A Framework for Success: Maximizing Collaborations between Federal Organizations  
*Caroline R. Earle, Deena S. Disraelly and Robert A. Zirkle*

Developing a Culture of Questioning or Don’t Tell, Do Ask  
*Ted Thomas and James Thomas*

Killing Kids: An Interagency Problem  
*John R. Bennett, Nicholas J. Hitt and Eric A. Swett*

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Before the Next Outbreak: Prepare for Everything Together  
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Leadership and the Art of Delegation  
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Trust and Networks in the Interagency  
*Nicole Alexander and Chad Thibodeau*
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This issue of the *InterAgency Journal* opens with three co-authors, Caroline Earle, Deena Disraelly, and Robert Zirkle, from the Institute for Defense Analyses presenting a framework for collaboration which could be applied to all agencies and levels of government. Given the on-going interest to make government more efficient, exploring how conditions might be set and then how efforts might be conducted in a collaborative fashion is something that should be of interest to us all. Their thoughtful analysis on the considerations involved in collaboration and presentation of a framework for use makes for an interesting read and merits consideration.

One of the keys to being an effective leader in any organization is to set the conditions which allow for all members of the Team to ask questions. Interagency leadership experts Ted Thomas and James Thomas explain how to foster a culture of questioning in your organization and how to avoid the “the white dot” syndrome.

What do you do when you are executing U.S. policy in a foreign land and you encounter an enemy combatant that happens to be a child? Authors John Bennett, Nicholas Hitt, and Eric Swett give us their perspective on this regrettable, and unfortunately more frequently occurring, conundrum.

The recent outbreak of Ebola in West Africa prompts our next three articles. The fear of the virus spreading into a pandemic disease led to much discussion on the international community’s role. Should organizations like the United Nations, or individual countries like the United States, take a more proactive approach to countering and controlling similar disease outbreaks in the sovereign territory of an effected nation? John Gartside, Elliott Burns, and Tim Downing discuss the UN doctrine of “responsibility to protect” and the notion of national security when facing this type of threat. Authors Megan McWilliams, Daniel Wiggins, and Matthew Wunderlich argue that the Ebola outbreak demonstrated the need for the United States to have a more comprehensive humanitarian assistance strategy. They provide their thoughts on how this strategy might be developed. And a discussion on the interaction between the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services with respect to the development of medical countermeasures is presented by Jeremy Hershfield, Conrad Wilmoski, and Kelly Meister.

John Moore offers the idea that successful organizational leadership requires the ability to effectively delegate. He presents a framework for effective and purposeful delegation and provides a methodology for leaders to use to address challenges using other members of the team.

Our final article addresses the issues that inhibit interagency collaboration. Nicole Alexander and Chad Thibodeau provide their perspective and offer recommendations as to how better interagency cooperation might be realized.

Thank you for reading this issue of the *InterAgency Journal*. Feedback is always welcome. I invite you to regularly visit our website to find current interagency “News You Can Use” and to take advantage of our comprehensive, user-friendly interagency bibliography. – RMC
Contributors Wanted!

The Simons Center is looking for articles that involve contemporary interagency issues at both the conceptual and the application level.

The InterAgency Journal is a refereed national security studies journal providing a forum to inform a broad audience on matters pertaining to tactical and operational issues of cooperation, collaboration, and/or coordination among and between various governmental departments, agencies, and offices. Each issue contains a number of articles covering a variety of topics, including national security, counterterrorism, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and disaster preparation and response.

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A Framework for Success: Maximizing Collaborations between Federal Organizations

by Caroline R. Earle, Deena S. Disraelly and Robert A. Zirkle

In an era of declining budgets and growing demands, the Obama White House and the Executive Department Secretaries have committed themselves to increasing the openness and transparency of government as a means to best employ available resources. The Administration identified collaboration among government entities as one of three key pillars to achieving this goal. The government contains multiple stakeholder organizations, each with its own mission, customers, and challenges. But these missions, customers, and challenges are not exclusive to any one organization; rather, they are shared across performers with specialized knowledge, skills, and tools that could be leveraged to support similar work across the same and different mission spaces. Through sharing information, experiences, responsibilities, and costs among organizations pursuing similar goals through collaboration, government has the opportunity to maximize openness and resource use.

This article presents a notional framework for implementation of the various phases of the collaboration activity, from evaluating opportunities to collaborate, through termination of a collaborative enterprise. This framework is based largely on three recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on interagency collaboration: “Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Organizations.”

Caroline R. Earle, holds a bachelor’s degree from Colby College and a master’s in international policy studies from the Monterey (now Middlebury) Institute of International Studies. She is a research staff member in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where she has led research on organizations and processes for joint, interagency, multinational, and multilateral approaches to complex contingencies.

Deena S. Disraelly, Ph.D., holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees, as well as a master’s of engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She holds a doctorate in engineering management with a focus in crisis, disaster, and risk management from The George Washington University, where she is an adjunct faculty member. She is a research staff member in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Robert A. Zirkle, Ph.D., holds both a B.S. and a B.A. from the University of Illinois and a doctorate in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Zirkle’s areas of expertise include combat modeling, weapons of mass destruction effects and modeling, model verification and validation, and culture and language training within professional military education. He is a research staff member in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
GAO defines collaboration as “any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the agencies act alone.”

Definition of Terms

Two terms used throughout this article are collaboration and stakeholder. GAO defines collaboration as “any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the agencies act alone.”

We draw upon the academic literature to derive the following definition for a stakeholder: “Any person, group or organization with an interest in, who affects, or is affected by an issue area or problem.” In other words, stakeholders are “those people who are responsible for problems or issues, whose perspectives or knowledge are needed to develop good solutions or strategies, and those who have the power and resources to block or implement solutions and strategies.”

GAO Best Practices for Collaboration

The 2005 GAO report focused on describing eight best practices designed to produce successful collaboration:

- Define and articulate a common outcome.

Agencies desiring to collaborate should develop “a clear and compelling rationale to work together,” one consistent with each agency’s goals and missions and backed with “sustained resources and commitment.”

- Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies. Successful collaboration requires that organizations establish joint strategies to “work in concert with those of their partners” and help align the agencies’ “activities, core processes, and resources to accomplish the common outcome.”

- Identify and address needs by leveraging resources. An assessment of each participating agency’s strengths and limitations can identify opportunities to leverage resources, (“human, information technology, physical, and financial”) in order to gain benefits otherwise not available to the organizations working alone.

- Agree on roles and responsibilities. Successful collaboration requires the participating agencies to “define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort will be led” in order to “clarify who will do what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision-making.”

- Establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries. Collaborating organizations need to “address the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, and data systems that will be used in the collaborative effort,” as well as overcome differences in cultures across agencies through the development of mutual trust and frequent communications.

- Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report results. Collaborating
organizations “need to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement” and to provide feedback through adequate reporting mechanisms to decision makers, clients, and stakeholders.¹¹

• Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports. Agencies participating in collaborative efforts should “use their strategic and annual performance plans as tools to drive collaboration with” their partner agencies and “establish complementary goals and strategies for achieving results.”¹²

• Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management systems. Organizations participating in a collaboration should “use their performance management systems (e.g., performance-based pay systems for senior executives designed around “partnership-oriented goals”) to strengthen accountability for results, specifically by placing greater emphasis on fostering the necessary collaboration both within and across organizational boundaries to achieve results.”¹³

• The 2012 GAO report described the following seven features, or characteristics, of successful interagency collaborations:

  • Outcomes and accountability (organizational and individual). A collaboration should have a clearly defined set of common short and long-term goals and outcomes, a mechanism for tracking and monitoring organizational progress toward those outcomes, and a means available for incentivizing participation from personnel in each agency.

  • Bridging organizational cultures. A variety of means are available to facilitate operating across agency boundaries, e.g., the establishment of common terminology, compatible policies and procedures, cross-agency lines of communication, and formal/informal networks; the conduct of relationship-building activities, planning activities, and joint exercises; and, most importantly, the achievement of mutual trust across agencies.

  • Leadership (models, top-level commitment, continuity in leadership). While a variety of leadership models are available (e.g., establishing a lead agency or sharing leadership among multiple agencies), a collaboration should establish measures to ensure continuity of leadership—preferably with direct connections to the high-level officials—over the course of its existence.

  • Clarity of roles and responsibilities. A collaboration activity should have a clearly- articulated and codified approach for decision making, as well as a clear delineation of who does what and how joint and individual efforts are organized.

  • Participants. Participants should be individuals with the appropriate skills and abilities who are able to participate on a regular basis and are knowledgeable of their organization’s resources, as well as those individuals with the requisite authority to commit resources, make decisions, and resolve policy and programmatic challenges that arise during collaboration.¹⁵

  • Resources (funding, staffing, technology). A successful collaboration requires the availability of a standardized method for tracking the expenditure of funds, a mechanism to ensure the staffing of collaborative activities from each agency (including individual and group incentives to encourage participation), and technology-
based tools designed to facilitate joint interaction.

- **Written guidance and agreements.** Having agencies articulate “a common outcome and roles and responsibilities into a written document” is a powerful tool for collaboration as are lower-level interagency agreements (spelling out the details of specific collaborative projects).\(^{16}\)

The 2012 GAO report built and expanded upon the agency’s 2005 report, and the best practices identified in the latter can be mapped onto the features found in the former. Table 1 outlines the GAO’s crosswalk of its eight identified best practices from the 2005 report to the seven key feature categories outlined in their 2012 report.

The 2014 GAO report focused on three of the features identified in the 2012 report: outcomes and accountability, leadership, and resources. Working with expert practitioners, the authors of this report investigated methods that interagency groups implemented to facilitate collaboration. For example, among the ways that organizations attempted to establish common outcomes and objectives were the following: the holding of “early in-person meetings to build relationships and trust,” the identification of “early wins for the group to accomplish,” and the development of “outcomes that represented the collective interests of participants.”\(^{17}\) To help promote accountability, the organizations undertook activities such as developing performance measures tied to shared outcomes and the development of “open and transparent” progress reporting methods.\(^{18}\) A complete list of these methods is shown in Table 2.\(^{19}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAO Recommended Practices</th>
<th>Outcomes and Accountability</th>
<th>Bridging Organizational Cultures</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Written Guidance and Agreements</th>
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<td>1) Define and articulate a common outcome</td>
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<td>2) Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies</td>
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<td>3) Identify and address needs by leveraging resources</td>
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<td>4) Agree on roles and responsibilities</td>
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<td>5) Establish compatible policies, procedures, to operate across agency boundaries</td>
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<td>6) Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report results</td>
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<td>7) Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports</td>
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<td>8) Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management</td>
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Table 1. GAO Cross Walk: 2005 Recommended Practices with 2012 Key Categories
Additional Key Features from the Literature

The findings from the three GAO reports summarized above provide a good starting point to inform government collaboration efforts; a review of the academic literature suggests additional features to facilitate such efforts. Organizations can use these elements to inform and evaluate whether the necessary conditions for collaboration success are present and identify areas for improvement. We expand the discussion along the four dimensions of collaborative leadership, motivation to collaborate, ability to collaborate, and trust and familiarity required to collaborate.

Collaborative Leadership

Leadership has been characterized in the literature as essential to the creation and maintenance of collaborative efforts. While the GAOs have characterized in the literature as key feature, it does not detail the underlying conditions for collaborative leadership success. The academic literature, for example, emphasizes that a non-hierarchical leadership structure is necessary for successful collaboration. According to Barbara Crosby and John Bryson, collaboration occurs in the realm of shared power, where different stakeholders control distinct resources and have their own bases of power and authority. Given this shared-power context and the fact that collaboration is typically voluntary, collaborative leadership tends to be facilitative, with leaders actively encouraging and engaging participants to work together rather than merely issuing orders. David Chrislip emphasizes the importance of strong facilitative leaders to “energize and sustain” the collaboration process.

Similarly, other authors have described collaborative leadership as “catalytic leadership where it is more about enabling or facilitating collaboration, or leading from the middle rather than leading from the top.” In contrast to hierarchical arrangements, Jeffrey Luke notes “catalytic leadership stimulates action
among people over whom one has little or no authority…. Catalytic leaders are collaborative and strategic, but do not dominate.”

Like the GAO reports, the academic literature suggests that leaders of successful collaborative efforts work with stakeholders to develop a common vision that keeps the common goal(s) in the forefront, while ensuring that the vision is adjusted as necessary when the conditions and context changes. Agreeing on a common vision, though difficult at times, is key to a successful outcome, and achieving this condition will be a recurring theme throughout this discussion. Ricardo Morse addresses this idea of the importance of a common vision in his concept of “integrative leadership,” describing it as a key catalyst for collaborations to produce public value. He argues that “it may be that successful partnerships occur when it is the common purpose that becomes the leader, with individuals exercising leadership in a way that develops and sustains the common purpose.”

Morse also describes “two primary defining features” of integrative leaders as “entrepreneurialism and their ability to cultivate trusting relationships.” In contrast to business entrepreneurs, Morse refers to integrative leaders as “public entrepreneurs” who “define success in terms of public value created.” The literature suggests that this sort of leadership is essential to foster a sense of trust and legitimacy in the collaborative process among the participating stakeholders, so long as this common purpose continues to resonate with their organizational interests. An important piece of collaboration planning that fosters trust among participants is the clear articulation of common goals as well as the individual organizational stakeholder interests. Trust building is discussed in more detail below.

Public administration literature and practice suggest that successful collaborations have committed sponsors and effective champions at many levels providing both formal and informal leadership. Sponsors have “formal authority [including resources and legitimacy] that can be used to legitimize and underwrite participation efforts,” while champions “have positions with considerable responsibility for managing the day-to-day work of the participation effort,” as well as “a high level of personal commitment to the process.” Crosby and Bryson note that:

Sponsors typically do not have to commit a lot of their time to the effort, but they can be counted on to come through when needed, especially at a high-visibility juncture…. Champions can be policy entrepreneurs themselves, or ‘process’ champions who do not have any preconceived notion about a desirable solution.

The 2012 GAO report discussed the importance of bridging across different organizational cultures; the academic literature suggests that boundary-spanning leaders—individuals with the experience in interorganizational management—are vital to achieving this goal. They have been defined as individuals who can “link two or more systems whose goals and expectations are likely to be at least partially conflicting.” Boundary-spanning leaders have broad credibility in areas linked to the problem and therefore “can play a significant role in negotiating and effecting collaborative relations between organizations.” Like all successful collaborative leaders, they are “individuals who help bridge the gap between organizations by finding and articulating common ground” during all phases

...successful collaborations have committed sponsors and effective champions at many levels providing both formal and informal leadership.
Motivation to Collaborate

Collaboration, in many ways, is voluntary and requires motivation on the part of the participants to occur. Therefore, it is important to understand what motivates leaders and organizations to form collaborative alliances. While the motivation of the partners does not need to be the same, all of the stakeholders need to be invested, have an understanding of the value of the collaboration, and recognize the value of the other partners to them and their shared goals.

Motivation to collaborate can take many forms, including incentives, interdependencies, common objectives, formal or political structures, and mutual self-interest. The 2012 GAO findings, for example, stress the importance of organizational incentive structures for collaboration. Mike Bresnen and Nick Marshall found that motivation results from a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and vary for each participant. Lowell Bryan and Claudia Joyce suggest the “use of mutual self-interest rather than authority to motivate collaboration.”

Morton Hansen’s research describes additional measures to enhance motivation for collaboration. He points out that in contrast to organizations with a culture of openness to outside ideas and a willingness to help others, groups exhibiting “not-invented here” or information hoarding behaviors present barriers to collaboration that increase collaboration costs. To break down these barriers, Hansen argues for leaders to promote unifying common goals and the value of cross-community teamwork, encourage collaboration, and send signals to get people to think beyond narrow interests. James Austin argues that frequent communication about these common goals and both the shared and individual benefits of teamwork can motivate organizations.

And, as Austin indicates, motivation must exist for the individuals as well as the organizations. Researchers recommend recognizing, assessing, and rewarding collaboration in organizational metrics, individual performance evaluations, 360-degree reviews with peer inputs, and promotion structures.

Ability to Collaborate

Stakeholders motivated to collaborate need pathways to provide the ability to do so. The 2014 GAO report examines the establishment of these pathways, including methods for tracking and monitoring progress, as well as mechanisms for funding and staffing. It finds that creating clear processes is vital to ensuring that organizations have the ability to collaborate.

A number of case studies in the academic literature describe various phases governing the collaboration process: problem-setting, direction-setting, and structuring. Barbara Gray suggests these three phases correspond to the following activities: identification of the stakeholders and common challenges, articulation of organizational values and common purpose, and the creation of the structures to “support and sustain their collective appreciation and problem-solving activities.” Whether established through formal processes or informal “personal relationships, psychological contracts, and informal understandings and
Despite the central role of trust in successful collaborations, the starting point often is one more of suspicion than trust.

Hansen’s research indicates that networks can facilitate the bridging of different organizational cultures, further enhancing these organizations’ abilities to collaborate. He argues that networks can enable stakeholders to find the information and expertise they are looking for and facilitate knowledge transfer. Moreover, linkages to networks can help stakeholders identify potential informal and formal collaboration partners. Alternatively, when these networks are not present, multiple barriers to collaboration arise.

Hansen suggests that leadership should foster development of “nimble interpersonal networks” across the interagency community. According to Hansen, the literature (drawing on theory and practice) provides the following set of rules (note the two phases) for network building in order to capture their greatest collaborative value:

**While seeking collaboration opportunities:**
- Build outward, not inward.
- Build diversity, not size.
- Build bridges, don’t use familiar faces.
- Build weak ties, not strong.

**When an opportunity is identified:**
- Swarm target, don’t go it alone.
- Switch to strong ties, don’t rely on weak.

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**Trust and Legitimacy Required to Collaborate**

All three GAO reports explicitly mention trust as one of the factors necessary to sustain collaborative relationships and, further, as a factor influenced by the implementation of the features and best practices outlined in the reports. Likewise, the academic literature speaks to the importance of legitimacy and trust and explores what methods collaborative leaders should employ to build trust.

Stephen Goldsmith and William Eggers call trust “the bedrock of collaboration” suggesting “without it people won’t collaborate or share knowledge.” The Wilder Institute’s Collaboration Factors Inventory lists “mutual respect, understanding and trust” as key membership-related factors for success. Trust and legitimacy are two of the top issues Barbara Gray suggests should be addressed during the early phases of a collaboration, specifically, “commitment to collaborate, growing from the interests of the stakeholders and the building and maintenance of trust among both present and potential participants” and “acceptance of the legitimacy of other stakeholders.”

Peter Ring and Andrew Van De Ven also emphasize the importance of trust, noting “the greater the ability to rely on trust, the lower the transaction costs (time and effort) required of parties to negotiate, reach agreements, and execute a cooperative IOR [interorganizational relationship].” Crosby and Bryson note that trust building is “one of the most important ingredients of a productive team,” and trust is “the foundation of team spirit, which is a shared enthusiasm for the group’s mission and a belief that the team can accomplish great things together.”

Despite the central role of trust in successful collaborations, the starting point often is one more of suspicion than trust between partners. And, several issues challenge a leader’s ability to build and sustain trust, including interpersonal
dynamics; complexity and multiplicity of goals, risks, and perceived benefits and consequences; the complexity of the collaboration itself; changing participants and evolving needs; power imbalances; and issues mentioned earlier, such as competing organizational cultures and missions. Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen state that, “if not managed effectively, any one of these issues can prevent trust from developing or even cause loss of trust,” thus the importance of dynamic management of these issues to prevent “the trust loop” from fracturing at any point throughout the collaborative process.

Huxham and Vangen argue that success in managing trust in collaborations “implies both the ability to cope in situations where trust is lacking and the ability to build trust in situations where this is possible.” They suggest that one method for managing trust is the adoption of a “small-wins approach,” where “trust is built incrementally via successful implementation of modest collaborative initiatives.”

Other methods for building trust found in the academic literature include the use of informal exploration sessions, where stakeholders get to know each other, and the creation of powerful, impelling experiences through team-building activities. An avenue described as especially effective for fostering trust among potential collaboration partners with initially weak ties is through the development of shared experiences, community building, and joint planning activities. These trust-building techniques, along with “easy-win” collaborative activities, are said to have immediate and long-term benefits for collaboration. Finally, learning feedback loops in which participants are constantly evaluating the conditions of the collaboration’s efficiency and equity, as well as the quality of the relationships, have also been credited in facilitating the building and sustainment of trust. As mentioned earlier, leaders should ensure that these trust-building activities (including those that nurture cross-sector understanding) are continuous throughout the collaboration project.

Lisa Bingham et al. argue that collaboration leaders succeed when they establish the legitimacy of collaboration as a form of organizing and a source of trusted interaction among members. In their view, this legitimacy can be established by members of the collaboration reaching a shared understanding of “how they will govern themselves to accomplish the task” to include “identifying ground rules, agreeing upon conflict management processes, and selecting decision norms.” Another means identified in the literature for maintaining legitimacy among stakeholders is the setting of clear expectations through the consistent application of the collaboration’s approach. This perceived legitimacy—achieved through recognition, cooperative interactions, and/or benefits by the stakeholders, external actors, or by the members and network—is a necessary/distinct dimension critical for collaborative networks.

Elaboration on Best Practices and Approaches

In order to provide greater granularity to the collaboration framework, we once again draw on the academic literature as a means to elaborate on certain aspects of the best practices identified in the 2005 GAO report and identify additional implementation approaches beyond those found in the 2014 GAO report.

Ensure Senior Leadership Support and Buy-in

Senior leadership support for collaboration should be explicit and mandated early in the process. This support facilitates many other pieces...
of the partnership for both the organizations and the individuals. Chrislip and Larson describe “commitment and/or involvement of high-level, visible leaders” and “support or acquiescence of ‘established’ authorities or powers” as key factors for collaboration success.\textsuperscript{71} Involving senior leadership sponsors with the authority to keep the process moving at high levels and/or dedicated leadership champions actively engaged in the process increases the chances for support in terms of resources, time, and visibility. Such senior-level support can also help maintain a healthy sense of urgency among the participants to help move the process forward.

\begin{boxedquote}
\textit{...it is important for collaboration leaders to conduct a stakeholder analysis early in the process and repeat this analysis as necessary...}
\end{boxedquote}

\textbf{Incorporate Appropriate Participants}

The 2012 GAO report mentions the importance of getting the right participants, with the appropriate skills, availability, and authority involved in the collaboration. The academic literature also emphasizes the criticality of those engaged in or planning to pursue a collaboration taking into account all of the stakeholders important to a collaborative partnership. Determining who should participate can have serious implications for outcomes. Gray emphasizes that participants should include “those whose expertise is essential to constructing a comprehensive picture [of the problem]...those who will be responsible for implementing the solution...those with authority to implement the decision.”\textsuperscript{72} According to her rationale, “having those ‘responsible for’ and ‘with authority to’ implement present during the design phase where the solutions are negotiated increases the likelihood that the agreed solution will be implemented.”\textsuperscript{73} Taking her argument into account, it is equally important to identify the not-so-obvious participants, such as those who may be detractors and those indirectly invested in the results.

To ensure that all appropriate participants are involved, it is important for collaboration leaders to conduct a stakeholder analysis early in the process and repeat this analysis as necessary when taking stock during the course of the collaboration. Bryson suggests a basic stakeholder analysis technique for strategic planning requires the team “brainstorm a list of who the organization’s stakeholders are; what their criteria are for judging the performance of the organization (that is, what their ‘stake’ is in the organization or its output); and how well the organization performs against those criteria from the stakeholder’s points of view.”\textsuperscript{74} Bryson notes additional steps for consideration include “understanding how the stakeholders influence the organization, identifying what the organization needs from its various stakeholders, and determining in general how important various stakeholders are.”\textsuperscript{75} According to Bryson, this analysis can “help clarify whether the organization needs to have different missions and perhaps different strategies for different stakeholders, whether it should seek to have its mandates changed, and in general what its strategic issues are.”\textsuperscript{76} Identifying the less obvious stakeholders early, helps organizations understand the challenges the collaboration may face later in the effort.

\textbf{Utilize a Participatory Planning Process}

Participatory planning processes in the early stages of a collaboration activity can greatly assist in establishing shared outcomes and bridging diverse organizational cultures. To facilitate success, the partner organizations should come together at the outset to discuss the goals, relationships and roles, procedures,
Participating in common planning activities can help to build trust and understanding among agencies...

Establish a Communication Mechanism

Effective communication is essential to a collaborative effort, including the maintenance of the trust-building loop among stakeholders. Crosby and Bryson emphasize the importance of “fostering communication that aligns and coordinates members’ actions, builds mutual understanding and trust, and fosters creative problem solving and commitment.” They also emphasize the need to match communication style and content to the group type and needs. Two related factors from the academic literature for ensuring effective communication are “open and frequent communication” and “established informal and formal communication links.” Building on this is the need to “create a communication plan” as a way of operationalizing those two factors. It is important that partners determine how they plan to communicate with one another, selecting communication mechanisms that facilitate effective collaboration and fit the communication styles of their partners. Stakeholders should hold additional meetings, if necessary, to insure all parties involved in the effort clearly understand the way forward. Organizations involved should assess each partner’s communication style when selecting a plan of actions and milestones, metrics for evaluating progress, and resources required/being contributed by each partner. Gray, for example, discusses “appreciative planning” and “collective strategies” as important collaboration processes, calling them “designs for advancing a shared vision.” These processes are used when there is recognition of the need for pooling complementary resources from several stakeholders to achieve desired actions. Appreciative planning involves exploratory joint inquiry by stakeholders into the context of the problem, without the expectation of reaching specific agreements or initiating specific actions. Collective strategies create specific agreements to address the problem and are often the result of appreciative planning processes. Participating in common planning activities can help to build trust and understanding among agencies, and such participatory planning is also important to effective stakeholder analysis. And, including as broad a population of participants as possible is important to the creation of a shared understanding of the problem and the solutions, which occurs during the planning process. Not including stakeholders affected by or responsible for implementing the solutions in the planning process could lead to conflict about objectives and potentially block implementation of the plans and solutions developed by the collaboration.

Understand the Organization’s Requirements and Flexibility

Stakeholders should come to the planning meetings prepared to discuss what each organization’s absolute requirements are and what objectives allow for flexibility and negotiation. A key to successful collaboration is the ability to create a “shared vision and joint strategies to address concerns that go beyond the purview of any particular party.” To do this, participants should understand their organization’s position, as well as possess the “ability to compromise.” Empowering participants can facilitate their flexibility and ability to compromise within the collaboration. One way to do this is the “empowerment of relationship managers,” where they are allowed to vary their own organizations’ procedures to make collaboration-specific decisions.
primary mode of communication, whether it be email, telephone, or online web repository. In addition, an effective communication mechanism also requires agreement on the frequency of communication—how often can participants expect information from the leadership and how often can they expect to communicate with the group? Finally, a means should be established for ensuring that everyone has the opportunity to participate in the communications process.

Written partnership agreements help prevent confusion and disagreements and can serve to bolster trust and a sense of legitimacy...

Establish a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)/Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Contract at the Start of the Collaboration and Be Prepared to Review and Modify as Necessary at Later Stages

Building on the 2012 GAO recommendation for written guidance and agreements, as well as recommendations from the academic literature to create joint agreements in order to ensure results, an MOA, MOU, or contract can assist in formalizing common understandings and agreements and provide a framework for collaboration implementation. While oftentimes difficult to develop and execute, for formal collaborations, a written agreement ensures the arrangement—including objectives, communication mechanism, and other processes and procedures—is clearly documented. The process of developing such an agreement provides all parties with an opportunity to read and agree to the parameters of the partnership, as well as modify it as necessary. It also serves as a reminder of what was agreed upon and helps to ensure that the responsibilities and resources that are required are available.

Written partnership agreements help prevent confusion and disagreements and can serve to bolster trust and a sense of legitimacy among the participants. It can also allow for a more seamless transition as participants leave and join the collaboration. For example, in one study, participants with formal agreements, who believed these agreements effectively articulated financial responsibilities, decision authority, and risk sharing, reported greater satisfaction with collaboration outcomes.

Develop a Plan of Actions and Milestones (POA&M) Agreed to by Participating Organizations

Building on the 2005 GAO report practices to build monitoring mechanisms and establish roles and responsibilities and the 2012 GAO feature of written guidance, the authors also recommend the drafting of a written plan of actions and milestones (POA&M). According to the federal government’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a POA&M is a “tool identifying tasks that need to be accomplished. It details resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, any milestones in meeting the task, and scheduled completion dates for the milestones.” POA&Ms are an OMB-required reporting tool for federal government agencies to comply with the Federal Information Security Management Act. They are commonly utilized in the Department of Defense acquisition community, for example, to facilitate program management and monitoring. This tool can serve formal cross-agency collaborations in a similar manner, including agreed upon milestones and schedules for regular activities.

Identify Decision Points in the Collaboration Process

A mechanism should be developed for identifying mutually-agreed-upon decision points—e.g., when organizations must commit to the collaboration, commit to staying in or leaving
the collaboration, and when the collaboration
should end—and criteria established under which
these decisions can be made. In particular, the
participating agencies should agree upon means
for modifying the collaboration arrangement.
Likewise, a mechanism should be in place to
enable the identification of an agreement on
metrics for performance and outcomes.

How to Structure Collaboration
Over Time: Proposed
Collaboration Framework

Drawing on the GAO findings and insights
from the academic literature, we propose a
notional collaboration framework to structure
collaboration over time. This framework can
serve to inform interagency collaborative
activities. While designed for the federal level,
the principles of this framework (and summary
of preconditions for collaboration) are drawn
from broad applications of cross-organizational
 collaboration and can also be implemented for
collaborations between the federal, state, and
local levels. The framework is not intended to
be prescriptive guidance; rather, it is a checklist
of activities designed to provide stakeholders
with a starting point for considering, planning,
executing, and concluding collaborative
partnerships. Each project will have its own
context that may require a different set of
activities be implemented; application of the
framework can be tailored, as appropriate, to
each scenario.

The notional framework is organized
around four phases of activity: 1) evaluating
opportunities, 2) planning the collaboration, 3) execution,
and 4) termination.

Phase One: Evaluating Opportunities
and Justifying Collaboration

The key activities of Phase One:

- Identify collaboration opportunities:
  - Use an evaluation method, such as the
    Prevention Institute’s “collaboration
    multiplier tool,”96 to cross-walk
    organizational requirements and
    resources that might be leveraged.
  - Conduct outreach and conversations
    or surveys of organizations with similar
    goals, missions, or pursuits to identify
    potential opportunities.
  - Review taskings and mandated
    activities to identify areas for potential
    collaboration.

- Estimate the opportunity and collaboration

- Estimate the opportunity and collaboration

- Estimate the opportunity and collaboration

- Estimate the opportunity and collaboration
costs, utilizing a tool such as Morton Hansen’s “collaboration equation”\textsuperscript{97} to determine whether the benefits of collaboration are greater than the sum of the opportunity and collaboration costs (see Figure 1).

- Lower any identified barriers to enable effective collaboration.

**Outcomes expected from Phase One:**

- Collaboration candidate(s) identified.
- Decision to initiate collaboration planning.

**Phase Two: Planning the Collaboration**

**The key activities of Phase Two:**

- Map the environment/context of collaboration:
  - What is the mandate and is it external or internally generated by stakeholder community?
  - What are the authorities and resources supporting/challenging collaboration?
- Map and analyze stakeholders to determine the participants in collaboration in order to ensure the right personnel are participating:
  - Who are the key stakeholders and possible participants?
  - What does each stakeholder/partner want to achieve? What are their interests/concerns?
  - What are the interrelationships with other stakeholders?
  - Are there existing collaborative arrangements?

![Figure 1. Decision to Collaborate Flow Chart](image-url)
» What can each partner/stakeholder/agency contribute to collaboration?

» What are the benefits and costs to each partner/stakeholder/agency to participating in the collaboration?

» What are the strengths/weaknesses of the collaborative partners?

• Together with collaborative partners, agree on and distinguish between common/complementary outcomes:

» What is the overarching common collaboration goal?

» Review the stakeholder interests; which of their organizational goals complement the common collaboration goal?

» Clearly articulate the goals and objectives of the collaborative activity

• Agree with partners on metrics and how progress toward the goal will be measured.

• Develop a written strategic plan (together with key stakeholders) including a mission statement (perhaps in the form of an MOU or MOA)

• Agree on required roles and responsibilities to achieve goals:

» What are the roles?

» Who has responsibility for what (assignments, Office of Primary Responsibility, leads)?

» What is the leadership continuity plan, if partners undergo organizational changes and/or lose key personnel for this effort?

• Determine resources required for collaborative project (funding, staffing, and information/technology):

» Who has these resources?

» Who will commit to sharing/contributing them?

» How will their use be tracked?

• Determine the mechanisms for communication and information sharing in support of the collaborative activity (to include any special handling requirements for proprietary, sensitive or classified data).

• Determine the agreed upon management and organizational structures, policies, and procedures required to support collaboration across agency boundaries:

» Determine how decisions will be made and/or conflicts adjudicated.

» Identify and agree upon project milestone decision points and other key activities, including joint concept development activities, joint studies, and requirements harmonization activities—document in a POA&M.

» In order to get senior leadership buy-in, take steps to develop high-level support within each agency for the collaborative activity, starting with the Senior Program Coordinators in each agency—develop formal documentation, as needed.

» Coordinate with appropriate umbrella structures and senior steering groups, and establish a working group for the activity when appropriate, again to ensure senior leadership support and buy-in.

• Determine how the arrangement is be documented/codified/formally endorsed by each partner:

» What mechanism is most appropriate? MOU, MOA, contract, other?
**Phase Three: Execution**

*The key activities of Phase Three:*

- Implementation in support of the common goals.
- Ensure the proper personnel, with appropriate skills, knowledge, and authority are assigned from each agency, and that they are able/willing to commit the necessary time to support the effort.
- Monitor, control, and track use of resources.
- Conduct regular in-process reviews to evaluate progress. The conditions for evaluation of collaboration projects (outcomes and accountability) should be set during the planning stage and be utilized during project implementation to track how the collaborative effort is doing and whether it is achieving its goals. This is also an important piece for closing out specific project collaborations (to determine how well they worked and identify what could be done better in future projects).
- Reinforce organizational and individual accountability for collaborative activities.
- Ensure adequate communications channels and associated technologies are in place to facilitate deepening trust and teamwork across agency boundaries.
- Maintain high-level visibility of and support for the activity in each agency and at higher echelons of government.
- Ensure continued provision of resources to support the collaboration.
- Identify conflict management mechanisms to be employed in cases where issues cannot be resolved at working levels (also part of the planning phase).
• Periodically review the status of the collaborative activity to assess whether it should continue and allow for the withdrawal of partners from the activity.

• Evaluate continuation or termination of collaboration based on agreed criteria such as:
  » Milestones and goals are being achieved.
  » Project’s common goals are no longer valid.
  » Collaborative inertia cannot be overcome.
  » Costs of collaboration exceed benefits.

**Outcomes expected from Phase Three:**

• Progress reports.

• Achievement of project goals.

• Modification of goals, roles, processes, POA&M, and documentation, as appropriate.

• Decision to continue or terminate collaboration.

**Phase Four: Termination**

**The key activities of Phase Four:**

• Reach the conditions and time points at which the activity can be terminated.

• Document outcomes and lessons learned from the project and share them with stakeholders and leadership champions/sponsors; such reports support accountability requirements and also serve to inform support for future collaborations.

• Modify any formal agreements as necessary to reflect the conclusion of the collaborative project.

• Cease formal collaboration.

**Outcomes expected from Phase Four:**

• Final reporting of outcomes with lessons learned.

• Documentation of agreement termination, as needed.

**Conclusion**

Given the high-level of interest in collaboration within the federal government and the need to maximize efficiencies and eliminate duplications of effort in times of declining budgets, the external pressures for collaboration will likely increase over time. Thus, it is important for stakeholder community leaders within the government to understand and cultivate the conditions for collaboration success. Work on the elements of leadership, trust, motivation, and the ability to collaborate will facilitate smoother planning processes for new collaboration projects. Implementing methodologies to assist in determining when collaborations should be attempted will help reduce waste in time and funding.

The framework outlined here provides for participation criteria and regular assessment, which aid in monitoring and evaluating the progress of a collaboration project and, importantly, provide structured decision points for determining when to withdraw from or terminate such a project. Such attributes lend more predictability and stability to collaborative endeavors making them more attractive for potential participants. Of the four phases described in the framework, the planning phase is the most important. Due diligence taken at the outset to clearly determine the common goals, requirements, commitments of resources and expectations is key to overall success. Engaging the right participants early on can help define and shape the way ahead and gain necessary stakeholder buy-in for effective collaboration.
The framework can help to identify a set of issues that should be given consideration as early in the planning process as feasible, so that as many potential problem areas are anticipated when their remedy is least expensive and their consequences least damaging.

Areas for further research to foster improved collaboration through implementation of this framework include an examination of: what additional conditions and/or drivers should be in place to cause use of the framework and how organizations might train and educate leaders to motivate their use of, reliance on this framework.

Effective collaboration can yield public value greater than the sum of individual organizational efforts. The collaborative framework presented in this paper, informed by the 2005, 2012, and 2014 GAO report findings and our review of the literature on partnerships and collaboration, is offered as a starting point and guide for stakeholders—at the federal, state, or local levels—in considering, planning, implementing, and evaluating collaborations. IAJ

NOTES


4 Chrislip and Larson, p. 65.


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 14.

8 Ibid., p. 16.

9 Ibid., p. 17.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 21.

12 Ibid., p. 22.

13 Ibid., pp. 23–24.

15 This may include persons who are outside federal agencies, but who have a significant stake in the collaboration.


18 Ibid., pp. 22–27.

19 Ibid., pp. 14, 22, 27, and 36.


21 Crosby and Bryson, Leadership for the Common Good: Tackling Public Problems in a Shared-Power World, pp. 17–19.


26 Morse, p. 242.

27 Ibid., p. 243.

28 Ibid.


32 Crosby and Bryson, Leadership for the Common Good: Tackling Public Problems in a Shared Power World, p. 208.

33 Ibid.


37  Ibid., p. 849.


44  Ibid., pp. 17 and 74.


49  Ibid., p. 18.

50  Ibid., p. 17.

51  Ibid., Table 6-1, p. 124. More details on these rules are in Chapter 6, “Build Nimble Networks,” pp. 124–139.


59 Huxham and Vangen, p. 166.


64 Huxham, p. 409.


67 Ibid., p. 224.


71 Chrislip and Larson, p. 40.


73 Ibid.

74 Bryson, p. 177.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.


78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.


82 Chrislip and Larson, p. 5.

83 Mattessich et al.


86 Ibid., p. 70.

87 Mattessich et al.


89 Ibid., p. 103.


94 Ariño and de la Torre, p. 306.

95 Winer and Ray, p. 133.


Developing a Culture of Questioning

or Don’t Tell, Do Ask

by Ted Thomas and James Thomas

A couple of decades ago, a young basic trainee at Fort Dix, NJ, was carrying a bucket of white paint and accidentally dropped it, causing a sizable splotch in the middle of a road. Fearful of the reaction of his drill sergeants and in a panic about his future, he quickly thought about what he could do to keep from getting in trouble. There was nothing at hand to clean up the spill, and it would be next to impossible to clean all of the paint off the road. He suddenly hit upon the idea of taking the random splotch of paint and forming it into a perfect circle so that it looked like someone had purposely painted it there. He took his brush and added a little more paint to get a good circle. He hurriedly went back to his barracks and told a few of his fellow trainees what he had done. No one in authority was the wiser for his accident. Twelve years later and now a noncommissioned officer (NCO), this Soldier had an opportunity to return to Fort Dix. Over the years he often wondered what had happened to the white paint on the road. Surely by now the weather had erased his blunder, or the road had been resurfaced and covered his handiwork. While at Fort Dix, he could not resist the temptation to go where he had spilled the paint to see what remained. When he arrived, to his amazement, he not only found the dot, but he discovered that it had been freshly painted.¹

People may think that only in the military could someone accidentally spill paint, turn the spill into a white dot, and then return years later to discover that the dot was repainted over and over again, without anyone asking why the dot was there in the first place. Behavior like this may be more common in organizations than one would think. Figuratively speaking, there are “white dots” in most organizations. “White dots” are the things we do because we have always, done them

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that way and never questioned why. They may have been done to cover up a mistake or perhaps there was once a valid reason. Organizations that continue to do things the way they have always been done become irrelevant and less effective. Without periodically questioning the status quo, an organization can decline to the point of extinction. Periodically examining how things operate and asking why “white dots” exist in our systems is essential to staying competitive in a changing and uncertain environment.

Corporate America often finds itself wrestling with “white dots.” When faced with a changing and uncertain future, some companies make decisions allowing them to survive, others do not and face obsolescence. The typewriter industry provides an example of how one company approached a changing market. Smith Corona, a company that made typewriters before it went out of business during the personal computer revolution, killed a partnering effort with Acer computers because the board of directors believed the Acer product line “wasn’t growing fast enough.” Mike Chernago, a former Vice President of Operations for Smith Corona, commented on this decision saying, “... at the time, the executives thought that Smith Corona was never going to be put out of business. It was hard to imagine that the typewriter would be annihilated in just 10 years.” When faced with the changing dynamics in the marketplace, Smith Corona executives did not challenge their beliefs. Instead of asking how to build a better typewriter, they should have asked, “what is the nature of our business,” and “how do we best position ourselves for the future?” When they had an opportunity to partner with a computer company, the leadership of Smith Corona was busy painting white dots on a road that was getting ready to shut down.

The correct answer to the wrong question will not produce the correct solution. Questioning takes time, practice, and perseverance. In a world of fast computers, fast food, and fast cars, organizations often do not take the time required to create a climate where people feel free to ask the right questions. Politicians, government leaders, and chief executive officers all need to learn how to create a questioning culture.

When faced with a changing and uncertain future, some companies make decisions allowing them to survive, others do not and face obsolescence.

Importance of Questioning

A culture that encourages questioning does many great things for an organization:

- It helps the organization define its mission and vision.
- It keeps the organization focused.
- It allows creativity to flow, innovative ideas to be presented as opportunities, and routines to be questioned and improved.
- It creates a climate that encourages adaptability, flexibility, and creativity.
- It helps identify and solve problems, question assumptions, look for interdependencies, and examine different points of view.

These are organizational behaviors necessary to survive in uncertainty. Questioning can help organizations look inward at its own biases, methods, and culture, thus enabling it to not only survive, but to thrive in a volatile and quickly changing environment.

A questioning culture critically examines the logic behind the status quo to find the right questions to ask. If President George W. Bush had had an effective questioning culture established among his advisors, he may not have expanded our national goals to include “spreading democracy in the Middle East,” and
touting it as an essential element to winning the war on terrorism. One of the first questions the President and his advisors may have asked before establishing this goal was, “What are the conditions necessary for democracy to work in a country?” This question challenges the assumption that democracy will work in Middle Eastern nations and cultures. This assumption may or may not be valid. Perhaps a more appropriate question to ask was, “What is the best form of government for that particular country or region to succeed?” The answer to this question may have necessitated a significantly different approach to the region and vastly change the execution of U.S. foreign policy for that area. At the very least, the answer may have prompted President Bush not to make such a socio-centric and, possibly, culturally-insensitive statement. Presidents surround themselves with advisors who have strong opinions based on their ideological beliefs and cultural patterns. Presidents may be better suited by surrounding themselves with people who can ask the questions through the lens of a different culture and perspective.

Our strategy in Iraq floundered for years. It was not until senior leaders put together a guiding coalition—one that began asking questions that challenged existing perceptions, did the situation begin to turn toward an acceptable solution. Because of our mental models, we sometimes make assumptions causing us to pursue answers to the wrong questions. Answering the wrong question will not achieve long-term success.

An open and questioning culture allowed the coalition to realize and capitalize on the Sunni awakening. However, yesterday’s solution has morphed into today’s problem of threats and challenges from the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL). Other new and developing issues in the South China Sea, Ukraine, and many other places present complex and uncertain situations requiring the U.S. government to ask the right questions and make hard choices based on finding the answers. Reinforcing failure usually does not work.

**Characteristics of a Questioning Culture**

How do you know if you are part of an organization that has a questioning culture? Professor Michael Marquardt of George Washington University gives six hallmarks of an organization with a questioning culture. The leaders and people in the organization:

1. Are willing to admit when they don’t know.
2. Encourage questioning.
3. Develop the skills to ask questions in a positive manner.
4. Focus on empowering questions and avoid disempowering ones.
5. Emphasize the process of questioning and not just finding the “right answer.”
6. Accept risk taking and reward it, even when it doesn’t work.

Questioning causes us as individuals to revisit the cognitive frameworks that help us to organize and process new information. Sometimes the organization needs to admit it does not know what it does not know. Questioning what information is used to arrive at decisions can help refine how the organization gathers and processes information, which can improve overall organizational effectiveness.

A questioning organization is one that
fosters learning. Its members are encouraged to ask questions and to develop their skills in questioning. A questioning culture is determined by the types of questions the leaders ask and by the freedom with which their subordinates ask questions of their leaders. When the lowest ranking person in an organization can freely ask a question, it allows anyone and everyone in that organization to be part of solving problems and allows the organization to take ownership of fixing itself. However, questions in and of themselves are not always positive. Sometimes they can cause damage.

Questions can be used as a hammer to bludgeon people. They can be used in a judgmental manner to place blame, such as, “Why did you do something that stupid?” or “What’s wrong with you?” or to fix responsibility, such as “This is your fault, isn’t it?” Judging questions are asked when the questioner thinks he or she knows the answer. They are based on past events and are often used in an attacking mode. Disempowering questions such as, “Why didn’t you do this task?” are used to manipulate, mislead, or detour, or they or carry baggage with them, such as “Why are you always behind schedule?” They often give the responder the feeling of being interrogated, for example, “Don’t you know better than that?” or “Why can’t you just do your job?” Some people become very skilled at this type of questioning, but it does not elicit any type of productive reflection, only defensive efforts to cover up mistakes and prevent another onslaught.

On the other hand, questions can empower others to action. Empowering questions give the receiver of the question the feeling of being valued and that his or her opinion is worthwhile and respected. The questioner empowers others by asking such questions as, “How do you feel about…?” or “What do you think about…?” or “Help me understand why you proposed that option?” Subordinates can tell when the leader is asking questions to genuinely learn. Even using the same question with different body language and tone of voice can change the intent of a question. For instance, “What were you thinking?” is a question that could be a genuine question looking for information or it could be yelled in an accusatory manner to disempower the receiver of the question.

Questions may have a time- and space-related aspect. The process of questioning is necessary to identify problems and to think through the answers, but the passage of time may change the conditions. The right answer today may not be the correct answer tomorrow. The right answer for a particular situation in one country or area may not work in another country or culture. In a complex, changing environment, right is fleeting, but the process of questioning to find answers is invaluable. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower so aptly put it, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”

There is risk involved in both asking and not asking questions. If there is no right answer or the right answer changes frequently, then the organization needs to take risks to find solutions. When subordinates are punished for taking risks, the culture will eventually eliminate the risk takers who ask the hard questions to drive change. An organization that does not learn how to evaluate and take prudent risks will not adjust fast enough to remain relevant in a quickly moving and changing environment. In business or war, stagnation means death, since there is always a competitor eager to take advantage of weakness. Leaders set the tone for adapting and changing their organizations, and questioning can be a vital part of the process.

If we are not careful, we can all become...
prisoners of our past models of behavior. Asking questions that challenge the status quo and how we see the world can be unsettling. For example, examining operations for obsolete tasks, positions, or functions may correctly lead some employees to believe that their job security is threatened. This fear can result in resistance to eliminating even outmoded and useless procedures. So how does an organization overcome this resistance? One method is to establish a questioning culture.

**Obstacles to Fostering a Questioning Organizational Culture**

There seems to be three major obstacles to fostering a questioning organizational culture. One is a culture of telling instead of asking. If people are always told what to do, they become reluctant to ask questions. Militaries and other hierarchical organizations often rely on directing people with little consideration for allowing questions. The second obstacle is expertise. The more experienced people become in a field, the less they ask questions and the more they feel they have the right answer. The third is a person’s status or role. The higher in rank or position, especially in a hierarchical organization, the more they feel expected to direct people and have the right answers.

**Culture of tell**

Edgar Schein, notable management professor from Massachusetts Institute for Technology, states that we “all live in a culture of Tell and find it difficult to ask, especially to ask in a humble way.” Government organizations often rely on directing people with little consideration for allowing questions. However, there are many times when questioning can improve the organization. In a questioning culture there has to be psychological safety that allows subordinates to question their leaders without fear of reprisal and threat of losing their jobs.

Schein poses a very important question leaders can ask as a measure to determine the level of psychological safety in an organization: “If I am about to make a mistake, will you tell me?” If there is not enough candor and safety built into an organization’s culture to honestly answer yes, then the next question becomes what do we need to do differently to develop and create that kind of culture?

While prevalent throughout government, the culture of “tell” is especially evident in the military. General Stanley McChrystal echoed the sentiment of telling and directing that is prevalent in the military. In his book *Team of Teams*, he states: “I expected myself to have the right answers and deliver them to my force with assurance. Failure to do that would reflect weakness and invite doubts about my relevance. I felt intense pressure to fulfill the role of chess master for which I had spent a lifetime preparing.” However, McChrystal also reflected that he had to become more of a gardener as a leader. He needed to be able to create the seedbed for ideas to grow. He had to learn the art of asking the right questions in order to be successful.

Developing a questioning culture requires unlearning old behaviors and learning new ones. A questioning culture allows people to question long-standing organizational policies and processes. People should feel that there is sufficient trust in the organization so that asking questions is not only acceptable, but desired. The freedom to challenge the status quo helps people to see the need to change. When people discover the need to change in collaboration with others, they may also discover how change will allow them to become more valuable to the company. As the members of an organization come to believe they are part of finding the problem and
contributing to providing solutions, they are well down the road to committing to the success of the organization.

**Expertise**

Every organization needs people who are experts in their field. However, sometimes experts who know a whole lot about something disadvantages an organization. The more people study something, the more convinced they become of the correctness of their opinion and the less able they are to think objectively. As Colin Powell, former Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in his “18 Points of Leadership,” “Experts often possess more data than judgment.” He goes on to say “that even the pros may have leveled out in terms of their learning and skills. Sometimes even the pros can become complacent and lazy.”

The more people are considered experts, the less likely they want to appear as if they are not, and the harder it becomes for them to assume the role of learners again. If the experts do not know the answer, then they are obviously not experts. Experts can become subject to the disease of certainty, which leads to a hardening of attitudes. These attitudes can translate into not asking questions other than to gather data in order to fit the information into a preconceived notion of their truth.

For most Americans, years of public schooling have shaped our mental models of questioning. For many years the American school model was for students to regurgitate information in response to questions posed by teachers. Clayton Christensen, Harvard business professor known for his study of innovation, said that, “Indeed, most of the academic world behaves as if we believe that the critical skill society needs of us is to know the right answers. Too often, as a result, we overlook an obvious fact: finding the right answer is impossible unless we have asked the right question.” The mental model, which we all have from school, is reinforced in military organizations. A leader asks the questions, while subordinates find the answers. In hierarchical cultures such as the military or government, leaders are promoted on their ability to get answers quickly and get things done. Too often we do not reward leaders who take a moment to reflectively question why things are done. Sometimes we do not value those who question the “white dots.” Reacting to a situation that is not time sensitive without pausing to ask key questions can be a recipe for disaster.

**Status**

In hierarchical organizations, one’s position indicates status and the flow of information that a person can control. Too many leaders look upon questions as a challenge to their authority instead of an opportunity to learn, grow, and become more aware.

Most organizations tend to become very hierarchical and bureaucratic as they become bigger and older. These aged organizations are “exemplified by conformity, groupthink, parochialism, dogmatism, intolerance, and anti-intellectualism.” Novel ideas tend to be treated as threats and dismissed. Instead of using judgment and experience, routines become the default. Promotions often create hubris in leaders, which causes them to have a difficult time admitting ignorance. In hierarchical and highly centralized organizations, leaders are usually reluctant to admit their failings and shortcomings openly, trying to keep an image of infallibility, even refusing to learn from their past mistakes.

With higher levels of responsibility comes the need to consider alternative perspectives and to question existing paradigms. Often,
subordinates who ask questions can quickly get marginalized. As a result, they do not get promoted to positions where the need for questioning is more important. The consequence is that those who are good at finding answers get promoted while those who think reflectively and ask probing, thought-provoking questions become seen as a threat and get passed over. Our systems often flush out those who we need the most to help identify the “white dots.”

The Leader’s Role in Developing a Questioning Culture

A questioning culture cannot emerge or thrive without the help of leadership. The leader has to set the example by asking thought-provoking questions and encouraging the same from all within the organization. Without support from the leadership, a questioning culture is next to impossible. In a hierarchical organization, the boss is normally promoted due to length of time or because of expected knowledge. Bosses do not want to look stupid or uniformed. Their role, status, and accompanying ego may dictate that they need to know the answer. They may be embarrassed or uncomfortable when confronted with questions they do not know or understand. This attitude can easily stifle questioning.

Developing a foundation in critical thinking is a good place to start in developing skills for a questioning culture. Critical thinkers ask such questions as what is the purpose, what are the different points of view and perspectives involved; what are the implications and consequences of different decisions; what is the problem or issue at hand; what are the relevant facts and data available; what are the assumptions being made, what concepts, theories, principles, or models are involved; and what are the conclusions and possible solutions. For a questioning culture to exist, the leader needs to model it, encourage it, and reward it.

Leaders need to seek out and encourage divergent and diverse opinions and perspectives, not punish them for being divergent and diverse. Actions speak much louder than words. Movie mogul Samuel Goldwyn Jr. said, “I don’t want any yes-men around me. I want them to tell me the truth even if it costs them their job.” An attitude such as this of punishing those who tell the truth will not encourage candor or frankness and will result in exactly what the leader does not want, a collection of yes men. Followers provide a barometer of the atmosphere of an organization as to whether or not it allows questions to flourish. Leaders who surround themselves with like-minded subordinates are often deluded into thinking their organization is open and free to allow change and growth because there is little creative abrasion. Organizations need creative tension to flourish to allow the freedom of thought and discussion necessary for a questioning culture.

A questioning culture is founded on a desire to learn and on genuine curiosity and interest. It once again starts with a learning attitude from the top and moves on down. If people have the attitude that they know all the answers, then there is no reason to learn, to ask questions, or to look for ways to improve. Asking for opinions and understanding lines of reasoning become opportunities to learn for both the giver and the receiver of the question. To promote a culture of questioning, leaders should adopt an attitude of inquisitiveness. Engaging others with thoughtful

Leading a Questioning Culture

- Critical thinking role model
- Seek divergent views
- Curiosity
- Listener
- Humility
- Accept Risk
questions and really listening to their answers are keys to inquiry.19

The questioning leader needs to listen. If leaders do not listen, there is no need to ask questions. In fact, leaders need to not only listen, but to also listen for what is not being said in order to question further to get to the root of an issue. They should pay attention to the content, the emotion in the person delivering the content, and to their own emotions. Listeners should put their internal filters on hold to prevent jumping to conclusions too early and forming false perceptions that may stick. Listening means suspending judgment and often restating what has been said in order to ensure mutual understanding. Leaders who listen gain understanding because they sincerely want to learn, which may involve some reflection to process the answers received and may require returning with further questions to clarify understanding.

Questioning requires some humility. People should accept that they may need to learn from others, regardless of their position. A volatile and constantly changing environment requires leaders to face situations for which they are unprepared. In such situations, an effective leader must exercise some humility by either admitting they do not know how to solve a particular problem or by asking their subordinates for help. This can be difficult in organizations where people are promoted because of their experience and expertise. It may be quite a change in organizational culture for the leader to genuinely ask and solicit the opinions of others on matters of importance and to openly admit they do not know everything.

The leader also has to be willing to give up a bit of control, which involves taking risk by allowing others to take risk and to underwrite their failure, if necessary. Questions that allow the questioner to maintain control of the conversation will never lead to a questioning culture and will not identify the “white dots” in organizations. Questions that maintain control are ones that ask for data or information; are close-ended and have a specific answer; are confrontational, rhetorical, or leading; are judging in nature or make statements; or are involved in coaching or evaluating others. If questioners already know the answer to the question, they are maintaining control as well. Questions that give control over to the person questioned involve turning the questioner into a student who wants to learn. They are questions with learning as the objective, are open ended, and empower the persons answering the question to really think and try to come up with answers or their own questions. For instance, instead of asking what are the three steps to do something, ask if there is a fourth step or if something is missing.

Leaders who are able to relinquish control and show a desire to learn from others encourage creativity, flexibility, and adaptability. People can actually increase their self-confidence when they believe they do not have to give the appearance of knowing everything. In effect, the organization can begin to access its collective brain power. The rewards can be great, as General George Patton indicated when he said, “Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.”20

Conclusion

The “white dots” are out there in every organization. Questioning is essential to the health and well-being of any organization, but especially one in which the conditions for
success change rapidly. It takes a shift in attitude for leaders to create an organization where people ask questions with genuine curiosity and with a desire to learn. The role of questioning is to find the right problem to solve by creating dialogue, showing respect for other’s opinions, and involving more people in the process. Three major ways questioning is hindered are through culture, expertise, and status. It is easy to maintain the attitude of a “tell” culture. It takes leaders to encourage subordinates to ask questions instead of just finding answers. As leaders progress higher up organizational ladders, the more important it becomes for them to foster a climate of questioning. Without the differing perspectives such a culture offers, the organization will not thrive.

As General Eric Shinseki said, “If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance even less.” Questioning cultures allow changes to be made by empowering and creating initiative. They foster a culture of asking the right questions and not repainting random “white dots.” A leader needs to understand where the organization is now. Does it have the characteristics of a questioning culture? Leaders then need to recognize the importance of their role in creating a questioning culture. A questioning culture needs leaders who think critically, who are curious and seek divergent views, who work to listen to others with humility, and who accept risk. Giving up some control is essential to creating an organization with a questioning culture that can find and deal with “white dots.”

John Kotter characterized the main difference between leaders and managers as the difference between one who asks the questions and one who finds answers. To build future strategic leaders, an organization has to teach and foster the ability to ask the right questions. If it does not, managers will be promoted into positions of leadership without experience in the critical questioning necessary to keep the organization viable and effective in a changing situation. They will be waiting for someone to ask them questions to answer, or they will continue to do what they know and what they have always done in the past. They will continue to repaint the “white dot.”

NOTES
1 Story told by Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rodriguez, June 2010, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
8 Ibid, pp. 64 and 78.
9 Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech given to the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference,
Washington, DC, November 14, 1957.

10 Schein, p. 8.

11 Schein, p. 108.


14 Christensen.


16 Ibid.


19 Schein, p. 5.


21 Marquardt, p. 171.

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Killing Kids: An Interagency Problem

by John R. Bennett, Nicholas J. Hitt and Eric A. Swett

This is not just a problem for academia, but it is a problem that has clear policy implications that should concern us all.... Our soldiers must deal with the complex dilemma of facing children on the battlefield without proper intelligence warnings or training to help prepare or guide them.

—P. W. Singer

A call crackled over the radio and broke the silence of a quiet morning in Iraq in 2003. With panic in his voice, a young American Soldier stammered, “There is a child pointing a gun at us from only a few feet away, what should we do?” The Soldier was in a mud brick tower, about eight to ten feet off the ground, that would not stop a bullet, and, additionally in mid-2003, the Soldiers at this outpost lacked body armor. The radio immediately came to life with voices cutting each other off. Some stated the laws of war were clear, shoot the armed combatant or eliminate the threat. Others on the radio gave orders not to shoot, making ethical and emotional arguments. The Soldier in the guard tower was faced with an impossible situation, kill the child in order to safely return to his wife and infant daughter or continue to hope the child would run away instead...
of shooting. Meanwhile, confusion reigned on the radio with distant leaders speculating that the child was innocent and just following the directions of bad parents. Fortunately, a tank on patrol nearby scared the child away before the impossible choice was made, but not before the Soldier suffered permanent mental scars from almost having to kill a child.

Afterwards, although the events were relayed up the chain of command, there were no attempts to resolve the root issues that caused the child to take up arms. The only result was a brief note that each Soldier had an inherent right to take a life in self-defense, and each would have to make that decision. While there are times when a Soldier may have to take the life of a child combatant, we owe it to our Soldiers to ensure all elements of national power are used to address the root causes of child combatants before ordering the military into combat. This article will address the question: Can greater interagency integration during military operations create a more ethical military response to child-soldier combatants?

Child combatants are not a new issue, but they are increasingly encountered by American Soldiers as the U.S. increases its presence in Africa and turns from fighting mostly nation states to insurgencies and terrorist organizations. American Soldiers famously encountered a unit of 14 to 17-year-old German soldiers near Normandy, France, during World War II, but this was a small fraction of the combatants in a war of approximately 100 million soldiers. This is not the case in Africa, where several nations and numerous insurgencies and terrorist groups use child combatants.

While some child combatants in Africa fight for belief in a cause, many are bought or abducted and forced to commit atrocities as their initiation. Children are forced to kill their parents and maim and rape fellow villagers. Some are made chemically dependent on drugs to create a feeling that they have no place to go, which makes them easier to control. Governments are faced with the difficulty of balancing reconciliation of the child combatants with the demands of justice from the families of those maimed, raped, or killed by the child.

...we owe it to our Soldiers to ensure all elements of national power are used to address the root causes of child combatants...

Current Military Approach

The U.S. Embassy coordinates the activities of the Department of State (State), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Department of Justice (DoJ), and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to assist the host nation in bringing an end to the violence. When such measures fail and military support is requested, the Department of Defense (DoD) deploys Soldiers to protect host-nation civilians from the violence.

While no DoD policy addresses child combatants, the recommended training is similar to that developed by the U.S. Marine Corps in 2002: (1) identify and remove the adult leaders; (2) fight child combatants at a distance utilizing shock firing (shooting above their heads); (3) secure child combatant recruitment zones (schools, refugee camps, etc.); (4) use nonlethal weaponry; (5) use psychological operations to persuade children to lay down their arms and return to a safe-haven environment; (6) inform the U.S. public of the problem and that troops might have to use lethal force if they face child soldiers; and (7) increase intelligence efforts to better understand the root issues.¹

These suggestions have limited impact on the root causes of children becoming child soldiers, and the suggestions require a significant number of Soldiers to secure the recruitment zones. Even then, these suggestions will only partially reduce the chance that a unit of child combatants will conduct an attack that will
An integrated interagency approach during combat operations can address the root causes from multiple fronts to significantly reduce the chance that the military will have to use lethal force against child soldiers.

**Legal Issues**

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that with regard to children (anyone under 18 years of age), government and nongovernmental actors must prohibit “the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography, and ... the involvement of children in armed conflict.” The concept of “international cooperation” identified in Article 7 promoted international help to uphold the law. Protocols I and II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits states from recruiting and using children under the age of fifteen for both international conflict and non-international conflict. The International Labor Organization Convention 182 prohibits the conscription of children into the armed forces. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court holds criminals accountable “for recruiting and using child soldiers in both international and non-international armed conflict,” which is considered a war crime. In summary, the legal finding is that there is legal protection for children being recruited and conscripted as child combatants.

Additionally, Soldiers retain the legal right to defend themselves on the battlefield.

**Ethical Issues**

Firstly, what are the ethic or moral grounds on which a country may conduct Phase III, (dominate) operations? There are only two kinds of causes for just war, national defense and humanitarian intervention. “[H]umanitarian intervention is permissible only to avert the very gravest of tragedies—‘crimes that shock the moral conscience of mankind’.”

Ethicist Seth Lazar warns: “How infrequently military intervention succeeds. Since it so often not only fails, but actually makes things worse, we should use it only when the ongoing crimes are so severe that we would take any risk to try to stop them.” Therefore, it may be morally acceptable under Just War Theory not to intervene because intervention may cause greater harm than not intervening. However, a problem arises when considering suitability and feasibility. For example, is there a critical resource or national interest at stake? Does failure to intervene really lead to less harm when factoring in national interests, i.e., protection of U.S. persons, allies, and human life; real estate; and resources or upholding U.S. values? With regard to the principle of proportionality, one consideration is that the benefits outweigh the harm caused by the war. For the purpose of this article, the authors assume that the U.S. decision to conduct Phase III operations is based on the premise that a greater good will come from the use of force.

Secondly, there are two possible responsibility to protect (R2P) scenarios and one non-R2P scenario to considered when U.S. forces are called upon to confront child soldiers. Under conditions of R2P, would the U.S. have an obligation to intervene in a national state where it can expect to combat child soldiers? What is our R2P under these conditions? It is possible...
that the UN Security Council may invoke R2P to authorize force to intervene in an instance where a host nation is committing war crimes against its population using child soldier forces. Additionally, the U.S. may find itself fighting under conditions as it had in Somalia, where there was no effective government and warlords were inflicting war crimes on the population. Under similar circumstances, the UN Security Council may invoke R2P in an effort to protect and assist the population from the warlords’ forces that may consist of child soldiers. In both of these scenarios, U.S. forces may be confronted with a situation in which they must engage with and destroy enemy combatants that include child soldiers. Finally, there may be another scenario where the host nation is unable to protect a portion of its population from an insurgency group who has enlisted child soldiers. Under these three scenarios, the authors believe that the Just War Theory would justify an intervention as long as the benefits outweigh the cost of a military intervention.

**Current Interagency Approaches**

**Department of State**

In conjunction with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), State approaches the child soldier problem from both the agency and the country level, but it does not specifically address approaches during military operations.

At the agency level, these organizations monitor for and attempt to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers. They also have interagency coordination tools that can be applied in crisis situations. State’s “Trafficking in Persons Report” places all countries into tiers according to “the extent of governments’ efforts to reach compliance with the TVPA’s [Trafficking Victims Protection Act] minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking,” which includes child soldiers. It also provides recommendations based on the persecution, protection, and prevention of child soldiers. As of the 2015 report, in the West Africa region alone, both Mali and Nigeria are labeled as Tier 2. A Tier 2 rating represents “countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.”

An effect of this report is direct pressure on countries supporting the use of child soldiers and indirect pressure though the international community.

...the UN Security Council may invoke responsibility to protect in an effort to protect and assist the population from the warlords’ forces that may consist of child soldiers.

Through State and the USAID, the U.S. government donates a significant amount of money to humanitarian aid efforts. In 2006, “across seven war-affected countries, the U.S. gave over $100 million to UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund], which is committed to improving the lives of children around the world.” The USAID also “contributed more than $10 million over the past several years toward the demobilization of child combatants and reintegration into their communities.”

State and the USAID also provide funding for early warning mechanisms, for example, “efforts to increase communication between and among rural communities affected by [terrorist] raids and attacks.”

Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability Operations*, produced under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes two interagency tools that support whole-of-government planning for stability operations—State’s Interagency Management System (IMS) for post-conflict reconstruction/stabilization
efforts and the USAID’s Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) that addresses conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization activities.15 IMS is used by the National Security Council when incidents become a national strategic interest. The ICAF is an “assessment [that] will provide for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in the country or region.”16

State also provides significant capabilities within recognized foreign countries with U.S. embassy country teams. “The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. programs and policies.”17 The actions that State and the USAID make at both the department or agency level and the country level attempt to address the child soldier issues with monitoring, prevention, pressure, humanitarian aid, whole-of-government crisis management, and assessments.

Department of the Treasury

The Treasury also is an important contributor to addressing child soldiers by using sanctions and freezing U.S. assets of individuals, organizations, and/or countries who are connected to those involved with child soldiers. An example of the Treasury’s use of sanctions was against “individuals being leaders of groups that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the CAR [Central African Republic].”18 Alfred Yekatom, one of the leaders identified by the Treasury Officer of Foreign Assets Control, “used 153 children as fighters in his group before handing them over to the UN in August 2014.”19 CAR and Belgium companies were also sanctioned in this instance and “any assets these individuals and entities may have under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.”20

The Treasury through its Office of International Affairs: Technical Assistance also has the capability to provide assistance in a range of areas dealing with revenue policy, budget and financial accountability, debt and infrastructure, banking and financial services, and economic crimes. While these actions are not tied to child soldier mitigation efforts, they do represent significant capabilities to assist “finance ministries and central banks of developing and transition countries [to] strengthen their ability to manage public finances effectively and safeguard their financial sectors.”21 These supportive functions could be used to support scenarios where nation states are partially failing to protect their people or when reconstructing governments completely. Overall, the Treasury’s approach also does not specifically address Phase III operations, as its direct contributions are fairly limited to the application and removal of sanctions.

Department of Justice

There are a few laws that effect the employment of child soldiers, including the International Labor Organization Convention 182, Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. There are many UN Security Council sanctions that have condemned the use of child soldiers. The DoJ in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation cooperate to prosecute violators of domestic and international laws that prohibit the
recruitment and use of child soldiers. Congress passed the Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008 that prohibits the use of child soldiers and has generated new emphasis with regard to executive agencies’ enforcement of human rights protections against child soldiers and prosecution of those who attempt to violate domestic and international laws that prohibit the use of child soldiers.

From a practical standpoint, it is feasible to employ DoD forces in an environment where vital national interests are at stake. We must assume that all efforts will be made to resolve the conflict prior to the employment of military forces. The DoJ applies power through the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT).

OPDAT works with partner countries to develop and strengthen fair, just, and accountable justice sector institutions, to build strong international partners to combat transnational criminal activities, and to enhance and foster the administration of justice and rule of law consistent with international norms and standards.²²

The DoJ works with other executive agencies to prosecute anti-child soldier legislation domestically and works with foreign judicial systems to establish host nation justice internationally.

A New Interagency Approach

The current interagency coordination efforts are not good enough. When a joint task force (JTF) deploys, it establishes liaison relationships with the U.S. embassy and the agencies contained within the embassy. The JTF and the embassy coordinate activities to ensure unity of effort within the country. The JTF can leverage the capabilities of other agencies through liaisons but does not have the authority to task the agencies. The agencies often have competing long-term requirements and goals that existed before the arrival of the JTF and will remain long after.

While the long-term efforts of the agencies within the embassy are important, when the President deploys the U.S. military, especially against armed children, service members should be the top priority of all agencies. A liaison-request relationship is insufficient. The authors recommend a formal support-tasking relationship. Upon the deployment of a JTF, deputies and staff from all U.S. government agencies in country should be placed in a formal supporting relationship to the JTF, and the JTF commander should be given the authority to task these personnel. If these personnel receive little to no tasks, there should be minimal impact to ongoing requirements. However, if the tasks prevent the agency from completing other urgent tasks, the agency can either present the conflict to the JTF commander for adjudication or request additional personnel from the agency. Under the current liaison-request relationship, challenging or resource-intensive tasks from the JTF are competing with other priorities and lack of authority. Under the new proposed support-tasking relationship, such requests become priority.

The psychological effect on the relationship between the JTF and the various U.S. government agencies is an important advantage of a support-tasking relationship. Things are always easier, done faster, and with less resistance if requested by someone with authority over the one performing the task. The President or Secretary of Defense can summon a General who will come immediately. However, this would not be likely if the General were summoned by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
The newly proposed support-tasking relationship would give the JTF commander similar authority over the various agencies in the country and enable the JTF commander to ensure the root causes of the conflict are addressed from an interagency, whole-of-government approach.

Recommendations

Military operations assume, unfortunately, that deterrence has failed to maintain peace, and a JTF has been ordered to deploy into a conflict to help restore order and peace. The following recommendations primarily focus on the need for greater interagency cooperation in military operations:

- During military operations the interagencies are subordinate to JTF commander. Establish an A and B Team of subject matter experts for each agency:
  - The A Team is the primary crisis-response element assigned to the JTF staff.
  - The B Team consists of interagency members necessary for the daily functioning of the interagency.

- Each agency will establish a more robust and expanded department-specific set of capabilities:
  - Agency senior leaders must proactively manage expectation to ensure that the public and stakeholders understand that long-term efforts may be impacted as a consequence of military operations.
  - Likewise, the U.S. and international public must be made aware of the strong likelihood that U.S. and other peacekeeping forces may be required to kill combatants that may include child soldiers.
  - The U.S. government must properly fund and resource each agency accordingly:

- Each agency must have reach-back capacity to its headquarters and the capability to rapidly and temporarily fill personnel staffing requirements to meet crisis response demands from the field.

- Similar to “reserve” military forces, other agencies may wish to provide an additional “reserve” capacity to develop a robust, crisis-response capability.

This proposal is a shift in the relationship between the DoD and the interagency community. Each situation will depend on the authority under which the JTF is established, the mission objectives, and charter the JTF commander has been given. Under combat response conditions, the JTF commander is directly accountable to the combatant commander. Under humanitarian and non-combat response conditions, the JTF commander is directly accountable to the ambassador. Each mission will be unique and will require clear authorities defined by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State prior to the deployment of forces.

Under this concept, all agencies in the executive branch of government are partners in the interagency community. Depending on where the conflict is on the continuum of operations (peace, non-conflict to conflict, or war), State or DoD will likely be the lead agency in international responses. The desired outcome is a more robust, whole-of-government integration that strengthens the relationships among the JTF commander, the ambassador, the agency deputies, the host nation, international partners, and other senior leaders and stakeholders.

Before these recommendations are accepted, the authors recommend the interagency analyze doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy to clarify and establish the second and third order effects of such a change. This type of analysis will determine requirements based on capability.
gaps. These recommendations will impact Joint doctrine and how the JTF commander fulfills mission requirements. It will require an interagency organizational structure that is prepared to provide flexible, crisis-response capacity to its field agencies throughout the world. The extent to which the DoD and interagency are able to build additional capacity under this recommendation will directly and positively impact the mutual benefit to the whole of government.

A unified chain of command will allow for a unified purpose for the mission and enable interagency integration at lower levels to work together to develop creative, new, adaptive, and well-informed plans to resolve problems. A fundamental component of this proposal is that deputies from each agency will be task organized as special staff members to the JTF commander. The JTF commander has direct authority to task each deputy, and each deputy retains parent-agency tasking authority to execute the tasks necessary to fulfill the requirement. All tasks coming from the JTF commander must be given top priority in the interagency structure established as part of the JTF. Additionally, each interagency deputy has the ability to effectively participate in the decision-making process. Each interagency deputy brings many years of experience, knows the capabilities of the parent agency, and can provide badly needed advice and counsel to the JTF commander. In this manner, interagency deputies may help ensure the best possible whole-of-government solution to meet the demands of the operating environment.

Truly the interagency community deserves better than the simply liaison relationship that exists now. It is not effective and does not provide the level of importance that the interagency stakeholders deserve. It is also an injustice to the DoD. The JTF commander needs the best possible counsel from the interagency stakeholders. By providing the JTF commander a deputy equivalent from each relevant agency, the whole-of-government will be better represented, and command decisions will be more informed.

The interagency community has been under resourced for many years. It is absolutely critical that the interagency community receives the funds, personnel, and resources necessary to have a flexible, robust, and in-depth reach-back capability to respond to multiple humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions simultaneously around the world. While deputies are important to this new proposal, just as important are the analysts, administrators, and support and logistics staff and personnel necessary for each agency to fulfill the requirements of a crisis-response capacity. Each agency will have to perform its audit and analysis to determine what the solution looks like for it and make the necessary budget proposal projections for funding to meet these requirements.

Collectively, the whole of government is greater than the sum of its parts. The development of this crisis-response capacity in each interagency will offer flexibility to provide better response solutions to any number of ongoing operations.

Summary and Conclusions

Ultimately, a service member on the ground will have to make a decision. Do I shoot...?

Ultimately, a service member on the ground will have to make a decision. Do I shoot the person in front of me who poses a threat to my friend and me? It is our obligation to set the conditions for success by eliminating as much ambiguity as possible by exhausting all means of national power prior to committing forces.

This is why it is so important for the DoD and interagency partners to work closely together throughout all phases of joint operations. The
U.S. government must do its very best to mitigate the risk to service members who face the ethical dilemma of killing child soldiers. The U.S. ambassador, especially in countries with vital, national security interests, must have robust capabilities and authority to gain meaningful, timely, and actionable products from all interagency partners. Likewise, during military operations, the JTF commander must have direct tasking authority over all interagency partners in his command. The interagency members on the JTF staff should have adequate experience and clout to advise the JTF commander and task their parent agencies for direct support to operations. The long-term success of State’s objectives depends upon how successfully the interagency cooperates to accomplish the mission during military operations. IAJ

NOTES


3. Ibid., p. 615.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp. 8–9.

8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 12.


11. Ibid., p. 53.


13. Ibid.


15. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 2011, p. IV-7.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. IV-4.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


National Security and the Responsibility to Protect

by John Gartside, Elliott B. Burns and Tim Downing

In response to the recent outbreak of Ebola in West Africa and the persistent threat of regional diseases turning into pandemics, some have called on the international community to take a more proactive approach to countering uncontrolled disease in countries that are unable to contain such events. While cooperative measures will undoubtedly continue and likely increase in such areas, what options are open to the international community should such an outbreak occur within a state that refuses help despite being unable to contain an outbreak? Some have called for the use of the UN “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine as a tool for addressing such an issue. This article is an argument against the application of R2P in such a situation because of the legal, ethical, and implementation challenges it creates, and it identifies more suitable justifications for international and interagency humanitarian crisis interventions.

Ebola Virus Disease (EVD)

On December 2, 2013, a two-year-old boy named Emile Ouamouno fell ill with a strange disease he likely contracted from contact with a fruit bat.1 He was treated in his village of Meliandou in southern Guinea, near the border of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The treatments were to no avail, and on December 2, 2013, Emile died.2 Not long after Emile’s death, his mother, sister, and grandmother began showing symptoms of the strange illness as well.3 What they had contracted was something
no one in the village had ever seen. A type of hemorrhagic fever, this disease destroyed their bodies through a host of terrifying and painful symptoms that began with flu-like symptoms and a rash. Quickly it developed into large blood blisters covering their bodies, followed by internal bleeding that ravaged their organs. In most cases, the final result of the infection was death. As news of the disease spread, so did panic. Soon, Emile’s mother, sister, and grandmother were dead, and many of the local healthcare workers that attempted to treat them became infected. Many of the inhabitants of Emile’s village fled. The disease has an incubation period that can last up to 21 days, and many of those fleeing carried the virus within them. They fled to nearby villages and beyond, crossing the porous borders of Liberia and Sierra Leone, infecting others as they went.

Healthcare workers, untrained and unfamiliar with the disease, often became the first casualties in newly infected areas, and some health clinics became centers for further infection. The loss of primary healthcare providers left the disease unchecked and helped the inkblot of infection spread across West Africa at an ever-increasing rate. The spread was also helped by misdiagnosis, poor communications, and governments unprepared or unable to coordinate an effective response to contain the disease.

On March 18, 2014, Guinea announced to the world that they had confirmed the outbreak of a hemorrhagic fever that had killed at least 23 people. On March 22, 2014, Guinea confirmed the mysterious fever was caused by EVD, and that it had likely killed 59 people thus far. Two days later, Liberia confirmed its first two cases. Later that week, Mauritania closed all crossings along the Senegal River, its natural boarder with Senegal, in an effort to halt the spread.

By the end of March 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced there had been 112 cases of EVD and 70 deaths. By the end of April 2014, there were 239, 160 deaths; by May, 383 cases, 211 deaths; by June, 779 cases, 481 deaths; by July, 1,603 cases, 887 deaths; and by August, 707 cases, 1,808 deaths. By mid-September, after identifying the uncontrolled spread of EVD as a threat to national security, President Obama announced that the U.S. would be deploying up to 3,000 military personnel to West Africa to help build facilities and train healthcare workers to contain the disease. By the end of September, there were 7,492 cases and 3,439 deaths caused by EVD in West Africa. Infection rates had doubled every month since the outbreak began, and the rate of infection was increasing. On September 28, 2014, Thomas Duncan, who recently returned to the U.S. from Liberia, was admitted to a hospital in Dallas, TX, suffering from EVD. Two of Duncan’s nurses later became infected.

Ebola, a virus whose terrifying effects had been brought to the forefront of the American mind by Richard Preston’s best-selling nonfiction thriller The Hot Zone: A Terrifying True Story, was now in America. Preston detailed viral hemorrhagic fever outbreaks, foreshadowing the possibility that one of these viruses could result in a pandemic. It now seemed this possibility was quickly becoming a reality, a scenario some epidemiologists had long feared.

Spurred on by high-profile infections in the West coupled with American pressure and leadership, the international community responded with over $2 billion in assistance and aid, along with a controlled distribution of healthcare providers to train and participate in
countering the outbreak.\textsuperscript{11}

By January 14, 2016, 42 days after the last known case was treated, the WHO would declare the outbreak over. The effort had, for the most part, contained the virus to West Africa and prevented a possible pandemic. The outbreak claimed the lives of more than 11,300 people and infected over 28,500.\textsuperscript{12}

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\end{quote}

As the world began the post mortem on this incident, a debate began about the international community’s response to disease outbreaks. Does the international community have a mandate allowing for the violation of state sovereignty in response to that state’s inability to contain and control naturally-occurring diseases? While international assistance was sought out and invited in by West African countries in this case, the question now surfacing is what would have happened if those governments had not asked for or allowed international assistance?

\textbf{Responsibility to Protect}

While a majority of rational, international actors likely agree that international intervention should be allowed to protect the world population from undue suffering from pandemic outbreaks, the mechanism of legitimate action of such a violation of a state’s sovereignty provides a legal sticking point. Among the first suggestions to emerge has been the idea that the UN doctrine concerning the international community’s “responsibility to protect” defined in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide of 1948 could be used as grounds to intervene without military force in such situations.

While we agree that international or even unilateral intervention should be taken in situations similar to the aforementioned when consent is lacking, R2P should not be used as the mechanism for its justification. Using R2P as justification is legally insufficient and would weaken the overall legitimacy of R2P in addressing the prevention of genocide for which it was originally intended. Addition applications of R2P present significant problems because it is extremely difficult to determine when the threshold for intervention has been crossed, how to address the ethical dilemmas created when doctors are placed in situations in which treatment is no longer optional, and the ludicrous assumption that such intervention could be done without military force.

While this is the wrong situation for the application of R2P, it is clear that the U.S. reserves and should continue to reserve the right to act unilaterally or in cooperation with other entities to halt such outbreaks in line with securing vital national interests. Likewise, the UN has the authority to authorize intervention under the legitimate mission of ensuring international order and preventing the catastrophic breakdown of world order likely created by allowing a regional health crisis to turn into a global pandemic.

\textbf{Sovereignty}

The modern idea of the sovereign state developed out of the disaster that was the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The Thirty Years war was fought in some form or another by every major European power of the time. The war initially began when the Holy Roman Empire attempted to unify the religious practices of those under its control, causing Protestant states to revolt. What followed was a bloodletting that became one of the most traumatic events to befall the European continent. As a result of
the Thirty Years War, an estimated eight million combatants and civilians died in combat or from disease and famine. This number represented between 30–40 percent of the total population of central Europe.\footnote{\textsuperscript{13}}

The Thirty Years War ended in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, the name used to encapsulate the numerous agreements reached through treaties negotiated in 1648 to end the war. Among the defining concepts to emerge out of these documents was the idea of state sovereignty.\footnote{\textsuperscript{14}} The chief cause of the Thirty Years War was seen as the interference of foreign powers into the internal domestic affairs of independent or semi-independent kingdoms. The Peace of Westphalia sought to prevent such conflicts from occurring in the future by establishing the idea that a state possessed absolute control and jurisdiction in regards to the internal workings and policies within its territory, and that all states were equal in this right.

Actions taken by a state within its own borders, therefore, could not be used as justification for intervention, if those internal policies and actions did not harm or threaten to harm another outside state. Through this idea, the Peace of Westphalia looked to prevent the type of idealistic crusading wars that comprised the Thirty Years War. The agreement of European powers on this idea of state sovereignty would go on to form the bedrock of the international system that persists to this day.

This concept of state sovereignty and the equality of state sovereignty would be codified as international law in the UN founding charter, which makes it clear the UN “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{15}} The only allowance for violations of this sovereignty are cases in which the General Assembly authorizes action to protect UN recognized rights, to maintain international order, or to exercise its responsibility to prevent genocide.

Following the horrors of World War II, the world came together to develop an international body to serve as a moderating force with the goal of preventing future wars. The UN was designed to provide a forum for international discussion and conflict resolution, while also establishing agreed-upon standards in regards to the justified use of force. These standards focused primarily on the right of self-determination of peoples and preserving those rights through the idea of state sovereignty established by the Peace of Westphalia. It was believed that interstate wars could be eliminated through the international preservation of state sovereignty. However, the atrocities committed in World War II against a number of vulnerable populations resulted in the inclusion of genocide as an international crime. Genocide is defined by the UN in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948):

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.\footnote{\textsuperscript{16}}

While the Article made genocide a crime, its
Before the UN adopted R2P, the international community did not have the adequate procedures to justify the violation of state sovereignty... It is from the spirit of these documents that the argument for extending the application of the R2P to health crisis emerges. However, this application first and foremost runs afoul of the legal definition, as well as the 2005 and 2009 reports and resolutions. The UN developed the R2P as a procedure for the international community to intervene on the behalf of the victims of war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Applying R2P to natural disasters, widespread disease, or other naturally-occurring humanitarian issues is contrary to the intent of the agreement and dilutes the legitimacy of international involvement. The U.S. and the rest of the international community should adhere to the intent of R2P and utilize permissive means to respond to naturally occurring humanitarian crisis without violating state sovereignty.

Application of R2P

Before the UN adopted R2P, the international community did not have the adequate procedures to justify the violation of state sovereignty in response to genocide. Following the atrocities in Rwanda, the UN spent the next ten years developing R2P. As defined in the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document, “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity but does not offer a definition for ethnic cleansing. However, the definition for genocide includes ethnicity as a group identifier. In all definitions, the perpetrator must act intentionally to cause harm to a person or group.

In order for a health crisis to qualify as genocide, a war crime, ethnic cleansing, or crime against humanity, a nation, organized group, or individual must intentionally infect or withhold treatment from targeted individuals. During the EVD outbreak in West Africa; Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea reacted to mitigate the spread of the disease. The numbers of suspected EVD cases overwhelmed the healthcare systems in each country, and the WHO dispatched teams to help train, advise, and assist the existing infrastructure. In each country, the government attempted to provide the necessary care for the situation. According to a statement from the WHO’s International Health Regulation Emergency Committee on the 2014 EVD outbreak in West Africa, “[West African] health systems are fragile with significant deficits in human, financial, and...
material resources, resulting in compromised ability to mount an adequate Ebola outbreak control response.” The results of the EVD outbreak were due to inexperienced staff and under-resourced healthcare systems and not the intentional systematic targeting of a population. The governments of these West African nations also readily accepted international assistance.

The UN developed R2P to provide a mechanism for protecting individuals from the intentional and systematic targeting associated with war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. While the EVD crisis presented the international community with a significant security concern, R2P is not the appropriate tool to address the situation. EVD occurred naturally, and the affected governments worked to care for their citizens. As such, this crisis did not qualify for the conditions of R2P.

Following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a nation’s sovereignty became the highest law of the land. A government was able to exert control over its citizens and establish whatever customs it deemed necessary. While international customs and norms have influenced a majority of the nations around the world, state sovereignty remains a sacred consideration. The UN developed R2P as a way to prevent human atrocities but established strict guidelines to ensure nations could not abuse the mechanism. If the international community tries to apply R2P to situations that fall outside the established tenets, the misuse of R2P will degrade the legitimacy of the policy. Additionally, the misuse of R2P will open the door for hostile nations to exert influence on another country under the guise of humanitarian assistance.

The architects of R2P intentionally created a restrictive definition that would force the UN to consider the situation before violating a state’s sovereignty. Before the UN approved R2P, several proposals included considerations for events outside of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, the consensus settled on the current definition. The General Assembly released a report in 2009 discussing R2P that confirmed the original intent of R2P: “To try to extend [R2P] to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility.” This meeting confirmed that the original concept of R2P gave the UN the latitude necessary to confront war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity without abusing its power. By maintaining the strict definition of R2P, the UN retained the support of the international community at large.

State sovereignty is an essential aspect of the established norms of international relations. Without this sovereignty, nations become less predictable when interacting with the rest of the world. While R2P establishes a framework for how the UN could violate state sovereignty, the UN only applies R2P when responding to war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Responding to these crimes is essential for the overall health and safety of all people. The strict application of R2P to these situations ensures that the international community maintains support for the measure. Proper application of R2P prevents nations from using R2P as a vehicle for military intervention in another country without sanctioned justification.

**R2P and the EVD Crisis**

According to the WHO, the outbreak in West Africa in 2014 was the largest known outbreak of EVD in the world. As of May 12,
While others suggested using R2P to intervene in the area, the WHO assessed that simple adjustments...would reduce the spread of the disease.

The EVD outbreak in West Africa was a terrible event for the region and frightened many countries around the world. The WHO addressed the international community to inform nations of the appropriate actions necessary to prevent the further spread of the disease. In a report from the meeting, the WHO stated, “A coordinated international response is deemed essential to stop and reverse the international spread of Ebola.”

Instead of encouraging complete isolation, the WHO stated, “There should be no general ban on international travel or trade,” and focused on establishing proper screening procedures.

This statement exposes a potential conflict when defining something as a pandemic that warrants violating a state’s sovereignty. The WHO recognized that the EVD outbreak was a significant health threat to the international community and encouraged an international effort when confronting the problem. However, the same report encouraged states to establish proper screening and treatment procedures while maintaining international trade and travel.

This suggests that an event such as the EVD outbreak in 2014 would not justify violating the sovereignty of the affected nations. With over 28,000 suspected cases and over 11,000 deaths, the WHO did not deem it necessary to completely isolate the region based on the relative difficulty in transmitting the disease.

The UN would be forced to depend on the WHO and other subject matter experts to assess the potential threat of every new situation. In the case of the EVD outbreak, the WHO assessed that the threat of spreading the disease through casual contact on an airline was too low to justify stopping travel to the region. Additionally, the WHO focused on educating the public and health professionals with the procedures necessary to prevent the further spread of the disease.

The WHO recognized that the EVD outbreak in West Africa would require international support to the host nations to stop the spread of the disease. While others suggested using R2P to intervene in the area, the WHO assessed that simple adjustments to screening procedures and disease education would reduce the spread of the disease. While new cases of EVD continue to occur, the healthcare systems in each of the affected counties are able to deal with the situation.

While R2P established the procedures to react to war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the tenets do not require the UN to use military forces when reacting to the situation. However, it is likely that a vast majority of the existing nations in the world would use military force to resist a breach of sovereignty. If the UN adjusted the definition of R2P to include pandemics, the situation would present a significant ethical dilemma. Reacting to a pandemic or lesser health crisis requires an extensive amount of medical personnel. Breaching a state’s sovereignty could place large numbers of medical and other humanitarian personnel on a battlefield, instead
of in a permissive environment. This scenario would create additional security challenges for these personnel as they attempt to provide optimal medical care. Additionally, because they mistrust the foreign medical staff, infected people may refuse treatment at a much higher rate following a foreign invasion.

Breaching a state’s sovereignty will require military force. If a state is resistant to international intervention, it is likely it will conduct whatever operations are necessary to protect the citizens of the country and the central government. By bringing military forces into the situation without host nation permission, the UN would detract from the primary humanitarian mission. Additionally, patients are more likely to refuse treatment. In that situation, doctors would be forced to choose if they should violate patient wishes in an effort to stop the spread of a disease. Breaching a state’s sovereignty greatly reduces medical capabilities during a pandemic because of the increased security needs, as well as the additional medical needs of those wounded in battle in a non-permissive environment.

**National Security**

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2015 relies on deepening our investment in Africa by accelerating access to energy, health, and security. In a changing global environment, the U.S. commitment to a rules-based international order and respect for universal values around the world enables it to lead with purpose. U.S. strategy relies on the ability to seize opportunities to shape economic order and form new relationships with emerging powers and countries in order to promote peace and democracy. These relationships should begin with mutual trust. This trust requires a permissive environment, in which the U.S. builds partnership capacity with other nations, while respecting their sovereignty. Invoking the R2P when it is not warranted jeopardizes mutual trust and makes it difficult for the U.S. to develop partnerships. In an interconnected world, there are few problems that can be solved by the U.S. or even the UN alone. U.S. leadership is considered essential for mobilizing collective action to mitigate risks and seize strategic opportunities. Our Nation is safer and stronger when our partners are flourishing, and when societies are free.

Cooperation with other nations enables the U.S. to lead with a long-term perspective in a world where power is shifting beyond the nation-state. Governments are expected to be accountable to civil society and often find themselves competing with the interests of nonstate actors. Globalization has increased interdependence on telecommunications and the global economy, which has linked people in unprecedented ways to expand trade and investment opportunities, but has also created shared vulnerabilities. These interconnected systems are more vulnerable to threats of pandemic diseases and global terrorism.

The U.S. military has no greater responsibility than protecting the American people. The call of duty does not end at America’s borders. The military fights our Nation’s wars and also prepares to mitigate the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. The military is crucial to America’s ability to respond to global challenges and build partnership capacity. The military’s role is not only to protect American citizens, but also to preserve regional security and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

**Partnership Capacity**

In building partnership capacity, the military
promotes regional security to prevent future conflicts. U.S. military action in Operation United Assistance (OUA) was successful in combating the spread of EVD in West Africa and enhanced our partnership with Liberia. This relationship enabled U.S. joint forces to partner with host-nation engineers from the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to increase construction assets available to Ebola treatment units (ETUs) and provide training for the host nation. This increased the capabilities of the AFL engineering teams and their status with the Liberian people.\textsuperscript{39} The U.S.-led design, material, and quality control allowed AFL engineers to execute some of their first major construction projects in Liberia.\textsuperscript{40} The projects were such a success that the country viewed them as a crucial advancement in infrastructure since the end of its civil war. By the end of the mission, the AFL engineer company commander spoke directly with the AFL chief of staff about the success of the ETUs.\textsuperscript{41} The U.S. military’s ability to build host nation partnerships allowed AFL engineers to then take the lead on construction and support to humanitarian efforts in Liberia.\textsuperscript{42} Advancements in Liberian engineering capabilities also enabled the Liberian government to advance the \textit{Agenda for Transformation: Steps Towards Liberia Rising 2030}. This agenda calls for outcome indicators as early as 2017, to include more roads in good condition to reduce travel times, better access to rural and main highways, and reduced traffic accidents.\textsuperscript{43} Robust engineering capabilities are needed to ensure Liberia’s macroeconomic issues for improved mining and forestry.\textsuperscript{44} AFL engineering assets will be crucial to improving the infrastructure needed for economic development.\textsuperscript{45} Plans in the 2030 Agenda include increased access to renewable energy and affordable power, improved connectivity of roads and bridges, affordable travel services, low-cost telecommunications, low-income housing, and improved public buildings.\textsuperscript{46} These infrastructure improvements will enable Liberia to attract more private-sector development of business ventures in the forestry and mining industries.\textsuperscript{47} Permissive U.S. military operations in Liberia allowed for multinational cooperation and improved infrastructure projects consistent with the host nation’s goals, while ensuring that humanitarian assistance was effective during the EVD outbreak. OUA was successful not only in preventing a global health threat, but in building a sustained partnership with Liberia consistent with the 2015 NSS.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Although the R2P does not strictly apply to the EVD outbreak in West Africa, the broader UN concept of human security applies to this situation. Human security is a dynamic and practical policy framework for dealing with widespread threats facing people and governments.\textsuperscript{48} The Ebola virus is a naturally occurring disease and not the result of genocide or of a failed state. Since West African nations did not maliciously spread the virus, commit genocide, cause the outbreak, or use it to commit war crimes, the UN does not have the duty to enact R2P and violate these nations’ sovereignty. However, nations may still intervene with permissive humanitarian aid to promote health and development in West Africa for human security. Security is global, and the EVD outbreak has potential to recur and spread to other nations. These other nations are potentially affected and have interests in West Africa to stop the outbreak and promote global health and security. This intervention needs to be done permissively. Humanitarian aid may be provided to West Africa with host nation permission under human security in order to improve the health of the involved populations, thus ensuring global security. \textit{IAJ}
NOTES


2 Ibid., p. 21.

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5 Ibid., pp. 21–24.

6 Ibid., p. 22.


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Synchronizing
America’s Humanitarian Strategy in the Wake of Operation United Assistance

by Megan McWilliams, Daniel Wiggins and Matthew Wunderlich

“Never let a serious crisis go to waste.”
– Rahm Emanuel¹

In 2014, the U.S. led the global response to the escalating Ebola pandemic in West Africa. The crisis spurred numerous interagency, multinational, and intergovernmental entities to unite and provide foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) through Operation United Assistance. While Operation United Assistance effectively halted the pandemic crisis, numerous issues arose due to a disjointed FHA strategy. These issues ranged from basic communication shortfalls to complex divergent interests. The U.S. should integrate lessons learned from Operation United Assistance into a comprehensive strategy for dealing with future humanitarian crises. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) entities must learn from the Ebola crisis and synchronize humanitarian strategy to provide trained, timely, flexible, and interoperable effects in West Africa and throughout the world.

The growing complexity of American interests abroad demands greater coordination through FHA strategy. These complex, shaping operations require integration by JIIM entities to bridge military, civilian, and nongovernmental interests toward a common goal. The challenges within this synchronization manifest in modern examples ranging from Operation Unified Response in

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A comprehensive foreign humanitarian assistance strategy requires an operational approach that prescribes ways to synchronize humanitarian efforts.

Current State

The 2014 West Africa Ebola pandemic was a humanitarian crisis that rapidly destabilized international security. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the outbreak began in Guinea in December 2013. From Guinea, the disease quickly spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone, with small outbreaks in Nigeria and Mali, along with isolated cases in Senegal, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Spain, and Italy. Initially, fatality rates were 70 percent for non-contemporary humanitarian operations and existing doctrine within JIIM communities for conducting humanitarian operations. This current state analysis identifies gaps and issues within current FHA capabilities, as well as opportunities for a galvanized, future humanitarian strategy. The lines of effort address the disparities or obstacles that prevent the desired end state. A holistic FHA strategy integrates these lines of effort to balance ends, ways, means, and risk to promulgate America's humanitarian interests and capabilities toward the desired future state objectives.

The FHA operational approach analyzes American interests and humanitarian capabilities utilizing a framework of doctrine, organization, training, and leadership. These domains derive from the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Joint Capabilities Integration Development System as a means for analyzing existing capabilities while targeting gaps and efforts. The four domains present a holistic framework for addressing the FHA issues and efforts necessary for a comprehensive strategy.

Operational Approach

A comprehensive FHA strategy requires an operational approach that prescribes ways to synchronize humanitarian efforts. An operational approach analyzes the current state of FHA efforts, forecasts future FHA requirements, and recommends lines of effort to overcome obstacles in order to reach the desired end state conditions. The current state of FHA efforts derives from both the lessons learned after contemporary humanitarian operations and existing doctrine within JIIM communities for conducting humanitarian operations. This current state analysis identifies gaps and issues within current FHA capabilities, as well as opportunities for a galvanized, future humanitarian strategy. The lines of effort address the disparities or obstacles that prevent the desired end state. A holistic FHA strategy integrates these lines of effort to balance ends, ways, means, and risk to promulgate America's humanitarian interests and capabilities toward the desired future state objectives.

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hospitalized infected individuals and 57–59 percent for those who were hospitalized. As of April 10, 2016, the outbreak consisted of 28,657 suspected Ebola cases resulting in 11,325 deaths, although experts suggest the magnitude was likely larger than the documented statistics.

In September 2014, the UN Security Council identified the Ebola epidemic as a threat to both international peace and security...
The organization of a joint task force under USAID in support of a foreign government was a unique structure that required trust and confidence... 

The importance of building trust, rapport, and a teamwork mentality with individuals outside the military channels was essential for mission success. JFC-UA personnel worked with Liberian leaders, regional leaders, tribal leaders, NGOs, and IGOs, as well as State and UN officials. Due to the unique organizational construct of joint forces, it was important to educate joint forces personnel on the concept of military forces acting in a FHA supportive role. Joint forces personnel were educated on the importance of conveying the message that the USAID DART was the U.S. government’s lead agency in support of the Liberian government. Key military members were educated on how the cooperating JIIM organizations conducted operations. With the Liberian government taking the lead of all relief operations, the United Assistance partners and international community were able to better work together once there was a shared understanding of combined capabilities and how those capabilities fit into overall operations.

Fortunately, Liberia was less austere than initial planners expected;
regardless, the command post training still proved extremely beneficial for synchronizing action during Operation United Assistance.

Exacerbating these organizational challenges were significant communication shortfalls throughout the operation. Disparate communication hardware, software, and security clearance requirements resulted in difficulties in communicating for the preponderance of JIIM entities. This interoperability issue unveiled significant doctrinal, organizational, training, and leadership shortfalls hindering JIIM humanitarian operations.

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Future State

In the wake of Operation United Assistance, the lack of a guiding FHA strategy negatively affected the operation. The desired end state is one where the JIIM communities can better synchronize, can easily integrate, and can functionally communicate with other agencies in response to future humanitarian crises. An overarching humanitarian assistance strategy provides the framework that optimizes JIIM efforts. The Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Guide is the name for a comprehensive FHA approach to provide joint, interagency, and intergovernmental doctrine on how to assess, plan, and execute FHA operations. Communication, cooperation, and coordination among the JIIM entities should occur seamlessly at all levels of operation to ensure improved humanitarian relief abroad.

All correspondence and coordination will occur at an unclassified level. Working through unclassified channels eases communication. It prevents potential delays that are typically associated with security clearance verifications. Additionally, working at the unclassified level allows the JIIM communities to effortlessly share information.

The future state of humanitarian assistance capabilities must recognize that not all humanitarian crises are identical in nature. The Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Guide affords options to the organizational structure depending on the type of crisis. All entities involved require education to understand the organizational structure. The FHA coordination should design a commensurate organizational structure appropriate to the humanitarian crisis. The design empowers principal actors to understand the structure and perform their duties according to specified roles and responsibilities.

From predeployment preparations to mission execution, coordination must begin immediately with the indications of a humanitarian crisis. This immediate response allows for timely effects with fully trained teams for countries in need. High levels of trust, rapport, and teamwork must exist within the JIIM community; establishing trust requires extensive training among the separate organizations and through JIIM training events. The DoD, State, and USAID must establish and maintain galvanized working relationships. Through training, each entity should know and understand capabilities and requirements for solving complex situations. The agencies will work together on problem solving, mission execution, and accomplishing key tasks through JIIM training events. This will vastly reduce the time required for JIIM partners to deploy, integrate, and commence operations.

Future FHA operations must employ interoperable communication networks. These networks will include common software, hardware, and security clearance considerations to ensure a common vernacular and medium for supporting humanitarian operations. Communications are a priority for training events among JIIM entities, while also manifesting as a priority consideration during future FHA
Leadership is the process in which a leader articulates clear guidance and tasks for others to accomplish a common goal. USAID is the primary State agent to provide emergency humanitarian assistance; with this authority, USAID should lead all future FHA operations. Within USAID structure, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance holds the key leadership position for coordinating response to disasters within the U.S. and abroad. All joint, interagency, and intergovernmental agencies will fall under the coordination of USAID and its subordinate bureaus. Establishing authority and leadership roles is essential before joint operation planning begins. The Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Guide clearly defines leadership positions and articulates the key roles and responsibilities of each position; this articulation allows for expedited planning while ensuring synchronized future FHA operations.

**Delineating Humanitarian Strategy**

The desired future state for FHA operations compared to existing capabilities permits articulating a comprehensive humanitarian assistance strategy. This strategy employs doctrinal, organizational, training, and leadership domains to synchronize America’s approach in executing FHA operations, while optimizing humanitarian effects. Each line of effort specifies objectives to focus resources and ensures a viable course of action to consolidate and delineate an overarching FHA strategy.

**Doctrinal Line of Effort**

Creating a shared, overarching doctrine is the first line of effort toward achieving the desired end state of a consolidated FHA strategy. There are three key objectives along the doctrinal line of effort to ensure a comprehensive solution to reaching the desired future state of humanitarian assistance capabilities. The doctrinal line of effort must accomplish all three objectives to synchronize humanitarian strategy.

A foundational, hierarchal system for ranking publication precedence is the first objective within the doctrinal line of effort. The DoD’s Joint Publication 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, provides the “doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian assistance operations” for the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. This publication is a joint doctrine prepared by and signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In going forward with a JIIM publication, the DoD must agree that Joint Publication 3-29 is subordinate to and nests within the Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Guide. The Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Guide should provide general guidance, whereas Joint Publication 3-29 provides supplemental coordinating instruction.

The second objective within the doctrinal line of effort is to agree upon signatories. This list is limited to principal supporters to humanitarian assistance under the U.S. government: DoD, State, and USAID. The DoD provides support with the use of the armed forces in executing humanitarian assistance operations. State is the lead in executing the President’s foreign affairs policy. USAID, while sharing administrative functions with State, is an independent agency. USAID is the principal agency for administering humanitarian assistance around the world. All three parties must concur on executing FHA operations; therefore, all three should sign the Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Guide to ensure strategic synchronization.
The third and final objective within the doctrinal line of effort is ownership. The Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Guide has three signatories. Each member has rights and responsibilities to the publication, while a single agency requires recognition as the doctrine proponent. Ownership creates a structure of authority and responsibility. USAID should be the owner of the publication. Ownership of FHA doctrine best synchronizes the whole-of-government approach to executing humanitarian operations.

**Organizational Line of Effort**

The second line of effort to achieve the desired end state of a consolidated FHA strategy addresses the organizational domain inherent to humanitarian assistance operations. Operation United Assistance demonstrated complex, organizational structures with divergent interests and unclear responsibilities. Achieving an effective FHA strategy requires specifying clear roles and responsibilities through organizational transparency.

The first objective within the organizational line of effort requires specifying the organizational structure. The overarching FHA doctrine must specify organizational structure. This must not be a rigid, single-option hierarchy, but instead it should employ functional clustering of organizations while clearly affording operational designers leeway in specifying details for variable mission sets.

The second objective within the organizational line of effort requires generating clear roles and responsibilities through an FHA staffing document nested within the specified organizational structure. This document ensures appropriate resourcing and frames the roles and responsibilities of individuals within the organizational hierarchy. Establishing a transparent organizational structure and generating comprehensive staffing documents for a whole-of-government operation ensures meeting the requirements of the organizational line of effort for a synchronized FHA strategy.

**Training Line of Effort**

The third line of effort to achieve the desired end state of a consolidated FHA strategy addresses the training domain inherent to humanitarian assistance operations. Training design should nest within a consolidated FHA strategy. Training will promote a shared understanding of how JIIM partners operate along lines of effort to produce synergistic capabilities that achieve a desired end state.

Service- or agency-specific FHA training requires a JIIM concept to optimize learning for all participating entities. Training should emphasize the use of information sharing with JIIM partners. Joint FHA training should implement the use of an unclassified website such as the All Partners Access Network to facilitate JIIM communication and coordination. An unclassified, open-access website is necessary to provide an information-sharing capacity and increase situational understanding on FHA operations for all JIIM partners. An unclassified, web-based system can be used to convey information pertaining to the common operational picture. Use of the system will facilitate daily operational summaries, medical information, and weather updates and inform JIIM partners on key operational factors. A web-based, common access, information-sharing system may also be passed to follow-on organizations during operational transitions. JIIM partners should train staff to use all access systems that allow all partners to share information.
Interagency cooperation during JIIM training exercises will build the foundation for future collaboration and coordination. Training opportunities manifest by inviting other agencies or organizations to joint training events, exercises at the U.S. Army’s National Training Center, emergency response exercises, or similar FHA-focused training exercises. The DoD and State should consider a mandate that lays out the principles for interagency presence during training opportunities.

Future successful FHA operations require establishing exchange programs among different agencies and organizations. Streamlining the process for interaction between agencies and aid organizations will improve combined response capabilities. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training require integration into Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity missions to improve the emergency response systems of partner nations. Developing JIIM relations through humanitarian assistance joint training before a crisis occurs is prudent.

Leadership Line of Effort

The fourth line of effort optimizes the leadership domain to direct the comprehensive FHA strategy. The first leadership objective is the transparent identification and empowerment of a single leader for the FHA operation. This objective requires the myriad of supporting agencies and departments to align commitment to this individual. By identifying and empowering a single leader for the humanitarian operation, the comprehensive FHA strategy ensures unity of command as well as unity of effort for all participating agencies.

Risk

There are inherent risks associated with any mission. Risks involve potential for mission failure, increased danger to JIIM entities, or results that are unfavorable. Risk must be understood prior to taking action. The U.S. military uses risk management as a “process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk costs with mission benefits.”

Assisting decision makers requires articulating risks to enable understanding FHA missions. The first risk within a comprehensive humanitarian strategy is overreach. Today’s military is downsizing, yet the requirements are increasing. The potential for extending beyond the military capabilities, with the means they have available, is a risk for future humanitarian crises. There may be a time that the military cannot support the multitude of requirements.

The first risk within a comprehensive humanitarian strategy is overreach.

The second associated risk to FHA is risk to force. The operational environment where military intervention is required during a humanitarian crisis may not be the safest. Emergencies require accelerated planning and execution. Required force protection measures may be overlooked to allow for expedited actions due to external pressures. Inserting troops without proper protection unnecessarily places U.S. forces at risk.

In addition to force protection, there are medical concerns related to FHA missions. Planners should understand the potential health risks associated with deploying forces into an FHA environment. Accelerated entry in response to a humanitarian crisis without proper health training or knowledge of health concerns creates an increased risk of exposure to potential deadly diseases and health risks. By understanding potential risk, USAID, State, and DoD can work to minimize the risk by applying additional resources or means.
Conclusion

The 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa demonstrated America’s requirement for a comprehensive humanitarian assistance strategy. This strategy consists of a whole-of-government approach through doctrinal, organizational, training, and leadership lines of effort to unite JIIM entities toward a functional FHA end state. This functional end state requires flexible, timely, trained, and interoperable effects delivered to the crisis with concerted effort by the U.S. and partner agencies. While this comprehensive FHA strategy invites a modicum of risk by increasing demands on American resources, the U.S. must learn from history and employ a prudent path forward to prepare for and resolve future humanitarian crises. **IAJ**

NOTES


Interagency Brown-Bag Lecture Series

“Roles and Missions of the Federal Executive Board”

presented by
Mr. Larry Hisle
Executive Director
Greater Kansas City Federal Executive Board

12:30pm—1:30pm
December 13, 2016
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#InterAgencyBrownBagLecture
Prepare for Everything Together

by Jeremy Hershfield, Conrad Wilmoski and Kelly Meister

Pandemic diseases are one of the top security threats to the U.S. Naturally, the prospect of a highly contagious disease incapacitating and/or killing large numbers of U.S. citizens is a vitally important concern to policymakers. Therefore, in keeping with the broadest principles of the National Security Strategy, the U.S. operates globally to identify and prevent disease epidemics whenever possible. To this end, both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) are tasked with protecting the health of U.S. citizens. Overall, the DoD can best support DHHS before the next big outbreak by broadening its research portfolio and amplifying its medical outreach programs.

While the DoD focuses on medical concerns related to fighting wars and deploying its service members, it invariably utilizes the same medicines as the rest of the civilian population. Therefore, subcomponents of DoD and DHHS that work on drug development are inextricably linked. This important and often efficient relationship in developing therapeutics and vaccines, commonly referred to as medical countermeasures (MCMs), should serve as a model for interagency coordination, particularly in terms of preparing for the next disruptive global outbreak. Specifically, during the response to the 2014 Ebola crisis in Western Africa, DoD and DHHS coordinated significantly to develop and deliver MCMs to the affected region. This proactive relationship should continue in the absence of a sustained crisis to solidify the hopes of a more rapid and improved response to the
next untreatable deadly disease ravaging another part of the world.

**Background**

The 2014 Ebola crisis was a watershed moment that highlighted the importance of DoD medical research in support of DHHS. However, before discussing some salient learning points from the outbreak response, it is important to understand the organizational approaches of DoD and DHHS with respect to preparing for and responding to infectious diseases.

DoD and DHHS have distinct but interrelated infectious disease missions. Both departments have centralized funding agencies to coordinate and manage specific research portfolios. Within DoD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) assumes this biodefense-specific capability because biological weapons fall under the broader mantle of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within DHHS, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) broadly assumes funding duties for basic and applied research phases, which culminate in experimental MCMs that are poised for human clinical trials and refined manufacturing capabilities. For advanced research and development (R&D), which is designed to secure Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval and to optimize manufacturing abilities for experimental MCMs, the lead DoD and DHHS agencies are the Joint Project Management Office for Medical Countermeasures Systems (JPM-MCS) and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), respectively.

With respect to infectious diseases, the departments share the same overall outlook, which is to produce MCMs to prevent and/or treat these infections. The major mission differences between DoD and DHHS MCM development relate to the likelihood, severity, and nature of the threats. The DoD is more concerned with combatting biological weapons in their traditional battlefield context and biological threats to service members in all types of hospitals, as well as current or future operational environments. Meanwhile, the DHHS is more broadly concerned with protecting the American public from hospital-acquired infections, pandemic diseases, and bioterrorism.

**In no uncertain terms, the DoD defends both its military forces and the American public.**

It should come as no surprise that DoD and DHHS often develop MCMs against the same pathogens with the same goals of producing FDA-approved medications. For example, the official mission of JPM-MCS is to “provide U.S. military forces and the nation safe, effective, and innovative medical solutions to counter CBRN threats.” In no uncertain terms, the DoD defends both its military forces and the American public. Military forces are a small subset of the American public, and all Americans are restricted to using only FDA-approved medications. Therefore, this specific subset of research within DTRA and within JPM-MCS complements the corresponding research within the NIH and BARDA. These agencies need not rely upon each other in order to execute their mandates. However, in the event of a domestic or international emergency, DHHS is the lead responding U.S. agency. Therefore, in terms of preparation, DoD absolutely supports DHHS in this respect. While the notion of the DoD supporting another department might be difficult for some to handle, DHHS has the overarching authority to protect U.S. health interests. Perhaps the simplest way to convey this, with respect to drug development, is that all medications, regardless of whether they are designed primarily for military forces or for the American public, must pass the rigors of the FDA, a DHHS agency.
Fortunately, the U.S. government recognizes these fundamentally overlapping mission sets and has devised multiple coordinating bodies. As will be discussed later, Global Health Initiatives establish DHHS as the lead agency for promoting public health abroad. Likewise, the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) coordinates U.S. government efforts with respect to MCMs against emerging infectious diseases. The DHHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response is in charge of PHEMCE, and certain DoD components are some of many supporting agencies. Under the auspices of the PHEMCE, as well as through continuing personal communications, meetings, and joint attendance at various medical and scientific conferences, drug developers from the DoD and the DHHS routinely share and coordinate their respective R&D portfolios, thereby highlighting this particular form of interagency interoperability.

In response to the Ebola epidemic in Western Africa in 2014–2015, the accelerated development of MCMs for the treatment of Ebola virus disease (EVD) particularly highlighted this efficient relationship between DoD and DHHS. For the purposes of discussing preparation for a future outbreak, this discussion will be limited in scope to therapeutics and vaccines against EVD. However, it is important to note that the DoD developed and distributed highly effective diagnostic testing capabilities to multiple agencies and countries during the Ebola response. While detection alone cannot treat or prevent an infectious disease, it is a critical first step for rapidly and accurately applying medical treatment.

Understandably, EVD was not considered to be a significant threat to U.S. public health prior to the summer of 2014. Rather, it was limited to a DoD concern as both a potential bioweapon and a potential medical threat to military forces deployed to Africa, as well as a DHHS bioterrorism concern. However, as the EVD outbreak morphed into an official epidemic that spanned multiple West African nations, DoD and DHHS rapidly coordinated their efforts in developing MCMs against EVD. Following multiple meetings with other stakeholders, such as Doctors without Borders and the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. government, led by the PHEMCE, selected three lead candidate therapeutics and vaccines for accelerated R&D toward FDA approval using emergency Congressional funding.2

While an ample stock of therapeutic medications could possibly stem the tide of an epidemic, public health measures spearheaded by mass vaccination are the most effective way to prevent future epidemics. Throughout the Ebola response, the U.S. government was involved in pushing multiple vaccine candidates from experimental animal testing to human clinical studies in both the U.S. and in Western Africa. Importantly, the original developing agency behind the respective candidates, be it a part of DoD or DHHS, was immaterial relative to the potential life-saving benefits of the vaccines in stemming the Ebola epidemic. Policymakers in both DoD and DHHS should remember this credit-agnostic approach in the future in order to avoid classical interagency bickering that might prevent future success.

Similarly, both DoD and DHHS played significant roles in the accelerated R&D of therapeutic candidates. Whereas vaccines are a delayed response to stemming an epidemic, immediate concerns focus on treating the sick. Thus, therapeutic medications were arguably the more urgent, potentially life-saving...
consideration in the summer of 2014. All three of the U.S. government-designated EVD therapeutic candidates were developed by both DoD and DHHS. For example, TKM-Ebola was in advanced development within DoD, funded by JPM-MCS. Also, ZMapp, the so-called “miracle drug” that was often mentioned in the news in the late summer and early fall of 2014, was originally funded by DTRA and developed and tested at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID); the NIH was also involved in its early development. In response to the epidemic, DoD and DHHS worked together to transition ZMapp from its applied research stages under DTRA into advanced R&D stages managed by BARDA. In what must be hailed as exemplary interagency coordination, BARDA primarily funded ZMapp’s manufacturability and clinical trials with continued guidance from DTRA.

In addition to continued portfolio coordination through the PHEMCE and the coordination during the Ebola response that was geared toward accelerating EVD R&D, DoD and DHHS also collaborated on funding additional EVD MCM development during the outbreak. From their centralized managerial and funding roles within their respective departments, NIH/BARDA and DTRA/JPM-MCS oversaw various R&D efforts executed by laboratories in the U.S. government, universities, companies, and even foreign governments. As part of their coordinated efforts to respond to the Ebola crisis, DoD and DHHS coordinated their requests for proposals and broad agency announcements to identify near-term solutions. Both departments continued to leverage their respective capabilities within their distinct yet overlapping mission sets in order to facilitate the larger U.S. government response to aiding in West Africa and preparing the nation for its own potential EVD outbreak.

Recommendations

Clearly, DoD and DHHS are broadly aligned toward a common goal of FDA-approved medications for both service members and the public at large. The 2014 Ebola response strengthened this existing relationship and also highlighted the importance of solidifying it in preparation for future epidemics. Although the DoD ultimately appears to have prevailed as a strong partner in providing possible MCM solutions to assist with the Ebola response in 2014, DoD’s most appropriate and effective role in future outbreaks requires further discussion.

One upfront policy concern for DoD infectious disease R&D pertains to the nature of the research itself.

One upfront policy concern for DoD infectious disease R&D pertains to the nature of the research itself. With well-defined and lasting budgetary constraints, the DoD can only invest limited funding toward developing MCMs against bio-threat agents and various emerging infectious diseases. Broadly speaking, the DoD has separated these types of pathogens based on their Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) classification. DTRA funds bio-threat research at service laboratories such as USAMRIID, and the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command funds the remaining infectious disease research at laboratories such as the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). Within each subcategory of research, the DoD focuses on certain pathogens against which to defend service members and the nation. For example, USAMRIID historically researches and develops MCMs against the causative agents of anthrax, plague, Western encephalitic virus, and of course EVD.

While the DoD has accumulated extensive and in-depth knowledge of these limited pathogens, the DoD should diversify its R&D
in coordination with DHHS to provide minimal anticipatory coverage against numerous potential threats. Clearly, there would be drawbacks to the DoD broadening its research against infectious diseases. For one, there is a fundamental danger in spreading resources too thin. It would be more difficult to quantifiably evaluate measures of success without sufficient funding to develop MCMs to a significant degree. Similarly, expanding the DoD’s research portfolio would require either additional manpower or existing researchers to diversify their duties. The result could be a shift from world-class expertise to a shallower knowledge base. Finally, should the DoD invest in MCM R&D against a much broader range of pathogens, it would be far costlier and slower to develop products from basic research through FDA approval for human use.

The inherent benefits of diversification include increased versatility, flexibility, and responsiveness. Both aforementioned drawbacks of spreading resources too thin and potentially losing subject-matter expertise would be mitigated by the extensive collaboration of DoD with the DHHS. Furthermore, while it might appear more difficult for the DoD to fully develop its products through full approval by opening its aperture to address countless more potential pathogenic threats, this does not account for industry involvement. Critical to the FDA approval process, a government agency, such as DTRA, the NIH, or WRAIR, is not supposed to submit a product on its own. As the usual owners and distributors of all government-funded medical products, private companies should be involved in the process. Commercialization strategies are important when recruiting the private sector to work toward the U.S. government’s objectives. Ultimately, FDA approval is hardly the DoD’s burden alone to bear. DoD-funded products should belong at least equally to non-governmental entities; be they companies or universities. Therefore, diversification and a concomitant divestment from acquiring FDA-approved products would free the DoD from excessive investments in products in which industry is historically uninterested. While resources might be spread thin, proverbial eggs would not be placed in the wrong baskets.

Diversification would help to enhance the probability of success in the following response scenario. When surveillance suggests an imminent epidemic, both departments will better be able to accelerate their relevant R&D efforts because they will have coordinated more broadly from the earliest possible stages. In essence, the DoD and DHHS will thereby have a wider range of options from which to choose in the event of an emergency. In 2014, it was a coincidence that the U.S. government was prepared to assist with the Ebola outbreak response in terms of...
its MCMs against EVD. In the future, the U.S. government might not be as fortunate. The next outbreak could result from a disease against which the DoD is entirely unprepared because of its relatively limited focus on specific pathogens. Broadening this pool will heighten the DoD’s overall readiness and preparedness in advance of the next great outbreak.

One possible way to enact this shifted relationship for infectious disease R&D collaboration between DoD and DHHS could involve leveraging specific expertise from each department. The DoD is highly attuned to developing products for FDA approval via the animal rule, under which “products can be considered for FDA licensing using data from animal studies when it’s too dangerous or simply not possible to conduct clinical trials in people.” Briefly, the FDA will approve an MCM for human use to treat or prevent a rare disease if the developer demonstrates that the product is safe for human use and sufficiently effective in an accepted large-animal model for the disease. MCMs to treat anthrax and plague have recently been approved for human use in this way, with funding by both the DoD and DHHS. Concurrently, the DHHS has much more extensive expertise working with industry due to clearer commercial indications, higher budgets, and the absence of any stigma associated with military research. Therefore, in response to a future outbreak, the DoD could best support the DHHS’s efforts in accelerating development of medications through its vast expertise in animal modeling and animal efficacy studies.

One final way for the DoD and DHHS to successfully solidify their current partnership in preparation for an uncertain future is to retain flexibility when transitioning MCMs from applied to advanced research. The example of DTRA transitioning ZMapp to BARDA in order to rapidly advance the therapeutic toward FDA approval and availability to the public serves as a reminder that both departments succeed when they work closely together. In the same way, the NIH could transition a product from its basic research to JPM-MCS for its advanced R&D.

In addition to the strategic-level question of which pathogens the DoD should focus upon, the DoD must decide how to present its medical R&D to the public...

In addition to the strategic-level question of which pathogens the DoD should focus upon, the DoD must decide how to present its medical R&D to the public during the next outbreak response. Within the holistic U.S. government approach to defending against both pandemics and bioterrorism, DoD and DHHS have specific missions that generally address strategic-level health threats, whether they are related to bioweapons, bioterrorism, or pandemic disease. The DHHS is the designated lead government component in response to a health crisis. Namely, the CDC took charge during the Ebola response. Working within its customary operational approaches, the DoD contributed to the overall U.S. government response by deploying forces to Liberia in a humanitarian, medical support role. While it took several months for the U.S. government to adequately engage in West Africa, the American public and the world in general accepted the DoD’s decision to deploy forces and medical equipment.

On the other hand, the DoD faced a much more difficult decision for how to respond with respect to its drug development efforts. The American public generally accepts that the U.S. government funds important medical R&D, typically through the NIH. In addition, Americans generally have little concerns that one of the two main functions of the FDA, other than food safety, is to assure that medical interventions are effective and safe. However, the American public might have a harder...
time accepting that the DoD also develops medications, often available for everybody to use.

Should the DoD actively promote its medical R&D options when the next outbreak arises? One challenge in promoting DoD’s medical R&D is the fact that the public is largely unaware of this DoD mission; they may fear the resulting medications. After all, products designed for public use are typically more palatable than products designed for “military purposes.” More importantly, divulging the DoD’s defensive research efforts alerts our adversaries to our concerns and enables them to potentially circumvent our known defenses.

...divulging the DoD’s defensive research efforts alerts our adversaries to our concerns and enables them to potentially circumvent our known defenses.

While the DoD normally encourages its funded scientists in the service laboratories such as USAMRIID and elsewhere to publish in scientific journals and share their research at open-source conferences and conventions, these technical and relatively low-impact public maneuvers pale in comparison to a concerted effort from the Pentagon to broadly advertise its central R&D strategies. Clearly, this is the central argument for why the DoD should remain relatively silent about its R&D portfolios before and even during the next outbreak response.

That being said, there are several potentially positive outcomes should the DoD proactively advertise its R&D in responding to a future infectious disease crisis. The DoD and DHHS both strive to defend the American public. Above all else, the DoD, in particular, is charged with defending the nation, which includes providing MCMs to the American public when needed. Clearly, this would be accepted as an effective victory for the U.S. military against an insidious adversary—deadly pathogens, in this case.

The much more uncertain question relates to whether the U.S. military should provide its experimental MCMs to a foreign nation. This was a major policy and ethical dilemma during the 2014 Ebola response, specifically with respect to the development of ZMapp. As it turned out, the DoD did not own the rights to ZMapp based on the terms of its developmental funding, and Mapp Pharmaceuticals nonetheless ran out of its drug supplies relatively quickly due to ZMapp’s manufacturing limitations. In other words, the DoD dodged this question at the time. However, should it arise again in the future, one must circle back to the purpose of the DoD. The U.S. government prefers to defend against potential threats as far forward as possible. Just as the U.S. has not fought wars on its home soil in quite some time, the U.S. prefers to wage its wars against potential homeland epidemics on foreign soils whenever possible. This forward-postured defense should include full transparency on MCM options. While the DoD did not truly possess therapeutics or vaccines to rapidly and effectively save countless lives of West Africans and humanitarian responders, this is not to say that the DoD will not be able to do so in responding to a different disease outbreak in the future.

Developing MCMs is ultimately only one part of preparedness, and it could be ineffective without an efficient means for providing the MCMs in the course of providing all facets of healthcare. To this end, the U.S. government engages in global health in a number of ways. For example, the U.S. contributes financially through the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief and the President’s Malaria Initiative, as well as through contributions to international organizations such as the United Nations, among others. Moreover, the U.S. is committed to developing health-enabling systems, such as frameworks for food safety, detecting and
reporting disease outbreaks, and responding to epidemics. These commitments aim to improve the ability of developing countries to provide for their citizens and improve the health of their people, while also contributing to broader U.S. global development goals and national security concerns.

Naturally, one specific aim of U.S. government global health efforts is to protect its citizens from global health threats, such as virulent infectious diseases that threaten national security by way of globalization and epidemics. A forward, proactive posture is certainly not limited to conventional military forces and their attendant supporting networks. The U.S. ultimately improves global health and protects its citizens from deadly disease and epidemics through a synchronized whole-of-government approach.

Synchronizing U.S. government agencies to achieve national security goals in global health is a daunting feat. Therefore, in 2010, President Obama issued a Global Health Initiative directive for coordinating interagency efforts related to global health. The initiative abides by seven guiding principles (women, girls, and gender equality; country ownership; health systems strengthening; partnerships; integration; research and innovation; monitoring and evaluation) drawn from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Similar to the PHEMCE, DHHS leads the nation’s Global Health Initiative, and other departments support the effort.

DoD’s civilian leaders directed its Global Health Engagement program to focus on strengthening health systems. However, other global health aspects are included in the program, such as monitoring and evaluation, research and innovation, integration, and partnerships to foster strengthening health systems. The DoD Global Health Working Group seeks to balance its global health efforts for its military purpose and support to global health development organizations, similar to how drug development efforts invariably support military and public interests.

MCMs and other technologies for combatting disease are more effective and easily sustained in the presence of high-performing health systems. Therefore, one proven way to improve global health, protect national interests, and heighten preparedness before the next great outbreak is through development aimed at strengthening health systems in regions where the military and other U.S. government agencies currently operate or could likely operate in the future.

The DoD executes its Global Health Engagement program by providing direct patient care and indirect military support to government and international organizations and states. Military medical personnel deliver varying degrees of direct patient care aimed at achieving military objectives, such as limiting human suffering during a disaster response or gaining access and influence through medical action programs. Indirect engagement by way of support is often through other agencies, including DHHS and host nation organizations. For example, USAID led the whole-of-government response to 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak. Through orders from the President and with support from Congress, USAID leveraged the unique capabilities of the DoD and DHHS to subdue the epidemic and help prevent a...
pandemic. In Operation United Assistance, the DoD unquestionably supported USAID and DHHS by deploying service members to West Africa. This response was, therefore, a further example of DoD and DHHS coordination, specifically following a disaster and leveraging Global Health Engagement.

With these lessons in mind, the DoD should continue to optimize its Global Health Engagement missions as a means to distribute its MCMs and support DHHS during global epidemic responses. The military strengthened relationships with the affected countries, fostering the development of regional health systems. Further, the research and innovation opportunities afforded to the military through cooperation with DHHS were instrumental in developing new health technologies and refining current research initiatives beyond MCMs, to include patient care, equipment, and medical techniques.

DoD’s Global Health Engagement should aim to strengthen allied and developing-partner state preparedness to respond to internal public health threats. Operation United Assistance and the humanitarian response to the outbreak deployed thousands of American citizens to an environment that placed them at risk to a particularly horrific disease without an approved treatment or vaccine. It is without question that the state of the health care systems in the affected countries contributed to the epidemic. In the spirit of global health, the aim is to prevent illness in order to foster health and inevitably save lives. Collaboration between agencies in developing MCMs for infectious diseases through the U.S. Global Health Initiative improves global preparedness to contain outbreaks and prevent pandemics.

There should be a distinct boundary to the DoD’s forward posture in best preparing for the next big outbreak. Specifically, the DoD should not be directly involved with clinical trials in foreign countries, particularly those involving rare and deadly infectious diseases. In contrast to offering its experimental MCMs to the DHHS for use on the American public, or even for possible foreign use by international bodies such as the WHO, the DoD would stand to lose far more than it might gain from human experimentation overseas. Regardless, overseas clinical trials are more effective and more beneficial for the DHHS. The DoD should only minimally support such efforts and should refrain from ever becoming the face of such a U.S. initiative.

Unfortunately, Western clinical trials in foreign countries, especially Africa, have a history of ethical conflict. Large pharmaceutical companies have been prosecuted for conducting clinical trials with unethical experimentation, with forced medical procedures, and without proper informed consent. For example, in the 1990s, Pfizer conducted a clinical trial for its antibiotic, Trovan, in Kano, Nigeria. Tragically, eleven children died in the trial, five after taking Trovan and six after taking a different antibiotic. Other children suffered blindness, deafness, and brain damage. Although these disabilities are relatively common outcomes of the bacterial infections themselves, a panel of medical experts later implicated Pfizer in the incident, concluding that the drugs had been administered as part of an illegal clinical trial without authorization from the Nigerian government or proper parental consent. The Nigerian government later filed a lawsuit against Pfizer.

The U.S. was directly involved in another incident of questionable ethics in clinical trials in Africa. The CDC and NIH, along with the WHO, funded clinical trials for the antiviral drug Zidovudine in Zimbabwe in 1994. Greater than

Unfortunately, Western clinical trials in foreign countries, especially Africa, have a history of ethical conflict.
17,000 women participated in the study, which was touted for testing a medication that prevents mother-to-child HIV/AIDS transmission. Later, it was determined that the study participants did not fully understand the testing methods, the effectiveness of the medication, the possible dangers, or the nature of placebos. Half of the women in the study received a placebo that was known to have no effect, thereby increasing the likelihood of HIV/AIDS transmission. As a result, an estimated 1,000 babies contracted HIV/AIDS even though a proven life-saving regimen already existed. The CDC ended the testing in 1998 after it announced it had enough information from another clinical trial conducted in Thailand.

These two example studies, as well as many other cases of unethical medical experimentation, significantly contribute to the documented fear and mistrust of doctors and Western medicine in Africa. In general, this fear has had detrimental effects on health in Africa. The incidence of polio infection has increased in Nigeria, Chad, and Burkina Faso because many people avoid vaccinations due to fears the vaccines may be contaminated with HIV or sterilization agents. Furthermore, many African nations cannot afford to offer medicine for their citizens without subsidies from multinational pharmaceutical corporations. To court these pharmaceutical corporations, some African nations minimize legal regulations on the conduct of medical research, which prevents potential legal battles from arising. This forces some Africans to make a Hobson’s choice—“experimental medicine or no medicine at all.” People living in the rural or slum areas are also more vulnerable to experimentation because they are more likely to be illiterate and to misunderstand the effects of the experimentation.

When viewed collectively, these events and engrained perceptions based on several, historically-difficult situations should caution the DoD. While there might be scenarios where the CDC or other DHHS elements manage clinical trials in foreign countries, there is no discernible reason for the DoD to be actively involved, especially in Africa. Rather, it is highly likely that actively participating in such trials would taint the DoD’s image. Africans in particular do not generally trust pharmaceutical companies. Providing Africans another reason to mistrust the U.S. would impede its military efforts and negatively impact regional security interests.

**Conclusion**

The 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa highlighted the importance of continued close interactions between DoD and DHHS with respect to MCM development. While it was fortunate that DoD’s R&D was somewhat prepared to address an Ebola epidemic, the DoD should broaden its R&D efforts in coordination with DHHS in order to prepare for the next great epidemic. Both departments must maintain as broad a readiness as possible, with the DoD clearly supporting the DHHS in this particular mission area. Furthermore, the DoD must continue to engage overseas with foreign healthcare systems in order to optimize its ability to respond to another outbreak. However, the DoD must restrict its overall positioning to R&D and engagements, refraining from actively participating in clinical trials in foreign countries.
NOTES


4 Pellerin.


7 “Medical Research Institute Has Years of Ebola Drug Expertise,” Targeted News Service, October 30, 2014.


Leadership and the Art of Delegation

by John Moore

Every officer the military commissions faces the same daunting experience at the start of their professional lives as a leader...the moment they meet the first group of people they will lead. The responsibility these young men and women have, most in their early twenties, is enormous. The lives of others depend, to a large degree, upon their competence and character. Each new leader wants their organization to know that they are technically competent and capable of leading them. And they know first impressions are lasting.

My particular experience occurred back in 1983. I reported to my unit where my platoon sergeant met me in the headquarters and began a 30-minute soliloquy on the duties and responsibilities of a platoon leader. My sergeant was an Army Ranger, three tour Vietnam veteran and truly larger than life. His leadership philosophy was simple, “there is right and there is wrong...do right.” When he took a rare breath and paused, I entered the conversation saying, “That is an awful lot to take in and carry out.” He paused and asked, “What do you mean?” I replied, “If I made a list of all the things you’ve described it would be long enough to be a book on being a platoon leader.” He laughed and said, “Sir - - that’s why you have the other sergeants in the platoon and me. Now looky here sir – you only have to do a few essential things.”

He laid them out for me. 1) Stay calm – always; and, never yell unless someone’s life depends on it. 2) When you get your mission, bring us in, we’ll break it down with you and we’ll work together to assign tasks and make sure we don’t miss anything. 3) Ensure those responsible for each task know exactly what you expect, why it needs to be done, and how they are to let you know its complete or that they need help. 4) Talk, listen, and listen some more. You’ve got to communicate with these men and most of communicating is listening. It’s a sign of respect and these senior sergeants have earned it. These folks are smart and they want to know the what and the why. They don’t get to spend much time around people with college and they’ll love it when you take the time to talk with them.” He then told me something my grandfather used to tell me, “Sir, remember you’ve got two ears and one mouth for a reason.”

John Moore is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and 30-year Army veteran. As the chief of staff of the Operations Directorate during the surge in Iraq and as the defense coordinating officer for the military disaster response in the Midwest, Moore has spent a great deal of time knitting together the efforts of government, for profit, and not-for-profit organizations.
At that moment I realized that during my four years at West Point I had developed a misconception. I believed that leading was all about me and how I exercised command and being in charge. I thought that the success or failure of the team was going to be a result of my competence and leadership. At that moment I realized that success is a shared responsibility, if the leader chooses to share it. This remains the most important leadership lesson of my life. Over time I also learned that a leader can only share responsibility if they have mastered the art of delegation. By being masters at delegating leaders build strong leaders, create a culture characterized by excellence, and they leave themselves free to focus on what is most essential.

What I learned in 1983 about the importance of delegating effectively is at the heart of what bedevils leaders at all levels and in all organizations. The vast majority of leaders and managers have too much on their plates because they are not delegating enough or delegating effectively. One of the greatest leaders I ever worked under said, “do only those things that only you can do.” My experience has shown that when an overwhelmed leader conducts a functional, task, and time analysis it often becomes clear to them that they are devoting a significant percentage of their time to tasks that others should be executing. Moving from front line leader to higher levels of management is sometimes a difficult transition. It is simpler and more comfortable to lead “doers” than to lead those that manage “doers.” By mastering delegation, the leader is able to break free of the non-essential tasks and focus their time on those activities that make a difference.

Over the years I have created a framework for leading through effective and purposeful delegation.

1. Stay Calm and Remain in Control

You are THE leader. There is only one of you and your people look to you for direction. They want to know that there is a purpose to the actions you tell them to execute and they look to you for guidance and motivation. If you don’t appear confident and sure of your plan, they will lose their confidence. When you start getting agitated they’ll wonder if you are truly in control. When you sense yourself getting angry, recognize it as a sign that you need someone to share the load with you. When you are overburdened you have to reach out for help, not strike out at others. You cannot carry the entire load.

In order to keep an even keel it is essential that you have a trusted advisor. The trusted adviser may be a business partner, friend, spouse, mentor or another who is able to maintain a dispassionate view. Without someone to discuss the challenges that cause you to lose sleep, you will ultimately be brought to your knees by carrying the load yourself. Sharing the load will also help you remain calm and steady. In most organizations people’s lives don’t necessarily depend upon you, but their livelihoods do. You have to instill confidence in them by demonstrating calm confidence in yourself.

2. Break it Down

When you receive a mission or project you are going to have the impulse to dive right in and start your analysis of what needs to be done. Every mission you receive will be complex with parts that you cannot understand or may not have experienced. Others on your team may have. Having them assist you in performing your analysis of what needs to be done is essential to not only fully examining the task but also is the first step in effectively delegating. Including others allows the team to brainstorm, adding their experience, knowledge, and points of view that you may not consider because of where you sit.

My experience has found that in many organizations that the more time a leader
has in their leadership seat the more they are inclined to depend upon their own intuition and initial impressions to guide their decisions. In today’s world the complexity of markets and the challenges associated with leading people and managing projects tend to put a different spin on each situation. Global change occurs in minutes, not years. The same problem that you solved two years ago will likely be unsolvable if you use the same solution today. Gathering a small group to conduct a collaborative analysis of the situation ensures that you consider multiple perspectives and have an accurate portrayal of the problem. The outcome will be a comprehensive list of actions and priorities.

3. Assign Responsibility

Each leader and team needs to know all of the actions they must take and exactly what you expect the result to look like. Remember that when you give them responsibility, you also have to give them the authority and resources to do it right.

When I served as the Military Disaster Response Coordinator for the Midwest I was fortunate to be able to attend many workshops with one of the best FEMA Administrators to hold the position. He would always tell the group that one of the greatest disasters within a disaster response is a lack of role clarity. When this is the case there are too many people from too many different organizations working on the same problem. Correspondingly there may be no one available to serve other needs. There are two key components to doing this right: 1) Ensuring the proper people and teams are assigned to every essential task. 2) Ensuring everyone knows their role and focus as well as knowing where other key players are focusing their effort and resources.

Large numbers of well-meaning people will respond to a humanitarian crisis and it is not uncommon to have more than one organization show up at a single point to perform a function such as distributing water. At other critical locations there may be no one who shows up with the water. The same holds true within the complexities of the global business market or in large governmental organizations. There is much to be done and limited resources to apply to any given project. Prioritization, timing, and the right capabilities assigned to the top priorities is the only road to success.

4. Hold Them Accountable

Your subordinates have to know when and what to report to you. You don’t want to be chasing information and you don’t need to know everything. When you constantly call or visit to ask about the status of a task you convey a lack of trust and become a distraction. One of the harder aspects of running an organization is knowing exactly what you need to know to make important decisions. If you ask for everything your mind will quickly be saturated with information that is irrelevant to you and you won’t be able to see the forest for the trees. Requiring your teams to report everything places an onerous burden on them that detracts from mission accomplishment.

A New Product Project Team in a Midwest manufacturing organization struggled with conducting a truly useful weekly meeting. The meeting’s purpose was to provide all of the key players a status of each new product and to identify bottle necks that were slowing development. In examining how to improve their process I used one product as a case study and asked every functional lead two things: 1) What is it that your department uniquely contributes to the successful development and production of this product? 2) What information must you have during these meetings to do your part well?

After 90 minutes they had a useful, simple spreadsheet that depicted the necessary information to cover at each meeting. The project integrator kept the spreadsheet up to date and sent it to each team member for proofing.
the day prior to the meeting. The team completed and approved for production twice as many new products in the next four months as they had in the previous year. A beneficial side effect was that the team members stopped hating these meetings and began to look forward to them as problem solving sessions.

5. Keep Talking and Keep Listening

The one thing you have to be is around. Your team want to see you, hear you, and most importantly be heard by you. When you think about it, everyone wants to matter and nothing makes someone believe they matter more than being heard and taken seriously by their leader. Never stop interfacing with your workforce. A common strand that runs through the entire delegation process is that of soliciting and receiving feedback. You will be amazed at how differently people perceive a challenge based upon where they sit or which functions they perform in the organization. I equate this phenomenon to a diamond. You can’t truly appreciate the beauty of a diamond until you have looked at all of its brilliant facets.

Effective and purposeful delegation is the only way that you can empower your leaders, teams, and individual members of your workforce. If the leader is doing it all, they are stealing opportunities for others’ growth and the chance to be relevant and significant to the organization. We all want to be valued and when an employee feels truly valued, their discretionary effort goes off the charts. By making your team members the hero of the story, you make them feel like champions. Just as importantly, if a leader is doing it all, they don’t have the time to do their job properly and the entire organization suffers. Trust subsides, discretionary effort dissolves, and so might the business or organization.

Conclusion

The next time you have a tough challenge that you believe you must solve yourself, resist the impulse. Take the following steps.

1. Bring a small team together and share the challenge with them. Ask each to describe the challenge as they see it. Ensure each one of you clearly understands all other perspectives.

2. Brainstorm all possible solutions and then as a group narrow them down to those that most believe are feasible to implement and stand a good chance of solving the problem. Pick the team’s top three.

3. Select the criteria you want the solution to meet. For example, “we want to reduce product returns to 4% no later than December 31st and we cannot devote more than $115K to the solution.”

4. Evaluate your top three against this metric and select the best of the three.

5. As a group, create an implementation plan that has rock solid accountability mechanisms.

6. Keep everyone abreast of progress made or lost in a timely way on a set schedule.

7. Be around and rather than asking “how’s it going?” or “have you completed that task?” ask what you can do to be helpful or stop doing that is being unhelpful. Your people will appreciate it, especially if you listen well and follow the recommendations that fit.
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Trust and Networks
in the Interagency

by Nicole Alexander and Chad Thibodeau

Interagency collaboration, integration, and information-sharing have been feverishly discussed and debated topics for decades. The events of September 11, 2001, only highlighted their importance. Since 9/11, the need for a shared vision and a synchronized plan of action that forces relationships and develops and supports organizational networks to work in unison toward universal objectives has been at the forefront of thought for U.S. military and civilian leadership. Fusion cells, task forces, and public discussion on the topic have been widespread, and directives from senior leadership at agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (State), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been written and disseminated. While some argue that the interagency is no better at information-sharing and cooperation than they were before 9/11, the U.S. cannot afford to abandon this goal. Achieving this goal will best prepare the U.S. to meet both current and future national security objectives and respond to disasters or emergencies, natural and man-made.

There are four issues that inhibit interagency collaboration, integration, and information-sharing. First and foremost, there is a lack of personal and institutional trust among the interagency. Second, there are few networks among the various agencies, both at individual and departmental levels. Third, plans and strategies are often stove piped in an individual agency. Finally, there is an atmosphere of competition for resources.

**Personal and Institutional Trust**

The lack of institutional trust among agencies such as the DoD, State, and USAID stymies the networks that provide for the dialogue, synchronization, and collaboration required to meet national

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**Major Chad Thibodeau** is a U.S. Army civil affairs officer, and is pursuing a master’s degree in information operations and political warfare. He has worked extensively within the interagency environment in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, the Philippines, and most recently at the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
security objectives at places like an embassy or an interagency task force. For the purposes of this article, trust is defined as “…a bet about the future contingent actions of others…” that enables individuals to adapt to complex social environments, and thereby benefit from increased opportunities. Those individuals that are accustomed to working in the interagency environment almost unequivocally agree that the most successful interagency collaborations have been built on a foundation of personal relationships rather than institutional trust. Most successful interagency collaborations are personality based, and both success and failure hinge on the trust built among the individuals within each organization.

In their article, “Trust in Small Military Teams,” Adams and Webb describe person-based trust as the ebb and flow of one’s likelihood to be able to determine and “predict the actions of another, as a result of our experiences and interactions with that person.” When an individual continues to make the expected and desired actions, trust is reinforced. If the DoD continues to select the right military personalities capable of integrating into their respective organizations, those individuals can continue to build person-based trust, and over time, person-based trust can transition to institutional-based trust. Although the assignment of civilians within primarily military-staffed organizations is slightly less common, the same must be done in these cases.

Efficient interagency coordination among agencies such as DoD, State, and USAID is necessary to meet national security objectives, react to emerging threats, and respond effectively. The complex and sometimes ambiguous problems of today cannot be solved by individuals; therefore, person-based trust must be replaced by institution-based trust and the belief that any individual, civilian, or military assigned to an interagency position is “plug and play” or, essentially, another person that will get the job done. Author Piotr Sztompka in Trust: A Sociological Theory, argues: “In order to face the future actively and constructively, we need to deploy trust.” In an increasingly complex environment, DoD, State, and USAID must work actively and constructively to meet their shared national objectives.

Because national security problems are complex and globalization is ever increasing, there exists a “network of tightening inter-linkages—political, military, economic, financial, cultural”—where “cooperation becomes a pressing need, a crucial challenge, but also the domain of uncertainties.” As mentioned earlier, trust is a bet on the uncertainties and the actions of others. Van den Bosch et al. finds that trust facilitates open communication and information sharing. When people act on beliefs, knowledge, and interpretations of their own or others past experiences and it is neither not enough or a bad experience, building institutional trust is difficult.

Institutional trust is based on two distinctly different components or dimensions: (1) a tightly interconnected and intertwined set of affective beliefs about institutional behavior, and (2) how competent the institution appears to be. Institutional trust is important in the interagency because roles and people in respective agencies change often.

Institutional trust develops when individuals know that an institution is open, forthcoming, reliable, consistent, honest, credible, competent, and has integrity. Without institutional trust, individuals must attempt to build personal trust, which is not immediate and can delay...
information-sharing and high degrees of collaboration.

The State-led Syria Transition Assistance Response Team (START) and later the DoD-led Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Syria (CJIATF-S) provide some insight into the effects of trust in interagency collaboration. The START relationship was based mainly on personal trust. The leaders of START had worked together on previous U.S. response teams and personally knew what to expect from each other. Because of those personal trust relationships, the information-sharing, collaboration, and synchronization among people and organizations was immeasurable. When the DoD assigned two Soldiers to work with the START, they had no previous trusting relationships with individual State and USAID members of the START. Additionally, each subsequent Soldier and START member had to work from scratch to build relationships that inevitably never led to a truly trusting relationship that furthered the ultimate goal of whole-of-government collaboration and interagency synchronization and information-sharing. It was the same with new civilian personnel with no previous personal relationship with the START group. The DoD, State, and USAID staff of the START was changing anywhere from every six weeks to every six months. If there had been institutional trust from each individual, the transition could have been easier because the remaining individuals would have had a reasonable level of trust in the new people on the team.

Even though the military members of START had provided exposure and dialogue for the DoD-led effort, as the CJIATF-S began to stand up, the lack of institutional trust meant that personal trusting relationships had to be built before there was complete integration and collaboration.

The Importance of Networks

In the interagency task forces that address humanitarian assistance disaster relief (HADR) situations or complex crises, such as the Syrian Civil War and the fight against ISIS, the networks that bind the organizations will only support the larger U.S. objective. As in the UN mission in Kosovo, in the Syrian crisis and the fight against ISIS, it is essential for all responding U.S. agencies to not only assert themselves into the role of guiding the Syrians, but also to create deep-seated networks and collaborate among agencies to help the Syrian population reestablish networks and collaboration. Just as trust aids information flow, a network for that information to flow through helps collaboration and synchronization of operations and programs. In an environment such as Syria where defense, diplomacy, and development are so crucial to national security objectives, a network of people and organizations working together toward one goal make the process more efficient and effective.

There are at least five main components of the U.S. government and about 50 individual agencies, bureaus, and departments within those components that are direct participants or assist the START and the CJIATF-S to meet U.S. national security objectives. This web of agencies and organizations requires networked collaboration and synchronization similar to what was needed in the municipality of Banshik, the model UN Civil Administration (UNCA) in Kosovo. There, the municipal advisor and his deputy believed that to attain the goals of the intervention, the UNCA required innovation and responsiveness that was only possible through cooperation with other organizations.
In her account of the success of Banshik, Ann Holohan finds that the factors that build a successful network organization are leadership, degrees of formality, social embeddedness, and accountability in the organization.\textsuperscript{10} Holohan points out that “in order to work together, they had to acknowledge that they were all part of a temporary organization, to trust one another enough to exchange information and to solve problems in a collaborative or cooperative way.”\textsuperscript{11} These factors and the acknowledgement of their roles in this temporary organization are crucial for the success of a task force such as the START and the CJIATF-S or for an embassy during a HADR situation.

**A Cross-Cutting Cleavages Approach**

Anne Holohan’s case study on Kosovo also provides an excellent example of how organization and unified action can positively support objectives and goals. The successful intervention strategy in Banshik was only successful because of the ability of the cast of individuals and individual organizations to use a “cross cutting cleavages” approach to strategy as opposed to a stovepipe mentality.\textsuperscript{12} Alternatively, the stovepipe mentality and associated actions that were executed in Holohan’s Threzren case study exemplify how ineffective and inefficient uncoordinated action can be.

The foundation of the “cross-cutting cleavages” approach stems from trust. While personal-based trust can support this approach, institutional trust would be considerably more advantageous. The “cross-cutting cleavages” approach to strategy forces relationships and develops and supports networks from the organization to work in unison toward universal objectives, an approach rarely observed in the current interagency environment. What is most often observed is a stovepipe mentality and stove piped action and activity; each organization working independently, each with the best of intentions, and each with its own objectives. It is only by sheer serendipitous circumstances, often because of personal relationships, that organizations’ hard work coincides and sometimes helps each of them to reach strategic goals.

**The Tragedy of the Commons**

The “tragedy of the commons” is a term that economist Garrett Hardin used in the late 1960s to describe a finite amount of resources that are desired by two or more groups.\textsuperscript{13} One group will often attempt to monopolize the resource at the expense of the other group. The two groups are not often adversaries, at least not to begin with; it is the resource they desire, not that they do not want their neighbor to have that resource for one reason or another. The most effective and efficient solution—to work together to split the resources—is rarely the chosen solution. More often than not, the lack of trust and understanding of the two normally friendly neighbors lead each group to attempt to dominate the other and its access to the resource. While Hardin used the term to describe tangible resources that two or more groups compete for, it is also applicable to the relationships among interagency organizations.

**Interagency organizations compete for resources and also for relevancy.**

Interagency organizations compete for resources and also for relevancy. Agencies know there is only a finite amount of money that is allocated to address a particular situation or support the activities in a particular geographic location. Often leaders ask, “How are we going to show relevance?” While on the surface, the leader may be pushing the team to show results, he or she may also create a sense of competition, because if a team, an organization, or an agency is not relevant, then it is not needed.
HADR in the flood prone areas in the Philippines offers an example of how to overcome the “tragedy of the common.” HADR is almost always best addressed by joint, interagency solutions, and often competition among agencies would only inhibit response and support to the affected areas. USAID often has food, potable water, and medical supplies prepositioned to meet the immediate needs of the population. But it does not generally have the transportation assets required to move them, especially when the natural disaster has had an effect on the local infrastructure of the affected area. The Joint Special Operations Task Force in the area has elements from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force with the necessary land, sea, and air capabilities to move USAID supplies, in addition to pallets of supplies of their own to help aid affected individuals. U.S. Embassy personnel in Manila worked feverishly to account for U.S. citizens living in affected areas and liaised with their respective counterparts from the host nation. The optimal solution to address the immediate and long-term needs of HADR responses is one that uses the most appropriate and pragmatic resources and capabilities of each of the agencies and its personnel. If in a HADR the agencies subscribed to the “tragedy of the common,” no one agency would be able to provide the required resources, and the result would be chaos and continued hardship for those affected by the disaster.

Overcoming the Issues

While there are myriad options to overcoming these issues, we offer the following: access and sharing of information and intelligence, institutional education and advocates, physical system integration, and parallel rotations among the agencies. Access, information-sharing, intelligence, and education should require only minor changes in doctrine, guidelines, and mind-set. Integration of physical systems and changes to agency substructures and rotations will require more robust changes and possible also have fiscal requirements. Regardless of ones preferred parlance, the definition of intelligence or information is the knowledge about a particular subject that is collected in order to draw conclusions about that subject. There is a chasm between the information that military and civilian members can access in the interagency environment. Much of the “unclassified” and “sensitive but unclassified” information that agencies such as State and USAID work with is considered too sensitive for the military, which leads to a lack of information-sharing. On the other hand, the military have the most security clearances in an interagency environment and thus have the most access to “secret” and above information. This security clearance chasm can lead to an inability or unwillingness to work together, misunderstanding, as well as a belief that two individuals are not working toward the same goal. While we do not propose that every military and civilian person working in the interagency environment have the same security clearances, we do propose that individuals of similar status working on similar or joint ventures and goals have mirrored access to all information. Common access to information would inevitably lead to more individual and institutional trust, a better and shared understanding of both problems and potential solutions, and ultimately more effective and efficient goal realization.

Sztompka says it best: “The complexity of institutions, organizations, and technological systems, and the increasingly global scope of their operations, make them impenetrable to ordinary people, but often also to the

There is a chasm between the information that military and civilian members can access in the interagency environment.
professional experts.” Even other U.S. government employees cannot always fully understand the complexities of agencies and departments—what they do and the value they add to the a whole-of-government approach to meeting national security objectives. There is a perceived lack of shared values among agencies, especially the defense, diplomacy, development, and intelligence agencies. Agencies such as USAID are based on the idea that international aid can diminish the threat of communism and help countries prosper. This concept directly meets a national security objective. The guiding principle is not “to do good things,” but rather “to diminish the threats.” The preconceived notion of a lack of shared values and objectives leads to distrust and exclusion from networks that are crucial to whole-of-government efforts. An increase in education about the values and goals of agencies will help build the institutional trust and networks needed.

Two of the ways to assist with interagency education and integration are liaison officers and cells. A preeminent organizational theorist Richard Daft describes the importance of horizontal integration, which is what is needed within the U.S. government. As described by Daft, true integration is through the quality of collaboration between departments. Integrators or liaison personnel and coordinators are necessary when there is a highly uncertain environment, and there are requirements for information processing to achieve synchronization and goals. This describes perfectly the situation agencies tasked to meet national security objectives face on a daily basis.

These liaisons require a specific type of person. This person must be respected in his or her own community and agency and must not be “cast-away.” Liaisons and integrators require the ability to synchronize, educate, and foster collaboration, often with little authority. They must use expertise and persuasion to achieve their goals. As Daft describes it, they “must be able to get people together, maintain their trust, confront problems, and resolve conflicts and disputes,” in the interest of meeting national security objectives through a whole-of-government approach.

There is also a requirement to populate and continue the education socialization in the interagency. Malcolm Gladwell, author of The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, describes three “laws” to spread an epidemic, message, or idea—the law of the few, the stickiness factor, and the power of context. Of importance in this discussion is the law of the few and the types and characteristics of people necessary to spread the idea. Gladwell describes these people as connectors, maven, and salespeople.

A connector is someone with a special gift for bringing the world together. They generally are part of many different worlds, subcultures, and niches. Their personalities are very specific; they are intensely social and gregarious. The maven is someone who accumulates knowledge; they are genuinely interested and curious and are motivated to educate and help. The salesman has the skills to persuade the unconvinced. They are not necessarily pushy in the way that turns people away, but they are pushy enough to convince people.

To help spread the idea and value of whole-of-government approach, leadership from departments, agencies, and bureaus must themselves be or must identify these types of people. They will help educate and synchronize across the U.S. government and the more of them, the better. It is also a responsibility of the people that serve as integrators or that work in
task forces and in interagency environments to understand their roles as connectors, mavens, and salesmen. Each individual within the interagency and joint task force environment has the responsibility to and must act as a connector as much and as often as possible in order to make the network denser and more interconnected.

Physical and system integration, especially abroad, must be addressed to better facilitate trust, network development, and coordination.

Physical and system integration, especially abroad, must be addressed to better facilitate trust, network development, and coordination. As an example, one of the authors assigned to the Embassy in Sri Lanka and the Maldives was surprised to learn that the DoD and USAID were not collocated but, in fact, a mile away from each other. As duties required the captain to work with both State and USAID personnel, much time was spent physically transiting from one meeting to another, from one building to another, and often back again. While some of engagements were State-centric and others were USAID-centric, many included elements from both. Key personnel within each organization developed relationships and had “business” with each office in the mission in order to overcome the physical and system separation. The majority of the personnel in each organization did not have significant interaction with their counterparts, even though inevitably their interests and goals were similar.

Lack of system integration is another barrier to coordination and integration. The number of email addresses, various systems access requirements, and phone numbers necessary to view information and talk among the departments highlight the system separation in the interagency. In an embassy abroad, business cards had three DoD email addresses, two State email addresses, one USAID email address, and three phone numbers, only two of which could actually reach the card holder. As a result of personnel and office location changes and different servers for the embassy and USAID systems, it was difficult to contact an unknown colleague whose experience and expertise might prove highly beneficial to addressing a shared concern and a common goal.

Integrated systems will also help address knowledge management across the interagency. When systems cannot “talk” to each other and portals cannot be shared, the lack of information-sharing only increases. As part of the START and the CJIA, a Civil Affairs knowledge management team was brought on to address this specific issue. Most of the reporting and programmatic data of the U.S. government response to the Syrian crisis was being stored on State’s OPENNET systems. Without access to that system, no one else in the interagency could see any of the reporting unless they were on a specific email list. The knowledge management team eventually worked with a National Geospatial Agency-funded program, Protected Internet Exchange, that could collate and store the unclassified reports and information and be accessed from anywhere with internet access.

Creating a common and ubiquitous system that allows for access and storage for all U.S. federal agencies and a global address list would address these systemic integration issues. This interconnectedness or at least interoperability would help create denser networks and enable collaboration.

Adjusting rotation lengths and regional reassignments are the final recommendations that can address issues of trust and, networks. Military rotations within the interagency average nine months in length. In comparison, host-nation counterparts will live their entire lives in the area interagency personnel deploy to for a few short months. The short rotations make it
difficult to build personal trust, let alone support the idea of institutional trust. In a recent rotation
to the UN mission in South Sudan, a Danish lieutenant colonel supervisor was on a 12-month
assignment. Due to the personnel moves and short assignments of U.S. military members, the Danish
supervisor had four different Army Civil Affairs captains serve under him during his tenure. While an
extreme example, this is not completely uncommon for military members in any assignment. Longer
rotations for military members working in interagency positions would build stronger networks and
trust. Where possible, similar to State and USAID colleagues, short unaccompanied assignments
should be adjusted to permanent accompanied assignments. In areas where the security situation
does not permit families to accompany service members, the U.S. should implement continuity of
assignment, whereby service members become masters of their region and assignment as opposed
to a jack of all trades and all regions.

Historic deployment data for special operations officers suggests there is approximately a 1:1
dwell ratio—in layman terms, for every year that a service member is deployed, he or she can expect
approximately one year at his continental U.S. duty station. With this in mind, individual service
members should not be expected to be separated from their families for years at a time in order to
build relationships, networks, trust, and expertise in a particular area. However, assigning the same
individuals to the same area to work with the same counterparts from the interagency and the host
country would prove instrumental in building interagency networks and trust, as well as enabling
cooperation. Members of other agencies such as State and USAID should also be re-assigned to areas
in which they have previously worked. In theory, individuals from each organization and agency
would replace the individual that replaced them perpetually, as would their interagency counterparts,
and continue to work with the same host nation counterparts in support of common goals.

Conclusion

There is a recognized issue with interagency integration and collaboration. While addressing
these issues by implementing these recommendations may not completely solve the problems,
they are major steps in the right direction. The future is going to be ever more complex, and these
complex issues must be addressed with a whole-of-government approach. The U.S. interagency must
make every effort to cooperate, communicate effectively, understand fellow organizations, and put
the right people with the right skills in positions to realize common goals. To effectively address
national issues, the U.S. must eliminate stove piped and parallel activities and replace them with
concerted efforts and cross-cultural, interconnected, and networked action. To build institutional trust
and developed networks, interagency partners must share access to information, mirror rotations,
provide area expertise and reassignment, and employ technological interface commonalities. If
implemented or addressed, these recommendations may serve as the catalyst to create a cascading
effect of trust, interconnectedness, and network density.
NOTES


2 Ibid.


4 Sztompka, p. 12.

5 Ibid.


8 Ibid., p. 103.


10 Ibid., p. 6.

11 Ibid., p. 20.


14 Sztompka, p. 13.


17 Ibid., p. 128.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 70.
DHS, White House release CVE guidance

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the White House recently released guidance on countering violent extremism (CVE). DHS released its plan on October 31, while the White House released their guidance earlier in October. The two documents focus on CVE efforts inside the United States.

The White House CVE plan replaces the previous CVE plan from 2011, and “responds to the current dynamics of violent extremism and reflects experiences and knowledge acquired over the last five years.” The CVE plan addresses all forms of violent extremism and involves non-government partnerships. The White House plan also provides information on the purpose and background of the interagency CVE Task Force, whose mission is to: (1) synchronize and integrate whole-of-government CVE programs and activities; (2) conduct ongoing strategic planning; and (3) assess and evaluate CVE efforts.

DHS partners with the Department of Justice in their CVE efforts, and will work with a variety of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as law enforcement, academia, social services, and the public sector. The DHS CVE plan is closely aligned to the White House plan, and lays out four guiding principles regarding the motives of violent extremists, CVE prevention, and civil liberties and privacy. The DHS plan also stipulates that DHS will collaborate with the CVE Task Force.

The CVE plans state that intelligence and law enforcement investigations are not part of CVE activities.

- Department of Homeland Security

Updated cyber response plan in the works

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working on an updated version of the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP). The current NCIRP has not been updated for six years.

The NCIRP provides a plan for the government’s response to major cyberattacks and is “a nationwide approach to cyber incidents, to talk about the important role that private sector entities, states, and multiple federal agencies play in responding to cyber incidents and how those activities all fit together.”

DHS has developed the new draft of the NCIRP in coordination with the Departments of Justice and Defense, other sector-specific agencies and interagency partners, and representatives from critical infrastructure and state and local governments.

Bridgette Walsh, a cyber branch chief with DHS’ National Protection and Programs Directorate said of the new NCIRP, “I think we owe it to the nation to show that there are a lot of big brains who have been thinking about this for many years and we are not all sitting around twiddling our thumbs waiting for the next attack.”

Comments closed on Oct. 31, 2016.

- Federal Times
Balancing Priorities: Immigration, National Security, and Public Safety


The authors note that “the immigration system has become much more sophisticated and effective since [the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] was created in 2001,” but that more needs to be done. DHS’s partnership with local law enforcement and federal intelligence agencies can be improved through several changes laid out in the report:

- Develop comprehensive, consistent metrics to (1) measure the effectiveness of immigration and enforcement efforts, (2) better allocate resources at the border and beyond, and (3) inform the public and policymakers on the state of border security.
- Complete a connected entry and exit system to track and deter visa overstayers and disrupt the international travel of dangerous individuals.
- Foster greater cooperation between local law enforcement and federal immigration officials to more effectively remove high-risk individuals from the U.S. interior while building trust with immigrant communities.
- Screen unauthorized immigrants living in the United States via a mechanism for documentation, allowing immigration enforcement officials to focus limited resources on individuals of concern.
- Update and expand legal immigration visas to redirect illegal immigration flows to vetted channels while meeting economic and humanitarian priorities.

The report allows that immigration reforms alone cannot address all the security threats facing the country, and notes that much relies on the combined efforts of defense, intelligence, and law enforcement.

- The Chicago Council on Global Affairs & the Bipartisan Policy Center

Second InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture a success

On Oct. 25, the Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS) hosted the second lecture in their new InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series. Over 65 students and faculty from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and other area universities attended the lecture.

Special Agent Christopher J. Lamb, Ph.D., from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), presented on the topic of the FBI Cyber Task Force. During his presentation, Lamb discussed the FBI Cyber Task Force’s mission and how it works with the Department of Defense and other government agencies with the students and faculty attending. Lamb also alluded to FBI Director James Comey’s address at the Symantec Government Symposium earlier this year.

The InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series is an extracurricular, interagency topic-focused series that is intended to help enrich the CGSS curriculum. The next lecture is scheduled for November, and will feature Dr. John G. Breen, CGSC Commandant’s Distinguished Chair for National Intelligence Studies. – The InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series will continue in 2017.

- Simons Center
Agencies participate in Task Force to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking

The President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (PITF) convened at the White House on Oct. 24. This was the final cabinet-level meeting of the PITF during the Obama administration.

The PITF reported on the progress made within four priority areas: rule of law, victim services, procurement and supply chains, and public awareness and outreach. The PITF also released a fact sheet earlier this year that provided an update on their efforts.

Secretary of State John Kerry said in his remarks “This all-of-government effort has really been very, very significant. Everybody here has contributed significantly in their agencies, and I think this Administration can be extraordinarily proud of what we have done to raise the profile of this challenge and to have an impact on countries all around the world.” He went on to say that human trafficking is an assault on human rights and a threat to global stability.

Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson also attended the PITF meeting. Johnson discussed the progress that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in combating human trafficking, including DHS’s Blue Campaign. At the PITF meeting, Johnson announced revision to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Directive on Continued Presence. This revision will extend the duration of this important immigration designation for non-U.S. citizen victims of human trafficking from one year to two years, providing crucial stability and greater support to victims as they aid in the investigation and prosecution of their traffickers.

The PITF was formed following President Obama’s March 2012 call to strengthen federal efforts to combat human trafficking through the cooperation and collaboration of government agencies, the private sector, advocates, survivors, faith communities, civil society, law enforcement, and academia.

FEMA releases 2016 National Preparedness Report

In September the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) announced the publication of its 2016 National Preparedness Report. The report, which was issued this spring, evaluates core capabilities of U.S. government agencies tasked with providing emergency preparedness and response.

FEMA’s report highlights several DHS initiatives, programs, and case studies that demonstrate their interagency efforts and cross-discipline programs for first responders, allowing emergency managers to build on lessons learned. These programs include work with fusion centers, counterterrorism awareness workshops, “If You See Something, Say Something,” and others focused on counterterrorism, law enforcement, and post-disaster response.

The 2016 National Preparedness Report includes 37 key findings across the five mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The key findings are based on qualitative and quantitative data from all levels of government and the private and nonprofit sectors.

- White House

- Department of Homeland Security
Simons Center hosts first InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture


Simons Center program director Rod Cox opened the lecture and introduced the two speakers, who shared their experiences with those attending. At the end of Lambertson and Keller’s presentation, they took questions from the audience. The speakers then thanked the military and government personnel in the audience for their service and wished them well as they continue their careers and move on to future interagency operations.

More than 75 students and faculty from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, as well as students from other nearby universities and members of the public attended. Feedback from the speakers and those in attendance was overwhelmingly positive.

DHS partnership to combat human trafficking

On July 20, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a new partnership between their Blue Campaign and the Virginia Office of the Attorney General to raise awareness about human trafficking. Blue Campaign Chair Maria Odom, said “The Blue Campaign is honored to work alongside the Virginia Office of the Attorney General. Partnerships like this are important to our efforts to combat human trafficking in the United States and in our communities, because no one fights human trafficking alone.”

DHS announced a similar partnership with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights earlier this year.

The DHS Blue Campaign works in collaboration with law enforcement, government, non-governmental, and private organizations to protect the basic right of freedom and to bring those who exploit human lives to justice.

Directive focuses on cyber incident coordination

In late July, the White House released a Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-41) focused on U.S. cyber incident coordination. PPD-41 sets forth principles governing the federal government’s response to any cyber incident, whether involving government or private sector entities.

The new directive also establishes lead federal agencies, lays a structure for coordinating broader federal government response, and requires the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to maintain updated contact information for the public to use when reporting incidents. The directive defines what cyber incidents are and explains the significant threats they pose.

PPD-41 focuses on shared responsibility between the private sector, government agencies, and individuals, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the various government entities involved.

In his statement on PPD-41, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson said the directive “not only clarifies the roles of the various government actors involved in cybersecurity, it re-enforces the reality that cybersecurity must be a partnership between the government and the private sector, and among the law enforcement, homeland security and intelligence components of the government.”
Experts gather at National Security Summit

In early September, a panel of military and government agency leaders gathered to share their experiences and perspectives on cyber and intelligence issues at the Intelligence and National Security Summit. The Summit is the premier gathering of senior decision makers from government, military, industry and academia.

Panelists included commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency (NSA) Navy Admiral Michael Rogers and director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Robert Cardillo. Rogers, Cardillo, and the other panelists discussed implications and opportunities involved in integrating artificial intelligence and human analysis, and other national defense and homeland security issues.

Among other topics, Rogers also discussed NSA’s initiative to develop cross-fertilization between the public and private sector.

This is the third year the event has taken place.

- DoD News

Report: Post-Katrina coordination could be improved

In July, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report assessing the effectiveness of emergency communications after the implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA). The PKEMRA was enacted to improve the federal government’s preparation for and response to disasters, including emergency communications.

GAO-16-681 examines federal efforts to implement PKEMRA emergency communications provisions related to planning and federal coordination, and how states’ emergency communications planning has changed since PKEMRA. During the investigation, GAO reviewed relevant reports and documentation from DHS and other agencies, surveyed Statewide Interoperability Coordinators, and interviewed federal and state officials selected for their emergency communications experience. GAO also assessed collaborative efforts of the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center’s (ECPC), an interagency group focused on improving coordination and information sharing among federal emergency communications programs.

GAO found that the implementation of the PKEMRA provisions related to emergency communications planning and federal coordination has enhanced federal support for state and local efforts. However, federal coordination could be improved. GAO also found that the EPCP’s efforts, while consistent with the key features identified for collaborative mechanisms, could benefit from clearly defining goals and tracking their progress.

- Government Accountability Office

DoD updates manual on intelligence

The Department of Defense (DoD) has updated its procedures on intelligence activities. The updated manual governs “how DoD intelligence elements will conduct activities supporting their missions while safeguarding legal rights and protections guaranteed by the Constitution to all U.S. persons,” said DoD senior intelligence oversight official Michael Mahar.

Changes to DoD Manual 5240.01, “Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities,” include updated procedures for the “collection” of information about U.S. persons and frameworks of distinct rules for information about U.S. persons that has been collected.
According to Mahar, updating the manual was an interagency process involving senior representatives of all defense intelligence components, including the Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency. They also worked closely with the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

- DoD News

Report advises next administration on national security

In June, the Atlantic Council published a report on the organization and performance of the National Security Council (NSC) system. The report provides insight and advice intended to help the next administration build an effective national security structure and clear up “strategic confusion.”

The report is the result of multiple interviews and seminars with over sixty senior foreign service policy, defense, and intelligence leaders. The authors conclude that structural and personnel failures at the NSC in the management of foreign, defense, intelligence, and legal policy have led to serious mistakes in foreign and defense policy.

According to the authors, an incoming president has seven fundamental decisions to make regarding the organization, staffing, and management of the NSC:

1. Focus the National Security Council Mission
2. Define the National Security Advisor’s Role
3. Reduce and Restrict the Size of the NSC Staff
4. Designate a Strategic Planning Staff
5. Use Interagency Teams and Task Forces
6. Coordinate Legal Advice
7. Prepare for the Transition Now

The authors suggest that reforming the size, mission, and staffing of the NSC can bring a return to models that have succeeded over many decades, saying that “Good structure does not guarantee success, but bad structure almost always overcomes good people and leads to poor results.”

- Atlantic Council

State, DoD counter terrorism online

In July, the State Department provided an update on their Global Engagement Center, which was established this spring after the signing of Executive Order 13721. The Center is an interagency entity charged with coordinating U.S. counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences, and replaced the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.

The Center is staffed by detailees from several U.S. agencies and liaises with many U.S. national security agencies to effectively coordinate, integrate, and synchronize their efforts. The Center is also focused on building partnerships to combat violent extremist messaging, analyzing data to inform messaging efforts, and creating content to counter ISIL.

The military is also working to fight ISIL online. Cybercom seeks to disrupt and destroy ISIL’s ability to use the internet and social media as a means to further their goals, and Central Command utilizes native-born Arabic, Urdu, Russian, Farsi, Dari, and Pashto speakers in their Digital Engagement Teams.

- State Department
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