitive care for patients with exotic, infectious disease and biological threats, such as EVD. The staff delivers intensive medical care to patients while maintaining the same infection control standards that the highest biosafety level requires.¹² Government authorities and experts from the hospital work closely with the ground transport element to maintain the biological containment standards throughout the ground movement operation. Currently, there are no reports of nosocomial infection to healthcare workers from patients admitted to biocontainment units in the U.S. Given the high quality of U.S. hospitals, this is expected.

The DoD should reconsider policies to provide care throughout the disease cycle outside the U.S. for service members exposed to Category “A” pathogens. We recommend they inculcate the lessons from transporting patients exposed to EVD and transfer this knowledge into a contingency plan in which patients receive treatment in a capable medical facility, such as the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland.

In October 2014, the DoD realized the possibility that service members could be at risk of exposure to EVD. particularly, service members deploying to West Africa in response to the Ebola outbreak. Moreover, State was limited to evacuating one patient per ABCS. Therefore, DoD, in coordination with other government agencies, began an initiative to develop a biocontainment unit capable of holding multiple patients during transportation on select U.S. Air Force transport aircraft. Although not ready for use by the end of the outbreak, they did build a Transport Isolation System capable of holding multiple infectious patients during transport.

Although this initiative aimed to address transporting multiple infectious patients in a single flight, the department failed to address how

to transport infectious patients using a military helicopter. It is obvious that some patients will be in places with terrain that restricts vehicle traffic, such as a dense jungle and mountainous area. A helicopter with a biocontainment system will be useful in circumstances where symptomatic Ebola patients walk through the jungles of Sierra Leone and Liberia to a road in order to ride on a vehicle to the treatment center.

Sustaining Capacity

Strong relationships foster capacity and sustainment for future crisis response. Visiting medical institutions within the U.S. and its partners is invaluable to understand the environment, address potential challenges, and build relationships. Meeting stakeholders and visiting the facilities provided a foundation for understanding the U.S. bed capacity for patients evacuated from West Africa. Additionally, site visits aimed to strengthen relationships and establish partnerships with stakeholders to call upon for support. Further, the visits developed situational awareness in terms of bed capacity, training, and concerns related to EVD patient admissions. Moreover, face-to-face visits and frequent communications foster synchronization and strengthen relationships. For instance, the University of Nebraska Medical Center converted one of its treatment units into a BSL-3 laboratory in order to enhance its ability for point-of-care diagnostics.¹³ The infrastructure change reduced an already limited nation-wide bed capacity. Understanding such resource changes underpins the importance of maintaining relationships with organizations. In this case, knowing that retrofitting treatment units to BSL-3 units reduced bed capacity ultimately allowed State to be flexible in its bed-regulating process for future mission requirements.

Gaining Access

Diplomacy was critical in providing the evacuation aircraft access to airspace and

landing privileges, which is critical for fueling as they traverse the Atlantic Ocean. State and DoD worked together and shared resources for refueling between West Africa and North America. The key lessons are to engage governments early and use diplomacy to negotiate air ambulance overflight and landing permits.

The key lessons are to engage governments early and use diplomacy to negotiate air ambulance overflight and landing permits.

One must remember that there is risk to the transiting country if an aircraft transporting a patient with an infectious disease lands and is unable to depart. For example, the patient might need to disembark the aircraft, which is a serious concern without the appropriate infrastructure to support such a patient. State and WHO learned early that private air ambulance companies would not transport contagious patients. Private companies failed to obtain overflight and landing permissions. They observed that diplomatic engagement was a much more successful method. Thus, a private and public partnership through government contracting allowed State to evacuate EVD patients using a private air ambulance company. Medical evacuation is a U.S. government mission: contractors submit overflight and landing permission requests under the auspices of the U.S. government.

State awarded and executed a contract with the ambulance company, but supported the DHHS and DoD by providing evacuation services at their request. The Economy Act of 1932, as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, permits federal government agencies to purchase goods or services from other federal government agencies or other major organizational units within the same agency. The Economy Act

allowed the federal government to share resources but was inapplicable when the international community also requested support. For these requests, apply the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 607, to authorize the U.S. government to provide assistance to foreign states and international organizations on a reimbursable basis. Moreover, an agreement between the U.S. government and the UN provided State the means to deliver medical evacuation services to the WHO and additional healthcare workers responding to the outbreak on a fully reimbursable basis. Thus, the spirit of these two pieces of legislation empowered the federal government to utilize a limited evacuation resource to support a whole-of-government and international approach to the outbreak response. It is critical to consider these funding mechanisms for similar circumstances in the future.

Recommendations

Synchronizing departments and agencies presents several daunting challenges during a crisis. Common understanding is crucial during any call for a whole-of-government response to a disaster, threat, or other extraordinary circumstance. In such cases, joint military, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational forces, along with humanitarians operate in foreign countries with exotic, infectious diseases and other personal hazards.

First, this consortium of governmental and nongovernmental personnel should plan to transport infected patients by air medical evacuation. In doing this, the U.S. military should continue its efforts in developing an improved biological containment system, rather than the hastily developed Transport Isolation System, to move several patients in a single airlift using a strategic air platform. In addition, develop a biological containment system and procedures for use in military helicopters. Further, ensure these biological containment systems are available for use when needed, rather than allowing a contractor to decide its fate. The capability must be available to other government agencies as needed. Moreover, DoD should consider a policy to evacuate service members and other authorized employees exposed to a Category “A” pathogen. Such a policy should be similar to the one emplaced during Operation United Assistance, the U.S. military operation in West Africa in response to the Ebola outbreak.

Second, the interagency community should prepare for future, exotic, infectious disease outbreaks. The DoD should develop and maintain a contingency plan that includes the consensus and participation of other government stakeholders in which patients arrive at Dulles International Airport, VA or Joint Base Andrews, MD for onward transportation via ground to National Institutes of Health for treatment in a biocontainment unit. It might also be beneficial to create an intensive care biocontainment unit within Walter Reed National Military Medical Center specifically for infected service members. DHHS’s role is to coordinate with civilian hospitals that have biocontainment units and other relevant stakeholders to build a consensus and maintain a robust pool of hospital beds ready for any patients infected with contagious, exotic diseases.

The air medical evacuation of patients exposed to Ebola is a unique mission that is often conducted in a complex environment with multiple agency involvement. Interagency lessons in capability availability, capacity, and access underscore the particular complexity of an international public health crisis. It is prudent to review such lessons from the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak to ensure the best response possible during a future outbreak. **IAJ**

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Ethics Committee Model for Humanitarian Operations Planning

by Philip W. Ginder

Most hospitals and healthcare organizations have established ethics committees that deal with issues involving medical, ethical, and/or legal conflict or uncertainty. The Joint Commission, the accreditation body for the vast majority of hospitals and other ambulatory healthcare settings in the U.S., requires that healthcare organizations have a defined process for addressing ethical concerns.¹ An ethics consult, typically presented by a member of the medical staff, is considered by a standing or *ad hoc* ethics committee and thoroughly examined using an established ethics framework. The committee is not a decision body, but renders a recommendation based on ethical considerations.²

Many hospital ethics committees use the principles of biomedical ethics as a framework to guide their recommendations to the medical staff and hospital leadership as situations arise.³ These principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice apply to an infinite number of broad situations and help steer these groups in making ethics recommendations in difficult and often uncharted situations. Frequently, these quandaries are a matter of life and death or have significant social or legal implications. For example, the committee often deals with questions dealing with competence of patients, refusal of healthcare providers to perform procedures that violate their moral principles, or end of life decisions involving great expenditure of resources for futile or ineffective treatments.

Similarly, a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations planning team will encounter ethical scenarios for which there are limited or no precedence. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has identified similar humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and operational independence to guide country teams executing HA/DR missions;⁴ however, although OCHA monitors and reviews humanitarian relief efforts during operations, there appears to be no process or review to consider these principles before a humanitarian mission is undertaken. These principles guide HA/DR planning and actions only

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to a limited degree. While most or all of the recent HA/DR activities in the recent past have met the “humanity” goal of reducing suffering, the intent of these responses was also to project soft power to build relationships or alliances or to take advantage of opportunistic access to closed or restricted countries. Additionally, some may have been ill-advised in their expense to the American taxpayer and their lack of effectiveness. The UN principles, while noble, are limited in addressing the principle of justice, as well as the pragmatic political motives of HA/DR activities, and they also do not address the main question for a donor nation: Do we contribute and to what extent? What and when should other nations contribute? Although not a perfect fit, applying a framework similar to the principles of biomedical ethics to the initial HA/DR decision making could prove to be a valuable resource when planning missions, as well as ensuring the U.S. is embarking on these endeavors for reasons that benefit all parties without overstepping sovereign nation boundaries.

...some [HA/DR activities in the recent past] may have been ill-advised in their expense to the American taxpayer and their lack of effectiveness.

Principles of Biomedical Ethics

Beneficence

Beauchamp and Childers define beneficence in relation to benevolence:

[T]he term beneficence connotes mercy, kindness and charity. Forms of beneficence also typically include altruism, love, and humanity...it includes all forms of action intended to benefit other persons. Beneficence refers to an action done to

benefit others; benevolence refers to the character trait or virtue of being disposed to act for the benefit of others; the principle of beneficence refers of a moral obligation to act for the benefit of others. Many acts of beneficence are not obligatory, but the principle of beneficence, in our usage, establishes an obligation to help others further their important and legitimate interests.⁵

Beneficence mostly correlates with the UN humanitarian principle of humanity. OCHA describes humanity with this statement: “Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.” Beneficence and humanity are the ethical cornerstones of any HA/DR operation and have been displayed in recent HA/DR missions such as Operation Tomadachi (Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, Japan, 2011) and Operation Damayan (Typhoon Ruby, Philippines, 2014). The primary ethical considerations revolve around the obligations of beneficence—preventing harm, removing harm, and promoting good.⁶ An ethics body considering HA/DR missions might focus on identifying the absence of beneficence overall or in any component of the operation.

Non-maleficence

Beauchamp and Childers describe the maxim “First do no harm” as the heart of the principle of non-maleficence.⁷ Additionally, they identify the obligation of non-maleficence as, “one ought not to inflict evil or harm.” Recent humanitarian efforts highlight several instances of unintentional harm or at least inconvenience to the nation being assisted. The 2009 Sumatra earthquakes prompted an international relief response that included the U.S. Department of Defense and the deployment of an Air Force Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team (HAART).⁸ Although the team deployed

successfully and delivered needed health services, its departure was difficult for local hospitals. The HARRT left without notice to these organizations, which caused disruption to the delivery of care in the affected area.⁹ In Operation Sea Angel, a HA/DR response to the 1991 Cyclone Marian in Bangladesh, although many facets of the operation were successful, the coastline forestation efforts led to an increased incidence of malaria.¹⁰ Using an ethical framework might allow a multidisciplinary team looking at HA/DR plans to identify similar concerns during HA/DR planning.

Respect for autonomy

Autonomy is one of the principles that, in many ways, can be applied to countries as well as individuals:

Personal autonomy is, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding that prevent meaningful choice. The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan, analogous to the way an independent government manages its territories and sets policies.¹¹

The corresponding OCHA humanitarian principles are independence—humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military, or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented—and neutrality—humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.¹²

As the world’s leading superpower, the U.S. is sometimes seen by other nations as being pushy and as meddling and coercive with its policies. Still, the U.S. provides billions of dollars in aid to other nations each year, even those with a strong anti-American sentiment. The American public largely supports the government’s

humanitarian aid policy—81 percent in 2008 favored providing relief to reduce poverty and severe hunger.¹³ Even so, conditions can exist where providing assistance is not clear cut from an ethics standpoint. For example, what is the obligation of the American people to provide aid which is likely being diverted to wealthy and connected landowners, such as in the 2010 Pakistan floods or the suspected diversion of aid to the Myanmar military during the 2008 cyclone relief operations?¹⁴

Many recipient nations do not want us to partner with them in HA/DR operations, they simply want to utilize the U.S. as a giant food bank or to provide an air bridge with U.S. military airlift capabilities. Is our objective to have some benevolent leverage over recipient nations following assistance to facilitate other political partnering (running contrary to the UN humanitarian principle of independence)? These questions of autonomy (independence) should play an important part in any ethics recommendation.

...the U.S. provides billions of dollars in aid to other nations each year, even those with a strong anti-American sentiment.

Justice

In the principles of biomedical ethics, a single definition of justice is elusive, but ethical concerns regarding this principle often revolve around the argument of healthcare as a right and the limitations of that right, as well as the distribution of scarce healthcare resources.¹⁵ Although the UN has a principle of impartiality, it fails to address the problem of limited resources and prioritization: “Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis

of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.”¹⁶ At what point does a need become “urgent distress” and who declares this state? When do the needs of the recipient country override domestic concerns of U.S. citizens? A Pew Research article in 2012 showed that the Pakistani public opinion of the U.S. actually decreased shortly after the 2011 flood relief operations, with 7 out of 10 Pakistani’s considering the U.S. to be an enemy while only 10 percent considered Americans to be a trusted ally.¹⁷ One could argue from a justice standpoint that the funds used for relief to flood victims in Pakistan (around \$550 million) could have been much better used for domestic purposes or even given to other foreign recipients. Although there was clearly a need to relieve suffering, other nations providing the bulk of the support, perhaps a regional ally, may have been a better ethical solution. Based on the justice principle, an ethics body might determine that providing this aid was not fair to the U.S. taxpayer as a marginal and perhaps even counterproductive relationship-building tool.

Ethics Committee for Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief Missions

The ethics committee provides a resource to leaders and staff in the healthcare setting. The committee strives for a multidisciplinary approach, and members usually include a member of the executive leadership, physicians, nurses, allied health providers, administrators, and patient and chaplain representatives. Some members might be *ad hoc*, particularly those consults involving new technology, dilemmas involving different religious denominations, or specific to a particular medical specialty. The standing committee members must maintain training, experience, and/or education in the area of biomedical ethics. The ethics committee meets, considers the consult from all these different perspectives, and provides a recommendation to the individual requesting the consult.

Ethics committees are not decision-making bodies but serve to make recommendations and thoroughly examine the subject in the ethics consult. Could a similar team be developed at the federal level to help resolve ethical questions regarding the execution of HA/DR missions? The establishment of a standing committee or council with education, training, and experience in the ethics of HA/DR support to advise national leaders before or at the beginning stages of HA/DR operations could thwart potential ethical traps before they become international blemishes or quagmires. The team could be fully multidisciplinary (operations, logistics, security, medical, cultural, religious, and political) and be supplemented with experts in emerging technologies, specific regions, religions, etc., as needed. The team could also include a representative of the host nation, as well as a member representing the interests of the U.S. taxpayer (a legislator).

The Consult

Any group formed to deliberate and make recommendations on the ethical implications of HA/DR will need a framework to consider the HA/DR plan. The report generated by this framework could be useful in both providing uniform recommendations to decision makers and providing a record of the ethical considerations that were deliberately considered prior to launching HA/DR response. Additionally, this group could provide guidance for expanding or decreasing the size of the response and make recommendations based on the principles vetted by the committee.

Conclusion

Humanity and generosity are two traits the U.S. strives to present to the rest of the world. Steps

taken to consider ethical concerns with HA/DR plans could provide leaders with the background to avoid potential pitfalls and landmines and help further U.S. interests while remaining in alignment with humanitarian principles. Just as a multidisciplinary, framework-driven, hospital ethics committee helps healthcare professional make sound ethical decisions, a HR/DR planning-focused, ethics body using an ethical framework could provide leaders valuable recommendations when embarking on humanitarian efforts. **IAJ**

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The Ethics of Espionage and Covert Action: *The CIA's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program as a Case Study*

by **John G. Breen**

I have just asked a classroom filled with U.S. Army officers (with a few sister service and civilian counterparts thrown in) to name some of the ethical challenges they believe are associated with spying. They have little trouble helping me fill a large whiteboard with their concerns. By this point in the course I teach at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College entitled "CIA for SoF, MI, and the Warfighter," the students have read extensively and discussed relevant case studies and many of the more controversial, historical episodes associated with the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) espionage and covert action.

Recent headline issues have included drone strikes, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's (SSCI) report on the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) program, the prosecution and jail sentence of mid-level CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling, the fine and probation offered to former CIA Director David Petraeus, and of course, Edward Snowden's espionage, with attendant revelations of the extent of National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs. Most recently, waterboarding became a topic of discussion in the run up to the 2016 Presidential election.

By this point in the course, students understand that the CIA recruits and handles human assets (HUMINT), produces finished intelligence, and conducts Presidentially-directed covert action. Historically, this last activity has been, perhaps, the most problematic. Today, covert action programs require a signed Presidential Finding, with subsequent Congressional notification. This is due in no small part to disputed claims of Presidential plausible deniability, revelations in the press, and Congress reasserting itself, over time, as a co-equal branch of government. Nevertheless, the golden thread of covert action connects the President and the CIA, and it is not likely to be severed any time soon.

Unfortunately, failed or ethically questionable covert action programs have been well documented—MKUltra (human testing of behavior-modification drugs), Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam-era Phoenix Program, Iran-Contra, and most recently, the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques"

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(EITs), such as waterboarding against prisoners in CIA custody.^{1,2} Morally dubious as it may sometimes be, Presidents rely on covert action as a vital means by which to implement identifiable foreign policy objectives in support of U.S. national security.

Morally dubious as it may sometimes be, Presidents rely on covert action as a vital means by which to implement identifiable foreign policy objectives...

Students identified, in no particular order and among others, concerns with lying, stealing, targeted assassination and drones, torture of detainees, interference with other nations, putting an asset in danger in order to accomplish mission, exploiting weakness in others, the involvement of healthcare professionals in interrogation, honey traps, misrepresentation, coercion, using money to buy influence, blackmail, treason, manipulation, ballot box stuffing, and so on. While the whiteboard now contained potentially objectionable issues, the listing also represented, perhaps uncomfortably, a menu of potentially effective techniques. In certain situations, some if not all of these techniques might be considered “appropriate.” They certainly have all been utilized (and likely continue to be) by intelligence services around the world with varying degrees of success.

The whiteboard discussion is used to set the stage for the remainder of the class session on the ethics of espionage, with a focus on covert action. The students explore whether or not a particular espionage technique or set of techniques may be permissible, forbidden, or even required. The CIA’s RDI program is discussed as a case study to explore the possible elements of a Just Espionage Theory.

Just War and Just Espionage

The students are already quite familiar with Just War Theory—an attempt to regulate the conduct of war, guarding against the slippery slope of narrow adherence to consequentialism (the ends justify the means), realpolitik (state-based pragmatism), or deontology (moral norms). The consequentialist, for example, can claim that almost any action, however dubious, was necessary, as it resulted in or it was anticipated to result in a “good” outcome. Realpolitik can place a state’s self-interest above all else. The deontologist may claim that an action is immoral, simply because it is deemed a norm that cannot be broken, e.g., “thou shalt not kill.” At certain times and in certain situations, one indeed will kill, and it will obviously not be immoral in any common sense of the word, e.g., self-defense.

Others have addressed in great detail how a discussion of the ethics of espionage may follow logically from Just War Theory.³ The main conditions of a Just Theory of Espionage might then at least include: (1) just cause, (2) proper authority, (3) proportionality, and (4) last resort. Can our intelligence services demonstrate that their efforts are for a just cause? Are they directed and monitored by a proper authority? Have they ensured that intelligence collection efforts and covert action campaigns are pursued in a manner proportional to the risks of causing undue harm? Do they employ the most contentious espionage techniques only as a last resort?

It has been suggested that simply keeping a secret from the U.S., one that could potentially be a threat to national security (not simply national interest), is in and of itself an act of aggression sufficient to justify certain techniques of espionage.⁴ For example, using any of the whiteboard “techniques” to commit economic espionage against a country or foreign business in order to marginally enhance the U.S. gross national product or to support the efforts of a specific U.S. company seems inappropriate. But spying on a country or nonstate actor with a

covert interest in destroying the U.S. economy seems worthwhile and ethically acceptable, if not required. Of course the U.S. is keeping secrets from other nations that they, in turn, could reasonably argue threaten their own national security. Thus we have set the stage for justifiable espionage against one another—the “Great Game.” In this context, what does “justifiable” entail? Are all of the whiteboard techniques justified?

One can develop a sharply sloped scale of perceived threat (X axis) versus “controversial” espionage technique (Y axis) from this discussion. (see Figure 1) The greater the threat, the more dubious the techniques an intelligence service might feel are warranted or acceptable. The slope of this curve might likely be flat for some time at lower levels of perceived threat, allowing for numerous, relatively uncontroversial approaches with primarily HUMINT-based espionage techniques (manipulation, coercion, etc.). The slope rises sharply thereafter as the threat approaches existential, and arguments for more drastic measures (blackmail and honey traps to torture and assassination) take hold. There are certainly a multitude of variables at play (societal, diplomatic, political) that determine exactly where along the threat-spectrum axis the slope of the curve skyrockets upward. Perhaps it is the quality of the ethical consideration that goes into planning a covert action or espionage effort that ultimately affects the slope of the curve and, thus, how quickly a service moves to the most morally suspect techniques. One might also ask, what is the ceiling for this graph? Is there a ceiling?

On whom can we use these techniques? Is everyone fair game or are certain individuals off limits? If we compare the espionage “field of play” to a football or other sporting field, appropriate targets for an opposing intelligence service may be identified—a useful metaphor for discussion with the students.⁵ Some individuals are clearly off the field of play, while others




Figure 1. Threat vs. Technique



Figure 2. Quality of Target vs. Technique

are along the sidelines as opposed to integral members of the opposing team. Integral players (vital espionage targets) have access to secrets with the greatest potential to damage U.S. national security.

Discrimination should be as important to practitioners of espionage as it is to military officers. Much as with the threat versus technique graph, a quality of target (X axis) versus technique (Y axis) graph now emerges. (see Figure 2) The slope of this curve might also be flat for some time at a lower (or undetermined) quality of target assessment, approached by intelligence officers with the most benign of HUMINT-based espionage techniques, such as subtle manipulation like flattery or playing to other nonthreatening character motivations. As the importance or quality of the human target increases, so too does the potential number of techniques an agency or intelligence officer might employ. But unlike the perceived threat versus “controversial” espionage technique

graph, there is likely a built-in ceiling on this graph when talking about recruiting human assets. The most dubious techniques tend to be ultimately ineffective and, indeed, counterproductive, e.g., an agent only working for money or a service that holds damaging information over the agent's head (blackmail) is not likely to work out long term.

...in many of the countries in which CIA officers operate (certainly not all), the worst thing the host country would do if traditional HUMINT spying activity was identified would be to kick the officer out of the country...

These metaphors lead to useful discussions about what it truly means for a potential target to have direct versus indirect access and the potential for collateral damage, whether we are discussing a lethal covert action or a traditional “Great Game” asset recruitment effort. Could an intelligence organization ethically target someone with no direct access to secrets but merely a relative of someone with that sought-after access? That target with indirect access could still be able to provide at least second-hand access to potentially vital information. Where on the field of play does this person find themselves, and what techniques could an intelligence service employ?

On a traditional field of play, like a sporting event, there are rules and referees, so too in “Great Game”-type espionage. There are mutually-accepted rules that allow countries to conduct espionage with minimal risk of conflagration. The U.S. and Soviet Union certainly appreciated this field of play and associated rules and regulations during the Cold War. Writing about nuclear nonproliferation

negotiations between Nikita Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, E. Drexel Godfrey, a former CIA Deputy Director, pointed out that “both leaders recognized that inspections in each other's countries would probably be out of the question for many years to come; each knew that in order to make any progress on arms limitation he would have to rely on the safety of his own intelligence monitoring system and avert his eyes to monitoring by the other.... The tensions of the nation-state system are, in other words, held in bounds not only by diplomacy and by mutual common sense, but also by carefully calibrated monitoring systems.”⁶

Thus, in many of the countries in which CIA officers operate (certainly not all), the worst thing the host country would do if traditional HUMINT spying activity was identified would be to kick the officer out of the country and name the individual *persona non grata*—unable to travel to that country ever again. There would be inevitable challenges diplomatically, perhaps some negative press articles, but eventually and certainly in private, both sides would move on and continue looking for opportunities to steal the other's secrets.

But how does this mesh with the case of Sabrina De Sousa, who was reportedly one of 26 Americans sentenced in absentia by the Italian judiciary for her alleged role in the February 2003 rendition of a terrorism suspect off the streets of Milan.⁷ In the spring of 2015, De Sousa traveled to visit relatives in Portugal and, as of May 2016, was not allowed to leave the country and was in the midst of a legal battle to avoid extradition back to Italy to face charges. Perhaps her actions and those of her 26 colleagues, rightly or wrongly, went beyond those mutually (and informally) accepted techniques one finds on the playing field of the “Great Game.”

In contrast to traditional espionage, the students inevitably point out that al-Qaida or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) clearly do not recognize any aspect of this “Great Game”

field of play. As a nonstate actor, ISIS is, of course, playing by its own set of rules. So it is fair to ask if there is a role for classical espionage against terrorist targets. Does the terrorist's disregard for accepted rules and regulations relinquish our responsibility and allow us greater ethical/moral flexibility with the range of techniques we can deploy? The answer we arrive at in the classroom discussion seems to be that there are multiple fields at play, each with its own set of rules.

The military, for example, engages in activities that are not appropriately (or at least commonly) found on the classic intelligence field of play. It would seem inappropriate, for example, to suggest that the mere act of keeping a secret would on its own allow a country to engage in lethal military activity, though it might. Historically, paramilitary and other more violent covert action has included techniques perhaps more appropriate on the military's field of play—targeted killing and EITs, among others.

When details of clandestine operations wind up in the press, they can have a negative impact on the other fields—future “Great Game”-type agent recruitment operations, for example. Much like the superstring theory in physics that postulates underlying connectivity, there appears to be a resonance between the more traditional intelligence field of play and the military or paramilitary fields. Nothing is more damaging when trying to convince a potential agent about the U.S. government's commitment to his/her safety and confidentiality, as when the agent then asks about the latest headline account of an arrested spy, a blown intelligence operation, or an ethically questionable paramilitary activity. A *Studies in Intelligence* article on “Ethics and Espionage” says it well:

Deception is inherent in agent operations, but rare is the agent who will risk his well-being unless there is a positive ethical

content in the relationship between him and the service for which he works. If the relationship is to endure, he must have confidence in the organization on whose instructions he is risking so much.⁸

Case Study: The CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program

The most recent, publicly-acknowledged example of a covert action program with dubious moral footing is the RDI program, authorized by President George W. Bush in the days following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 2009 and by Executive Order, President Obama ended the CIA program and prohibited the use of EITs, including waterboarding. Obama also prohibited the CIA from operating detention facilities and directed that only interrogation techniques detailed in the Army Field Manual would be authorized. According to the CIA's official account of the RDI program, three detainees were waterboarded. The technique was last used in March 2003.⁹

When details of clandestine operations wind up in the press, they can have a negative impact on the other fields...

According to the SSCI, the CIA oversold the efficacy of the RDI program and resisted oversight.¹⁰ In response, CIA Director John Brennan defended the work of the Agency. The official CIA response pushed back on certain SSCI findings, but also identified failures and highlighted areas in which there was agreement: “While we made mistakes, the record does not support the Study's inference that the Agency systematically and intentionally misled each of these audiences on the effectiveness of the program.”¹¹ Retired CIA officials involved with the program, including former Directors

George Tenet and Porter Goss and former Deputy Director for Operations Jose Rodriguez, among others, published memoirs and wrote numerous articles and essays in support of the RDI program.

The public commentary and press reporting that followed the release of the SSCI report highlighted the more graphically disturbing details of EITs but largely focused on effectiveness: Did use of EITs lead us to Usama Bin Laden? What seemed lost in the debate and left largely unaddressed in the CIA's response was not if the RDI program and EITs worked or not, but if it was right that they were utilized in the first place. Was it ethical to use these techniques? Mike Morrel, former acting CIA Director, addressed the question in his memoir:

When it comes to EITs, there are two key aspects to the morality question. Is it moral to subject human beings, no matter how evil they are, to harsh interrogation techniques, particularly when done by the country that stands for human dignity and human rights in the world? At the same time, what is the morality of not doing so? What is the morality of believing that, if you do not use the harsh techniques, you may well be making a decision that leads to the death of Americans in a terrorist attack that you could have otherwise prevented? These are complicated and extremely tough difficult questions. Some people make them sound easy. They are wrong. The Senate report did not, in any way, address this most difficult of issues.¹²

Perhaps a Just Theory of Espionage could have been used during CIA's RDI campaign program planning to address these important questions:

Just cause

Did the President have national security concerns sufficient to order the CIA to initiate an RDI program and employ EITs? In a 2015 essay,

former CIA Director George Tenet suggests intelligence existed confirming meetings between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Usama Bin Laden. Tenet then reveals that "we briefed the President of reporting that indicated a nuclear weapon had been smuggled into the United States destined for New York City."¹³ Regardless of the ultimate veracity of this intelligence, faced with this dire threat warning from the Director of the CIA, it seems the President would have had just cause sufficient to take immediate steps to protect the Nation from another attack. One could argue then that, in isolation, this just cause condition appears to have been met.

Proper authority

Did executive and legislative bodies oversee the activities of the CIA appropriately, and did the CIA keep its executive and legislative overseers fully informed? As oversight of a clandestine organization is by definition an act involving the directed transparency of an otherwise opaque organization, it requires a relationship built on trust and a certain level of voluntary openness. The SSCI report makes a detailed case that the CIA misrepresented the effectiveness of EITs and the value of the information obtained from their use and argues that the CIA purposely mislead and failed to fully brief executive and congressional oversight. While defending itself, the CIA admitted shortcomings: "Despite some flaws in CIA's representations of effectiveness, the overall nature and value of the program, including the manner in which interrogations were carried out and the IG's findings about the program's shortcomings, were accurately portrayed to CIA's Executive and Legislative Branch overseers, as well as the Justice Department."¹⁴ Critics might ask how many "flaws in representation" it takes to make a pattern. According to former CIA acting General Counsel John Rizzo, for example, Goss failed to inform Congress that videotape records of waterboarding had been destroyed on the orders

of Jose Rodriguez:

“So please tell me,” I [Rizzo] asked, “that you briefed the intelligence committee leaders about the destruction and that there’s a record somewhere of that briefing.”

There was a pause, and then Porter said, “Gee, I don’t remember ever telling them. I don’t think there was ever the right opportunity to do it.”

My heart sank. It was the ultimate nightmare scenario.¹⁵ As for the Executive, Rizzo stated that he was unaware of President Bush ever having been briefed on the specifics of EITs. Rizzo reported that he asked former Director Tenet about this directly, who confirmed that he, Tenet, was not aware of Bush having been briefed, despite Bush’s own published memories to the contrary.¹⁶ Furthermore, Rizzo points out that “the Bush MON [Memorandum of Notification] issued days after 9/11 authorized the capture, detention and questioning of Al Qaeda leaders, but was silent about the means by which any of it could be carried out.”¹⁷ And referring to the specific location of CIA’s RDI “black site” facilities overseas, Rodriguez asserted that senior White House officials did not have a need to know.¹⁸

At a minimum, these statements suggest a lack of clarity in how much oversight took place or was allowed to take place. Despite these exceptions, if the CIA did indeed brief oversight to the extent it claims, then the proper authority obligation appears to have been, in large part, met; more detailed and accessible recordkeeping on the part of both the intelligence community, the executive, and legislative bodies may help clarify levels of oversight for future covert action programs. Of course, if the legislative branch was not fully briefed, they certainly had and have recourse to pass new laws and to put

marks on CIA budgets, all effective tools to ensure transparency.

Proportionality

Given concerns over terrorist acquisition of WMD and fear of a second-wave, al-Qaida attack and assuming graduated increases in the intensity levels of enhanced interrogation (moving from traditional techniques to EITs, including waterboarding), one could argue that this requirement was met, at least at the programmatic level. Rizzo states in his memoirs that “...the EITs would be judiciously applied, beginning with the ones least coercive, for a limited period of time, and would end as soon as [Abu] Zubaydah demonstrated that he was no longer resisting and ready to cooperate.”¹⁹ Of course, this presumes that these detainees actually have access to threat intelligence of such a quality as to merit such extreme measures. Before the most morally dangerous techniques are applied, the CIA needs to be able to say definitively that a potential target is on the field of play and confirm (not just assess) beforehand the target’s knowledge of threat details.

Last resort

Despite early, tragic lapses in CIA leadership, this requirement was arguably met. The Agency employed traditional interrogation techniques against detainees assessed to have vital threat intelligence prior to the graduated initiation of EITs, using them only when traditional interrogation techniques failed or, at least were assessed to have failed. The element of last resort may be one of the more readily challenged of the Just Espionage conditions for RDI. After all, Abu Zubaydah was in CIA custody in March 2002. The CIA then spent four months seeking a legal judgment about EITs from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. Zubaydah was only then subjected to waterboarding in August 2002.²⁰ One could reasonably ask how the threat information he may have possessed could have been truly imminent or constituted an “extreme

emergency” if waterboarding was withheld for four months while legal cover was sought. Perhaps the most relevant challenge to the last resort requirement comes from Brennan himself when he acknowledges “the Agency takes no position on whether intelligence obtained from detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques could have been obtained through other means or from other individuals. The answer to this question is and will forever remain unknowable.”²¹

Conclusion

Brennan has commented that problems within the RDI program were the result of “failure of management at multiple levels.”²²

As a CIA employee, the best presentation I ever heard on ethics and leadership was given by Kyle “Dusty” Foggo. At the time, he was one of the most powerful officers in the Agency; his discussion of ethics was motivational, clear, and compelling. He shortly thereafter pleaded guilty to charges of felony corruption.²³

A close runner-up in quality to Dusty was a presentation delivered by Rodriguez at a CIA leadership seminar. In his book, *Hard Measures*, Rodriguez, who ordered the destruction of videotapes of CIA officers waterboarding detainees, complains that critics of waterboarding have shown “fanciful simulations” with large volumes of water used during the 183 times Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was waterboarded. Without a conscious hint of irony, Rodriguez suggests these were more like “splashes of water.”²⁴ Perhaps if he had not ordered the tapes destroyed, he could demonstrate his point more effectively.

Rizzo, writing in his memoir about his own role in the RDI program, describes how he heard music in the hallways of a black site and “pondered the question of whether being involuntarily subjected to Anne Murray’s musical offerings could be construed as cruel or inhumane treatment.”²⁵ He also relates a story in which a detainee refused to take medicine, and another senior officer responsible for the prisons asked, “What do you recommend we do to make him take his pills? Wash it down with a waterboard?” Rizzo notes that he “resisted the temptation” to report this exchange to Harriet Miers, the newly appointed White House counsel.²⁶ One must ask how the Acting General Counsel of the CIA could not have reacted more forcefully to this inane comment from another senior leader responsible for the well-being of detainees.

These former senior leaders were forced to consider ethical challenges foisted on them by terrorists seeking to repeat the horrors of 9/11. Hind-sight criticism can certainly be unfair. But their writings after retirement and some of their actions during their tenures suggest they may not have fully explored the moral and ethical character of the RDI program, nor their roles and responsibilities for executing it. Would the use of a Just Theory of Espionage framework have changed anything at all about the conduct of this covert action campaign? To steal a line from Brennan—this is unknowable. This may be, nevertheless, an important question to consider, as the 2016 Presidential campaign has been filled with questionable rhetoric, to include calling for the return of waterboarding. Brennan has said: “I personally remain firm in my belief that enhanced interrogation techniques are not an appropriate method to obtain intelligence and that their use impairs our ability to continue to play a leadership role in the world.”²⁷ In the absence of clear-cut legislation prohibiting (or alternatively, sanctioning) EITs, what will the next Director say when faced with a crisis and asked to use EITs, or worse? **IAJ**

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Worth Noting

GAO reports on human trafficking

In June, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report assessing federal agencies' efforts to combat human trafficking. The report, GAO-16-555, focuses on the prevalence of human trafficking, victim issues, and avoiding grant duplication.

Many U.S. federal agencies lead efforts to address human trafficking. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security lead federal investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes. The Departments of Defense, Labor, and State, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigate trafficking related offenses under certain circumstances, and take further action, as appropriate. And the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services award grants to fund victim service programs.

While completing this study, GAO found that federal agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, have begun efforts to assess the prevalence of human trafficking in the United States and develop data standards and definitions to help facilitate prevalence studies. GAO's interviews with federal, state, and local law enforcement revealed that victim service programs, such as those that provide mental health and substance abuse services, have helped improve victim cooperation in trafficking cases.

GAO also identified 42 grant programs with awards made in 2014 and 2015 that may be used to combat human trafficking or to assist victims of human trafficking.

- Government Accountability Office

Administration releases cybersecurity workforce strategy

On July 12, the Obama Administration announced a new strategy to help agencies build the cybersecurity workforce. The Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy is designed to "grow the pipeline of highly skilled cybersecurity talent entering federal service" and to retain and invest in that talent.

In a blog post announcing the Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy, the authors discuss the persistence of cyber threats, saying that "Addressing these cyber threats has required a bold reassessment of the way we approach security in the digital age and a significant investment in critical security tools and our cybersecurity workforce."

The new strategy establishes four key initiatives: expanding the cybersecurity workforce through education and training, recruitment of the nation's best cyber talent for federal service, retain and develop highly skilled talent, and identifying cybersecurity workforce needs. The strategy also encourages private sector companies and the federal government work together to expand the cyber workforce.

- White House

GAO reports on progress in CBRN response

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released a report assessing the Department of Defense's (DoD) progress incorporating the Homeland Response Force into the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response enterprise.

DoD is expected to play a prominent role in supporting civil authorities in a CBRN incident, and the Homeland Response Force is intended to bridge the gap between the National Guard's initial response to a CBRN incident and any need for additional capabilities that the DoD military services' active-duty personnel can provide, if requested.

GAO's report describes the current status of Homeland Response Force capabilities and readiness, and assesses DoD's progress incorporating the Homeland Response Force into the CBRN response enterprise. During their investigation, GAO examined National Guard fiscal year 2013-15 evaluation reports and fiscal year 2012 through March 2016 readiness information, as well as other plans and guidance, and surveyed Homeland Response Force commanders.

GAO found that DoD has made progress in incorporating the Homeland Response Force into the CBRN response enterprise by updating plans, guidance, and exercises, and GAO did not make any suggestions for change.

- Government Accountability Office

State publishes 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report

On June 30, Secretary of State John Kerry announced the release of the State Department's 2016 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.

The report focuses on strategies to prevent human trafficking around the globe, analyzing governments' prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts. The 2016 report also builds on previous reports, featuring ways governments can identify people most at-risk and reduce their vulnerability.

In his opening letter, Secretary Kerry stated his belief that an end to human trafficking is possible, saying "If there is a single theme to this year's [report], it is the conviction that there is nothing inevitable about trafficking in human beings. That conviction is where the process of change really begins."

Kerry also discussed the creation of the first-ever U.S. Advisory Council on Human Trafficking, which includes 11 trafficking survivors

- State Department

DoD official speaks on "culture of cybersecurity"

On June 22, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security Thomas Atkin told members of the House Armed Services Committee that the Department of Defense (DoD) has made significant progress in implementing its cyber strategy.

In his address, Atkin spoke of our increasingly interconnected world and our increasing vulnerability to cyberattacks. According to Atkin, while the DoD's cyber capabilities are remarkable, they are not enough to protect the nation. Atkin insists that safeguarding the homeland requires "a culture of cybersecurity" and "a whole-of-government, and whole-of-nation approach."

Atkins went on to speak of the DoD's work with federal agencies and other partners to protect DoD networks and defend the U.S. against cyberattacks.

- DoD News

Assessment needed for National Disaster Recovery Framework

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently published a report on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) implementation of the National Disaster Recovery Framework, which provides the overarching interagency coordination structure for the recovery phase of incidents and calls for a "whole community" approach to recovery. The report, GAO-16-476, examines FEMA's implementation of the framework in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, New York, and Oklahoma.

During their study, GAO looked at the roles and responsibilities of FEMA and state emergency management offices and the extent to which FEMA worked with selected states to implement the framework. GAO also interviewed state and FEMA officials and reviewed state recovery plans and documents, FEMA plans and policies, and other relevant statutes.

GAO found that while FEMA provided a number of outreach activities to promote state adoption of the framework, officials in four of the five states did not understand aspects of the framework. GAO also found that only two of the five states had developed pre-disaster recovery plans based on the framework, and FEMA officials estimate that over three-fourths of the states do not have pre-disaster recovery plans based on the framework. The study also revealed that FEMA has not utilized readiness assessments to analyze operations across its regional offices.

GAO recommends that FEMA conduct a systematic analysis of its assessments to determine the effectiveness of its framework outreach. They also recommend FEMA develop and disseminate best practices and lessons learned for conducting framework outreach. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with GAO's recommendations.

- Government Accountability Office

Cyber exercise brings together agencies, partners

Nearly 800 representatives from U.S. government agencies, private industry, and foreign nations recently participated in Cyber Guard 2016, a nine-day exercise that concluded on June 18. U.S. government participants included representatives from the FBI and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, among others. Non-government entities included power companies and port facilities.

This year's Cyber Guard exercise scenarios involved a mass power outage, an oil spill, and the port of Los Angeles shutting down – all possible scenarios in the event of a massive cyberattack. Last year's exercise involved a major earthquake in Southern California, followed by a series of cyberattacks that disrupt electrical power along the West and East Coasts.

U.S. Cyber Command commander and director of the National Security Agency Navy Admiral Michael S. Rogers addressed exercise visitors on June 16, speaking of the progress that has been made in training to meet cyber threats. Rogers also spoke of the importance of training across different areas of interest – such as banking and business – to emphasize that no single organization or nation can act alone against cyber threats.

Cyber Guard is part of a suite of annual exercises aimed at preparing critical defense and economic sectors to deal with cyber threats. The first Cyber Guard exercise was held in 2012.

- DoD News

OPM provides guidance on interagency personnel rotations

In June, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) issued guidance on national security professional development interagency personnel rotations. On June 15, Acting Director Beth F. Cobert announced OPM's guidance aimed at assisting participating agencies in meeting the requirement mandated by section 1107(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

The guidance encourages agencies to give "strong preference" to national security executive candidates who have completed interagency rotations when filling senior positions within the interagency community of interest. Agencies are also required to provide rotation opportunities for employees "to ensure a sufficient pool of qualified individuals" exists.

- Office of Personnel Management

Reports examine DoD civilian deployment

On June 9, RAND Corporation released two reports examining the deployment of Department of Defense (DoD) civilians. The full case study is included in Expeditionary Civilians: Creating a Viable Practice of Department of Defense Civilian Deployment, and while a shorter report, Expeditionary Civilians: Creating a Viable Practice of Civilian Deployment Within the U.S. Interagency Community and Among Foreign Defense Organizations, focuses primarily on DoD civilian deployments in interagency and international missions.

The full case study is an end-to-end review and analysis of DoD civilian deployments that looks at the goals of DoD's civilian deployment capability and attempts to identify gaps between policy and practice. The report also considers combatant commander's perspectives on the use of civilians, and gathers lessons learned from analogous organizations in the United States and other countries to benefit DoD civilian deployments.

The shorter report explores the requirements needed to deploy DoD civilians, the types of missions deployable civilians support internationally, and the methods used to identify, select, track, and deploy eligible civilians. The report builds on interviews with representatives from 17 government agencies in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Australia with well-established civilian deployment programs. The report makes several recommendations about championing, structuring, and planning expeditionary civilian operations.

- RAND Corporation

Agencies collaborate on Zika vaccine

Scientists at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research are making progress on a Zika virus vaccine, and plan to start human testing later this year. Efforts to produce the vaccine and prepare for the spread of the virus have included components of the Department of Defense, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Department of Health and Human Services.

In a recent interview, Army Col. (Dr.) Stephen Thomas said that the swift progress on the Zika vaccine is due to the institute's scientists familiarity and experience with flaviviruses like Zika. Thomas said "it's in our DNA to work on flaviviruses, and we've been doing vaccine development for flaviviruses since World War II." According to Thomas, the institute began to take part in the whole-of-government response when they started to see an increase in Zika a couple years ago.

The CDC is tracking active Zika virus transmission in effected areas, and reports 618 travel-

associated Zika cases, 11 sexually transmitted cases, one case of Zika-related Guillain-Barré syndrome within the continental U.S. However, there have been no reports of locally acquired mosquito-borne cases.

- **DoD News**

State, USAID release joint strategy for countering violent extremism

In May, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released their Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The joint strategy builds on the foundation of the 2015 White House CVE Summit and provides a “roadmap” for U.S. CVE efforts.

In his opening message for the strategy, Secretary of State John Kerry states that “The Department of State and USAID have produced a proactive international strategy recognizing immediate needs, utilizing our strengths, and demonstrating our will to comprehensively address the challenge of violent extremism, including the root causes. Together, we are building organizational structures needed to pursue a more aggressive and integrated approach to this challenge. This is a generational struggle, but we must begin now.”

The new CVE strategy will guide U.S. efforts to leverage the full range of diplomatic and development resources to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism through five objectives:

- Expand international political will, partnerships, and expertise to better understand the drivers of violent extremism and mobilize effective interventions.
- Encourage and assist partner governments to adopt more effective policies and approaches to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism, including changing unhelpful practices where necessary.
- Employ foreign assistance tools and approaches, including development assistance, to reduce specific political or social and economic factors that contribute to community support for violent extremism in identifiable areas or put particular segments of a population at high risk of violent extremist radicalization and recruitment to violence.
- Empower and amplify locally credible voices that can change the perception of violent extremist groups among key demographic segments.
- Strengthen the capabilities of government and non-governmental actors to isolate, intervene with, and promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals caught in the cycle of radicalization to violence.

- **State Department**

State report on terrorism critical of interagency cooperation

The State Department recently released the 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism. The reports assesses global terrorist threats, including terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

Many of the country reports also appraise U.S. involvement and interagency cooperation, calling for better coordinated efforts in countering terrorist threats and citing “limited” interagency coordination as an impediment to effective operations.

- State Department

PKSOI publishes case studies on conflict, illicit power

In May, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) published *Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and Transition*. The work contains a collection of case studies and analyses on the dynamics associated with illicit power and state weaknesses relating to preventing or resolving armed conflict.

Impunity addresses how to effectively respond to the illicit power structures and networks encountered in both conflict and post-conflict environments. These structures and networks undermine conflict resolution, stabilization, reconstruction, and peacekeeping efforts.

Impunity is the result of a 10-year interagency effort that included the U.S. Institute for Peace, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the intelligence community, international coalition partners, and the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice.

- Peacekeeping & Stabilization Operations Institute

Executive Order presents comprehensive approach to atrocity prevention

On May 18 the White House released an Executive Order that presents a comprehensive approach to atrocity prevention and response. The Executive Order continues the interagency Atrocities Prevention Board that was established via Presidential Study Directive-10 in 2012; lays out support from executive departments, agencies, and offices; and updates and memorializes the terms on which the Board will continue its mission.

The Executive Order directs that “The Board shall seek to ensure that mass atrocities and the risk thereof are effectively considered and appropriately addressed by the U.S. Government, and shall coordinate the development and execution of policies and tools to enhance our capacity to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.” This includes identifying gaps in current policies and interagency processes related to mass atrocity prevention and response, as well as developing policy recommendations and programmatic recommendations for agencies, offices, and existing interagency processes.

The order also emphasizes the importance of properly staffing, training, and funding mass atrocity prevention and response, and lays out guidelines for the United States Agency for International Development, the Departments of State and Defense, and other government entities.

The Department of State hosted a teleconference on the U.S. government’s comprehensive approach to atrocity prevention and response the same day the Executive Order was released.

- White House

GAO: DoD should clarify its role during cyber incidents

In April the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report suggesting the Department of Defense (DoD) clarify its roles and responsibilities for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) during cyber incidents. The report, GAO-16-332, comes as the scale, frequency, and impact of cyber incidents grow.

Cyber threats loom over U.S. national and economic security, requiring DoD to be ready to support civil authorities in all domains. To prepare for this report, GAO reviewed DoD DSCA guidance, policies, and plans. GAO also met with relevant officials from DoD, National Guard Bureau, and Department of Homeland Security.

GAO found that while DoD has developed guidance for its support to civil authorities, the DoD guidance does not clearly define its roles and responsibilities for cyber incidents. DoD officials acknowledged the limitations of the current guidance, saying that the department had not yet determined the approach it would take to support civil authorities in a cyber event.

GAO recommended that DoD issue guidance that clarifies their roles and responsibilities to support civil authorities in a domestic cyber incident. DoD concurred with the recommendation.

- Government Accountability Office

The General of the Armies John J. Pershing

Great War Centennial Series



The eighth lecture of the General of the Armies John J. Pershing Great War Centennial Series will be conducted Sept. 14, 2016 in the Arnold Conference Room of the Lewis and Clark Center.

The title of this lecture is "The Battle of the Somme." Dr. Mark Hull from CGSC's Department of Military History will lead the discussion on one of the bloodiest battles in human history.

The reception begins at 5:30; the presentation will begin at 6 p.m.

All lectures in this series are free and open to the public.

For more information about this lecture series, contact the CGSC Foundation.

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