



The Simons Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

InterAgency Journal

**A Brief History of Scandals:
Special Oversight Challenges
in National Security Interrogations**

Erik Jens

**A CGSC International Hall of Fame
Member and the CIA's
Covert Action in 1954**

John G. Breen

**Application of the Ethical Triangle in the
2014 Ebola Epidemic: A Case Study**

Katie Martinez and Marcos Martinez

**Why We Keep Getting it Wrong:
What Makes the JIIM so Different?**

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**The Vision Process:
Seven Steps to a Better Organization**

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**Speak Smartly and Carry a Big Stick:
Competing Successfully
in the Global Narrative**

Brian Anthony, Robert Lyons and Stuart Peebles

**Train with the Brain in Mind:
Neuroscience Education
as a Force Multiplier**

Michael J. Cheatham

**Decline of Westphalia in West Africa:
How Decentralized Power in West Africa
Can be a Rebirth of African Identity**

*Matthew D. Pride, Bryan C. Smith
and Harmonie Foster*

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The Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation is a major program of the Command and General Staff College Foundation, Inc. The Simons Center is committed to the development of military leaders with interagency operational skills and an interagency body of knowledge that facilitates broader and more effective cooperation and policy implementation.



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From the Editor-in-Chief

This issue of the *InterAgency Journal* features writings on ethics, leadership, strategic communications, educating, and the world order. Our lead article by Erik Jens provides an insider's perspective, using historical analysis, on the ethics of interrogation. He offers the conditions that best allow for interrogation to yield success. We follow that with another insider's perspective by long-time contributor and former Editorial Board member John Breen on a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College International Hall of Fame honoree and covert actions of the CIA. Our third article continues the ethics theme as authors Katie Martinez and Marcos Martinez, who were recent participants in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's West African Scholars program, make the case for applying the ethical triangle methodology to determine the allocation of experimental drugs in an epidemic or pandemic situation.

The next article, authored by William Davis, is one of the chapters of an interagency leadership handbook that he and the Simons Center are developing for publication. This preview of the handbook addresses the unique conditions of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment and why it is so difficult for trained and educated leaders to be successful in that type of environment.

Vision in an organization is a crucial element for success. However, developing and implementing a vision, particularly for an organizational-level leader, is a challenge. Our fourth article by Matthew Bonnot and Carey Walker offers a learned perspective of a process for creating and implementing a vision as part of a change strategy.

Is the U.S. losing on the world stage in the area of strategic communications? Authors Brian Anthony, Robert Lyons, and Stuart Peebles argue that with a simplified framework and some practical changes in strategy that U.S. interagency leaders can succeed in taking back the initiative in the information realm from our adversaries.

Warfare is a human endeavor. Understanding cognitive training and learning in young adults is an area that merits further research and discussion. Michael Cheatham offers a fascinating examination of the relationships between young adult brain development, operational responsibilities, and current and future operating environments.

Our final article is from another group of recent participants in the CGSC West African Scholars program. Authors Matthew Pride, Bryan Smith, and Harmonie Foster make an interesting argument as to how the developed world might better interact with weak nation-states in the West African region.

Thank you for reading this issue of the *InterAgency Journal*. Please consider sharing your expertise and experiences by submitting articles for publication. – **RMC**



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A Brief History of Scandals: Special Oversight Challenges in National Security Interrogations

by Erik Jens

Remember in the United States there are no secrets, only delayed disclosures. One day, whether one year away or ten years away, people will be looking at what we did, so make sure you act with the utmost integrity.

— Mark Fallon, FBI counterterrorism official, quoted in Ali H. Soufan's "The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda"

A history of (at least) American national security operations and initiatives shows, fairly convincingly, the need for external oversight. Time and again, executive branch agencies have, with the best of motives as they perceived them, violated Americans' civil rights, compromised foreign relations, or otherwise behaved in ways irrelevant or counterproductive to national defense. The Church Committee report, the Pentagon Papers, Iran-Contra, and numerous other exposes during and since the Cold War have illustrated the range of abuses committed by executive branch agencies in the name of national defense.

More recently, a partly-declassified, Senate report on the CIA's post-9/11 interrogation and detention program has shown once again that in the intelligence arena, "there are no secrets, only delayed disclosures." History has amply demonstrated that interrogation succeeds best, and with the least amount of excess and abuse, when conducted by trained and certified personnel, pursuant to a formal program of instruction, with provisions for regular oversight by both the local chain of command and outside observers.

Among the myriad potential legal and ethical issues related to intelligence work, interrogation holds a special place. Interrogation, more than any other branch of intelligence, implicates the most dangerous and primal aspects of human behavior: self-righteous anger, urge for revenge, and a desire to dominate. All these emotions can potentially compromise the interrogator's sole legitimate

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mission—to elicit within the limits of domestic and international law actionable intelligence for military or national security purposes. The need for formal screening, training, and certification processes for interrogators and for subsequent close and continuing supervision of interrogation operations have been amply proven by each of the historical and contemporary case studies this article will address.

At various times since 9/11, the U.S. and the United Kingdom’s (UK) military or national leaders have authorized various “enhanced” methods of interrogation for military or civilian agency interrogators. Either during or after the fact, the governments involved have emphasized the purported controlled, selective application of such methods. Experience shows, however, that once authorized, even in limited circumstances, trying to subsequently hold the line at a specific level of “authorized” coercion rarely succeeds. Indeed, the legitimization of such methods, authorized or not, seems to lie at the heart of every interrogation scandal.

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Any initial validation of “enhanced measures” implicitly and instantly demotes all humane (legally supportable) and proven to be effective questioning techniques in favor of physical punishment. Given the psychological factors present in most interrogations—for example, the extreme power imbalance in the questioner’s favor or the questioner’s desire for revenge upon the detainee and all the detainee represents—any authorized exception in favor of physical roughness will tend to grow until it

swallows the rule.

Given the above realities, this article proceeds from an assumption that a strategically and politically viable interrogation doctrine—even for the most sensitive interrogation operations—must remain humane, not physically coercive or otherwise brutal, and in full accord with domestic and international law. (The question of establishing and enforcing a doctrine, of course, is closely bound up with effective supervision and leadership of those who execute that doctrine. Oversight does not end with the passage of a law or promulgation of a policy.) Almost every interrogation practice that has departed from these standards—whether conducted by military interrogators in wartime or by civilian security and intelligence agencies—has failed, despite some temporary tactical successes, to support long-term, strategic victory.

The Interrogation Oversight “Tripod”

Public scandals arising from military and national security-related interrogation operations have invariably resulted from lack of at least one of three essential elements for efficient, humane, and morally defensible interrogation. These essential elements are lack of internal and/or external oversight, lack of a formal training process, and lack of a certification process. This “tripod,” forming a viable regulatory framework for interrogation, is vital to establish and, even more importantly, to maintain a lawful, efficient, and publicly-defensible interrogation apparatus.

Oversight may be internal, i.e., conducted by a closely involved, local chain of command. Alternatively, oversight may be external, i.e., inspectors general, legislative or judicial watchdogs, or even an aggressive media digging into details via either legal or illegal means. Both types of oversight have their weaknesses. Local oversight authorities, e.g., the relatively junior officers who supervise most military or civilian interrogation teams, may be too close to the issue, informing a kind of groupthink; whereby,

interrogators and their superiors agree to wink at the rules and to take the gloves off in dealing with recalcitrant or despised detainees. And external oversight, such as visits by inspectors general, lawyers, or senior officials checking up on operations, tends to be occasional and either seemingly, or in fact, disengaged from the realities of interrogation operations in often difficult conditions. The secrecy inherent in most interrogation operations and especially those conducted by civilian intelligence agencies further complicates the problem of effective oversight and accountability.

Building and maintaining a cadre of competent, disciplined interrogators is a more complex problem. Is it not enough to appoint interrogators; they must be trained. It is not enough to train them; the training must be formalized and culminate in certification. And it is not even sufficient merely to train and certify interrogators to a common standard; they should be assigned in specific billets on the organization's strength to ensure they do not operate under the radar of designated interrogation oversight elements or procedures.

Comparing and assessing interrogation scandals from the early twentieth century through the post-9/11 era highlights the importance of all the above requirements for an efficient, legally-compliant, and ethically-defensible interrogation community. Where any one element is wanting, the potential for public scandal rises sharply—with all the attendant consequences for political leadership, operational effectiveness, and international alliances. Almost every public interrogation scandal in U.S. history has involved a lack of thorough or, in many cases, any formal interrogation training, either in permissible techniques or in the framework of domestic and international law obligations.

Starting with the experience of U.S. interrogators during the Philippine Insurrection, this article passes through some World War II and subsequent episodes en route to the Central

Intelligence Agency's (CIA) long-classified attempts during the Cold War to establish a common skill set for its interrogators, with subsequent reverberations for post-9/11 counterterrorism-related interrogations. A more recent phenomenon, the often-destructive synergy between popular culture's post-9/11 glorification of abusive interrogation and the real-life practice of interrogation by incompletely trained or poorly supervised interrogators whose ethical and legal shortfalls are reinforced by the influence of charismatic, brutal, and entirely fictional heroes of television and screen also merit discussion.

Almost every public interrogation scandal in U.S. history has involved a lack of thorough or, in many cases, any formal interrogation training...

The Philippine Insurrection and the "Water Cure"

In 1902, revelations in the American press of soldiers' use of the "water cure"—an especially brutal, often fatal variant of waterboarding—on captured Philippine guerillas became the "Abu Ghraib scandal" of its time. The U.S., which since the Civil War had led a global effort to establish an international humanitarian law of war, found itself the target of considerable *schadenfreude* from its European critics, who trumpeted the gap between America's self-asserted role as the font of civilized humanity and its actual practice.

Though reportedly hundreds of Filipinos had been "water cured"—many fatally—by American troops by early 1902, only one court-martial resulted, that of Major Edwin F. Glenn.² He defended his actions by arguing that:

every man, woman, and child in the islands was an enemy, and in my best judgment they

are today, and always will be...[T]hey have made use of every means forbidden to them by the laws of war...I am convinced that my action resulted in hastening the termination of hostilities and directly resulted in saving many human lives, and directly injured no one.³

Major Glenn was court-martialed in the Philippines by a board of his fellow officers, who pitilessly sentenced him to a fifty-dollar fine and a month's suspension from command. In reluctantly confirming the verdict, U.S. Army Judge-Advocate General George Davis

...General Davis nonetheless warned that the rules of war were not to be set aside merely on the grounds that the enemy was not respecting them.

harshly criticized the apparent camaraderie the court-martial officers had expressed for Major Glenn in the leniency of their judgment. Admitting that American troops deployed to the Philippines faced “difficult and to the last degree exasperating” conditions, General Davis nonetheless warned that the rules of war were not to be set aside merely on the grounds that the enemy was not respecting them.⁴ In any case, Major Glenn's career survived his conviction, and he reached the rank of major general before retiring in 1919.⁵

Those American soldiers who routinely administered the water cure to captured Filipino fighters underwent no formal interrogation training whose records have survived. Their methods and their well-documented indifference to whether their prisoners survived the questioning reflected a high degree not only of brutality, but of racism and xenophobia. It was surely not the first or last time that conventional military forces had found themselves in an

utterly foreign land, facing an enemy that refused to fight or otherwise behave in a “civilized” manner.

The Philippine interrogation scandal took place at a time when the U.S. had only a rudimentary permanent intelligence apparatus, the Secret Service on the civilian side and the Army and Navy's fledgling intelligence offices. Interrogation, then, was purely an ad hoc activity, subject only to whatever rules of humanitarian law the questioners saw fit to obey, more scrupulously, perhaps, in conventional wars with state adversaries; however, much less frequently in undeclared campaigns or those waged against the so-called “inferior” races.

The lasting lesson of the Philippine episode was not merely in the routine brutality shown by American troops. At least two other factors pertained. The letters that American soldiers wrote to their families describing, often in folksy or approving tones, the effect and frequency of deploying the water cure, shocked many of the recipients, some of whom alerted U.S. newspapers and magazines.⁶ The speedy (by nineteenth-century standards) communication to the American public of what “their boys” were doing on the battlefield and the psychological disconnect between the culture of the battlefield and that of the home front presaged the instant communications of Vietnam, and, more recently, of the Abu Ghraib episode. In a way, this “interrogation perception gap” also foreshadowed the findings of the 1972 Stanford prison experiment that found in the absence of structure and oversight people under stress will act out their assigned roles—soldier, interrogator, or both—to the point of almost unlimited brutality.⁷

In fairness, American troops in the Philippines were ill prepared for success in terms of interrogation requirements. Clearly, someone would have to question captured fighters. But who would get the job? And how would they do it? What techniques were rumored

to “work” best? Leaving it all to guesswork and serendipity was an almost certain recipe for escalating brutality. And while this was certainly not the first time an American military operation had involved abuse of prisoners, it was one of the first publicized scandals, since the gradual international recognition throughout the nineteenth century of a common baseline for treatment of captured enemy soldiers.

Ironically, the global groundswell of proclaiming and agreeing on human rights of captured soldiers had begun with the late nineteenth century dissemination across Europe of U.S. General Order 100, issued by President Lincoln to the Union Army in 1864 to provide for humanitarian treatment of all categories of Confederate fighters, whether or not they were regular uniformed troops.⁸

World War Two: Three Interrogators’ Legacies

Interrogators seldom see their names included in the history books. The nature of their work and operational requirements for secrecy consign most military and other national security interrogators to labor unseen, mere packhorses in the great affairs of their military commanders. Yet three interrogators of World War II have achieved fame within the circles of professional interrogators and, more generally, military and intelligence historians. The German Luftwaffe Corporal Hanns Scharff, the American Marine Major Sherwood Moran, and—perhaps most notoriously—the British Lieutenant Colonel Robin “Tin Eye” Stephens all made major contributions to the current ethics and doctrine of military and national security-related interrogation. While none of these three luminaries of humane interrogation had been formally trained in the art—both the era and the exigencies of war precluded it—they independently arrived at a similar philosophy: humane questioning carried out with decency and without allowing personal feelings to

interfere with the job works best. (That one of them, as discussed below, was implicated in a postwar atrocity, proves a larger point that even the best of us cannot be trusted with unchecked, unsupervised power over one’s enemy.)

...humane questioning carried out with decency and without allowing personal feelings to interfere with the job works best.

Germany: Hanns-Joachim Gottlob Scharff, Luftwaffe

For American interrogators in training, perhaps no individual comes in for more praise and respect than the WW2-era German Lance Corporal Hanns Scharff. A former businessman, Scharff through a series of absurd events found himself assigned to the Luftwaffe’s interrogation facility for captured Allied aircrews. Soon after his arrival, both the facility’s assigned interrogators were killed in a plane crash, and Corporal Scharff found himself the de facto chief interrogator. With no formal training, Scharff fell back on his fluent English and long experience as a salesman to winkle critical military information out of almost every American and British flier who passed through his facility for the remainder of the war.⁹ Scharff convincingly adopted a basic approach combining direct questioning, flattery, and—backed up by a highly efficient analysis shop—apparent omniscience. (Much later, the CIA’s long-classified KUBARK Manual would cite Scharff’s essay on humane interrogation as recommended reading.¹⁰)

Following the war, Scharff immigrated to the U.S. (thanks largely to his many former prisoners who had fervently praised his gentlemanly treatment) and lived out his years as a professional artist.¹¹ He would have faded into obscurity but for his postwar essay for the U.S. Army on interrogation, which drew the attention

of his eventual biographer, the military historian Raymond Tolliver.

Corporal Scharff demonstrated convincingly that a nuanced, psychological approach to eliciting information from wary prisoners is far more productive than relying on mental or physical abuse. Fortunately for the eventual winning side, though terribly unfortunately for most of their captives, the rest of the German intelligence apparatus was not nearly so enlightened. Nor are any other wartime German officials or interrogators known to have publicized, much less replicated, the questioning methods of a lowly lance corporal.

In 1944, the U.S. Army Training Corps

Major Moran used direct, humane methods, combined with his intimate understanding of Japanese culture, to elicit cooperation from Japanese prisoners.

produced a 65-minute film for its aircrew training programs. *Resisting Enemy Interrogation* was the fictional story of an American bomber crew captured and subjected to a range of interrogation techniques by a courtly, well-educated, yet ruthless Luftwaffe officer.¹² Apart from a few psychologically harsh measures, this interrogator might almost have been demonstrating the permissible, humane approaches approved under current U.S. laws and other governing documents for interrogations.

While this must remain largely speculation, one might almost think that the script for *Resisting Enemy Interrogation* had been based on debriefings of escaped Allied aviators describing their questioning by Lance Corporal Scharff (whom most captured airmen would have assumed to be a more senior officer, since he was in his mid-thirties and, like most interrogators,

wore no rank when questioning prisoners). Indeed, the film's interrogator relies heavily on a "we know all" approach backstopped by an efficient analysis operation, which was how the CIA's KUBARK Manual summarized Scharff's technique.¹³

United States: Sherwood Moran, USMC

Lance-Corporal Scharff, had he known it, had a philosophical counterpart on the other side of the world in the Pacific war. Major Sherwood Moran, U.S. Marine Corps, had spent decades as a missionary in Japan before volunteering for service after Pearl Harbor. An avuncular man already in his fifties when the war began, Major Moran used direct, humane methods, combined with his intimate understanding of Japanese culture, to elicit cooperation from Japanese prisoners.¹⁴ Unlike Corporal Scharff, Major Moran's rank allowed him to promulgate throughout the Marine Corps his memoranda on useful, humane interrogation techniques. His precepts on interrogation psychology, approaches, and the ethical and practical reasons to eschew brutal questioning methods became the foundation of modern U.S. military interrogation doctrine.¹⁵

Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Moran's example highlights not only the practical virtues of humane interrogation approaches, but the role of serendipity in interrogation (as in most other realms of intelligence work). Had this aging missionary not volunteered for service, it is doubtful any other interrogator in the Marines or the Navy (whose leadership, embittered by Pearl Harbor, refused to trust any Japanese-Americans as linguists) could have developed such an insightful collection of interrogation precepts.¹⁶ And Major Moran's field-grade rank was critical in persuading Marine Corps leaders to disseminate his lessons learned to the rest of the fleet (any interrogation lessons proposed by "Private Moran" would most likely have been lost to history).

Great Britain: Robin “Tin Eye” Stephens, MI5

A third World War II interrogator presents a special case: the British interrogator Lieutenant Colonel Robin “Tin Eye” Stephens (so dubbed for his monocle). Stephens was chief interrogator for Operation Double Cross, a top-secret program that relied on decrypting German Enigma messages to intercept nearly every German agent upon arrival in England, doubling many of them back against Germany for the remainder of the war.¹⁷ Colonel Stephens, while championing a psychologically tough approach to captured German agents, adamantly forbade physical mistreatment. His disdain for roughing up detainees was based not on ethics—he routinely dispatched to the firing squad any captured spies whom he deemed ill-suited to be a double agent—but on operational practice; he argued that physically extracting responses by abusing prisoners compromised the reliability of any resulting intelligence.¹⁸

Long after the war, allegations surfaced that, in fact, Stephens had tolerated if not authorized physical abuse at Camp 020, MI5’s then-secret London detention facility.¹⁹ However, on the available evidence, Stephens—in an operation closely monitored and approved by higher wartime commanders—appears to have run a tight ship, with a minimum of physical abuse and no deliberate torture. By 1940s wartime standards, his was surely one of the more regulated and humane interrogation operations run by any of the belligerent states.

But Colonel Stephens’ story has a sequel. Stephens left Camp 020 in late 1945 to assume command of a secret British detention facility in the German resort town of Bad Nenndorf. The prison was initially established to hold and interrogate captured Nazis and German partisan fighters. However, as the supply of captured Nazis dried up, Bad Nenndorf’s mission soon pivoted to counter Communist infiltration;

Communists, ex-Communists, suspected Communists, and Russian speakers—many such found themselves at Bad Nenndorf, answering to a team of interrogators working for the prison commander, none other than “Tin Eye” Stephens.²⁰

...[Colonel Stephens] argued that physically extracting responses by abusing prisoners compromised the reliability of any resulting intelligence.

In early 1947, an ambulance dropped off several starving, frozen prisoners at a German hospital; two of them died that night, of cold and malnourishment as severe as anything suffered at Dachau. British servicemembers working at the hospital alerted the British press, and soon Great Britain had its own “Abu Ghraib-level” scandal to deal with. Hector McNeill, the foreign minister, lamented that “[w]henver we have any allegations to make about the political police methods in Eastern European states it will be enough to call out in the House ‘Bad Nenndorf,’ and no reply is left to us.”²¹ Stephens and several other officers were court-martialed; he pled ignorance of conditions at the facility he had commanded and, with most of his colleagues, was acquitted.

The investigation revealed deployment by Stephen’s interrogators of a range of abusive methods—beatings, freezing cold, starvation, forced exercise, and other brutality leading to serious injuries or death. That many of Bad Nenndorf’s interrogators were German Jews, violent felons, or troublesome soldiers sent to work at Bad Nenndorf to get them off their former commanders’ hands certainly called into question their ability or willingness to set aside personal vengeance or sadistic impulses.²²

Colonel Stephens, in addition to possessing a set of racist attitudes fairly common for upper-

class Britons (among many others) of his era, famously despised Communists. Whether he genuinely had no idea what was going on under his command (unlikely) or allowed his interrogators to creatively improvise in “breaking” the hated Communists in their custody, it is clear that his postwar interrogation operation had no effective internal oversight, and—as far as is known—no external oversight whatever, at least regarding the treatment and welfare of prisoners.

The Bad Nenndorf episode highlighted the evil... consequences of combining in one office the responsibilities for both prisoner welfare and interrogation results.

The Bad Nenndorf episode highlighted the evil—and almost certainly counterproductive from an intelligence point of view—consequences of combining in one office the responsibilities for both prisoner welfare and interrogation results.²³ Decades later, a similar meltdown of basic standards of humanity at Abu Ghraib was likewise attributed, in part, to enlisting detainee’s guards in “creating conditions” for interrogation. Even without the extreme secrecy surrounding the Bad Nenndorf interrogations, this arrangement was a recipe for trouble; as it was, Great Britain was forced to acknowledge abuses as extreme as those dispensed by the Germans at Dachau (albeit of course on a far smaller scale).

The Cold War: CIA’s Interrogation Manuals

In 1963, likely at the instigation of the CIA’s then-counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton, the agency issued a classified manual, *KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation*.²⁴

At 130 pages, the manual provides enough information to occupy a substantial training course. It includes discussions of legal, policy, and psychological considerations; an interrogation planning checklist; and a list of techniques, both noncoercive (psychological approaches) and coercive (use of threats and fear).

The manual contains an annotated bibliography which includes a 1956 article by a German veteran, one Hanns Scharff. The manual cites Scharff’s memoirs as an example of the value of thoroughly preparing for interrogations, but dismiss much of his technique as requiring conditions (presumably including Geneva Convention restrictions, lack of extreme time pressure, and a formidable level of analytic support for the interrogator) not likely to be present in most secret interrogation scenarios envisioned by the manual’s authors.²⁵

The scandal arising from the manual arose not from any specific interrogation operations, but from its disclosure in 1997, following a Freedom of Information Act request (a marginally less-redacted version of the manual was released in 2014). While most of the manual’s content is uncontroversial, the CIA faced criticism from a wide range of critics for appearing to provide and plan for inflicting “bodily harm” on interrogation subjects or for using “medical, chemical, or electrical methods or materials to induce acquiescence.”²⁶

We need not examine here whether the CIA secretly adopted inhumane questioning methods in the spirit of General Doolittle’s 1954 claim that America must prepare, in the battle against Communism, to adopt the enemy’s “repugnant philosophy.”²⁷ But the disclosure of the *KUBARK Manual* raises an important question: Had the CIA gone beyond merely printing up a set of tips of the trade and established a formal interrogation “schoolhouse,” would the manual’s authors have so readily endorsed its more brutal techniques? Any formal course of instruction run

by a government agency requires funding and permanent supervision, which means oversight, likely including a measure of external oversight, even if limited to the agency's own inspector general.

By making the corporate decision to produce a classified interrogation guide without tying it to any formalized course of instruction or certification process, the agency unwittingly invited negative publicity and other consequences when the manual's existence and eventually most of its contents inevitably became public. In producing the manual as its internal response to the problem, "How should the agency maintain a cadre of qualified interrogators?" the CIA set itself up for the manual's inevitable disclosure, with all the public relations nightmare that followed.

In 1983, the CIA published another secret interrogation guide, the *Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual*.²⁸ This manual, reportedly meant to assist CIA officers in teaching interrogation methods to South American security agencies, appears—at least in its original version—to endorse a considerably more brutal approach, combining very harsh psychological techniques with a range of physically painful measures. The version of the manual that was declassified in 1997 contains many handwritten corrections to the printed text that are, at best, hard to interpret as anything other than a half-baked attempt to backtrack from the least defensible sections. An example follows, with the handwritten corrections indicated in italics: "While we ~~do not stress~~ *deplore* the use of coercive techniques, we do want to make you aware of them ~~and the proper way to use them~~, *so that you may avoid them.*"²⁹

An abundance of academic and popular literature condemns both the CIA's leadership for propagating harsh interrogation techniques through these two manuals and its field officers, who allegedly taught the techniques to other nations' police and military during the Cold War.

Much of this scholarship argues, persuasively, that abusive interrogation not only debases the questioner and his or her nation but is less effective than skillful, humane interrogation as practiced, for example, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).³⁰ The point to be made here, however, is that where an interrogation program is run in secrecy and without a formal training and certifying process for its interrogators, abuses and escalating cruelty are almost inevitable.

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CIA and Post-9/11 Interrogation Operations

On December 9, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its 500-page Executive Summary of a (as of March 2017) still-classified, 6700-page report on the CIA's post-9/11 detention and interrogation programs. The Committee's sixteen findings excoriated (albeit with strong minority dissent) the CIA's alleged shortfalls in planning, executing, and reporting its various programs.³¹

The declassified Senate report is remarkable for its frank discussions of CIA's post-9/11 training program for interrogators. As the report makes clear, and without specific refutation from any of those politicians and officials who have criticized other parts of the report, the CIA was ill-prepared to conduct interrogation operations at the time of the 9/11 attacks. This is not a criticism of the agency: CIA, by the terms of its charter under the National Security Act of 1947, is neither a military nor a law enforcement

agency, and it is therefore no surprise that the agency would not necessarily have had a cadre of trained interrogators on standby in late 2001.

On September 17, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a then-secret authorization for the CIA to conduct a range of counterterrorism activities, including license to secretly capture and detain persons “posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or planning terrorist activities.”³² The President’s memorandum said nothing about interrogations, coercive or otherwise, nor did it address any standard of proof applying to CIA capture or detention of suspected terrorists.

The result was the training and deployment of an initial group of CIA interrogators who, at best, had received gravely insufficient training to do much more than creatively abuse detainees...

From fall 2001 through early 2002, the CIA apparently undertook neither to formally train any of its officers in interrogation, nor even to consult with any other government elements with interrogation expertise.³³ These might have included the longstanding ten-to-twelve-week interrogation programs, focusing on a combination of legal and practical instruction and extensive practical exercises, run by the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Defense Intelligence Agency.³⁴ In addition, of course, the FBI had long trained its agents in lawful, psychologically-based interrogation techniques for law enforcement purposes.

In any case, not until November 2002 did the CIA run its first interrogation course. Far from modeling the immersive, multi-month courses run by the Departments of Justice and Defense, the CIA program consisted of 65 hours, or less than two weeks, of classroom instruction, much

of it devoted to teaching “enhanced techniques,” which at the time, had still not been evaluated by the Justice Department for legality under domestic or international law.³⁵

Moreover, the first groups of CIA interrogation trainees included a large share of officers with documented “anger management issues,” or who had, presumably in the previous year since 9/11, already “engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations.”³⁶ Attempts by lawyers in the CIA Counterterrorism Center’s (CTC) legal shop to exercise some oversight over the quality of interrogation students were rebuffed by the CTC chief on the grounds that lawyers “should [not] get into the business of vetting [anyone] involved in this program. It is simply not your job.”³⁷

The CTC official may have been correct on the specific issue of agency lawyers micromanaging candidate selection. But in retrospect, the Senate report shows persuasively that those internal CIA elements with oversight authorities that might have interceded to ensure effective screening of interrogator candidates either did not or could not exercise sufficient, if any, oversight. The result was the training and deployment of an initial group of CIA interrogators who, at best, had received gravely insufficient training to do much more than creatively abuse detainees, and some of whom, at worst, had troubled personal and professional backgrounds that should have disqualified them from being allowed to exert control over prisoners.

U.S. Army Field Manual and Provisions for Training, Certification, and Oversight

Until the 2006 issue of a wholly revised human intelligence (HUMINT) manual (FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*), the primary textbook and regulation for military interrogations was the 1992 FM 34-52, *Intelligence Interrogation*. The earlier field

manual failed to recognize the lessons, discussed earlier, of Tin Eye Stephens' blighted tenure as both commander and chief inquisitor at Bad Nenndorf, nor did not address the respective authorities of detention facility commanders and interrogators (including their direct commanders) working in the facility.

With no clear guidance as to the propriety of military police and other servicemembers helping to "set the stage" for interrogations, predictable problems arose when personnel with no interrogation training or authority either pressed for or were invited to play a role in detainee interrogations. This lack of guidance led to abuses such as military police personnel, with no interrogation training or experience, tasked by intelligence personnel to "set the conditions" for interrogation. These issues and the operational and political nightmare they unleashed with the revelations of Abu Ghraib and a number of other interrogation operations led to the withdrawal of FM 34-52 in favor of the 2006 U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*.³⁸

Abu Ghraib was an extreme example of the negative consequences of a lack of clear lines of authority, although other factors all but guaranteed the disgraceful treatment of detainees there. It was not, strictly speaking, an interrogation operation, so much as an unsupervised exercise by unaccountable "intelligence personnel" in "breaking" detainees with the unofficial support of a group of untrained, badly-led reservists.

Most spectacularly, Abu Ghraib combined lack of meaningful oversight over intelligence operations with the psychological tendency toward escalation of power relationships that Dr. Philip Zimbardo had demonstrated decades earlier in his 1972 "Stanford prison experiment." In fact, Dr. Zimbardo testified for one of the Abu Ghraib defendants in his court-martial, stating that the breakdown of discipline and humanity at Abu Ghraib was a natural consequence of

conditions there.³⁹

Since 2009, all U.S. government interrogators (contractors are no longer authorized to conduct interrogations, although there is a waiver process for them to do so on a case-by-case basis) have been subject to the provisions and restrictions of Field Manual 2-22.3 and of Executive Order 13491, which binds all Executive Branch interrogators to following U.S. domestic law as well as all international agreements and laws to which the U.S. is a party.⁴⁰

Abu Ghraib was an extreme example of the negative consequences of a lack of clear lines of authority...

FM 2-22.3 distinguishes tactical questioning and screening of individuals (which any U.S. government employee or servicemember may conduct) from interrogation. The manual requires that all interrogations, beyond direct questioning at the point of capture, be conducted only by "personnel trained and certified in the interrogation methodology. . . in accordance with the Law of War."⁴¹ The manual also holds interrogators (along with all other U.S. HUMINT collectors) responsible for knowing and complying with all applicable U.S. law, the Geneva Conventions, and other relevant international law and all local or military regulations and policies (which may not authorize interrogation operations in violation of either U.S. or international law).⁴² The manual repeatedly adjures interrogators and other HUMINT collectors to know and comply with Department of Defense Directive 3115.09, "DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning." This directive bars "physical or mental torture" under all circumstances.

FM 2-22.3 expressly forbids detention

facility personnel from “direct participat[ion] in the conduct of interrogations,” though they may passively observe detainees’ behavior and statements to interrogators. (The limits run both ways: interrogators’ offers of incentives for detainees, such as reading or writing materials, increased freedom of movement, etc., are all subject to veto by the facility commander on legitimate security grounds.) Having outlined all applicable restrictions on interrogation operations, the directive provides for regular oversight of said operations, by both local commanders and by a number of DoD-level officials and departments.

FM 2-22.3 provides for separate lines of authority for the care and safeguarding of detainees, and the interrogation of same.

FM 2-22.3 provides for separate lines of authority for the care and safeguarding of detainees, and the interrogation of same. Detention facility commanders are “responsible for all actions involving the humane treatment, custody, evacuation, and administration of detainees, and force protection,” whereas local intelligence authorities are responsible for the actual “conduct of interrogation operations.”⁴³ This basic division of authority ensures that those persons who are ultimately responsible for the lives and welfare of captured detainees are not the same persons responsible for “breaking” them as part of interrogation operations. Failure to establish this firewall has been a factor in all too many public interrogation scandals.

A standardized course of instruction followed by certification is necessary but not sufficient to ensure a well-regulated and legally compliant interrogation apparatus. Ultimately, however, any governmental oversight, training, and certification regime will depend on the political will to establish and maintain it.

Former Army interrogator Tony Lagouranis recalls his schoolhouse instructors salting their formal warnings against illegal questioning methods with jokes and historical anecdotes about particularly imaginative or, supposedly, “effective” tortures now banned, alas, by “regulations.”⁴⁴ Here is an example of external oversight being unlikely to detect and deter such internal undermining of the intended instruction. Rather, strong internal oversight—in the form, for example, of these instructors’ direct superiors monitoring instruction in progress, and modeling complete, unironic endorsement of interrogators’ legal and ethical duties toward detainees—can exert far more direct and positive influence on the message received by interrogators in training. Lagouranis approvingly cites an Army sergeant deployed to Iraq who unequivocally banned abuse and whose interrogators followed his strong leadership in refraining from treatment or questioning techniques not in compliance with military doctrine.⁴⁵

In 2006, when the public scandals over “enhanced” interrogations were still in the very recent past and some political and cultural leaders throughout the country still advocated the need for interrogators to “take the gloves off,” a National Defense Intelligence College graduate student conducted an anonymous survey of U.S. Army interrogators. The majority had served at least one deployment as a field interrogator. By a two-to-one margin these servicemembers responded that they would refuse any order to torture a prisoner, regardless of the military necessity presented. Particular scorn was directed at senior officers who presumed to involve themselves in interrogation operations, generally with poor if not illegal results.⁴⁶

This survey of active-duty interrogators highlights the positive effect of professionalizing the interrogation corps. The adage that sunlight is the best disinfectant certainly applies to the realm of interrogation: Winking approvals by “higher” of coercive or otherwise illegal methods are

very unlikely to survive a professional training and certification regimen. A fully trained and professional interrogator, such as those quoted in the 2016 survey, is far more likely to view with contempt any hints from commanders that the written protections need not apply to any given detainee.

Anecdotes are not evidence. Nonetheless, this author's experience, throughout multiple war-zone deployments, is that many (if not most) intelligence oversight investigations arise from the misdeeds not of trained and certified intelligence personnel, but of mostly senior officers and others with no relevant training or experience who insert themselves into intelligence activities without authorization. Their misplaced confidence in their own abilities and authority, combined with their senior rank, can make it difficult for the competent sergeants and warrant officers who execute most military intelligence activities to prevent them from interfering until the issue has risen to the level of a formal investigation.

Interrogation Oversight Challenge: Command Influence in the Field

A persistent urban myth in the U.S. military is the tale of Lieutenant Colonel Allen West, who in August 2003—according to legend—made the hard choice to brutalize and mock-execute an Iraqi insurgent, thereby obtaining intelligence that saved the lives of his men. West then turned himself in and retired with honor. West's admirers cite him as a hero who faced a real-world ticking bomb situation and reacted as he had to do to save his soldiers. In fact, as a declassified Army criminal investigation report makes clear, the West case played out very differently and illustrates the dangers of untrained personnel interfering in interrogation and detention operations.

Faced with a series of roadside bombs and an anonymous tip that he was being targeted for assassination, then Colonel West had his men

detain a local Iraqi, whom they suspected had information about the plot. The man denied knowledge and no other evidence linked him to the insurgency. Rather than turn the Iraqi over to local U.S. Army interrogators, West first ordered his enlisted troops to beat a confession out of their detainee, telling them only not to break his bones or draw blood. After an hour of watching his men beat up the detainee, Colonel West interceded, told him he was about to die, put him against a clearing barrel, and fired two live rounds past his head. At that point, the senior sergeant on the scene said, "Sir, I don't think he knows," whereupon West returned the detainee to his cell and—to his credit—turned himself in to his commander.⁴⁷

**...no amount of formal
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into the intelligence process...**

No intelligence was gained; a senior officer's career was ended; and, arguably worst of all, the enlisted soldiers of Colonel West's battalion were invited to beat up a prisoner at length in front of their approving commander, just in case the prisoner might have actionable intelligence. This episode serves as a reminder that no amount of formal interrogation oversight and training can defeat senior officers or civilians injecting themselves into the intelligence process—whether to appear tough or, more charitably, out of a sincere belief that they can obtain lifesaving information by "taking the gloves off." One reason that external oversight of interrogation is so critical is that a team of low-ranking enlisted interrogators may otherwise be ignored or steamrolled by officers who decide that it is time to do things "the way Jack Bauer would."

Ticking Bombs, the “24” Effect and the Special Influence of Popular Culture on Interrogations

Any discussion of interrogation as a trope of post-9/11 films and television series must begin with that staple of fictional inquisitions, the “ticking time bomb scenario.” In a typical scene, our heroic interrogator is faced with a smirking, silent prisoner who alone possesses information needed to prevent an imminent, large-scale terrorist attack. Such scenes are almost invariably constructed to rule out the possibility of due process or time-consuming, psychology-based interrogation techniques. Only the infliction of pain on the perpetrator—and lots of it, right now—can save Manhattan from (to use a common MacGuffin) the suitcase nuke.

Mirror imaging is a common occupational hazard for intelligence analysts and policymakers across all countries and cultures.

The first modern use of the ticking bomb scenario was in Jean Larteguy’s 1960 novel *Les Centurions*, in which a French officer in occupied Algeria tortures an Arab woman into revealing the location of a series of bombs.⁴⁸ The novel, an immediate bestseller in France and later translated into English, gained currency among American military leaders and strategists after 9/11. In its absorption into the American popular culture surrounding interrogation and counterterrorism, its status as pure fiction tended to be muddled. The novel’s central ethical dilemma, resolved in favor of torture for the greater good, was frequently cited in support of “enhanced” interrogation as well as outright torture, as though it were relevant to real-world decisions whether a fictional character ought to torture prisoners. (On the other hand, a 1966 French film in the same setting, *The Battle of*

Algiers, focused on the moral decay of French officials attempting to suppress an insurgency with ever more brutal methods. It too enjoyed a minor renaissance among American intelligence and security officials.)

The popularity of *Les Centurions* in France, including much of the country’s liberal intelligentsia, may shed light on American society’s post-9/11 increased acceptance of brutal interrogation methods. The novel constructed a scenario that resonated with French liberals, and, arguably, with a later generation of Americans as well: “their enlightened legal systems had made them vulnerable to security threats.”⁴⁹

The American popular-culture descendant of *Les Centurions* was the television series *24*. The popular espionage and covert action series ran from 2001 to 2010 on American television, and may well be studied by sociologists in future decades for the ways in which it uses ticking bomb scenarios to justify its hero’s willingness to “take off the gloves” and beat, torture, or otherwise coerce life-saving information out of the villain of the week. (As most readers already know, *24*’s protagonist, the elite counterterrorism agent Jack Bauer, spends each season experiencing a 24-hour day in real time, one hour per week, as he battles that season’s terrorist threat to the U.S.)

Mirror imaging is a common occupational hazard for intelligence analysts and policymakers across all countries and cultures. Foreign observers from less democratic nations could therefore be forgiven for perceiving *24*, however wrongly, as a tool of the U.S. government, directly commissioned and designed to create public approval of its interrogation methods. And indeed *24*’s message was publicly endorsed by many American leaders and politicians, at least in the half-decade following 9/11.

Like the ticking-bomb scenario from *Les Centurions*, Jack Bauer and his questioning methods were approvingly cited by a number of U.S. experts and officials, including former

Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff, Bush-era White House lawyer John Yoo, and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.⁵⁰ The routine, approving references by these and other influential persons to Jack Bauer's interrogation methods, betray an intellectual laziness—a readiness, even eagerness, in the rush to dehumanize a despised (and, indeed, often despicable) enemy, to abandon basic humanitarian law as well as sound interrogation tradecraft. In the process, effective, useful intelligence as well as international partnerships and the nation's own sense of moral superiority are often early casualties.

Before 9/11, interrogation in film and television was something that happened mostly to the hero, who would stoically withstand all the abuse his irredeemably evil interrogator could inflict, up to the moment of his escape (and, usually, his thrashing of his former inquisitor). 9/11 brought a seismic shift in such fictional interrogation. Firstly, instances of abusive interrogation in film and television, which had numbered about four per year in the late 1990s, rose to over a hundred such instances annually by 2005.⁵¹ Furthermore, the brutal questioner was no longer invariably the villain; he was now more likely to be our hero, beating or otherwise coercing information out of a terrorist who, in this fictional world, was clearly guilty and thus richly deserved whatever the hero chose to do to him.

While many researchers have examined the link between post-9/11 fictional torture and actual U.S. government-approved brutality (including, for argument's sake, the range of controversial practices characterized as “enhanced interrogation” or, more flippantly, “torture lite”), it is difficult to quantify the degree of cause and effect, due largely to the apparent absence of any national polls before 9/11 querying people on their attitude toward torture as a tool of the state.

On one hand, this makes perfect sense.

Such a poll, prior to 9/11, would have seemed bizarre. From the early Cold War through the 1990s, torture was almost invariably attributed to the nation's most wicked or dangerous adversaries: the KGB, the Viet Cong, escaped Nazis, and, of course, assorted terrorists and psychopaths. There was an apparent American cultural consensus (both official, and popular) that torture was a tool of the Other, signifying the wickedness of those who would employ it. It might simply never have occurred to pre-9/11 sociologists that whether the U.S. should or should not endorse torture as policy was a question for serious study.

Before 9/11, interrogation in film and television was something that happened mostly to the hero...

In November 2006, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, the dean of the United States Military Academy at West Point, flew to Hollywood with a team of senior military and FBI interrogators to meet with *24*'s production team. His mission was to persuade *24*'s producers to stop promoting “unethical and illegal behavior” that was “adversely affect[ing] the training and performance” of American soldiers, and especially of interrogators, both in training and in the field.⁵²

An experienced Army interrogator, who had accompanied Brigadier General Finnegan to meet the *24* production team, later discussed their meeting. He had cited the disturbing increase in brutal interrogation as an acceptable tactic for fictional “good guys,” and the danger that young military interrogators would find inspiration in Jack Bauer's always-successful questioning methods:

[W]hat's particularly disturbing is that

when you look at who's doing the torturing, the people who are involved in it have changed. It used to be the bad guys were the ones who tortured, the Nazis or aliens or something like that, and torture never worked. But now it's people like Jack Bauer. It's the heroes of these shows...and it always works for these people. So, the message that 18-, 19-, 20-year-old soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan get is that good guys use this stuff and it works.⁵³

This interrogator told the television producers that DVDs of *24* were popular in the field, and that “people watch the shows, and then walk into the interrogation booth and do the same things they've seen.”⁵⁴

The pervasive influence of fictional heroes who brutalize their prisoners poses an ongoing threat to the professionalism of both military and civilian interrogators.

The program's producers defended their scripts on the grounds that Jack Bauer never enjoys abusing or torturing prisoners, but that he finds himself in impossible situations requiring tough decisions.⁵⁵ (A common ethical criticism of fictional torture scenes is that the script is invariably constructed so as to seemingly require torture—a situation that practically never arises in real life, and that has never yet, unsubstantiated urban myths aside, occurred in the context of preventing a terrorist attack.⁵⁶) In the end, the meeting changed little. While the television producers welcomed the real-life interrogators' ideas for non-abusive interrogation as possible plot devices, they were unwilling to alter their hugely profitable formula of a tough, brutal hero who nonetheless gets results and saves America from terrorists.

The pervasive influence of fictional heroes who brutalize their prisoners poses an ongoing threat to the professionalism of both military and civilian interrogators. As former Army interrogator Tony Lagouranis recalls in his memoir *Fear Up Harsh*, not only young, less educated interrogators, but also more mature college graduates, such as Lagouranis himself, proved susceptible to the temptations of brutality and vengeance. Lagouranis highlights the near-total absence of “adult supervision” over deployed interrogators and the ascendancy of personal vengeance and face-saving—among both interrogators and their combat commanders—over sound interrogation doctrine. Only where the local interrogation sergeant strictly enforced a professional standard of compliance with sound interrogation doctrine and regulations were interrogations conducted professionally and without brutality. As depicted in Lagouranis' book, brutality by trained and certified interrogators was almost wholly due to inconsistent internal oversight and almost nonexistent external oversight by any authorities outside the immediate chain of command.

Conclusion

Interrogation succeeds best, and with the least amount of excess and abuse, when conducted by trained and certified personnel, pursuant to a formal program of instruction, with provisions for regular oversight by both the local chain of command and by outside observers. The ethical and legal pitfalls inherent in interrogations—and especially in interrogations conducted in times of national crisis or military emergencies, actual or perceived—demand unrelenting oversight and self-appraisal at all levels. Individual interrogators, their local leaderships, their national agencies, and even (especially) national leaders, with both their public pronouncements and their administration of the national security community, all have a part to play in resisting pressures to bend or

abandon established, well-tested rules mandating humane questioning.

Every interrogation scandal the U.S. has suffered since 1902 has resulted from a lack of training and oversight standards. This has, again and again, left a vacuum for interrogators and their bosses to fill with rumor, legend, “helpful” interrogation tips from all over, and the ever-present temptation to dehumanize those under interrogation—whether Filipino guerillas, Japanese soldiers, Taliban fighters, or al-Qaeda masterminds. It is past time to develop and maintain—across the entire intelligence community, not merely military and other defense agencies—formal training, certification and oversight measures for all interrogators in the national security realm. **IAJ**

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A CGSC International Hall of Fame Member and the *CIA's Covert Action in 1954*

by John G. Breen

The International Hall of Fame at the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, was established in 1973 to recognize prominent, international military officer graduates. Inductees have included those who rose through the ranks to become their nations' senior military officers. A small number had become heads of state. Seventy-seven foreign military officers were inducted together in 1973 to establish the program.¹ As of January 2017, there were 266 inductees from 71 countries.² Currently, with the formal concurrence of the relevant U.S. Ambassador, nominees must go through a rigorous vetting process; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation manages vetting, and final approval rests with the Chief of Staff of the Army. Nomination packages are vetted through the Department of Defense and by the Department of State. The process can take as long as six months.

To now be eligible, the international CGSC graduate must have accomplished "through merit" one of the following:

- a. Served as the senior military officer, by rank seniority, in one of his nation's service components.
- b. Been appointed to the highest command position in a national service component or the nation's armed forces (i.e., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff when such position entails service component command, Commanding General-Gendarmerie, Commanding General-Service Component, Commanding General-National Guard).
- c. Been appointed commander of an operational combined command while holding a rank equal or senior to the highest rank held in his nation's service component.
- d. Been internationally recognized as having made a significant and enduring military or humanitarian contribution to international peace and stability (i.e., Commanding General of humanitarian relief or peace-keeping forces) while holding a rank equal or senior to the highest rank held in his nation's service components.³

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Figure 1. The twenty-sixth General Staff Class, Service Section, October 1945–February 1946. Interestingly, the only student not present for the photograph that day was Major Castillo.
Source: Photograph from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College archives, retrieved on January 12, 2017.

Notably, current requirements also state: “Individuals who have attained a qualifying position through means other than military merit are not eligible. Exceptions may be considered in rare circumstances on case-by-case basis.”⁷⁴ It is unclear if there exists any mechanism to review those officers already inducted who later are shown not to have gained their status through merit or whose later actions caused their suitability to be questioned.

One of the 77 officers inducted in 1973 was Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan major who graduated as an “allied officer” from the CGSC program in 1946 and went on to become his nation’s head of state. He did not get to that lofty position on his own, however. In 1954, the CIA orchestrated the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Guatemala—Operation PBSUCCESS, a covert-action program. Castillo’s ensuing term

as the President of Guatemala was marked by significant human rights abuses. He was assassinated in 1957. “Military merit” may not be the most accurate term to describe Castillo’s rise to power.

Operation PBSUCCESS

The story of the 1954 coup in Guatemala has been well told inside CIA as a case study and publicly through a limited number of declassified, historical documents and several books. As the Cold War kicked into high gear and the Eisenhower administration took power in 1953, the U.S. sought to ensure that at least its own neighborhood was secure, preventing communist expansion into Latin America. Coups were certainly one way to accomplish this goal, emplacing and propping up compliant leaders who would follow the lead of the U.S. Critics, of course, have reasonably pointed out the

hypocrisy of undermining democratic systems to preserve democracy.

By 1951, the newly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala City had initiated reforms that from the U.S. perspective could be construed as, at best, socialist and, at worst, communist. Arbenz sought to redistribute land from Spanish-speaking land owners and businesspeople—*ladinos*—to the native, ethnic-Indian, poor laborers—the *finqueros*. In this mix was an American company, United Fruit, which harvested bananas from Guatemalan land, employed tens of thousands of low-wage *finqueros*, and benefited from quite favorable financial and regulatory arrangements inherited from past Guatemalan governments. Arbenz sought better terms.

So on one side, there were the poor masses supported by a progressive government and most of the military and on the other side, rich land owners and American business interests. Upon his election in 1952, Eisenhower had filled his cabinet with pragmatic businessmen and the former head of the Plumbers and Steamfitters Union— “nine millionaires and a plumber.”⁵ This collection of successful capitalists was perhaps overly keen to interpret Guatemalan assertiveness as a threat to American business interests.

Indeed, as oil and protection of British commercial interests appeared to be motivations for the CIA’s 1953 TPAJAX overthrow of the Iranian government, so too the close ties between United Fruit and the Eisenhower administration seem to have inspired the 1954 PBSUCCESS campaign. While fear of communism was genuine, the commercial conflicts of interest of the Eisenhower administration were, in retrospect, astounding:

- The U.S. law firm that represented United Fruit was Sullivan and Cromwell; a lawyer from the firm who had previously negotiated on the company’s behalf was John Foster Dulles, now Eisenhower’s Secretary of

State.⁶

- His brother, Allen Dulles, also a former lawyer at Sullivan and Cromwell was Eisenhower’s Director of Central Intelligence.
- Thomas Dudley Cabot, who had been a director for United Fruit and president of the U.S. registrar bank for United Fruit, was the State Department’s Director of Security Affairs.
- Another former director of this same bank was Eisenhower’s Secretary of Commerce.
- The Special Assistant to the president for national security affairs had been the board chairman for United Fruit’s transfer agent.
- A future director of United Fruit was Eisenhower’s U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
- Eisenhower’s Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John Moors Cabot (Thomas Dudley’s brother), held significant stock in United Fruit.⁷
- Cabot’s predecessor as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edward G. Miller (1949-1952), had been a partner at Sullivan and Cromwell right before and then again right after PBSUCCESS (1947–1949 and 1953–1958). This was again the same law firm representing United Fruit and the former employer of the Dulles brothers.⁸

It was Edward G. Miller and Thomas Mann of the State Department who told then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles in July of 1952 that they wanted “a new government in Guatemala imposed by force if necessary”; DCI Walter Bedell Smith confirmed State Department approval and ordered that efforts to topple the Guatemalan government

should begin.⁹ After leaving government service, Bedell Smith accepted a membership on the board of United Fruit.¹⁰ In the declassified version of Cullather's *Secret History of PBSUCCESS*, it is Thomas G. Corocoran, United Fruit's "purveyor of concentrated influence" who is said to have arranged for former DCI Smith to join the board. As early as 1950, Corocoran had also met with Thomas Mann (among others) from the State Department to urge action be taken in Guatemala to oust the elected president.^{11,12}

Once the CIA received its orders, it needed someone to lead the insurgency. And by 1952, Carlos Castillo Armas had already been attempting to foment rebellion in Guatemala for some time. Following his graduation from the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College program in 1946, Castillo rose quickly through the ranks, at one point directing the Guatemalan military academy. He was on the wrong side of a 1949 power struggle in Guatemala and called for a military coup. Castillo "believed Army officers, inspired by the spectacle of his bravery, would overthrow the government and install him as president. Instead, they threw him in jail."¹³

Castillo "believed Army officers, inspired by the spectacle of his bravery, would overthrow the government and install him as president. Instead, they threw him in jail."

He later mounted a feckless assault, was again arrested, and eventually bribed his way out of prison, fleeing to Honduras. Castillo was in some contact with the CIA as early as 1950 and engaged with surrounding foreign leaders, seeking their support for his insurgent overthrow of the Arbenz government.¹⁴ United Fruit privately fortified Castillo with money and arms and initiated its own public relations/propaganda

operation against the Arbenz government.¹⁵ The CIA's PBSUCCESS planners believed a buildup of diplomatic and economic pressure, along with political agitation, sabotage, and rumor campaigns would lead to a popular uprising and the downfall of the Arbenz government. Castillo would invade with an insurgent force, the *coup de grace*.¹⁶

Unfortunately, Castillo's military leadership was soon in doubt. "The rebel army never impressed officials at CIA headquarters (Bissell [CIA Special Assistant and Deputy Director of Plans] later remembered it as "extremely small and ill-trained"), and in the months before the invasion, some in the PBSUCCESS hierarchy were beginning to have doubts about Castillo Armas's suitability for command."¹⁷ These doubts were apparently well-founded as, after the first three days of military action, a significant portion of his invasion force had been turned back, with much of the resistance mounted by local police and a small loyalist garrison with a courageous leader.¹⁸ Castillo had unwisely attempted to take and hold territory and had significant challenges with logistics.¹⁹

Luckily for PBSUCCESS, Castillo's insurgent force, ineffectual as it was, served at least as an effective psychological add-on to the ongoing diplomatic, economic, and highly-effective propaganda pressure exerted by the rest of PBSUCCESS and the U.S. government. Along with some last minute, limited air power approved by Eisenhower, these elements combined to tip the balance, and Arbenz was removed from power by his own military leadership. After some opposition by the deposed generals, Castillo was placed in power. He did not distinguish himself. Until his assassination in 1957, Castillo's rule was marked by human rights abuses and corruption. As Cullather notes in his secret history:

Case officers found him malleable and receptive to suggestions. But, as the State

Department soon learned, Castillo Armas's relationship to CIA had been dictated by his circumstances. As president of Guatemala, he was in a better position to press the demands of his primary constituency, conservative land barons and political opportunists. When the United States failed to provide enough aid to satisfy these groups, Castillo Armas was forced to appease them in other ways, through graft and preferment. The United States' heavy stake in Castillo Armas's success reduced its leverage in dealing with him. State Department officials were unable to bargain with the junta on a quid pro quo basis because they knew—and the Guatemalans knew—the United States would never allow Castillo Armas to fail. In Guatemala, U.S. officials learned a lesson they would relearn in Vietnam, Iran, [redacted] and other countries: intervention usually produces “allies” that are stubborn, aid-hungry, and corrupt.²⁰

The obvious parallels to more recent U.S. interventions are striking.

Castillo's Early Exposure to Intelligence

The twenty-sixth General Staff Class Program and Schedule for the Army's Command and General Staff College (October 1945–February 1946) notes Castillo and his classmates received briefings on basic and advanced general staff and command duties and military doctrine. Given his eventual involvement with the CIA, it is noteworthy that he was also provided instruction in intelligence. His coursework included: Sources of Information, including captured documents and prisoners of war, technical intelligence, reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance, visual aerial reconnaissance, espionage, underground forces and guerrillas, signal communications, and photo interpretation; Combat Intelligence, including operational use of intelligence including

psychological warfare; Counterintelligence, including internal security and censorship; Strategic Intelligence; and additional intelligence activities, such as public relations.²¹

One of Castillo's Intelligence instructors was Lieutenant Colonel Jules Dubois, a Military Intelligence officer and head of the Language Training section. He also served as Class Director for the Latin American military students.²² This likely gave Dubois and Castillo significant contact time throughout the year. Castillo would likely have been in the audience for lectures from Dubois on Army Service Forces Intelligence, Public Relations, Captured Documents and Prisoners of War, Technical Intelligence, and interestingly enough, Censorship.²³

There is no indication that the CIA had any connection to Dubois (nor to Castillo) during his time in the Army and specifically at CGSC...

Dubois would later leave the Army to become an accomplished journalist, working most conspicuously in Latin America. According to a scathing 1977 article in *The New York Times* about CIA involvement with the U.S. press, Dubois, asserted but never otherwise confirmed to have had at least vaguely defined connections to the CIA, was described by one former official as “well and favorably known” to the agency, though never on its payroll.”²⁴

There is no indication that the CIA had any connection to Dubois (nor to Castillo) during his time in the Army and specifically at CGSC, though at least one of Dubois' contemporary military intelligence instructors at CGSC had at least some interaction with the CIA's predecessor organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). From the 1946 CGSC archives, Intelligence instructor Lieutenant Colonel H.G.V. Hart noted in the bibliography for a class



Figure 2. The portrait of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas as it currently appears in the displayed gallery of the CGSC International Hall of Fame inside the Lewis and Clark Center on Fort Leavenworth, KS. The engraving reads, "Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, Commander in Chief of the Army, Guatemala, USACGSC 1946." The gold star at the top right of the portrait signifies he became the Head of State of his home country.

Source: Photograph taken by the author on January 12, 2017.

he was teaching on “Espionage, Underground Forces and Guerillas” that his lectures would be based on “ten days at OSS, Washington, D.C. during which time I studied reports and records of espionage and U/G activities and had numerous conferences with agents from the various theaters of operation and with chief of sections.”²⁵ Undoubtedly, Castillo was also in Hart’s audience. The only question is perhaps to what extent he absorbed the material.

Conclusions

It appears Eisenhower and successive presidents may actually have been misled by the perceived accomplishments of both PBSUCCESS and its predecessor, the 1953 TPAJAX overthrow of the Iranian government. They were both seen as exemplars for how best to meet U.S. security goals without the attendant risks associated with overt military intervention, especially with the menace of nuclear and then thermonuclear annihilation from a seemingly ever expansive Soviet Communist threat. The President, with relatively little “skin in

the game,” could direct the CIA to foment revolution and emplace a compliant figurehead to ensure U.S. regional influence. TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS, both at the start of Eisenhower’s Cold War administration, seemed to suggest such efforts could be accomplished easily. In hindsight, these two operations seem to have been more relevantly exemplars of beginner’s luck. And as with all luck, it tends to run out. Over time, “regression toward the mean” took over, and considerable failures and blow-back from revelations of nefarious CIA operations brought a more sober assessment of what covert action could and could not accomplish. It was not until the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion that this sort of intervention convincingly revealed at least its potential for large-scale, short term failure. It can take decades to see the longer-term, unintended consequences (good and bad) of these and other CIA covert-action programs.

While this particular covert action may have been a success for the U.S. in the short-term, Guatemala certainly suffered decades of, at a minimum, brutal autocratic leadership that

favored minority rich landowners and American business at the expense of the poor majority of its citizens. One can attempt to argue that policymakers and covert-action planners at CIA were not malicious in pursuing these covert initiatives, and offer that they had little understanding or experience with the potential for unforeseen, negative, long-term consequences. Alternatively, in the afterword to Cullather's declassified PBSUCCESS history, Piero Gleijeses points out:

I disagree that the men who engineered PBSUCCESS were well-intentioned. Their intentions were as old as international relations: they believed they were acting in the U.S. national interest. Any impact on the Guatemalan people was incidental: if they did not suffer in the process, so much the better, but if they did, *tant pis*. My own study of PBSUCCESS, which has been confirmed by the documents that the CIA has declassified and by Cullather's history, showed that the Eisenhower administration acted with supreme indifference toward the fate of the Guatemalan people. This cannot be described as being well-intentioned. It is, rather, wanton criminal negligence.²⁶

On the other hand, and although regional challenges remain, as of this writing there are no military *juntas* in Latin America, none of the countries is at war, and no major insurgencies remain (assuming continued progress between the government of Colombia and the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army]).²⁷ "Only time will tell" can certainly be used to dodge culpability. However, one might not unreasonably argue that decades of U.S. covert action, overt military, and other whole-of-government intervention and leadership has helped make lasting peace in the Western Hemisphere a possibility.

How does all of this reflect on Carlos Castillo Armas and his continued presence in CGSC's International Hall of Fame? His photograph is displayed prominently with all other inductees; it has a gold star in the top right corner that signifies he was at one point his country's head of state. Today, the vetting process is quite rigorous, and one can, of course, be much more comfortable with the quality of the officers more recently placed into the Hall, certainly those inducted after 1973. This is because CGSC simply did not have all available information on hand when Castillo was inducted. Remember that 77 officers were inducted together in 1973 to establish the Hall of Fame. Unfortunately, it was not until 1975—the "Year of Intelligence"—that the Church Committee hearings laid bare the CIA wrong doing in, among other locales, Latin America. It is unclear that a mechanism exists to re-evaluate the suitability of inductees. If a need exists to do so, Castillo Armas might serve as a useful case in point. **IAJ**

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Application of the Ethical Triangle in the 2014 Ebola Epidemic: A Case Study

by Katie Martinez and Marcos Martinez

I don't think that there could be any fair distribution of something which is available in such a small quantity.

*— Marie-Paul Kieny, Assistant Director General
of the World Health Organization*

Since 1976 there have been 25 Ebola outbreaks reported worldwide. Eight of these outbreaks occurred in the West Africa region.¹ Although recent drug research shows promising results, there are no approved vaccines or known curative therapies available. At the time of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, experimental Ebola therapies had not yet made it through human trials. The 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic resulted in an international containment effort and expedited the research and development of experimental drugs and vaccines. However, the supply and availability of these experimental therapies were extremely limited. Two American aid workers were among the first to be treated with an experimental drug called ZMapp. The provision of this experimental drug to two Americans ignited international controversy over the ethical allocation of a limited supply of experimental treatment.

Background

The 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic was the largest outbreak of the virus in history.² Initial outbreak estimates indicated 70 percent case-fatality rates; the World Health Organization

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(WHO) declared a “public health emergency of international concern.”³ The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates more than 11,000 individuals died in West Africa during the 2014 Ebola crisis.⁴

Humans contract the Ebola virus from contact with the blood, skin, or bodily fluids of infected primates.⁵ Symptoms are relatively non-specific and include fever, headache, muscle pain, vomiting, diarrhea, fatigue, and unexplained hemorrhage.⁶ Left untreated, the Ebola virus typically results in death. There is currently no Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved vaccine or curative therapy available for the Ebola virus.⁷ Treatment is focused on supportive care to allow the patient’s immune system to mount an adequate response to the virus.

During previous outbreaks, offering African patients drugs that had not been tested on humans or proven safe and effective for Ebola was considered unethical. One example of why this is considered unethical occurred in 1996 when Pfizer conducted a clinical trial of an experimental antibiotic in children during a meningitis outbreak in Nigeria.⁸ The Nigerian government and ethical council of Nigeria approved the provision of the experimental drug. However, Pfizer did not seek FDA approval because the clinical trial occurred outside the U.S.⁹

The use of this unproven experimental antibiotic was widely considered unethical for many reasons. Consent was not documented, there were charges that the patients were unaware that they were receiving experimental treatment, the medication had not been previously proven safe or effective in children, and some children receiving the therapy experienced complications or died as a result of receiving the medication.¹⁰ This Pfizer clinical trial conducted outside commonly accepted ethical guidelines is just one example of why using experimental therapies during disease outbreaks has historically been

considered unethical.

In August 2014, the WHO shifted its stance and declared that it was ethical to offer patients experimental treatments for the Ebola outbreak.¹¹ Due to the size and fatality rate of the 2014 West Africa outbreak, the consensus at the WHO was that the change in ethical guidelines was necessary to help contain the spread of the Ebola virus and reduce the fatality rate. Because these experimental treatments are not commercially made and available, the quantity and availability were limited, and not everyone infected with Ebola would receive them. This

During previous outbreaks, offering African patients drugs that had not been tested on humans or proven safe and effective for Ebola was considered unethical.

decision by the WHO led to a significant shift in the ongoing ethical debate about experimental drug use during a disease outbreak. The previous ethical question centered around the ethics of using experimental treatment during a disease outbreak. The WHO’s declaration that experimental treatment was ethical during the 2014 Ebola Crisis spawned a debate over a different ethical question: Who should receive the limited quantity of experimental drugs available during an epidemic?

In its statement declaring the shift in ethics regarding provision of experimental treatments, the WHO also issued a set of guidelines. One of these guidelines was a mandate to fairly distribute the scarce resource of experimental drugs.¹² The WHO acknowledged in its declaration that further ethical analysis and guidance would be needed to achieve this fair distribution.¹³ However, no further guidance to ensure ethical distribution of scarce experimental treatment was ever published by governing medical bodies

such as the WHO, CDC, or National Institutes of Health. There have been several authors who have provided ethical guidance for the allocation of a limited quantity of experimental drugs.¹⁴ However, none of these guidelines have been adopted by the international community.

ZMapp, the experimental drug for Ebola, garnered the most attention. Mapp Biopharmaceutical developed this experimental treatment in collaboration with the Public Health Agency of Canada, Defyrus, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, and Kentucky BioProcessing.¹⁵ The

Further convoluting the ethical question of how to allocate experimental treatment is the question of who makes this determination.

Department of Defense has a long history of involvement in research surrounding infectious diseases such as Ebola.¹⁶ This involvement stems from the military's concern of diseases that could potentially impact the effectiveness and readiness of troops. Two American aid workers were among the first individuals to receive ZMapp. Questions soon arose over why Americans were the first to receive the experimental treatment over others infected with Ebola in West Africa. This led to a global debate over the ethical allocation of experimental treatments available in limited quantities. This question has proven challenging to answer.

Further convoluting the ethical question of how to allocate experimental treatment is the question of who makes this determination. When responding to the ethical questions that arose after the provision of ZMapp to the American aid workers, it was made clear that Mapp Biopharmaceutical's only role in the distribution of experimental treatment was to respond to requests for the treatment.¹⁷ With no agency

stepping forward to provide concrete guidelines to ensure fair distribution, the determination of who would receive experimental treatment fell largely to the government. For example, Liberia received the last three doses of ZMapp in August 2014, and it was left to its government to determine who should receive the doses.

The Ethical Triangle

The Ethical Triangle is a model that can be used when faced with an ethical dilemma (see Figure 1). This ethical model allows the user to test a course of action (COA) against three different ethical approaches: principles, virtues, and consequences.¹⁸ Although the Ethical Triangle was originally intended for use by an individual, it can also serve as a model beyond the individual level because it allows for the testing of complex ethical decisions through three different approaches. Applying the Ethical Triangle to a situation allows for greater understanding of complicated ethical decisions. A more complete understanding of an ethical dilemma leads to the development of a logical and ethically-justified solution.

A principles-based approach emphasizes making ethical decisions on universally-accepted rules that always apply. These rules are often referred to as maxims. This approach also takes into consideration one's moral obligation. With a principles-based ethical approach, there is little focus on the immediate effects of a decision. More consideration is given to universally-applicable maxims that apply in the situation. When using a principles-based approach, two key questions are considered: "What rules exist?" and "What are my moral obligations?"¹⁹

A consequences-based ethical approach can also be considered a utilitarian-based approach. A consequences-based ethical approach primarily considers the consequence(s) as part of the act itself.²⁰ A key tenet of this approach is to focus on what decision produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people.²¹ When


THE ETHICAL TRIANGLE

Principles

“Act as if the maxim of your action
was to become a
universal law of nature.”
What rules exist?
What is my moral obligation?

Consequences

“Do what produces the greatest
good for the greatest number.”
What gives the best “bang for the buck?”
Who wins and loses?



Virtues

Golden Rule: “Do to others what
you would have them do to you.”
What would Mom think? WWJD?
What if my actions show up on the front page?

Figure 1. The Ethical Triangle depicting three different approaches to an ethical dilemma.

Source: Source: Jack D. Kem. "Ethical Decision Making: Using the 'Ethical Triangle,'" Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2016.

using a consequences-based approach, two key questions are considered: “What gives the biggest bang for the buck?” and “Who wins and who loses?”

A virtues-based ethical approach focuses on making ethical decisions based on a set of requisite skills or virtues.²² Virtues are not innately known, but are instead learned from others and practiced.²³ A fundamental tenet of a virtues-based approach is the old axiom “do unto others what you would have them do unto you.”²⁴ When using a virtues-based approach, two key questions are considered: “What would my grandmother think?” or “What if my actions showed up as the lead story in the news?”

The Ethical Triangle provides an ethical model that brings together three very different ethical approaches. This three-dimensional approach provides greater insight into complex ethical decisions and ensures that the resulting answer is well-reasoned and ethically sound. Application of the Ethical Triangle will ensure that the allocation of a limited supply

of experimental drugs during an epidemic or pandemic is ethically sound.

Application of the Ethical Triangle to Experimental Drug Allocation

Application of the Ethical Triangle to the decision of experimental drug allocation is a six-step process (see Figure 2, page 38).

To demonstrate the validity of applying the Ethical Triangle to the allocation of experimental drugs during an epidemic or pandemic, this article uses a case study from the 2014 Ebola Crisis. The case study chosen occurred in August 2014 when Liberia received three doses of the experimental drug ZMapp. Although not yet tested in humans, the results of using this drug in animal trials showed promise in the treatment of Ebola. These were the last known available doses of this potentially lifesaving drug. This case study will look at how the Liberian government could have used the Ethical Triangle when determining how to allocate these doses of ZMapp.

The Ethical Triangle Decision Making Model

1 *Truth v. Loyalty *Individual v. Community *Short-term v. Long-term *Justice v. Mercy

Step 1. Identify the ethical dilemma in terms of right versus right.

2 Step 2. Determine possible actions.

Step 3. Examine actions (alternative courses of action) through the lens of the three ethical systems.

- 3a. Principles-based ethics
- 3b. Consequences-based ethics
- 3c. Virtues-based ethics

4 Step 4. Step back and see if a “third” response, or an alternative COA presents itself.

5 Step 5. Make a choice.

6 Step 6. Implementation.




Figure 2. Depiction of the six-step process used when applying the Ethical Triangle to an ethical dilemma.

Source: Jack D. Kem. "Ethical Decision Making: Using the 'Ethical Triangle,'" *Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2016.*

Application of the Ethical Triangle: Step One

The first step is to identify the ethical dilemma.²⁵ This step is critical because identification of the ethical dilemma provides clarity and ensures that a predetermined decision is not made. As stated in the *Army Leadership Manual*, "Ethical choices may be between right and wrong, shades of gray or two rights."²⁶ Using the Ethical Triangle, the ethical dilemma of allocation of experimental treatment is defined in terms of right versus right. There are four categories of right versus right dilemmas: truth versus loyalty, individual versus community, short-term versus long-term, and justice versus mercy.²⁷ Framing the ethical problem in this manner will allow testing of recommended actions.

It is critical to take into consideration relevant contextual factors when fully ascertaining the ethical dilemma. One important contextual factor is that the supply of the experimental treatment

is extremely limited. In our case study, only three doses of ZMapp are available. Because the number of patients infected with Ebola greatly outnumber the number of available ZMapp doses there are many individuals who will not receive the treatment. Cultural attitudes toward the receipt of experimental treatment should also be a consideration. Studies have shown that fear of treatment already exists in the Liberian population despite communication about the treatments.²⁸ When taking these contextual factors into account, the ethical dilemma can be stated as, "Who should the Liberian government select to receive the three doses of ZMapp for the Ebola virus?"

Application of the Ethical Triangle: Step Two

The second step is to determine the possible COAs or decisions that can be made.²⁹ Although there may be COAs which are obvious, such as doing nothing, it is critical that all COAs be considered. In this case study, after considering

all choices, three possible COAs are identified:

- COA 1 would be to provide ZMapp to those involved in the provision of healthcare to others infected with Ebola. The rationale for this COA is that healthcare workers provide supportive care to others infected with Ebola. Supportive care could contribute to additional lives saved. At first glance, this course may provide the “biggest bang for the buck.”
- COA 2 takes a more egalitarian approach. Everyone infected with Ebola, who could clinically benefit from the drug, would be entered into a lottery providing a truly equal chance of receiving ZMapp.
- COA 3, doing nothing is always COA. The Liberian government could take an all-or-nothing approach and choose not to provide the three remaining doses to anyone with the Ebola virus. While no action may seem like it wastes the limited supply of ZMapp, with thousands of people infected with Ebola, COA 3’s “do nothing” approach is one way to ensure equitable distribution. In other words, if no one is prioritized to receive the experimental treatment, then everyone is treated fairly with regards to the distribution of ZMapp.

Application of the Ethical Triangle: Step Three

The third step is to examine the two most likely COAs through the perspectives of the three ethical systems of the Ethical Triangle.³⁰ When considering the three courses of action identified in step two, the first and second courses of action are the two most likely. The first is prioritizing healthcare workers infected with Ebola to receive the experimental treatment. The second is conducting a lottery, which includes all individuals infected with Ebola, to determine who receives the three

ZMapp doses. We will examine these courses of action from a principles-based ethical approach, a consequences-based ethical approach, and a virtues-based ethical approach.

Principles-based approach

When looking at each COA through the lens of a principles-based approach, the focus is on universally accepted rules and one’s moral obligation. Two primary questions are asked to analyze each COA through a principles-based viewpoint: “What rules exist?” and “What are my moral obligations?”³¹ The answers to these questions will provide insight into the ethical ramifications of each COA from a principles-based ethical lens.

The first question when analyzing courses of action from a principles-based approach is “What rules exist?”

In general, there are commonly-accepted, egalitarian principles that require resources to be distributed to minimize inequality in any form.³² When conditions of scarcity and competition for resources exist, the principles of material distributive justice come into play.³³ There are six commonly agreed upon material distributive justice principles: to each person an equal share, to each person according to need, to each person according to effort, to each person according to contribution, to each person according to merit, and to each person according to free-market exchange.³⁴ Which of the six principles are applied varies depending on the context and nature of the situation.³⁵

- The principles of “to each person an equal share” and “to each person according to need” do not apply to this case study given that the thousands of patients with Ebola who need treatment greatly outnumbers the three doses of ZMapp available. There is no feasible way to provide each person an equal share, and the need was overwhelming in the 2014 Ebola outbreak.

- The principle of “to each person according to effort” refers to how much an individual “tries” in a society regardless of the outcome.³⁶ This rule is not applicable to the case study or the courses of action chosen due to the sheer volume of individuals needing this medication and the extremely limited supply.
- The principle of “to each person according to contribution” refers to the overall economic contribution of an individual to society and could be considered applicable in this case.³⁷
- The principle of “to each person according to merit,” which is distribution based on what each person deserves would only apply on a small scale in this case. For example, an individual in prison for having committed murder would arguably be less

...given the limited supply of ZMapp there is no feasible way to ensure that all citizens were provided equal treatment.

deserving of receiving a drug that was in limited supply than an individual who abides by the laws of society. However, given the scale of this Ebola outbreak, it is not practicable to distribute three doses of ZMapp based on merit.

- The principle of “each person according to free-market exchange” refers to a capitalist-type approach of supply and demand.³⁸ Given that there is a clear demand for a drug in limited supply in this case study, this principle is applicable. The supply of ZMapp in this case is limited, which inherently brings about competition for who will be selected to receive this potentially life-saving experimental treatment.

Choosing COA 1 violates the basic egalitarian principles of minimizing inequality by prioritizing a group of individuals (health care workers) above another (non-healthcare workers). It is also important to analyze COA 1 with the principles of distributive justice that apply to this case: to each person according to contribution and to each person according to free-market exchange. It appears that prioritizing healthcare workers supports the principle of “to each person according to contribution” by considering the healthcare workers’ current contribution to society. The healthcare workers provide necessary supportive care to other patients with Ebola, contributing to the saving of lives in Liberia. Prioritizing healthcare workers does not support the principle of “to each person according to free-market exchange.”

COA 2, a lottery including all Ebola patients, appears to better support egalitarian principles by minimizing inequality. A lottery does not support the two distributive justice principles that apply in this case which are: to each person according to contribution and according to free-market exchange. This COA essentially negates any form of consideration of a person’s contribution. It also does not allow for free-market distribution of ZMapp in this case.

The second question when analyzing COAs from a principles-based approach is “What are my moral obligations?”

Inherently, one’s moral obligations would be to treat all individuals as equal. In this case, the Liberian government is the decisionmaker, and the state’s moral obligation is to ensure that all its citizens are provided equal treatment and have equal access.³⁹ Regardless of which COA we are looking at, given the limited supply of ZMapp there is no feasible way to ensure that all citizens were provided equal treatment. However, equal access to treatment could also be considered a moral obligation. A third moral obligation should also be considered and that is the obligation of the Liberian government to save as many lives

as possible.

COA 1, which prioritizes healthcare workers does not align with the moral obligation of ensuring equal access for all citizens to ZMapp. If the experimental treatments save the lives of the healthcare workers, then arguably additional lives will be saved because of those healthcare workers continuing to provide care to other Ebola patients. While this may border on a consequences-based ethical approach, it still supports the moral obligation that the Liberian government should save as many of its citizens lives as possible.

COA 2, a lottery, would better ensure equal access to treatment. With no established prioritization, everyone is given a fair shot at receiving ZMapp. This COA firmly supports the moral obligation of the Liberian government to ensure that all its citizens are provided equal access to treatment. COA 2 does not support the moral obligation that the Liberian government should save as many lives as possible.

From a principles-based ethical approach, there are arguments for both COAs. Prioritization of healthcare workers supports the widely-accepted distributive just principle “to each person according to contribution.” It also supports the moral obligation that the Liberian government should save as many lives as possible. COA 2 supports the moral obligation of the Liberian government is to provide equal civilian access to treatment. COA 2 also supports the egalitarian principle of minimizing inequality. Following a principles-based approach, it appears that both COAs are on relatively equal ethical footing. However, there are still two other ethical approaches to take into consideration when deciding between these two COAs.

Consequences-based approach

When looking at each COA through the lens of a consequences-based ethical approach, the focus is on the consequences of the action. This

analysis can be challenging especially when considering all the potential second and third-order effects.⁴⁰ For this case study, we will be asking two primary questions to analyze each COA: “What gives the biggest bang for the buck?” and “Who wins and who loses?”

“Bang for the buck” in this case study centers on the number of lives saved and containment of the Ebola outbreak.

The first question when analyzing COAs from a consequences-based approach is, “What gives the biggest bang for the buck?”

In this case study, it is important to consider this question from the perspective of the Liberian government. They are primarily concerned with the containment of this Ebola crisis to protect the health and welfare of its citizens and ensure the survival of the country. “Bang for the buck” in this case study centers on the number of lives saved and containment of the Ebola outbreak.

COA 1, which prioritizes healthcare workers to receive ZMapp, potentially results in lives saved of healthcare workers. These healthcare workers can further aid in the management of the Ebola crisis and save additional lives. Given that the focus of the Liberian government is the health and welfare of its citizens, this COA potentially provides more than just three lives saved from the initial ZMapp doses.

COA 2, a lottery for determining who receives ZMapp, will most likely save the lives of only the individuals selected to receive ZMapp. When considering “bang for the buck,” those chosen from the lottery will most likely not be healthcare workers. Therefore, the assumption is that number of lives saved will most likely be only the three individuals that receive ZMapp, and that those individuals who receive ZMapp will not directly aid in the containment of the Ebola outbreak.

The second question when analyzing COAs from a consequences-based approach is “Who wins and who loses?” From the perspective of the Liberian government, the focus on who wins and who loses centers around the containment of this Ebola crisis and the protection of the health and welfare of Liberian citizens to ensure the survival of the country. To “win” lives need to be saved, and the Ebola crisis needs to be contained.

From the perspective of the Liberian government, the focus on who wins and who loses centers around the containment of this Ebola crisis and the protection of the health and welfare of Liberian citizens...

At first glance, it appears that with COA 1 it is just the healthcare workers receiving ZMapp who win, and all others not prioritized for treatment lose. However, if the healthcare workers survive because of their treatment and continue to provide care to other Ebola patients, then those that receive care are “secondary” winners. With COA 1, it is likely that there will be more “winners” than just the three workers. Providing care to patients will help contribute to the containment of Ebola. Both the secondary winners and contributions to the containment of the Ebola outbreak translates to a win for the Liberian government due to the focus on the health and welfare of its citizens and containment of the Ebola outbreak. However, the Liberian government may lose trust with its citizens if perception of fair treatment with ZMapp is lacking.

COA 2, a lottery for determining who receives ZMapp, reveals a different set of winners and losers. The three individuals who receive ZMapp are winners; however, it is unlikely that there will be any “secondary” winners as in COA 1. Arguably another winner

with COA 2 is the Liberian government. COA 2, which does not prioritize any individuals, may help in maintaining the people’s trust by proving that the government fairly considered all its citizens for treatment.

Based on the analysis above, COA 1 better aligns with a consequences-based ethical approach. Prioritization of healthcare workers provides the biggest “bang for the buck” by having the potential to result in more lives saved than just those with the three initial ZMapp doses. COA 1 also leads to more individuals who “win” when looking at “secondary winners.” Following a consequences-based approach, it appears that COA 1 is more ethically sound. However, there is still one other ethical approach to take into consideration when deciding between these two COAs.

Virtues-based approach

When looking at each COA through the lens of a virtues-based approach, the focus is on what a virtuous person would do.⁴¹ For a virtues-based ethical approach the two questions typically considered are “What would my grandmother think?” and “What if my actions showed up as the lead story in the news?” These questions are more fitting for an individualized approach, so for this case study we will be using a broader question to analyze each COA: “What if the decision appears as the lead story in the news?”

The question of “What if the decision appears as the lead story in the news?” is important for the Liberian government to consider.

It is important that the decision made is one that the Liberian people and global community regards as virtuous.

COA 1, which prioritizes healthcare workers, would most likely appear as the lead story in the news as not a virtuous decision. We can say this with relative certainty because when two American healthcare workers were prioritized to receive ZMapp, it was portrayed as an unethical

decision. The reason it was viewed as unethical is because it appeared to prioritize individuals based on their status as healthcare workers over equally deserving Liberians impacted by Ebola.⁴² However, a better characterization of this would be that it was not an ethical decision from a virtues-based, ethical decision-making lens. Prioritizing individuals based on any criteria, be it social status, financial status, or job status went against our commonly-held and accepted set of virtues.

COA 2, a lottery to determine who receives ZMapp, may be regarded as the more virtuous choice. It does not prioritize individuals based on any criteria and affords everyone an equal chance. COA 2 would most likely be portrayed in a positive manner as a sound ethical decision if it were to be the lead story in the news. Treating all humans as equal aligns with the global societies espoused set of virtues.

Based on the analysis above, COA 2 better aligns with a virtues-based ethical approach. By not prioritizing any individual based on job or status, this COA best adheres to the principle of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Following a virtues-based approach, it appears that COA 2 is more ethically sound.

Application of the Ethical Triangle: Step four

The fourth step is to revisit all potential COAs again and see if an alternative COA has presented itself. The reason for revisiting COAs again is that during step three, another solution outside of the two selected COAs may have presented itself. In this case study, only one additional COA presented itself.

During the application of a principles-based ethical approach, one principle of distributive justice “to each according to free-market exchange” revealed another COA not previously considered. This COA would be allocation of ZMapp based on an individual’s ability to pay. In other words, true supply and demand principles,

where ZMapp would go to the highest bidder. However, because this capitalistic approach would not be considered an ethical COA among the global community, it was not considered further in this case study.

Prioritizing individuals based on any criteria, be it social status, financial status, or job status went against our commonly-held and accepted set of virtues.

Application of the Ethical Triangle: Step Five

The fifth step is to make a choice based on the analysis conducted in steps one through four. When making a choice, it is important that the context of the organizational climate and culture as well as the professional values of the organization are taken into consideration. In this case study, the Liberian government values the health and welfare of all citizens above other interests. From a principles-based approach, both COAs appear to be on equal ethical footing. From a consequences-based approach, COA 1 was a clear choice. From a virtues-based approach, COA 2 was a clear choice. Given that the Liberian government must consider all citizens, and a virtues-based approach tends to be more individualistic, more weight was given to the consequences and principles-based ethical approaches when making a final decision in this case study. Based on the ethical analysis above, COA 1, prioritizing health care workers to receive ZMapp, is the COA that should be chosen.

Application of the Ethical Triangle: Step Six

The sixth and final step is implementation of the choice.⁴³ After working through the previous five steps, the decision for allocation

of experimental treatment has been examined from multiple ethical angles and is well reasoned. Three healthcare workers with Ebola, who meet the necessary clinical parameters, should be given ZMapp. In this case study, this is exactly what the Liberian government chose to do.⁴⁴

Military Application

As evidenced by the collaboration involved in the development of the drug ZMapp, the U.S. military is often involved in the research and development of experimental therapies. However, with regards to the distribution of experimental therapies, military leaders are more likely to function as advisors when allocation decisions are made or implementers of allocation decisions. Although the decision for how to allocate experimental treatment will more than likely continue to fall to the state, for military leaders to effectively implement the treatment allocation decisions, it is crucial that there is an understanding of the ethical reasoning process used to make these decisions.

Conclusion

In the event of another epidemic or pandemic without a curative therapy available, the need to use experimental treatments could occur again. Given the ethical implications that arise with allocation of these experimental treatments with scarce availability, we recommend the deciding authority apply the Ethical Triangle to assist in determining the allocation of experimental drugs. Application of the Ethical Triangle will lead to a well-reasoned ethical approach to a situation that has shades of gray or two “right” answers. Additionally, when implementing the decision, it allows the decision-making authority to better articulate and maintain transparency with the community regarding the ethical reasoning that led to the decision that was made. The Ethical Triangle is a useful tool in ensuring that the allocation of a limited supply of experimental drugs during an epidemic or pandemic is ethically sound. **IAJ**

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Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium

An intellectual forum co-sponsored
by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
and the CGSC Foundation, Inc.

2018 Ethics Symposium Announcement and Call for Papers

The United States Army Command and General Staff College and the CGSC Foundation, Inc. will co-host the ninth annual Fort Leavenworth Ethics symposium April 30-May 1 in the Lewis and Clark Center on Fort Leavenworth. This year's symposium theme is "The Impact of Diverse Worldviews on Military Conflict."

CGSC is issuing a call for unpublished papers for the symposium. Authors are invited to submit their papers for consideration. Selected presenters will be asked to facilitate lively discussions about their work. Please consider the ethical aspects of the topics below and submit an abstract (300-500 words) that includes a narrowed topic with a clear thesis statement and brief outline of the topic you intend to write about. This will be an unclassified symposium.

Views of War

- As the United States refocuses on large scale military operations against peer or near peer threats, what ethical considerations should guide the use of military force, personnel or technology as we seek to gain the upper hand without violating our ethical principles?
- Has adherence to the Just War Tradition or international agreements like the Geneva Convention lost its utility as a guide for military conflict with adversaries who may not share our same worldview and ethical underpinnings?
- How do we steel the heart and mind of the American Soldier so that their confidence in political leaders and lawmakers enables them to ethically engage in the application of violence with a clean conscience? How does the United States' approach to war impact the moral resiliency of the Soldier?
- Have policy makers in the United States moved away from the Just War criteria found in the Western Just War Tradition, such as "just cause" and "last resort," and, if so, what criteria are now in use? How do policies such as the so-called "Powell Doctrine" or the "Weinberger Doctrine" or other more recent doctrines fit with or challenge the original Just War principles?
- What is the ethical impact on the American Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine if traditional Just War principles are eroded or revised?
- How do other nations view the ethics of war? How does this compare/contrast with the United States' view on the ethical conduct of war?
- How does the rest of the world view the criteria used by the United States to justify military interventions and other military operations? Have views of the U.S.'s moral authority changed, for better or worse, due to the country's military actions?

Regional, State, Non-State Challenges or Emerging Threats

- How can we determine the prevailing worldview or ethical framework of a specific state or a group of non-state actors? How important is it to understand the prevailing worldview or ethical framework of states or groups with which we are in conflict? Or of our Allies?
- Can we increase cooperation and decrease conflict in various regions of the world by learning more about the underlying issues that generated conflict? Or is that information only useful before conflicts arise and after military solutions have been enacted (in the post-conflict rebuilding phase)?
- What are some of the key underlying political, economic, or cultural issues in the following areas that might not be well understood by U.S. participants: North Korea, China, Russia and the "near abroad," the Philippines, Caucasus, Syria, Iran and its neighbors, or the African continent?
- What ethical implications do recent military activity in Syria, the Ukraine, and Russia's "New Generation Warfare" have for potential future conflict?
- What U.S. military involvement can we expect in the future against IS? Does IS have an ethical code with regard to conduct of war/conflicts? Does the U.S. have a regional obligation to deal with the threat of IS? What are our ethical obligations to regions where IS has spread?
- What are the non-conventional or emerging threats the world will face in the next decade and how is America ethically prepared to engage those threats? Can we predict any of these conflicts or threats through a better understanding of different worldviews?
- What are the different ethical approaches of private enterprise and national security entities? Can those differences be reconciled in order to maintain public trust and preserve national security?

It is the goal of Command and General Staff College and the Command and General Staff College Foundation to facilitate lasting relationships among the military and civilian academic community. To accomplish this goal, we will invite military, academic and professional personnel to participate in this year's symposium. This will allow us to build a community of expertise that includes both military and non-military thinkers.

Deadline for abstracts: January 12, 2018

Notification of abstract selection: January 19, 2018

Symposium date: April 30 – 1 May, 2018

Contact the symposium coordinator with questions or to submit abstracts:

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Why We Keep Getting it Wrong: What Makes the JIIM so Different?

by William J. Davis, Jr.

I used to have 5,000 people who would hang on my every word, now I can't even get my desk to do what I want it to, why won't these civilians listen to me?

— Anonymous former brigade Commander

When I told a senior military officer who had spent significant time working on Capitol Hill and who had deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan that I was thinking about writing on the leadership challenges within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment, his eyes opened wide and he stated, “Yeah good topic, *they* need all the help *they* can get. After watching the people from the Department of State and on the National Security Council, I can tell you that *those people* don't know how to do any leading.” This perspective on leadership in the JIIM is wrong for so many reasons. This officer had fallen into a common ethnocentric trap very often espoused by leaders – that any dysfunction in and across organizations can be remedied with some good old-fashioned leader-subordinate leadership, similar to that which can be exercised within a single organization. What the leaders who espouse this forget is that not all situations, organizations, or environments are amenable to the significant hierarchical underpinnings so crucial to the success of most leaders within a single organization. As it was so aptly noted by the former brigade commander quoted above, in an organization that values mission and hierarchy above all else¹ perhaps it is a little harder to lead in an environment where there is no hierarchy, no standard operating procedures, misaligned interests, and where even the concept of a lawful order is laughable.

In an address to the Joint Forces Staff College in 1993, General Anthony Zinni discussed the leadership challenges of a joint, multinational, and interagency environment. The surprising aspect of his remarks is that when viewed today, it is as if he were providing his insights about

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the current JIIM environment. It appears that in the past quarter century, the dynamics and associated problems with leading in that environment have neither changed nor been solved. The same issues are endemic. Some may offer that it is the institutional structure that begets the problems, but it might be offered that the traditional leader-subordinate model of leadership considered desirable and practiced within most organizations does not prepare leaders to excel in an environment that has little structure. Too often, personnel from one organization will disparage those not from their organization as “non-team players” or disregard situations as “hopeless,” when in fact the only delinquency of either is that they do not fit the model in which the leader has been inculcated as the only valid model for organizational leadership and structure.

When I asked a senior State Department member who was to be posted to a troubled country of critical strategic interest to the United States, “How do you even begin to address the myriad of significant problems within the country without angering the country’s officials by placing demands on them?,” he gave me an answer that would be completely unfamiliar to most leaders who have been indoctrinated into classical models of leadership. He answered, “I will carefully observe the situation and wait for an opportunity to help when I can, align interests if I can, and have the patience to do neither if I must.” This assessment of the situation and the myriad of leadership/management options that the Department of State officer could potentially employ should become part of a model for the JIIM leader who wants to successfully lead.

Too often JIIM leaders use only the leadership techniques they developed while working in a hierarchical, mission oriented, structured organization and then lash out (as the colonel in the introduction did) that the other people in the JIIM do not know how to lead. The first step of any planning or problem solving

evolution is to gain situational awareness and often JIIM leaders are deficient when evaluating the leadership environment when outside his or her organization. This article will provide a general situational awareness of the leadership environment in the JIIM.

Setting a climate of cooperation is quite possibly the most difficult task of the leader. Unfortunately there are leaders who either are not really committed to the concept of cooperation (most likely based upon some institutionalized sense that it is competition that gets results) or have subordinates who are not intelligent, competent, team-oriented or gifted enough to see beyond their interests and put the team first.

Setting a climate of cooperation is quite possibly the most difficult task of the leader.

When I first observed this type of friction and in-fighting amongst people who should have been on the same team (an Air Wing of the U.S. Navy on aboard an aircraft carrier), it was a personal revelation for me. But what I also observed was that there were mechanisms in place to force compliance from any teamwork saboteurs. However, imagine my surprise when I observed the same disparate interests and respective degrees of diverse behavior during the planning of a NATO operation, but realized that no forcing mechanisms existed in the JIIM to truncate those who had misaligned (either valid or non-valid) interests in following the leader.

It was in this JIIM environment that I realized that before I could determine the optimal way to get things done and achieve my organization’s mission that I needed to do an analysis of the environment and determine what made it so foreign and frustrating for leaders.

What follows are seven key enduring aspects of the JIIM that a leader must appreciate in order to be able to successfully lead and operate.



Figure 1. "They will not be like you."

Each will be addressed in kind with a “*Critical Attribute for the Leader*” summary provided at the end.

1. They will not be like you
2. There is no doctrine to which every participant adheres
3. Your goals and objectives are not, and will not be, congruent with others’ goals and objectives
4. There is no such thing as an order among all the participants
5. Your organization may not be liked or wanted in the JIIM by all participants
6. Language will be difficult
7. Expect no adaptability and flexibility

They will not be like you

While this first enduring aspect of the JIIM environment appears to be straight out of the book of “Captain Obvious,” it requires stating because too often others are viewed through an ethnocentric lens as shown in the illustration above.

Each organization has developed its own culture and subsequent values and expectations from its leaders. It is well known that being a member of the military entails inculcation into a very unique culture of tradition, discipline, and obedience to hierarchy with an unquestioned dedication to mission accomplishment. Even though the military has always tried to promote balancing the needs of its people with mission accomplishment (hence aphorisms such as “people first, mission always”) research has shown that it is the mission that has precedence over any competing values.² So, a military

leader will often enter into an effort expecting everyone else to have that same focus. Also, it is equally well known that even among the Services, military personnel will often disparage others who do not *exactly* reflect their culture. Members of the U.S. Air Force will often become the brunt of humor because they are perceived to be not as “military” as the other Services, even though their culture has generated what it takes to be the best air force in the world. Social Identity Theory informs the inclination of humans to formulate a “them versus us” perspective, and it is this tendency that creates a barrier to effectively interacting in the JIIM.³ One cannot expect a member of the Department of State to forgo building long-term relationships for the sake of mission expediency just as a member of the Department of State should not expect a U.S. Military member to disregard planning protocol when considering action. It is precisely this appreciation for the differences and subsequent potential oppositional behaviors and expectations that the JIIM leader needs to embrace.

Critical Attribute for the Leader:

It is important to understand that someone from another organization who looks different, acts different, or is differently focused than the leader’s culture, is not necessarily wrong. Tolerance and appreciation for the unique contributions of every organization is required to successfully address the problem that brought everyone together in the first place.

There is no doctrine to which every participant adheres

It has taken the United States Military over 30 years to develop a robust doctrinal library of how it expects to conduct Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational operations. However, what that doctrine fails to adequately address is that other stakeholders in the JIIM are neither obliged nor necessarily inclined to

follow that doctrine. There is no single agreed upon source for how to operate in the JIIM. Each organization may have volumes of operations manuals on how *it* will conduct business, but there is no doctrine that everyone involved in the JIIM will follow. This means that leaders who operate in the JIIM will have to be adaptable and flexible in how they interface with other entities. Any type of coordinated action that needs to be taken to address problems will have to be negotiated.

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An oft shared and aspired to metaphor for managers and leaders is that of comparing the leader to the conductor of a symphony orchestra. It offers that the leader should be like a conductor; ensuring every part of the orchestra plays from the same sheet of music, thus eventually resulting in a coordinated entity that is greater than the sum of its parts. In the JIIM, this vision is a complete fantasy. When there is a lack of shared operating procedures, leaders should aspire to be like a member of an improvisational jazz band. Every band member is quite adept at playing their instrument, but the music is not tightly synchronized and choreographed. Each member improvises his or her talents to create an impressive and beautiful piece of musical art equal to a symphony, with the leader of the improvisational band as well as the timing and tempo of the music changing according to the needs of the musical environment. This metaphorical understanding of how leadership actually is in the JIIM versus how everyone wishes it were is very important for leaders to grasp as they may tend to get frustrated with the seeming lack of control that any one entity has.

Critical Attribute for the Leader:

When operating within the JIIM, there is no single way to operate that is prescribed among stakeholders. Leaders have to remain flexible and adaptable, and be willing to negotiate to determine how best to operate with other entities as the situation and environment dictate.

Your goals and objectives are not, and will not be, congruent with others' goals and objectives

I once helped develop a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief exercise for a professional military education institution that attempted to emulate the many differing agendas one might encounter in the JIIM. Many scripts were developed for participants that provided underlying agendas for participants in the effort.

...the JIIM is not monolithic and is for the most part an ad hoc conglomeration of organizations.

During a hot-wash after the exercise one of the participating international officers asked to see the scripted agenda for the American participants. This request took me by surprise. Because of my ethnocentric hubris, I had failed to develop one. In my mind the Americans were there for no other reason than to do charitable deeds and relieve suffering with no underlying motive. Of course, this is not always the case.

The United States, like every other country, has foreign policy goals and anytime it uses its resources and power around the world, it should be done so in support of those goals. So while this section addresses the concept of others' agendas, be aware that every other entity will be presupposing that whatever organization you represent also has an agenda or underlying motivation. Because of this, do not expect others to blindly accept your proposals or actions as being "for the greater good." JIIM leaders must

devote energy to the building of trust (or at least acceptance that your motives and objectives will not inhibit or contradict someone else's motives or objectives).

For the majority of organizations, regardless of origin, a person who wants to be successful in that organization must inculcate the values espoused by that organization. Most corporations, institutions, and government agencies go to great lengths to ensure that the organization has a published set of values and goals so as to focus the efforts of its personnel. However, the JIIM is not monolithic and is for the most part an ad hoc conglomeration of organizations. Thus, a shared set of values, goals, missions, or purpose does not singularly exist for any mission undertaking.

If a natural disaster again occurs similar to the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti, countless entities can be counted upon to arrive upon the scene to provide help. However, other than the fact that those entities are present, their motivations for being present will be as numerous as there are entities.

Imagine that you are the commander of Joint Task Force "Unified Response," responsible for the direction of 17,000 military personnel in and around Haiti. Your main focus in the early days would probably be to get the airport operational so that critical relief supplies can make it to the island in a timely fashion. In the middle of all your efforts a celebrity who is a proponent of a non-governmental organization (NGO) requests a landing time at the airport. Despite your exhortations that it is more critical to get relief supplies in rather than an entourage, you are ordered by your higher headquarters not only to ensure a landing time for the celebrity, but also that you must meet with the celebrity to figure out how best to support the efforts of the NGO he or she represents.

Or imagine that you are told your focus is the immediate relief of human suffering. So even though you might have determined that making sure the local environment is secure is a critical



Figure 2. "Your goals and objectives are not, and will not be, congruent with others' goals and objectives."

element to success, you are told not to do that and that your force will have to rely on others such as the United Nations to counter-act profiteers or other factions that threaten the mission. And, by the way, adding to your frustration is that you will have no control over how the United Nations does this. These scenarios all can and do occur. A leader in the JIIM must be aware that others might view efforts to coordinate actions as nothing more than a "fig-leaf for co-optation."⁴

As shown in the illustration above, what all this means is that any leader working in the JIIM cannot assume that there will be a single mind-set or self-sacrificing value among those who respond to the situation.

Each organization will focus on its values, interests, and reason for existence. Therefore, you must be willing to operate within an environment that will present competing and sometimes paradoxical values.

Critical Attribute for the Leader:

A leader in the JIIM must appreciate and be aware of the differing pressures that each contributing organization will be experiencing to support its unique mission-set and satisfy *its* stakeholders.

There is no such thing as an order among all the participants

There is no hierarchy within the JIIM, hence, there is no such thing as tasking or ordering another entity to do anything. The entities that participate in undertakings in the JIIM are doing so under ad hoc and voluntary agreements. If the Spanish government sends a battalion of infantry to aid in stabilizing an African nation, that battalion is obligated first and foremost to the achievement of the political objective(s) the Spanish government hoped to achieve by sending them. If a lead nation

“lead nation” is a loose term which usually means “coordinating nation”) tries to order the battalion to conduct a mission that the Spanish government deems as not congruent with its goals, then the battalion has every right to (and usually will) refuse the mission. Also, NGOs are not obligated to any organization and will usually only cooperate when it is in their best interest to do so. This behavior befuddles many JIIM leaders who have grown up in what is most likely a hierarchical government bureaucracy. Even the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, two organizations that at first glance appear to be polar opposites in their approaches to national security, share a very high organizational value of adherence to hierarchy.⁵ But alas this is not always the case with the myriad of JIIM players.

From a United States’ perspective, any action taken within the JIIM, either self-directed or in concert with other entities, requires two constructs: authority (legitimacy) and resources. Leaders should ask two questions as they conduct operations abroad: “Do I have the authority to do what I am about to do?” and “Do I have the resources available (or legally allocated to me) to do what I am trying to do?” Authority to conduct operations primarily rests upon numerous legal constructs ranging from international law, customary international law, national law, host nation law, and/or intra-organizational policies and regulations. However, there is another more insidious aspect of authority that must be of concern - the aspect of normative legitimacy.⁶ It is normative legitimacy that generally requires more forethought when taking actions. You must determine if the populace (and other entities operating in the environment) will accept that you have the right to make rules and that they can be expected to follow your rules. Adhering to normative legitimacy requires a thorough appreciation for the complexity of the environment and the entities within. Suppose you belong to the U.S. Department of Justice and you arrive on scene in Haiti to represent

the United States in a United Nations’ effort to keep the peace. In the initial planning meeting you are asked to provide advisors who can patrol with the Haitian police to advise them during operations. You must first decide if your people have the lawful authority to act as advisors on operational patrols as well as what are your limits on aiding in case of need or even self-defense. The answers to these types of questions would constitute the “legal” construct of legitimacy. However, you also have to think about “normative” legitimacy questions. Will the population accept your presence? Will the formal and informal leadership of local governments accept your presence? These questions are more difficult to answer, but nonetheless are just as critical to mission success.

Critical Attribute for the Leader:

Since no entity in the JIIM has the authority to order another to do anything, it becomes necessary for the leader to be empathetic to the legal and political restrictions that accompany participation in the JIIM.

Your organization may not be liked or wanted in the JIIM by all participants

One of the missteps made by leaders in the JIIM is that they believe that somehow the problem that brought the participants together could not be solved if they were not there (otherwise, why would they be there?). But for many participants, the primary reason they are there is solely to protect their interests. Many NGOs may have been working in a country for years and may view the actions of other newly arrived participants as incongruent with their objectives and thus may openly resent or oppose your presence. Some countries might view another country’s presence as a threat (think about how Russia might perceive a U.S. presence in Eastern Europe after a natural disaster). The current situation in Syria provides an example

of numerous factions operating in a region that are oppositional in intent and action. Many do not like each other, will not cooperate, and even clash on occasion. Leaders in the JIIM must realize that “cliques” will form and that open and honest communication and coordination should not be expected from all participants.

Critical Attribute for the Leader:

Leaders need to do an assessment of the openness and willingness to cooperate of each participant in the JIIM. Assuming that all participants will be happy to see that your, or any particular, organization is participating would be creating a risk.

Language will be difficult

Most will easily recognize that different languages provide significant challenges in the JIIM; but, there is an even more insidious threat to good communication – jargon. Organizations have developed not only a series of acronyms that are commonly used, but each will have most likely developed a unique use language.

One of the most famous examples of this is the incident that occurred during the Department of Defense’s support to civil authorities in Los Angeles in 1992. The local police told the United States Marines to “cover me” with the intent that they would be ready to fire if needed. The Marines were trained that “cover me” meant to lay down a heavy base of live fire.⁷ This classic miscommunication illustrates the point concerning differing cultural perspectives of language. While most miscommunication is not as immediately life-threatening as the USMC example, over time it can be even more debilitating.

For example, an Army headquarters acting as the Joint Task Force Leader during a recent exercise was using Army jargon such as “Blank Six” and “Blank Five.” Not only did these terms mean absolutely nothing to the other Joint participants, they were even more alienating to

the interagency participants. When this was brought to the attention of those in charge, they only replied that this was the way it was going to be done so everyone needed to get used to it. This might be considered an utter failing move in the JIIM environment. In a JIIM meeting, if you assume that everyone in attendance understands the acronyms or jargon you use, opportunities for coordination or integration may be lost because the attendees do not understand precisely what you mean nor view the situation according to your interests.

Critical Attribute for the Leader:

Be specifically aware of the jargon of your culture. Avoid jargon at all times when addressing members of the JIIM environment. And do not assume that the language of others, even when similar to yours, holds the same meaning.

Expect no adaptability and flexibility

Try to visualize what it would take to get you to abandon the cultural values that have been a part of your actions and organization for years. Should the Department of Defense be expected to abandon the planning process because another organization finds it burdensome? Or should the Federal Bureau of Investigation focus on immediate arrests vice building an intelligence picture that might manifest a larger more insidious network of crime?

In each of these situations, the obvious answer is no. At Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), there are numerous agencies and nations that work together to prevent trafficking. However, there are no memorandums of agreement on file. The philosophy of the command is that JIATF-South operations need to be considerate of the interests of all the participants. The primary way to do this is to ensure that there are no “artificial” structures in place that require an organization or country to stay in the Task Force who does

not feel that its interests are considered. When the Task Force conducts operations, the interests of each organization are considered and integrated into the operation. This is done not by asking that an organization change to adapt to the operation, but rather that the operation uses the unique capabilities of each participant. As a leader in the JIIM, you must ask yourself what it would take to change the way you operate. If there is no answer to that question, then it is incumbent upon the leader to consider that expecting change from others is not a viable course of action.

Critical Attribute for the Leader:

Do not expect another participant in the JIIM to change the way it operates, but instead seek to find a “coupler” that will allow each organization to operate within its culture, pursue its interests, and add to solving the complex problem.

Conclusion

There is nothing that was written in this manuscript that seems especially difficult or insidious; it all appears to be common sense. However, as noted in the title, why is it so difficult to lead in the JIIM? The answer is because the environment is quite different than to that which most leaders have been normalized – one wherein the leader-subordinate model can be successfully applied. Many aspects of the JIIM environment are completely contrary to the environment in which most leaders learned to lead. By remembering the stark differences in the JIIM environment, the leader can begin to develop nuanced behaviors that optimize every capability brought by the other participants. Only then will the leader be able to make progress in addressing the complex challenges of operating and leading in the JIIM environment. **IAJ**

NOTES

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The Vision Process: Seven Steps to a Better Organization

by **Matthew J. Bonnot and Carey W. Walker**

*Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?
That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
I don't much care where—said Alice.
Then it doesn't matter which way you go, said the Cat.*

— *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, by Lewis Carroll*

When someone mentions the need for a vision in an organization, more seasoned leaders tend to roll their eyes at the concept and snicker and with good reason. New leaders seem to publish vision statements much the same way politicians promise to balance the budget. It is done with great hoopla and noise, but nothing seems to come of it. The vision statement goes into a file until the next leader takes over and publishes a new one. This happens for a couple of reasons. Vision statements are typically long, verbose declarations written in isolation, making them about as memorable as an annual shareholder report. On the rare occasions when they do pique our interest, they provide little direction for moving the organization into the future. In other words, they have no associated implementation plan. It does not have to be this way.

Members of the military are familiar with the term “commander’s intent.”¹ It is a statement that provides the purpose and desired end state for an operation. It clearly articulates the conditions required for mission success, which increases shared understanding within the organization and drives individual initiative. Everyone in the organization is charged with understanding the commander’s intent.

Intent statements from military commanders, however, are for specific missions and operations. How can leaders capture this concept while casting a wider net and shifting the focus

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


Figure 1. The Seven-Step Vision Process.

Source: Created by the authors.

to the organization as a whole? How can they improve the organization while still operating to accomplish the mission? It is through a vision process.

Books on leadership are replete with references on the importance of sharing a vision to provide organizations a sense of purpose, inspiration, long-term direction, and goals. Most come up short, however, on the mechanics of creating one, beyond the development of a short, pithy statement that will somehow catch lightning in a bottle and inspire unremittent loyalty within the organization. More significantly, these “expert” publications are deathly silent on the critical step of implementing a vision. We take a different approach. This article describes a process for creating and implementing a vision as part of a change strategy. It incorporates a seven-step methodology for tackling the very challenging—but very important—task of bringing meaning to the idea of an

organizational-level vision.

We begin with a definition. Organizational-level vision is a “picture of the future framed by a value-based purpose that creates a path to drive behavior, change, and motivation.” For ease of understanding, we can deconstruct the definition into three components using a variation of Senge’s governing ideas for a vision.²

- What: A picture of the future (i.e., “What we want”).
- Why: Framed by a value-based purpose (answers the question, “Why do we do what we do?”)
- How: Creating a path to drive behavior, change, and motivation.

The seven-step process is visually depicted in Figure 1.

The first four steps of the process cover the formulation of the organizational vision.

It is written from a leader’s perspective, since leaders are inherently responsible for the first two components of the vision, the “what” and “why.” This does not preclude collaboration by the leader, which is expected and encouraged. It simply recognizes the office of the person in charge and the associated decision-making authority that rests with the boss.

Steps five and six focus on developing the strategy for implementing the vision. At this point in the process, use of collaboration in the form of a guiding coalition is critical.³ The leader is transitioning the plan from concepts to constructive actions and needs a committed and collaborative team to formulate the effort.

The final step of the process is the execution of the plan. You cannot implement a vision without effecting change, so the fundamental ideas from Kotter’s critical work *Leading Change* are closely entwined within the discussion.

As you study the steps in the process, remember that implementing a vision is fundamentally a form of problem solving closely associated with Army design methodology.⁴ You identify your future state or objective (the “what”), explain the purpose for going there (the “why”), determine obstacles blocking the way (as part of your assessment), figure out how to take down the obstacles (the “how”), and then execute the plan. Leadership pundits tend to mystify the vision process because, typically, it is not done well. It is not rocket science. But it is hard. It takes time, persistence, and thought.

The Vision Process

Step 1: Begin an initial assessment of the organization.

New leaders usually begin assessing organizations prior to arrival based on previous knowledge, experience, reputation, research, and study. This preparation forms the foundation for the initial “what” and “why” of the vision. More

experienced leaders identify these components before setting foot within the organization. Less experienced ones, unfamiliar with the organization’s culture and operational focus, need time on the ground to gain situational understanding and uncover the shared beliefs that form the culture of the organization.⁵

Upon arrival, working with key members of the organization, new leaders continue their initial assessment. Earlier expectations are confirmed or denied based on personal impressions and continued gathering of information to form or revise a preliminary “what” and “why.” This is critical. Having a “what” and “why” allows leaders to better focus their initial assessment. If they know where they are going—unlike Alice in the opening quote—they can better determine problems that impede movement to this future state.

Leadership pundits tend to mystify the vision process because, typically, it is not done well.

Thus, a primary purpose of the initial assessment is to identify the obstacles organizations must overcome to navigate the way ahead. From a problem-solving perspective, without the “what,” the initial assessment has little focus or direction. You will identify plenty of potential problems as you analyze the organization, but true problems are the ones that block your path, not detritus on the side of the road.

Remember, the initial assessment continues throughout the first four steps of this process. It does not consist of walking around an organization for a day or two and suddenly achieving perfect understanding. Few people have a “eureka moment” when figuring out the “what” and “why” for their organization. It takes time and analysis.

Step 2: Develop an initial organizational-level vision.

As mentioned earlier, new leaders do not typically walk into organizations with preformed visions in their heads. But they should, based on their experiences and background, have some initial ideas developed on the “what” (a picture of the future) and “why” (framed by a value-based purpose) components of the vision. They then refine these ideas as discussed below during their initial assessment of the organization.

Simply stating the organization will be “the best” is equivalent to saying, “everyone is a winner.” It does little for motivation.

The challenges with describing a picture of the future for an organization are twofold. The leader must first have a “picture” of a future state. “Where are we going?” “What do we want the organization to look like?” This is easier said than done. Immediate demands tend to drive thinking and overwhelm any thoughts for long-term development.

The ability to step back and reflect is a deliberate act and does not occur by happenstance. But it is what organizational-level leaders get paid to do, and it takes an incredible amount of persistence to force a separation from the here-and-now and look to the future. To do it, the leader must have a good understanding of the organization—its mission and functions, the shared beliefs (i.e., cultural norms and values) associated with the most critical functions performed by the organization, its relationship to affiliated organizations, and its interdependence with the surrounding environment—all within a future timeframe nested with the boss’s vision (if he or she has one). Gaining this situational understanding can take time. Many leaders want to formulate the initial “what” prior to arrival so they can hit the ground running. Depending on

their experience, this may be unrealistic and, as a minimum, requires validation and adjustment as they go through their initial “on-the-ground” assessment (Step 1).

The second challenge with describing a picture of the future is ensuring the “what” is meaningful. Simply stating the organization will be “the best” is equivalent to saying, “everyone is a winner.” It does little for motivation. Everyone wants to be the best or already thinks they are. The “what” should inspire others by providing an organization-specific focus that is inextricably linked to the organization’s culture (i.e., the collective learning of the group).

For example, consider this from an educator’s perspective. The authors teach in the Department of Command and Leadership (DCL) at the Army’s Command and General Staff College. Should DCL be “the best teaching department in the college” or “serve as the Army’s premier organizational-level leadership resource?” The first “what” description might provide short-term gratification for the faculty, but would not sit well with other departments in the school; plus, it has a finite end state. What do you do when you become the best? You probably spend more time worrying about the performance of other organizations than your own. The second designation casts a much wider net by focusing on the actions that make the teaching department successful; it is a very challenging but attainable objective.

The concept of “a value-based purpose” means focusing on what is of value, worth, or importance to the organization when describing why we want to achieve some future state. It answers the question, “Why do we do what we do?” For example, a teaching organization finds value in enhancing life-long learning, meaning making, and critical thinking. What an organization holds in value is inextricably linked to its culture. The collective norms and valued outcomes form the shared beliefs that drive thinking and behavior in organizations.⁶

Assessment	Goals
The school has weak professional development programs and fails to promote from within.	Growing Talent
Tendency towards group thinking and over reliance on dated curriculum.	Generating Ideas
An inability to integrate new processes and procedures into the organization.	Using Systems Approach

Figure 2. Initial Assessment and Goals.
Source: Created by the authors.

Returning to the teaching organization example, the “why” component of the vision could be “to instill a desire in others, both in an out of the schoolhouse, to be better leaders.” This directly links to the three attributes of life-long learning, meaning making, and critical thinking. The challenge in formulating the “why” is moving beyond trite, formulaic statements to something that has meaning and “sticking power” in the organization. Putting the “why” within a functional context (i.e., “why we do what we do”) helps ensure success.

Step 3: Establish goals based on the initial assessment.

Implementing a vision is grounded in the fundamentals of problem solving. The “what” provides the end state or objective, and the initial assessment identifies the obstacles blocking the path. The missing link is the goals, the broad general actions for navigating the path and circumventing the obstacles. Once identified, the goals form the foundation for the “how” component of the vision.

Most leaders fail at implementing a vision because they never get beyond Step 2. They formulate the “what” and “why” prior to arrival, publish it as a vision statement once on the ground, and then move on to more pressing issues. Some make tweaks to the “what” and “why” of the vision based on their initial assessment. Most skip the third step because they do not understand the goal-setting process or suddenly realize how hard it is. Step 3 is the

transition point from words to action. Leaders must identify goals for the organization, and these goals must address the problems that impede forward movement.

Leaders that do get this far often struggle because they make the goals too broad and not problem specific: “It’s all about taking care of our people and our interagency partners.” These might, in fact, be very good words for a vision statement, but if the leader cannot identify a cause and effect relationship between an objective, obstacles, goals, and associated tasks, the organization probably is not headed in the right direction.

For our teaching institution example, a department might identify the following three goals based on the initial assessment listed in Figure 2.

Step 4: Complete the initial organizational-level vision.

The “how” component of the vision is the path the organization must follow to achieve the picture of the future. Formulating the “how” begins with the leader’s initial assessment of the organization and the identification of organizational goals. The leader must determine where the organization is, where it needs to go, and the barriers or obstacles that must be overcome to move the organization to that future state. Overcoming these hurdles requires driving change within the organization and motivating others by providing direction, intensity, and persistence to behavior.⁷ The “how” therefore,

based on the identified goals, describes in general terms a path to drive behavior, change, and motivation.

To affect change within an organization, leaders and a guiding coalition of key and influential members must share a vision...

If the leader has done a good job identifying the goals for the organization, the major challenge with the “how” is packaging. The leader must communicate these ideas within a vision that is short, concise, and meaningful. This is more important than you might think. The primary purpose is not having a vision statement you can publish and post (though that may happen). It is having a statement people can remember, talk about, and hopefully internalize. Here is an example using the teaching organization illustration:

The Department of Command and Leadership serves as the Army’s premier organizational-level leadership resource by instilling a desire in others, both in and out of the schoolhouse, to be better leaders. We do this by growing talent, generating ideas, and using a systems approach to drive excellence in the department.

The statement is written in the present tense because the vision process is an ongoing event. It embraces the idea that the change initiative is occurring now and not in some future time frame.

Step 5: Refine the goals based on guiding coalition input.

The perception to this point is that leaders conduct the first four steps primarily on their own. That is rarely the case. Depending on the organization, leaders begin building a guiding coalition of key and influential members prior

to arrival, if possible. To affect change within an organization, leaders and a guiding coalition of key and influential members must share a vision, which requires gaining commitment from the guiding coalition that will lead the implementation plan and foster a sense of urgency in its execution.⁸

Gaining this buy-in and input means giving the members a voice in the vision process,⁹ especially in establishing the implementation strategy (Steps 5 and 6). Obviously, the coalition must be on board with the “what” and “why” of the vision—they get a voice in this as well—but their most important input is refining the goals. Members must validate cause and effect relationships to ensure the correct problems are identified and the corresponding goals move the organization on a path to overcome the identified obstacles to achieve the future state. This is a difficult task. The leader cannot do this in isolation; it requires a team effort.

An effective method for building a guiding coalition and energizing a team is to create a sense of urgency throughout the vision-implementation process. There are several ways to do this. One approach uses commitment-focused influence techniques, which requires the use of personal power, the trust-based authority given to leaders by followers because of their admiration and respect for the person. Leaders that use this effective but time-intensive approach rely on relationship building and personal appeals to establish emotional bonds with their followers to create a cohesive team.¹⁰ Alternatively, leaders with less available time can create dissatisfaction with the status quo within the organization, a powerful catalyst for overcoming resistance to change.¹¹ Leaders have to increase dissatisfaction to the point where followers are willing to take action, but not tip the organization into apathy.¹² This increase in dissatisfaction could be through awareness—the intrinsic motivation of a better future to gain commitment—but the implementation plan

Steps to Empowering Others
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating a supportive work environment • Demonstrating trust in subordinates to build confidence and cohesion • Sharing of power, typically in the form of position power, to allow decision making • Training to provide necessary skills • Providing resources, especially time, to foster professional development and growth • Giving feedback to improve performance through a process of meaning-making

Figure 3. Steps to Empowering Others.
Source: Created by the authors.

most likely will include extrinsic motivation techniques as well to gain compliance.

Step 6: Establish prioritized tasks to support the goals.

While goals form the building blocks of the implementation strategy, prioritized tasks represent the concrete and measurable programs and activities required to support the goals. What makes this step especially difficult is the issue of resourcing. Material, manpower, and time come at a cost, and leaders must carefully plan and prepare their strategy using a systems approach as they weigh and prioritize tasks.

How you define the terms in this step (tasks, activities, programs) is up to you. The key point is that the strategy must translate the goals into integrated actions, and in this framework, we use the term “prioritized tasks” to represent the process. As in Step 5, this step requires a collective effort and the guiding coalition must be at the heart of the action. Additionally, as discussed in Step 2, goals and prioritized tasks must be nested with the vision of the parent organization. Initiating actions that run counter to the intent of your boss is the quickest way to stop an implementation strategy in its tracks.

Step 7: Implement change.

Executing an implementation strategy for an organizational-level vision is all about leading change. Throughout this discussion, we highlight

key components of the change models (sense of urgency, guiding coalition, dissatisfaction, and resistance) that relate to implementing a vision.

Two important components remain: empowering others and generating short-term wins.¹³ These components are critical because they tie to intrinsic motivation, the engine of commitment. Three primary factors drive intrinsic motivation.¹⁴ The first is having a sense of purpose, a “big picture” idea that provides direction that is both worthwhile and satisfactory. We use the “what,” “why,” and “how” components of the vision to appeal to this factor.

The second factor is autonomy. People like being self-directed, acting on their own initiative to achieve a measurable outcome without micromanagement or excessive supervision. Empowering subordinates is an important component of execution and if done properly through a supportive command climate will greatly enhance performance, motivation, and commitment.¹⁵ But it must be done deliberately and thoughtfully to set people up for success (see Figure 3).

The third factor that drives intrinsic motivation is mastery. People like to get good at what they do; it provides a sense of pride and satisfaction. It also leads to success, a key indicator of mastery. Leaders that understand this dynamic use short-term wins during the

execution of a vision strategy to gain buy-in for the plan, build momentum, enhance self-direction, and strengthen commitment. Without short-term wins, followers become disillusioned, dissatisfaction grows, and resistance overwhelms the change effort.

A final point to consider is the importance of continued assessment. An organizational-level vision is not a static document. It is an active and dynamic process that requires continuous monitoring, evaluation, and adjustment. As the operating environment changes, so must the strategy and execution that could require additional refinement of goals and prioritized tasks.

Conclusion

This article provides an overview and methodology to guide your thinking. You will undoubtedly revisit several steps during the process as you refine your thinking and consider recommendations from your guiding coalition.

While this article is written for new leaders arriving in organizations, the process works as well for those serving in current leadership positions. In fact, it is easier for incumbent leaders to execute the seven-step vision process because of their familiarity with the organization's culture. This could be an important selling point when you attempt to convince your boss of the need for an organizational-level vision.

Remember, the vision process takes significant time, substantial planning, and continuous assessment. Change is not easy, and performance typically decreases in the short run as people struggle with new ways of thinking. You must remain resilient, maximize short-term wins, and foster a learning environment that sets the conditions for long-term success. Improving while operating is not easy, but it is your charge as an organizational-level leader. The seven-step vision process will take you there. **IAJ**

NOTES

1 Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, May 2012, para. 2-10.

2 Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, Doubleday, New York, 2006, p. 208. Senge uses the words “what,” “why,” and “how” to describe the “governing ideas” that guide organizations. He equates the “what” to the vision, the picture of the future we seek to create. The “why” is the purpose or mission of the organization and answers the question, “Why do we exist?” The “how” are the core values of the organization and answer the question, “How do we want to act, consistent with our mission, along the path toward achieving our vision?” We have adopted Senge’s “governing ideas” and transformed them into a single concept, a seven-step vision process. While we use the same definition for the “what”—a picture of the future—we use a slightly different perspective for the “why” and “how” to better capture the nuances of military culture and the role of problem solving in implementing a vision.

3 John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1996, p. 21. This leadership classic is a “must read” for all organizational leaders. It discusses the dynamics of change, the challenges of recognizing when change is necessary, and an eight-stage process for implementing lasting organizational change. We reference five of the eight stages in this article: 1) establishing a sense of urgency, 2) creating a guiding coalition, 3) developing a vision and strategy, 5) empowering broad-based action, and 6) generating short-term wins.

4 Department of the Army, ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, May 2012, Figure 2-2.

- 5 Carey W. Walker and Matthew J. Bonnot, "Understanding Organizational Climate and Culture," *Army Press Online Journal*, July 2016, p. 2, <<http://armypress.dodlive.mil/understanding-organizational-climate-and-culture/>>, accessed on July 11, 2016.
- 6 Ibid., p. 3.
- 7 Richard L. Hughes et al., *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*, McGraw-Hill Irwin, New York, 2006, p. 243.
- 8 Kotter, p. 36.
- 9 Carey W. Walker and Matthew J. Bonnot, "Improving while Operating: The Paradox of Learning," *Army Press Online Journal*, August 2016, p. 4, <<http://armypress.dodlive.mil/2016/08/29/improving-while-operating-the-paradox-of-learning/>>, accessed on October 6, 2016.
- 10 Walker and Bonnot, "Understanding Organizational Climate and Culture," p. 6.
- 11 Michael Beer, "Leading Change," *Harvard Business School Publishing*, January 2007, p. 1.
- 12 Walker and Bonnot, "Improving while Operating: The Paradox of Learning," p. 8.
- 13 Kotter, pp. 102 and 122.
- 14 Daniel H. Pink, *Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us*, Riverhead Books, New York, 2009, Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
- 15 Walker and Bonnot, "Understanding Organizational Climate and Culture," p. 6.



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Speak Smartly and Carry a Big Stick: Competing Successfully in the Global Narrative

by Brian Anthony, Robert Lyons and Stuart Peebles

Strategic Communications

“Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far,” the 26th President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt famously advised.¹ Notwithstanding the wisdom of Teddy Roosevelt, his advice may not ring true in the Twitter age. The U.S. government spends roughly 40 billion dollars on foreign aid annually – a pretty big stick by most standards – but struggles to generate a comparable amount of global goodwill.² Meanwhile, U.S. adversaries and near-peer competitors, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State and Russia, have become bolder in their approach to shaping the global narrative. These nefarious actors destabilize the global security order while advancing an effective narrative that suggests the complete reverse.³ How can U.S. interagency leaders compete with such effective adversary messaging and capitalize on U.S. development and defense efforts around the globe? The U.S. interagency community needs a streamlined theoretical framework to think about information power more proportionally; it also needs to take practical steps to nest informational efforts more soundly in U.S. strategy. In today’s environment, interagency leaders must speak *smartly* not softly in order to realize the best return on our hard-power global investments.

In 2008, U.S. Congressman Adam Smith (D-WA) recorded the main obstacles to effective U.S.

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strategic communications: “The U.S. doesn’t have a coherent, high-level interagency strategy. The State Department and Defense Department aren’t coordinating sufficiently; and we lack focus and nuance in our strategic communication messaging.”⁴ Roughly a decade after Smith’s diagnosis, the problem is still acute.

Government watchdogs recently lampooned *WebOps*, a multi-million dollar information operations program at U.S. Central Command.⁵ The program involves specialists who scour popular Arabic social media sites for potential radical Islamic recruits. In theory, when the specialists find a likely recruit, they present the susceptible youth with a more moderate, alternative perspective. In practice, the program has been crippled by operators who lack the necessary linguistic and cultural acumen to be effective. Many of them have trouble with basic Arabic vocabulary, let alone the nuance required to discuss theology with both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Lack of proper oversight has compounded the problem of evaluating such a program, which has been reporting its own success using dubious methods.⁶

Central Command is preparing to spend 500 million dollars more on similar programs in the coming years.⁷ In addition, the U.S. is failing to challenge rampant international conspiracy theories of U.S. malevolence. For example, one of the more insidious lines of thought popular in Iran is that the U.S. deliberately created ISIS in order to weaken the Middle East.⁸ These are but two instances among many of how current U.S. efforts to inform the global narrative have had questionable effectiveness.

The U.S. government has not always been poor at leveraging information to bolster national power. From its inception, the U.S. demonstrated creative ways to influence the strategic narrative. During the American Revolutionary War, the British commander in the Carolinas complained that large parts of the populace never heard about his thrashing of the colonists at the battle

of Camden because the Americans violently threatened anyone who spoke of the battle.⁹ In addition, the Americans effectively disseminated editorial cartoons to paint the British as oppressors while also generating more support for independence.¹⁰ By combining such savvy information operations with creative operational maneuver, the American rebels forced the British to cede their American colonies.

The U.S. government has not always been poor at leveraging information to bolster national power.

During the Second World War, the U.S. federal government hired Walt Disney to produce numerous films to bolster domestic support and troop morale for the war effort.¹¹ During the Cold War, the U.S. was able to win the “war of ideas” through establishing the U.S. Information Agency, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe.¹² Thus, the current U.S. strategic communications difficulties are a historical aberration. How did our opponents – Russia and the Islamic State, for instance – get the upper hand and how can we regain the initiative?

Russia: A Sophisticated State Communicator

Russia seeks to create adversarial opinions of the NATO alliance by inferring that our ships and aircraft are encroaching on Russian territory in an attempt to threaten their homeland.¹³

- Vice Admiral James Foggo III

While U.S. strategies in shaping the global narrative lag, Russia appears to be capitalizing on the information revolution. Senior leaders in the Russian government have made no secret about their choice to emphasize information in their grand strategy. General Valery Gerasimov,

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, explained in an article from 2013: “Information warfare opens wide asymmetric possibilities for decreasing the fighting potential of an enemy.”¹⁴

Some strategists in the U.S. are going so far as to name the new Russian emphasis on ‘information warfare’ the Gerasimov Doctrine.¹⁵ Russian President Vladimir Putin has also been sanguine about the broader power of controlling the narrative. In October 2014, he described his state-sponsored news channel *RT* (formerly *Russia Today*) as “a formidable weapon enabling the manipulation of public opinion.”¹⁶

The Russian mouthpiece has a budget rivaling the BBC...

The Russian mouthpiece has a budget rivaling the BBC with channels in English, Spanish, Arabic, and of course Russian; it also has more YouTube viewers than any other international news channel.¹⁷ Between Putin’s “weaponizing” of *RT* and Gerasimov’s information warfare doctrine, Russian leaders have been unified in their effort to leverage information in support of their muscular foreign policy.

The Russian information campaign has worked particularly well in some of the former Soviet republics. After annexing Crimea in 2014, the Russians immediately began a coordinated effort to control the narrative. Within Crimea itself, the Russians censored the media to forestall any opposition to their operations.¹⁸ Beyond Crimea, the Russians energized their robust network of media channels and affiliated non-governmental organizations “to justify Crimea’s ‘return’ to Russia.”¹⁹ Russian messaging regarding its actions in Crimea paid dividends. Soon after the annexation, a Gallup poll showed that most of the people in the former Soviet republics were inclined to support

Russia’s policy towards Crimea.²⁰ Presidential elections in Bulgaria and Moldova in 2016, also seem to validate Russian information efforts, as the new leaders of both countries are decidedly pro-Russian.²¹ Many of the people in those former Soviet states also look admiringly to the east. Two thirds of the respondents to a recent poll in Moldova said that they “trusted” Vladimir Putin, while less than one third felt the same way about German Chancellor Angela Merkel.²² In the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary, their move towards Russia is particularly concerning for the U.S., considering their membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Having such Russophile allies could complicate future operations.

Despite evidence of Russian success in targeted information operations, the net result of Russian efforts is mixed. In 2015, a research team queried households in the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Russia itself in order to gauge the influence of Russian propaganda.²³ Within Ukraine, Russian messages have largely fallen on deaf ears. Ukrainians do *not* believe Russian claims that the U.S. fomented the instability in Ukraine.

In Azerbaijan, some elements of the Russian narrative have swayed the populace, while others have not. Roughly one third of Azeris view Russia as “a partner or ally,” while one quarter view the U.S. in the same terms.²⁴ Kyrgyzstan recorded the most pro-Russian views of the former Soviet republics. Unsurprisingly, over 75 percent of Kyrgyz people consume their daily news from Russian television sources. Despite such a one-sided media diet, Kyrgyz people strongly support core democratic principles that Russian messages discourage.²⁵ Within Russia, domestic opinion showed much higher rates of anti-Americanism than in the former Soviet republics, but Russians still do not buy all elements of the Russian narrative that the Kremlin is peddling.²⁶ These mixed results

reveal vulnerabilities in the Russian narrative that the U.S. could exploit in pursuit of its national interests.

Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham: Effective Non-state Communicator

This broader challenge of countering violent extremism is not simply a military effort. Ideologies are not defeated with guns, they are defeated by better ideas and more attractive and more compelling vision. So the United States will continue to do our part by continuing to counter ISIL's hateful propaganda, especially online.²⁷

- 44th U.S. President Barack Obama

Like Russia, the Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS) demonstrates proficiency in strategic communication. ISIS employs production quality digital communications that would rival the best of Hollywood movie studios or Madison Avenue marketing firms. With strategic communications, ISIS reinforces its ideological narrative, inspires attacks, supports a global recruiting effort, and executes terror operations of global reach. Even the organization's name "ISIS" provides a measure of gravitas by incorporating the term "State" which suggests a *fait accompli* to state-like legitimacy. For ISIS, strategic communication is central to grand strategy.

ISIS' high priority on strategic communication is evident by the emphasis of media operations in their masterplan for creating the Islamic State. The ISIS doctrine describes the importance of complementing ISIS operations with robust media coverage.²⁸ Of note, their doctrine applies lessons-learned about America's information approach to win the Iraq War. Specifically, ISIS doctrine mentions how the United States used strategic communication during the Iraq War to portray a Sunni caliphate "as a treacherous terrorist state of hypocritical political projects, with great marshalling of

the media to accomplish that."²⁹ By having a doctrine, ISIS seeks to ensure that others don't define them and that they maintain the edge through aggressive strategic communications.

While the U.S. takes the fight to ISIS in the physical domain in Syria and Iraq, ISIS has demonstrated operational reach into the U.S. and throughout the rest of the world through the information domain.

...ISIS has demonstrated operational reach into the U.S. and throughout the rest of the world through the information domain.

In the summer of 2016, the U.S. FBI Director asserted that the U.S. had over 1,000 open cases involving ISIS threats within the U.S.³⁰ In 2016, ISIS inspired or linked to over 80 attacks throughout North Africa, the U.S., and Europe.³¹ In 2015, ISIS claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack in Paris that killed over 120 people.³² Many of these operations were accompanied with a social media statement and video. The attackers became radicalized by ISIS' ideological narrative. Until the U.S. contests ISIS' ideological narrative, these types of threats will persist to the U.S. homeland, allies, partners, and many other nation states for decades. As recently as February 2017, General David Petraeus testified to Congress that the U.S. has to do more to discredit ISIS ideological narrative otherwise military victories in Iraq and Syria would be "fleeing."³³

Defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS), also known as Daesh, remains a top priority for the U.S.³⁴ In January 2017, the White House issued National Security Presidential Memorandum-3 (NSPM-3) that requires a whole of government approach to combatting ISIS. NSPM-3 directs the application of "public diplomacy, information operations, and cyber




Figure 1. Proactive Approach to Strategic Communications.

strategies to isolate and delegitimize ISIS and its radical Islamist ideology.”³⁵ Certainly, President Trump’s administration can build upon the Obama administration’s creations, such as the Global Engagement Center at the Department of State.

The Global Engagement Center uses third party organizations to compete with Daesh strategic communications. State’s new Center aims to have more engagement with third parties and people that can actually engage with humans on social networks, not just post messages at them; and it will use data to tailor messages and campaigns. The Center will also provide seed funding and other support to NGOs and media startups focused on countering violent extremist messaging.³⁶ The Global Engagement Center implemented more content in Arabic than English and contests ISIS in more places on the internet.³⁷ As a result, ISIS has lost over 45% of its Twitter presence and deals with a 6:1 ratio of anti-ISIS to pro-ISIS propaganda.³⁸ The GEC’s results are positive, and it should serve as a model for future initiatives.

A Simplified Theoretical Framework for Strategic Communications

In today’s information age, success is the result not merely of whose army wins but also of whose story wins.³⁹

- Dr. Joseph Nye

In order for the U.S. to compete with the stories of its adversaries – be they state or non-state – policy makers and strategists should think about power more broadly and speak “smartly.” Current joint doctrine from the Department of Defense on information operations contains models designed to help commanders and their staffs think this way.⁴⁰ However, these models over-complicate the matter and obfuscate more than clarify.⁴¹ A better way to think about speaking smartly is to use what Nye calls “contextual intelligence” to combine soft and hard power in effective ways.⁴² Interagency leaders should use a more proportional approach to blend its resources for such activities as strategic communications and military operations/development. The joint and interagency community needs new models to think about how to combine soft and hard power, specifically *words* (information power) and *deeds* (military or development power).

Figure 1 depicts a simple way for the joint and interagency community to think about strategic communications in a *proactive* manner. The crossbar represents the proportional effort between what the U.S. and its partners “say” (i.e. information efforts) and what they “do” (e.g. military or development efforts). If there is a hypocritical mismatch between words and deeds, then U.S. adversaries have informational leverage. As noted by Admiral Michael Mullen, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “We hurt ourselves more when our words don’t




Figure 2. Reactive Approach to Strategic Communications.

align with our actions. Our enemies regularly monitor the news to discern coalition and American intent as weighed against the efforts of our forces. When they find a ‘say-do’ gap—such as Abu Ghraib—they drive a truck right through it. So should we, quite frankly.”⁴³ The reverse is also true. If the U.S. is using its military and development power to conduct *deeds* in a manner that promotes global stability and security, then it should also leverage information power or *words* in a proportional manner to achieve maximal effect.

Figure 2 depicts a streamlined way for interagency leaders to think about strategic communications in a *reactive* manner. The process begins with *anticipating* what types of negative messages the adversary will likely employ to various audiences and developing options for response. The next step is to *detect* these messages and measure their “stickiness” in traditional and social media using analytics.⁴⁴ The third step, if necessary, is to *compete* with adversary messaging using well-crafted, thoughtful, and targeted responses that are grounded in reality. The fourth step in this

iterative process is to *measure* the effectiveness of U.S. and partner messages, again using analytics.

These two models assume some capabilities that the U.S. currently lacks. First, accurate measurement of the “stickiness” of adversary messaging, as well as U.S. messaging, takes bona fide cultural and linguistic experts. This measurement process will have a technical and quantitative aspect, but will also be somewhat subjective. Similar in methodology to political polling, this measurement process will be only a rough estimate of what the target audience thinks.

The joint and interagency community must also develop “contextual intelligence” to assess the necessary balance of military/ development and informational efforts throughout both proposed models.

Finally, the entire process involves *disciplined* interagency communicators who know the appropriate message to deliver and who emphasize that message in appropriate settings.

Practical Steps to Better U.S. Strategic Communications

Interagency leaders not only need simplified theoretical frameworks, they also need to take concrete, practical steps to improve the nation's use of information in its overall strategy. For the U.S. to achieve its national interests on the global stage, the interagency community must provide clearer ends, greater means, and more adaptive ways in the information realm.

The U.S. must respond publicly and vigorously to high-profile Russian falsehoods, while constantly re-emphasizing the regime's suppression of independent media in Russia.

Clearer Ends

1. Refer to "ISIS" without using the term "State."

In their U.S. strategic communication, U.S. civilian and military leaders should refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State in Syria and Levant, the Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham, and any other form that includes the term "state" simply as Daesh.⁴⁵ By eliminating the term "state," the U.S. removes the perception of legitimacy.⁴⁶ A good example occurred during the joint press conference between the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Theresa May, and U.S. President Donald Trump. The Prime Minister mentioned working with the U.S. to "take on and defeat Daesh and the ideology of Islamist extremism wherever it's found."⁴⁷ This is consistent with other European leaders. Since October 2014, the French refer to the organization as Daesh.⁴⁸ In contrast, the President used the term "ISIS" at the press conference.

The Department of Defense (DoD) recently addressed the term "ISIS." In February 2017, the

DoD Public Affairs released guidance to refer to ISIS as the Islamic State in Iraq and ash-Sham. Before completely eliminating the term, speakers should first associate the term "Daesh" with "ISIS," because most Americans probably recognize ISIS instead of "Daesh."

2. Reveal the truth about Russia's strategic communications.

To address Russian Strategic Communications, the U.S. must focus on how Russia is providing inaccurate information and misinformation to the world. The U.S. must respond publicly and vigorously to high-profile Russian falsehoods, while constantly re-emphasizing the regime's suppression of independent media in Russia.⁴⁹ By doing so, the U.S. challenges Russian credibility, and highlights the lack of free press. It is important that when the U.S. responds, actual and factual data are provided, to show that Russia is not being truthful in their accounts. Vice Admiral James Foggo III, former U.S. Sixth Fleet Commander, provides an example on this subject:

One such instance of this misinformation campaign occurred when the USS Ross (DDG-71) was operating in the Black Sea. Russia's international news agency RIA Novosti, quoting an anonymous source, reported that the Ross was acting "provocatively and aggressively." Admiral Mark Ferguson, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet (CNE-CNA/ C6F), countered the misinformation using Twitter and published a video of the interaction on YouTube. That video showed how sailors of the Ross were navigating in the Black Sea when they observed SU-24s flying over in a routine nature. The Ross bridge team kept course and speed throughout the interaction. The world was so intrigued by what had originally been titled "provocative" behavior that people flocked to the YouTube page to see for themselves how it all played out.⁵⁰

Ties To Russia

The Kremlin says Moscow will strive to protect the interests of Russians and Russian speakers wherever they may be. We look at the regions where the greatest concentrations of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians and native Russian speakers live, outside the borders of the Russian Federation.



Figure 3. Countries with large ethnic Russian populations.⁵⁶

Once the U.S. released this video, Russia backed off of its claims of this “provocative” encounter, and their tally of falsehoods increased. The world is beginning to take note of Russia’s misinformation tactics, and analysts say Moscow is losing credibility because of it. Surveys found that between 2013 and 2014 negative views of Russia rose from 54 to 74 percent in Europe, with the country’s reputation failing to improve in any corner of the globe.⁵¹

The U.S. should publicize Russian support for Western media outlets and their involvement in Western civil society, and if their support is overt, the U.S. should emphasize it. If it is covert, then Russian support should be publicized to the extent that is allowable with the security of intelligence sources. The goal in either case is to deprive these outlets of their credibility, thereby depriving the Russian government of its credibility.⁵²

More Adaptive Ways

1. Build competing narratives with the help of true experts.

In its strategic communication, the U.S. should incorporate the testimonies of people with firsthand, negative experiences with ISIS.⁵³ Those who suffered under ISIS have compelling stories that would undermine ISIS’ credibility with potential recruits and sympathizers. An ISIS defector’s credibility has more chance of resonating with an extremist who questions their resolve to an Islamist cause while holed up at a base in Syria. Their experience is more likely to hit home with teenagers trawling over extremist chat rooms in the dark, and more relatable than any upper middle class white politician or inexperienced prevention officer.⁵⁴ Furthermore, those former ISIS members helping the U.S. should be taken care of, which would further U.S. strategic communications. The government needs to support defectors, by helping them reintegrate to a post-extremist lifestyle and by

providing them with an opportunity to help others who have travelled down the same path.⁵⁵

The U.S. should seek assistance, advice, and leadership from citizens who speak the Arabic language, who have deep familiarity with the cultures of nations afflicted by ISIS, and who also have passion to see ISIS defeated. Many first-generation American Muslims fled the Middle East and Afghanistan for freedom and to escape oppressive religious organizations such as ISIS and the Taliban. This group of people could be a resource for contesting ISIS' narrative. Similarly, Middle Eastern nations have people who could assist with defining ISIS' narrative and identifying ways to address and counter it.

To avoid being reactive during a conflict, the U.S. and NATO should consider how Russia might apply strategic communication and prepare competing messages in advance.

2. Anticipate, be proactive with Strategic Communication plans.

The U.S., NATO partners, Ukraine, and other nations should prepare strategic communication plans in advance of potential Russian shaping and follow-on military operations. It's no mystery where Russia might act next on the globe.⁵⁷ One simply has to compare and contrast maps of Soviet Russia with today's Russian Federation. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Russia's borders and sphere of influence retracted leaving several nations that have large Russian ethnic populations outside of Russia's control. These include Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Lithuania (see Figure 3). Based on experience with eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Russia would likely use an aggressive strategic communication campaign to foment unrest in those countries, discredit governments and leaders, and justify any overt Russian operations

as "peacekeeping operations" to protect ethnic Russians.

To avoid being reactive during a conflict, the U.S. and NATO should consider how Russia might apply strategic communication and prepare competing messages in advance. Coalition and interagency leaders should rehearse such contingencies during table top exercises to examine specific Russian strategic communications, predict content, develop competing content, and evaluate the effectiveness of counter-strategic communications. Similar to the approach with ISIS, the United States government can include Russian experts, American citizens, NATO partners, and others to develop these strategic communication plans.

Greater Means

1. Capitalize on the recently passed Countering Propaganda Bill.

This December 2016 bill creates a grant program for non-governmental organizations, think tanks, civil society and other experts outside government who are engaged in counter-propaganda related work to better leverage existing expertise and empower local communities to defend themselves from foreign manipulation.⁵⁸ This bill also makes the State Department the lead agency, but more importantly it allows organizations outside the government to be more vocal in addressing Russia and ISIS. Interagency leaders should become conversant with the intricacies of this bill – including its authorities and restrictions – in order to understand how their organizations and implementing partners fit into its funding framework.

2. Leverage Big Data to detect, characterize, and monitor ISIS' ideological narrative.

Countering a narrative requires understanding what that narrative is, where to contest the narrative (physically and virtually),

and knowing about the target audiences. “Big Data” can help with all three. Pouring more resources into “Big Data,” including analytics and algorithms, would enable the U.S. to accelerate operations to address the strategic communications of ISIS and Russia. In 2015, a small company applied “Big Data” to estimate the population size susceptible to radicalization and the typical profile of an ISIS recruit.⁵⁹ By using “Big Data” to recognize patterns on social media, the firm’s results indicate approximately 71,000 people ripe for radicalization.⁶⁰ Furthermore, data show the typical Western recruit is male, in his 20s, from middle-to-upper class families, and educated.⁶¹ Clearly, having this type of information would help focus strategic communication. “Big Data” tools could also be used to scour social media content that is in Arabic for ISIS’ broad themes, trends, and interest areas. For example, an individual has voluntarily translated many ISIS social media posts to illuminate the organization’s various activities ranging from education, administration, calls to arms, and many others. “Big Data” tools could accelerate this type of work.

Additionally, there is a lack of analysis, comparing and assessing already-implemented government strategies. There should be a list of best practices, and while there are some solid comprehensive strategies, such as *Winning Information Warfare* by CEPA, very little policy assessment has been produced thus far.⁶² Building and sharing this database helps push resources to focus on the right problem set.

3. Support and Expand beyond the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center.

In addition to full and optimal use of the Global Engagement Center and its assets, the U.S. should use organizations like the Broadcasting Board of Governors to address Russian and ISIS strategic communications. The U.S. should set up various media sources that allow America to take the lead in strategic communications, vice merely competing against Russian strategic communications. This approach would entail use of public diplomacy to address anti-American and pro-Russian propaganda by the Russian government. Efforts should include international broadcasting, a new Russian satellite channel, the Internet, social networking, print media, and revamped academic exchange programs.⁶³ This will not only allow the U.S. to have both a constant voice in Russia and in countries that receive a lot of Russian media, but also will allow individuals in those areas (as seen in Figure 3) to have access to Western media.

Conclusion

U.S. strategic communications is as important today as it was during the World Wars. With a simplified theoretical framework and practical changes in strategy, U.S. interagency leaders can improve their use of information power in order to take back the initiative in the information realm from our adversaries. A more proportional blend of informational and defense/developmental efforts will enable the interagency to pursue U.S. national interests more successfully. Over the last year, the U.S. has taken steps to achieve this desired end state. The Global Engagement Center is a step in the right direction in addressing U.S. strategic communications. Additionally, the passing of the Counter Propaganda Bill, which opens up more resources and avenues for the U.S. to address shortfalls that have caused the U.S. to give ground to Russia and ISIS, further advances U.S. progress toward goals of information dominance. Interagency leaders should build upon the positive frameworks that these two initiatives represent. Unless we leverage the appropriate blend of strategic communications with U.S. hard power, we will continue to miss opportunities to speak “smartly.” **IAJ**

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Above: A reproduction 5th century Corinthian helmet given by a visiting Greek Army officer. The Foundation selected the helmet as the basis for the the Art of War Initiative logo. (Photo by Reed Hoffman)

The Art of War Initiative featured in *Smithsonian* magazine online!

On Aug. 15, Kansas City freelance writer Anne Kniggendorf visited the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College to explore the background of the CGSC Foundation's Art of War Initiative for an article she was writing for smithsonian.com.

Read Kniggendorf's article
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Train with the Brain in Mind: Neuroscience Education as a Force Multiplier

by **Michael J. Cheatham**

To think about the future usefully, we must describe change in a rigorous and credible way. Concurrently, we must creatively account for the unexpected by stepping outside the assumptions and certainties that anchor us today.

— **Vice Admiral Kevin D. Scott**

Ever-increasing lethality and superior technology epitomize the American way of war. However, despite continued investments in technological innovations, military equipment alone has rarely sufficed to ensure victory.¹ Indeed, war is an affair with humans, not hardware. Until recently, widespread efforts to shape cognitive development in servicemembers remained a fringe issue. After more than a decade at war, acceptance of cognitive training is rising but is mostly limited to resilience-focused programs, such as Comprehensive Soldier/Airman Fitness and Defender's Edge.

Resilience is a complex, multi-dimensional construct through which individuals cope, withstand, recover, and grow in the face of stressors and changing demands.² Contemporary resilience programs integrate cross-functional education activities and programs such as mental and physical wellness; social activities; family, peer, and mentor support; and spiritual health.³ As enterprise-directed endeavors, military resilience programs offer a broad array of training and tools to provide something for everyone. However, blanket approaches to cognitive training overlook important age-related differences and fail to directly enhance duty performance. Reliance on young adults—ages 17 to 25—to execute decentralized operations on the future battlefield should spur leaders to understand, tailor, and apply neuroscience research today.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff's *Joint Operating Environment 2035*, the U.S. Air Force's *Future Operating Concept*, and the U.S. Army's *Win in a Complex World* forecast future operating environments of unprecedented complexity, making agile and adaptive decision-making and

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measured motor responses as critical frontline traits.⁴ These environments require bold innovation in the human cognitive domain to ensure individual, leader, and team readiness. Service, branch, and unit leaders should begin incorporating tailored neuroscience research and education into unit training programs to enhance operational frameworks and improve young-adult reflexive performance in judgment-dependent situations.

...performance and operational risk stem from the brain's natural maturation and survival-based responses...

This article examines the relationships between young-adult brain development, operational responsibilities, and current and future operating environments. It briefly discusses foundational neuroscience education concepts with an emphasis on the neuroanatomy and physiological responses commonly exhibited by military-aged young adults. This article explores five core questions to help leaders understand how neuroscience education can aid in developing the performance of young adults in high-threat situations:

1. What living and moral forces shape how leaders train young adults?
2. What are relevant neuroanatomical fundamentals?
3. How does neuroanatomy influence physiological response?
4. What are the key neuroscience education takeaways?
5. How can leaders apply neuroscience education?

Living and Moral Forces Shaping Future Training

Leaders should study brain function to develop awareness—in themselves and their subordinates—regarding how neuroanatomical factors influence contextual interpretation and performance under threatening situations. As this article outlines, performance and operational risk stem from the brain's natural maturation and survival-based responses. Both young and mature adults are capable of good and bad decision-making. However, mature adults have a fully “wired” brain to help shape informed, interpretive decisions over uninformed instinctual reactions. Neuroanatomical limitations coupled with perceptual threat danger and time constraints characteristic of use-of-force situations leave young adults more vulnerable to committing errors than their mature adult counterparts.

The linkage between young adults and cognitive processing in perceived high-threat situations is an enduring military consideration. Nearly two centuries ago, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz remarked how the unpredictable nature of war creates cognitive dissonance or “fog” in the minds of young soldiers. Clausewitz discerned that when soldiers mentally processed environmental sensory inputs (i.e., peripheral sights, smells, and sounds), personal beliefs, and the threats themselves, fog pervaded.⁵

Neuroanatomical limitations stemming from developmental age and relative inexperience appear to amplify fog in chaotic or complex operating environments. Recent examples of situational miscalculations by civilian law enforcement officers and para-military agencies—actual or perceived—demonstrate how single instances of cognitive errors compromise the credibility and trust of the people they serve.




Figure 1. The Brain's Neural Flow.
 Source: Created by author. Data adapted from Eric Cobb, *Z-Health R-Phase Certification, 5th ed., Health Performance Solutions, Tempe, AZ, 2013, p. 5.*

Despite consistently high perceptions of public trust, the U.S. military is not immune from the public's growing desire for decision-making perfection. With one eye on future operating requirements and the other on the implications of tactical errors, the U.S. military's internal and external pressures for its servicemembers to perform at near-zero-defect levels is palpable. Tactical-level judgment errors, captured and transmitted nearly instantaneously by non-traditional media, can strike at the U.S. "narrative space" and spark disastrous operational and strategic-level implications. Strategic leader interest in tactical-level performance will continue to grow if U.S. military forces become overextended, and dependence on decentralized operations and disciplined initiative increases.

Military branches employ young adults to conduct highly-contextual duties in gray circumstances—duties for which they may not necessarily be cognitively prepared. Thoughtful training and leadership create a context for

change. Neuroscience is a critical part of this context development.

Relevant Neuroanatomical Fundamentals

Neuroscience education is the synthesis of relevant neuroanatomical and physiological response processes. In the context of this article, neuroscience education aims to improve self-understanding of brain functions and cognitive limitations based on age. Current neuroscience research indicates human brain maturation requires at least 26 years.⁶ Even more surprising, emerging neuroscience research suggests brain integration could continue beyond age 30.⁷

Over the last decade, the National Institute of Mental Health conducted a major study to examine how brain regions activate over the first 21 years of life.⁸ The study found that the brain's connectivity and input patterns move from the bottom of the brain to the top and from the back of the brain to the front (see Figure 1).

Consequently, the brain operates in the same fashion as it evolved. The brain's bottom-to-top and back-to-front neural flow is significant to understanding how neural integration occurs and sensory information is processed.

The brain operates as a "system of systems" model. As the young-adult brain matures, systems increasingly integrate from evolutionarily primitive autonomic brain systems to high-functioning cognitive systems. In general, young-adult brains are only about 80 percent mature, with the strongest connections rising from the lower-back (i.e., the brain stem).⁹ The remaining 20 percent, located in the upper front (i.e., the frontal lobes) where the neural integration is weakest, is crucial to controlling self-behavior. Indeed, the very last places to "link" and the areas of weakest integration until approximately age 26 or beyond are the frontal lobes.¹⁰ Weak frontal-lobe integration helps explain why young adults sometimes behave in

Weak front-brain integration, such as that commonly found in young adults, presents frontal lobes that are less capable of rationally evaluating threats.

risky or irrational ways.¹¹

The frontal lobes regulate executive functioning. As the brain's highest processing system, the frontal lobes act together to generate characteristic human behaviors and decision-making.¹² The frontal lobes coordinate or inhibit other parts of the brain, help the mind focus on key situational aspects, generate long-term planning, and enable critical and creative thinking processes.

Under threat, a well-integrated brain accesses frontal lobe resources to make sense of perceived threats from a rational perspective. Weak front-brain integration, such as that commonly found in young adults, presents frontal lobes that are

less capable of rationally evaluating threats.¹³

The result is a brain that may be structurally ill-equipped to anticipate the potential consequences of actions. Incomplete brain development also impacts the production of critical thought and agile decisions under pressures characteristic of military and law enforcement situations.

Physiological Response Considerations

While the frontal lobes represent the hallmark of all neuroanatomical evolution, they are not a primal autonomous system. In the 26 years it takes for the frontal lobes to develop fully, the brain relies on the limbic system and the autonomic nervous system (ANS) to ensure survival during high-threat situations.¹⁴ In general, as the brain matures and myelinates, the ability to regulate the limbic system and the ANS increases.¹⁵ Regulating the limbic system and the ANS improves the probability of making appropriate decisions faster in high-threat situations,¹⁶ which explains why young adults who lack experience and the full ability to inhibit limbic and ANS responses are more prone to display impulsive or unintentional reactions or hesitation when faced with high-threat decisions.¹⁷

The central nervous system (the brain and spinal cord) and the peripheral nervous system comprise the nervous system. The ANS is one of two primary peripheral nervous system components and consists of two major subsystems: the parasympathetic nervous system (PNS) and the sympathetic nervous system (SNS). As the term "autonomic" suggests, the ANS reflexively performs tasks that most neither think about, nor have much control over without awareness or deliberate training.¹⁸ (See Figure 2.)

Together, the PNS and SNS operate in a mutually-supporting, alternating fashion to maintain a state of homeostasis. Under normal operating conditions, the PNS is dominant. The




Figure 2. Nervous System Hierarchy.

*Source: Created by author. Data adapted from Sandra Blakeslee and Matthew Blakeslee, **The Body Has a Mind of Its Own**, Random House, New York, 2007, p. 183.*

PNS regulates heart rate, breathing, digestion, and many other functions that are essential for survival.¹⁹ Exposures to threat activate the SNS and disrupt normal PNS function.

The SNS prepares the body for fight, flight, or freeze responses. The degree to which the SNS activates depends on the level of perceived threat. Under extreme threat, the SNS can cause catastrophic failures in the visual and memory centers, executive functioning, and motor control.²⁰ SNS effects last as long as the perceived threat exists, until catastrophic failure occurs, or the PNS is reactivated.²¹

The activation of the SNS is dependent on how the limbic system’s thalamus interprets and processes the perceived threat. The thalamus acts as a sensory input gatekeeper, directing where information processing will occur to create an output. The thalamus directs sensory inputs to the low road or high road.²² The differences between the two pathways are rate of speed and interpretation clarity. The low road is a raw,

unfiltered direct input to the amygdala—the brain’s fear response center. The high road also feeds into the amygdala but with clearer, more refined information input.

The low road is the brain’s quickest way to create a motor output. The purpose of this primitive pathway is to generate a survival response before the brain fully understands what is happening.²³ A classic example of low road processing involves walking on a path and seeing a snake. The natural reaction is a startle reflex. Only after additional cognitive processing does one realize the “snake” was nothing more than a harmless stick.²⁴ The low road is an evolutionary protective mechanism that enables the brain to generate fight, flight, or freeze motor responses in less than 12 milliseconds.²⁵

The low road operationalizes at a very young age. Based on an individual’s internal model (previous sensory input, life experiences, cultural factors, and perception of social or work environments), the low road signals the




Figure 3. The High Road/Low Road Response.
 Source: Created by author. Data adapted from Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life*, Touchstone, New York, 1996, p. 64; David Eagleman, *The Brain: The Story of You*, Pantheon Books, New York, 2007, Kindle, p. 772.

amygdala to “sound the alarm” and mobilize sufficient SNS functions.²⁶ Unfortunately, a low road response is not always appropriate. (See Figure 3.)

Conversely, the high road offers the brain an alternative to uninformed, survival-based actions. The high road applies cognitive processing “filters” to produce more accurate and detailed interpretations but at a slightly slower motor response—from 12 to 36 milliseconds.²⁷

There is a clear connection between frontal lobe development and the low road/high road paradigm. Research suggests there is a gradual, but non-linear shift from low road to high road processing as the young-adult brain matures and gains experience.²⁸ Default frontal lobe processing (high road or low road) is a prime delineator between mature and young adults. It helps explain why young adults often struggle to regulate emotions, especially in crisis situations. The good news is the brain is not fixed. The brain

is trainable. Neuroplasticity or brain adaptability is the rule not the exception.²⁹

Neuroscience Education Takeaways

What is the relevancy for military leaders of neuroanatomical fundamentals and physiological response considerations? In high-threat situations, personnel will respond using one of two neural flow pathways to interpret a situation and generate a motor response. The low road produces a fast but hard-to-predict response. Under threat, the brain reverts to encoded data to process what is going on and to predict what will happen. The data retrieved, whether from an instinctual response, experiential memories stored in the amygdala, or ingrained training, determines the brain’s response.

Relying on the brain to recall limited training or experiences is hit-or-miss, especially for young adults. Without sufficient encoded training or integration of the frontal lobes, prior

experiences stored in the amygdala dominate the brain, and reactions are protective but uninformed survival responses. Response is highly individualistic. Response unpredictability underlies the performance output and risk concerns during use-of-force employment. Thus, training should incorporate individual response.

The high road is the neural flow pathway the military profession demands—for young and mature adults alike. During high-threat situations, the high road is slightly slower than an instinctive reaction but highly effective in producing a rational response.

The ability to operate effectively in high-stress and quick-decision-making environments is challenging for young adults who lack full neuroanatomical capacity. Understanding how young-adult brain function develops and differs from mature-brain function presents significant challenges and implications for commanders and supervisors.

Leadership Applications

Commanders—regardless of branch or specialty—may not clearly understand the inherent risks of fielding a force primarily composed of young adults. However, recent lessons learned by civilian law enforcement should generate a sense of urgency for all services and branches to take an introspective look at how they train their servicemembers. Leaders should ask themselves: “Is our current training consistently producing the desired attributes required for tomorrow’s operating environment?” Developing an awareness that gaps exist is the first step to enhancing young-adult duty performance.

Can leaders accelerate the shift from survival to performance processing in young adults? Leaders cannot “force” biological development to occur, but perhaps they can set conditions to enable change. Leaders have wide latitude in integrating neuroscience into performance training. There is no one way to

produce positive performance results. Different organizations have distinctive needs based on their compositions and missions. However, creating awareness of young-adult-specific brain function and biological limitations and developing a deliberate practice culture are two recommended starting points for all organizations.

Commanders—regardless of branch or specialty—may not clearly understand the inherent risks of fielding a force primarily composed of young adults.

Neuroscience Education

Stages of change.

The first technique is to provide and integrate neuroscience education into formal training. Branch or unit leaders should develop and deliver a targeted “Neuro 101” course to inform young adults on their brain’s structure and how its design affects judgment and decision-making. A “Neuro 101” course would move leaders and young adults from not knowing a problem exists (the pre-cognitive stage of change) to deciding if they want to act on that information (the awareness stage of change).³⁰ Neuroscience evidence should inform the “why” behind the “what” of military and law enforcement procedures and decision-making processes. Simply creating awareness that a cognitive gap exists will elicit behavior change. Additional research indicates that developing an awareness of brain functions and limitations creates a natural motivation to want to reduce those gaps.³¹

A key consideration behind the study’s result is the average age of the study’s participants. Most young adults are primed to receive similar education. Similar duty

performance results are possible. Creating awareness of brain structure and functions will nudge many young adults to take an active role in their professional and intellectual efforts. Even if results are modest, minor improvements applied across the future force are significant in both short- and long-term.

Deliberate practice.

The second technique requires a commitment to quality over quantity. Leaders focus on how available time is used, not on how much training time is available. Leaders should develop a culture of deliberate practice, building both motor and decision-making skills. Deliberate practice is defined as working on technical skill, seeking constant critical feedback, and focusing ruthlessly on weaknesses.³²

Based on research of world-class performers from every domain, the deliberate practice model follows three primary guidelines:

- Practice with an explicit goal of getting better. The human brain is a target-focused system. Start each training block by identifying the specific skill being trained. A trainer's job is to create trainees who are fluent in the components of mission-essential tasks. Trainers must spend an inordinate amount of time teaching in the cognitive (crawl) and associative (walk) stages of learning as compared to the autonomous (run) stage. Trainers with limited time must focus on the "crawl" and "walk" phases and fight the gravitational pull to focus on the "run" phase. Many trainers mistakenly believe that all good training comes from the "run" phase when trying to master a skill. In reality, the greatest gains occur in the "crawl" phase. Even after mastering their specific skill, the best performers always return to the "crawl" stage to refine the basics that actually make them better.

- Stay in the moment and be present. Leaders should think about how training cycles are designed to maximize mental repetitions. Since it is rare for all trainees to participate at the same time, leaders should assess if the culture is conducive to learning by active viewership. Is the training area viewable by inactive trainees? Are phones allowed in the training area? Are noncommissioned officers talking through another team's performance with his team? Likewise, trainers involved must remain present for signs of threat response or startle reflex at the individual level and readily provide immediate feedback.

- Get as much feedback as possible. Immediate feedback is essential, especially in the "crawl" phase. Trainers should identify and address performance errors the moment they occur to avoid encoding poor motor movements. It is much easier to instill correct neuro-signatures or "muscle memory" than to alter an incorrect one. A properly trained, ingrained movement will retain its quality even as speed and intensity increases. Trainers must remain attuned to how trainees move in the "walk" and "run" phases. When motor outputs are no longer quality, stop training. The goal of training is to develop proper neuro-signatures to create skilled pathways for real-world application. Quantity over quality compromises neuro-signature development and produces diminishing returns.

The deliberate practice model offers leaders an adaptive training framework. Serious focus on the quality of training holds greater potential than quantity alone. Quality-focused training creates motor-response fluency by building and reinforcing brain myelination of gray matter. The quality of training expedites brain myelination and correlates to the quality of real-world decision-making.

Myelination increases integration between rear-sensory and front-motor cortices and the frontal cognitive system's synaptic speed, precision, and efficiency.³³ The results are not subtle—myelinated neurons deliver signals up to 100 times faster than non-myelinated neurons.³⁴ Increased synaptic speed helps level the response time deviation between the low road and high road.

Conclusion

There are no simple solutions to address the relationships between young-adult brain development, operational responsibilities, and current and future operating environments. However, leaders must be willing to wrestle with the unfamiliar and seek better ways to meet tomorrow's challenges.

What does the future look like with increased neuroscience integration into military training and operations? Predictive results are promising. Reviews of cross-functional domains and accumulating scientific knowledge indicate neuroscience integration could benefit a wide range of learners over broad fields.³⁵ Neuroscience offers leaders a unique lens from which to redesign training and lead operations. Leaders who operate using concepts grounded in neuroscience will open new avenues to improve young-adult effectiveness and reduce operational risk to a greater extent than those who do not.

The future operating environment will be the most complex in history. State and non-state adversaries will continuously seek to disrupt communications to gain positions of relative advantage. Decentralized operations relying on the concept of disciplined initiative to cope with uncertainty will dominate operations. The skills required to operate in this environment are not intuitive. Leaders must repeatedly explain and train the desired skills. Leaders who engage in neuroscience education and link available research to duty performance open new, viable approaches to improve individual decision-making and reduce tactical risk.

As history repeatedly reveals, militaries and branches that fail to innovate are destined to fail in future conflicts. Leaders should begin to embrace neuroscience concepts today to prepare young adults for the cognitive challenges of tomorrow. Training must evolve beyond traditional methods if and when scientific research identifies better ways. Indeed, better ways exist now. Now is the time to embrace innovative human performance strategies. **IAJ**

We now face another of those crucial moments in time. The dynamic, complex future is already beginning to challenge us. It is time for this generation of [leaders] to develop a way to succeed.

— Deborah Lee James

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31 A recent study informed teenagers on their neuroanatomy, physiological responses, brain plasticity and integration, and a clear message that they had control over their own brain development. The results were significant. Providing teenagers with neuroscience education created awareness and initiated changes from fixed mindsets to malleable growth mindsets. Once the subjects understood they were the responsible agents for their thoughts and brain growth, learning pathways changed as well. The differences between the experimental and control groups were substantial. Over a two-year period, the experimental group who received neuroscience education experienced a continuous upward trend of scholastic performance. Those who did not receive neuroscience education experienced a downward trend commensurate with the experimental group. The resulting disparity in performance between the two groups is significant to military leader efforts.

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Decline of Westphalia in West Africa:

How Decentralized Power in West Africa Can be a Rebirth of African Identity

by Matthew D. Pride, Bryan C. Smith and Harmonie Foster

The day might soon arrive where responsible sub-state and non-state actors may rotate seats on the United Nations Security Council as non-voting members. It seems implausible today that a non-state actor would have the latitude to act officially within the existing framework of global institutions like the United Nations and the European Union, institutions exclusively built on a foundation of state actors and liberal governance. Still, the modern-day rise of non-state actors wielding power and influence is unprecedented in world history. Despite potential negative aspects of rising non-state actors, this article argues the potential for state advancement through effective cooperation with sub-state and non-state actors within the existing order. In West Africa, powerful and responsible non-state and sub-state actors, who leverage globalization and political decentralization to secure “political goods”—what scholars consider “critical ingredients of good governance”¹—that advance stability and security may be the critical factor missing from the region to allow African nation-states to flourish and thrive.

The world’s larger sub-state and non-state actors (i.e., nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations [IGOs], and terrorist

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groups) employ hundreds of thousands of people from dozens of countries and frequently deliver on political goods more effectively than smaller governments. Large multinational corporations (e.g., Walmart) often provide their employees with benefits and entitlements that small governments struggle to provide, such as educational and development opportunities, access to health services, commercial and communication infrastructure, and safe work environments. Unfortunately, the news is not all good. Many transnational criminal and terrorist organizations (e.g., Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) threaten the existing order and international or regional stability like never before.

Within this environment, weak nation-states risk becoming failed states as their national institutions struggle to function alongside non-state and sub-state actors. Throughout history and in modern times, corruption precedes and favors failure. Professor Robert I. Rotberg, Founding Director of Harvard Kennedy School's Program on Intrastate Conflict, argued in a recent essay that of the "193 nation-states, at any one time upward of a dozen are failed or failing," while another "three dozen are weak and intrinsically in danger of slipping into failure."²

Rotberg, like many other scholars, paints a rather grim picture for the future of weak and failed states:

Unless the United Nations or the big powers develop an effective series of mechanisms to forestall failure by diplomatic, technical, or military means—a highly unlikely proposition in the modern era—the phenomenon of nation-state failure remain for years and decades, and the peoples of those deprived and depraved polities will continue to suffer at the hands of avaricious rulers.³

This article explores ways that the U.S. and other world powers can interact with West

African nation-states classified as weak to avoid such fates as the Côte d'Ivoire, a once relatively stable country rocked by division and civil war in 2011.

First, we examine how the strategic context of globalization impacts the current international system. Second, we focus more narrowly on West African nation-states classified as weak and the processes of decentralization that might allow for greater prosperity for more Africans.

This article utilizes a comparative analysis between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire as a springboard into a broader discussion on how the U.S. might utilize a policy building on globalization and decentralization to bolster weak West African governments through local self-governance.

Nation-state boundaries in West Africa are an unnatural imposition—a legacy of European colonialism built upon the Westphalian nation-state model...

Nation-state boundaries in West Africa are an unnatural imposition—a legacy of European colonialism built upon the Westphalian nation-state model—codified by the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and indirectly solidified by the Atlantic Charter in 1941.

This article proposes ways to vitalize weak nation-states in West Africa, leveraging globalization and decentralization to harness national identities, particularly in countries where weak central governments find it difficult to capitalize on political goods.

Through U.S. leadership, the globalized world can find ways to cooperate with sub-state and non-state actors to strengthen weak West African governments, helping them emerge onto the global stage as stable partners for future economic growth and prosperity.




Figure 1. Effects of Globalization on the current International System.
Source: Created by the authors.

Background

Following World War II, the U.S. sought to unite cooperative nations using international institutions built on a foundation of liberal philosophical governance (see Figure 1). Certainly, U.S. administrations in the post-war era viewed foreign policy through philosophically realist lenses; nonetheless, the global world order was a liberal order. Through U.S. leadership, international democratization flourished as U.S. economic and military strength staved off the Soviet’s international Communist system. As historian Robert Kagan noted, “International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in this case, the domination of liberal principles of economics, domestic politics, and international relations over other, non-liberal principles.”⁴ Even with the emergence of the current international order, the nation-state remained the primary actor on the international stage.

September 11, 2001, changed the

international order in a way few at the time realized. After that horrific day, the emergence of non-state power gained international recognition. In the wake of that tragedy, President George W. Bush faced an enemy different from any that his predecessors previously confronted. Rather extraordinarily, for the first time in human history, the government of a nation-state formally proclaimed as public law that its executive branch could direct the instruments of national power to wield military force against “persons” responsible for what President Bush called “acts of war.” On September 14, 2001, the American Congress passed Public Law 107-40, which authorized President Bush:

...to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United

States by such nations, organizations or persons.⁵

Fast-forward to 2015; President Barack Obama's Administration incorporated this new normal of state military engagement against non-state actors into the 2015 *National Security Strategy* (NSS). Moreover, the document highlights the expanding influence and role of non-state and sub-state actors on the international stage. The term "non-state" appears five different times in the 2015 NSS. According to the strategy, the U.S. intends to cooperate with NGOs and IGOs, key regional organizations, and international financial institutions to confront global problems impacting an interconnected world.

The Obama Administration stressed that these non-state "partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international behavior."⁶ In this light, it recognized that power existed outside nation-states. President Obama contended that "governments once able to operate with few checks and balances are increasingly expected to be more accountable to sub-state and non-state actors."⁷ Globalization is the force within the global environment that bends financial, social, and political institutions down to the sub-state and non-state actor levels, giving both governments and peoples in some instances unfettered access to systems once exclusively reserved for states.

Thomas Friedman, *New York Times* journalist and leading proponent of globalization, argues globalization is "the integration of markets, finance, technology, and telecommunications" throughout the world.⁸ The crumbling of barriers to trade and information represents a major characteristic of globalization, allowing sub-state and non-state actors greater access to instruments of power once reserved for nation-states.⁹ Instead of centralized state power, globalization focuses

on decentralizing power to multiple actors, ranging from multinational corporations to individuals.¹⁰ Friedman argues that as barriers to capital fall, an "electronic herd" emerges, which allows capital to move instantaneously around the world.¹¹ To take advantage of this electronic herd, participants must conform to globalized standards of privatization and decentralization.¹² Beneficial to states as well, this condition allows non-state actors to sustain and operate globally in a way not previously possible.

Friedman viewed the electronic herd as a force for good, arguing, "the electronic herd punishes states for going to war."¹³ Instability to the global order creates negative conditions impacting global capital investment. Under these conditions, nation-states will pursue negotiation over other forms of political discourse, such as violence and conflict, to prevent instability. Because of its potential to improve the lives of people throughout the world as well as increase stability and security in the world, Friedman advocates increasing globalization.

Globalization is the force within the global environment that bends financial, social, and political institutions down to the sub-state and non-state actor levels...

The privatization and decentralization of economic interaction that characterizes globalization are similar to the process of political decentralization that West African nations have struggled with since the 1960s. West African nation-states have long sought ways to decentralize responsibility and power, sometimes incrementally and other times suddenly, to allow greater participation of their people in the political process. Since the 1960s and early 1970s, African countries underwent a sweeping revitalization, coming off the heels of

colonial rule and moving rapidly toward self-governance. Researchers Stephen N. Ndegwa and Brian Levy, in a 2003 World Bank analysis noted:

In a recent World Bank study, thirteen of 30 countries surveyed showed high or moderate levels of decentralization as measured by a composite index of political, administrative, and fiscal devolution indicators. Another thirteen showed at least some degree of decentralization, with several in the process of change. Although not all countries have fully revived local governance, the study also indicated no country in Africa today propounds a preference for centralized state.¹⁴

...globalization may also drive a wider wedge between income inequalities, sowing the seeds of political and civil unrest and societal instability.

Ndegwa and Levy indicate decentralization and dramatic political reforms derive from donor pressure and programs, or as part of what they called “evolutionary administrative change.”¹⁵ In other words, with increased opportunity afforded to local communities to gain access to global markets, financial institutions, advanced technology, and telecommunications around the world, globalization provides the right context to allow West African local communities to thrive—a condition not previously existent.

University of Texas (Austin) Professor Catherine Boone noted in a 2003 *Comparative Political Studies* journal that the “shrinking of the state has not produced ‘politically unstructured’ local arenas.”¹⁶ A bit counterintuitively, decentralization enables more rural elites—chiefs, local leaders, big merchants, other notables—to participate in political life, often

in better ways. Boone argues that within decentralized West African “politically and economically strategic rural zones, rural administration remains in place...” and “political society at the local level is structured by informal institutions that define community hierarchy, cohesion, and control over access to local resources and to the state.” In other words, decentralized West African nation-states embrace local participation of rural notables and the communities they represent in political life. There is great potential for these local leaders to enhance their influence through globalization to maximize their participation and finally break through decades of stagnant regional activity. However, globalization and decentralization do not exist without drawbacks.

Friedman acknowledges that globalization may also drive a wider wedge between income inequalities, sowing the seeds of political and civil unrest and societal instability.¹⁷ He admits those unable to adjust to globalization may resort to violence and crime more readily.¹⁸ In a similar vein, in 2010, when reflecting on decentralization, Sten Hagberg, Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Uppsala University, expressed concern that transferring a centralized power to peripheral administrative and political powers assumes such peripheral powers are both competent and capable. He argued “the transfer of power away from a center to a periphery involves the construction of such a periphery in the first place! In order to make the transfer of competencies to local governments, the latter must already exist as an administrative entity.”¹⁹ Institutional devolution occurs in nation-states where competent or capable localities are non-existent or where they are weak and ineffective. Acclaimed travel writer Robert Kaplan described this downside of globalization and decentralization through his reporting on West Africa. He argued that as barriers continue to fall, globalization and decentralization lead to resource scarcity, increased disease, unsecured

borders, weakened states, increased crime, and illegal private armies.²⁰

Kaplan described how intrastate conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone sparked massive refugee flows throughout West Africa, as weak governments failed to maintain control of their borders.²¹ Because securing the territory of a nation-state represents the most important function in providing political goods for its citizens, failing to do so sets conditions for these states to fail. Nation-states should be able to control their borders and reduce domestic threats to bolster human and community security.²² Under globalization, however, a flood of individuals moved from disadvantaged regions to developed, industrialized regions, prompting commodity prices to fall and higher unemployment rates among the immigrant labor.²³ As economic conditions deteriorated and barriers to movement fell, disease grew more rampant in underdeveloped and disadvantaged regions.²⁴ Kaplan criticized the economic benefits that Friedman extolled, as these heighten tensions between warring sub-state factions.²⁵

As economies of developing nations in West Africa stagnate and the economies of developed nations outpace them, regional instability may explode into large-scale humanitarian crises or international security threats. Rotberg argued:

In the post-9/11 world . . . failed and collapsing states bear watching because their very insecurity could potentially create havens for al Qaeda (as in Sudan and Afghanistan in the 1990s) or harbor terrorist cells capable of regrouping, training, and preparing bombing operations (as in Somalia before the car bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and before the missile attacks at the Mombasa airport in 2002).²⁶

The future trends analysis of the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Staff's Joint Operational Environment (JOE) 2035

emphasizes this, pointing to a "continuing internal collapse of weak states." It describes the tendency for some central governments to find it increasingly more difficult to maintain power and control as groups object to human rights abuses. The governments will have to either reform or lash out against their populations, which further leads to instability. They argue: "While some disenfranchised sub-state actors will have legitimate grievances, other groups

As economic conditions deteriorated and barriers to movement fell, disease grew more rampant in underdeveloped and disadvantaged regions.

will exploit failures by the central government as a justification to seize more power, important resources, or strategic territory."²⁷ Finally, they summarize their overarching concerns, echoing Kaplan and Rotberg:

As states erode and fail, the danger is not simply the potential for adverse effects at the local level, but more importantly for the United States, what their collapse does to the broader world. Failing states create dangerous, transregional ripples with other, long-term global consequences. For example, non-state actors may acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons in unexpected and unrestrained ways designed to inflict the greatest damage possible against the United States and its allies. Furthermore, the inability of weak states to effectively respond to epidemics may require external intervention in order to contain and prevent the global spread of infectious diseases.²⁸

Despite the negative potential for instability under globalization, this report sees opportunity to revitalize West African nations struggling to find an identity with the Westphalian nation-

state model of centralized national power and arbitrary state-boundaries. The Westphalian system of international order dates to the end of the Thirty Year's War in 1648, when European powers established sovereign nation-states' rights and a system by which external powers did not interfere with the internal affairs of others.²⁹ Each state would determine and control its own institutions and domestic matters.³⁰ The Montevideo Convention of 1933 further clarified what constituted a state by defining it as having "a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states."³¹

In applying the Westphalian nation-state model in West Africa, foreign powers did not address the unique identities of local populations.

In applying the Westphalian nation-state model in West Africa, foreign powers did not address the unique identities of local populations. The nation-states on the African continent do not represent self-governance and organic organization but rather an artificial creation by European colonialists.³² Globalization, however, may provide the right opportunity for external powers and, more importantly, African people to challenge the status quo. Rather than continually force a system over grassroots efforts, decentralization of rule offers citizens of African nation-states a chance to secure their own destiny and identity. Local governing powers now have an unprecedented opportunity to direct their own fate through globalization.

Decentralization in West Africa

To understand decentralization better, and how it might work in West Africa, this article presents a short comparative analysis between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire. In vitalizing African


communities, governments in the 1980s and 1990s began to strategize ways to decentralize control while retaining influence and power. In fact, "Decentralization became one central element of democratization processes, making some refer to [it] as 'democratic decentralization.'"³³ Hagberg highlighted that decentralization has the following four positive effects in West Africa:

1. It changes the politico-administrative stakes in local arenas across West Africa.
2. It recasts the primacy of urbanity and modern education.
3. It attempts to marry legality and legitimacy and has often been interpreted as the return of traditional chieftaincy; it is a political fact that discourses of autochthony, whereby family decent and ethnic belonging are made criteria for defining legitimate political actors, are increasingly ventured in local political arenas
4. It reinvents the local to be able to mobilize it; from a top-down and highly authoritarian State with its colonial legacy, [there is a] process that at least holds promises of a possible change because, despite manipulations, frauds, and deviations, democracy provides the framework for present-day local politics in West Africa.

A closer look at the decentralization within two French West African countries, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, provides insight factors leading to stability vis-à-vis instability (see Figures 2 and 3).

Of the world's developing nations, Mali stands among the lowest in terms of economic vibrancy, industrial capacity, and agricultural productivity. The World Food Programme (WFP) reports: "Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world. It ranked 174th out of 177 in 2002, according to United Nations Development

Quick Reference: Mali



Flag



Population: 17,467,108

Size: 1,241,278 Sq. Km

Neighbors: Niger, Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso

Capitol City: Bamako

Government: Semi-Presidential Republic

Economy: \$38.09 billion (Purchasing Power Parity) (2016)

GDP Ranking: 118/230 Rankings (2016)

Urbanization: 39.9% of total population (2015)

Military: 2.43% of GDP (2015) military expenditures

Figure 2. Quick Reference Sheet: Mali.

Source: CIA World Factbook.

Programme (UNDP) and is very dependent on external aid, which comprised 15% to 25% of the GDP in the 1990s.” In the same report, experts noted that according to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, “poverty affected close to 64% of the total population in 1998, almost a third of which lived in extreme poverty.”


As early as the 1990s, the Mali government attempted ways to implement political decentralization to fight poverty, to support the donor community and foreign aid constituents, and to meet civil society’s demand for the government to undertake a process of

decentralization. “Popular uprisings eventually led the government to adopt laws instituting the creation of three sub-national levels in 1995 and 1996.”³⁴ This political reality allowed the Mali government to delegate the heavy responsibilities of service provision to local authorities while maintaining political power. The Mali government divided its territory into eight regions, forty-nine *cercles* and seven hundred and three communes. Within this framework, the WFP and other organizations found ways to supply aid directly to the most impoverished people. The government supported

Quick Reference: Cote d'Ivoire



Flag



Population: 23,740,424

Size: 322,460 Sq. Km

Neighbors: Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana

Capitol City: Yamoussoukro

Government: Presidential Republic

Economy: \$87.12 billion (Purchasing Power Parity) (2016)

GDP Ranking: 88/230 Rankings (2016)

Urbanization: 54.2% of total population (2015)

Military: 1.47% of GDP (2015) military expenditures

Figure 3. Quick Reference Sheet: Côte d'Ivoire.

Source: CIA World Factbook.

WFP and other non-state actors by establishing two mechanisms for decentralized control:

- A financial mechanism: Pursuant to an agreement with the government, Agence Nationale d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (ANICT), which has a directorate located in Bamako and regional directorates in each region, receives funds from certain partners earmarked for investment in decentralized communities. It asks for a financial contribution of 20 percent from communes on the various investments it manages.
- A technical mechanism: Based in each *cercle*, the Centre de Conseil Communal (CCC) [communal advisory center], is responsible for advisory and technical support to the communes. The CCC is entrusted to a local beneficiary (generally an NGO) established in the *cercle* that knows the development problems of the various communities.³⁵

Decentralization led to an awakening of sorts for the Bambara people of Mali, the national

citizens. Hagberg highlights how the Bambara people responded to the opportunity to direct their destiny through national decentralization. He wrote:

Two main terms in Bambara express power. While the term *mara* refers to the exercise of authority at all levels of society, the term *fanga* implies force, strength. The concept of Decentralization was translated into *mara ka ségi so*, that is, “the power returns home”³⁶

In contrast, Côte d’Ivoire has struggled to implement policies of decentralization, largely due to decades of internal civil unrest, instability, and violent regime change. Following independence from France in 1960s, cocoa production and foreign investment made Cote d’Ivoire one of the most prosperous West African nation-states. The government built nation-state institutions centralized and concentrated in the nation’s capital and completely ignored indigenous rural authorities.³⁷ Few local-level points of access to state power and resources existed. In December 1999, a military coup—the first ever in Cote d’Ivoire’s history—overthrew the government, launching a decade of civil unrest and eventually all-out civil war.

Boone argues that years of a military-style, administrative corps controlled directly from the center resulted in no viably-strong, well-structured, local constituency to emerge.³⁸ She notes that “social fragmentation, economic atomization of households, unstable economic relations among factions in ethnically heterogeneous villages, and the narrow scope of all forms of local political authority” created decentralization policies adopted in name only.³⁹ As such, Côte d’Ivoire’s indigenous rural authorities remained characteristically weak politically and economically.

In the southeast of the country, “commodity production and colonial rule developed in a way that weakened community coherence

and eroded the political and economic hold of indigenous political authorities.”⁴⁰ The practice of land pioneering created new, ethnically-heterogeneous, rural communities that lacked social cohesion and political strength among indigenous rural elites.⁴¹ As such, the post-colonial Côte d’Ivoire government maintained “minimal administrative presence at the local level and provided no institutional footholds or political resources that could have promoted the emergence of new, postcolonial generations of rural leaders.”⁴²

Way Ahead

In recent years, the U.S. intervened in the affairs of weak or corrupt governments posing a security threat to U.S. interests. Examples include Iraq, Syria, and Libya, three “bad” state actors that repeatedly underwent sanctions and other unilateral disciplinary measures. For each, the U.S. adopted a policy of either regime change (as in the case of Hussein’s Regime in Iraq) or support to rebel forces who sought regime change (as in the case of Kaddafi’s Regime in Libya and Assad’s Regime in Syria). The pattern of military intervention to support regime change that results in a failed state and further security threats in the region or to U.S. interests around the world is a model that must cease (see Figure 4).

The U.S. cannot wait for Boko Haram or some other transnational terrorist or criminal organization to seize power within a weak West African nation-state, materializing a military security threat to the U.S., before repeating the same bad model.

The frailty to the Westphalian model of statehood in West Africa necessitates that U.S. assistance strengthens weak governments using globalization and decentralization policies focused on the “good” sub-state and non-state actors in West Africa (see Figure 5).

This process will require work to balance empowering sub-state and non-state actors




Figure 4. Military Intervention and Nation-State Failure: A Failed Model.
Source: Created by the authors.

and maintaining functioning and responsive central governments. To do so, the U.S. will need to condition assistance to these actors on their support for interacting with their central governments in peaceful and non-violent ways.

Simultaneously, the U.S. should acknowledge the role of large IGOs, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Originally established as the Organization of African Unity in 1963 to address political discord, the AU's revitalized purpose under globalization and decentralization is to focus on peace, unity, and broadened goals to incorporate economic and political integration within the African continent. The AU integrates executive, legislative, and judiciary components, in addition to advisory and financial bodies. Likewise,

the ECOWAS remains a pivotal role player in promoting economic integration within the fifteen regional states of West Africa.⁴³

By providing opportunities to benefit local institutions working within the rule of law, U.S. assistance may establish norms that hold central governments accountable. What is certain is that the old model of U.S. military intervention to prevent weak governments from becoming failed governments and a regional—or even international—security threat no longer remains a viable option. The U.S. will need to offer support to a broad range of activities that benefit more than one state to spread benefits across borders. This policy will create opportunities to establish frameworks for multinational communication, coordination, and cooperation as nations work together to ensure access to benefits common




Figure 5. Cooperation Through Globalization: A New Approach.

Source: Created by the authors.

to all and is possible through empowering local non-state actors that may serve as impartial mediators in West African disputes.

The U.S. should look to strengthen non-state actors that have significant and constructive involvement in the region, specifically in the ECOWAS. The U.S. may work with these non-state actors in economic initiatives similar to the Trade Africa program established with states in East Africa by the Obama Administration.⁴⁴ Under Trade Africa, the U.S. seeks to increase trade between the region and the U.S., improve regional integration, and foster economic competitiveness.⁴⁵ A similar initiative focused on West Africa may also assist in building a broader economic base, increasing economic opportunities, and helping the local populations to improve their standards of living. This is certain to strengthen the ECOWAS's ability to impact the political decision-making of member states. By tying increased trade to

other important objectives, such as the rule of law and democracy promotion, the ECOWAS may provide another partner to pressure member states to perform so they may continue to benefit from the economic opportunities provided.

This approach may strengthen central governments as it allows pre-existing institutions a voice but also inputs into the development of the institutions governing the nation. By providing platforms in West African nations that access information centers, such as universities in other nations, the U.S. sets conditions to better educate greater numbers of West Africans. The U.S. may also use this as an opportunity to support brick-and-mortar, secondary-educational institutions in West Africa as centers of learning for the region. Founding advanced educational institutions in West Africa will create a foundation of educated individuals able to work the institutions necessary for the functioning of these states.

Globalization offers opportunities for potential solutions to help reform the current international system in West Africa through empowering traditional and organic power structures to bolster weak central governments. The decentralization of power created by globalization provides opportunities for these power structures to leverage their legitimacy with their people in greater ways than before. To enable them to do so while also supporting their central governments, however, will require reform. In doing so, reforms should acknowledge and address differences between groups to mitigate conflict. Reforms should seek sustainable approaches to economic development to prevent dependencies emerging, setting the conditions for another collapse. Increasing access to information may also allow for innovations to the educational systems in many West African nations.

As suggested by Figure 5, the U.S. and other world powers may find viable partners within local power centers below the state, enhanced and empowered through decentralization of power and globalization. Because of the inherent cultural power these entities have, the U.S. should work with these local leaders to help manifest the characteristics found in other civil institutions. Working with these entities may create conditions for more representative institutions and greater democracy within West African states, directly supporting overall regional and global security. **IAJ**

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The Simons Center is looking for articles that involve contemporary interagency issues at both the conceptual and the application level.



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Worth Noting

UN Assistant Secretary-General visits CGSC

United Nations Assistant Secretary-General Kevin M. Kennedy met with faculty and students in a professional development session Oct. 19, in Eisenhower Auditorium of the Lewis and Clark Center to discuss a variety of topics ranging from the current situation in Syria to various U.N. humanitarian and peacekeeping missions both past and present.

More than 50 faculty and students of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College attended the “fire-side chat,” which was hosted by Dr. Jack Kem, CGSC’s associate dean. Kennedy, who is an expert in Syria and humanitarian crises, was in Kansas City this week serving as the keynote speaker for the Mayor’s United Nations Day Dinner. His visit to CGSC was facilitated by Simons Center Director Col. (Ret.) Roderick Cox.

Mr. Kennedy has a distinguished career of almost 50 years, which includes service with honor and distinction for both the United States and the world community. He has served with the U.N. since 1993, valued for his expertise in organizing the international community’s response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide at the strategic, political, policy and field levels. He most recently served as the U.N.’s regional humanitarian coordinator for the Syria crisis. Based in Amman, Jordan, Mr. Kennedy provided strategic and operational guidance to the world’s Syria relief effort and to that end worked closely with the governments of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon. Prior assignments include service as the U.N. humanitarian coordinator in Iraq, Sudan, East Timor and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and as deputy humanitarian coordinator in Somalia and the Balkans.

Mr. Kennedy also served as head of the U.N. Department of Safety and Security and as deputy special representative for the U.N. Stabilization Mission on Haiti. Thirteen of his 24 years’ service with the U.N. were with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), where he served in senior positions including director of the Coordination and Response Division, frequently deploying to the field. Before joining the U.N., Mr. Kennedy served in the U.S. Marine Corps for 25 years as an infantry officer retiring at the rank of colonel. He served around the world to include duty in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Bangladesh and the Gulf War, where he commanded the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in the liberation of Kuwait.

- *Simons Center*

Agency partnerships vital to defeat ISIS

In early October, Mark Swayne spoke before the House Armed Services subcommittee on the Department of Defense’s (DoD) role in defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Swayne is the acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability and humanitarian affairs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

In his testimony, Swayne spoke of the importance of working with other U.S. entities and coalition partners to create a stable Iraq, and testified that the prioritization of humanitarian assistance and stabilization is vital to defeating ISIS, saying “We are working closely with the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United Nations and our coalition partners on near-term stabilization activities to support the government of Iraq.”

- *DoD*

Hurricane response ongoing in Puerto Rico, Caribbean

The U.S. response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean continues after the storms devastated the area last month. As of Oct. 30, more than 15,000 federal civilian and military personnel are on location in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has awarded hundreds of millions of dollars for survivor assistance, emergency work, and debris removal.

Department of Defense (DoD) personnel continue to support FEMA and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) efforts to clear roads, deliver generator fuel to hospitals, and distribute food, water, and supplies. DoD personnel are also helping to reestablish essential services, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers working with the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and representatives from U.S. Department of Energy to restore power.

The U.S. Agency for International Development is also involved in providing humanitarian relief to those affected, and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol has been making targeted flights to assess the well-being of survivors.

- Departments of Defense and Homeland Security

Rogers speaks on evolution of cyber

Navy Admiral Michael S. Rogers, U.S. Cyber Command commander and director of the National Security Agency, spoke at the Air Force Association's Air, Space and Cyber Conference on September 19. The conference took place in National Harbor, Maryland.

Rogers spoke about the ever-evolving cyber mission, saying that the Department of Defense needs to accept that change will be a constant as the department addresses cyber threats to networks, platforms, weapons systems, and data. Rogers also talked about interagency cooperation in cybersecurity, stating "The idea that the DoD all by itself is just going to defend its networks [is not] going to get us where we need to go."

- Department of Defense

ICE, law enforcement address intellectual property crime

Officials from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) recently joined law enforcement and security professionals at the 11th annual International Law Enforcement Intellectual Property Crime Conference. The two-day conference took place at the end of August.

The conference aims to combat transnational organized intellectual property crime and develop joint initiatives with an emphasis on enforcement. This year's conference focused on illicit trafficking on the internet and protecting the public from potentially harmful counterfeit products, such as pharmaceuticals.

The event was co-hosted by INTERPOL, ICE's Homeland Security Investigations-led National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, in partnership with Underwriters Laboratories and the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition.

- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

DoD response to wildfires ongoing

Firefighters and guardsmen from the Army and Air National Guard continue to battle the wildfires in Montana, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, California, and Utah. In September there were 123 active fires burning approximately 2 million acres of land.

This year's fire season has been long and unforgiving. Jessica Gardetto, a representative of the National Interagency Fire Center, spoke about this rough season, saying "Typically by the third week of September we see not as much fire activity, but we just haven't had that relief."

According to another representative of the National Interagency Fire Center, the fires haven't stopped since fall 2016, leaving responders stretched thin. Chris Wilcox recently stated in an interview that "all of our national wildland firefighting assets are committed." Wilcox went on to talk about working with state and local partners, including the National Guard.

The National Interagency Fire Center coordinates wildland firefighting efforts across the country.

- Department of Defense

FEMA, agencies respond to Hurricane Irma

U.S. agencies are responding to Hurricane Irma, which struck Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in early September.

Personnel from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed to the Caribbean in advance of the storm, including incident management assistance teams and urban search and rescue teams. FEMA is also providing meals and water to those affected.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is also involved in the response, providing personnel for urban search and rescue and evacuation operations. U.S. Southern Command is working closely with the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and U.S. Navy ships are providing additional support to the area.

Irma is forecast to be a category 5 storm it is very dangerous. People in potentially affected areas are encouraged to listen to the directions of state, local, territorial, and tribal officials.

- Departments of Defense and Homeland Security

DoD, WVU researchers combat opioid crises

Researchers from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USU) and West Virginia University (WVU) have joined together to combat the growing opioid epidemic.

West Virginia has been hard hit by the opioid crisis. The state's indigent burial fund has run out of money six years in a row due to overdose deaths, and many counties see over 10% of residents are addicted to opioids. In response to this, WVU reached out to USU's Defense and Veterans Center for Integrative Pain Management, which has had success combating the misuse of opioids in the military.

The two universities' agreement will allow researchers from USU to use the tools they've developed to address opioid misuse in the military in a civilian environment. "Our partnership allows us to... expand treatment options for our state's residents to successfully combat opioid misuse," said Clay Marsh, M.D., WVU health sciences vice president and executive dean.

- Department of Defense

Agencies respond to Hurricane Harvey

Multiple federal agencies are responding to the damage caused by Hurricane Harvey, which made landfall as a category 4 hurricane on August 25 and was later downgraded to a tropical storm. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) encouraged individuals in affected areas to follow the instructions of state, local, and tribal officials, and cautioned that evacuees should not return to evacuated areas until it is safe to do so.

According to FEMA Director Brock Long, “This will be a devastating disaster, probably the worst disaster the state’s seen.” Daniel Porter of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration had similar feelings, saying “This is really going to be an event that is going to continue to worsen.”

FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center in Washington and its Regional Response Coordination Center in Denton, Texas, coordinated the federal response, which included search and rescue operations, emergency medical services, and providing food, water, and other supplies to those affected by Harvey.

The Department of Defense provided additional manpower, vehicles, aircraft, and supplies as needed, and the entire Texas National Guard force was activated to respond to Harvey. Other federal agencies involved in the response included the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Energy, National Guard Bureau, and the Department of Health and Human Services, among others. Many non-government organizations were also involved.

President Trump praised the agencies’ response, tweeting “wonderful coordination between Federal, State and Local Governments in the Great State of Texas...”

- Department of Defense

Standing room only at first brown-bag lecture of AY2018

On August 22, over 100 students, staff, and faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), as well other individuals from the surrounding area, packed into the Arnold Conference Room at CGSC’s Lewis and Clark Center to attend the inaugural lecture in CGSC’s Academic Year 2018 Interagency Brown-Bag Lecture Series. This is the second year for the lecture series, which is co-hosted by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS) and the Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation.

Mr. Patrick J. Wesner, the Command and General Staff College Distinguished Chair for Development Studies, provided an overview on the history and purpose of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), discussing USAID’s changing functions over time and its current role in U.S. national security. After his presentation, Wesner opened the floor for questions from the audience. During the Q&A, Wesner discussed how USAID prioritizes missions, chooses partner non-governmental organizations, and deals with governments who may be resistant to their mission, particularly missions involving human rights.

The InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series is an extracurricular, interagency topic-focused series that is designed to enhance and enrich the CGSS curriculum. All lectures in the series are open to the public. Attendees are welcome to bring their own lunches into the conference room for the presentation. A schedule for future InterAgency Brown-Bag Lectures can be found on the Simons Center website.

- Simons Center

Military, government personnel train in IA exercise

In early August, Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians and federal, state, and local bomb squads participated in the Raven's Challenge exercise. The Raven's Challenge is an annual, interagency, counter IED exercise that incorporates scenarios focused on interoperability capabilities between public safety bomb squads and military EOD units in operational domestic type IED environments.

The exercise included scenarios that prepared the military and non-military participants for future collaboration and provided opportunities to pick up new skills. According to John Simpson, Raven's Challenge exercise program manager, exercises like Raven's Challenge increase the interoperability between the military and law enforcement agencies to meet domestic threats like the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. Don Robinson, special agent in charge with the Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) National Center for Explosives Training and Research, echoed Simpson's thoughts, saying "This is the perfect exercise to have the military and public safety bomb squads training together and working together before another Boston occurs."

Participants shared their reasons for choosing EOD, many saying that they chose the field because they wanted to make a difference and protect others, be it their brothers and sisters at arms or civilians at home and across the globe. "Training like this is how we keep people alive. This is what gets service members back home alive," said Air Force Staff Sgt. Cole Carroll, an EOD technician assigned to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany.

Raven's Challenge is funded by the Department of the Army. The exercise is led by ATF, and is supported through partnerships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Defense, the Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration, and state and local public safety agencies.

- Department of Defense

WHINSEC commandant discusses interagency focus

In a July interview with Diálogo, U.S. Army Colonel Keith Anthony spoke about the mission and curriculum of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), and institute's place within U.S. Southern Command. Col. Anthony has been the commandant of WHINSEC for over two years.

During the interview, Anthony discussed WHINSEC's mission to train and educate military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel within the context of the Charter of the Organization of American States, including several courses focused on interagency and whole-of-government operations. Anthony also touched on some of the challenges facing WHINSEC, saying "the biggest challenge is having good communication and understanding of the joint, interagency, and multinational operating environment."

- Diálogo

Dunford speaks on State's role with Defense

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Joe Dunford spoke at the Aspen Security Forum in Aspen, Colorado on July 22. In his remarks Dunford spoke about his evolving view of the State Department and State's importance to U.S. defense.

While speaking to NBC News Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Andrea Mitchell, Dunford admitted the he didn't appreciate the work of the State Department and their Foreign Service officers

when he was a young Marine. As his career progressed and he gained experience, that changed. “I sit here now with a great deal of humility, because there is not actually not one challenge that we confront in the U.S. military that can be solved militarily,” said Dunford, who went on to talk about the importance of foreign policy and closing the civil-military gap in politics.

Dunford also spoke about threats facing the nation, including Russia, North Korea, and ISIS..”

- Department of Defense

State releases 2016 country report on terrorism

On July 19, the State Department released the 2016 Country Reports on Terrorism. The annual Country Reports on Terrorism provide policy-related assessments and country-by-country breakdowns of foreign government counterterrorism cooperation, and contain information on state sponsors of terrorism, terrorist safe havens, foreign terrorist organizations, and the global challenge of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism.


The 2016 report names the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) a top terrorist threat, as well as terrorist groups backed by Iran. According to the report, while ISIS attacks increased in 2016, there were fewer terrorist attacks and fewer fatalities overall worldwide.

While the 2015 Country Report on Terrorism was critical of interagency cooperation in many of the countries’ reports, the 2016 report notes that terrorist attacks on soft targets lead to “increased focus on the need for greater coordination and interoperability between intelligence agencies and law enforcement at the national level, increased information sharing, and expanded public-private partnerships.”

The report also pointed to an increased awareness of what drives violent extremism in 2016, with the GCTF endorsing terrorism prevention training and implementing international platforms for information sharing and cooperation among counter-radicalization experts.

- Department of State

Book Review



**Foreign Service: :
Five Decades on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy**
James Dobbins

Brookings Institution Press, 2017, 329 pp.

Reviewed by Mark Wilcox

*Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College*

Whither American diplomacy? If one were to judge by reporting and commentary over the past months (for example, “The Desperation of Our Diplomats” and “How the Trump Administration Broke the State Department”), the situation seems rather grim. President Trump’s comments following Moscow’s decision to reduce the United States’ diplomatic presence in the Russian Federation, in which he thanked President Putin for helping to reduce the State Department’s budget, cast further doubt on the short-term prospects for the role of the diplomatic instrument of power in American statecraft. To sort through this angst, we need to understand the nuts and bolts of diplomatic practice and how the nation’s Foreign Service officers support United States policy. Fortunately, retired Ambassador James Dobbins has given us such an understanding through his sweeping memoir *Foreign Service*, which spans the spectrum of foreign policy challenges from the Vietnam War to the aftermath of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ambassador Dobbins, as the expression goes, has been around the block a few times in American diplomacy. His insights bear our attention.

Ambassador Dobbins’s aim is not to debate the merits of various policies through the years. Rather, he chronicles American diplomacy from a foxhole perspective (even noting the work of John Keegan and other military historians who depict warfare from a similar viewpoint) and “focuses on the tactical and operational levels of diplomacy, describing what individual American diplomats actually do, how policies are made and executed, and what it is like to be caught up in the process.” Dobbins draws on rich experience as a naval officer serving off the coast of Vietnam during the Gulf of Tonkin incident, a Foreign Service officer posted to multiple embassies and other diplomatic missions (although never as a Senate-confirmed ambassador – more on that below), as well as in the State Department’s bureaucracy at Foggy Bottom, and finally answering more than one summons to trouble-shoot some of the toughest foreign policy challenges, to take the reader through the ins and outs and ups and downs of American diplomatic practice over roughly 50 years. Having completed *Foreign Service*, one is left with a greater appreciation of life as a Foreign Service officer as well as the internal procedural and personal dynamics of United States embassies, Foggy Bottom, and delegations to negotiations and international organizations.

Foreign Service is exceptionally well written, a testament to Dobbins's years of experience writing diplomatic cables, policy papers for the government and research reports from his post-State Department home, the RAND Corporation. His descriptions of routine interactions with colleagues as well as conversations with secretaries of state, national security advisors and a host of foreign interlocutors give the reader a sense of being in the room as they occur. He deals candidly with the good – for example postings to both Paris and Strasbourg, France – and the ugly – an allegation of misleading Congress in testimony about Haiti that earned him the eternal enmity of Congressman Dan Burton and Senator Jesse Helms, the latter the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and resulted in him never receiving a Senate-confirmed ambassadorial post. While honest in his assessments of people with whom he has worked, Dobbins has no axes to grind and even concludes that Burton and Helms might have done him a favor by inadvertently opening doors to assignments in the Balkans and Afghanistan that have enriched his work inside and outside of government service.

Foreign Service is more than a memoir, however. It is also a history of United States diplomacy from the end of the Vietnam War, through the end of the Cold War in Europe and conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia, and on to the current challenges of democratization and state building in, for example, Afghanistan and Iraq. Some might see Dobbins's lack of experience in Asia and Africa (less Somalia) as a significant limitation. However, given Europe's centrality to the Cold War after Vietnam and Dobbins's experience in Haiti, Somalia and Afghanistan, the value of the book as a chronicle of contemporary American diplomacy remains undiminished.

Who will benefit from reading this book? First, citizens in general who are interested in looking beyond stereotypes of a bloated and overfunded State Department to understand the contribution of commissioned officers who do not wear uniforms – Foreign Service officers – to the security of the United States. Second, practitioners from other government agencies who want a better grasp of the role of the State Department at the tactical and operational levels of policy development and execution. Finally, military professionals, to better understand the role of diplomacy in not only supporting military operations but also working to precluding situations from developing to the point that the military instrument of power must come into play. In this reviewer's experience, too many military officers assess their State Department peers based on service in a provincial reconstruction team or similar capacity either in Afghanistan or Iraq. Thanks to James Dobbins and *Foreign Service*, we can better appreciate American diplomats' service on the front lines of protecting our nation's security. We should bear in mind their contributions and capabilities when looking for ways to tackle the challenges of the twenty-first century. **IAJ**

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