The Ethical Considerations of Unmasking Procedures

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This paper interrogates the ethical dimensions of the Army’s current unmasking procedures in a known or suspected Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) environment. In particular, this paper asks the question, “Does current procedure comport with our institutional ethical commitments and our shared identity as Trusted Army Professionals?” To gauge this comportment, this paper will utilize the doctrinal ethical reasoning process and the Army’s institutional articulations of its ethics and identity.

Personal Reflections on a Visceral Topic

The origins of this investigation trace to a “call for papers” for the 2019 Command and General Staff College Ethics Symposium. As the Ethicist for the United States Army Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear School, I conferred with Brigadier General Antonio V. Munera, Commandant of U.S. Army CBRN School and the 30th Chief of Chemical, on suitable symposium topics related to our community of practice. Brigadier General Munera stated,

Take a look at unmasking procedures; they involve an ethical decision over which intermediate leaders can have a great deal of influence. I would also be interested to see if our procedures, which I don’t think have changed very much, match our commitments.

With these marching orders in hand, my intent was to move out smartly. Instead, I was immediately surprised by the surfacing of a long-buried, yet still visceral memory.

Long before becoming a Chaplain or an Ethicist, I was an Armored Reconnaissance Specialist assigned to the 24th Infantry Division (later 3rd Infantry Division), where I had my first encounter with unmasking. During a field exercise at Fort Stewart involving copious quantities of CS gas and the full implementation of Mission Oriented Protective Posture, the Platoon Sergeant gathered several Soldiers as the all-clear sounded. He then said,

Men, we are going to begin unmasking and, as you all know, the low-man on the totem pole goes first. You [indicating me], grab the Private’s weapon. You two [indicating the others], be prepared to grab him if he makes a break for it.

In short, my first experience with unmasking involved a highly coercive procedure which touched on the worst of human inclinations. The fact that this happened in a front-line combat unit, where proximity to loaded weapons was a real concern, only served to further charge the atmosphere.

At the time, I had growing sense of moral unease, mitigated only by the somewhat uncharitable thought, “Thank God I got here a month before him.” In retrospect, this moral unease came from the fact that we systematically eliminated every possibility our comrade-in-arms could turn on us, so we could turn on him. While the Army condones acts of selfless-service and even self-sacrifice, the entire affair felt more like ritual sacrifice, wherein the group forfeits one unwilling victim so the remainder can escape some real or imagined catastrophe. To frame this thought in military terms, while the Army might grant the Medal
of Honor to a Soldier who jumps on a grenade to save his squad, the squad who pushes their Soldier onto the grenade to save themselves would receive no such praise. In fact, this latter squad would more likely receive an extended stay in the portion of Fort Leavenworth not devoted to developing future leaders.

The Commandant’s Intent

Personal reflections aside, Brigadier General Munera’s initial guidance implies several questions: What are the current Army unmasking procedures? Have they changed? Do they match our ethical commitments and professional identity?

The answer to the question on current procedure lies within Army Techniques Publication 3-11.32, “Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense.” This regulation outlines two unmasking procedures, the first presenting a short procedure for use in conjunction with a chemical detector and the second presenting a longer procedure for use in the absence of a chemical detector. Both procedures presume uncertainty about the current CBRN environment. In the case of a functional detector, the uncertainty comes from the fact that no chemical detector detects all agents. In the case of an unserviceable or unavailable detector, the uncertainty becomes obvious. In both cases, the portion of ethical import proves identical and presents in the first step; “The senior person should select one or two individuals to start the unmasking procedures.”

The answer to the question on change lies within the superseded Field Manual 3-4 [Nuclear Biological Chemical] Protection, and serves to confirm Brigadier General Munera’s suspicions. This regulation contains virtually the same branching process and presents leaders with the same dilemma: “The senior person should select one or two soldiers to start the unmasking procedures.” Thus, Brigadier General Munera’s hunch stands confirmed. Unmasking procedures remain essentially unchanged. As written, the procedures of today allow for the same, unsettling interpretation as practiced on Fort Stewart decades ago.

The answer to the third and final question, of how unmasking procedures intersect with the Army’s stated ethical commitments and professional identity, proves complex and occupies the rest of this paper. As a final note to this section, during the decades where unmasking procedures remained essentially unchanged, the Army’s efforts toward articulating a professional ethic and identity took fantastic leaps forward. These leaps include: the establishment of the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, the publishing of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1 The Army Profession (ADRP 1), the publishing of the Army Ethic White Paper, and the publishing of the Character Development White Paper. While exploring these developments in detail is beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that the Army now possesses both a profession proponency and a fully articulated ethic makes the interrogation of static procedures all the more urgent.

Methodology

Since unmasking procedures are Army procedures, the most logical way to interrogate them for institutional comportment proves to utilize the Army’s own doctrinal process for ethical reasoning. The Ethical Reasoning Model (ERM) provides this framework. Oddly, though referenced in doctrine, a complete outline of ERM proves generally elusive, with the most explicit reference occurring in the “Ethical Reasoning” section of ADRP 6-22. Despite this, ERM promulgates to the force through the curriculums of the Basic Officer Leaders Course and the Captains Career Course.

ERM presents a four-step process for ethical reasoning based loosely on the work of moral psychologist Dr. James Rest. The four steps include: recognize ethical conflicts, evaluate the options, commit to decision, and take action. These methods, taught to company-grade officers across the force, provide the ideal vehicle to interrogate unmasking procedures.
Figure 1. Ethical Reasoning Model.

Figure 2. The Legal and Moral Framework of the Army Ethic.
Recognize Ethical Conflicts

Recognize ethical conflicts provides the crucial first step. This is not, perhaps, as simple as it first appears. To adequately begin this effort requires a brief discussion of institutional standards and what constitutes a true ethical dilemma.

Any meaningful discussion of what constitutes right or wrong action needs begin with a discussion of standards. While private citizens may entertain any number of influences in this regard, the Army rather practically defines its commitments and trains its moral compass firmly upon them. ADRP 1 states, “We live by and uphold the Army Ethic, embracing our shared identity as trusted Army professionals.” This leads naturally to the next question, “What is The Army Ethic?” In short, “The Army Ethic is the evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, embedded within the Army culture of trust that motivates and guides the conduct of Army professionals bound together in common moral purpose.” (See Figure 2.) The Army Ethic, then, is short-hand for the institution’s collective moral and legal commitments, providing the standard to which its members must account. Since the standard itself presents complexity, ERM provides a practical way to navigate its rigors when faced with an ethical dilemma.

Here a discussion of what constitutes a true ethical dilemma requires some attention. In its section on “Ethical Reasoning,” Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 Army Leadership (ADRP 6-22) states, “Ethical choices may be between right and wrong, shades of gray, or two rights.” Ethics, as a discipline, generally recognizes only the latter cases as true ethical dilemmas. As U.S. Army Command and General Staff College luminary Dr. Jack Kem states,

An ethical dilemma, by its very nature, places the moral decision maker in a situation with competing virtues or values; in a true ethical dilemma, two or more of the possible solutions have merit and ethical support. If an actor is placed in a situation where there is only one ethical answer, it isn’t a dilemma—it’s a case of having the moral courage to do what is obvious.

This insight greatly clarifies the instances where ERM proves useful or even necessary. ERM is not required for “tests of character”—situations where the ethical solution is obvious and only requires the moral temerity to execute. ERM proves ideal, however, for addressing true ethical dilemmas—that is, situations where ethical commitments come into tension.

The first step of ERM, recognize ethical conflicts, contains three sub-steps. These steps include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Community</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Values:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Values:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Courage</td>
<td>Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>Selfless Service</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Principles:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Principles:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Guide: tradition of care for Soldiers</td>
<td>Officer Guide: traditions of mission accomplishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer Creed: welfare of my Soldiers</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer Creed: accomplishment of the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I will always place [my Soldiers] needs above my own</td>
<td>I will fulfill my responsibilities</td>
</tr>
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Figure 3. Areas of Tension.
Army unmasking procedures present no easy resolution, failing to meet the simplistic criterion of a “test of character,” and so present a true ethical dilemma. These procedures charge the senior leader on the ground to choose “one or two individuals” to begin unmasking, potentially exposing them to any number of agents capable of inflicting horrific suffering, death, or both. Moreover, this threat is no longer hypothetical, with the United Nations (UN) finding “clear and convincing” evidence of their present use in the Syrian Civil War where U.S. forces and their allies are engaged.\textsuperscript{22}

With the ethical dilemma recognized, the next sub-step entails defining the conflict. Here again, the work of Dr. Jack Kem proves useful as he identifies four common “right versus right” dilemmas that can be used to define the problem – truth versus loyalty, individual versus community, short term versus long term, and justice versus mercy.”\textsuperscript{23} While this list does not purport to be exhaustive, Army unmasking procedures perfectly fit the mold of an “individual versus community” dilemma. In other words, the good of the few (the one or two individuals selected by their senior) is necessarily pitted against the good of the whole (the unit entire).

Having recognized the character of the dilemma, the final sub-step entails identifying the conflicting values and principles. This process is more art than science, but serves to further hone and clarify the dilemma. Here again, the sourcing documents of The Army Ethic provide an excellent place to begin. (See Figure 2.) The Non-Commissioned Officer Creed provides a ready example of moral aspirations brought into conflict by the “individual verses community dilemma.” In this case, the conflict exists in a single line of the Creed, “My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind – accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my Soldiers.”\textsuperscript{24} In the case of unmasking, an Non-Commissioned Officer cannot accomplish the mission without intentionally jeopardizing the welfare of at least one Soldier.\textsuperscript{25} While certainly not exhausting the possibilities offered by the moral sources comprising the Army Ethic, the following chart documents several distinct areas of tension.

**Evaluate the Options**

The second step of ERM is *evaluate the options* and entails “developing courses of action (COAs) by looking at the situation from various ethical theories or lenses and then evaluating which options are ethically sound.”\textsuperscript{29} To complete this step requires a working knowledge of these “ethical lenses” and a method for comparing COAs.

The “ethical lenses” are three distinct approaches for ethical evaluation corresponding to three broad traditions in the discipline of ethics: virtue ethics, principle ethics (rule ethics), and consequence ethics (utilitarianism/outcome ethics). Dr. Jack Kem christens this trio of traditions the “ethical triangle,” a scheme which the Army University lesson plan simplifies to: virtues, rules, and outcomes.\textsuperscript{30} Probably the most succinct explanation of the “ethical triangle” is found in ADRP 6-22.

Leaders use multiple perspectives to think about ethical concerns, applying the following perspectives to determine the most ethical choice. One perspective comes from the view that desirable virtues such as courage, justice, and benevolence define ethical outcomes. A second perspective comes from the set of agreed-upon values or rules, such as the Army Values or Constitutional rights. A third perspective bases the consequences of the decision on whatever produces the greatest good for the greatest number as most favorable.

Armed with this understanding, the tasks remain both to develop possible COAs and a method for comparing them. When developing possible COAs, it proves useful to consider the Army’s time honored guidance that, “all COAs must be feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete.”\textsuperscript{31} Similarly, the Army’s informal but ingrained process of using matrices to compare COAs serves the ongoing effort well enough.
When considering the options for unmasking, leaders might be tempted to grasp for technical solutions or the “unthought-of alternative ‘third choices’ (such as ‘win-win’ possibilities or no decision at all).”

Doctrinally, one should generally consider unmasking a step beyond technical solutions, since detection options are typically exhausted by the time “human trials” begin. Moreover, most “win-win” and “no decision” scenarios involve simply remaining in full Mission Oriented Protective Posture, which proves infeasible due to degradation both in unit capability and in the Mission Oriented Protective Posture equipment’s own protective efficacy. Thus, if a unit is doctrinally considering unmasking, the situation necessarily demands a human decision and human risk.

With this in mind, viable unmasking COAs generally fall into one of two categories: direction or voluntarism. The category of direction obviously covers all COAs wherein the leader directs a follower to unmask, which is the most obvious interpretation of Army Techniques Publication 3-11.32 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense (ATP 3-11.32). The category of voluntarism is less obvious, but certainly possible, and involves the leader selecting from volunteers or, more radically, practicing self-selection.

Voluntarism as a category produces two distinct COAs: general voluntarism and self-selection. While this may seem to be pushing the bounds of the regulation, ATP 3-11.32 says nothing about “how” the leader makes their selection. Therefore, either selecting from solicited volunteers or volunteering oneself (self-selection) prove viable, if not immediately apparent, COAs. While self-selection might seem to be the more radical choice, a discussion with the Deputy Commandant of U.S. Army CBRN School, Mr. Scott Kimmel, revealed that some leaders have already availed themselves of this option. Mr. Kimmel, himself a former Chemical Officer, stated with all his characteristic candor, “Chaplain, I always took my mask off first. Isn’t that what a leader is supposed to do?”

With three distinct COAs present, the task remains to compare them against the screening criteria on a matrix. Here again, ERM requires COA evaluation against the three “ethical lenses” of virtue, rules, and outcomes. Since neither ADRP 6-22 nor the published curriculums give any precedence to a particular ethical lens, the ERM matrix will not weight any one screening criterion above another. Each COA will be scored, however, according to its level of comportment in a given lens, from high (3) to low (1). This matrix will then score each COA on the following scale: light gray (7-9), medium gray (4-6), dark gray (1-3). (See Figure 4.)

Here again, the judgments used represent more art than science. While other scenarios might merit a more detailed examination in each category, for the sake of brevity, this matrix will consider each COA against the seminal articulation of each lens. Dr. Jack Kem identifies these seminal articulations as the golden rule for virtue ethics, the categorical imperative for rule ethics, and John Stuart Mills’ formulation of the greater good for outcome ethics.

When evaluating the COAs against the lens of virtue, there are clear winners and losers. COA 1: Direction receives the lowest rating, because a good person would not generally send others to their death from a position of safety, even for an ostensibly good cause. COA 2: Voluntarism receives a median rating, because a good person might solicit volunteers to face danger for a good cause, yet such a course would ultimately fall short of the highest aspirations of virtue. Finally, COA 3: Self-Selection receives the highest rating, because sacrifice on behalf of others is the penultimate expression of virtue.
Evaluating the three COAs against the lens of rules produces a more skewed list of winners and losers. COA 1 again receives the lowest rating, because one dare not universalize the glaring inequalities inherent in coercive unmasking. COAs 2 and 3 both receive the highest marks because one could ethically universalize both the principle of soliciting volunteers and the principle of personal voluntarism in the face death and danger. Arguably, these latter COAs reflect the approach the United States has taken in instituting an all-volunteer military over the draft system.

Evaluating the three COAs against the lens of outcomes produces perhaps the most surprising results yet. Here COA 2: Voluntarism receives the lowest marks, because of the chaos and uncertainty it injects into the procedure. In contrast, COAs 1 and 3 receive the highest marks when one consider outcome because, in each COA, the leader quickly and decisively identifies the individual(s) to begin unmasking.

**Commit to a Decision**

The third step in ERM is *commit to a decision* and merely entails settling on the most ethical course of action. Here ADRP 1 gives useful guidance.

> We contribute honorable service as we accomplish our mission, perform our duty, and live our lives in a manner worthy of our professional status. Doing so requires that we make right decisions and take right action. This requires an understanding of what is right. A right decision and action is ethical, effective, and efficient.

This speaks to one of the prime purposes of this work, to gauge the comportment of an Army procedure with the Army’s articulated ethical commitments and professional identity. ADRP 1, then, indicates a kind of screening criteria for decisions and actions, namely that these must always prove ethical, effective and efficient.

Using the rationale discussed in this work, the decision matrix reveals COA 3: Self-Selection as the standout ethical option. In addition, when considering the outcomes, the matrix also suggested COA 3 as an efficient option. The lingering question, then, concerns COA 3’s efficacy. Here one might object that, if the leader goes first and there is an agent present, this COA could hand the enemy a command and control victory they could only wish for in their wildest dreams. Several considerations mitigate this concern. First, unmasking procedures begin only when either detectors show no presence of agents or there is a reasonable certainty agents have dispersed. Second, a well-trained unit vigorously implementing the principles of mission command would not be dependent upon a single leader. Third, the leadership effect created by a leader who routinely “shares in team hardships and dangers” greatly outweighs the associated risk, and this effect would persist for a time even if that leader were lost.
Take Action

The fourth and final step in ERM is *take action* and the only required achievement in this section is to act on the decision. Earlier the distinction was made between a “test of character” and a true ethical dilemma. Ironically, by this stage of the model, the complexities of a true ethical dilemma have resolved into a much simpler “test of character.” Now the ethical solution is obvious and only requires the moral temerity to execute. In the situation of unmasking after a CBRN event, the nerve required of the moral agent is not hypothetical, yet the leadership opportunity proves inestimable.52

Conclusions

This paper asked the question, “Does current procedure comport with our institutional ethical commitments and our shared identity as Trusted Army Professionals?” After noting that unmasking procedures remained static while the Army Profession and Ethic evolved considerably, this work made use of the Army’s Ethical Reasoning Model to interrogate said procedures. This process yielded three distinct unmasking courses of action, to include: direction, volunteerism, and self-selection. Utilizing the “ethical lenses” as screening criteria, the most ethical, effective and efficient course of action proved self-selection. In short, when the Deputy Commandant of U.S. Army CBRN School, Mr. Kimmel asked, “Chaplain, I always took my mask off first. Isn’t that what a leader is supposed to do?” The answer appears to be, “YES!”
End Notes


2 Interview with Brigadier General Antonio V. Munera, December 14, 2018.

3 CS gas (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile, C10H5ClN2).

4 Note: i.e. the unfortunate Private selected for unmasking.


7 Ibid., D-4.

8 Ibid., Appendix D.


10 Note: As a darkly humorous aside, the Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks concurrently advised skill level 1 Soldiers to, “See your supervisor for unmasking procedures.” See your supervisor, indeed!


12 ADRP 6-22: Army Leadership, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 3-37 – 3-41. This section references specific steps in ERM without outlining it directly (e.g. using the three “ethical lenses”).


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 ADRP 1, Table 2-1.

17 Ibid., 2-14.

18 Ibid., 1-12.

19 ADRP 6-22, 3-38.

21 FY19 Army Profession (AP) Lesson 140, Army University.


23 Kem, 26.

24 ADRP 1, B-4.

25 Note: The fact that the Army requires leaders to put troops in harm’s way and routinely make risk decisions does not alleviate this tension. Similarly, while leaders may routinely select Soldiers for high risk endeavors (e.g. room clearance, walking point, etc.), unmasking stands apart in that leaders cannot mitigate the risk through training or equipping.

26 Note: Army leaders often instinctively react negatively to any proposed conflict amongst Army Values. Yet, in this scenario, compelling another to face death (personal courage) patently comes into tension with respect (treat others as they should be treated).


28 ADRP 1, B-4.

29 FY19 Army Profession (AP) Lesson 140, Army University.

30 Kem, 35.


32 Kem, 27.

33 Note: The most common thoughts here are to use some additional equipment or an animal substitute (e.g. the proverbial ‘canary in a coal mine’), yet these options all serve the same essential function: yet another detector.

34 Note: “Kicking the can down the road” does not work since someone, sometime will eventually have to take their mask off. This is the point the unit is at if they initiate unmasking procedures. Admittedly, someone, somewhere might also suggest that, in a wonderful show of solidarity, the unit might “take their masks off together.” This COA proves more “lose-lose” than “win-win” and so fails to meet the criterion of “acceptable.”

35 Note: The exact criterion used by the author’s Platoon Sergeant.

36 Interview with CH (MAJ) Dave Ward, March 12, 2019. Note: CH (MAJ) Ward divulged serving with a company commander who permanently designated the chaplain for unmasking duties, deeming his noncombatant status as equating to a lack of mission-essential function.

37 Note: While similar to “function”, rather than searching for the least mission-essential skillset, “duplication” as a criterion would imply choosing personnel based on skill redundancy.

38 Note: Choosing to risk the incompetent or the derelict is another pragmatic possibility, popularized in any number of films from The Dirty Dozen to Suicide Squad.

39 Note: While this may not seem obvious at first, one has only to consider the “sole survivor” policy to find

40 Note: While certainly against any number of policies, knowing a Soldier has a serious or terminal diagnosis could easily tempt a leader to use this information in a risk decision.

41 Note: Here utility-consequence-outcome all refer to the same ethical school, which prizes producing the greatest good for the greatest number. Unmasking, by its very nature, is already weighted toward this perspective.

42 Interview with Mr. Scott Kimmel, January 25, 2019

43 Ibid.

44 Note: The scoring scheme is admittedly arbitrary and the three-tiered system here simply recalls the Army’s traditional evaluations of green-amber-red.

45 Kem, 34. Note: “Do to others what you would have them do to you.”

46 Kem, 29. Note: “Act as if the maxim of your action was to become a universal law of nature.” (While the first two seem similar in their focus on mutuality, their driving principles are quite different.)

47 Kem, 32. Note: “Do what produces the greatest good for the greatest number.”

48 Note: Admittedly, this formulation depends on the authority of the author of the Golden Rule. This penultimate expression of virtue is generally familiar to the military audience and is found in John 15:13, “Greater love has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his friends.” The Holy Bible, (New International Version, 1984).

49 Note: While voluntarism might produce a good outcome, it is equally probable may not. Uncertainty is introduced when one considers the question, “What if no one volunteers?” Chaos is introduced by the very process of soliciting volunteers, which take additional time and presents no certain outcome.

50 ADRP 1, 4-2.

51 ADRP 6-22, 4-2.

52 Note: As final aside, even after a decision is reached and action taken, leaders should continue to perform assessments of the solution and adjust accordingly to new situations or challenges.