

# The Moral and Ethical Leadership Implications for Close Combat Soldiers in Subterranean Operations

by Anthony Randall

The moral and ethical leadership implications for close combat Soldiers in subterranean environments present complex problem sets in multi-domain warfare. Subterranean systems impact efficient implementation of Mission Command, effective application of doctrine, and ethical application of moral courage essential to the warrior's long term vitality spiritually, psychologically, and physiologically. Subterranean environments are a potential living hell for all who descend where "being fades away into nonentity."<sup>1</sup> Leaders must prepare, protect, and preserve close combat soldiers soul, psyche, and warrior code embodied by the Army Ethic.

## Subterranean Space Overview: Concepts and Doctrine

The U.S. Army's recent focus on developing, shaping, and implementing concepts and doctrine into multi-domain training and operational environments must include subterranean warfare. *ATP 3-21.51 Subterranean Operations*, identifies the brigade combat team (BCT) as the "Army's primary combined arms, close combat force." When necessary, they conduct "operations in subterranean environments...to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative."<sup>2</sup>

Three subterranean environments, "natural tunnels, urban subsurface systems, and underground facilities" disrupt and deny mission command, restrict tactics and techniques normally providing overmatch, and threaten the warrior's spiritual, psychological, and physiological being.<sup>3</sup> Whether used for "command and control, operations, production, storage, or protection," no subterranean system is the same and pose "tactical and physical risk."<sup>4</sup> Close combat units mitigate subterranean threats with five options: bypass, neutralize, control, defeat, or clear, with clear being the most inherently dangerous option.<sup>5</sup>

"Operations in a subterranean environment are physically and psychologically demanding. Specialized equipment such as ballistic shields, air quality monitors, and breathing apparatus must be either worn or hand carried in addition to an already robust combat load. Enclosed spaces, potential low or no light conditions, extremely limited maneuver options, and intermittent communications create immense psychological stress. Potential unique environmental or structural hazards such as air quality deteriorating to dangerous levels, injury from blast overpressure, or tunnel collapse serve to compound an already stressful environment."<sup>6</sup>—LTC Nathan Palisca<sup>7</sup>

Threat forces increase the tactical and physical risk endemic in subterranean operations by accelerating the psychological and physiological culminating point of close combat forces. Whether confronting a traditional threat such as North Korea, an irregular threat such as insurgents and guerilla's in Afghanistan, or a hybrid threat such as Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), close combat leaders must assess the significant moral and ethical dilemmas of sending a close combat force into a subterranean system.<sup>8</sup> U.S. and Iraqi Forces encountered this complexity during the 2017 battle of Mosul, Iraq against ISIS.<sup>9</sup>

## Realized Mission Command in Subterranean Space

Doctrine developers and practitioners collectively realize the challenges of efficiently and effectively conducting subterranean operations. Since the emergence of ATP 3-21.51 in February 2018, LTC Rob Stanton and his CWMD Elimination Task Force and Sub-T SME, have solely focused on integrating concepts, doctrine, and training into real world application as a close combat force. He frames the problem set of realized mission command twofold, recognizing the “Sub-T environment becomes a ‘condition of the battlefield’ and simply a sub-set of a larger mission.”<sup>10</sup> Secondly, “what can a general purpose force realistically do...and do we really have the capability to send large numbers of GPF Soldiers underground?”<sup>11</sup>

The effectiveness of clearing a subterranean space will directly correspond to Soldiers’ cohesion and ability to trust one another with limited to no communications outside of their breaching element. Going underground removes many forms of overmatch leaving a peer to peer, close range, deadly fight. According to Stanton, “The only way to survive is to be a cohesive team before the breach ever takes place.”<sup>12</sup>

Leaders must recognize the “intimate brutality” and “primal aggression” killing range LTC (USA, Ret.) David Grossman identifies as the most damaging to a warrior’s mind, spirit, and body.<sup>13</sup> It is the hardest distance to kill another human being as the “average human being has a strong resistance to piercing the body of another of his own kind.”<sup>14</sup> It must be trained.

Despite a perceived or real intention of some Army leaders to limit or close the Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP), an intentional and renewed emphasis on hand to hand combat and knife fighting skills, to include training on the psychological impacts of killing an enemy combatant at close range is paramount to close combat unit training. The MACP and SOCP (Special Operations Combatives Program) should receive unanimous Army leadership support and emphasis in doctrine and training. Over 10,000 known military subterranean systems today.<sup>15</sup> Close combat forces must train and expect to fight in subsurface space.

If not, it presents a failure to address a clear and present danger in subterranean space affecting Soldiers holistic well-being. Israeli Defense Force Major Ran Tinichigiu, a former subterranean unit company commander, concurs that their training in Krav Maga conditions soldiers to be confident with killing at close range while understanding the advantages of creating space to use personal weapons while wearing body armor, night vision goggles, and other equipment.<sup>16</sup> Choosing to clear a subterranean system should weigh heavy on the moral and ethical decision making process of leaders when planning and conducting the mission.

Creating shared understanding requires an “incredible amount of tactical patience”<sup>17</sup> as the accustomed IPB and real-time assets may be limited or deemed irrelevant literally leaving a commander and their force blind. Therefore, clear commander’s intent from the senior commander to the lead soldier in the breach must convey the “why” of going underground in order to achieve the decisive action required and buy-in of soldiers.

Subterranean environments may more acutely reduce Soldiers heartiness and grit causing them to culminate quicker due to the moral and ethical implications of their actions and subsequent psychological and physiological stress of subterranean environments. Stanton believes, “Soldiers will likely ‘culminate’ much faster in the three domains (mental, physical, emotional) and much more rapidly than we expect. We need to realize and be prepared for that.”<sup>18</sup> Soldiers’ moral courage and professional ethic internalized beforehand and steadfast determination increases their survivability during and after operations.

Regarding disciplined initiative, it is a double edged sword. Major Tinichigiu advises the enemy may have less information of who and what is breaching their defenses and may struggle comparatively with the sense or feeling of being trapped or buried alive. It is a “psychological game of hide and seek. You must keep moving and not become static.”<sup>19</sup>

Bypassing a subterranean space may elicit psychological duress on units. Israeli Defense Force Major Ido Puterkovski recalled during the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict with Hamas his unit established a secure battle position for 72 hours and implemented routine defensive procedures to include rest and recovery operations. During that time, an enemy combatant emerged from a subterranean space with an anti-tank weapon and engaged a tank inside their battle position. Psychologically this reduced their forces confidence in a secure area impacting rest and recovery plans and creating a hyper-vigilance of seeing each terrain feature as Sub-T entry or exit points.<sup>20</sup>

When Paragraph 1 regarding enemy and terrain may be incomplete or altogether missing, LTC Palisca encourages close combat soldiers to consider three aspects of subterranean warfare with regard to realized mission command. First, to the individual soldier, remember the enemy has to fight in the same environment. They are not superhuman. Second, leaders must ensure their units do not outrun their sensors, mirrors, robots, or moral and ethical rules of engagement. Third, leaders at every level must assume this mission set and train for proficiency now.<sup>21</sup>

### **Welcome to Hell: Theological and Psychological Impacts of Subterranean Space**

The highway to hell is glorified by rock ‘n’ rollers, condemned by firebrand preachers, and its very existence questioned by philosophers, theologians, and psychologists. To understand the implications of subterranean space as a living hell, it is necessary to consider the religious, philosophical, and psychological frameworks shaping our culture, warriors, and warrior codes.<sup>22</sup>

The darkness, isolation, and torment of hell opposes the immortal peace of heaven and pleasures of life and earthly relationships. Cultural and religious burial practices associate death and afterlife as subsurface. Greek mythology identifies the underworld of Hades as a place of torment. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam believe in some form of subsurface physical hell where torment and isolation from God prevails eternally, or for a period of time before annihilation, or redemption. Hinduism’s Yama judges the dead in multiple kinds of hell. Buddhist teachings associate death and hell with an underground concept of “diyu.”

The Judeo-Christian tradition portrays hell as a place of permanence, annihilation, or temporary torment for purification. Jesus warned, “Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.” (Matthew 10:28). Jesus taught that hell is a physical location prescribed for punishment “after judgment,” consumed with “fire and darkness,” and “never ending punishment.”<sup>23</sup> Origen believed hell held wicked souls for temporary purification in hopes of reunification with God, and Dante’s Inferno spirals the wicked down nine levels of torment.

Today progressive theologians, like Rob Bell, question hell as an actual physical location preferring to describe it as a “terrible evil that comes from the secrets hidden deep within our hearts.”<sup>24</sup> His perspective of experiencing a living hell within the depth of our soul is similar to psychologist, Carl Jung’s “shadow” identity of depravity and evil. Karl Marlantes writes, “The warrior must recognize the moments when circumstances mirror the ugly unwanted parts of his or her psyche. This is the only way to minimize the evil consequences of ignoring these parts. To do this requires recognizing and accepting one’s own despised parts, a form of heroism not taught in boot camp.”<sup>25</sup> Concepts of hell impact a warrior’s functionality in a subterranean space.

Understanding how close combat soldiers may respond in a subterranean environment includes psychosocial research in conjunction with theological and philosophical beliefs. Psychosocial research on humans interacting with subterranean spaces identified four major issues of concern: “isolation, perceived control, negative culture-based associations, and perceived security.”<sup>26</sup> Real time intelligence assets, protection from overmatching weaponry, and national defense strategies increase the propensity of these concerns in subterranean spaces.

The descent into unknown subterranean spaces to include temperature, narrowing, widening, descending, turning of tunnels, and confronting obstacles without situational awareness of what is happening above ground creates a natural sense of isolation, entrapment, and claustrophobia.<sup>27</sup> The darkness and fear of the unknown affects an individual's conception of time and duration underground. However, when close combat soldiers work as tight knit teams through training and experience, the subsurface space acts as a bonding relationship impacting mission accomplishment, survival, and returning to the surface.

Close combat soldiers entering unknown subterranean spaces must mitigate perceived and actual lack of control and security. Lack of reliable maps, self-correcting landmarks and terrain features minimize soldiers' abilities to navigate and adjust positions especially under the duress of enemy contact, evacuating wounded personnel, and escaping environmental threats like cave-ins or limited oxygen. Teaching warriors to 'control what they can control' and mindfulness fosters mental conditioning and emotional health under duress in uncontrollable conditions.

Enter the enemy force. Based upon psycho-social research of subterranean spaces, dehumanizing populations living underground is a natural human response.<sup>28</sup> The cultural and religious affiliations to death, demons, and the tormented, coupled with a hatred, fear, and disgust of an unknown number and location of enemy and how they are prepared to fight, can quickly lead to dehumanizing and demonizing the enemy.

Our Professional Ethic and Army Values encourage Soldiers to refrain from dehumanizing the enemy. Rules of Engagement aid Soldiers in discerning *jus in bello* principles such as proportional use of force, discrimination between combatants, and noncombatants, avoiding evil means, and using good faith of treating the enemy honorably as a combatant, with care as a prisoner, and with dignity when deceased. The Geneva Convention and UCMJ provide systems of justice for warriors who violate the ethic.

However, something deeper must compel warriors through a sense of character, identity, and honor than simply rules of war. Aristotelean virtue ethics and the works of Thomas Aquinas attempt to create a moral and ethical framework for the warrior to operate within since even "the most virtuous of soldiers, therefore, in the most just of wars, could, under Thomistic scrutiny also, still sense a certain disorientation in his attempt to do what was right on the battlefield."<sup>29</sup>

Our religious and philosophical perspectives of death, hell, and the enemy's humanity contribute to our perspective lenses as well as the psycho-social issues of isolation, and perceived control and security. Close Combat Leaders must ensure their personal and personnel's professional ethic, moral character, intent, action, and end state is rooted, founded, exercised, and tested in order to live with the hell of war ready to pierce through their soul.

### **Prepare, Protect, and Preserve: The Professional Army Ethic, Training, and Care**

Steeling the soul of the warrior is a holistic and ongoing process rather than a systematic task or program of instruction. It requires recruiting, teaching, and training Soldiers of character. Soldiers must know who they are individually as trusted professionals, who they are collectively as a professional ethic, and who benefits from their character, intent, and actions as leaders.

Our professional Army Ethic relies upon trusted professionals comprised of character, competence, and commitment who execute their mission effectively, efficiently, and ethically.<sup>30</sup> Our ethic is shaped by our culture and societal beliefs to include our spiritual and religious beliefs and practices, and philosophical and psychological development.<sup>31</sup>

Instilling the character of a professional warrior requires a professional ethic, a warrior's code, self-regulated and enforced from within out of a compelling love for one another and ones warrior class in war and peace. Major General Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "The soldier trade, if it is to mean anything at all, has to be

anchored to an unshakable code of honor. Otherwise, those of us who follow the drums become nothing more than a bunch of hired assassins walking around in gaudy clothes... a disgrace to God and mankind.”<sup>32</sup>

For the U.S. Army this includes ADRP-1 and the Army Framework for Character Development, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Rules of Engagement (ROE), and just war principles. These ethical rule sets create a framework for the compelling moral code of the warrior class shaping their moral and ethical reasoning and decision making process.

Immanuel Kant’s deontological moral reasoning and categorical imperatives continue to influence today’s professional armies. The first imperative of universal law shapes leaders’ use of just war theory and international law to determine if intentions, actions, and proposed end states fulfill *jus in bello* when choosing a subterranean mitigating course of action.

Subterranean operations are morally and ethically challenging especially when non-combatants such as human shields, enslaved labor, and trafficked people are involved. If *jus ad bellum* principles for going to war guide the *jus in bello* principles of war, subterranean warfare may shift 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare towards traditional total war principles. Such a dramatic shift conflicts with technology, social media, and public opinions conditioning of society to expect and demand risk averse surgical strikes and minimal casualties of combatants and non-combatants. Today, *jus in bello* seemingly dictates *jus ad bellum* contrary to the traditional deontological approach due to a hypersensitivity of battlefield violence via 24/7 real time access. The Clausewitz Trinity prevails. We must defeat our enemies with speed, surprise and violence of action, free the oppressed, and protect the innocent with the greatest scrutiny in history.

Kant’s second imperative supports people to be seen as an end state rather than merely a means to an end. How close combat leaders interpret this imperative impacts the livelihood of their soldiers, non-combatants, and an enemy force when considering proportionality in the use of force, discrimination, avoidance of evil means, and good faith. Choosing to bypass, neutralize, or control a subterranean space may better fulfill this imperative than destroying or clearing it. Conversely, destroying or clearing a subterranean space in order to deny the enemy use of space to attack other friendly forces may also be a viable course of action.

Finally, the third imperative of making rules in a position of authority that one would also willingly be subjected to, prepares us to effectively protect our soldiers, non-combatants, and treat enemy soldiers justly during and after conflict. Leaders must consider the cost of subterranean operations regarding a units’ combat effectiveness and culmination points, and the potential post combat psychological trauma and moral injury resulting from subterranean spaces.

A professional ethic, moral and ethical reasoning, and morally courageous leadership enhance the preparation, protection, and preservation of close combat soldiers from the banality of evil and propensity of humanity to commit atrocities against humanity. Regarding subterranean spaces, there is no difference in proportionality, use of force, and right intent in suffocating a submarine crew at the bottom of the ocean by disabling their vessel with depth charges as there is closing off ventilation shafts or entrance/exit points of subterranean spaces. When both situations contain combatants, who by their own volition and intent, have chosen to fight from those defenses, which can also be considered offensive in nature, and must be bypassed, neutralized, controlled, defeated, or cleared. Additionally, we have integrated soft and hard call out techniques on objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to mitigate risk to noncombatants even at the risk of our forces, losing initiative, or control of time and space.

### **Conclusion: Reclaiming the Warrior’s “Ticket”**

Warriors who look into the snarling, gazing, fearful, or saddened eyes of our enemy, kill them as combatants, care for them as wounded, and respect them as fellow warriors, meanwhile understanding their own fear of death and desire to live life another day, must have the spiritual, behavioral, and physical coping

mechanisms necessary to live well. “Warriors, above all, must fundamentally be spiritual people, that is, people who are on a different path to start with.”<sup>33</sup>

Steven Pressfield captures this image in, *Gates of Fire*, when after battle the Spartans reclaim their “tickets,” “wooden-twig bracelets,” that are snapped in half before battle. One part is placed in the basket held by the priest, the other attached to the body of the Spartan as their dog tag.<sup>34</sup> Reclaiming ones ticket and reattaching it is a purging and healing process of thanksgiving for surviving battle, mourning for those comrades who died, and living to fight another day. Critical characters in the scene include: the priest, the leader, and fellow warriors.

Addressing the moral pain of soldiers and preserving and caring for the wounded soul of the soldier is nothing new. Warrior codes, penances, ritual religious cleansings, and therapeutic psychology all attempt to address caring for the Soldiers soul after combat. Sigmund Freud mistakenly assumed soldiers returning from World War I would “joyfully return to his home, his wife, and his children, undelayed and undisturbed by any thought of the enemy he has slain” because “civilized man” had lost or discarded “ethical sensitiveness.”<sup>35</sup>

Many of the Enlightenment’s moral philosophies discarded a creator God’s objective truth, religion, and Aristolean and Thomistic virtues, in an effort to find moral good, without God, or an objective good. This led to the evolutionary social scientific pursuits of therapy while limiting the spiritual growth and healing required by the human soul. This pursuit is contrary to historical warrior codes across all cultures including our professional Army Ethic.

Preserving the force through the Army’s Human Performance Program is a holistic attempt to develop the 21<sup>st</sup> century American Soldier and care for the greatest asset of today’s military, people. Carl Jung wrote in reference to the psychological needs of humanity that, “It is indeed high time for the clergyman and psychotherapist to join forces to meet this great spiritual task.”<sup>36</sup> We must remember, “The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.” (Spartan king, quoted by Thucydides) Subterranean warfare highlights the continual need for professional Soldiers to prepare, protect, and preserve the warrior’s soul by internalizing a warrior code, utilizing moral and ethical decision making, and the exercising transformational leadership necessary to teach, train, refine, forge, and heal the warrior soul. May we trust that, “*God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power and love and of a sound mind.*” (2 Timothy 1:7)

## End Notes

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- 30 “Army White Paper: The Army Framework for Character Development” (Department of the Army, June 2017). 4.
- 31 Ibid., 6.
- 32 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
- 33 Marlantes, 64.
- 34 Steven Pressfield, *Gates of Fire* (New York: Bantam, 1998).
- 35 Verkamp, 49.
- 36 Carl Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1933). 265.

# “Reflecting the Best in Us”<sup>1</sup>: Traditional Just War Principles as a Framework for Building Character and Maintaining Trust

by Kenneth L. Sampson

*“Killing, whatever its form, can be morally corrosive. Mid-intensity counter insurgency, with its myriad of complex situations, an enemy who won’t play fair and the constant, enduring feeling of being under threat, compound such corrosiveness... There is a balance to be struck between morality and operational effectiveness, between softness and hardness. It is a fine line to walk, but one which must be walked nonetheless.”<sup>2</sup>*

The moral steadiness described by Lieutenant Paddy Bury, platoon leader for a Ranger Company, 1 Royal Irish Regiment, Afghanistan, 2008, addresses aspects of Just War. This paper contends that the Just War Tradition, articulated and instilled at the Soldier, Sailor, Marine, Airman, Coast Guard level—and integrated throughout the Armed Forces, serves to stimulate individual character development and cultivate systemic trust. It draws heavily on a variety of recent articles, memoirs, novels and Armed Forces publications relating to combat realities, moral injury, and the necessity of character development.

While focused on the tactical-to-operational levels of conflict, the findings within this work nonetheless apply to strategic concerns. The actions of a “strategic corporal” can have international impact. The patterns of thought and conduct developed by Armed Forces members at the Battalion and Brigade level continue as they advance to the ambiguous, more globally-focused senior positions. And, tactically positioned forces benefit by clear nationally developed objectives on the reasons why they go to war.

The Just War framework, though not without its detractors, is a command “caretakers-of-the-profession-of-arms” responsibility, leadership duty, cohesion-building opportunity, and character-developing imperative. Outcomes include enhanced military credibility, greater public “buy-in” of direction and policy, fewer spiritually-injured combat-exposed personnel, and strengthened “why we fight” integration with Armed Forces members on the ground.

The Tradition offers criteria and principles “...stretching back in time and continuing even today on the intersection of ethics and war...[a framework] significantly larger and richer than is often assumed and... not a fixed theory or doctrine.”<sup>3</sup> For many, it is a “living tradition that more closely resembles an ongoing conversation about what it means to love and seek justice for our neighbors in war.”<sup>4</sup>

Legal prescriptions guiding policy and conduct leading to and within war are extensive. The 1204 page *Department of Defense Law of War Manual* and 253 page *Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook* parse with great detail particular legal issues of war.<sup>5</sup> Yet the more lofty aspirations and standards of morality, reflected in the best within us as a Nation and Armed Forces, and which impact on-the-ground behavior in complex settings, may not be readily accessible within such legal formulations.<sup>6</sup> Embracing the Tradition’s structure within our units—“The only framework that offers a rich, highly inflected language, a storehouse of categories, concepts, and common places developed over centuries of reflection, in which the moral

particulars of war can be examined”—leads to readily available, humanity-centered insight and guidance for our citizen warriors.<sup>7</sup>

This moral insight is critical, especially in the ethically corrosive (over time) combat environment. On the “morally bruising battlefield,”<sup>8</sup> “...in the heat and fury of combat...there are powerful forces, the ‘forces of moral gravity,’ which tend to drag the soldier down to the enemy’s level.”<sup>9</sup> After five months combat near Sangin, Afghanistan in 2008, Patrick Bury would write, “We are being [morally] corroded, eaten by this hard place.”<sup>10</sup> Yet he could keep his “moral compass...still pointing North,” in part due to the positive impact of the Just War Tradition.<sup>11</sup>

The Tradition can assist in providing a helpful moral context, a sense of coherence and orientation in the too often falling-to-pieces, pulled-in-a-hundred-directions world of deployments or Stateside assignments. Nearing the end of their 2008 Iraq combat tour, “The Good Soldiers” of the 1-16 Infantry Battalion experienced “fresh fires and explosions, and after more than four hundred days [in Baghdad], there was a growing sense of bewilderment within the soldiers. What were they supposed to think of what was happening? How were they to make sense of it? How could they shape it into something understandable?”<sup>12</sup> In this often confusing world where soldiers are “required to make the most consequential, intense and complex moral decisions of their lives...to help them understand why it is morally right for them to fight”<sup>13</sup> the Just War Tradition can assist.

## Obstacles

*“Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime. Ask the infantry and ask the dead.”—Ernest Hemingway<sup>14</sup>*

From many quarters we are encouraged to “tread lightly” in our use and treatment of Just War principles. First, on the soldier level, the obstinateness of the enemy seems to make empathy impossible: “These are a people who do not understand kindness...They see kindness as a weakness. And they will take advantage of it. And Marines will die.”<sup>15</sup> There is the unthinking, “My country right or wrong” obedience and “muscle memory” reflex that those who engage directly with the enemy must possess: “As Private Tilley my most important job was to carry out orders.”<sup>16</sup> “Stuffing down” ethical questions experienced in combat is the avenue of some: “There were names people used to describe soldiers who struggled with combat stress and they were often degrading or unsoldierly. One knew it was better to keep your demons locked inside and not talk much about it.”<sup>17</sup> Then, there’s the hard-hearted, uncompromising nature of “closing with the enemy.” “This book [*Callsign Hades*]...is not meant for those who serve bravely in the infantry, for I fear my observations are too soft for men who need to remain hard.”<sup>18</sup> Lastly, on the soldier level, there’s the negation of conscience:

“Our military’s institutional preferences leave little room for personal conscience. Military culture expects service members suffering from moral distress to ‘suck it up and drive on’... ‘Resilience’ training prepares soldiers to cope with bad experiences—even if these future experiences involve their doing, or witnessing, something that they *should* feel bad about.”<sup>19</sup>

Secondly, the realities of war may seem to obliterate Just War considerations. There’s a seemingly “monstrous immorality” in even considering advanced weaponry: “Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war. They are the first of mankind’s technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world.”<sup>20</sup> Next, there’s the savage nature of combat: “War is brutish, inglorious and a terrible waste...Combat leaves an indelible mark on those who are forced to endure it.”<sup>21</sup> War realities can lead to a celebration of hate: “Allied officers were constantly fretting that the troops’ hate levels weren’t high enough...George Patton’s aide praised him as ‘a great hate builder.’ Dwight Eisenhower bragged, ‘I am not one who finds it difficult to hate my enemies.’”<sup>22</sup>

Third, faith/philosophical factors may curtail Just War reasoning. A basic incompatibility surfaces when combining the concepts “just” (fair-minded, even-handed, decent, righteous, principled) and “war” (bloodshed, fighting, struggles, encounters). The inner moral conflict experienced by “Golden Rule” (“Do unto others as you would have others do unto you”) constraints in combat can be great:

“[Soldiers] do not want to be killed themselves, yet they must sometimes kill others. Compassion, the ‘Golden Rule,’ and laws and mores that are normal at home are greatly modified on battlefields, applying to a warrior’s dealings with his comrades-in-arms but only in special circumstances to his interactions with ‘enemy’ troops.”<sup>23</sup>

Lastly, in *Killing From the Inside Out—Moral Injury and Just War*, humanities professor Robert Emmet Meagher, outlines reasons “[it] is time to declare [Just War theory’s] death and to write an autopsy.”<sup>24</sup> The Tradition has been used to so “rubber stamp” and justify military actions that its effectiveness is null:

“...following World War I...the concept of just war has been invoked to drape with legitimacy every major war that the United States has waged and is waging...despite the fact that none of these conflicts would have met the criteria for just war before those criteria became so opportunistically diluted and distorted that they could be used to stamp as legitimate whatever acts a warring nation deems necessary to prevail.”<sup>25</sup>

The “broken promises” offered by Just War invalidate its utility: “...at its worst [Just War theory] was a lie, a deadly lie. It promised at least the possibility of war without sin, war without criminality, war without guilt or shame, war in which men would risk their lives but not their souls.”<sup>26</sup> Finally, the moral dissonance within recent wars makes for the Tradition’s unsuitableness:

“War has its own rules, and they don’t include fair play, moral limits, or an agreement that right trumps might. War, as Bertrand Russell is said to have once memorably stated, never decides who’s right, just who’s left. It is, as Vietnam veteran [and Veterans Affairs Chaplain] William Mahedy put it, ‘a moral sewer’ that can’t be cleaned up and whose waters never were and never will be morally potable.”<sup>27</sup>

Despite these barriers, the Just War Tradition remains valid. Not that the Tradition resolves or even begins to resolve all ethical issues raised in combat; not that Just War can unambiguously defend certain courses of action and policies that would necessitate war; not that post war moral concerns—especially for the Armed Forces members who fight them—are easily remedied and sorted out. Rather the Tradition provides a context, a common moral vocabulary, by which we may discuss, wrestle with, and view issues brought about by our profession. Within the Tradition, we have “...inherited a vast moral vocabulary and set of moral tools, developed over centuries and handed down from generation to generation...a practical inheritance... which people could use to engage their own moral struggles.”<sup>28</sup> This shared moral vocabulary enriches, enlightens, and identifies common ground and context with which we can grapple with issues.<sup>29</sup> Though not easy, in identifying particulars of the ethical concerns at hand, and nuances of approach—while engaged with the framework offered by the Just War Tradition—we can arrive at clear, straightforward directives and instruction applicable throughout our chain of command.

### **Command “Caretakers-of-the-Profession-of-Arms” Responsibility**

*“People want to do the right thing in the midst of war...they want moral guidance...”*<sup>30</sup>

As caretakers-of-the-profession-of-arms, Officers embody the “ethos” of the Armed Forces profession and fulfill a calling and vocation with responsibilities “octaves above” that required by civilian counterparts.<sup>31</sup> “[The] commander must be the controlling head, his must be the master mind, and from him must flow the energy and the impulse which are to animate all under him.”<sup>32</sup>

This obligation of service includes providing a moral compass for subordinates, maintaining the “moral high ground,” knowing “when to inspire and embolden their Soldiers and Marines and when to enforce restraint and discipline”—all Just War concerns.<sup>33</sup>

“Leaders prepare to indirectly inflict suffering on their Soldiers and Marines by sending them into harm’s way to accomplish the mission. At the same time, leaders attempt to avoid, at great length, injury and death to innocents. This requirement gets to the very essence of what some describe as ‘the burden of command.’...Leaders must develop these characteristics [fortitude, resolve, mental toughness in commanders and units] in peacetime through study and hard training. They must maintain them in combat.”<sup>34</sup>

This command responsibility involves the education as well as training of those entrusted to one’s care. Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, held for eight years in a North Vietnamese prison, wrote:

“Every great leader I have known has been a great teacher, able to give those around him a sense of perspective and to set the moral, social, and motivational climate among his followers. This is not easy; it takes wisdom and discipline and requires both the sensitivity to perceive philosophic disarray in your charges and the knowledge of how to put things in order.”<sup>35</sup>

The Just War “disarray” within those whom we lead may express itself within combat by indiscriminate, undisciplined “shoot-em-up time” attitudes.<sup>36</sup> “Nuke the Middle East...Let the whole region be glass...Kill ‘em all...” hatred can easily seep into squads and platoons long exposed to harsh and austere battlefields.<sup>37</sup> Yet to temper this tangle of excessive rhetoric, the wise commander will have offered prior education and training regarding the Just War Tradition—not to enforce *compliance* to rules of conduct but to *embed principles and values* addressing deep moral concerns and understanding.

Command guidance concerning going to war (Jus ad Bellum) principles—competent authority; just cause; proportionate means; exhaustion of peaceful alternatives; right intention—can lead to more thorough “boots-on-the-ground” purpose and integration for the cause at hand.<sup>38</sup> Coaching regarding conduct within war (Jus in Bello) concepts—military necessity; humanity; proportionality; distinction; honor—bolsters understanding for implementation of rules of engagement and behavior on the battlefield.<sup>39</sup> Instruction on cessation of hostilities (Jus Post Bellum) essentials—“...issues regulating the end of warfare and the return from war to peace...i.e., what a just peace should look like...”—can lead to a vision contributing to the personal healing and wholeness of those charged to carry out our nation’s wars.<sup>40</sup>

Rigorous, creative training that promotes awareness of these principles will help raise consciousness of their importance and fix their understanding within units. Then, in the hard-edged realm of combat, where, especially over time, an “ethical fading” may occur, responsible leaders will double efforts to attend to command climate and the Tradition’s awareness and applicability to situations at hand.<sup>41</sup>

## Leadership Duty

*“In sum, then: carefulness before battle, callousness in it, and compassion after it.”<sup>42</sup>*

“Good people volunteer to become soldiers—despite knowing they may be required to do bad things to bad people—because they trust they will be led by good people working to achieve a greater good.”<sup>43</sup> This leadership duty falls most often into the hands of those closest to Armed Forces members on the ground, Noncommissioned Officers/Petty Officers (NCOs/POs). As members of the profession of arms, NCOs/POs are bound together in a shared calling, “a commonly accepted ethos, an ethical framework or code that guides and governs” their behavior.<sup>44</sup>

“In the United States, the members of this noble profession are held to a higher standard of conduct than most of their fellow citizens. They are required to follow a unique set of laws

and a code that guides them morally and ethically, while preparing for—and during—the heat of battle. This code is what separates them from mere criminals, savages, mercenaries, and terrorists. They bear arms and share risks out of necessity at the call of their nation, not out of enjoyment or uncivilized greed.”<sup>45</sup>

Embracing this “moral and ethical code,” which is given structure and shared vocabulary within the Just War Tradition, is both a leadership privilege and obligation. Leaders, at all levels, provide troops on the ground with opportunities to carry out the “most consistent moral conduct in the throes of combat.”<sup>46</sup> They seek to develop an ethical “muscle memory” not conditioned upon “legalistic indoctrination, which easily breaks down under the pressure of complex, confusing, and morally ambiguous circumstances.”<sup>47</sup> Rather, throughout the stages leading to, during and after combat, junior officers and NCOs/POs can take the Just War Tradition “off the shelf...out of their kitbags...[and place it] into their hip pockets” for the betterment of their charges.<sup>48</sup> They train and educate their subordinates in practical, “hands on,” ethically enhancing ways, to include the following:

### Going to War

In preparation for training exercises, Combat Maneuver Training Center rotations, deployments, and combat stationing, the orders process can include reasons for the current fight based on “big picture” Just War principles (Jus ad Bellum). The concept is not to promote an “airtight” Just War checklist. Rather, the intent is for conscious fostering of dialogue and interaction regarding the reasons for going to war.<sup>49</sup> Breaking these notions down into language and moral examples that are accessible and understood by soldiers is essential.<sup>50</sup> During training, formal and informal gatherings after an all-night infiltration, an assault on the objective, or “fire-for-effect” can lead to the practical application of Just War principles “until they become second nature.”<sup>51</sup>

### During War

Remaining “...morally focused and righteous in their intentions, even in the fog of war and under the psychological pressures of combat” has been an upstanding achievement of our individual and collective conduct during these past sixteen years.<sup>52</sup> Yes, aberrations occurred. Yet, throughout combat operations in two theaters, and continuous postings in often austere, harsh and hostile settings around the globe, our Armed Forces have engaged with ethical “eyes wide open” and a “moral compass in hand.”<sup>53</sup> Holding the “precious legacy of ferocious, ethical combat performance”<sup>54</sup> has been maintained by means of “training in the principles of just warfare, the just war tradition, and military standards of conduct and core values.”<sup>55</sup>

The recurrence of moral and spiritual injury within returning forces may be indicative of a need for more intentional “justice within war” approaches. The continuing expert work of the U.S. Naval Academy’s “Stockdale Institute,” the “Center for the Army’s Profession and Ethic” (CAPE), and “The Leavenworth Symposium” offer abundant social media and print-based case studies, speeches, and articles to stimulate leader engagement in “justice within war” training, discussion and insight.<sup>56</sup> Intentionally tying rules of engagement to traditional “conduct within war” moral principles may further embed their value within our forces. Leaders who open squad level dialogue, within a safe space, on issues like combat stress, perfection, guilt, regret, and the “hero narrative” (being “the good guys...protectors of the innocent...destroyers of evil,” practically invincible)<sup>57</sup> may provide “emotional ‘shock absorbers’ [so necessary] for their subordinates.”<sup>58</sup> And, guarding the moral small-unit command climate, even in the midst of dramatic and audacious success, will reap dividends.<sup>59</sup>

### After Combat

After-action reviews, both informal and deliberate, can voice observations concerning moral appeals regarding the use of force and implications appropriate to operations just conducted. Teaming with unit,

ship or squadron assigned Religious Support Teams, Staff Judge Advocates, Behavioral Health and Medical personnel, to offer opportunities for decompression, ethical and spiritual processing, realizing “[m]ind-sets reflecting humility, regret, and perhaps contrition acknowledge this [mixed emotions of regret and sadness in some victorious soldiers] ambivalence and may actually ease a warrior’s transition to peacetime existence.”<sup>60</sup>

### **Unit Cohesion-Building Opportunity**

*“The commander...create[s] an ethical space within which collective reflection on the military calling is frequent, accepted, and instructive. Normally this requires the human touch, an ability to engage informally with subordinates, and to coach and mentor without creating a sense of unease with those whose professional futures are very much in the commander’s hands.”<sup>61</sup>*

Establishing and maintaining a climate of trust within an Armed Forces unit contributes greatly to building cohesion and confidence. The sense of integrity, strength, and loyalty generated by leaders and returned by those who are led shapes and forges bonds so necessary to carry out our military calling. Being committed to “the dignity, worth, and well-being of the other...is the foundation of trust.”<sup>62</sup> Integration of Just War principles within and throughout the command contributes much to establishing such an ethos of assurance and hope.

“The moral truth [of the Just War Tradition] has a reassuring stability and resilience to it” that governs our actions leading to, during and after combat.<sup>63</sup> The discipline required to fight wars justly contributes positively to soldiers sticking together, over time, under trying or exhilarating conditions. The Tradition offers “interdependent and reinforcing parts of a coherent system, ...a general guide for conduct during war when no specific rule applies.”<sup>64</sup> The internal confidence generated by these principles flows from individual Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen and Coastguard to teams, squads, platoons, and companies. A formidable unit bonding can occur.

Then, whether in counterinsurgency (COIN) or force-on-force action, leaders who set “an example for the local populace,” serving as a “moral compass that extends beyond the COIN force and into the community” will bolster the highest moral aspirations of those within their command.<sup>65</sup> This positive “aspiration-energy” uplifts, ennobles and fuses-together subordinates, peers and superiors alike.

Credible command and leader presence is key to fostering such conditions. Armed Forces members “will remain loyal and dutiful if they see in the one junior officer who is nearest them the embodiment of the ideals which they believe should apply throughout the service.”<sup>66</sup> These front-line leaders, with their day-in and day-out “hands on” interactions, have many opportunities “to create conversations that enable soldiers to gain and maintain healthy perspectives on their wartime experiences.”<sup>67</sup> During these discussions—times that are often spontaneous—to talk deeply of matters that count, and address the “why” of “what to do (and not to do) in war” enable significant moral growth.<sup>68</sup> In the absence of such leader presence, or if the cause is not seen to be just, soldiers may generate squad-level values of some sort, often expressing cynicism, disdain or resentment. A negative small-unit climate develops “from the bottom up, in one-on-one engagements that build interpersonal connections and develop a sense of being understood.”<sup>69</sup> This hostile atmosphere too often leads to an “us-versus-them” antagonism, detrimental to cohesion and whole unit bonding.<sup>70</sup>

Intentionally engaging the Just War Tradition within unit training and “down time” occasions may foster a unified, collective spirit that builds unstoppable trust, resilience and commitment. “Reflection about the practice of justice in war,” a process of “the community’s reflection and discernment,” when introduced or cultivated by a respected, caring leader, may pay great dividends.<sup>71</sup> Tapping the wide array of on-line videos and training aids, or suggesting recent memoirs, novels or documentaries,<sup>72</sup> shows involved, patient leadership, leading to “Soldiers and Marines [who] are more confident in their chances of success...”<sup>73</sup>

Including *ARMY Magazine's* recent "Strong to the Core" series by line-officer Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Pete Kilner, which features cutting-edge Just War themed insight, will benefit formal and informal dialogue and interaction.<sup>74</sup>

### Character-Developing Imperative

*"It's a journey that one could never imagine—I've touched lives, made folks feel and be appreciated for who they are—never for what they are wearing in terms of rank but as the human beings under the uniform."*<sup>75</sup>

Our nation looks to us to help develop the character of those entrusted to our care. "Enacting justice [a primary Armed Forces capability] requires more than mere determination or willpower; one must be attuned to what justice is and formed in the habits and practices that render the pursuit of justice second nature. This is what is meant by character."<sup>76</sup> The Just War Tradition gives credible voice to character-enhancing topics. The inner life of Armed Forces members, addressing issues of conscience, humility, moral struggle, one's "moral core," love, forgiveness, human weakness, courage, reconciliation, revenge, justice...are key areas related to and included within character development and Just War concerns.<sup>77</sup> Rigid mindsets fostering "zero-defect perfection" or an "over-idealized sense of good soldiering" can lead to excessive shame and deep guilt when character breaches occur.<sup>78</sup> Wise leaders would incorporate such issues within their soldier-level discussions and character-building sessions.

Character within the leader or led "is not innate or automatic. You have to build it with effort and artistry... You won't even achieve enduring external success unless you build a solid moral core. If you don't have some inner integrity, eventually your...scandal, your betrayal, will happen."<sup>79</sup> Within the Armed Forces, character marks the moral qualities, ethical standards, persistent courage and inner principles of right conduct possessed by those who lead. "Our leaders, then, are...going to have to have maximum amounts of initiative...critical thinking skills...[and] character, so they make the right moral and ethical choices in the absence of supervision under intense pressure in combat."<sup>80</sup>

Character development, a matter of the mind and heart as much as technique and direction, depends in part on the makeup of the leader. Eugene B. Sledge's memory of his company commander during World War II is instructive:

*"Our company commander represented stability and direction in a world of violence, death, and destruction...the loss of [Captain Haldane] at Peleliu was like losing a parent we depended upon for security—not our physical security, because we knew that was a commodity beyond our reach in combat, but our mental security."*<sup>81</sup>

The character insights of West Point plebes in Professor Elizabeth D. Samet's English class are enlightening: "They seemed to understand that courage isn't simply a matter of leading charges: sometimes it consists in speaking up, sometimes in stoic silence, sometimes in forging ahead, sometimes in circumspection, and sometimes in nothing less than preserving our own humanity."<sup>82</sup>

Character-building leaders are self-aware, knowing and continually assessing their strengths and weaknesses, and motivations for decision-making.<sup>83</sup> They recognize, especially as they are granted higher rank, how they are "in danger of being corrupted by their own aggressive actions."<sup>84</sup> The genuine humility of the Armed Forces leader, and ability to listen to peers, subordinates and superiors alike, is essential to the character maturation of all.

The Just War Tradition can help foster such moral strength. The mandates given by and for those we lead—to "not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage;"<sup>85</sup> to know that "at the heart of moral conduct... is a sense that our actions, whether in peace or war, are constrained; by respect and reverence for others;"<sup>86</sup>

to realize that what draws our recruits to join “may be less out of an interest in violence than a longing for the kind of maturity and respect that often come with it;”<sup>87</sup> and to work out the notion of our military’s “conception of honor rooted in inner virtue...in conscience, integrity, and doing what is right”<sup>88</sup>—are charges rooted in the Tradition and are noble responsibilities for us all to fulfill.

## Implications

*“Military leadership is an endlessly interesting subject. Few human activities carry such a heavy triple burden—physical, intellectual and spiritual.”<sup>89</sup>*

The following outcomes of this renewed emphasis on traditional Just War thought and practice benefit both the Armed Forces and civilian communities. By fusing the Tradition within tactical/operational training and deployments, trust and the human dimension of Soldiering are recognized and reinforced. The attendant benefits to the greater public at-large build wider trust and confidence within our citizenry for military undertakings and action.

### 1. Greater Public “Buy-In” for Direction and Policy.

*“...helping Soldiers figure out what war will do to them morally, and thereby to the network of relationships and communities within which each of them lives...should be...as much a subject of professional military education and training for combat as any other.”<sup>90</sup>*

Clear articulation of the moral underpinnings of strategy and practice, and the attendant impact on the military member “on-the-ground,” are Just War concerns. “Figuring out” the ethical implications of policy and action leads to greater moral integration within the soldier and within the parent society. This “moral attachment...[the] affirmation of our commitments to [the] larger community, the embrace of an ideal that attracts...draws...animates...inspires us” further adheres military aims to civilian concerns.<sup>91</sup>

When the Just War Tradition teams with valued military applications of discipline and the power of example, greater community alignment with policy can occur. The result is true moral strength, something “...formed over long periods of time...often hidden, humble, and unobtrusive, [this] good character evolves through disciplined practices and morally significant relationships.”<sup>92</sup> Such commitment, empowered by the example of leaders and led alike, is carried out by military members daily, leading to greater public “buy-in” for direction and policy and for the betterment of us all.

The focus of our training and care, and the product we send back into society—Sailors, Coastguard, Soldiers, Airmen and Marines—strengthened by the Tradition, contribute to greater public “ownership” and endorsement of strategy and approach. A military that intentionally exercises “...our nation’s greatest strength during military operations abroad—our nation’s strong tradition of respect for basic human rights” contributes as well to the high Armed Forces regard by citizens at home.<sup>93</sup> In embodying a “sacred trust,” the “...protection of the weak and unarmed...the very essence and reason of [the Soldier’s] being” is to build cohesion within the “fabric” of society.<sup>94</sup> And, military members concerned about the aftereffects of conflict—issues such as care for the most vulnerable (displaced persons, children, the infirm, refugees), respect for the environment, embracing a “healing-mindset” regarding reintroduction of warriors back into society—foster admiration from a grateful public and deeper respect for courses of action to be employed.<sup>95</sup>

Lastly, this public “buy-in” is fortified by the Tradition’s realities applied to “going-to,” “during,” and “after-war.” Treating the thought and practice of Just War patriarchs such as Augustine and Aquinas who “...shared a moral presumption against war and killing and saw these as a last and unfortunate resort” may curb the appeal of “saber-rattling” military and public servant civilian leaders.<sup>96</sup> Seeking to unmask and remove ethical blinders within war not only builds professionalism, but leads to greater civilian respect for and support of the

war effort.<sup>97</sup> Wars remembered not for “military victory...but for the quality of the peace that followed” are wars that can maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public.<sup>98</sup>

## 2. Enhanced Military Credibility

*“Good leaders are humble leaders. They are servant leaders. It is not about themselves. It’s never about you. It’s about the cause. It’s about the people you serve.”<sup>99</sup>*

It takes restraint, discipline and humility to embody Just War principles while maintaining a “warrior’s edge.” Such leaders of character “know who they are.” In possessing ethical maturity and substance, these leaders are seen by the American public at large as trusted agents and trustworthy representatives of our Nation. Armed Forces members who possess qualities of “restraint, temperance, respect...soft self-discipline...inner cohesion...calm, settled, and rooted [dispositions]...”—all traits integrated within the Just War Tradition—build the reliability of our military institutions at large.<sup>100</sup> When leaders “radiate a sort of moral joy”<sup>101</sup> and sense of shared humanity in the management and enforcement of their duties, the reputation of our Armed Forces, and confidence in its overall mission, increases.

Two significant recent examples of the public embrace of Just War principles by senior Army leaders serve to illustrate this institutional credibility. LTG Sean MacFarland, while serving as senior military commander in Iraq, stated in response to “carpet-bomb ISIS” threats by political candidates, “We are bound by the laws of armed conflict and at the end of the day it doesn’t only matter whether or not you win, it matters how you win...”<sup>102</sup> Then, General Mick Nicholson, upon taking command of forces in Afghanistan, traveled to Kunduz where a recent “friendly fire” bombing decimated a Doctors Without Borders Hospital. “As commander, I wanted to come to Kunduz personally...to deeply apologize for the events which destroyed the hospital...I grieve with you for your loss and suffering, and humbly and respectfully ask for your forgiveness.”<sup>103</sup>

This grounding of one’s own inner person, an internal sense of moral clarity and resultant “...calm, settled, and rooted” profession-of-arms disposition, can lead to increased flexibility and adaptability in carrying out mission specifics.<sup>104</sup> Brigade Commander Colonel Pat Work, 2<sup>nd</sup> BDE Combat Team, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, spoke of his recent Iraq deployment to partner with Iraqi Security Forces to retake Mosul: “To be successful in this type of mission, it requires one characteristic in particular. ‘When it comes to advising...there’s a humility we need to have.’”<sup>105</sup> Combat-proven LTG H.R. McMaster, an officer who embodies the moral depth required of the Armed Forces Profession, could be adaptable in carrying out his duties as National Security Advisor in an often unpredictable environment. On his final day in the White House, to the credit of his integrity, adaptability and sense of appreciation by the Nation-at-large, it was said, “McMaster leaves, broadly speaking, with his dignity intact.”<sup>106</sup>

The competence within and calling of the Armed Forces member, stemming from Just War concerns and a shared moral language, contribute to this increased admiration for the military profession. The high aspirations found within being a member of the Armed Forces profession, “...a vocation, a higher calling, to serve others, to sacrifice self, one’s own ambition and desires, something greater than one’s own contributions...” can be reinforced by means of adhering to principles within the Tradition.<sup>107</sup> “Moral discipline...the inner capacity for restraint—an ability to inhibit oneself in one’s passions, desires, and habits within the boundaries of a moral order...” leads to personal character that is deep and lasting.<sup>108</sup> When applied to and embedded in the real world of soldiering—in field training, deployments, and combat—such moral authority garners exceptional respect from the larger society.

Providing opportunities and training to embed Just War values (such as temperance, courage, prudence, justice...) within our forces, and speak to the reality that “our military needs to pay more attention to conscience” also bolsters the credibility of our Armed Forces.<sup>109</sup> Finding one’s “North Star” requires examining one’s desires and intentions--an examination that moves beyond legal compliance and is more

directly tied to the values and language of the Just War Tradition.<sup>110</sup> Integrating Service values with Just War concerns is one way to integrate this conscience-recognizing-enterprise. “Forming faithful consciences” whether through faith, philosophic, humanist, behavioral health/medical or psychological communities, is an additional process by which Just War values engage with and increase stature in the larger community.<sup>111</sup>

### 3. Fewer Spiritually Injured Personnel

*“...[S]oldiers’ knowledge that they have behaved in a professional, disciplined, moral manner when confronting the enemy is one of the most important factors to prevent post-traumatic stress and various dysfunctions that come with it.”<sup>112</sup>*

Spiritual injury, the “soul damage” that can occur as a result of significant trauma experienced by military members within war, is related to moral injury, wherein an Armed Forces member breaks “the Geneva Convention of the soul.”<sup>113</sup> Spiritual harm can affect one’s relation to their Higher Power, leading to identity conflict and resultant questions about forgiveness, doubt, suffering, hope and connection. Guilt, regret, grace, ambition and perfectibility are “inner-self” concepts that we can acknowledge and wrestle with when integrating Just War interests within our operations.<sup>114</sup>

Despite careful planning and attentive execution, “...the world of war is not a fully comprehensible, let alone a morally satisfactory place.”<sup>115</sup> Notwithstanding our best intentions, “...wars are human enterprises and all human enterprises are flawed, reflecting the limitations and the weaknesses and the disordered loves of the human agents who operate them.”<sup>116</sup> At the conclusion of “horrific and grisly” battlefield events, units press on, “often losing sight of the individuals who were most affected by the incidents.”<sup>117</sup> In training and deployments, simply acknowledging this rushed and intense environment, and voicing—at appropriate times—the morally disrupting aspects of war may positively impact soldiers’ lives for the better.

Employing the language of the Just War Tradition helps military members “understand why it is morally right for them to fight.”<sup>118</sup> The value of respect for humanity, both in oneself and others (to include the enemy), can protect military members “from the dehumanization that naturally follows descent into the maelstrom of war.”<sup>119</sup> Recognizing the “discomfort of many soldiers’ consciences” and addressing these ethical concerns with moral language may lead to fewer spiritually and morally injured Armed Forces members.<sup>120</sup>

### 4. Strengthened “Why We Fight” Integration

*“Although soldiers do not get to choose their deployments, they do deserve to know their deployments are morally justified and how to act morally within them.”<sup>121</sup>*

“Moral authority matters.”<sup>122</sup> Knowing the reason, cause, and purpose for going to war—so much a part of the Just War Tradition—can positively affect the morale and “fighting spirit” of those who carry out our war plans. To preserve a soldier’s sense of “agency or control...it is vital that troopers understand how the risks they take and sacrifices they make are contributing to the achievement of objectives worthy of those risks and sacrifices.”<sup>123</sup> This sense of understanding of the purpose behind both the strategic and tactical mission, clearly and straightforwardly articulated and communicated, can strengthen and sustain the Armed Forces member who fights on-the-ground.<sup>124</sup>

While it may be true that “Sovereigns...alone make the call whether war is rightly warranted...” and “what must concern the soldier is to obey his ruler and, at the same time, to wage war with the right intent and inner disposition—free of hatred, rage, revenge, battle-lust, savagery, or any other dark, corrupting passion or disturbance of soul...” confidence that the war “is rightly warranted” reinforces disciplined soldier conduct within war.<sup>125</sup> “...[A]ny nation or military that desires to truly honor its warriors must place perceptions of ‘what is right’ at the forefront of its deliberations on when and how to wage war.”<sup>126</sup>

Yet, too often, the “why” of going into a particular conflict or engagement is either too expansive to be achievable or too poorly explained to be meaningful for those on-the-ground.<sup>127</sup> Such ambiguity or obscurity in going to war may lead to more conflicted consciences and less confident Armed Forces members.<sup>128</sup> Whether going to war is seen as just or unjust can determine the amount of “soulful struggle of conscience” a soldier undergoes.<sup>129</sup> Possessing morally grounded justification for going to war (“why we fight”) can lead to greater soldier-level courage, assurance and trust within and after war.

## Conclusion

*“At the end of an [Armed Forces member’s] service, no matter how short or long, the reward will be the satisfaction of knowing that character, competence, and leadership made a difference in his or her own life, the lives of troops led, and the lives of fellow citizens.”<sup>130</sup>*

The sense of satisfaction described in this concluding paragraph from *The Armed Forces Officer* speaks to a feeling of fulfillment that can be ennobled and solidified by means of the Just War Tradition. Yes, there are significant difficulties in implementation. I realize our “plates are full” with an excessive amount of priorities and duties as Officers and Noncommissioned Officers/Petty Officers of our Armed Forces.

In writing this paper, I’ve looked back over nearly thirty years of serving as a Chaplain in the United States Army. My first eight-and-a-half years were with Light Artillery and Infantry units. Later, I was Deputy Division Chaplain for a Heavy Mechanized Division and then a Division Chaplain in combat with the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry). Whatever the assignment, I felt training to be essential. All the while, I considered the Just War Tradition to be important. Yet seldom, outside of individual counseling settings, did I observe or take responsibility for the Tradition making intentional inroads into training or unit-level activities. I regret this.

Now, reflecting back after being retired four-and-a-half years, and reading some of the Just War resources that remained “on the shelf” during my active duty time, I see the Tradition as offering so much. The welfare of individual Armed Forces members of whatever creed, religious or ethnic background, stands to profit from insights gained. Unit bonding is strengthened. And, the ties of our military to the Nation are fortified.

Even in the “rush” of our leadership positions within Battalions, Brigades and Divisions, in the forward-looking, energizing, fast-paced military environment, we can attempt to insert Just War concerns into plans and operations. Leaders over company-level training “lanes” can include opportunities for moral reflection after significant events or as part of their After Action Reviews. Exercise directives and mission briefings could cover the broader ethical framework, and how the operation at hand engages larger National interests and objectives. CMTC rotations could clearly have Just War considerations woven throughout their scenarios. Officers could utilize unit Medical, Staff Judge Advocate and Religious Support Team personnel to offer Just War insights, examples and training experiences to enliven unit ethical development. In these and other intentional ways we can engrain the Tradition within our forces. And, in so “reflecting the best in us,” we keep our moral compasses pointing “true North” and are strengthened and sustained.

## End Notes

1 Adapted from President Barack Obama, Letter to author, 1 DEC 2016.

2 Lt. Paddy Bury, “Pointing North,” unpublished paper, May 2009. Quoted in Nigel Biggar, *In Defence of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 89. See also Patrick Bury, *Callsign Hades* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 234-235.

3 David D. Corey and J. Daryl Charles, *The Just War Tradition—An Introduction*, (Intercollegiate Studies Institute: Wilmington, Delaware, 2012), 7.

4 Ibid., 184.

5 Office of General Counsel, *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, June 2015; International and Operational Law Department, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, *Department of Defense and Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook*, Fifth Edition, June 2015.

6 Legal prescriptions speak to the lowest “rung” in the “ladder” of ethics and morality. “What could be done,” which the law parses, is less laudatory than “What should be done,” (moral elements of a decision at hand) or “values, traditions and principles that speak to our highest, most noble aspirations as a people,” (ethics). As Michael Walzer writes, “Moral argument is especially important in wartime because...the laws of war are radically incomplete” (Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars—A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, Second Edition, New York: Basic Books, 1992), 288.

See also Brian Orend, *The Morality of War*, (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006, 61, “Just war theory is thus *even more demanding than international law...since, quite often, morality sets itself a higher standard than law*” (author’s italics). Columnist David Brooks, addressing a different ethical concern, nonetheless speaks to this legal, moral hierarchy: “Legal conflict is a clumsy tool to manage the holy messiness of actual pluralistic community. The legal system does not deal well with local and practical knowledge, the wisdom to know when a rule should be applied and when it should be bent. It does not do well with humility, tolerance and patience—virtues that are hard to put into rule and can be achieved only in a specific situation.” David Brooks, “How Not To Advance Gay Marriage,” *New York Times*, 4 DEC 2017, A27.

7 Corey and Charles, 4.

8 Phil Klay, *Redeployment*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 145.

9 Richard M. Swain and Albert C. Pierce, *The Armed Forces Officer*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2017), 52.

10 Bury, *Callsign Hades*, 257.

11 Biggar, 90.

12 David Finkel, *The Good Soldiers*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 249.

13 Pete Kilner, “How Leaders Can Combat Moral Injury in Their Troops,” *ARMY Magazine*, May 2017, 24.

14 As quoted in Bury, *Callsign Hades*, 75.

15 Klay, 141.

16 Jack L. Tilley and Dan Elder, *Soldier for Life*, (Temple, Texas: NCO Historical Society, 2015), 29.

17 Ibid., 69. See also Douglas Pryer, “Moral Injury and Military Suicide,” *Cicero Magazine*, 3 JUN 2014, <http://ciceromagazine.com/features/moral-injury-and-the-american-soldier>. “Better it would be, I have often

felt, to keep such memories at a distance, as if they were islands with submerged, dangerous reefs safely viewed only from afar.”

18 Bury, *Callsign Hades*, xi.

19 Douglas Pryer, “Review Essay, God is Not Here—A Soldier’s Struggle with Torture, Trauma, and the Moral Injuries of War” by Bill Russell Edmonds, *Military Review*, September-October 2015, 134-135. Pryer continues: “Doctrine does not mention conscience...Technology enables service members to kill our nation’s enemies at increasingly greater distances and thereby avoid the fact that they are killing human beings.”

20 Walzer, 282. We could add “invincible, hypersonic weapons” and “Star Wars” laser technology to this category as well.

21 E.B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed*, quoted in Dwight Garner, “Hell in the Pacific, and Much Worse—E.B. Sledge’s account of being a Marine in World War II is unforgettable and harrowing,” *New York Times*, 21 April 2017, C28.

22 Anna Fels, “The Point of Hate,” *New York Times*, 14 April 2017, A23.

23 Douglas Pryor, “Moral Injury and the American Soldier,” *Cicero Magazine*, 2 June 2014, <http://ciceromagazine.com/features/moral-injury-and-the-american-soldier>.

24 Robert Emmet Meagher, *Killing from the Inside Out—Moral Injury and Just War*, (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2014), 129.

25 Ibid., 128.

26 Ibid., 129.

27 Ibid., 132.

28 David Brooks, *The Road to Character*, (New York: Random House, 2015), 56.

29 See Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, xxviii and 20: “The moral world of war is shared not because we arrive at the same conclusions as to whose fight is just and whose is unjust, but because we acknowledge the same difficulties on the way to our conclusions, face the same problems, talk the same language. It’s not easy to opt out, and only the wicked and the simple make the attempt” (xxvii). “...one of the things most of us want, even in war, is to act or to seem to act morally...because we know what morality means...I am going to assume...that we really do act within a moral world; that particular decisions really are difficult, problematic, agonizing, and that this has to do with the structure of that world; that language reflects the moral world and gives us access to it; and finally that our understanding of the moral vocabulary is sufficiently common and stable so that shared judgments are possible” (20).

30 Daniel M. Bell, *Just War as Christian Discipleship—Recentering the Tradition in the Church rather than the State*, (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2009), 14.

31 The expansive nature of this ethos and the calling’s burden-of-obligation is seen in the following from Swain and Pierce, *The Armed Forces Officer*: “...a professional *ethos* is the collective and *internal* sense of what each member must *be* as a member of the profession. It is felt more than known” (25). “Only the true warrior ethos can moderate war’s inevitable brutality” (Les Brownlee and Peter Schoomaker, ‘Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities,’ *Parameters* (Summer 2004), 12-13 quoted on page 9). “Like the priesthood, the profession of arms is a *vocation*, a higher calling, to serve others, to sacrifice self, to be about something larger than one’s own ambitions and desires, something grander than one’s own contributions and even one’s own life” (17).

32 *Field Regulations, United States Army, 1923*, as quoted in Swain and Pierce, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 77.

33 U.S. Army, Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5*, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 2007), 240.

34 *Ibid.*, 241.

35 James B. Stockdale, *A Vietnam Experience—Ten Years of Reflection*, (Hoover Institution: Stanford, 1984), 121. Vice Admiral Stockdale continues, “A leader must aspire to a strength, compassion, and a conviction several octaves above that required by society in general.”

36 Kayla Williams, *Love My Rifle More Than You—Young and Female in the U.S. Army*, (W.W. Norton: New York, 2005), 142.

37 *Ibid.*, 253-254.

38 *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, 40.

39 *Ibid.*, 50.

40 *Department of Defense Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook*, 10. Rear Admiral Louis Iasiello, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy, outlines seven helpful principles/criteria that could set the moral parameters for the post-combat phase of war: “...a healing mind-set, just restoration, safe-guards for the innocent, respect for the environment, post bellum justice, the transition of warriors [mind-body-spirit reintegration], and the study of the lessons of war” (Louis Iasiello, “Jus Post Bellum—The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. LVII, No. 3/4, Summer/Autumn 2004, 40.

41 See Swain and Pierce, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 52. On this moral erosion over time within combat, see also Paolo G. Tripodi and David M. Todd, “Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan,” *Parameters*, 47(3), Autumn 2017, 65-78.

42 Biggar, *In Defence of War*, 118. Nigel Biggar provides the context for the carefulness, callousness and compassion needed: “To be successful, a military commander must be sufficiently callous to spend the lives of his troops. Such callousness can accompany carefulness. But can it also accompany compassion...? In one...sense, the answer has to be negative; for ‘compassion’ connotes a certain emotional identification, an entering into the suffering of others, which is exactly what a commander must callous himself against, if he is to order his troops to risk or spend their lives...This callousness, however, is perfectly compatible with having such sympathy for the plight of front-line troops before battle, or for the plight of the wounded afterwards...” 118.

43 Pete Kilner, “When ‘Moral Compasses’ Need Calibration,” *ARMY Magazine*, JUN 2017, 24.

44 *The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer*, (National Defense University Press: Washington, D.C., 2013), 22.

45 *Ibid.*, 22.

46 Wollom A. Jensen and James M. Childs, Jr., *Moral Warriors, Moral Wounds—The Ministry of the Christian Ethic*, (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2016), 117.

47 *Ibid.*, 117.

48 See unpublished paper, “Agents of Grace—Armed Forces Chaplaincy and the Just War Tradition,” by Kenneth L. Sampson, (DEC 2017), 1.

49 Though not addressing specific Just War concerns, Pete Kilner’s “Serving the Empire—Soldiers Deserve to Know How Deployments Support the Constitution,” (*ARMY Magazine*, MAR 2018, 34-35) infers a similar “big picture” approach in integrating national principles to orders for Armed Forces members on the ground.

50 In my judgment, it is debatable whether “simple rules” or guidelines “are best because they are easy to understand, less difficult to follow and allow fewer moral errors” by Armed Forces members. See Micah Chapman, “World Renowned War Theorist headlines Ethics of War Conference,” (*Pointer View*, 16 NOV 2017), 4.

51 Swain and Pierce, 29.

52 Iasiello, 39.

53 Meagher, 94.

54 James Mattis, “Acceptance Speech,” *Marine Corps University Foundation 2014 Semper Fidelis Award Dinner*, 22 FEB 2014.

55 Iasiello, 39.

56 Stockdale Institute, <https://www.usna.edu/Ethics/index.php>; CAPE, <http://cape.army.mil>; Leavenworth Symposium, <http://www.cgscfoundation.org/events/ethics-symposium>.

57 Chaplain (LTC) Bill Harrison, “What is Moral Injury?—Unit Ministry Team Role?” slide presentation, Operational Religious Support Leader Training, USAREUR, 15 March 2017, 12.

58 U.S. Army, Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 240.

59 See Tripodi and Todd, *Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan*, 77.

60 Iasiello, 41.

61 Swain and Pierce, 87.

62 Jensen and Childs, 137.

63 Orend, 144.

64 *Department of Defense Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook*, 51.

65 U.S. Army, Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 239.

66 Swain and Pierce, 87. The authors quote S.L.A. Marshall’s 1950 edition of *The Armed Forces Officer*, 141.

67 Pete Kilner, “How Leaders Can Combat Moral Injury in Their Troops,” *Army Magazine*, May 2017, 24.

68 *Ibid.*, 24.

69 Nancy Sherman, *Afterwar—Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 2015), 47.

70 Tripodi and Todd, *Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan*, 76. “[T]he scout snipers...had moved into an ‘us-them’ frame, in which ‘us’ were only the members of the platoon and ‘them’ were not only the enemy but also fellow marines who did not approve of the sniper’s conduct.”

71 Bell, 15.

72 A sample includes The Yellow Birds, by Kevin Powers (2012); Tribe—On Homecoming and Belonging by Sebastian Junger (2016); The Good Soldiers by David Finkel (2009); Thank You for Your Service by David Finkel (2013); Redeployment by Phil Klay (2014) and God is Not Here—A Soldier's Struggle with Torture, Trauma, and the Moral Injuries of War by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Edmonds, (2015).

73 U.S. Army, Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 243.

74 See “How Leaders Can Combat Moral Injury in Their Troops,” (May 2017, 24-25); “When ‘Moral Compasses’ Need Calibration,” (June 2017, 24-25); “Know Thy Enemy—Better Understanding Foes Can Prevent Debilitating Hatred,” (July 2017, 22-23); “Divergent Ethics—Facing a Foreign Partner Who Has a Different Moral Code,” (August 2017, 24-25); “Bending the Rules—Ambiguous Standards, Falsified Records Cause Ethical Harm,” September 2017, 26-27); “Moral Misconceptions—Five Flawed Assumptions Confuse Moral Judgments on War,” November 2017, 43-44); “Is Loyalty Overvalued?” (December 2017, 34-35), *ARMY Magazine*.

75 Major General Errol R. Schwartz, words at his retirement ceremony, District of Columbia National Guard Armory, 19 MAR 2017, Arthur Mondale, “Private to major general: D.C. Guard past commander reflects on career impacts on Soldiers, Airmen, Cadets,” *Pentagram*, 1.

76 Bell, 172. Dr. Bell continues: “Right intent arises from and is sustained by character. Consider the centrality of drill and repetition, particularly under stressful conditions, to good military training, as well as the importance of being steeped in military tradition and culture. The point is to mold the character of soldiers so that certain dispositions and actions becomes almost a second nature.”

77 See Brooks, *The Road to Character*, index, 287-300.

78 See Nancy Sherman, *The Untold War—Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers*, (Norton and Company: New York, 2010), 63, 69, 147. See also Jensen and Childs, *Moral Warriors, Moral Wounds*, 130, “From the standpoint of faith is a question of how the principles that embody love of neighbor can best be served when, in fact, they cannot be perfectly served...we recognize that the practice of the Christian ethic does not operate with the certitude of moral perfection but rather with the assurance of God with us with grace for the way.”

79 Brooks, 12.

80 General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army, Remarks to the Association of the United States Army, (2016), Washington, D.C. October 2016, as quoted on the cover of *Army White Paper—The Army's Framework for Character Development*, 28 AUG 2017.

81 Eugene B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* (Presidio Press: New York, 1981), 140-141, as quoted in Swain and Pierce, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 92.

82 Elizabeth D. Samet, *Soldier's Heart—Reading Literature Through Peace and War at West Point*, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York, 2007), 214.

83 See unpublished remarks by Lieutenant General (Retired) William B. Garrett III, University of North Georgia, Alumni Weekend Military Awards Review, 23 APR 2017.

84 Brooks, 148.

85 Portion of the NCO Creed, quoted in Richard Bobitaille, “Saved at the Stalag—NCO Risked His Life for Other Prisoners,” *ARMY Magazine*, FEB 2018, 22.

86 Sherman, 85.

87 Sebastian Junger, *Tribes—On Homecoming and Belonging*, (Hachette Book Group: New York, 2016), 38.

88 Sherman, 74.

89 Thomas Ricks, “War Stories—Military History—New perspectives on My Lai and Dunkirk; the life of Hannibal; and the rise and fall of Communism,” *The New York Times Book Review*, SUN, 12 NOV 2017, 37.

90 James M. Dubik, Foreward, in Sherman, *Afterwar*, xvii.

91 Swaine and Pierce, 34.

92 Peter W. Marty, “An Undivided Life,” *Christian Century*, 2 AUG 2017, 3.

93 Douglas Pryer, “Moral Injury and Military Suicide,” *Cicero Magazine*, 3 JUN 2014, 7, <http://ciceromagazine.com/features/moral-injury-and-military-suicide>.

94 General Douglas MacArthur, confirming the death sentence for Japanese General Yamashita, quoted in *Department of Defense Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook*, 9.

95 See Iasiello, *Jus Post Bellum—The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War*, 41-45, 48-50.

96 Meagher, 108.

97 See Tripodi and Todd, *Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan*, 66.

98 Tim Collins, *Rules of Engagement*, (Headline Book Publishing: London, 2005), 166.

99 General Mark Milley, remarks 30<sup>th</sup> annual General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award Ceremony, Pentagon, 15 JUN 2017, reported by David Vergun, “Soldiers wise to learn from MacArthur, says CSA,” Army News Service, 15 JUN 2017.

100 Brooks, xvi.

101 Ibid.

102 News Transcript, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, 1 Feb. 2016. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/647924/departement-of-defense-press-briefing-by-gen-macfarland-via-teleconference-in-th>.

103 Mujib Marshal and Najim Rahim, “U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Apologizes for Bombing of Hospital,” *New York Times*, 22 MAR 2016.

104 Brooks, xvi.

105 John Amble, “Brigade Commander Discusses the Fight for Mosul at Modern War Institute Event,” *Pointer View*, 1 FEB 2018, 4. Adaptability also included an expansion of the “Advise and Assist” nature of working closely with partner Forces: “It’s actually all six ‘A’s of ‘A and A,’ ...In addition to advising and assisting, ‘you have to ‘accompany,’ which is important in order to ‘assure’ the partnered force. You also need to ‘anticipate’ their needs, and to do that you need to be ‘agile,’ [Colonel Pat Work] said.”

106 Quote by LTC (RET) John Nagl, in Mark Landler, “For McMaster, Pomp Under Bittersweet Circumstances,” *New York Times*, 6 APR 2018.

107 Swain and Pierce, 17.

108 James Davidson Hunter, *The Death of Character: Moral Education in an Age Without Good or Evil*, (Basic Books: New York, 2000), 16, quoted in Swain and Pierce, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 34

109 Douglas Pryer, *God is Not Here*, 135.

110 See James M. Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered*, (University Press of Kentucky: Lexington, Kentucky, 2016), 67, “Justice in war demands more than compliance.”

111 See Bell, *Just War as Christian Discipleship*, 116.

112 H.R. McMaster, “Remaining True to Our Values—Reflections on Military Ethics in Trying Times,” (*Journal of Military Ethics*, 2010), 9:3, 183-194, DOI: 10.1080/15027570.2010.510850, 192.

113 See “The (Twin) Wounds of War” by Chaplain (Colonel) Timothy S. Mallard, Providence Journal, Fall 2015, Issue 5, <https://providencemag.com/2017/02/twin-wounds-war-spiritual-injury-moral-injury>. Chaplain Mallard identifies twelve markers of spiritual injury (Loss of God in Relationship, God’s Providence and/or Sovereignty, Suffering, Forgiveness, Paralyzing Doubt, Excessive Sorrow, Justice and Reconciliation, Truth or Faith Claims, Identity—Meaning—Purpose, Theology of the Body, Hope—Eternal Life, Connection with Others). See also Larry Dewey, *War and Redemption—Treatment and Recovery in Combat-related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder*, (Ashgate Publishing: Burlington, VT, 2004), Chapter 4, “The Burden of ‘Breaking the Geneva Convention of the Soul,’” 75-95.

114 See Sherman, *Afterwar*, 18-21.

115 Walzer, 327.

116 Biggar, 325.

117 Tilley, 41.

118 Kilner, “How Leaders Can Combat Moral Injury in Their Troops,” 24.

119 Kilner, “Know Thy Enemy,” 22.

120 Ibid.

121 Pete Kilner, “Serving the Empire—Soldiers Deserve to Know How Deployments Support the Constitution,” *ARMY Magazine*, MAR 2018, 34.

122 Ibid., 35.

123 McMaster, “Remaining True to Our Values,” 192-193. The resultant embedded discipline can lead to “achievement” of soldiers in battle marked by similar restraint. “It is almost certainly true that [soldiers] fight best when they are most disciplined, when they are most in control of themselves and committed to the restraints appropriate to their trade.” (Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 308).

124 This confidence in going to war can also counteract debilitating moral and spiritual injury: “deployed troops want ‘assurance that wars will be justified on moral or even prudential grounds...’ Such assurances may not be forthcoming during deployment with the result that ‘deep resentments may fester, and veterans may become re-traumatized as they live through new wars that they believe are unjustified or unnecessary.’” (Nancy Sherman, *Afterwar*, 47 as quoted in Jensen and Childs, *Moral Warriors, Moral Wounds*, 108).

125 Meagher, 96.

126 Pryer, “Moral Injury and the American Soldier,” 4.

127 See Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered*, 174. “At times, American war aims have been clear but so expansive as to be not achievable or at least not achievable by the ways and means applied. At other times, they have been absent or at least opaque to the common citizens.” See also James N. Mattis, “The Meaning of Their Service,” Remarks for the fourth annual salute to Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans at the Marines Memorial Club, San Francisco, 16 APR 2015, <http://www.ruthfullyyours.com/2015/04/18/the-meaning-of-their-service-general-4star-ret-u-s-m-c-james-n-mattis>. “For the veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars—poorly explained and inconclusive wars...the question of what our service meant may loom large in your minds.” Additionally, see Robert Gates, *Duty—Memoirs of a Secretary At War*, (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 2014), 567-568: “In December 2006, my goals in our wars were straightforward and I think relatively modest, but they still seemed nearly unattainable...in Iraq, I hoped we could stabilize the country in such a way that when U.S. forces departed, the war there would not be viewed as a strategic defeat for the United States, or as a failure with global consequences; in Afghanistan, I sought only an Afghan government and army that were strong enough to prevent the Taliban from returning to power and al Qaeda from returning to use the country again as a launching pad for terror. These goals were more modest than President Bush’s...”

128 Some Armed Forces members looking for the “why?” of a conflict or war at hand may look to other-than-just means to justify the cause. See Tim Collins, *Rules of Engagement*, 433. “What I found particularly ironic in modern Iraq was that the young fighters on both sides were motivated to a large extent by identical outrage...Both the insurgents...and many of the GIs fought out of a need for vengeance, the cycle of retaliation gathering pace with every fresh killing.” Some soldiers step back into rock solid foundations. See also Williams, *Love My Rifle More Than You*, 77. “I memorized the code of conduct: ‘I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life...I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free...’” Yet without specific application of Just War principles to the cause at hand, dissolution can occur. Williams continues: “The more we know about what brought about this war in the first place, the harder and harder it gets. It was a year of my life. And what...for? What was it all about? Not having an answer for that makes it hard. Makes it feel dirty...” (282).

129 See Sherman, *The Untold War*, 46. “[S]truggle, largely inside...a soulful struggle with conscience...worry about whether being betrayed or manipulated by leadership...how [one] can serve honorably...”

130 Swain and Pierce, 150.