U.S. Special Operations Forces and the Interagency in Phase Zero

To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists—because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.

— George W. Bush
National Security Strategy of the United States

by Kyle Johnston

The events of September 11, 2001, redefined the American model of security—no longer was the threat of American military power enough to deter large-scale attacks on the homeland. In the year that followed that historic day, President George W. Bush laid out a vision for ensuring American security that set a precedent for preemptive action unseen in modern foreign policy. The Bush Doctrine, as it became known, was codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. In the introduction, the President stated that “the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.” For the first time in American history, the foundation of securing the American people meant projecting power across the globe and creating free-market democracies to prevent attacks on the homeland. Pulitzer Prize winning author and Yale University professor John Lewis Gaddis reflecting on this change stated: “A nation that began with the belief that it could not be safe as long as pirates, marauders, and the agents of predatory empires remained active along its borders...
has now taken the position that it cannot be safe as long as terrorists and tyrants remain active anywhere in the world.” After September 11, 2001, every tool in the arsenal of American power was dedicated to achieving a democratic, liberal, world order.

The military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed are well known to the public at large. Lesser known operations, but foundational to the President’s global counterterrorism (CT) and preemption efforts, were those executed by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their interagency partners outside declared theaters of armed conflict. In places like the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. diplomats and military commanders pursued one of the President’s top CT priorities to “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.” These operations began in the aftermath of 9/11 and endure today as a cornerstone of securing American interests abroad.

The national security strategy of the U.S. has evolved since Bush left office, but the legacy of the Bush Doctrine permeates the tenets of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. continues to use its power, both hard and soft, to identify and preemptively interdict threats before a crisis occurs. The balance between diplomacy and force, between carrots and sticks, is what former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Harvard Kennedy School Professor Joseph Nye coined “smart power.” This term has come to define the approach to American foreign policy since 9/11, as the U.S. pursues its interests through a blend of coercion, payment, and attraction. In the 2015 National Security Strategy of the United States, President Barack Obama reiterates the projection of smart power to shape environments before conflict occurs:

American diplomacy and leadership, backed by a strong military, remain essential to deterring future acts of inter-state aggression and provocation by reaffirming our security commitments to allies and partners, investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms, and embedding our actions within wider regional strategies.

In the SOF community, the integration of diplomacy and warfighting before the point of crisis is called phase zero. Phase zero is all activities that happen before the first phases of traditional military operations that serve to shape the environment and prevent or deter future conflicts from emerging or escalating. The term phase zero entered popular lexicon following the publication, “New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign,” in the October 2006 edition of Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ). In this article, USEUCOM Deputy Commander Charles Wald stated:

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, is fighting a new kind of campaign in the global war on terror…. These dangers require new thinking and a new understanding of the differences between theater security cooperation (TSC) and traditional warfighting….the command is fighting the war on terror using a new approach, focusing on terrorism’s longterm, underlying conditions. This deliberate strategy of engagement is called Phase Zero, but in truth it is much more than just a new phase of systematic campaign planning; it is a new form of campaign in and of itself.
Following the publication of this JFQ article, the SOF community adopted the term phase zero as a relevant descriptor of regular operations, actions, and activities conducted by SOF during TSC events. These events are bi- and multilateral events that progress the objectives laid out in the geographic combatant commander’s theater campaign plan (TCP) to enhance partner force capacity and interoperability, shape the operational environment, prevent the escalation of armed conflict, and promote U.S. interests. Successful phase zero operations also serve to develop infrastructure in order to offer a gambit of policy options if armed conflict does erupt and increased military intervention is required.

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) describes the complex environment that requires smart power projection as the “gray zone.” U.S. Navy Captain Philip Kapusta of USSOCOM Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy writes that the gray zone is “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.” For SOF, the gray zone is an operational reality. By design, SOF “work in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments.” This doctrinal distinction as forces designed to work in sensitive environments is important; SOF are inherently the Department of Defense (DoD) forces of choice when operational or strategic effects are required in an environment that falls somewhere between diplomacy, law enforcement, and armed conflict—in the gray zone. In this environment, U.S. policymakers and those who execute that policy face difficult decisions: How do we respond appropriately? What are the right tools to deter or counter non-state and state sponsored naval, ground, air, cyber or terrorist militias? How do we employ such as China and Russia are turning more and more to legal, cyber, and political warfare and the use of proxy forces to avoid direct attribution and military confrontation with the U.S. Meanwhile, non-state actors take advantage of cheap, lethal technologies to empower resistance and insurgent movements and exploit regions with relative instability. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton observed that for this type of environment, “we need Special Operations Forces who are as comfortable drinking tea with tribal leaders as raiding a terrorist compound. We also need diplomats and development experts who understand modern warfare and are up to the job of being your partners.”

The nature of executing a blend of diplomacy and special operations outside a declared theater of armed conflict is complex. The contemporary operating environment involves not just transnational terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda (AQ), but a dynamic range of actors that challenge existing international norms in pursuit of their own self interests. Established powers such as China and Russia are turning more and more to legal, cyber, and political warfare and the use of proxy forces to avoid direct attribution and military confrontation with the U.S.
these tools without escalating the conflict or delegitimizing our regional partners?

**Phase Zero in the Pacific Theater**

The Pacific theater is an ideal venue to explore SOF and interagency phase zero operations. The strategic rebalance to the Pacific theater outlined by the Obama Administration in 2011 highlights the importance of the region and the relevance of the phase zero discussion in the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Specifically in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, Chinese aggression is threatening existing international norms and challenging U.S. prominence in the Pacific theater. Islamic extremist groups, pledged to AQ and the Islamic State, maneuver with some freedom in separatist and isolated islands across Southeast Asia. This complex environment, littered with gray zone ambiguities, is an ideal venue to explore the utilization and employment of SOF as tools for foreign policy. In this paper, I will analyze two vignettes to determine how SOF and the interagency can improve chiefs of mission and geographic combatant command (GCC) foreign assistance efforts.

The first case study will explore the U.S. military’s CT and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Unlike operations with other Southeast Asian nations, a joint task force was established in the Philippines in 2002 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P). This joint task force demarcated several southern Philippine islands as combat zones for U.S. troops. The U.S. combat mission in the Philippines focused on advise and assist operations against AQ-affiliated terrorist organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

The second case study will discuss the U.S. government campaign in Indonesia to counter the Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). JI is an AQ-affiliated terrorist organization that came to global prominence after the 2002 Bali night-club bombing that killed over 200 people. The group also has links to the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the attacks on 9/11.

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These vignettes are particularly relevant for several reasons. Due to differing operational environments, a stark contrast exists in how the U.S. government executed CT missions in the Philippines and Indonesia. This contrast provides an opportunity to juxtapose two campaigns that took place within one geographic combatant command. Just as importantly, as these countries addressed their internal terrorism threats, Chinese aggression in the South China Sea threatened the interests of both the Philippines and Indonesia. This geopolitical tension adds to the complexities of the gray zone in this region and creates a unique set of challenges for each chief of mission and geographic combatant commander. The nature of these conflicts raises the question of whether the structures built by SOF and the interagency are adequate to respond to the gray zone challenges faced by the U.S. and its partners in the region.

For several reasons, these two cases provide a unique lens through which to study how SOF and the interagency support chiefs of mission and geographic combatant commander objectives. First, these campaigns were executed within the borders of, sanctioned by, and conducted by, with, and through the host nation government. Additionally, these campaigns were initiated in response to an AQ-linked terrorist threat and embedded in the broader Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Because of the connection with the GWOT, these two campaigns are described as CT campaigns, even though they were executed...
through foreign assistance programs. In the Philippines, SOF utilized a broad foreign internal defense (FID) and COIN approach to execute their CT missions, but it was a CT operation nonetheless. In Indonesia, the Department of State (State) utilized multiple funding authorities to build the capacity of the Indonesian government and the development of its CT capabilities. So, the U.S. waged a CT operation in Southeast Asia by building partner capacity in Indonesia and the Philippines through foreign assistance. Both these CT campaigns took place within a sovereign country, under the invitation of the host nation government, and at the discretion of the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission.

In addition to contributing to the existing literature on phase zero and the utilization of SOF in the spectrum of gray zone environments, this paper attempts to answer the following questions:

- How does SOF and the interagency work to achieve national security objectives at the country-team level in phase zero?
- What are the costs and benefits of a SOF-led CT campaign versus a State-led CT campaign?
- Where are the tensions in executing phase zero operations and where can SOF and the interagency better complement each other to advance the geographic combatant commander and chief of mission objectives in the Pacific theater?

### Counterterrorism in the Philippines, 2000–2014

#### Historical Landscape

To understand the operating environment of U.S. forces in the Philippines, it is essential to understand the historical landscape of the 118-year, U.S.-Filipino relationship. Following the U.S. declaration of war with Spain in 1898, the U.S. military sailed into Manila Bay, and with support of a local, anti-Spanish, insurgent force led by Philippine national Emilio Aguinaldo, ousted the Spanish occupation force. As the Spanish surrendered and sailed out of Manila, U.S. forces occupied and refused to hand the city over to Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo perceived this action as a betrayal of his agreement with the U.S., and it ignited an intense, three-year conflict that reverted to a COIN fight between the U.S. and Aguinaldo’s forces. This conflict became known as the Philippine-American War, and it marked the beginning of a long, tenuous relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines.\(^{12}\)

Although the Philippine-American War would officially end in 1902, small insurgencies would continue for more than a decade. The most notable of these insurgencies was the Muslim Moros in the Sulu Archipelago, who fought to preserve “their traditional practices of slavery, tribal warfare, and Islam.”\(^{13}\) Although pacified in 1915 when Moroland came under complete U.S. rule, the grievances and motivations of these southern Islamic separatist groups would endure throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The three decades following the 1915 pacification in the Southern Philippines included some form of U.S. colonial rule during a slow transition to Philippine independence. This transition was interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines and the subsequent re-conquest of the islands at the end World War II. Following the war, the
U.S. granted the Philippines independence with the 1946 Treaty of Manila, which established the Philippine Republic. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. responded to a growing threat of communist insurgency in the Philippines with the Philippines Military Assistance Act, which authorizes U.S. forces to train, staff, and equip the Philippine armed forces. Among other things, this act ultimately led to the establishment of a joint U.S. military advisory group in the Philippines, a group that endures today in the capital of Manila. In 1952, the U.S. and the Philippines signed a mutual defense treaty, and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines approved the lease of major airbases and naval stations on the main island of Luzon for U.S. forces throughout the Cold War.

The U.S. maintained these strategic platforms until 1992 when the two countries failed to renegotiate the lease of the two major air and naval bases, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station. The withdrawal of permanent U.S. basing in 1992 significantly curtailed military-to-military training, exchange opportunities and security assistance programs for the armed forces of the Philippines. According to the former command historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Dr. C. H. Briscoe, the withdrawal of U.S. military forces had implications beyond the loss of a key strategic platform in the Asia-Pacific:

In the ensuing decade, without U.S. support and the benefits of a U.S.-Philippines professional military relationship, the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, declined rapidly. That military erosion allowed latent insurgencies, some of which had ties to international terrorism, to flare to the point that they posed a threat to the viability of the Philippine Government.

During the 1990s, the threat of these budding insurgencies in the southern Philippines rose concurrently with the growing reach of other global, Islamic, terror networks such as AQ.

### The Threat in the Philippines

The threat groups in the Philippines are diverse in both demographic composition and agenda. In addition to multiple Islamic separatist and terrorist groups, the Philippines is home to a persistent communist insurgency, the New People’s Army that strikes out violently against the government and undermines the rule of law. The primary focus of the government’s CT efforts over the past several decades, however, was focused on Islamic separatist groups in the southern islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. These islands are home to what the Spanish called the “Moros,” Muslim ethnicities that maintain long-standing grievances based on political exclusion, a lack of economic development, and relative geographic isolation. The historic colonial presence in the Philippines and continued U.S. support to the Christian-dominated government exacerbates the perceived disenfranchisement of the Muslim population.

These symptoms manifested in armed conflict in the 1970s with the establishment of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), whose stated goal was self-determination for the establishment of a future Bangsamoro Republic. For over two decades, the MNLF engaged in a protracted insurgency against the government, until a 1996 agreement allowed the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Under this agreement, the government established a special council...
to oversee infrastructure development in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and the MNLF assumed governing control of the region.¹⁸

In 1984 after a rift with the MNLF, another Islamic separatist group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), emerged in the southern Philippines. The MILF rejected the idea of autonomy after the 1996 accord, seeking the creation of an independent, theocratic, Islamic state governed by sharia law.¹⁹ “The underlying difference between the MNLF and MILF...lay in ideology: Whereas the former was geared toward largely nationalist goals, the latter championed aspirations of a far more religious nature.”²⁰ Strategically, however, the MILF downplayed ideology over time and negotiated with the government for secession and increased autonomy for the southern provinces.²¹ Since the late 1990s, the government and MILF have signed various ceasefires to further Bangsamoro autonomy and address MILF relationships with other terrorist groups such as JI and ASG.²²

September 11, 2001, dramatically changed the legal authorities and resources available for USSOC PAC operations in the Philippines.

Another extremist group in the southern Philippines with links to the MNLF and MILF is the ASG. In 1991, Abdurajak Janjalani, a Philippine Muslim who fought in the international Islamist brigade in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, established ASG on Basilan Island.²³ ASG, or “father of the sword,” sought the creation of an Islamic State in the Southern Philippines and received funding from AQ throughout the 1990s.²⁴ Although it vacillated between an ideological, zealous, terrorist group and a criminal organization, the increased brutality of ASG in the 1990s elevated the group’s stature in the region. Across the southern islands of Mindanao and Basilan, the group conducted ambushes, kidnappings, bombings, and executions that included dramatic beheadings.²⁵

This insurgent activity in the southern Philippines began to gain attention in USPACOM headquarters. By early 2000, ASG began kidnapping Westerners for ransom, and USPACOM leaders and staffs began developing strategies for helping the government with internal instability.²⁶ In August 2000, ASG kidnapped 30 hostages including American Joseph Schilling, sparking an urgent request for U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific (USSOC PAC) to deploy an advisory group to train and assist the Philippine armed forces’ CT efforts.²⁷ By March 2001, a company of U.S. Army Special Forces from 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) began training the first Light Reaction Company (LRC).²⁸ Soldiers assessed and selected out of the ranks of the Philippine special forces and scout ranger organizations comprised the initial LRC and were trained as a national CT force. While U.S. Special Forces trained the LRC from September 2000 through April 2001, ASG militants kidnapped three more Americans, and in response, the LRC deployed to Basilan Island to free the hostages.²⁹ The first employment of the LRC did not end well. The force was deployed as a conventional, not a national, CT force and lacked effective coordination, command, and control at the operational level. This failure spurred enhanced USSOC PAC efforts to increase operational training resources.³⁰ As a result, key leaders from across USSOC PAC and 1st Special Forces Group (A) scheduled a meeting to incorporate increased CT training into an upcoming joint exercise named Balikatan 02-1. This meeting was scheduled for September 11, 2001.³¹

September 11, 2001, dramatically changed the legal authorities and resources available
For USSOCAPC operations in the Philippines, the U.S. Congress authorized the deployment of forces to assist the Philippine government to counter AQ-linked terrorist groups under an Authorization for the Use of Military Force. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo offered unequivocal support to the U.S. and immediately allowed military overflight rights and use of Philippine air and naval bases to support operations in Afghanistan as part of the GWOT. She defined the government’s alliance with the U.S. as in the Philippine national interest, aligning the government fight against domestic terrorism with the GWOT. In November 2001, after President Arroyo’s visit to Washington, she and President George W. Bush affirmed their intent to cooperate closely in strengthening her government’s CT capabilities. In the shadow of the operations beginning in Afghanistan, the USPACOM commander approved plans to increase training to the LRC and other units to thwart the terrorist threat in the southern Philippines. By February 2002, hundreds of SOF and support personnel were deployed under USSOCAPC’s deployable headquarters, Task Force 510 (TF510), to train, advise, and assist the armed forces of the Philippines under the auspices of bilateral training exercise known as Balikatan 02-1. This task force became known as Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).

JSOTF-P grew to nearly 1,300 personnel by early 2002. Its mission was to conduct unconventional warfare operations by, with, and through the Philippine armed forces to isolate and destroy terrorist organizations as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines. According to Colonel David Maxwell, Commander of JSOTF-P from 2006 to 2007, the end state of this operation was for the armed forces of the Philippines to “gain sufficient capability to locate and destroy the ASG, to recover hostages, and to enhance the legitimacy of the Philippine government.” JSOTF-P would achieve this end state by accomplishing six key tasks:

- Denying the ASG sanctuary.
- Surveilling, controlling, and denying ASG routes.
- Surveilling supporting villages and key personnel.
- Conducting local training to overcome Philippine armed forces weaknesses and sustain their strengths.
- Supporting operations with the LRC “strike force” in the area of responsibility.
- Conducting and supporting civil affairs operations in the area of responsibility.

In the summer of 2002, Philippine forces deployed to rescue the U.S. hostages kidnapped the previous year. Although one hostage was killed, the overall operation was considered a success by military leaders: the ASG was driven from Basilan and the government gained legitimacy through the effective employment of its armed forces in a contested area.

From 2002 on, an average of five to six hundred SOF worked by, with, and through conventional and special operations Philippine military and police forces in close synchronization with the U.S. country team’s defense, development, and diplomacy approach. Key to this campaign was embedding small, liaison-control elements into various armed forces and Philippine National Police-Special Action Force units across the battlespace. These liaison-control elements were comprised...
primarily of Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas or partial contingents of Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas, and they developed intimate relationships with their Filipino counterparts. Throughout OEF-P, these liaison-control elements trained, advised, assisted, and coordinated U.S. support to the CT activities across the southern Philippines.

In addition to building the capacity of the armed forces to directly engage insurgent and terrorist fighters, the SOF campaign focused on isolating threat groups from the population with widespread humanitarian and economic development projects. These efforts were augmented by a SOF engineering task force dedicated to infrastructure development on the island of Basilan, a known safe-haven for ASG and other separatist militant groups. Extensive civil affairs operations were bolstered by targeted military information support operations to influence the local populace and legitimize the Philippines government.

Most importantly, SOF in the Philippines were effectively integrated into the country team and focused on FID to support the capacity of the Philippines armed forces to execute COIN and CT operations. According to a former JSOTF-P Commander:

A corollary of JSOTF-P’s mission is their support role as a component of the ambassador’s “America-in-3D” initiative focusing on diplomacy, development, and defense. The JSOTF-P deputy commander and J9 work in the U.S. Embassy in Manila, maintaining effective relationships with all critical components of the U.S. country team. Similarly, the JSOTF-P leadership meets weekly with the ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and senior embassy officials. Further, JSOTF-P personnel of all ranks meet on a weekly basis with representatives from the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury and are collocated at their headquarters with FBI and Department of Justice representatives. At three locations in the southern Philippines, JSOTF-P forces are collocated with members of the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program, who train local law-enforcement officials.

This whole–of-government approach by SOF in the Philippines ensured the synchronization of U.S. efforts across the country.

**Summary**

By most discernible measures, the campaign in the Philippines between 2000 and 2014 was successful. In an extensive study published by the RAND Corporation in 2016, OEF-P succeeded in reducing transnational terrorist threats and conditions, increasing the capabilities of the Philippine security forces, and enhancing U.S.-Philippine relations. These conclusions are supported by a mixed methodology analysis that reflected a decrease in enemy attacks and in membership and support for ASG, an increased satisfaction with the Philippine security forces, and an improvement in the armed forces capabilities at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels.

The mission in the Philippines is also recognized by the U.S. Army as a model construct for planning and executing FID and is outlined in the Army Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense publication, *Army Techniques Publication 3-05.2*. This publication claims that:

Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines was successful because it maintained a small SOF U.S. Military footprint in a
politically-sensitive environment to be in agreement with the HN constitution. This operation applied interagency concepts because the operation was completely synchronized between the JSOTF-P Headquarters, U.S. country team, TSOC, and GCC. In addition, the JSOTF-P staff operated in close coordination with the military assistance advisory group to interact with Philippine national-level headquarters to facilitate nation assistance. This mutual effort enabled the JSOTF-P to assist its partner nation along four lines of operations that were balanced and executed simultaneously.\textsuperscript{45}

Some of the key lessons learned from the Philippines model include emphasizing the host nation’s sovereignty; integrating SOF at all levels of command across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national (JIIM) hierarchy; and developing an extensive understanding of the operational environment through personal relationships and an enduring presence in the region. The limited budget and “light footprint” of U.S. military personnel in country, arguably, acted as a forcing mechanism to encourage the focus on Philippine-led initiatives and interagency cooperation. OEF-P cost only $52 million annually, and on average only 500 to 600 U.S. military personnel were deployed as part of JSOTF-P.\textsuperscript{46}

The efforts of JSOTF-P assisted the Philippine armed force to attrit ASG’s capabilities to conduct effective terrorist attacks and build the legitimacy of the government in the southern Philippines. In 2014, the MILF cut ties with the ASG and subsequently signed a cease fire with the government. The FID and unconventional warfare characteristics of the Philippines campaign lend credence to the use of SOF in phase zero operations before widespread conflict erupts. In the findings of one RAND Corporation study: “The intervention benefited from its proactive nature: The U.S. did not wait until the Philippine Government was near collapse or ASG on the brink of overrunning the government. Because the situation was not dire, it was also relatively less costly to deal with.”\textsuperscript{47}

In 2014, the combat mission in the Philippines officially ended when USSOCPAC dissolved JSOTF-P. However, the foreign assistance, phase zero campaign endures today as part of the chief of mission’s country strategy through multiple SOF operations, actions, and activities that occur annually in the Philippines. This includes the bilateral exercise Balikatan, which in 2016 marks its 15th consecutive year.

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The modern U.S.-Indonesian relationship was formally born in the aftermath of World War II.\end{boxedtext}

\textbf{Counterterrorism in Indonesia, 2004–2014}

\textbf{The History of U.S.-Indonesia Relations and the Strategic Environment}

The modern U.S.-Indonesian relationship was formally born in the aftermath of World War II. In 1799, the Dutch colonized what is modern-day Indonesia as part of the Dutch East Indies. Until Japanese forces invaded and occupied Indonesia during World War II, the Netherlands successfully maintained its colonial rule by repressing and isolating nationalist or anti-colonial movements across the various Indonesian islands. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Indonesian nationalism took root under the absence of Dutch forces, and Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno declared independence.\textsuperscript{48} The Netherlands refused to relinquish its colonial possessions, however, and a four-year anti-colonial insurrection ensued. In 1949, Indonesia successfully gained independence from the Netherlands and established a parliamentary democracy under
Sukarno. The U.S. became one of the first nations to recognize Indonesian independence and established diplomatic relations with Indonesia in 1949.49

Sukarno’s government evolved over a 16-year period until a perceived crisis of communist insurgency set the conditions for the military, under command of General Suharto, to undermine Sukarno and take control of the government. After Suharto assumed the presidency in 1965, a brutal wave of violence swept the country resulting in an estimated 500,000 deaths, many characterized by the government as “anti-communist” purges.50 Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the U.S. maintained a strong relationship with the Indonesian government. Although not officially aligned with the U.S., Indonesian President Suharto was a strong supporter of U.S. anti-communist efforts in Asia. As a result, the U.S. aggressively supported the dictator from the beginning of his tenure in the late 1960s until his resignation in 1998.51

Suharto ruled with an authoritarian hand, supported by his national armed forces, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). The TNI ran its own governments at the local and national levels and deeply controlled all aspects of social and political life.52 Suharto and his generals brutally repressed dissent across the diverse archipelago in an attempt to maintain control over an expansive territory spanning over 17,000 islands.53 The most infamous of the regime’s authoritarian repression took place in East Timor, where some human rights groups estimate the TNI killed more than 200,000 people over a 25-year period.54

Despite the brutality of the Suharto regime, the U.S. government funded a generous international military and education training (IMET) program with the TNI and funded a foreign assistance program totaling nearly $35 billion between 1965 and 1991.55 When the TNI massacred nearly three hundred civilians in the East Timor capital of Dili in 1991, however, the U.S. Congress banned the U.S. military from training Indonesian forces under the IMET program. U.S. commanders in the Pacific theater challenged Congress on this ban, believing that this limitation greatly inhibited their access to Indonesian military leaders and ability to respond to a crisis. These leaders in USPACOM and USSOCAP believed that access “was more important than making a point about human rights. Sanctions would do little more than antagonize the Indonesian military and leave the United States with no contacts in a critical Pacific theater country.”56 As a result, commanders in USPACOM searched for ways around the legislative barrier to continue training the TNI.

USPACOM found the route around the IMET ban with the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Program. The JCET was a vehicle to train SOF core competencies, including unconventional warfare (UW) and FID overseas. Part of that training for SOF required the training of a host nation or indigenous force. In the case of Indonesia, this meant the ability for SOF to train the TNI outside the scope of the IMET program, and “between 1991 and 1998, U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted forty-one training exercises with Indonesian troops, at least twenty-six of which were with the Kopassus [TNI special operations forces primarily indicated in the widespread human rights abuses in East Timor].”57 USPACOM continued the JCET Program until instability within the Suharto regime led to reliable reports linking the Kopassus to political kidnappings in February 1998. Under mounting pressure from human rights groups and with the newly passed...
Leahy Amendment, the Pentagon shut down the JCET Program in May 1998.

Meanwhile, the economic crisis of the late 1990s enflamed growing social and political tensions across Indonesia. The corruption and brutality of Suharto’s regime was tolerated for decades by most Indonesians, in part due to the strong growth of the Indonesian economy throughout his rule. As the economy stagnated, however, the corruption and authoritarianism was seen more and more as the source of the country’s problems. As living conditions worsened for wide swaths of the population, anti-Suharto demonstrations grew across the country, and after 30 years in power, Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998.58

Geo-strategically, Indonesia is a critical U.S. ally in the Pacific theater. It has a population of 240 million, making it the largest country in Southeast Asia, and it is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world.59 Indonesia also sits at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, linking energy and commercial trade routes between the Middle East and Africa to East Asia and the Americas. According to a Congressional Research Service Report, “the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits are some of the world’s most important strategic sea lanes.”60 Nearly half of all the world’s ocean trade travels through the straits that border Indonesia, and the U.S. has significant economic and military interests in maintaining freedom of navigation in these strategic sea lanes of communication.61

This geography and demography also add a layer of complexity to the security environment in Indonesia. Indonesia is an archipelago of more than 17,000 islands, scattered across the equator and sharing maritime borders with the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Timor, Palau, and Australia. Securing this diverse and expansive terrain is only one of many challenges facing Indonesia. Due to its vast Muslim population and many isolated regions, Indonesia is a potential recruiting ground for a variety of Islamic extremist groups. In recent years, many Indonesian fighters have traveled to conflict zones in the Middle East and South Asia, and foreign fighter flow is a security concern of local, national, and regional governments across Southeast Asia.62

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**The Threat in Indonesia**

The collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 created a relative vacuum of governance that allowed many formerly restricted Islamic extremist groups to openly recruit, train, and expand their operational capacity. Sectarian violence and major Christian-Muslim clashes erupted in several islands of Indonesia that fell outside the immediate control of the central government. By the early 2000s, the two major islands of Maluku and Sulawesi were immersed in full-scale, sectarian, civil wars, and JI, that grew out of cultural and religious opposition to foreign imperialism and secular Indonesian governments in the mid-twentieth century, came to prominence as a regional terrorist group.63

In the 1940s, a group of Muslim militants organized a group named Darul Islam to propagate the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state under *sharia* law. Following World War II and the four-year Indonesian National Revolution, the Indonesian government implemented democratic changes and aggressive military operations to thwart the expansion of the group. By the 1960s, the Indonesian government effectively dismantled Darul Islam as a coherent organization. Veterans of the group, however, splintered into factions and continued to spread
their extremist ideology underground. Following the government repression of insurgents and separatists in the 1960s under Suharto, two radical clerics, Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, took up the torch of Darul Islam and reignited the call for sharia law in Indonesia. In the following decades, these clerics preached a fiery brand of Wahhabi extremism, proselytizing and recruiting across Southeast Asia. The invasion of Russian forces into Afghanistan offered Baasyir and Sungkar the opportunity to build their organization, gain tactical experience, and network with the global jihadi network. They sent fighters to Afghanistan in support of the mujahedeen, many of whom would later train in AQ camps. In the early 1990s, Baaysir and Sungkar formally established JI at Camp Saddah, Afghanistan, a training camp set up by a close confidant of Usama bin Laden. Following the collapse of the Suharto Regime, JI gained regional prominence as a notable militant Islamic group in Southeast Asia. At its height, JI was described as AQ’s operational wing in Southeast Asia and reportedly counted total membership around 2,000, with another 5,000 passive sympathizers.

Jemaah Islamiyah garnered the attention of the intelligence and military communities after its members reportedly met with AQ operatives in Malaysia to discuss the 2000 USS Cole and September 11, 2001, attacks against the U.S. Its international notoriety came, however, on October 12, 2002, when a massive car bomb exploded near a popular nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 people and injuring more than 300 others. Less than one year later, on August 5, 2003, a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside the JW Marriott in Bali, killing 12 and injuring another 150. In 2004, a suicide car bomb detonated outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 3 and wounding more than 100. On October 1, 2005, another string of terrorist bombings across Bali killed 20 and injured over 100. Dozens of terrorist attacks in Indonesia claimed more than 600 killed and wounded in four consecutive years. Every one of these attacks was linked to the terrorist group JI. On October 23, 2002, the U.S. officially declared JI a terrorist organization and included Indonesia as another front for the GWOT.

The Counterterrorism Campaign in Indonesia

Although the U.S.-led GWOT generated significant regional and international pressure on the Indonesian government to address domestic terrorism, it was not until the 2002 Bali attacks that the Indonesian government took deliberate actions to address the threat. In 2003, the Indonesian government passed significant antiterrorism regulations and legislation that provided law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges proactive authority to thwart domestic terrorist threats. The new CT laws “empowered the police to detain terrorism suspects for up to six months before indictment and gave prosecutors and judges the authority to block bank accounts belonging to individuals or organizations believed to be funding militant activities.” Additionally, the new legislation included the creation of several national-level CT departments and an overhaul of the domestic intelligence services.

In 2003, the Indonesian government passed significant antiterrorism regulations and legislation...
at the time, the Kopassus, retained a mandated national CT role. The U.S. government, however, could not develop the capabilities of the Kopassus due to the enduring legislative ban dating back to 1991 and 1998 human rights abuses. In light of these allegations, the DoD and State were prevented from providing support to the Kopassus until 2010, when the Obama Administration lifted the ban. Due to these constraints, SOF played a minimal role in the training of the Kopassus in the campaign against JI, and the foreign assistance mission in Indonesia remained a State-led operation.

While the Bush Administration and leaders in USSOCPAC attempted to find creative ways of vetting and developing the Kopassus to take a role in the GWOT, the U.S. country team in Indonesia pursued the development of new capabilities to thwart the threat of JI and other Islamic terrorist groups. Specifically, the State Department developed the Indonesian police CT and rule of law capabilities through a variety of Title 22 funding mechanisms. The largest portion of U.S. funding to Indonesia came in the form of economic support funds, part of which were spent bolstering the country’s police and security forces. These funds amounted to nearly $80M between 2003 and 2007. For funding directly toward Indonesian security forces, most assistance came through State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, which provided $40M to support Indonesian CT efforts between 2003 and 2007.

In 2003, State designated an initial $8M of supplemental funding under the auspices of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to develop a national CT police force, known as Detasemen Khusus (Densus) 88 (also known as Detachment 88). Densus 88 consisted of three police divisions focused on investigations, intelligence logistical support, and hostage rescue and raids. The Indonesian government complemented Densus 88 and expanded its CT capabilities with a national bomb task force.

While developing Densus 88 capabilities, the U.S. country team, specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s legal attaché, worked with the Indonesian attorney general to develop the legal infrastructure to aggressively pursue terrorist suspects. The FBI and government of Indonesia built upon domestic legislative changes to establish a Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force in 2006. This task force included specially-trained terrorism prosecutors who could effectively address the growing number of domestic terrorism-related trials. In conjunction with the establishment of Densus 88, the Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force was one of several initiatives developed by the Indonesian country team to enhance the capabilities of Indonesian security forces and address domestic terrorism.

In conjunction with the aggressive CT activities of Densus 88 and the Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force, Indonesia developed de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs to build popular resilience against Islamic extremism. These efforts included “prison reform, rehabilitation programs, and counterpropaganda. The purpose of these measures [was] to disengage terrorist convicts from future activities and prevent or disrupt the radicalization process of Indonesian society.” The prison reforms undertaken by the Indonesian government were an important acknowledgement that poor living conditions and inhumane treatment by Indonesian officials created an environment conducive to radicalization and increased danger of terrorist recidivism.
In conjunction with these CT efforts, the Indonesian government instituted significant democratic reforms after the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004. These changes influenced the political, economic, and social dynamics in Indonesia and complemented the widespread CT and de-radicalization efforts in the country. Since the end of the Suharto Regime, democratic transparency and the development of a free and open media expanded civil society. Indonesian leaders removed the governing powers of military leaders and separated the roles of the armed forces and the domestic police forces. These reforms in civil society resulted in significant changes to U.S. policies toward Indonesian security cooperation and foreign assistance. Specifically, these policies addressed the ban on military support to the TNI, resurrecting the IMET, restarting non-lethal foreign military sales, and waiving foreign military financing restrictions. These policy changes built upon the momentum the State-led foreign assistance mission and created opportunities for SOF to engage and develop the CT capabilities of the Indonesian military.

Conclusion

Similar to the campaign in the Philippines, the campaign to counter terrorists in Indonesia between 2003 and 2014 is considered a success by contemporary analysts and policymakers. The investment by the U.S. and the development of Indonesia’s CT capabilities had measurable impact, and many recognize that it has paid considerable dividends in the Southeast Asia CT fight. This case study is a great example of U.S. support to a host-nation-led, whole-of-government approach to an internal security problem with regional and global implications.

Indonesia’s success is measured in part by the approximately 300 JI militants that were killed or captured between 2003 and 2014, including key organizational leaders. According to The Jamestown Foundation, a global analysis and research foundation, Densus 88 has crippled JI:

In November 2005, Densus 88 turned the tide in Indonesia’s war against JI. A Densus 88 sniper shot Dr. Azahari Husin, the JI mastermind behind the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings and the JW Marriot and Australian Embassy bombings, during a raid on Husin’s hideout in Batu, East Java. An accomplice set off a suicide explosive killing himself and a third man who had joined Husin in engaging the counterterrorism force in an intense gun battle. After Husin, Densus 88 eliminated JI’s other top operatives in near succession.

This analysis is supported by numerous U.S. agencies and independent think tanks. The Congressional Research Service, for example, stated:

Since the Bali bombing in 2002, crackdowns by various governments in the region—encouraged and in some cases supported by the US government and military—are believed to have weakened JI to such an extent that it essentially is no longer a regional organization, but rather is one confined to Indonesia, with some individuals still operating in the southern Philippines.

This case study represents an effective State-led foreign assistance mission that enabled a whole-of-government approach to address both immediate threats and the root causes of terrorism.
Analysis

Success in the future demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and understanding conditions that can’t be surged.
— United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear

Review of the pertinent literature and the U.S. phase zero CT campaigns in the Philippines and Indonesia revealed four major themes. First, threat groups exploit instability, and voids in phase zero engagement prevent the U.S. from understanding that exploitation. Second, authorities can be mutually supportive for State and SOF, but they can also unintentionally narrow the scope of phase zero operations and create an “authorities trap.” Third, the contemporary operating environment is complex, and the U.S. lacks a strategy that synchronizes all the elements of national power to navigate that environment effectively. Finally, understanding the operational environment is paramount for SOF to effectively execute their phase zero tasks.

Before discussing these four themes in further depth, an important discovery should be discussed—phase zero is not a SOF-specific activity, and SOF is not required for phase zero in every environment. Phase zero must be conducted as a whole-of-government campaign, with SOF utilized as one tool among many in that campaign. Some environments, like the environment characterized by popular, anti-American sentiment in Indonesia during the first several years of the GWOT—are not conducive for SOF to shape the environment. Therefore, the definition of phase zero used throughout this paper should be amended to include all the elements of national power at the disposal of the geographic combatant commander and chief of mission.

Phase zero must be conducted as a whole-of-government campaign, with SOF utilized as one tool among many...

Theme #1: Threat groups exploit instability, and voids in phase zero engagement prevent the U.S. from understanding that exploitation.

For any casual student of history, foreign policy, or sociology, the first part of this statement may sound not only like a shallow observation of the obvious but a law of human nature and a fundamental rule of how societies interact. A nuanced reflection of this idea, however, is important in the context of how the U.S. secures its interests abroad. Based on the two case studies explored, this exploitation appears to have greater effects when the U.S. is not actively involved in a holistic, phase zero campaign in those regions.

In the context of U.S. foreign assistance abroad, understanding the nature of this exploitation is paramount. When national interests are at stake, the U.S. government has a plethora of established capabilities and authorities to pursue those interests. This is reflected by the multiple sources of foreign assistance programs under U.S.C. Title 22 and 10, among others, utilized to support the Philippines and Indonesia in their efforts to develop CT capabilities. These programs, however, were reactionary, employed coherently to target established terrorist threats only after the attacks on September 11, 2001. The U.S. employed its capabilities aggressively in the USPACOM theater only after a third party exploited relative instability in the region.

In the case of the Philippines, the rise in Islamic extremism correlated with the withdrawal of a largescale U.S. military presence in the country after 1992. In Indonesia, Islamic extremism rose during the collapse of the Suharto regime and the prohibition of U.S.
foreign assistance after the passing of the Leahy Amendment in 1997. While these events do not have a cause and effect relationship, the lack of a U.S. military presence did have tertiary effects. The geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission did not fully understand the magnitude or the nature of the Islamic extremist threat growing in Southeast Asia. It took the kidnappings of U.S. citizens in the Philippines, and then the tragedy of September 11 to focus phase zero activities in the Philippines and Indonesia.

Kidnappings, terrorism, and violence, however, were only symptoms of wider sources of instability, such as economic insecurity and the relative deprivation felt by alienated populations. In this environment, JI and ASG built their international terrorist networks and developed tactical and operational capacity. The planners of the USS Cole attack met with JI leaders in Malaysia, and the 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammad developed his plan to use commercial airlines as weapons in the Philippines. These threat groups exploited relative instability in the region prior to 9/11, and a void of a coherent U.S. phase zero campaign prevented the U.S. from understanding the extent of that exploitation.

This first theme about exploitation and engagement provides a premise for the next three themes involving authorities, complexity and strategy, and trust. These three themes are all predicated on understanding the environment and effectively addressing the root problems that threaten U.S. interests abroad. The first theme does not portend that phase zero operations can mitigate every threat to the U.S. Instead, it reflects the complexity of the environment and the fact that a lack of phase zero engagement inhibits planners from avoiding an “authorities trap” that limits their view of the problem to the tools they have at their disposal, making strategic assessments of the operational environment and effectively shaping regional or national strategy, and building the global SOF network and requisite understanding of the operational environment to tackle local, nuanced problems.

**Theme #2: Authorities can support interagency cooperation, but they can also bias phase zero planners with the “authorities trap.”**

USSOCPPAC initially deployed to the Philippines to train, advise, and assist the armed forces of the Philippines to counter terrorist groups and free kidnapped U.S. citizens. After September 11, 2001, this task evolved to advising and assisting the Philippines government to destroy terrorist networks, such as the ASG, linked to AQ. This mission was authorized by the U.S. Congress and President as part of the GWOT, and ultimately achieved its desired end state. These authorities, however, coupled with a decade-long void in phase zero engagement, fostered an environment for the chiefs of mission and geographic combatant commander to focus most of their foreign assistance efforts on CT in the southern Philippines. SOF commanders effectively executed that mission by integrating their commands across the JIIM structure and developing effective relationships and communications structures at the tactical, operational, and national levels. Due to its effectiveness and resource capacity, JSOTF-P, naturally, became the main effort for the development of capabilities for the Philippines armed forces under the country team’s internal defense and development programs. SOF effectively utilized their Title 10 authorities in the OEF-P campaign. In a complementary
nature, State used existing Title 22 authorities to support the JSOTF-P as the main effort for foreign assistance in the Philippines.

Developing host nation armed forces CT capabilities in the southern Philippines, however, did not translate to a whole-of-government approach to build enduring security and stability. One problem lay in that fact that the Islamic extremist groups targeted in OEF-P represented only one part of the multi-faceted security threats and sources of instability faced by the government. Because GWOT authorities existed, both the geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission narrowed the focus of their foreign assistance, or phase zero campaign, on Islamic extremism. This is an “authorities trap” for phase zero planners—both SOF and State. While the GWOT was arguably the most pressing national security concern to the U.S., the inherent value of a phase zero campaign is that it provides access for U.S. policymakers to understand and shape the environment. When a CT campaign becomes a replacement for an overarching phase zero campaign, as it did in the Philippines, other strategic threats can be overlooked. In the case of the Philippines, for example, political violence, communist insurgency, transnational criminal organizations, and rising aggression by China collectively posed a much greater threat to Philippines security than did Islamic extremism.

During the timeframe of this study, political violence was rampant in the Philippines, and it continues today as a significant threat to the country’s stability. During election cycles, violent attacks and assassinations of political leaders, their supporters, and their family members spike dramatically. Leading up to the 2009 presidential elections in the Philippines, 57 politicians, journalists, and political supporters were murdered. In April 2013, attackers ambushed a town mayor after a campaign rally, killing 10, including the mayor and his 15 year old daughter. Six months later, more than 20 people were killed and 27 injured in political violence leading up to national elections, half of whom were incumbent politicians running for reelection. In the fall of 2015, at least two mayors seeking reelection in 2016 were murdered.

Much of this violence is linked to the communist insurgency in the Philippines led by the New People’s Army, the militant wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The New People’s Army, a Maoist-based revolutionary movement, has waged the world’s longest communist insurgency and is considered the greatest threat to the country’s stability. According to the Global Terrorism Index Report in 2014:

The largest individual group [for terrorist attacks] was the New People’s Army, a communist organisation, which claimed responsibility for 30 per cent of deaths in 2013…. In total, 103 people were killed by assassinations in 2013 which is more than five times higher than 2012. The use of these tactics and targets demonstrates that many of the terrorist groups in the Philippines are seeking to directly change the political system. Around 34 per cent of deaths from terrorist attacks were targeting the government, with business leaders, private citizens and police representing between ten and seventeen per cent of deaths.

Despite the threat posed by the New People’s Army and its designation as a terrorist organization by the U.S., the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force for the Philippines limited JSOTF-P to targeting AQ-linked
terrorist organizations. As such, the U.S. foreign assistance mission from 2000 to 2014 did not address a terrorist organization credited with nearly one third of the terrorist attacks in the Philippines.

In addition to the political violence and insurgency outside the scope of Islamic extremism, transnational criminal organizations severely undermine the country’s internal security and U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. Human trafficking for prostitution and child labor is widespread in the Philippines and undermines the rule of law and the formal economy. The criminal networks that operate these human trafficking networks facilitate other criminal activity that allows the movement of illicit material in and out of the country. These internal security threats all exist in the shadow of China’s maritime activities in the South China Sea that threaten the country’s sovereignty and economic income from commercial fishing.

Due to the nature of SOF’s CT mission in the Philippines from 2000 to 2014, however, these dynamic threats were not inherently part of JSOTF-P’s efforts to develop the capacity of the Philippines armed forces. The mission of JSOTF-P from 2002 to 2014 justifiably focused on the threat of Islamic extremism. The CT nature of the authorization for OEF-P, however, facilitated an environment for the chiefs of mission and geographic combatant commanders to focus on countering Islamic terrorism, and not necessarily addressing the widespread symptoms of instability in the Philippines that fostered the rise of Islamic extremism in the first place. The former was a CT campaign; the latter would have been a phase zero campaign: this is the “authorities trap.”

The observation of the “authorities trap” is not a criticism of the holistic COIN and CT campaign waged by JSOTF-P from 2002 to 2014. JSOTF-P’s activities during OEF-P are considered a great interagency success in countering the Islamic extremist threat in the southern Philippines. JSOTF-P effectively integrated intelligence activities, civil-military operations, humanitarian assistance, and military information support activities with effective military training, advising, and assisting to build the local infrastructure, win the support of the population, isolate the insurgency, and target bad actors. In the context of complex and bureaucratic JIIM relationships, these achievements cannot be overstated. The observation of the “authorities trap” simply states that when sent on a CT mission with specific Title 10 CT authorities, SOF should accomplish that mission. Additionally, the amount of resources tied to Title 10 authorities may hinder the overarching U.S. mission from a whole-of-government phase zero campaign that seeks to understand the root causes of instability and shape that environment accordingly. The lesson learned is that specific SOF missions should not replace an overarching phase zero campaign, and a CT campaign, such as OEF-P, should be one line of effort in a broad, whole-of-government approach to shaping the environment.

The “authorities trap” is simply an acknowledgement of potential bias in planning for phase zero. The role of SOF is to provide chiefs of mission and geographic combatant commanders options. To do that effectively, SOF planners must understand potential biases that may inhibit objective recommendations for the allocation of limited resources. Understanding this bias is also reflected in the third theme identified throughout the research, which involves the complexity of the environment and the need for a strategy to navigate that complexity effectively. Without a coherent strategy for the conduct of phase zero or the
implementation of SOF activities, planners will continue to fall victim to simply executing the mission they are authorized to do, instead of providing the chief of mission and geographic combatant commander with the best options for long-term, phase zero shaping operations that leverage all the instruments of national power.

Theme #3: The contemporary operating environment is complex, and the U.S. lacks an integrative strategy to effectively navigate that environment.

Most of the literature reviewed for this paper reflects a belief that the international security environment is increasingly complex. National security experts, academics, and military professionals define these challenges with a range of descriptors such as asymmetric, irregular, hybrid, unconventional, or gray. Adjectives aside, the common theme is that the complexity of the environment requires a flexible strategy that can address the spectrum of conflicts between war and peace. Contemporary authors are exploring what this strategy may look like, but there is no established consensus on what an asymmetric, irregular, hybrid, unconventional, or gray zone strategy looks like.

Colonel Brian Petit in his book, Getting Big by Going Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero, argues that the U.S. has replaced strategy with engagement. Accepting that premise has some significant implications for phase zero campaign planning. Engagement in the phase zero environment is specifically susceptible to the “authorities trap” bias, as phase zero engagements for SOF are typically carried out as part of a JCET Program. The exercises are authorized as a means for SOF to train on their core capabilities. Although that authorization includes training partner forces for FID and UW, the geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission must understand that JCET engagements do not take the place of a phase zero campaign. JCETs and other bilateral or multilateral training exercises are only one tool, and as Petit states they should be “tied to and in support of the overall strategy of the combatant commander and U.S. country team.”

All the elements of national power must be synchronized in a coherent strategy and campaign, using engagement tools such as JCET as a way to execute that strategy.

If no strategy exists to marry engagements with the right partner, at the right place, at the right time in pursuit of regional or strategic objectives, those engagements are not part of a phase zero campaign; they are simply training exercises that offer SOF some exposure to the local environment. It is important for SOF planners to clearly articulate this to geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission. For example, a chief of mission may use SOF as an effective diplomatic tool to conduct bilateral training with one of the host nation’s elite forces. This can demonstrate the chief of mission’s commitment to the development of the host nation’s military capability and articulate the nature of the U.S. relationship with that country. If the chief of mission’s primary security issue in that country is CT, however, and SOF are conducting bilateral training with a military force that does not have domestic CT authorities in that country, that diplomatic tool is being utilized improperly. The same is true if SOF is training a domestic CT unit in a nation where the U.S.’s primary security concern is maritime aggression from a state actor like China. Yet, this misapplication of SOF is probably transparent to the chief of mission, as he or she met their diplomatic goal to demonstrate a
U.S. commitment to enhance the host nation’s security capacity. Therefore, a coherent strategy must exist to outline the strategic objectives for phase zero planners and synchronize the efforts of the U.S. across the interagency.

According to military theorist and academic James D. Kiras of the United States Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, strategy is “the bridge between policy and available means, including the use of military force.” In order for the U.S. to realize a strategy, it must have all the elements of national power working in concert toward a unified goal. When executive national security objectives conflict with legislation, as in the Indonesia case study, the chief of mission and geographic combatant commanders cannot develop a comprehensive operational approach that is synchronized across the JIIM environment to meet strategic objectives.

The lack of a strategy prohibits SOF and interagency planners from effectively linking national objectives to the ends, ways, and means of tactical missions during phase zero. Petit’s commentary on the challenges to operational design in phase zero reflect the nature of this disconnect. Both case studies reflect these tensions, as does the GWOT in the Pacific theater as a whole from 2001 to 2014. There was no regional, whole-of-government strategy to combat terrorism across Southeast Asia. USSOCPAC executed a campaign in the Philippines, and the Indonesian country team executed a campaign in Indonesia. The intersection of governed spaces, however, is the environment most highly exploited by those threat groups phase zero campaigns intend to target.

In the case of Southeast Asia, the lack of a coherent national or regional strategy prevented the development of an effective campaign to address the border areas in the Celebes and Sulu seas. A 2007 Asia Times article succinctly summed up the threat from the maritime space between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia:

Decades of poor governance, economic and political marginalization, lack of state capacity, and separatist conflict have turned this area into an “ungoverned space” and hence a haven for transnational criminals, including terrorists. Addressing transnational threats in this area not only requires greater security cooperation among the three countries, but also increased assistance from external powers who have much to offer in terms of capacity building.

Country-level CT campaigns are not sufficient to address transnational terrorist and criminal organizations that exploit the seams and gaps between countries. A national and regional strategy is required to holistically approach these issues and synchronize the elements of U.S. national power with the interests of regional partners.

Theme #4: Understanding the operational environment is paramount in the development of effective phase zero operations.

The landscape in Southeast Asia is reflective of a larger struggle for identity in a globalizing world. What renowned author, teacher, and foreign policy expert Samuel Huntington described decades ago as the “Clash of Civilizations” is personified in places like Indonesia and the Philippines, where traditionalists seek to preserve a way of life in an environment that is rapidly changing.
This “clash” is just one of the complexities of the environment that phase zero planners must understand when developing campaigns to achieve U.S. interests.

On the small island of Bali, Indonesia, for example, Westerners flock to the beaches for the exotic nightlife and world-class surfing. International companies develop the pristine landscape to cater to these tourists and to capitalize on their desire for luxury goods and first-class accommodations. This development is in sharp contrast to the rich cultural and religious landscape. Bali is home to over 80 percent of ethnic Balinese who practice a form of Hinduism that is shaped by the history of the native tribes, Buddhism, and centuries of traders and merchants traveling across the Indian Ocean. Time barely touches many of the small villages in the central jungles of the island, unmolested by travelers and development, owned by historic temples and irreverent, lounging monkeys. The past, the present, the primitive, and the developed first world co-exist in an island barely 2,200 square miles small. The result is an environment that Islamic extremists target as a reprehensible representation of the West perverting a traditional society.

The description of this environment is important because SOF identify the first of 12 “SOF Imperatives” as “understand the operational environment.” To be effective, SOF and diplomats must understand the nuances of the local culture, politics, and geography and the geopolitical implications of armed U.S. military in a foreign country. This is an incredibly high expectation and requires time in the region developing relationships and trust with host nation partners. In the Philippines case study, this trust was built upon small teams and liaison at all levels of the host nation’s military and the U.S. country team. The enduring, day-to-day presence facilitated the development of personal, not just organizational, relationships. In the Indonesia case study, understanding the local perceptions and popular sentiment against U.S. military presence prompted a non-military approach to what appeared to a military security problem. According to USSOCOM:

Special operations are “special” because their success depends on long-term relationships with indigenous forces and populations and knowledge of the cultural, societal, economic, and political environments in which they occur…. The greater the environmental knowledge and extent of relationships, the more likely the outcome will be successful. This, more than any other single factor, defines the nature of special operations.

This articulation of special operations could be expanded to include all JIIM actors who are essential to the development and execution of phase zero operations. Relationships matter, and the executors of phase zero campaigns must be provided the time and flexibility to develop a nuanced, personal understanding of the operational environment.

To be effective, SOF and diplomats must understand the nuances...

Conclusion

The two case studies examined identify tensions in applying interagency authorities and capabilities in a coherent, national, and regional phase zero strategy. Those tensions beg the question: Are the current structures and organizations to execute foreign assistance and phase zero operations conducive to addressing the complexities of the threats in the current operating environment?

In undertaking this research, I sought to understand how SOF and the interagency achieve national security objectives during phase zero operations. The introduction of new
Technologies in warfare and diplomacy always challenge existing tactics, strategies, and internal processes. The technologies emerging in the information age are no different, and just as industrial revolution and nuclear age required changes in U.S. strategy and tactics, technology today requires the U.S. to adapt. This is important for U.S. policymakers to embrace. Viewing the environment as increasingly complex externalizes the challenges to U.S. national security. Believing that conflict naturally and continuously evolves, on the other hand, mandates perpetual review and adaptation of internal processes, strategies, and tactics. The former allows complacency; the later demands action and change.

In the execution of phase zero and political warfare, the geographic combatant commander and chief of mission must employ all the elements of national power...

The current national security structure is built upon the 1947 National Security Act and must evolve. The first prominent change to this document occurred in 1986, with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, after crisis drove policymakers to react to the reality that contemporary warfare required an integrated joint force. In the past 30 years, globalization and the information age has fundamentally altered how individuals and societies interact, yet the U.S. national security architecture has changed little since the reforms in 1986.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is proposing to update some provisions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act through what he calls the “Force of the Future” initiative. Among other things, his initiative seeks to reform the human resourcing and acquisition processes and clarify some of the roles and functions of senior DoD officials. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John McCain, has also mentioned recently that the U.S. Congress is working on a legislative update to Goldwater-Nichols. The extent of these recommended changes is yet to be published, but this is an acknowledgement by the senior leaders in both the executive and legislative bodies that the current national security construct is outdated. The question remains how flexible will the “Force of the Future” be to react to the sort of gray zone challenges described in this paper.

Acknowledging antiquated legislative structures highlights a national security apparatus that lacks an effective agency to coordinate, synchronize, and execute effective phase zero strategy. Nearly 70 years ago, the father of the U.S. containment strategy during the Cold War, George Kennan, described the execution of U.S. policy in this environment as political warfare. He said, “Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.” A range of descriptors has emerged in the post-9/11 operating environment, but Kennan’s political warfare definition from 1948 most accurately depicts the challenges the U.S. faces by unconventional, irregular, asymmetric, and gray zone threats.

In the execution of phase zero and political warfare, the geographic combatant commander and chief of mission must employ all the elements of national power at his or her disposal, including SOF, to achieve national objectives. In adversarial states, this should include influencing, coercing, deterring, and resisting state aggression in conjunction with unconventional, hybrid, irregular, and asymmetric means. In friendly and allied states, this means supporting the existing regime with foreign assistance and FID. These efforts, however, must be synchronized across...
the JIIM environment and regionally focused by a national-level agency.

The U.S. needs a National Security Council-level headquarters to develop strategy, synchronize the interagency, and execute political warfare in phase zero. In a 2016 *Joint Forces Quarterly* article, four senior ranking officers in the special operations community—including the former commanders of both USSOCOM and USASOC—make this very argument:

President Eisenhower once considered appointing a National Security Council (NSC)-level “director of unconventional or non-military warfare,” with responsibilities including such areas as ‘economic warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and foreign information.’ In other words, he saw the need for an NSC-level director of political warfare, someone to quarterback the habitually interagency effort. This need still exists to achieve unity of effort across all aspects of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) across the continuum of international competition. As Max Boot has observed, political warfare has become a lost art which no department or agency of the U.S. Government views as a core mission.\(^{106}\)

The creation of such an organization would require significant political will. In the absence of a national directorate to develop and execute political and UW, however, the theater special operations commands should strive to shape national policy by developing focused regional phase zero campaigns. Communicating and integrating seamlessly with the country teams and geographic combatant commands is essential in this endeavor. Widespread use of liaison, decentralized interagency commands, and enduring presence by regional experts should be the standard, not an exception to the rule. Short, rotational training engagements cannot be misconstrued as a replacement for strategy, outside of declared, armed conflict. Several white papers from USSOCOM and USASOC concisely describe these challenges and potential responses. RAND corporation has also published extensively on these topics. With this paper, I hope to contribute to that discussion, and suggest that SOF be widely used in the phase zero environment across the spectrum of gray zone threats. As the nature of conflict between and among states evolves, the role of SOF must evolve as well, and geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission must view them as a dynamic tool that can operate across the spectrum of conflict between and among states.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

The interactions between SOF and the interagency during phase zero warrant further exploration. This study analyzed relationships only in the Pacific theater and primarily between State and SOF. Expanding this research to include several other case studies or vignettes from a variety of geographic combatant commands could provide further insight as to how SOF and the interagency interact at the country team and geographic combatant command levels. This research should include an examination of other...
U.S. government agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and Drug Enforcement Agency and interagency or multinational organizations that address regional transnational crime, drugs, and terrorism. Additionally, identifying quantitative measures to support the qualitative analysis in this study might provide more correlative support to the effectiveness of different phase zero approaches. Additional research into this topic may provide insight into the fog and frictions that hinder the achievement of national security objectives during phase zero, and may also illuminate innovative solutions to alleviating the tensions across the JIIM environment. **IAJ**

**NOTES**


7. Ibid., p. 72.


13. Ibid., p. 6.


15. Ibid., p. 10.


18 Ibid., p. 34. The term Bangsamoro refers to the Bangsamoro people of the Southern Philippines who represent a variety Muslim ethnic groups.

19 Ibid., p. 37.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 38.


25 Ibid.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 17; David Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?” *Military Review*, Vol. 82, No. 3, May-June 2004, p. 20. There are five active duty special forces groups that are aligned with each of the five geographic combatant commands and theater special operations commands. 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is aligned with U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific.


31 Ibid.

32 Niksch.

33 Ibid., p. 1.


35 Maxwell, p. 20.

36 Ibid.; Vaughn et al., p. 19.

37 Maxwell, p. 21.

38 Ibid., pp. 20–21.

39 Ibid., p. 21.


45 Ibid.

46 Robinson et al., p. 112

47 Ibid., pp. 74–75.


49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., p. 7.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., pp. 216–217.

54 Ibid., p. 217.

55 Ibid., p. 216.

56 Ibid., p. 218.

57 Ibid., p. 222.

58 Ibid., pp. 224–225.

59 Vaughn, summary.

60 Ibid., p. 33.

61 Ibid., pp. 33–34.


63 Ibid., p. 89.

64 Vaughn, p. 5.
65 Chalk et al., p. 87.

66 Vaughn, p. 5; Chalk et al., p. 89.

67 Chalk et al., pp. 92–93.

68 Vaughn, p. 6.


71 Chalk et al., p. 153.

72 Ibid.

73 Priest.

74 Chalk et al., p. 153.


76 Chalk et al., p. 173.

77 Ibid.


80 Ibid.

81 Gindarsah.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., p. 3.

84 Vaughn, p. 8.

85 Chalk et al., p. 16.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., pp. 93–94.


89 Vaughn, p. 2.


Petit, p. 173.


