


applications in the U.S. The sole criticism of the book is the lack of dialogue regarding the other domains, specifically space and cyber. Nonetheless, the authors unquestionably present compelling debates to the legal and ethical challenges for not only the U.S., but international leaders, intergovernmental organizations and international forum leaders as well. **IAJ**



Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship

David P. Oakley

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The benefits of interagency cooperation are fairly obvious. Working together to achieve a common purpose is preferable to working separately in competition. But can there be such a thing as too much interagency cooperation? In *Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship*, author David P. Oakley traces the DoD/CIA interagency relationship as it developed from a relatively competitive rivalry into a more cooperative and highly effective national security partnership. Although the book focuses on one interagency relationship, it serves as a case study on the complexities facing any organization operating in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment. In addition to describing the challenges overcome and benefits achieved by improving DoD/CIA cooperation, Oakley also identifies some potential costs that he views as indicative of a broader concern; the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.

Oakley argues that operational issues in the early 1980's, such as the interoperability problems that marred Urgent Fury in Grenada, and the perceived intelligence and organizational shortfalls exposed by the Beirut Barracks and U.S. Embassy bombings, led to calls for reform directed primarily at the U.S. military services that simultaneously kicked off change within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). For example, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 "did not tackle the DoD/CIA partnership directly, but it introduced policy changes that made increased DoD/CIA collaboration necessary and structural changes that made it easier."¹ Oakley highlights the creation of USSOCOM as a major structural change that made it easier to lash up CIA capabilities to the military, fostering improved overall DoD/CIA collaboration.

General Schwarzkopf's criticisms of the intelligence support he received during Desert Storm (many of which Oakley notes were in hindsight arguably unjustified) became an even greater catalyst for change within the IC. Central to Schwarzkopf's concerns was his view of the support

relationships he expected as the combatant commander. Oakley provides an example of this when he discusses the U.S. Air Force Gulf War Air Power Survey and its description of CIA as a “supporting agency” and Schwarzkopf as a “supported commander.” Oakley observes that “although many CIA officers and leaders agreed they were supporting military operations during Desert Storm, their definition of the term *support* probably more closely resembled that of *Webster’s Dictionary* and not the command-relationship “support” that Schwarzkopf had in mind.”² Such misunderstandings rooted in organizational language can be a significant issue while operating in the broader JIIM environment. A recent CGSC Foundation publication, *A Practitioner’s Handbook for Interagency Leadership*, warns that organizational language can lead to miscommunication problems because separate organizations often develop a unique sense of the meaning of particular words.³

Oakley explains how the CIA/DoD relationship that lawmakers and military commanders called for in the 1980’s and pursued in the 1990’s was fundamentally different than previous CIA/DoD relationships. The CIA was created in 1947 to be an independent service providing strategic intelligence collection and analysis to national-level leaders, but was criticized for inadequately supporting military combat operations—a mission not envisioned for the Agency at its founding. Congress took this criticism a step further by arguing that the CIA needed to be more responsive to DoD in peacetime as well. Oakley explains that “expanding the CIA’s role to include supporting military operations to peacetime and giving regional commander’s peacetime control of national systems were significant steps toward subordinating national intelligence to the combatant commander.”⁴

Oakley digs further into potential complications posed by the “tension and unequal influence of DoD’s priorities.”⁵ He notes that the significant imbalance in resourcing national security priorities leads policy makers to rely increasingly on the military, and the “military then becomes the lead while other organizations find themselves in supporting roles.”⁶ *Interagency Leadership* explains that “if there is a situation in which the United States has an interest, the DoD will most likely play a role in supporting those interests.”⁷ The U.S. military is the 800-pound gorilla in the JIIM, and although it is just one among many interagency partners, “DoD will most likely show up in numbers that are unimaginable to most other stakeholders.”⁸ Oakley argues that this imbalance imposes an unforeseen cost with promoting a closer relationship between the CIA and DoD. Oakley claims that the CIA’s focus on broader more strategic intelligence collection and analytic support to national-level decision-makers, “has been significantly distracted by the CIA’s support to military operations.”⁹ This underscores Oakley’s broader concern with the overall militarization of U.S. foreign policy.¹⁰

Oakley, an assistant professor at National Defense University, began this study of CIA while a student at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).¹¹ While Oakley’s SAMS monograph was a “good-news story” emphasizing the history and the benefits of the improved DoD/CIA relationship, his book takes a more developed and balanced view.¹² Although still a positive overall assessment of DoD/CIA cooperation, the potential unintended consequences that could emerge over the long-term are worth considering. Interagency cooperation and the improved capability to synchronize operations among multiple organizations that has been honed since 9/11 should be continually studied, re-evaluated, and adapted as needed to better cope with whatever new security challenges the 21st century may pose. **IAJ**

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NOTES

- 1 David P. Oakley. *Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2019), 25.
- 2 *Subordinating Intelligence*, 53.
- 3 William J. Davis, with Janet K. Benini and Michael S. Choe. Ed by Roderick M. Cox. *A Practitioner's Handbook for Interagency Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Foundations Press, 2018), 17.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 33.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 159.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 159
- 7 *Interagency Leadership*, 43.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Subordinating Intelligence*, 160.
- 10 See David Oakley. "The Problems of a Militarized Foreign Policy for America's Premier Intelligence Agency" commentary in *War on the Rocks* May 2, 2019. Accessed on 11 May 2019 at <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-problems-of-a-militarized-foreign-policy-for-americas-premier-intelligence-agency/>
- 11 See David P. Oakley. *Partners or Competitors: The Evolution of the Department of Defense/Central Intelligence Agency Relationship Since Desert Storm and Its Prospects for the Future*. Joint Special Operations University Report 14-2, MacDill Air Force Base: Florida, 2014. Accessed on 11 May 2019 at <https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications/2014>
- 12 Oakley also summarized his views in an article published in this journal. See David Oakley "Adapting to Change: Strategic Turning Points and the CIA/DoD Relationship." *InterAgency Journal*, Vol. 5, Issue 1, Winter, 2014. Accessed on 21 May 2019 at <http://thesimonscenter.org/featured-article-adapting-to-change/>