

# IAJ

## INTERAGENCY JOURNAL

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*from the Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation*



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# InterAgency Journal

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# From the Editor-in-Chief

Happy New Year! This edition of the *InterAgency Journal* marks our twenty-fourth issue since we began publishing in 2010. The new year brings a new look to our *Journal*. We listened to your feedback and suggestions and have created a new style layout along with differing colors schemes for each issue which should allow for distinction and easier identification between editions. I welcome your continued feedback. I hope you enjoy this edition's selection of diverse articles.

Homeland security is our Nation's first priority. Are we ready to respond to another terrorism attack here in the States? In our first article author Matthew Bartels argues that we are vulnerable and calls upon USNORTHCOM to designate a counterterrorism response force that is trained and certified with its interagency counterparts.

In our second article Adam Bushey makes the case for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to be the interagency partner that the Department of Defense should focus teaming with to tackle corruption in overseas security operations.

The use of soft power to bring about stability and end suffering is addressed in our next two articles. Joel Funk takes on the contentious issue of refugees, specifically refugees resulting from the conflict in Syria. He argues that the United States should accept refugees as part of an overall strategy to not only end the conflict but also to counter the rise of radical religious extremism and to stabilize the region. Authors Karie Hawk, Johnny Wandasari, and Michael Cheatham, all former scholars studying in the West African Scholars program at CGSC, then examine the Millennium Challenge Corporation's efforts to increase energy production in West Africa and discuss a possible way ahead in Liberia.

In our fifth article, Robert Payne argues that our current legacy institutions designed to execute foreign policy are no longer adequate for the task. He offers an interesting alternative.


Successful interagency leadership is something we are all seeking. It takes a combination of skills, smarts, and experience. In our next two articles experienced leaders and educators offer their thoughts on developing this skill set. William Davis provides us another preview of his forthcoming interagency leadership handbook. He addresses the issue of why those of us who try to lead in the interagency environment might have trouble getting along. Dr. Davis points out how individual preferences and prejudices are often the reason why effective interagency collaboration is thwarted. We follow that with Professors Bill McCollum and Kevin Shea continuing our learning on the complex environment of interagency leadership as they discuss the concept of adaptive leadership.

And in our final article authored by another group of CGSC West African Scholars, Kevin Peel, Justin Reddick, John Hoeck, and Cynthia Dehne discuss a framework for economic cooperation in West Africa. They present an interesting idea for consideration.

Thank you for reading this issue of the *InterAgency Journal*. And thank you for contributing to our growth and success. Once you have finished reading this edition, I urge you to pass it along to your colleagues. And finally, as always, please consider sharing your expertise and experiences by submitting articles for publication. – **RMC**



# Upcoming CGSC Foundation and Simons Center Events



**The Ludendorff Offensive**  
**March 14, 2018**

**The Great War in the Middle East, 1916-1918**  
**May 9, 2018**

Receptions at 5:30 p.m., Lectures at 6 p.m.  
Stove Factory Ballroom  
417 S. 2nd St., Leavenworth, KS 66048




**Chinese Involvement in the Vietnam War**  
**September (TBD), 2018**

Receptions at 5:30 p.m., Lectures at 6 p.m.  
Stove Factory Ballroom  
417 S. 2nd St., Leavenworth, KS 66048



**The 2018 Ethics Symposium is**  
**April 30-May 1, 2018**

For details visit:  
[www.leavenworthethicssymposium.org](http://www.leavenworthethicssymposium.org)



**Ambassadorial Expectations and  
Country Team Operations**  
**April 3, 2018**

**Space Domain and National Security**  
**May 8, 2018**

**Interagency Leadership**  
**June 6, 2018**

All brown-bag lectures are from 12:30-1:30 p.m., in the Arnold Conference Room of the Lewis and Clark Center, 100 Stimson Ave., Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Note: Members of the public coming to the brown-bag lectures from off-post will need to add extra time to check-in at the Fort Leavenworth visitor center.

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# U.S. Northern Command Counterterrorism Response Force Requirement

**by Matthew D. Bartels**

***To preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, the Nation must have a homeland that is secure from threats and violence, including terrorism. Homeland security (HS) is the Nation's first priority, and it requires a national effort. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a key role in that effort.***

***— Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-26,  
"Homeland Security" (2005)***

Nassim Nicholas Taleb introduced the theory of a “Black Swan” event in 2007.<sup>1</sup> It is described “as an event in human history that was unprecedented and unexpected at the point in time it occurred; however, after evaluating the surrounding context, domain experts can usually conclude that it was bound to happen.”<sup>2</sup> The terrorist attacks on 9/11 are examples of “Black Swan” events in recent American history.<sup>3</sup> Implementing proactive measures in today’s complex environment, where clear delineations across the spectrum of conflict no longer exist, is often viewed as a challenging task concerning homeland security. Strategists and military planners are constantly adapting the ways and means to maintain an advantage in this multi-dimensional environment.

In the interests of national security, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) may require the capability to deploy an available DoD counterterrorism (CT) response force specifically trained to reinforce interagency partners within the United States. USNORTHCOM can designate every service to proactively train, staff, equip, and certify an on-call Title 10 response force to reduce this vulnerability and improve interagency integration for homeland security. Urban environments are dynamic and demand large numbers of forces to ultimately neutralize and resolve a chaotic situation.<sup>4</sup> For example, if a minimally trained fifteen- to twenty-person terrorist cell executed a complex attack on an iconic American venue, the current USNORTHCOM response does not expedite the deployment of a CT task force already trained and certified with its interagency counterparts. This

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vulnerability can be reduced by tasking a Title 10 asset that will fall under combatant command authority with direct liaison to a federally-led emergency operations center (EOC).

**National and state policymakers may assume military forces will be readily available to defend the homeland when required; however, an alarming vulnerability may exist.**

The purpose of this study is to identify if there is a requirement for USNORTHCOM to establish a designated Title 10 CT response team to strengthen Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) response. USNORTHCOM currently lacks a designated Title 10 CT response force to reinforce federally-led, homeland security efforts during a national crisis. The National Guard annually trains with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and active duty Title 10 units for DSCA response. The exercises typically focus on natural disaster response, riot control, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) scenarios. With the heightened threat of a radicalized-homegrown or transnational terrorist attack within the continental U.S., a possible vulnerability may exist beyond the current National Guard and law enforcement solution. A designated service may be able to implement DSCA CT training to existing training exercises and venues should USNORTHCOM designate a Title 10 force with response to a homeland crisis. There appears to be an opportunity for the DoD to expand relations with interagency partners through liaison and certification exercises that will proactively train for a CT response and reduce this concern for USNORTHCOM.

Title 10 of the U.S. Code (U.S.C.) outlines the role of armed forces under federal code signed by Congress.<sup>5</sup> It provides the legal basis

for the roles, missions, and organization of each of the services as well as the DoD. Each of the five subtitles deals with a separate aspect or component of the armed services.

National and state policymakers may assume military forces will be readily available to defend the homeland when required; however, an alarming vulnerability may exist. The 2013 attacks at the Kenyan Westgate Mall and the 2015 attacks in Paris highlight the amount of manpower required to respond to and neutralize a small-scale terrorist attack. Title 10 forces may be a viable option to reinforce a federal response to help safeguard the American public. Proactive training and coordination measures should be evaluated and prioritized for future interoperability.

The establishment of USNORTHCOM in the spring of 2002 implemented the necessary command structure to bridge the lines of communications between Title 10 forces with state and federal authorities. The National Guard is strongly suited for natural disaster response; however, it may lack the mission-specific type and duration of training required to respond to a complex terrorist attack in an urban environment.

Currently, mutual aid response among law enforcement entities provides sufficient reinforcement for mass casualty incidents, but manpower and training restraints limit response effectiveness. Law enforcement training and coordination have improved over the past decade, as apparent in the Washington Navy Yard shooting. However, shortfalls with interoperability, command authority, and structured response are still apparent, as evident in the after-actions reviews conducted by responding federal, civil, and military entities.

During emergencies the Armed Forces may provide military support to civil authorities in mitigating the consequences of an attack or other catastrophic event when the civilian responders are overwhelmed. Military responses under these conditions

require a streamlined chain-of-command that integrates the unique capabilities of active and reserve military components and civilian responders.

—General Richard B. Myers,  
quoted in Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
*The National Military Strategy of the  
U.S. of America*

## **USNORTHCOM: History and Policy**

USNORTHCOM was established to unify interagency and interstate efforts to defend the nation from attack or overwhelming natural disaster. Established on the heels of 9/11, it was “to provide command and control of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) homeland security efforts and to coordinate military support to civil authorities.”<sup>6</sup> The 1,200-member staff is the pivotal command to ensure that effective proactive and reactive measures are maintained, in addition to being a catalyst for information sharing and productive interagency cooperation.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).<sup>8</sup> The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* dated October 2007 is an unclassified document that provides guidance and direction to the stakeholders within the DHS to include the DoD.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, Joint Publication 3-26 (2014) specifically links the DHS mission to DoD CT efforts within the homeland:

Domestic CT operations are considered part of homeland security under the lead of DHS. DHS is considered primary for coordinating Executive Branch efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. DOJ [Department of Justice] supports DHS for CT, but could also be the primary federal agency for some situations. If tasked to support the primary agency for domestic CT operations, DOD would be in

a supporting role, which would include any support for law enforcement purposes.<sup>10</sup>

A specific mission of USNORTHCOM states, “as directed by the President of the United States or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities, including immediate crisis and subsequent consequence management operations.”<sup>11</sup> What is the current state of readiness for this mission, and does USNORTHCOM maintain the readiness to achieve this standard consistent with the rhetoric of DHS’s own strategy?

**USNORTHCOM was established to unify interagency and interstate efforts to defend the nation from attack or overwhelming natural disaster.**

It is important to note that there are three primary mechanisms by which DoD would take part in a federal response to a domestic threat. Federal assistance, including DoD, would be provided: (1) at the direction of the President; (2) if the Secretary of Homeland Defense declares an event an Incident of National Significance; or (3) at the request of the Governor of the affected state in accordance with the Stafford Act.<sup>12</sup> The Standing Joint Force Headquarters North based at Peterson Air Force Base, CO, “maintains situational awareness of USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility to allow rapid transition to a contingency response posture, and when directed, quickly deploys assets to support homeland defense and civil support operations.”<sup>13</sup> For example, in September 2004, USNORTHCOM tracked the path of Hurricane Ivan. As it approached, it prepositioned water, food, and supplies close to the areas expected to be hit for immediate response in the aftermath.

*Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents* establishes

a single, comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS) and assigns the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations (and with agencies to include DoD) within the U.S. to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.<sup>14</sup>

The focal point of homeland security is American territory inclusive to coastal waters and territories legally claimed by the U.S. A recent report to Congress hones in on the lack of definition for homeland security by sharply stating, “ten years after the 11 September

**Many military and civilian leaders are focused overseas and believe that providing support to civilian authorities is of secondary importance.**

terrorist attacks, the U.S. government does not have a single definition for ‘homeland security.’ Currently, different strategic documents and mission statements offer varying missions that are derived from different homeland security definitions.”<sup>15</sup> Of the varying definitions, homeland security is best described as a “national effort to prevent aggression and terrorist attacks against the United States from within its own borders, reduce vulnerability to those attacks, minimize damage, and assist in recovery should an attack or domestic emergency occur.”<sup>16</sup>

As a combatant command, USNORTHCOM has the exclusive dilemma of maintaining responsibility and authority for North America without the operational control of dedicated resources at its disposal. The following excerpt sheds light on the current gaps facing USNORTHCOM:

In short, USNORTHCOM needs the right people, in sufficient numbers, properly trained, with the necessary equipment, ready to rapidly execute operational plans. Unless the policy errors hereafter highlighted in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review are promptly rectified, future leaders will be left with a critical gap between USNORTHCOM’s missions and its capabilities to fulfill them.<sup>17</sup>

In theory, and in reality, a properly trained and staffed USNORTHCOM according to the organizational charts is effective and vital to U.S. security. However, staffing and resource shortfalls due to administration constraints fail to provide the mission-essential personnel required to fulfill the organization’s mission statement.

In addition to the staffing shortfalls, there is an institutional culture aversion to DSCA throughout the DoD. Many military and civilian leaders are focused overseas and believe that providing support to civilian authorities is of secondary importance.<sup>18</sup> The National Guard emphasizes the need to overcome DoD’s cultural resistance to domestic civil support missions:

Despite producing policy documents claiming that protecting the homeland is its most important function, the Department of Defense historically, has not made civil support a priority. This shortcoming is especially glaring in the post 9/11, post Hurricane Katrina environment. Ensuring that the homeland is secure should be the top priority of the Government of the United States.<sup>19</sup>

Like all combatant commands, USNORTHCOM is an active duty command. As a result, many of the cultural biases and tensions between active and reserve component forces permeate the working relationships between USNORTHCOM and the broader National Guard community.<sup>20</sup> DSCA needs to be considered a greater Title 10 requirement

by every service vice considering it the sole responsibility of the National Guard.

## **DSCA Legal Constraints**

Enacted by Congress under the provisions of Title 18, U.S.C. §§ 1385, the Posse Comitatus Act was originally passed on 18 June 1878 as an amendment to an Army appropriation bill.<sup>21</sup> The National Security Act of 1947, Title 10, Section 375, further directed that the Secretary of Defense publish regulations to ensure that any activity (including providing equipment, facility, or personnel) does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army and Air Force in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless authorized by law.<sup>22</sup> It was not until 1956 that Congress amended the Posse Comitatus Act to include the Air Force and moved the act to Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1385, stating, “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”<sup>23</sup> Although the Posse Comitatus Act does not address the Navy or Marine Corps, by DoD directives and regulations, they are under the same restrictions as the Army and Air Force.<sup>24</sup>

It is generally accepted that Posse Comitatus does not apply to the Army and Air National Guard while serving under state control because they operate under Title 32 authority and not Title 10 authority.<sup>25</sup> Since the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to National Guard units while under state control, state governors have the flexibility to use National Guardsmen for law enforcement and in support of law enforcement missions. Once federalized, however, National Guard forces are subject to Title 10 and the Posse Comitatus Act.<sup>26</sup> As a result, states are reluctant to allow their forces to be called to active federal service during disasters like Hurricane Katrina.<sup>27</sup>

While the U.S. Constitution does not bar the use of active duty military forces in civilian situations or in matters of law enforcement, the U.S. government has traditionally refrained from employing federal troops to enforce the domestic law, except in cases of civil disturbance.<sup>28</sup> The President is authorized by the U.S. Constitution and various federal laws to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to suppress insurrections, rebellions, domestic violence, and disasters under an assortment of conditions and circumstances.<sup>29</sup> It is now DoD policy that National Guard forces have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local government agencies, mostly under the command of the state’s governor.

**It is now DoD policy that National Guard forces have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local government agencies...**

The Insurrection Act and the Stafford Act allow the President and/or Congress to abrogate the Posse Comitatus Act. Under the Insurrection Act, amended in 2007, Congress delegated the authority to the President to call forth the military during an insurrection or civil disturbance. Specifically, Title 10, U.S.C. §§ 331, authorizes the President to use military force to suppress an insurrection at the request of a state government.<sup>30</sup> This is meant to fulfill the federal government’s responsibility to protect states against domestic violence. The Insurrection Act has been used to send armed forces to quell civil disturbances a number of times during U.S. history. The most recent example of this occurred during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The Insurrection Act was also used after Hurricane Hugo in 1989, during which widespread looting was reported in St. Croix, Virgin Islands.<sup>31</sup> If the President decides

to respond to such situations, generally upon the recommendation of the Attorney General or at the request of a governor, he must first issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse within a limited time.<sup>32</sup>

Another relevant federal law is the Robert Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Congress enacted Title 42, U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 to authorize the President to make a wide range of federal aid available to states that suffer natural or manmade disasters. In order to receive federal assistance, the governor must first execute the state's emergency plan and make a determination that state capabilities are insufficient to deal with the circumstances. However, the Stafford Act does not allow federal, active-duty, military forces to patrol civilian neighborhoods for the purpose of providing security from looting and other activities.

**...the Stafford Act does not allow federal, active-duty, military forces to patrol civilian neighborhoods for the purpose of providing security from looting and other activities.**

Additional federal laws enable the command and control of military forces. Title 32, U.S.C. §§ 325 requires the consent of the governor to allow a Title 10 officer to exercise command over Title 32 members, even when that officer is a member of that state's National Guard who has been ordered to active duty. National Guard officers can exercise dual-status command under Title 32, U.S.C. §§ 325, and federal officers may accept state commissions when offered by a governor under Title 32, U.S.C. §§ 315. While there is no specific law or policy for state command or even tactical control of federal forces, it may not matter.

The fact is both the President and the States' governors have sufficient legal authorities that

provide command and control options for active and National Guard military forces. Therefore, the friction between federal and state powers is not necessarily a command and control issue from a legal standpoint. Instead, the problem is more about minimizing the political friction that results from the unity of effort options exercised by DoD rules, regulations, and military doctrine.<sup>33</sup>

The following case studies provide historic context to further analyze the possible requirement and role of a Title 10 DSCA response force. The Los Angeles Riots, although not a CT response, provide excellent historic context to evaluate the proficiency of the National Guard and Title 10 response in support of a federalized crisis. The terrorist attacks at the Kenyan Westgate Mall in 2013 and the most recent one in Paris in 2015 depict the types of emerging threats the U.S. may encounter and the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with violent extreme terrorist cells.

## **Los Angeles Riots**

The 1992 Los Angeles Riots are the most profound civil disturbance in recent U.S. history, resulting in the deaths of 54 people and causing more than \$800 million in property damage throughout Los Angeles County.<sup>34</sup> Excessive use of force by the Los Angeles Police Department on Rodney King after a police chase on 3 March 1991 escalated tension between law enforcement and the predominantly, African American neighborhoods across Los Angeles. At the time, rival gangs dominated many of the Los Angeles neighborhoods, and the Los Angeles Police Department had openly admitted they had "lost the streets."<sup>35</sup> Sparked by the acquittal of all four officers on trial for assault and the acquittal of three out of the four for excessive force, the riots began the day of the verdict, 29 April 1992.<sup>36</sup>

Prior to the verdict, the California Army National Guard had "repeatedly been assured they would not be needed for any disturbances"

by the office of the Governor.<sup>37</sup> At 3:15 p.m. on 29 April 1992, the verdict was announced, and the governor requested the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) of the California National Guard just after 9:00 p.m. Within six hours, there were 2,000 National Guardsmen marshaled in southern California. Roughly five hours later, units from the National Guard's 49th Military Police Brigade were mobilized and attached to the division.<sup>38</sup> Tasking authority to the Title 32 National Guard forces initially came from the sheriff's emergency operations center (EOC), where commanders from the Los Angeles Police Department and military were collocated with a representative from the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services. The unexpected nature of the emergency caused the National Guard commanders to activate and deploy the closest units to Los Angeles first.

On the third day of the riots "it appeared to the LA Mayor and the California Governor that the National Guard was deploying too slowly to effectively handle the problem."<sup>39</sup> The National Guard was constrained by an abundance of logistical shortfalls, such as misplaced riot gear, ammunition mix ups, and miscalculated helicopter re-supplies. The California governor requested federal Title 10 DoD support from the President and the authorization to federalize the National Guard. Ultimately, the California National Guard deployed 10,465 soldiers that were subsumed by Joint Task Force-Los Angeles. The Army's U.S. Forces Command was the command authority for the joint task force. In addition, roughly 1,500 Marines from the 1st Marine Division out of Camp Pendleton, CA, deployed in support. Due to the Posse Comitatus Act, under the federalization of Joint Task Force-Los Angeles, "the Guard was about 80 percent less responsive supporting law enforcement agencies."<sup>40</sup> By the fifth day of the riots, Los Angeles County was largely quiet. Joint Task Force-Los Angeles remained in support of DSCA operations until Day 11 and officially

stood down on 9 May.

The riots occurred prior to the establishment of USNORTHCOM. Had USNORTHCOM been established, it could have better prepared and supported three primary areas prior to and during the riots: (1) command and control; (2) DSCA training prior to the riots; and (3) logistical staging and resupply.

**The synchronization of proper command authority between federal and state, in regards to military, law enforcement, and political authority caused significant problems throughout the riots.**

The synchronization of proper command authority between federal and state, in regards to military, law enforcement, and political authority caused significant problems throughout the riots. Then California Governor Pete Wilson "called for federalization of the counter-riot effort without consulting with the National Guard Commanders in charge and on-scene," and without a request from the state representative for emergency services.<sup>41</sup> From the top-down, there was an apparent disconnect among the leadership with communication and tactical control. Under enormous political pressure, both the governor of California and mayor of Los Angeles guided priorities and objectives at the tactical level of operations in a political and media vacuum, rather than listening to bottom-up refinement and plausible courses of action from law enforcement and military leadership.<sup>42</sup>

Under the command of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the EOC was "slow to get established and did not provide the kind of coherent operational direction that would facilitate unit employment."<sup>43</sup> In essence, the EOC took tactical control of the crisis without standing operating procedures (SOPs),

previously exercised according to doctrine and policy. Proper command authority and mutually supporting relationships between the National Guard and local law enforcement were figured out on the fly rather than pre-planned for this type of crisis. The California National Guard was tasked and integrated to support local law enforcement in sizes and tactical formations outside the realm of its military training and unit SOPs. There were several success stories at the tactical level of operations, where young, talented, small-unit leaders made proper and ethical decisions. However as a whole, the DSCA operations directed from the EOC were counterproductive and confusing.

**Prior to the riots, the annual training of National Guard units in support of DSCA operations was inadequate.**

Prior to the riots, the annual training of National Guard units in support of DSCA operations was inadequate. Interagency relationship-building exercises and staff coordination down to the tactical level of operations were insufficiently tested. The California National Guard had annually conducted a Battle Command Training Program and Exercise Warfighter. This was a yearly exercise designed to validate National Guard response and command and control. However, due to budget restraints and lack of federal oversight, the scope of these exercises did not validate the integration of SOPs in support of DSCA. It is important to note that National Guard staff officers did attend state interagency coordination training prior to the riots, but the focus was on earthquake response and other natural disasters. Staff training exercised the lines of communication between military and civil response to natural disasters but did not validate civil disturbance response or doctrine/

policy EOC functions and procedures.<sup>44</sup>

There was no emphasis placed on civil disturbance training from the state level to the National Guard. At the time, there was a system of mutual aid in place among California law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and other emergency services. “The concept of mutual aid was that if a particular sheriff or police department became overwhelmed by local event, the state Office of Emergency Services would coordinate the dispatch of reinforcements from other jurisdictions.”<sup>45</sup> Essentially, the National Guard would not be requested and/or activated until all available law enforcement entities had been committed to the response. “Absolutely no one, civilian or military, expected a situation wherein the National Guard would be needed in the streets in a matter of hours.”<sup>46</sup> This reality would be unacceptable by today’s DSCA standard.

The logistical shortfalls throughout the riots highlighted the importance of maintaining pre-staged supplies and proactive planning measures. The California National Guard responded to the riots without enough riot shields, facemasks, batons, flak jackets, ammunition, and other various items. Although the riot gear physically existed within inventories, they were on loan to various organizations and not properly staged for quick access and distribution. In addition, lock plates were to be installed in every M16 and M16A1 rifle prior to deploying National Guardsmen “to prevent automatic firing during civil disturbances.”<sup>47</sup> Due to the rapid response of the California National Guard, this complex and timely armory maintenance was not conducted, and the soldiers reinforced DSCA operations with fully automatic rifles.

The ammunition supply for the guardsmen was stored in a separate location from the marshalling areas. The National Guard helicopters used to pick up the ammunition were not fueled and ready for flight operations.<sup>48</sup> In addition, the ammunition was not properly

staged on pallets and ready for resupply upon arrival of the helicopters. Ammunition had to be hand loaded, which caused significant delays to the deployment of California National Guard from the marshalling areas.<sup>49</sup> Although the lack of logistical preparedness may or may not have been avoided with the presence of USNORTHCOM, a proficient unit consistently trained in exercises beyond natural disaster and CBRNE response would have maintained a better state of readiness and alert.

### **Kenyan Westgate Mall Attack**

On 21 September 2013, four terrorists launched an armed assault using rifles and hand grenades at the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. At least 70 people died, over 175 were injured, and several others were held hostage.<sup>50</sup> Reportedly, the Islamist fighters shouted in the local Swahili language that Muslims would be allowed to leave while all others were subjected to their bloodletting.<sup>51</sup> Citizens from 13 different countries, including the U.S., France, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, were among those killed. Of note, it took almost four days before authorities declared the scene safe.<sup>52</sup> The Somali-based and al-Qaeda-linked Islamist terrorist group Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the horrific attack.<sup>53</sup> The victims of this attack included males and females, ranging in age from 8 to 78 years of age.<sup>54</sup> The majority of these casualties most likely occurred within the first hour of the attack.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, the terrorists made a conscious effort to target non-Muslims.<sup>56</sup>

The central lesson learned from the Westgate Mall attack as described in the New York Police Department's analysis was that terrorists seek high profile attacks and that this attack "clearly illustrates that armed assaults by terrorists on 'soft' targets such as a shopping mall are a simple, effective and easy to copy tactic."<sup>57</sup> This attack "successfully raised Al-Shababb's worldwide profile as a terrorist organization"

and will remain the premier example of how to exploit soft, high-profile venues world-wide.<sup>58</sup>

The concept that four, well-armed attackers with fundamental training can cause an international crisis, killing 70 non-Muslim citizens over a 48-hour period is a high reward and low-risk opportunity for any terrorist organization. The last confirmed sighting of the terrorists takes place twelve hours after the start of the attack.<sup>59</sup> It is unknown if the terrorists were killed or escaped the mall.<sup>60</sup> Although this attack did not take place on American soil, under the direction of the President, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assisted Kenyan authorities with the investigation. Opposing critics to U.S. involvement claimed that: "Direct U.S. involvement would be the quickest way to provide al-Shabaab with the propaganda bonanza it needs to recruit a new generation of jihadists."<sup>61</sup> Immediately following the crisis, the U.S. government insisted that it did not have firm proof that any American nationals took part in the Westgate attack. However, later reports

**The central lesson learned from the Westgate Mall attack as described in the New York Police Department's analysis was that terrorists seek high profile attacks...**

indicated that at least one shooter had spent time in a predominantly Somalian neighborhood just outside of Minneapolis, MN.<sup>62</sup> The FBI was "thought to be investigating the suspected involvement of al-Shabaab recruits from Somali communities in Minnesota and Maine."<sup>63</sup> A number of U.S. citizens have been recruited to fight in Somalia from Minneapolis, which is home to 32,000 of the estimated 100,000 Somalis who have fled the country's civil war and settled in the U.S.<sup>64</sup>

A final important lesson learned from this

attack is the “poor coordination and lack of effective communication between police and military commanders that resulted in the military troops firing on members of the police tactical team, killing one officer and wounding the team commander.”<sup>65</sup> This situation highlights the importance of consistent military and police exercises to test and validate a common operating picture where tactics, communications, and procedures are synchronized to enhance mutual response.

## Paris Attacks

On 13 November 2015, a terrorist cell conducted a series of coordinated attacks throughout Paris.<sup>66</sup> Three suicide bombers struck near the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, followed by suicide bombings and mass shootings at cafes, restaurants, and the Bataclan Concert Hall in Paris. In all, 129 people were killed and 368 wounded, in addition to the 7 attackers who died.<sup>67</sup>

**The commonality between every terrorist attack in France in 2015 is the deeply entrenched, religious-driven motivation of the attackers.**

The attacks were the deadliest in France since World War II and the deadliest in the European Union since the Madrid train bombings in 2004.<sup>68</sup> France had already been on high alert due to the terrorist attack on 7 January 2015, which killed twelve civilians at the satirical weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris,<sup>69</sup> and the thwarted Thalys train attack on 21 August 2015, where three Americans subdued a lone gunman aboard a train traveling from Belgium to France.<sup>70</sup>

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks.<sup>71</sup> ISIL stated that they were conducted

in retaliation for the French airstrikes on ISIL targets in Syria and Iraq.<sup>72</sup> French President François Hollande said the attacks were “an act of war by ISIL.”<sup>73</sup> President Hollande vowed to “be unforgiving with the barbarians from Daesh [ISIL],” and added that France would act within the law “in coordination with our allies, who are, themselves, targeted by this terrorist threat.”<sup>74</sup>

Former Director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter stated, “this will be a game-changer for how the West looks at this threat.”<sup>75</sup> The level of sophistication and coordination of the attacks pointed more toward al-Qaeda and will bring the reach and threat of ISIL to a new level.<sup>76</sup> Some of the attackers were known to law enforcement officials prior to the attacks, and at least some of the attackers had residences in the Molenbeek area of Brussels, which is noted for its links to extremist activities.<sup>77</sup>

A CT expert said the fact that authorities knew the perpetrators suggests that intelligence was “pretty good,” but the ability to act on it was lacking.<sup>78</sup> The number of Europeans who have links to Syria makes it difficult for security services to keep track of them all.<sup>79</sup> Evidence points to the attackers having regularly used unencrypted communications during the planning of the attack.<sup>80</sup>

The commonality between every terrorist attack in France in 2015 is the deeply entrenched, religious-driven motivation of the attackers. These attacks exhibit the ability for large-scale Muslim terrorist organizations such as ISIL to recruit, train, equip, and direct small cells or lone wolves to conduct high-profile attacks on vulnerable soft targets. New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton said the Paris attacks have changed the way law enforcement deals with security.<sup>81</sup>

## Conclusions and Recommendations

Recent history has taught that violent extreme organizations seek high-profile attacks

on vulnerable populated areas to reinforce their rhetoric and desired outcomes. If terrorist attacks, similar to the Kenyan Westgate Mall attack and the Paris attack increase within the U.S., USNORTHCOM is required by the National Military Strategy to have a viable Title 10 force capable of responding and reinforcing civil authorities. Proactive measures should be taken to implement new requirements to the traditional DSCA responsibilities of Title 10 forces to address this threat.

The homeland security doctrine indicates that the DoD should provide seamless integration into a federally-led EOC upon a catastrophic crisis resulting from a terrorist attack. The DoD mirrors this requirement in both the DSCA joint publications and individual service requirements, with strict adherence to the Posse Comitatus Act. A Title 10 CT force responding within the homeland under the guise of the Insurrection Act will never assume the primary role in response to these types of attacks. They will only respond within the U.S. when civil and federal law enforcement authorities become overwhelmed and are unable to dedicate the manpower required to effectively control the crisis and safeguard the American people.

The conundrum for USNORTHCOM is to identify a suitable and feasible DoD entity that can assume the role of a Title 10 CT force in addition to its primary roles and responsibilities. The National Guard, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the Marine Corps are all viable candidates with components already suited for urban warfare and interagency synchronization. Of these options, USNORTHCOM should identify a Title 10 entity that requires minimal additional training and funding, a force that can remain on-call for six to twelve months, and a service capable of rapidly deploying within the U.S. with organic command and control, air, and sustainment for a catastrophic event. Serving as the combatant command lead, USNORTHCOM can initiate

the process to certify and fund this requirement through Congress and the Secretary of Defense.

### ***Recommendation 1: Required Attributes for a DSCA CT Response Force***

USNORTHCOM should serve as the certification authority for the training and readiness of a DSCA CT force. A certification exercise should be conducted with the Title 10 force and the lead federal law enforcement CT response unit—the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). This certification exercise should also provide any specialized instruction from USNORTHCOM and federal law enforcement over the course of a 72- to 96-hour period. Training and validation directly from USNORTHCOM will ensure adherence to Title 10 legal constraints and provide seamless integration to a federally-led EOC.

**The conundrum for USNORTHCOM is to identify a suitable and feasible DoD entity that can assume the role of a Title 10 CT force...**

A dedicated asset for USNORTHCOM must have the ability to serve as an on-call DSCA response force for a significant duration of time to ensure consistency, mission preparedness, and continuity for turnover with follow-on forces. Upon certification from USNORTHCOM, the Title 10 response force should remain on-call for no less than six months. This will provide USNORTHCOM with a dedicated asset and reduce certification and coordination time.

The Title 10 force selected to serve as the DSCA CT response force should have a high level of proficiency in urban warfare and decentralized operations prior to additional USNORTHCOM-mandated training with federal law enforcement. Standardized training in military operations in the urban terrain, which involves high

proficiency in room clearing and close quarter marksmanship, should be prerequisites for selection. These are vital qualities of any military or law enforcement entity conducting operations in an urban environment and cannot be instructed to a high level of proficiency during a certification exercise. In addition, the DSCA CT force can participate in USNORTHCOM, DHS, and FEMA quarterly and annual national-level exercises across the country to maintain readiness.

**The ability to rapidly respond to a large-scale terrorist attack within hours as opposed to days is critical to the effectiveness and utility of a DSCA response force.**

The catalyst for the implementation of a Title 10 CT response force is derived from the manpower constraints of local and federal law enforcement when a catastrophe occurs. Therefore, the Title 10 response force should be able to reinforce the federally-led situation with no less than 100 operators to assist with cordons, room clearing, and securing large populated areas. Martial law in Paris after the November 2015 attacks required hundreds of active-duty military personnel to cordon off sections of the city, while search operations for the remaining terrorists were conducted. The FBI HRT is already reinforced with law enforcement special weapons and tactics teams from the communities surrounding a crisis. A small Title 10 response force will not provide the federal authorities with an increased capability. However, a large 100- to 200-person force with a single command and control construct in direct support of the federal authority will greatly increase its ability to search for and defeat a terrorist cell.

The ability to rapidly respond to a large-scale terrorist attack within hours as opposed to days is critical to the effectiveness and utility of a

DSCA response force. The selected Title 10 force must have access to pre-staged gear, weapons, ammunition, and specialized equipment upon activation from USNORTHCOM. In addition, pre-designated air and sustainment, to include berthing and communication infrastructure, should be integrated in the staged assets. This process will require the Title 10 force to remain in the continental U.S. throughout its on-call status and be primarily dedicated to this mission.

Dedicated airlift and sustainment of food, ammunition, and equipment upon integration with an EOC is critical to rapid response and seamless integration. A dedicated Title 10 DSCA response force should not be limited solely to the operators on the ground. Federal and local law enforcement will not have the food and berthing capacity for a 100- to 200-person Title 10 force. The holistic approach of an expeditionary force capable with organic air and logistical self-sustainment will greatly increase response and operational effectiveness for USNORTHCOM.

A dedicated Title 10 force should have a command and control authority capable of directing operations throughout the entirety of the response. Placed with or adjacent to the EOC, the Title 10 leadership will be capable of synchronizing the actions of the military forces with the law enforcement personnel already in place.

***Recommendation 2: Suitable Candidates for DSCA CT Response***

With an increased reliance on reserve components compared to other combatant commands, USNORTHCOM has placed a high priority on maintaining the proficiency and response capabilities of National Guard units. The National Guard is the feasible solution for natural disasters, riot control, and specialized CBRNE response. However, serving in the capacity of Title 32 forces, the National Guard lacks the dedicated training time to acquire the capabilities of a response force proficient in

military operations in the urban terrain consistent with interagency counterparts. This specialized training is paramount to effectively integrate and reinforce leading federal CT response entities such as the FBI's HRT.

In addition to training restraints, the ability to mobilize reserve personnel makes the National Guard a non-suitable candidate. As noted from the Los Angeles riots, the process of re-calling soldiers and drawing the necessary weapons, ammunition, and equipment will delay a response in terms of days vice hours. It is also important to note that air and sustainment is not organic to most National Guard units and is often not collocated with the designated responding forces. These delays coupled with the inadequate CT training make the National Guard unable to achieve the timely response required of a CT response force.

The use of regular active U.S. Army forces was the next option considered to serve as a DSCA CT response force. On 1 October 2008, the 3rd Infantry Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team was assigned to USNORTHCOM, marking the first time an active unit had been given a dedicated assignment to Northern Command.<sup>82</sup> The force will be known as the "first dedicated chemical, biological, radiological and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management response force (CCMRF)."<sup>83</sup> During the first year as a CCMRF, 3rd Infantry Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team served as an on-call federal response force for catastrophic events within the homeland that included terrorist attacks and other natural or manmade emergencies and disasters. Assigned as a subcomponent of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support, it conducted exercises to coordinate with local governments and interagency organizations and FEMA, under U.S. Army North at Fort Sam Houston, TX, in 2008.<sup>84</sup> Joint Task Force-Civil Support, a subordinate element of USNORTHCOM, has the primary mission to assist civilian authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident.<sup>85</sup>

A detailed report conducted by RAND noted there is a lack of training authority within the CCMRF to ensure forces are consistently and properly trained.<sup>86</sup> Additionally, the DSCA-specific training for the 3rd Infantry Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team has been solely focused on CBRNE and not CT response. The terrorist attacks conducted by ISIL and lone wolf actors require a more specialized response force that is capable of responding in a limited time window with organic assets that do not exist within the CCMRF. As of today, the CCMRF is not an adequate CT response force for USNORTHCOM, and it does not possess the organic assets to modify its organizational structure to meet these demands. It will, however, continue to serve as the premier Title 10 DSCA asset for CBRNE as reflected in its training, staffing, and equipment disposition and composition.

**In addition to training restraints, the ability to mobilize reserve personnel makes the National Guard a non-suitable candidate.**

The training response capabilities and current mission focus make the U.S. SOF ideally suited to serve as a CT response force for USNORTHCOM. Traditional, core SOF missions and capabilities offer a unique and versatile joint force that can respond globally within hours. Their limitations to providing USNORTHCOM an on-call DSCA CT force lies in their operational demand to the other combatant commands and their numerically small team compositions. Every combatant command has operational control of some type of special operations response except for USNORTHCOM. Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*, describes the relationship between the combatant command authorities and Special Operations Command:

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command. It is unique among the combatant commands in that it performs Service-like functions and has Military Department-like responsibilities and authorities. A theater special operations command (TSOC) is a subordinate unified command of USSOCOM. TSOCs perform broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to special operations forces capabilities. Secretary of Defense has assigned operational control (OPCON) of the TSOCs and attached SOF tactical units to their respective geographic combatant commander (GCC) via the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.<sup>87</sup>

**The Marine Corps is another ideal option to provide USNORTHCOM with a specialized CT response force.**

A possible solution is to provide USNORTHCOM with assigned SOF to utilize as a designated DSCA CT response force within the U.S. However, the demanding SOF deployment cycle and specialized role in homeland defense may inhibit their role in homeland security. SOF personnel are highly-trained assets that are better suited for overseas consistent response than homeland on-call duties. Plain and simple, there are not enough SOF to support the DSCA mission set, and even if there were, the amount of funding invested in SOF training and specialized skills are better suited for overseas operations.

SOF are clearly qualified to serve as a dedicated USNORTHCOM CT force, and their ability to provide organic air and sustainment satisfies every attribute required to fulfill this role. A dedicated DSCA CT team will need sufficient home-station training time to conduct interagency certification and serve as a dedicated

on-call asset within the U.S. for six to twelve months. For these reasons, time demands and mission relevance to their core skills may result in a mission misalignment of critical SOF capabilities.

The Marine Corps is another ideal option to provide USNORTHCOM with a specialized CT response force. The deployment cycle of Marine Corps combat infantry units permit company-size elements to serve as on-call CT response forces to USNORTHCOM for dedicated periods of six to twelve months. Its core capabilities and small unit leader focus is optimal for interagency integration that would require minimal additional training. Most importantly, the Marine Corps deploys as a self-supported, expeditionary asset overseas that utilizes organic command and control, air, medical, and supply entities to maintain force projection and sustainment. This unique capability within the DoD is already in place conducting home-station training prior to a deployment as part of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The pre-deployment training window for a MEU is twelve to eighteen months within its home-station assignment, thus requiring minimal time and external support to rapidly deploy to a catastrophic terrorist attack within the homeland.

The disposition of Marine Corps forces allows USNORTHCOM to train and certify two CT response teams (one on each coast) with little interference to the operational demands for the infantry units. First Marine Expeditionary Force is located on the west coast in Camp Pendleton, CA. Second Marine Expeditionary Force is located on the east coast in Camp Lejeune, NC. As an infantry battalion assigned to the MEU conducting a pre-deployment training cycle, it can assign one infantry company on each coast to assume the additional role of the USNORTHCOM CT response force with little additional training and equipment. An infantry company, commanded by a captain, could be augmented with select members from the

battalion leadership for additional command and control, flexibility, and strength. Ultimately led by a battalion executive officer with the rank of major, each CT force can serve as a six- to twelve-month on-call asset for USNORTHCOM and be organically supported by the MEU's air and supply assets.

The Marine Corps has one primary DSCA publication in concert with the other armed services. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-36.2, *DSCA: Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, is a multi-service publication that prescribes the general tactics, techniques, and procedures for DSCA.<sup>88</sup> From background information to introductory-level guidance on legal guidelines, the publication provides every armed service with a common foundation. Of note, Chapter 5 outlines "domestic activities and special events" and is limited to eight pages that feature basic information on natural disasters and CBRNE incidents.<sup>89</sup> The publication does not refer to Title 10 forces responding to and supporting terrorist activity or attacks.

In addition to MCWP 3-36.2, the Marine Corps has released two official Marine Administration (MARADMIN) messages from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps that provide further guidance on DSCA. MARADMIN 589/05, Subj: "USMC Roles and Missions in Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities," describes the roles and missions of the Marine Corps in homeland defense and DSCA. It is limited to three pages; however, it provides background, standing command structure, and detailed information on the implementation of the National Response Plan (NRP) and the NIMS.<sup>90</sup> Specific verbiage outlines the reporting structure for Marine Corps units in response:

The Marine Corps provides support to a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) at the direction

of the president or Secretary of Defense, by using our expeditionary warfighting capability to rapidly respond to a domestic incident in Support of Civilian Authorities.<sup>91</sup>

Additionally, the following excerpt sets conditions for the Marine Corps to respond to terrorist attacks:

Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders, or by responsible officials of other DOD Agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other DOD components are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests from civil authorities. Such actions are referred to as immediate response. (Per ref e), The military commander, or responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such assistance shall report the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC).<sup>92</sup>

Notably, the above direction and authorization enabled Marine Corps security forces at Marine Barracks, Washington, DC, to respond to the active shooting crisis at the Washington Navy Yard on 16 September 2013.<sup>93</sup> However, the response occurred at a neighboring federal installation, which expedited the Title 10 response and mutual aid given the shared jurisdiction.

The second MARADMIN message provides guidance on DSCA. MARADMIN 423/06, Subj: "Training to Support Implementation of National Incident Mngt System and Natl Response Plan at USMC Domestic Installations," provides amplifying guidance on training to support

implementation of NIMS and NRP at USMC domestic installations.<sup>94</sup> Of note, this official message directs the Marine Corps to not only support but to also receive support from civil authorities when necessary.<sup>95</sup> The mission of this message is “to establish and announce minimum training requirements for designated USMC people in support of the implementation of NIMS and NRP on domestic USMC installations for domestic incident management.”<sup>96</sup> Common knowledge and proper utilization of NIMS and the NRP will set conditions for seamless integration of DSCA whether supporting or receiving. Additionally, this allows Marine Corps commanders to integrate with interagency and civil authority partners to conduct DSCA training from tabletop exercises to large-scale response scenarios to include FEMA and NORTHCOM support and oversight.

**The service guidance from the Marine Corps requires the leadership to train and support DSCA operations.**

The service guidance from the Marine Corps requires the leadership to train and support DSCA operations. The composition and home-station training windows of the MEUs create the ideal continuity of a medium-size, CT response force for USNORTHCOM. With minimal additional training and equipment requirements, these augmented elements with seasoned leadership, adaptable communication capabilities, and organic sustainment and air make them ideal for USNORTHCOM. Stationed on each coast, their ability to collectively organize, equip, and respond to a federally-led operations center upon a catastrophic terrorist attack within the U.S. is the best solution for this requirement.

***Recommendation 3: DSCA CT Training***

The training required for a Title 10 CT

force requires a USNORTHCOM certification beyond the annual national-level exercises. The DoD’s “participation in national level exercises includes exercises that evaluate DoD linkages to homeland security through DSCA and homeland defense.”<sup>97</sup> USNORTHCOM has the primary responsibility for DSCA and “conducts exercises to train and evaluate its DSCA capabilities at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”<sup>98</sup> The USNORTHCOM commander has directed that the command will exercise with all ten FEMA regions in consequence management exercises. Additionally, “NORTHCOM’s Joint Task Force also conducts at least one regional and several Tactical Training Exercise/Seminar events each year with DHS components and National Guard entities.”<sup>99</sup> From improvised nuclear device detonation to hurricane preparation and response, USNORTHCOM is the overarching driving force that sets and maintains standards for DSCA requirements.

USNORTHCOM’s initiatives with national-level exercises and staff officer training opportunities enhance the National Guard’s ability to conduct standardized DSCA training according to doctrine. These exercises also foster mutually-supported relationships through interagency cooperation that strengthen the lines of communication between DoD and federal law enforcement. Key National Guard stakeholders utilize USNORTHCOM’s formal exercises and training opportunities to refine and assess their unit’s SOPs, but there is simply not enough time to proficiently train to every DSCA mission required by the *National Military Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.

A CT response team requires tactical-level training exercises with federal law enforcement counterparts. The USMC CT forces on each coast can conduct a certification exercise at Quantico, VA, prior to assuming the duties for USNORTHCOM. The infantry company selected to serve as the CT force can conduct a 72- to 96-hour certification exercise at one

of the many urban warfare venues offered at Quantico. This base not only offers the ideal training sites for DSCA CT response, but it is home to the leading federal response entity, the FBI HRT. An interagency certification where the Marine Corps CT response team conducts a series of exercises with FBI HRT will set conditions for seamless response during a crisis. From the synchronization of communication assets to learning federal SOPs, the Marine Corps forces could be tested and certified under the supervision of a designated USNORTHCOM authority. From the guidelines of the Posse Comitatus Act, to the coordination and authority integration with a federally-led EOC, USNORTHCOM can validate and certify the readiness status of these forces.

#### ***Recommendation 4: Counterterrorism DSCA Interoperable Equipment Sets***

DoD forces often use encrypted communication equipment that is not interoperable with federal and civil authorities. The standard communication suite owned by an infantry company that would serve as a CT response force would require augmented assets from USNORTHCOM to effectively coordinate with a federal EOC. As part of the validation and certification exercise, each CT response force should be issued the federal law enforcement equivalent of the communication assets required to effectively conduct this mission set. Funded through USNORTHCOM, the representative assigned to certify each team would transfer the communication suites to the leadership of each force prior to the exercise. These communication suites would travel back to the home station of each force and stand by in readiness for real-world response.

Additionally, the CT response teams should be issued special badging from USNORTHCOM to validate each member's authorization when operating in a DSCA situation. The identification badges or cards would be kept on the individual

service member when conducting DSCA operations to validate his/her presence within the federal jurisdiction. Strict adherence to personnel rosters would be reported to the EOC by the Title 10 commander on scene, and the badging process would expedite daily accountability and medical-related situations if and when a service member is wounded or killed while conducting DSCA operations.

**Now is the time for USNORTHCOM to designate a specific service to proactively train, staff, equip, and certify an on-call Title 10 response force...**

#### **Conclusion**

National and state policymakers may assume that military forces will be readily available to defend the homeland when required; however, a growing threat abroad may expand vulnerability currently present in USNORTHCOM. The 2013 attacks at the Kenyan Westgate Mall and the 2015 attacks in Paris highlight the amount of staffing required to respond to and neutralize a small-scale terrorist attack. *The National Security Strategy* signed by the President and the capstone documents for the DHS mandate USNORTHCOM have a Title 10 asset to respond and support federal and civil authorities during a terrorist crisis within the homeland.

Now is the time for USNORTHCOM to designate a specific service to proactively train, staff, equip, and certify an on-call Title 10 response force to reduce this vulnerability and improve interagency integration for homeland security. Urban environments are dynamic and demand large numbers of forces to ultimately neutralize and resolve a chaotic situation.<sup>100</sup> For example, if a minimally trained 15- to 20-man terrorist cell executed a complex attack on an

iconic, American venue, the current USNORTHCOM force structure does not have a certified Title 10 asset to rapidly respond.

The Marine Corps is the best-suited service to provide a Title 10 CT force that can remain on-call under combatant command authority with direct liaison to a federally-led EOC. Upon certification by USNORTHCOM authorities at Quantico, the Marine Corps can sustain one CT response force on each coast to fulfill this growing requirement for USNORTHCOM. As the threat of violent extreme organizations increases within the homeland, proactively planning and training between the DoD and federal law enforcement must follow in suit. The DoD has grown more joint; now it must also expand the interagency relationships and interoperability with its federal partners. DSCA operations are a critical mission set required by every military service. The Marine Corps can strengthen USNORTHCOM's capabilities and response by establishing a DSCA CT force for homeland response. **IAJ**

## NOTES

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# Partnering to End Corruption

## *through Security Cooperation and Defense Institution Building*

**by Adam J. Bushey**

***Corruption is the existential, strategic threat to Afghanistan.***

***— ISAF Commander General Allen***

### **Corruption Affects the Battlefield**

Corruption damages a mission's operational effectiveness and credibility and is "a key inhibitor of stability... is often a key cause of conflict... and erodes the legitimacy and efficacy of an international mission."<sup>1</sup> The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has the expertise and capabilities to assist the Department of Defense (DoD) to tackle corruption, support mission operations, reduce violent extremism, and increase government legitimacy and citizen confidence.

### **Do No Harm**

Ignoring corruption, even within "friendly groups," has had detrimental results. Current U.S. National Security Advisor, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster states, "Paradoxically, avoiding state building or sidestepping the political causes of state weakness in the hope of avoiding costly or protracted commitments often increases costs and extends efforts in time."<sup>2</sup> In fragile states, self-protection forces and other powerbrokers often provide security, distribute aid, deliver justice, and supply jobs in lieu of government intervention. While U.S. assistance to these forces may secure short-term gains, if not done carefully, these self-protection forces "have a tendency to evolve into predatory groups, attacking external enemies while extorting or preying upon their own community."<sup>3</sup> Such extortion and corruption reinforces ethnic, religious, and other divisions that fuel cycles of

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violence; this makes peace more difficult and prolongs the need for international forces. In 2014, DoD concluded that initial support of warlords in Afghanistan created an environment that exacerbated criminal patronage networks and fostered corruption, which ultimately had significant unintended consequences for U.S. strategy.<sup>4</sup>

Harm can also result from empowering a military or an executive branch through its military that already has undue influence in a country without also strengthening oversight institutions that can stem corruption. When inspector general, ombudsman, or legislative committees' capacities are increased, the oversight bodies can safeguard against power-grabs and illegal activities.<sup>5</sup> Further, unmatched military assistance to an already militarized society may tip the scales of power and permit the military to act as a tool to "suppress democratic opposition or movements."<sup>6</sup> Yemen and its current crisis is an example of where the U.S. government failed to counterbalance security cooperation programming to a corrupt executive with assistance programs to other branches of government that had oversight authorities over the executive.<sup>7</sup>

### **Can Anything be Done about Corruption?**

Twelve of the fifteen lowest ranked countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) have issues with insurgents or international security.<sup>8</sup> Many officers in DoD believe that corruption is simply part of some countries' cultures, where citizens have attitudes of resignation to corruption, and therefore, nothing can be done to address it.<sup>9</sup> However, citizens want medicine in their clinics and books in their classrooms, and they do not want to be shaken down at police checkpoints. This is why the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) uses propaganda to paint the governments as illegitimate, due in part to their corruption,

in order to gain sympathizers for their cause to overthrow the government.<sup>10</sup>

Corruption as the status quo does not have to be the end state. In fact, many anticorruption programs that focus on changing the rules of the game, incentives, or illegal behaviors that undermine the rule of law (ROL) have found significant success. These programs start with an in-depth assessment that is used to develop programs tailored to specific objectives within a sector where political will exists.<sup>11</sup>

**Many officers in DoD believe that corruption is simply part of some countries' cultures, where citizens have attitudes of resignation to corruption, and therefore, nothing can be done to address it.**

For example, the USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Strategy identifies public financial management (PFM) strengthening interventions as a proven method of promoting norms of lawfulness. PFM programs increase auditing and transparency in accounting, recording, and reporting processes. This USAID position is partly based on the recent, meta-analysis, evidence-based study of impact evaluations by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, one of the preeminent research institutions on corruption. U4, which receives substantial funding from multiple G7 countries, found that studies have consistently shown that PFM programs have reduced corruption and fraud by changing incentives and the rules of the game.<sup>12</sup>

### **Ten DoD Lines of Effort Ripe for Collaboration with USAID**

Once established, corruption, is "hard to reduce; ideally it should be taken into account from the planning stages of any crisis response

operation.”<sup>13</sup> The steps below from Transparency International’s book, *Defense and Security Program: Corruption Threats and International Missions: Practical Guidance for Leaders* (TI CTIM), as well as other recently-published literature, outline how DoD can partner with USAID to address corruption at different levels of command.

### **1. Prepare early.**

The military should integrate transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption (TAAC) measures into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) associated with security cooperation. Specifically, combatant command (COCOM) theater campaign plans, as well as region and country plans, should more thoroughly address TAAC. For example, the force structure and personnel may need to be adjusted to account for an increased emphasis on supporting anti-corruption efforts.<sup>14</sup>

a) USAID already has an anti-corruption strategy, personnel trainings on anti-corruption programming, best practice guides, and other material that could be used as a starting point for a COCOM interested in initiating an anti-corruption DOTMLPF-P process for its area of responsibility.

b) In Afghanistan, it was not until 2011 that revisions were made to operation plans and fragmentary orders that elevated anticorruption efforts to a distinct line of operation within the mission campaign plans.

### **2. Incorporate TAAC analysis into Ministry of Defense country-strategy problem-framing through scoping assessment tools.**

A corruption analysis should be required every few years during security cooperation or defense-institution building programs. A corruption political economy analysis (PEA) examines the actors and institutions that support

or oppose democratic reform. The corruption PEA also reviews the interests, resources, and strategies of key actors to ascertain whether a critical mass of reformists and resources exist, or if they could be organized to exist, to champion specific reforms. In other words, a corruption PEA helps determine what corruption mitigations strategies should be made a priority, based in part on need and the political feasibility of reform.

a) USAID can assist with a security-sector corruption PEA. USAID’s Center of Excellence on DRG has an entire division dedicated to supporting PEA assessments, as well broader assessments, such as the democracy, human rights, and governance assessment. Conducting a thorough scoping institution or corruption assessment is the most critical missing ingredient to effective security cooperation and security assistance.

b) USAID and its international partners have toolkits on TAAC. One such toolkit is the *Anticorruption Assessment Handbook* (2009).<sup>15</sup> Like the corruption PEA, these tools can help security cooperation professionals determine how and in what ways they can support TAAC initiatives, even when there are other competing U.S. interests and agendas. Other TAAC tools include:

- Human resource management (HRM): The World Bank assesses civil service integrity through the HRM Actionable Governance Assessment. This analysis identifies weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Civil Service systems for which appropriate reforms can be implemented, thereby reducing inefficiencies and improprieties, including corruption. This assessment tool has been completed in 12 countries.<sup>16</sup>
- Financial management: PFM reforms within a Ministry of Defense can

substantially reduce corruption. USAID's Public Financial Management Risk Assessment Framework and the World Bank Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework<sup>17</sup> both assess forecasting capabilities, fiscal discipline, strategic resource allocation, and efficient use of resources. These financial assessment tools can be used at the Ministry of Defense level and provide a partner nation's decision-makers with reliable information on its public financial management system, processes, and vulnerabilities, which allows it to focus on effective reform efforts. PFM assistance could be a powerful defense institution building line of effort.

c) If any DoD staff wishes to have a deeper understanding of the governance systems, political dynamics, or country context of its area of responsibility, USAID has completed governance assessments in about 80 countries, half of which have been completed in the last five years. While many are sensitive but unclassified, USAID can share any of them with DoD staff upon request.

### ***3. Create a basis for unified action.***

There should be as much alignment as possible between security and development agendas. For example, DoD could create a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with USAID to pay for the costs of civilian agency staff to work on DoD TAAC lines of effort pre-deployment during mobilization. An MOU for similar purposes already exists between the Department of State and DoD.<sup>18</sup> Alternatively, once in country, DoD and USAID could use an MOU to coordinate future programs at the country-level, such as the agreement signed in Armenia.<sup>19</sup>

### ***4. Supply chain management (SCM) assessment.***

USAID's National Supply Chain Assessment (NSCA) conducts a diagnostic on SCM systems in the health sector that could be tailored to fit DoD's needs.<sup>20</sup> The footnoted link outlines the Key Performance Indicators as well as the assessment questions used for the NSCA review of the five-supply chain functional areas (forecasting process, procurement maturity, product selection, transportation, and warehousing). USAID has used the NSCA to assess SCM systems in dozens of countries and at the national, state (division), and local (brigade/company) functional levels.

Having security cooperation professionals use USAID's NSCA within Ministries of Defense is likely one of the most straightforward and achievable recommendations. If DoD logistical experts were interested in using NSCA, a DoD unit could buy-into USAID's existing NSCA efforts and USAID's implementing partners could help tailor NSCA to fit the needs of Ministries of Defense. USAID and its partners could work hand in hand with DoD to ensure that the NSCA reflects the unique characteristics of SCM within a Ministry of Defense.

### ***5. Promote accountability.***

Providing security cooperation funds to Ministries of Defense without providing simultaneous funds for accountability to oversight bodies, such as parliamentarians or inspector general offices, may sacrifice other strategic, long-term interests (e.g., meeting the third National Security Strategy (NSS) objective of respect for universal values and human rights) the U.S. has for the partner nation for short-term, tactical gains.<sup>21</sup> To remedy this, security cooperation programs could provide support to security-related investigative, oversight, and adjudicative bodies within the legislature or security ministries. For example, security cooperation programs could support the

Internal Affairs Department within a Ministry of Defense with contracted experts who help train and build the capacity of the department to prevent corruption and opportunistic collection of payments by soldiers.

**DoD must, when appropriate, be willing to make security cooperation conditional based on corruption reform benchmarks.**

Security cooperation, like other forms of development, is a multidimensional effort and may be limited by weak or poorly-functioning legislative bodies. By increasing the capacity of legislative committees and bill drafters in the security sector, needed reforms can begin to take shape, which will lead to a stronger security sector and a more rigorous parliamentary- oversight capacity. Such a result can lead to greater host-country ownership and sustainability and increase a partner's ability to make informed security budgetary decisions, while also strengthening checks and balances against the potential of corruption within Ministries of Defense.

According to an index developed by Transparency International that measures the quality of legislative oversight of defense ministries across over 80 countries, two-thirds of countries are at high risk of corruption due to poor legislative controls over defense security.<sup>22</sup> USAID has completed over 50 legislative strengthening programs over the past 10 years and is in good position to assist the U.S. military in providing capacity-building technical assistance to armed forces' legislator or parliamentary committees.

This assistance could be programmed in many ways. For example, supporting defense institution oversight bodies could be contracted to a USAID-suggested, nongovernmental organization (NGO) or contractor through

DoD's existing building partner capacity (BPC) authorities or alternatively, by DoD directly transferring funds to USAID. DoD has recognized the importance of having a "total package approach" for its materiel sales; it similarly needs a total package approach for BPC programs, which should include supporting oversight bodies.

***6. Condition assistance on political reform.***

DoD must, when appropriate, be willing to make security cooperation conditional based on corruption reform benchmarks. It was not until the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Conference in July 2012 that the Afghan government had to meet hard conditions regarding reductions in corruption to receive U.S. military and other aid.<sup>23</sup> However, such conditionality for assistance should be tailored to a specific, identified reform and done in coordination with the interagency (and other donors if possible), if it is going to be effective and not have unintended consequences.<sup>24</sup> Diplomatic methods for creating conditions include sanctions, embargoes, conditional aid, and domestic legislation with international scope and reach.

Some critics contend that conditionality does not work. Others contend that even if it does not work, it sends a message, both to the host nation and to other nations around the world that the U.S. is serious about its commitments to universally-recognized rights for all people, such as those outlined in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>25</sup>

Regardless, USAID and the Millennium Challenge Cooperation have requirements for recipients of government-to-government assistance. In adherence to section 7031 of the Foreign Assistance appropriation bill, USAID's policy chapter ADS 220 requires all government-to-government assistance recipients to have policies and systems in place that demonstrate sufficient financial management capacity

and public accountability to reduce fraud and corruption through effective PFM. USAID has a process to ensure host nation financial checks and balances exist before providing on-budget assistance to ministries. As appropriate, DoD could condition security cooperation to PFM assessments and reforms within Ministries of defense based on USAID lessons learned.

### ***7. Changing norms, behaviors and leader's incentives.***

Many DoD security cooperation practitioners are often reluctant to suggest reform to their counterparts in fear of upsetting their bilateral relationship. However, if the norms and behaviors within the partner-nation military institution reinforce corruption or violate internationally-recognized human rights, such as abridging women's basic rights, then, in accordance with the current U.S. NSS, it is a U.S. strategic interest for the defense attaché office to act and encourage reform.

To influence leaders and generate the political will necessary for reform, partner-nation decision makers often must be incentivized (e.g., through financial rewards, nonfinancial rewards, media oversight, and punishments) to give-up power and change norms and behaviors that violate the rule of law.<sup>26</sup> By giving up some power and control, such as permitting internal audits or parliamentary oversight, leaders can create needed checks and balances. While the sharing and distribution of power through the process of checks and balances may "slow reform," it also limits government overreach. These horizontal and vertical checks and balances on power are essential because they limit the subjectivity of future leaders who may not be so reform minded.

**a)** USAID has experience changing leader's incentives. Recent USAID programming initiatives focused on USAID's DRG Strategy Development Goal #2<sup>27</sup> are framed similarly to the United Kingdom's

Department for International Development (DFID) efforts, which is eloquently explained as supporting "accountability to shift the incentives of the ruling elite so they will support meaningful reforms and more inclusive and accountable modes of political and economic governance."<sup>28</sup>

**b)** Further, security cooperation programs could support anti-corruption efforts by using existing incentives framed around:

- Increasing government efficiency and decreasing waste;
- Adhering to UN Conventions to which they are already a signatory;
- Ensuring partner nation existing de jure national laws (what is written) are also the de facto law (what is followed);
- Tying foreign military sales or War College attendance to increasing checks and balances;
- Articulating economic benefits of meeting international norms and standards;
- Facilitating eligibility for membership in an international organization;
- Building the capacity of oversight institutions to provide adequate checks and balances; or
- Promoting ambassador-level diplomacy. When all elements of U.S. national power are buttressed by each other, through a systems-based approach (organized complexity), security cooperation programs can better alter power and popular (soldier) and professional (officer clubs and associations) behaviors and norms to affect change.<sup>29</sup>

## **8. Protect human rights.**

Nominal or superficial human rights programs do not prevent human rights abuses against partner-nation citizens. After conducting an assessment on gaps, U.S. DoD security cooperation programs should: “a) proactively encourage strong human rights standards and accountability among partner forces and b) specifically develop and execute remediation.”<sup>30</sup> For example, DoD could protect host-nation reformers or whistleblowers by supporting the passage of human rights law or the creation of corruption hotlines as it relates to host nation DoD employees based on best practices.

a) The military could work with USAID on gender rights; just as DoD has internal suicide and sexual assault prevention programs, DIB could run campaigns similar to the USAID-supported, *What does it mean to be a man?*<sup>31</sup> campaign. Such efforts would align partner nations to their existing commitments, since most are already UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women signatories.

b) In 2015, USAID published a lessoned learned guide<sup>32</sup> and several toolkits<sup>33</sup> on working with men to end gender-based violence.<sup>34</sup> USAID/Bangladesh is working to reduce the high prevalence of domestic violence in Bangladesh and other related human rights violations (e.g., sexual harassment, child marriage, and other root causes of domestic abuse). USAID has programs and initiatives that DoD could modify to assist foreign militaries to provide training and capacity building to oppose domestic violence and gender-based violence conducted by military members.

c) USAID could also assist DoD with its obligations under the Leahy Law, by helping to identify human right violations and necessary reform initiatives.<sup>35</sup> USAID human

rights protection programming is broadly defined and operationalized through three key areas: 1) environment building focuses on strengthening the normative frameworks (laws and policies), institutions, and actors that help safeguard against violations; 2) response efforts mitigate the impact of violations regardless of the ability to end them; and 3) remedy efforts include judicial and non-judicial measures to provide redress and deter future violations.

## **9. Reforming the code of military justice disciplinary measures and military law.**

The most successful ROL and military justice programs do not end after a two-week training.<sup>36</sup> In order to be most effective, security-cooperation programs that focus on legal reform and the ROL should be long-term initiatives focused on change management that not only help develop and shepherd the new rules through the approval process, but also assist partner nations with the roll-out and implementation of the new policies.<sup>37</sup> For example, does the host nation military have a code of military justice capable of dealing with human rights violations when they occur? If not, a multi-year ROL program would help the partner nation (with input from civil society) consider what ethical standards and codes of conduct are appropriate, draft regulations or codes for the security forces that are legally binding, and finally, roll-out, train on, and implement the new rules.

USAID has helped write and facilitate the implementation of a vast number of codes of conduct and the reform of thousands of laws. For example, to strengthen the professional skills of Russian judges and lawyers, USAID’s Rule of Law Partnership Project promoted continuing legal education, professional self-governance, and ethics regulation. As outlined in the 2015 Practitioner’s Guide to Anticorruption, the Palestine PACE program used a Centers of Excellence (COE) framework, where members

of six ministries implemented 100 government reform initiatives.<sup>38</sup> Similar results were made in the Paraguay Fight Against Corruption and Impunity program focused on ethics and codes of conduct.<sup>39</sup> USAID could provide guidance and partners to help DoD conduct long-term, change-management ROL programs as DoD assists Ministries of Defense reform their code of military justice or code of conduct.

### ***10. Including rigorous monitoring and evaluations (M&E).***

Security cooperation efforts have struggled to establish indicators beyond basic quantitative number counting to determine which of the multiple U.S. objectives should be measured.<sup>40</sup>

USAID could assist DoD with creating a more systematic structure for developing and tracking quantitative and qualitative indicators of effectiveness and efficiency prior to program approval.<sup>41</sup> This would almost always include a baseline assessment immediately prior to the initiation of a BPC security cooperation program. RAND completed an impressive amount of research on this in 2016.<sup>42</sup> Such efforts could include the use of basket indicators, which are a collection or grouping of two to nine indicators; using baskets to measure success in an area of foreign assistance has become a respected trend in the field.<sup>43</sup> Baskets permit practitioners to measure the same thing from multiple angles in order to get a fuller picture of the situation.<sup>44</sup> Due to the multiplicity of strategic-level goals that security cooperation programs are intended to achieve, it may be beneficial to have one basket of indicators for each strategic objective. USAID trains its field staff to use varied baskets of measures that adhere to data integrity standards.

### **Military Strategies and Publications**

The 2010 NSS, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS), and 2015 NSS all promote security cooperation as a line of effort to reduce state

fragility.<sup>45</sup> The 2014 QDR states, “Building security globally not only assures allies and partners and builds partnership capacity, but also helps protect the homeland.”<sup>46</sup> Recent military strategies have increasingly emphasized the need to accomplish this through interagency cooperation—the 2015 National Military Strategy mandates it.<sup>47</sup>

**Strengthening governance to reduce the likelihood of corruption or state failure has also been part of DoD policy for over a decade.**

Strengthening governance to reduce the likelihood of corruption or state failure has also been part of DoD policy for over a decade. The Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* states that “extensive corruption significantly challenges security sector reform efforts . . . [and] security sector reform should address these challenges.”<sup>48</sup> Following suit, the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual 3-24, which classifies security cooperation as an effective COIN tool, states in chapter 10 that “enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks and balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction, or development program.”<sup>49</sup>

### **Summary**

Corruption is a major impediment to military operations and the establishment of the ROL. Between 2007 and 2013, USAID sponsored more than 330 projects worldwide that included anticorruption activities with a total funding of about \$6.7 billion. USAID has the experience, expertise, and ability to assist DoD in preparing for and fighting against corruption to support mission operations to reduce violent extremism, as well as increase government legitimacy and

citizen confidence of local security forces. **IAJ**

*The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army or any other governmental agency. Specifically, they do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and USAID is not responsible for the accuracy of any information supplied herein.*

## NOTES

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- 9 Based on nine years of conversations the author has had with DoD officers.
- 10 Gary Quinlan, “Letter Dated 13 November 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, November 14, 2014, <[http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2014\\_815.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_815.pdf)>, accessed on March 26, 2017.
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- 23 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, p. 6.
- 24 Adam J. Bushey, “Second Generation Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Programming Abroad Next Generation Reform: Comparing Existing U.S. Government and International Best Practices to Rachel Kleinfeld’s Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad,” *Houston Journal of International Law*, Vol. 37, No. 139, December 8, 2014, p. 149. See Rachel Kleinfeld, *Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, Washington, DC, p. 133.

25 Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel, *Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment*, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, 2015, p. 20.

26 Bushey, “Second Generation Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Programming Abroad Next Generation Reform: Comparing Existing U.S. Government and International Best Practices to Rachel Kleinfeld’s Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad,” p. 145. ROL initiatives support a culture of lawfulness through checks and balances on power and through changes in social norms.

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28 In Department for International Development’s, “The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy,” an incredible focus is put on the need for incentivizing political actors to give up control and allow for a change in cultural norms. Popular and professional norms that impede the growth of rule of law in countries where there is a substantive deficit can range from graft and kickbacks, to gender and human rights violations. The word “incentive” is used more than 200 times in the 115-page review. The review makes it clear that impact evaluation research on anti-corruption programs has proven that simply creating a monitoring system is ineffective without a simultaneous incentive (and/or consequence) program (note incentive programs can also be “ineffective if the incentive [and/or consequence] is not large enough”). In other words, checks and balances are not effective in curtailing anti-corruption without corresponding punishments, financial rewards, nonfinancial rewards, or media oversight.

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31 Here are 4 links to modules on engaging men on the issue of preventing gender violence: <<https://men-care.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/05/Program-P-English-web.pdf>>; <<https://promundoglobal.org/resources/program-h-working-with-young-men/>>; <<http://gender.care2share.wikispaces.net/file/view/VSLManualFinal.pdf/351415986/VSLManualFinal.pdf>>; <[http://www.acquireproject.org/archive/files/7.0\\_engage\\_men\\_as\\_partners/7.2\\_resources/7.2.3\\_tools/Community\\_Engagement\\_Manual\\_final.pdf](http://www.acquireproject.org/archive/files/7.0_engage_men_as_partners/7.2_resources/7.2.3_tools/Community_Engagement_Manual_final.pdf)>, accessed on January 8, 2018.

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34 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Working with Men and Boys to End Violence Against Women and Girls,” and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Toolkit for Addressing Gender-based Violence through Rule of Law Projects,” September 2014, <<https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1865/toolkit-addressing-gender-based-violence-through-rule-law-projects>>, accessed on January 8, 2018.

35 The U.S. Agency for International Development has extensive experience in the field of human rights. For example, USAID created Anti-Corruption Advocacy and Legal Aid Centers (ALACs) in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Dominican Republic with toll-free hotlines that provide citizens with initial advice and, where evidence of corruption exists, referral for further legal counseling. USAID also supported human rights advocates in Zimbabwe. A joint DoD/USAID Victims of Torture Program could provide support to victims of violence, torture, state harassment, or arrest carried out by foreign militaries.

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# The Syrian Refugee Crisis:

## A Moral and Ethical Obligation of Resettlement or “I’ll Pass on the Poisoned Skittles”

**by Joel D. Funk**

What are the relationships between the migration of refugees and conflict? The conventional logic presumes that demographic factors and how they interact with resources are potential causes of conflict. To survive, all creatures seek to acquire food, water, and territory. Where those needs are not met for the individual and subsequently the group, conflict is assured. Additional system stresses, such as rivalry, environmental factors, and resource depletion, will eventually lead to violent conflict if the system is not balanced. Resources within a complex and multilayered system, such as humanity, are not just real but also symbolic and ethereal. Capital, purchasing power, education, personal-integrity rights, healthcare, political power, and social mobility are a few aspects of modern society that frame social stability and security. Understanding the causes, implications, and remedies for refugee crises is of utmost importance especially within Syria.

The civil war in Syria is the worst humanitarian disaster of our time. The conflict has its roots in the Arab Spring and the subsequent attempt to oust the autocratic regime of Bashar al-Assad from power. Starting in March 2011, the war is now in its sixth year.<sup>1</sup> It has destabilized the region and brought untold human suffering to the civilian populace. The most current data has the death toll at 470,000, the externally displaced diaspora at 4,900,000, and the internally-displaced population at 6,300,000,<sup>2</sup> which equates to 11,670,000, over half the pre-war Syrian population of 22,000,000.<sup>3</sup> Almost twice as many Syrians are dead or displaced now as the total number of Jews that were exterminated by the Nazi regime during World War II.<sup>4</sup>

The conflict has emboldened religious extremist organizations, most notably Daesh (also known as the Islamic State [IS], the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], and the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant [ISIL]) and allowed them to maneuver freely and expand. The war pits the policies and strategic objectives of the U.S. against those of Russia, and allows the two regional powers

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of Iran and Saudi Arabia to use the conflict as a proxy war for regional hegemony.<sup>5</sup> Global trade markets have been affected; flagrant human rights violations have been committed; and no reasonable end is in sight. The international community is at odds with itself. Sensible and rational people argue over various means of involvement, engagement, and conflict resolution. The forced migration of millions of people attempting to flee the threat of bodily harm, human-rights violations, enslavement, and death is not just a regional destabilizing force and an ethical catastrophe, but a global

**...migration and resettlement can be used as an effective tool to reduce regional instability, conflict duration, and human suffering.**

blight of instability and a breeding ground for devolutionary societal constructs and liberties.

Building on the research and findings of Idean Salehyan with regards to refugees as a cause of conflict, this paper proposes that migration is not causal with regards to conflict outside of neighboring states and that migration and resettlement can be used as an effective tool to reduce regional instability, conflict duration, and human suffering. In developed countries, such as the U.S., where immigration now accounts for more than a third of the annual population increase, immigration of refugees is not just a good tool to reduce conflict in destabilized regions of the world but essential to economic, social, and human-capital recruitment and development.

Salehyan's work focuses exclusively on refugee crises and forced migration patterns. He states that there are four main causes of conflict or friction with regards to refugees:

1. Refugee migration can inflict an economic burden on host countries.
2. Refugees may entail negative public health consequences for their host countries.
3. Refugees may upset the ethnic balance in their host countries through what may be thought of as a "demographic" externality.
4. Refugee flows may directly affect the security and stability of the host country by contributing to organized armed conflict on the host's territory.<sup>6</sup>

Along with the refugees themselves, foreign fighters, arms, and ideologies that contribute to violence may stream across the border.

The wars in Iraq and Syria provide support to this argument. The available water supply in Syria was halved in the last decade in large part due to state mismanagement but also the absorption of approximately 1.5 million Iraqi refugees starting in 2004. The population's liberties were restricted, essential services were limited, upward mobility was practically nonexistent, and the state was failing to respond to the needs of the people.<sup>7</sup> The conflict in Syria has spilled over and destabilized its neighbor Turkey now as well. Turkey's negative attitude toward the Syrian regime and its support to radical Sunni Islamists groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria has also had a disturbing influence on the environment of its southern population centers:

Following the outbreak of war in Syria, Turkey was overwhelmed by an influx of refugees. The inadequacy of the support offered by Turkey to the refugees and the changes occurring in city life stemming from the waves of new arrivals, which have brought about feelings of unease among the local people, have paved the way for the exclusion of the refugees by the local people. The local inhabitants, who perceive these people as a threat to the security of their environment, have taken a hostile stance against them.<sup>8</sup>

Salehyan dissects the factors and variables that are tied to a refugee population and explains how those factors and not the actual refugees themselves are the cause for conflict:

Both refugee-sending and refugee-receiving states are more likely to initiate militarized disputes. More generally, the issues and actors in civil wars frequently span national boundaries and become part of a regional security nexus, blurring firm distinctions between domestic and international conflict.”<sup>9</sup>

Although Salehyan finds the refugee-producing states and refugee-receiving states might engage in conflict to stop refugees from entering their country, he notes “that while refugee flows may raise the probability of international conflict, not all refugee crises lead to an escalation of violence, and future research should take into account how policy responses can mitigate potential security risks.”<sup>10</sup>

Salehyan also claims that hegemonic states have a duty to help stabilize refugee populations to ensure regional stability, but often they do not: “Yet, powerful countries— most notably the United States—have been reluctant to resettle refugees from these conflicts, even though this could relieve the burden on regional hosts.”<sup>11</sup> The resettlement of refugees by powerful, hegemonic, or developed states is not a new undertaking. Between 1975 and 1990, over 2.5 million refugees from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East gained residence in the First World.<sup>12</sup> He takes the criticism further by calling out apparent policy hypocrisy. The refusal of the U.S. to admit sizable numbers of refugees significantly contrasts with the approach taken after the Vietnam War, when large numbers of refugees were resettled to prevent regional destabilization:

In 1975, the United States responded to the influx of 130,000 refugees with an aggressive, targeted program and, through

the following years continued this initiative with selective programs that responded to sporadic outflows of smaller groups. In 1979, the expanded U.S. commitment to resettle 14,000 refugees a month transformed the resettlement program from a relatively temporary program into a longer-term, institutionalized effort.<sup>13</sup>

This was not an easy undertaking and required effort, capital, and human resources, but the political will existed to execute the endeavor. As a result, roughly 750,000 refugees from Southeast Asia were resettled permanently in the U.S.<sup>14</sup> Similar resettlement efforts could significantly improve economic and security conditions in other volatile regions as well.<sup>15</sup> Forced migration and refugee crises occur disproportionately in the countries with the lowest standard of living and are prone to be caused by ethnic conflict.<sup>16</sup>

**Between 1975 and 1990, over 2.5 million refugees from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East gained residence in the First World.**

Salehyan and Kristian Gleditsch detail a similar list of factors that can cause refugee populations to increase the probability of conflict:

Refugees can change the ethnic composition of the host state; exacerbate economic competition; bring with them arms, combatants, and ideologies that are conducive to violence; and mobilize opposition directed at their country of origin as well as their host country.”<sup>17</sup>

There is rampant evidence of this to be true within the Syrian refugee populations in states bordering Syria. “Among the refugees who do not stay in the camps, there are many who

are poor and will work for very little, and this has affected the locals who can no longer find work.”<sup>18</sup>

**[Salehyan and Gleditsch]  
argue that conflicts do not  
just cause refugees, but that  
refugees can cause conflicts.**

Salehyan and Gleditsch argue that refugee populations can be causal with regards to regional violence clusters, which often is a result of conflict bleed over. This view puts a different perspective on the refugee/conflict relationship. They argue that conflicts do not just cause refugees, but that refugees can cause conflicts. “Thus, population movements are an important factor contributing to the regional clustering of violence and the diffusion of conflict.”<sup>19</sup> They do caution that the majority of refugees are not violent, do not seek violence, and do not engage in violence. “The vast majority of the world’s refugees never directly engage in political violence but are rather the unfortunate victims of it. Furthermore, most refugee hosts never experience armed violence.”<sup>20</sup>

The key distinction in their argument is that the key enabler of conflict with regards to refugee populations is the proximity of those refugees to their former host country:

We believe the most important factor in raising the risk of conflict is the presence of refugees from neighboring countries. Refugees from distant countries are less likely to have ethnic kin in the host country. They are also less likely to mobilize militarily, bring in arms, and concentrate in large numbers in particular areas. Accordingly, we do not expect the risk of civil war in the United States to be affected by the influx of refugees from Somalia, but Somali refugees could increase the risk of civil conflict in Ethiopia.<sup>21</sup>

Their analysis shows that a state’s probability of conflict both inter and intrastate increased from 3 percent to 10 percent when refugees were present.<sup>22</sup> They caution that although there is statistical correlation and arguable causation, the results are not earthshattering:

However, it is also clearly the case that the relationship between refugees and conflict is not a deterministic one. Although civil wars are more common in countries that are refugee recipients, the majority of cases in which a country hosts refugee populations are not violent.<sup>23</sup> We have shown that refugees from neighboring countries can increase the risk of intrastate conflict.<sup>24</sup>

Salehyan and Gleditsch also argue that turning away refugees is counterproductive:

Closing the border to refugees is, furthermore, likely to be a counterproductive response to refugee influxes. Despite the ethical problems with such an approach, restricting exit options, an alternative to fighting, may lead to the escalation of violence in neighboring states, which could yield even greater security risks.<sup>25</sup>

This paper builds upon these findings and looks at the effects of refugee migration outside their neighboring country and the effects on the gaining host country and analyzes and applies other cases of refugee migration and assimilation to dispel the common myth that refugees seamlessly merge into the multicultural melting pot of the U.S. My research indicates that refugee migration does cause friction, but it does not violate a tolerable level of violence. Evidence supports the positive impacts on host states that accept and assimilate refugee populations. This paper presents a coherent and logical argument that has policy implications with regards to accepting refugees.

## U.S. Historical Context and Lessons

The U.S. immigration and refugee policy is the product of two very different, engrained, and deeply-conflicting strands of American nationality identity. There exists a “‘cosmopolitan and democratic ideal of nationality,’ an optimism and faith in nation’s capacity for assimilation—a faith that remained fairly unshaken, at least through the early part of the nineteenth century.”<sup>26</sup> This view stands in stark contrast to the other view of American national identity commonly referred to as nativism, which is a belief that “...the important problems faced by the nation, and the threats to its survival and integrity, are not the result of internal causes, but of foreign influences from abroad.”<sup>27</sup>

This fear and loathing has been focused at many groups over the centuries to include communists, French Jacobins, anarchists, socialists, East Asians, Africans, Eastern Europeans, Italians, Germans, the Irish, Hispanics, and Muslims, just to name a few. There is hardly a demographic other than ethnically-pure Anglo-Saxons that at one point or another has not received widespread discrimination at the hands of nativists. Ironically, even Native Americans have suffered discrimination at the hands of nativists.

On the surface, it might appear that the migration of Germans to the U.S. seems devoid of the cultural incompatibility concerns that exist with modern Syrian refugees, but there are vast similarities. The German migrants were also refugees and were not a homogenous, docile, submissive, and easily assimilated people:

With the collapse of the liberal movement, so fateful for Germany and the world, a large number of the revolutionists migrated to the United States, many with prison sentences, or worse, hanging over their heads. It would be misleading to say that the majority in the tidal wave of German

immigration to America in the last half of the nineteenth century were intellectuals, university graduates, professional men, or members of the higher social classes. They were not.<sup>28</sup>

The migration of Germans to the U.S. was massive. From 1850 through 1900, 10,956,436 Germans immigrated to the U.S.—583,774 in 1850 and 2,663,413 in 1900.<sup>29</sup> Compare this to the total population of the U.S.—23,191,876 in 1850 and 76,212,168 in 1900.<sup>30</sup> In 1850, 2.5 percent and in 1890, 3.5 percent of the total U.S. population in the previous decade were German. As recently as 2014, 14.4 percent of the U.S. population or 46,047,113 individuals claimed German ancestry.<sup>31</sup>

**On the surface, it might appear that the migration of Germans to the U.S. seems devoid of the cultural incompatibility concerns that exist with modern Syrian refugees, but there are vast similarities.**

The German migrants were not as culturally, religiously, or ideologically compatible with Anglo-Americans as many now believe. There were stark cultural differences, especially among radical elements of the German population, known for social revolution and at times militant secularism:

The Forty-eighters ridiculed such American habits as rocking in chairs, chewing and spitting tobacco, standing up to a bar to down a drink, getting “eye-openers” each morning, wearing hats crooked, and sticking feet on tables and window sills. They were not impressed by the “anarchical noise” of Fourth of July or firemen’s parades, or by the muddy streets, the corrupt shirt-sleeve, tobacco cud politics of the cities, and the

“human bull fighting” known as pugilism. They preferred sausage and sauerkraut to pie and pork and beans. They were shocked to find slavery firmly established and nativism rampant in a free republic. They hated American sabbatarianism, blue laws, and “the temperance swindle,” and the more radical ridiculed what they called the religious superstitions of the American people. They were determined to preserve their language and customs and to resist assimilation to an inferior culture. In politics, they became “politically hyper-conscious,” and the flattery of American politicians, angling for votes, gave them a false sense of importance.<sup>32</sup>

**Both the Irish and German immigrants were forced to operate within a framework of society with distinct values and governmental structures...**

Until World War I, the second most-spoken language in the U.S. was German. Throughout the U.S. many classrooms in German-American enclaves taught exclusively in German or, at the very, least taught the lectures bilingually. It was not until after the Civil War that German-Americans really began assimilating:

The war record of the Germans greatly speeded their amalgamation with their fellow Americans, for their sacrifices on the battlefield quieted even the nativists, and their efforts in defense of the Union gave them a real sense of belonging to the American enterprise. Now they were entitled to consideration for political jobs, both elective and appointive, and each administration, beginning with Lincoln’s, paid its debt to the German element by distributing political spoils among their leaders.<sup>33</sup>

Once the nativists accepted the Germans, the process of assimilation and cultural merging could truly begin.

Irish immigration to the U.S. was equally massive. The Irish were the largest immigrant group in the U.S. in the 1840s totaling 45 percent of total immigration and second only to the Germans in the 1850s.<sup>34</sup> Irish refugees were also fleeing colonial persecution at the hands of England as well as death, disease, and famine in Ireland.

Most of the early Irish immigrants were Protestants.<sup>35</sup> A disproportionate number of them would settle in the cities, work in the factories, and serve as domestic servants. The Irish did not assimilate quickly or completely peacefully. Irish-Americans adopted and asserted their own ethno-nationalism in order to strengthen their collective identity and make their own way in the U.S., in spite of the nativists. They joined together collectively and formed gangs, unions, and secret societies to progress their agenda, influence, and power.

Both the Irish and German immigrants were forced to operate within a framework of society with distinct values and governmental structures:

From the outset the immigrants were drawn into the universalistic framework of American society, with its strong emphasis on formal criteria and achievement orientated status which helped to dissolve their own traditional grouping and patterns of life.<sup>36</sup>

The U.S. was built on the backs of these immigrants whose language, culture, and religious views often ran contrary to the nativists.

Societal constructs, cultural norms, values, and worldviews are malleable. All it takes is the right societal structures, immigration and assimilation system, and encoding of secular and liberal values. Eisenhart explains mechanisms and processes by which different groups assimilate or fail to. To facilitate

assimilation, the government must avoid a state where “immigrants continue to maintain a culturally closed and distinct community, based to a large extent on ascriptive (usually traditional) values, with little institutional change and intermingling with the formal economic and political structure.”<sup>37</sup> Irish and German immigrants resisted assimilation for so long by doing exactly what Eisenhower describes. The German’s migrated in bulk, lived in mass, and maintained their cultural homogeneity by distancing themselves from more native American populations. The Irish developed a counter culture to draw strength and extend their influence.

No population assimilates immediately or without friction, but the government structures and the American culture is strong and deep enough to absorb those that flee their homelands to seek a better life in the U.S. It has absorbed diverse populations from across the globe. The lack of persistent and intolerable levels of violence as a result of refugee acceptance is indicative of this success.

The history of U.S. refugee policy since the nineteenth century has ebbed and flowed between the forces of nativism and multiculturalism mixed with national security policy. Overcome by fear of population and labor saturation and fooled by a new science that claimed intelligence and other personal traits were inherited and racially based, the U.S. Congress enacted its first numerical controls on immigration.<sup>38</sup> “The 1924 national origins system was enacted to keep out what were described in the legislative records as “the innately inferior new immigrants of eastern and southern Europe.”<sup>39</sup>

After World War II concluded, a new tune developed as part of the Cold War and struggle against communism: “In welcoming and encouraging refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States foreign policy-makers saw the power and utility of evoking the national historical mission as a haven for

freedom-loving peoples.”<sup>40</sup> The Congress still balked at admitting refugees and mandated restrictions; nativism abounded in their halls. The executive branch was usually more liberal in its view of accepting refugees and saw it as a means to project and influence foreign policy. Essentially, if a refugee’s plight was in line with the U.S. national security policy and justifiable within the scope of the Cold War, the executive branch sought their admittance. Thus, a conflict between the two branches existed, but it was not unassailable.

The parole power, a small loophole in the Immigration and Nationality Act, became the major vehicle for refugee admissions until the 1980 Refugee Act. It was used for Hungarians in 1956, for Cubans in the 1960s and 1970s, and for Russian Jews and the Indochinese in the late 1970s. Hundreds of thousands of refugees were admitted under the parole power. Congress often balked and complained about this extraordinary exercise of power, but in each case, it conceded in the end.<sup>41</sup> The 1980 Refugee Act is now the law of the land and caps the admission of refugees to the U.S. at 50,000 per year, except for in emergency situations as deemed by the President.

**...the American culture is strong and deep enough to absorb those that flee their homelands to seek a better life in the U.S.**

## Ethics

With regards to admission of refugees, a state must ask two questions to determine the right course of action: “What is the ethical answer?” and “What is the pragmatic answer that best serves the interest of the state?” Ethics is “the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation.”<sup>42</sup> Ethical constructs help us face the dilemmas of life and, subsequently, determine how we are to act.

Humanity attempts to quantify and categorize right and wrong behaviors and thoughts through ancient texts, scholars, reason, logic, codes of conduct, law, cultural norms, and pragmatism.

As part of the international community, each state must determine what is more just with regards to the probable outcome of certain actions. The empirical evidence points to an increased probability of perpetual conflict in a region, which is further destabilized by a refugee crisis. Furthermore:

The easy availability of arms and smuggling networks allow for refugee “militarization.” Refugees can also pose economic burdens on their host states, many of which are already poor to begin with, explaining why so many countries do not want refugees semi-permanently settled. Communities of displaced people foster competition with the local population over scarce resources. They drive up prices for food, rent, and fuel, angering locals in the process. Terrorism scholars have found that refugee camps are fertile ground for recruitment, while activists have documented vast human rights violations both within camps and between refugees and local populations, especially concerning the trafficking of humans.<sup>43</sup>

**If a state can offer assistance to reduce human suffering and reduce the probability the conflict will spread, is it not ethical to act?**

If a state can offer assistance to reduce human suffering and reduce the probability the conflict will spread, is it not ethical to act? In a world that is growing more networked, more globalized, and more interdependent and where conflict spillover is no longer easily contained regionally, does it not behoove global powers to defuse the situation by all means necessary, to

include accepting refugees and asylum seekers?

## **The Irrational Fear of Poisoned Skittles**

Isolationist, xenophobic, and nationalistic fervor is on the rise. Identity politics is beginning to take center stage yet again. There is a growing concern among developed countries that change will lead to decline, a loss of national identity, and a gradual watering down of their cultures by multicultural influences. A narrative of ethno-purification is once again taking root in Europe and the U.S. The target audience of the vitriol is new, but the roots of this nativism run deep. Cummings and Lambert, using data from a 1992 National Election cross-sectional survey, found that:

Variations in support for tougher immigration restrictions were not systematically associated with actual or perceived levels of economic deprivation... the data showed a moderately high level of support for explanations of support for the exclusion of immigrants based upon simple prejudice and group stereotypes. Respondents showing the highest levels of support for tougher immigration policies also registered high levels of nationalistic and nativistic sentiment... tend to be somewhat pessimistic about the future, and some believe that their standard of living is slowly eroding.<sup>44</sup>

This nativism takes many forms and has varying degrees of extremism and logical irrationality. On April 17, 2017, Iowa U.S. Representative Steve King posted on Twitter that “We can’t restore our civilization with somebody else’s babies.”<sup>45</sup> This statement contradicts the reality of U.S. history. Furthermore, unless King is a Native American, he and his family are themselves “somebody else’s babies.” Cummings and Lambert conclude that, “variations in prejudice, nativism, and

learned-group stereotypes appear to explain current political ideas about immigration policy more effectively than theories premised upon labor market competition and conflict.”<sup>46</sup> This deduction helps to explain Donald Trump, Jr.’s September 19, 2017, Twitter post of a bowl of skittles with the caption, “If I had a bowl of skittles and I told you just three would kill you. Would you take a handful? That’s our Syrian refugee problem.” He further proclaimed that “This image says it all. Let’s end the politically correct agenda that doesn’t put America first. #trump2016.”<sup>47</sup> Is the fear of transnational terrorism and Trojan-horse-style attacks against the U.S. a real and tangible threat or an overly-exaggerated menace used by xenophobic nativists to betrumph the public?

Two authors from the Business Insider combined data from a 2016 report by the National Safety Council and a 2013 National Center for Health Statistics report on causes of death in the U.S. to compare the threats of terrorism to U.S. citizens to other causes of death.<sup>48</sup> According to their datum set, U.S. citizens have a 1 in 45,808 chance of being killed by a foreign-born terrorist and a 1 in 46,192,893 chance of being killed by a refugee terrorist. This is in stark contrast to other causes of death such as choking on food (1 in 3,409), motorcycle accidents (1 in 949), all other vehicular accidents (1 in 565), falling (1 in 133), and cancer or heart disease (both 1 in 7). A U.S. citizen is 264 times more likely to be killed by lightning than by a refugee terrorist.<sup>49</sup> Alex Nowrasteh used a larger data set and his probabilities were even more stunning:

Foreign-born terrorists who entered the country, either as immigrants or tourists, were responsible for 88 percent (or 3,024) of the 3,432 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end of 2015... including those murdered in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the chance of an American perishing in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil that was

committed by a foreigner over the 41-year period studied here is 1 in 3.6 million per year... the chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack caused by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year....<sup>50</sup>

### **A U.S. citizen is 264 times more likely to be killed by lightning than by a refugee terrorist.**

Terrorism is a threat and by very definition terrifying, but the cost of a threat should merit the benefit of a policy both with regards to lives saved, public money well spent, and economic costs. The irrational fear of terrorism is affecting refugee acceptance policy and driving the expenditure of billions of U.S. tax dollars annually:

The irrational fear of poisoned skittles has pushed the US legislature to the point that it... spends about \$100 billion per year seeking to deter, disrupt, or protect against domestic terrorism. If each saved life is valued at \$14 million, it would be necessary for the counterterrorism measures to prevent or protect against between 6,000 and 7,000 terrorism deaths in the country each year.... The total number of people killed by terrorists within the United States is very small, and the number killed by Islamist extremist terrorists since 9/11 is 19, or fewer than 2 per year.<sup>51</sup>

To be irrational with other people’s money and public policy is irresponsible. It is a dereliction of duty that cannot be justified by political pressure, bureaucratic constraints, or emotional drives. The irrational fear of “poisoned skittles” blinds the policymakers and general population at large from the tangible and intangible benefits of immigration. That immigrant is just as or more likely to develop a new vaccine or cancer treatment than to kill you.

Looking past the threat of terrorism, the perception that refugee acceptance and immigration will result in increased crime is also misguided. Research and the resultant literature shows that immigrants commit fewer crimes than native-born Americans.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, U.S. cities with sizable immigrant populations have lower crime rates than cities with negligible or non-existent immigrant populations.<sup>53</sup> In an article published last year Adelman et al. utilized census data from 1970 to 2010 for 200 randomly selected metropolitan areas and found that for murder, robbery, burglary and larceny, as immigration increased, crime decreased, on average.<sup>54</sup> The only crime that immigration had no impact on was aggravated assault. There are numerous explanations for why this trend exists, but the leading explanation is that immigration leads to revitalized urban neighborhoods, which creates economic growth and prosperity.<sup>55</sup> There

**Prominent economists have shown that immigrants bring a net gain to the overall U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).**

are a few studies, which run contrary to these findings and find that immigration leads to an increase in crime. As Adelman states: "...there were 2.5 times as many findings that showed immigration was actually correlated with less crime. And, the most common finding was that immigration had no impact on crime. The upshot? We find no evidence to indicate that immigration leads to more crime and it may, in fact, suppress it."<sup>56</sup> This runs contrary to the fear mongering and nativist narrative that immigrants bring blight and pestilence to the host country, but what is further damning is the research that shows the economic gain that is derived from refugee acceptance and immigration.

### **The Financial Benefits**

Some argue there is no economic benefit to

the arrival, integration, and potential assimilation of refugees. Refugees are demonized as being parasites on the social welfare state or worse yet, for competing with native labor and driving down wages. However, the empirical and academic literature paints a different picture. Refugees and immigrants do compete with native jobs and wages especially with regards to unskilled labor pools, but the net result to the state is positive in multiple ways:

Immigrants buy goods and services produced by American firms, increasing the demand for native workers; they can lower the price of services in many industries, such as construction, benefiting American consumers; and immigrant entrepreneurs open up firms, create jobs, and possibly make a large contribution to economic growth.<sup>57</sup>

Prominent economists have shown that immigrants bring a net gain to the overall U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Harvard economist George Borjas argues that a complete moratorium on U.S. immigration would cost \$35 billion annually. That figure only accounts for what is deemed the immigration surplus, which is the increase in American wages caused by immigration. Benjamin Powell took the work of Borjas and included the economic gains to the immigrants themselves and projects a moratorium on U.S. immigration would cost the \$229 billion annually.<sup>58</sup> Refugees to the U.S. account for a fraction of this total figure, but the logic stands, if not for refugees, the U.S. would have a decreased GDP and tax base.

Surprisingly, over time immigrants make more and work more than natives. Chiswick found that the initial earnings of newly-arrived immigrants were approximately 17 percent less than those of native-born workers. Chiswick deduced that at the time of arrival immigrants earn less than natives because of their lack of specific skills, such as language proficiency.

As immigrants acquire additional skills and accumulate country-specific human capital, they experience faster wage growth than native-born workers. He found that immigrant earnings surpass native earnings within 15 years after immigration. After 30 years of living in the U.S., a typical immigrant earns approximately 11 percent more than a native-born worker.<sup>59</sup> It has been found that refugees stand even further part in their success stories than economic immigrants:

In 1980 refugee immigrants in this cohort earned 6% less and worked 14% fewer hours than economic immigrants. Both had approximately the same level of English skills. The two immigrant groups had made substantial gains by 1990; however, refugees had made greater gains. In fact, the labor market outcomes of refugee immigrants surpassed those of economic immigrants. In 1990, refugees from the 1975-1980 arrival cohort earned 20% more, worked 4% more hours, and improved their English skills by 11% relative to economic immigrants. The higher rates of human capital accumulation for refugee immigrants contribute to these findings.<sup>60</sup>

The logic behind this distinction can be found in the ambition to attain what is deemed human capital. Human capital is made up of skills and abilities that allow a person to engage with and derive benefits from society. They are both intangible and tangible and include language proficiency, social skills, networking, and civil understanding. The argument asserts that refugees are unable to emigrate back to their homeland and thus have a longer time horizon in the host country. They are subsequently more inclined to invest in country-specific human capital. This line of reasoning suggests that refugee immigrants are more likely to assimilate to the earnings growth path of the native-born population.<sup>61</sup> Of equal importance is the finding

that: “The striking comparisons between refugee and economic immigrants are not attributable to any single country of origin or ethnic group.”<sup>62</sup> Thus, the benefits of accepting and absorbing refugees are not dependent on the specific culture. It should also be noted that the ages of refugees are not clustered and are more indicative of the average age demographics of their native country, whereas economic immigrants are concentrated between the ages of 18 and 35.<sup>63</sup>

**After 30 years of living in the U.S., a typical immigrant earns approximately 11 percent more than a native-born worker.**

There are attributes and factors of resettlement and integration that are more conducive to the overall success of the refugee migrant. The societal constructs and cultural norms of the refugee’s native state are factors. In 1961, Judith R. Kramer of Brooklyn College and Seymour Leventman of the University of Pennsylvania reported that nearly 90 percent of the third generation of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe attended college. This is even more impressive when one considers that the first generation had little or no education when they arrived in the U.S. The researchers concluded that emphasis on family and culture was held to be instrumental in this success.<sup>64</sup> The resettlement and assimilation program of the new host country was also indicative of refugee success rates. Their research finds that “those who participate in the labor force are significantly more likely to have been resettled by an American family”;<sup>65</sup> whereas, “refugees sponsored by their formerly-resettled relatives have a significantly lower rate of labor force participation.”<sup>66</sup> The number one most important variable was language proficiency: “English language proficiency for the entire refugee population positively influences labor force

participation.”<sup>67</sup> Various studies have found a positive relationship between language skills and immigrant success (Carliner, 1996; Chiswick, 1986, 1991, 1998; Chiswick and Miller, 1996; Funkhouser, 1995; Rivera-Batiz, 1990; Shields & Price, 2001). The assimilation process is a two-way street, and the refugee must exist in an accepting and native environment conducive to assimilation and acceptance. Refugees are incorporated into the U.S. through the interaction of social and economic relationships in local geographical areas and communities:

These various modes of incorporation distinguish one group from another not only on the basis of their different backgrounds or skills, but in terms of the resources they bring with them or can accumulate in the United States and, perhaps most importantly, that they confront in the hands of other groups and institutions that are already established in the United States.<sup>68</sup>

The interaction between the refugees and the native population is imperative for the success of the refugee. That relationship will influence not only the success of the refugee, but the length of time it takes for assimilation to occur as well.

**Nativists argue that accepting refugees will dilute, change, or conflict with American culture, government, and law.**

### **The Fallacy of Cultural Incompatibility**

Nativists argue that accepting refugees will dilute, change, or conflict with American culture, government, and law. The U.S. is a melting pot of cultures, religions, and ethnicities, and when cultures come into contact with each other, they are undoubtedly changed by the interaction. Over time, as people from distinct

backgrounds begin to intermingle, marry, and bear offspring, the mergers become something entirely new and distinct. Such is the nature of a heterogeneous society such as the U.S. A brief history of the U.S. with regards to the concept of cultural relativism will argue that the nativists are correct. The U.S. is and will be different in the future, just as it is a different state than at any other point in its history, which is something all Americans should be thankful for. It was not better in the good ole days.

The ethical code of cultural relativism maintains “that morality is grounded in the approval of one’s society—and not simply in the preferences of individual people... and hold[s] instead that moral values in fact change from society to society throughout time and throughout the world.”<sup>69</sup> This concept is borne out in the history of the U.S. The country and world we live in today is vastly different than it was in every preceding generation, and it bears the scars of the long march toward expanded liberty and equality.

When my German ancestors immigrated to Illinois in the 1830s, half of the U.S. considered the ownership of a person as their property perfectly moral, acceptable, and just. Slavery was not only a state-sanctioned practice enshrined within the U.S. Constitution, it was also upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. A series of legal opinions culminated in the 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford case. The justices found that Dred Scott was neither a citizen nor person, but property to be bought, sold, and treated as his owners saw fit. The justices also proclaimed that persons of African descent cannot be citizens under the U.S. Constitution. Slave owners that sought moral guidance apart from secular law and looked to religious texts found solace, not just in a complete lack of condemnation, but outright support for the institution of slavery.

Slaves, obey your earthly masters with deep respect and fear. Serve them

sincerely as you would serve Christ. (Ephesians 6:5 NLT).

Christians who are slaves should give their masters full respect so that the name of God and his teaching will not be shamed. If your master is a Christian, that is no excuse for being disrespectful. You should work all the harder because you are helping another believer by your efforts. (1 Timothy 6:1-2 NLT).

Arguments for slavery and indentured servitude in Illinois were not completely nullified until 1841 when Abraham Lincoln argued a case before the Illinois Supreme Court and established the important precedent that under the Illinois constitution all persons were presumed to be free.

When my ancestors from the Balkans immigrated to Missouri in the early 1900s, half of the U.S. population still lacked many of the basic rights and liberties we now take for granted. It was not until 1920 that women were allowed to vote after the 19th Amendment to the Constitution was finally ratified.<sup>70</sup> The fight for women's rights and equality under the law continued long after the right to vote was won and continues to this day to include legislation that granted equal access to professions, pay, and credit as well as protection against discrimination, abuse, and assault. It was not until the 1965 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Griswold v. Connecticut* that the state could no longer forbid the distribution of birth control to married women and the "right to privacy" was firmly articulated. It took another seven years for the same restrictions to be lifted for all women regardless of marital status with the 1972 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Eisenstadt v. Baird*.<sup>71</sup> The removal of these arbitrary restrictions finally granted women the ability to control the most fundamental decisions in their life and as William J. Brennan, Jr. clearly articulated, "If the

right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."<sup>72</sup>

My grandparents grew up in an America that included a government-imposed system of second-class citizenship on non-white Americans. This system subjugated an entire people to destitution and fear based solely on the color of their skin. It was not until my parent's generation that women were able to seek more equality in the workplace and at home. It was not until their adolescence that the American Psychiatric Association voted to remove homosexuality from the list of diagnosable mental disorders.<sup>73</sup> It was only seven years before my first child was born and only after extreme political pressure that Bob Jones University finally removed its ban on interracial dating.<sup>74</sup> My children and their generation will be the first to experience a U.S. where they can serve in any job in the military and marry whomever they want, regardless of their gender. These slow, but progressive achievements in human dignity, self-determination, and liberty were made possible by the unchaining of archaic cultural norms and religious law from society, in the pursuit of a more liberated and less bigoted system of governance and culture. Other cultures will assimilate into this system.

The U.S. system of governance is secular. The U.S. Constitution forbids the establishment of religion at all levels of governance, to include legislation that is based on or the result of excessive government entanglement in religious dogma or teaching. The legal system of the U.S. is conducive to all religions and cultures. insofar as the behavior of a person does not interfere with or infringe on another person's constitutionally protected rights. One can argue that in the U.S. you can "do what you will as long as it harms no one," with few exceptions to include the prevention of "self-harm" as in

the case of drug use. The Constitution enshrines the protection of personal rights and liberties to include speech, assembly, religion, due process, life, and liberty from slavery and indentured servitude.<sup>75</sup> As the U.S. and much of the liberal and secular-minded world has moved forward and progressed in time, the expansion of liberty, equality, and peace has followed suit.

**Any concern that Syrians will upturn and change the very fabric of the U.S. culture and legal system is a delusional fantasy...**

However, this is not true for much of the rest of the world and especially the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The MENA has a long and tumultuous history of autocratic regimes, both secular and theocratic. Small blips in time on the radar of the MENA that represent democracy and other liberal tenets are quickly overshadowed by military coups, religious extremism, despotism, dictatorship, or a combination of the above. Peaceful transitions of power, except within families, are hardly existent. It is within this context that the Arab Spring began. Across the MENA, discontent and grievances grew, followed by largely youthful protests against oppressive and liberty-restricting regimes. A combination of a more networked, educated, and disenfranchised generation cried out for more liberty and opportunity.

The failure of liberty to take root and expand within these states is not the fault of the people, but rather of the failed institutions, governments, and leaders. Without a proper framework, such as a secular constitution, legal system, and civic structures, the quest for liberty will not be achieved. Transplanting people from these failed states within a successful state, such as the U.S., will allow their human capital to take root and grow, and including Syrian refugees will be a

drop in the bucket of the overall U.S. population demographic. Any concern that Syrians will upturn and change the very fabric of the U.S. culture and legal system is a delusional fantasy:

Pew Research Center estimates that there were about 3.3 million Muslims of all ages living in the United States in 2015. This means that Muslims made up about 1% of the total U.S. population (about 322 million people in 2015), and we estimate that that share will double by 2050.... By 2050, the American Muslim population is projected to reach 8.1 million people, or 2.1% of the total population.<sup>76</sup>

It is the Syrian culture and religion that will ultimately be diluted and absorbed by the U.S. multicultural behemoth, not the other way around.

### **Syria: A Closer Look**

It is from within this framework that we must now peer deeper into the disaster of Syria. Syria, a predominately Islamic and Arabic-speaking state, is composed of several different ethnicities, religions, and language groups, all with varying degrees of religiosity. Ruled by Bashar al-Assad who took power in 2000, Syria has competing interests within the conflict, including pro and anti-government forces, as well as theocracy-minded and secular-seeking factions. Some groups are separatists while others are revolutionary. The result is a war-torn country where all have lost some and many have lost all.

Conflict forces people to make one of three decisions: stay and fight, stay and avoid fighting, or leave. No one wants to leave his or her home, family, possessions, and stability. Few people chose to put their lives on the line and fight unless they feel utterly compelled to. It is not a choice many make lightly. Few choose to leave, and fewer still have the means to leave. However, in Syria, where the conflict has gone

on for so long and the destruction is so epic, the rationale choice continues to sway more and more toward leaving. In interviews with Syrian refugees in the Jordanian based camp of Za'atari, Beehner found that:

The refugees who came to Za'atari, while certainly all different, share some common attributes. As mentioned before, they are largely middle-class families by Syrian standards—educated, though often heavily in debt. Most of the refugees were better off than those who remained in Syria, given how expensive it is to flee.... They all never thought they would have to move and only did so as a means of last resort. Well over half of those interviewed lost at least one family member or their home to the war, and often it is not just households but whole villages that relocate together.<sup>77</sup>

What does the empirical evidence tell us about refugee flows? Is this purely a humanitarian issue or a broader security concern with regards to Syria's neighbors, a regional problem, or even a global instability issue?

The neighboring countries of Syria have absorbed the majority of its externally displaced refugee population. The countries that have accepted the most Syrian refugees are Turkey (2,760,000); Lebanon (1,017,000), Jordan (655,000), and Iraq (228,000).<sup>78</sup> Not a single Arab Persian Gulf state has accepted a single refugee, which is not surprising and could be used to the U.S.'s advantage. The predominantly Sunni states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have an interest in a destabilized Iraq and Levant. Destabilized and anarchic territory allows for a battleground far from home to commence a proxy war against their Shiite adversary, Iran. Syria is not just a battlefield, but also a recruiting ground for converts and foot soldiers. The Gulf States are opposed to absorbing people that are not homogenous to their internal ethnicity, share their fervent

religious persuasion, and are liberty seeking. They cite "security concerns" for not admitting Syrian refugees, but it has more to do with their societal and closed citizenship structures.<sup>79</sup> The Persian Gulf States have thus far avoided and nullified the liberty-minded and freethinking movement of the Arab Spring. They want to maintain their autocracies and placate their internal populations with state oil revenues and targeted subjugation of their Shiite minority and migrant workers. The Arab Gulf states are part of the problem and cannot be relied upon to be part of the solution. Marginalizing their influence is the best course of action.

**Failure to relieve the stress of the humanitarian crisis from the pressure cooker of Syria will only prolong the war.**

## Conclusion

The U.S. and its liberal, democratic, and secular-minded allies must exert their influence in the Syrian conflict to reduce the rise of radical religious extremism, counter autocratic regimes, and stabilize the region. An element of that approach must be the absorption of refugees fleeing the conflict. Failure to relieve the stress of the humanitarian crisis from the pressure cooker of Syria will only prolong the war. The refusal to accept refugees risks expanding the conflict to Syria's neighbors. The conflict has already spilled over into Iraq. Daesh used the vacuum of power, freedom of maneuver, and increase in arms availability in Syria to bolster its forces and capture much of Iraq's territory. The presence of refugees in a country increases the probability of intra and interstate war in that country when the refugees come from a neighboring country. Any additional conflicts would only further destabilize the region, yield more death and destruction, and produce even

more refugees.

The U.S. has a vested interest in combating the theocratic influence of both Iran and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. has secular and liberal values, which run counter to the goals of the Ayatollah and the Wahhabis. Ignoring their influence, allowing them to expand it, and pretending that the U.S. values are in synch with them is dangerous. I, like most Americans, am descended from the poor, unskilled, peasant class of generations past and share more in common with the Syrian refugee than not. The U.S. is a nation of migrants and refugees that left autocracies, religious tyrannies, and persecution for a better life and liberty. All it takes is knowledge to combat ignorance and undue irrational fear coupled with the political will to act. The U.S. has absorbed and resettled refugees in the past successfully and can do again in the future.

Those states that turn their backs on the refugees will only embolden the religious extremists to target refugees to become their new foot soldiers, radicals, and suicidal bombers. The U.S. is a nation of 300,000,000 people that can readily absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees and assimilate them into American culture with ease and little demographic impact.

Refugees should be looked upon as human capital and a rare resource that would be indebted to their newfound motherland. The host country should view refugees as a cultural, military, educational, and intelligence-gathering asset. Combating the spread of religious extremism and theocratic tyranny is a war of ideas within the human domain more so than in the kinetic world of strikes and body counts. The U.S. should use every means at its disposal to spread its values both abroad and domestically.

Globalization and the technology that is driving its quickening pace are drawing the world's populations closer than ever. It affects refugees as well. Refugees are rational actors and are becoming well informed before and during their decision to flee their homeland. They are increasingly avoiding their neighboring countries and seeking asylum in more developed countries. This trend will likely accelerate as "the combined effects of the expansion of modern means of communication and closed political systems in many countries are expected to generate refugees, even in the presence of nominal peace, in the years to come."<sup>80</sup> The world is on the cusp of a new phase of human development as the distance between our neighbors continues to shrink. Liberty-seeking people will forever strive for and face extreme hardship when they are pushed to the breaking point. Such is the story of Eritrean refugees seeking admittance to the U.S., who reported hardships on the way, "including the rape of women, as in Libya; death in the deserts, as in the Sahara and Sinai; the risks of being taken hostages, as in the Sinai; and drowning in dangerous waters, as in the Mediterranean Sea."<sup>81</sup> Failure to acknowledge, accept, understand, and develop a means to adapt to this reality is not an option. Building concrete walls and other arbitrary barriers will do nothing but provide our descendants something to gawk at and study, just as Hadrian's Wall does for us today.

Darkness is the absence of light. One does not spread the light of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness by putting it in a box or building a wall around it. Allowing discontent to fester, the innocent to wallow in misery, and turning away those seeking liberty, empowerment, and equality is how the despots and tyrants of the world were empowered. The New Colossus must once again cry out across the ocean, **"Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"**<sup>82</sup> A failure to adapt, assimilate new patriots and spread the values of enlightenment and liberty will leave the U.S. weakened and forgotten in the dustbin of history. **IAJ**

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# Searching for a Win-Win-Win: Rethinking Energy Crisis Solutions in West Africa

**by Johnny J. Wandasan, Karie Hawk and Michael J. Cheatham**

***Access to electricity is fundamental to opportunity in this age. It's the light that children study by; the energy that allows an idea to be transformed into a real business. It's the lifeline for families to meet their most basic needs.***

**— Barack Obama**

**O**n March 9, 2017, venture magnate Elon Musk sent shockwaves through the energy production world. With a simple tweet, Musk accepted an unprecedented challenge from fellow billionaire Michael Cannon-Brookes in response to rolling blackouts experienced in South Australia—100 megawatts (mW) of power installed and working 100 days from contract or it is free. In the U.S., where electricity is a ubiquitous commodity, Musk's bold assertion garnered a mild reaction. However, the implications of Musk's system to provide clean, renewable, and affordable energy should not be understated. Power diffusion of electricity-producing technology is an essential element to meeting modern energy needs and achieving U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) goals.

The U.S.'s desire for a stable Africa is a consistent NSS theme. Shaping Africa's stability ensures foundations for peace, security, prosperity, and improved democratic governance and the rule of law in a dynamic region. The U.S. employs a variety of foreign aid hard and soft power instruments to

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achieve its interests. In vulnerable regions within Africa, soft power—the ability to influence others to do what is in our interests without the use of “sticks” and “carrots” associated with traditional national instruments of power—is more advantageous to gaining and maintaining a positive U.S. narrative than traditional hard power. A prime example of innovative U.S. soft power in Africa is the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) efforts to increase energy production in the West African nation Liberia.

**In vulnerable regions within Africa, soft power... is more advantageous to gaining and maintaining a positive U.S. narrative than traditional hard power.**

The “Liberia Compact” is a \$257 million, Liberia-focused, MCC-led effort designed to encourage economic growth and reduce poverty in Liberia through three separate but mutually-supportive goals: enhance power generation; strengthen the capabilities of sector investment planning, asset management, and regulatory and social institutions; and support the development of policymaking institutions as the sector modernizes and becomes more commercially viable.<sup>1</sup> In Liberia, MCC’s main effort focuses on funding the rehabilitation of the Mt. Coffee Hydroelectric Plant to increase power production and access and to decrease energy tariff costs. In comparison to its African state peers, Liberia lags behind in energy production, accessibility, and cost per kilowatt-hour (kWh).

The need for vastly improved infrastructure and reduced tariffs in Liberia is obvious. Excessive energy costs limit nearly all other aspects of modern progress including medical care, education, and industry. MCC’s efforts serve both the interests of the U.S. and the needs of Liberia. The MCC-Liberia partnership—the

Liberia Compact—is win-win. However, with Musk’s recent revolution in energy affairs, MCC should reevaluate its current and future energy compacts. The advancements and availability of energy production and storage technologies open previously impractical opportunities for MCC to expand U.S. soft power influence, support innovative U.S. technology maturation with private/public partnerships, and expedite affordable energy production solutions in weak states—a win-win-win.

This article examines the relationships between U.S. interests, Liberia’s self-interests, private sector innovation, and MCC’s approach to soft power. It briefly outlines background information of Liberia’s current state, MCC and its ongoing efforts, and Musk’s SolarCity company. Five core questions guide the discussion to determine if private industry-led innovations in new, hybrid solar/battery technologies should be the primary MCC energy-production solution in Africa:

- What current Liberia conditions drive the need for MCC assistance?
- What is MCC, its capabilities, and intent?
- What is the Liberia Compact and its intent?
- What is SolarCity, and how could its technology aid MCC efforts?
- Should technological advancement guide MCC operations?

## **Liberia’s Current State**

Liberia, like most of Africa, is on the rise but well behind the rest of the modern world in many respects. With an estimated gross domestic product of just \$3.881 billion and a 2 percent economic real growth rate, Liberia struggles to sustain the basic human needs of its 4.3 million population.<sup>2</sup> Liberia is unable to sustain itself economically under its own weight and relies heavily on foreign assistance.

While Liberia boasts large freshwater reserves, mineral resources, and other natural resources, it lacks the infrastructure to capitalize on them. Leading up to 2005, civil war, political infighting between native Liberians and descendants of former slaves, and government mismanagement steadily degraded or destroyed what limited infrastructure existed. Despite a steady economic build-up over the next decade, the recent Ebola crisis wiped out most gains and forced the government to abandon public investments to support disease prevention. Liberia's economic development is caught in a revolving door and is struggling for survival. Fortunately, U.S. NSS interests in Africa and historic ties to Liberia make the U.S.-Liberia partnership a natural endeavor. However, determining where and how to provide assistance to Liberia is a difficult task.

Although simplistic, Maslow's classic Hierarchy of Needs Theory offers a basic lens to understand Liberia's current state. Organized into a pyramid, Maslow's theory asserts there are five basic human needs placed in an ascending order of precedence. Survival needs such as oxygen, water, food, heat, and sleep form the first basic tier. The second tier requires safety needs such as protection, law and order, stability, and safety. Tiers three, four, and five are social and self-interested characteristics born from a stable pyramid base. Through Maslow's lens, Liberia is foundering in the riptide between tiers one and two—physical and safety needs.

U.S. foreign aid targets Maslow's tiers one and two. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports tier one and two concerns generally; MCC targets tier two improvements specifically. Tier one activities are essential for survival but do not solve the problems driving foreign assistance needs. For Liberia, the focus on tier two activities—specifically energy production—is of greatest importance long-term to help it not just survive, but thrive.

Energy production is a missing link between Liberia's current state and future economic prosperity. Liberia's current total power production is a paltry 335-mW.<sup>3</sup> Reliability and access to what energy is available are far from stable. The Liberian power grid experiences frequent blackouts, and what businesses remain in country frequently rely on solitary diesel generators that drive energy operating costs substantially higher. Even more surprising, current estimates indicate only about 2 percent of Liberians have access to the electric grid.<sup>4</sup> Liberia's low power production should not be understated. Arkansas, a U.S. state relatively proportional in land mass and population to Liberia, generates more than 4,200 mWh of electricity per year at an average cost of \$0.08 per kWh.<sup>5</sup> However, access to power alone is not enough to create change. Liberians with electric grid access have only a limited advantage over those who do not.

**Energy production is a missing link between Liberia's current state and future economic prosperity.**

Although average effective electricity tariffs in Africa hover around \$0.14 per kWh, the Liberian electricity tariff remains above \$0.52 per kWh. The cost difference is significant, especially when coupled with the stunningly-low living wages of Liberia. The official United Nations threshold for extreme poverty is less than \$1.90 per day.<sup>6</sup> In Liberia, 84 percent live on less than \$1.25 per day, averaging \$434 annually.<sup>7</sup> At the current state, Liberians who gained access to electricity are unlikely to afford it.

The need for vastly improved infrastructure and reduced energy tariffs is evident. Excessive energy costs limit nearly all aspects of modern progress including medical care, education, and industry. However, Liberia lacks the resources

to create significant change unilaterally. Liberia relies on two external forces for change—power diffusion and foreign assistance.

Power diffusion of technology, such as the 1,000 percent drop in technology costs from the 1970s to today, applied to energy production is a predictable, long-term tendency. Over the past 25 years, new technologies, such as wireless devices, went from unaffordable to ubiquitous—even to Liberians. Liberians who struggle financially and physically have access to cellular technologies unimagined 30 years ago.<sup>8</sup> The potential for power-producing technology to become instantly accessible by the poorest of countries is not likely, but we are seeing a power diffusion transformation taking place now.

**Until energy production experiences drops in technology costs similar to the cell phone, Liberia must rely on foreign assistance.**

Until energy production experiences drops in technology costs similar to the cell phone, Liberia must rely on foreign assistance. For the needs of Liberia, U.S. foreign assistance in the form of the MCC offers a viable alternative to simply meeting survival needs. By targeting the right projects at the right times, MCC is leading a small change that has big implications for a fledgling country.

### **MCC Capabilities and Intent**

In January 2004, bipartisan Congressional support paved the way for the formation of a foreign assistance program aimed at fighting global poverty through the principles of sound policies, ownership and accountability for approved country partners, and measurable outcomes.<sup>9</sup>

The process for receiving U.S. assistance through the MCC is comprehensive, and the

programs are scalable.

In providing aid to the most impoverished countries across the globe, the MCC considers the commitment of potential candidates to improving their country's conditions in the following three areas: 1) democratic governance, 2) investments in its people, and 3) economic freedom as measured by different policy indicators.<sup>10</sup> To be considered a candidate, several other evaluation criteria apply.

Each year, MCC's Board of Directors evaluates all low-income countries and lower-middle income countries. For consideration for assistance, MCC defines low-income countries as the 75 countries with the lowest gross national income (GNI) per capita, and lower-middle income countries as all remaining countries with a GNI per capita that is lower than the World Bank's threshold for upper-middle income countries. Only countries that meet these income tests and are otherwise eligible to receive assistance under the laws of the U.S. are considered candidates for MCC assistance.<sup>11</sup>

Based on the rigorous assessment that the MCC conducts for prospective countries, two forms of grants are provided when partnerships are approved. The most robust grants offered are known as "compacts," which are grants that entail a five-year maturation period for the execution of large-scale projects for those countries that meet the MCC's requirements for eligibility.<sup>12</sup> Not meeting the rigorous standards does not automatically disqualify a country from being an MCC recipient. In this instance, smaller grants, known as "threshold programs," are offered to assist countries that demonstrate a commitment to improving their policies toward the three considerations and are close to meeting eligibility requirements.<sup>13</sup>

Attaining MCC partnership eligibility for compacts or threshold programs is an important first step. However, as a way to ensure accountability and continued commitment to democratic values, MCC continues to monitor

and evaluate engaged countries during both the development and execution of these programs.<sup>14</sup> Failure of a country's reform and policy efforts to increase good governance carries a range of implications. Warnings may be issued, and suspension or termination of eligibility for MCC programs may result.<sup>15</sup> However, countries that show consistent improvement may become eligible for compact renewal.<sup>16</sup> The signing of a compact with Liberia in October 2015 is among MCC's recent success stories.

## **Liberia Compact**

A liberalist approach to the international system undergirds the current NSS. Through this lens, the U.S. grand strategy depends on active involvement with the international system's political and economic self-interests. Active engagement fosters internal stability within weaker states and grows interdependence. Interdependence between states shapes conditions for peace and regional stability consistent with U.S. interests.

Besides virtuous reasoning, why should the U.S. care about Liberia? In an era punctuated by terrorism, growth of peers and near-peers, and burgeoning federal spending deficits, the U.S. government's support to Liberia through the MCC is a suitable approach, given that critics of assistance there view Liberia as a "peripheral" U.S. security interest.<sup>17</sup> Across the spectrum of U.S. national interests, peripheral implies that resources should be applied judiciously. As an instrument of U.S. government soft power, the MCC is a proven model for advancing democracy and U.S. values abroad in a cost-effective manner that bolsters self-sustaining growth in partnered nations.

The Liberia Compact between the U.S. and Liberia is codified in a 50-page document that outlines the funding protocols and expectations of both governments toward their goal "to reduce poverty through economic growth in Liberia (the "Compact Goal")."<sup>18</sup> The Liberia Compact

is a \$257 million grant that covers four major areas to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth: 1) funding for the rehabilitation of the Mt. Coffee Hydroelectric Plant, 2) developing a training center for technicians in the electricity sector, 3) supporting the creation of an independent, energy-sector regulator, and 4) providing development support for an approach to nationwide road maintenance.<sup>19</sup>

**...the Liberia Compact supports the two key U.S. initiatives of supporting Ebola recovery efforts and furthering the "Power Africa" initiative...**

In fulfillment of MCC's principled approach, the Liberia Compact supports the two key U.S. initiatives of supporting Ebola recovery efforts and furthering the "Power Africa" initiative in the region. Still recovering from the Ebola outbreak in 2014, Liberia continues to receive support from the U.S., and access to electricity is key to sustaining this effort.<sup>20</sup> The completion of the Mt. Coffee Hydroelectric Plant restoration will also enable expanded participation in "Power Africa," a 2013 Obama administration initiative.<sup>21</sup> The MCC expects that the Liberia Compact will benefit over 460,000 people over the next two decades.<sup>22</sup> This number could be higher, and MCC's goals could be accomplished sooner, however, if funding and resources were invested in more current innovations that leverage cutting-edge technologies and capitalize on greater efficiencies in power generation and storage. SolarCity is an example of one such corporation that can offer the MCC access to expedited timelines and reduced costs in achieving its program goals and objectives in Liberia.

## SolarCity: Background and Technology

SolarCity began as an idea conceived by billionaire Elon Musk, who saw opportunity in providing cost-effective and highly-efficient solar-panel systems that incorporate battery-pack technologies direct to consumers.<sup>23</sup> Peter and Lyndon Rive, both cousins of Musk, co-founded SolarCity Corporation in 2006 and leveraged access to low-priced solar panels to gain initial successes in the photovoltaic industry.<sup>24</sup> Over the years, SolarCity would become the first in the industry to provide an all-in-one, direct to consumer, photovoltaic system solution that integrates design, sales, financing, installation, monitoring, and other services.<sup>25</sup> The company's investments toward in-house production of solar panels enabled significant growth, which increased further after Musk's company, Tesla, acquired the company in 2016.

**SolarCity founded the Give Power Foundation to expand and leverage the use of clean energy technologies to improve the quality of life for people living in underdeveloped and impoverished communities.**

In August 2016, Tesla shareholders approved a proposal by Musk to acquire SolarCity and merge the two companies to allow them to scale both battery and solar-panel system operations.<sup>26</sup> This conglomeration availed access by SolarCity to cutting-edge, energy-storage systems by Tesla. Successful collaboration with Panasonic on a battery pack known as “Powerwall” resulted in Tesla producing a game-changing, energy-storage device that is currently without any near-peer competition.<sup>27</sup> On average, the “Powerwall 2” has a 5 kW greater capacity and costs approximately \$800 less per kWh to operate than

its current nearest competitors, while including an integrated inverter at a competitive price point.<sup>28</sup> “Powerwall” is billed as “a completely automated system that installs easily and requires no maintenance.”<sup>29</sup> It will be only a matter of time before this technology finds application in the nonprofit segment of SolarCity's operations. Since December 2013, SolarCity has been supporting efforts by the United Nations to fight climate change and ensure that people around the globe have access to electricity by 2030 through the company's “Give Power Foundation.”<sup>30</sup>

SolarCity founded the Give Power Foundation to expand and leverage the use of clean energy technologies to improve the quality of life for people living in underdeveloped and impoverished communities.<sup>31</sup> The Give Power Foundation focuses on sectors that are essential for bolstering stability, security, and good governance. The seven objective areas include water, food, health, education, conservation, economic development, and telecommunications.<sup>32</sup> Access to solar-power applications is at the center of these efforts.

The Give Power Foundation started with a commitment that for every mW of residential solar power installation sold by SolarCity in 2014, the Give Power Foundation would donate a solar-power and battery-pack system to a school without access to electricity, beginning with communities in Haiti, Mali, Malawi, and Nepal.<sup>33</sup> Achieving similar success with expansion and growth as its for-profit segment, SolarCity's Give Power Foundation has expanded its philanthropy beyond these initial four countries. Today, the organization has benefitted developing communities around the world in 13 countries, bringing power to 1,500 schools and benefitting over 200,000 people.<sup>34</sup>

The alignment of Tesla, SolarCity, and the Give Power Foundation could mean a brighter future for the communities of West Africa. Enabled by the energy conglomerate's technologies, the Give Power Foundation

continues to expand its efforts through two main types of partnerships. The first partnership type is the “Funding Partner,” which consists of both “Power Partners,” who sponsor projects from one of the seven sectors and “Signature Partners,” who fund entire projects.<sup>35</sup> The second partnership type consists of “Program Partners,” who are individuals or organizations that nominate projects that could be “strengthened by clean technology” and is “relevant to the community.”<sup>36</sup> The Give Power Foundation has completed philanthropic work in the West African nations of Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal.<sup>37</sup> Successes at home are exportable abroad, and a proof-of-concept for large-scale, grid-connected, and reliable power-generation solution exists on the U.S. west coast in Ontario, CA.

To reduce reliance on fossil fuels, Tesla worked with utility company California Edison to complete the Mira Loma substation, regarded as among the largest energy-storage facilities in the world.<sup>38</sup> The impressiveness of the storage capacity resulting from this project is perhaps paralleled by the short amount of time needed to complete the project. The planning and building of this 1.5-acre project took only six months to complete and can provide 80 MWh of power to the city.<sup>39</sup> Beyond speed and capacity, advances in technology are making solar farms similar to Mira Loma more expedient. Evidentiary is the offer by Musk to build, in under four months, a battery farm capable of producing 100 MWh.<sup>40</sup> For organizations like MCC looking for a cost-effective approach to the application of soft power for peripheral interests, Tesla offers a viable option to increase access to energy in developing nations.

## **Future MCC Outlook**

The future of MCC should include modifications to its current compacts. If MCC is unwilling to modify its current compacts, then at the very least it should consider adding new

compacts regarding the rapid advancements in technology as a way forward. As a soft power tool, it makes sense to achieve the goals of the NSS as expeditiously as possible to stabilize low and lower-middle income countries.

**...Liberia is on the verge of a revolution facilitated over a period of 20 years...**

On its current trajectory with MCC, Liberia is on the verge of a revolution facilitated over a period of 20 years; however, that revolution is complicated by weak government and the growth and expansion of terrorism. A new compact through partnership with Tesla, SolarCity, and Give Power Foundation can expeditiously aid that revolution while combatting weak governance and instability by advancing technology and clean energy alternatives similar to Mira Loma. This clean energy solution via battery-enabled solar power can assist Liberia to achieve such exponential leaps in the future that the once impossible are now possible. There are numerous advancements that can benefit Liberia and ultimately improve the overall standard of living for its society as a whole.

One of the most important factors Liberia faces is the increased ability to foster expanded educational opportunities. Research shows a direct correlation between increased education and increased wages. Increased wages boost and stabilize the economy. Those who seize the opportunity to become more educated will be immediately invest in Liberia’s economic growth. Those who do not choose to seek higher education still benefit because they are embedded in a society that is increasing its knowledge base. A rising tide raises all boats.

Better incomes also increase standards of living. Increased standards of living are evident in the advancements in technology. Having educated and certified engineers leads to

building more medical facilities. Trained and qualified medical staff and personnel increases care. Increases in infrastructure boost capabilities to provide simple preventative care, such as refrigerated vaccinations, or fight complex diseases such as Ebola.

Advancement in technology and partnerships—which begins with MCC partnering with Tesla, SolarCity, and Give Power Foundation—brings Liberia full circle. Technology begets technology. All parties involved win by creating stabilization of the nation through the development and support of an independent electricity sector, economy, and government.

## **Conclusion: Creating a Win-Win-Win**

The impact of adopting a battery- and solar-powered alternative for the economy is favorable and creates a win for both Liberia and the U.S. As a result of increased education and educational opportunities, the economy in Liberia will increase and stabilize the government and protect it from being vulnerable to other state and non-state actors operating within the region. The economy in the U.S. is furthered through peaceful economic relations as well as through the SolarCity employees who manufacture systems, train Liberians on system usage, install new systems, and reclaim old ones for refurbishment.

Battery-solar power can create jobs. As an example, the Ivanpah Solar Power Facility—the world’s largest solar-thermal power station—was developed by Brightsource and Bechtel and is estimated to “involve some 1,000 jobs at the peak of construction, 86 permanent jobs, and total economic benefits of \$3 billion.”<sup>41</sup>

Hydropower generation through MCC’s current plan to renovate the Mt. Coffee Hydroelectric Plant will lead to these same ends. However, time is a factor—and its plan is staged to achieve this over a 20-year period. It is possible that the terrorist organizations operating within the area, such as Boko Haram, could grow and negatively impact the populous within that timeframe. Implementing the same capability to foster climate growth and change in an expeditious manner with SolarCity and Musk’s ambition would offer the ability for stability within the government and economy. It creates a more timely win, allowing Liberia to achieve stability sooner—in perhaps 1–5 years.

Besides boosting the economy of Liberia and creating stability within the nation in a timely fashion, there is the other aspect of creating a win fiscally for both Liberia and the U.S. Manufacturing battery- and solar-powered systems is possible at costs less than that currently invested in the Mt. Coffee Hydroelectric Plant rehabilitation project. The end result of clean solar energy is long-term affordable energy to Liberians, especially since there are no manufacturing costs or refurbishing costs.

A solar-energy consortium project between West African nations implemented by MCC, in cooperation with private industry corporations such as Tesla, SolarCity, and Give Power Foundation, would be much more advantageous to create stability, energy security, national security, and subsequent secondary and tertiary effects on political, military economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time/sewage, water, electric, academics, trash, medical, security (PMESII-PT/SWEAT-MS) throughout the region. By reassessing its current Mt. Coffee Hydroelectric Plant compact or creating a new compact with regard to advancements in technology, MCC will be able to better exercise its soft power capabilities throughout Liberia. Time factors into the equation to offer stability, energy independence, and security as expeditiously as possible. MCC should look toward the future through advancing technology not only to achieve NSS goals within Liberia, but also throughout the West Africa region. **IAJ**

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# New Foreign Policy Capability

**by Robert D. Payne III**

On September 5, 2017 Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, in an attempt to achieve positive effects in the strategic narrative of the war there, dropped thousands of leaflets hoping to inspire support for Coalition efforts among the majority ambivalent population. What happened was the exact opposite, a direct attack on the largest U.S. base in the country.

“The U.S. military in Afghanistan apologized Wednesday for distributing leaflets featuring an image “highly offensive” to Muslims. The leaflets dropped Tuesday night over parts of Parwan province showed the Shahada, the Muslim profession of faith, printed on the image of a dog, an animal viewed by many Muslims as unclean...After the leaflet drop, a Taliban suicide bomber blew himself up Wednesday outside a base used by American forces, wounding four civilians.”<sup>1</sup>

Once again, western forces are causing self-inflicted wounds by ceding critical ground in the strategic narrative space of warfare to its enemy. It does not matter how many times the U.S. destroys an ISIS stronghold or kills a Taliban key leader so long as the people the U.S. is attempting to support see the U.S. as the cause of all their turmoil reinforced by the U.S.’s own messaging. Now is the time for the United States to ask itself why it appears to be incapable of accomplishing most of its major foreign policy goals. The answer might be that those institutions created to execute a foreign policy agenda, primarily the State Department and Department of Defense, are no longer adequate to effectively accomplish what is needed.

The National Security Act of 1947 was created to aid the President during the post-WWII/Cold War era by establishing the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and subsequently various national intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The 1947 National Security Act was a response to a threat environment that was remarkably distinct from the pre-WWII era. While the end of the Cold War might have necessitated some updates to the

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**Figure 1. A photograph of the leaflet distributed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan on September 5, 2017.<sup>2</sup>**

overarching guidance from 1947, the future threat environment during the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies was simply too obscure to comprehend. Therefore, instead of anticipation, threat reaction became the standard operating procedure.

Today, there are four inarguable realities President Trump has to recognize when implementing his foreign policy agenda:

1. The United States has proven incapable of ending conflicts in the Middle East after fifteen years of sustained combat.
2. The State Department has proven incapable of securing peace agreements with key actors influencing the current conflicts in Ukraine, Korea, and the Middle East.
3. The Department of Defense overwhelms the Department of State in terms of international influence, due to its robust international presence and significantly greater funding.
4. The Department of Defense is currently

more involved than ever before in social issues such as climate change, human rights, and humanitarian aid/development efforts.

This article seeks to address how future administrations can reconcile the four challenges presented. It presents a historical analysis of how warfare has changed and why that change has resulted in sixteen straight years of conflict in the Middle East without an end in sight. It then presents a historical analysis of previous generations' attempts to reform the national security structure culminating in the success of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reform act. Finally, it presents what a new national security structure might look like and how it can address the four challenges presented.

## **The Power of Narrative in Warfare**

What is the power of narrative in warfare? Narratives have dominated American politics for decades as the evolution of media capability and campaign tactics evolved. However, in a narrative dominated environment where “facts”

matter less than the “truths” that reinforce a preconceived belief, it is the narrative of warfare that is proving to have the most significant impact on global events today. Europe is experiencing a massive identity crisis resulting from the massive refugee migration resulting from turmoil in Syria born out of Iraq. Afghanistan is once again a toss-up with the resurgence of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. The common link between all these is a narrative: the “West” vs Islam. What the September leaflet incident demonstrates is that western militaries, and especially the U.S. military leading efforts across the Middle East, are currently incapable of positively impacting or countering the prevailing strategic narrative and thus incapable of winning modern wars.

This is not the first generation to face a challenge of this nature and it does not mean that all is doomed. What it does mean is that a new method of fighting war must be developed and with it a new institutional framework free from the intellectual chains of the past thirty years of warfare. The Truman administration was faced with a new nuclear world void of traditional European leadership. The Regan administration was faced with a numerically superior Russian threat and decades of inefficiency within the Department of Defense. What is required today is no different than what was required then, a new National Security Act that redefines the tools of national security within the Executive Branch and empowers the Commander and Chief to employ those tools in a way that wins the peace, not just a battle.

In 2011 the world witnessed the popular uprising against several Middle Eastern and North African regimes. This event has since been labeled “the Arab Spring.” These groups were not organized militias, but rather the civil body who leveraged their social networks to unite and mobilize:

Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” is the first popular uprising to topple an established

government in the Middle East and North Africa since the Iranian revolution of 1979; it’s also the spark that ignited and inspired other revolutions in the region. It unfolded in three phases: First, on December 17, 2011, a young Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in hopelessness and to protest his treatment at the hands of the authorities.... A brutal security crackdown followed, reported in chocking details by online social media. Second, when protests reached the capital, Tunis, the government responded with even more brutality.... Lastly, the President, Zine el-Abidin Ben Ali... promised to create 300,000 jobs, but it was too late; protesters now just wanted the regime to

**...a new method of fighting war must be developed and with it a new institutional framework free from the intellectual chains of the past thirty years of warfare.**

fall and its President stripped of any power. On January 14, Ben Ali and his family fled the country taking refuge in Saudi Arabia. This act marked the end of one of the Arab world’s most repressive regimes. It was a victory for people power and perhaps the first time ever in history that an Arab dictator has been removed by a revolution rather than a coup d’état.<sup>3</sup>

The key takeaway is that a lightly armed popular uprising overthrew an oppressive government. What was the catalyst for this action? What drove the behavior of so many people to change their daily actions from accepting or tolerating the government’s control? While there were surely multiple factors, the narrative of one common man’s tragic end was the spark. It was a credible story of an oppressed man’s unwillingness to take more oppression. It was logical that he was

incapable of fighting the government. It was an emotional story of a man who sought a painful death rather than subject himself to the pain of government oppression. That powerful narrative lit the region on fire.

## **Narrative's Dominate Role in War Outcomes**

What is war and how has narrative taken such a dominant role in its success or failure? Carl Von Clausewitz described war as a paradoxical trinity whose first component is primordial violence kindled by the passion of the people.<sup>4</sup> For the U.S. and Western societies this passion for violence was drastically diminished following August 1945. The Enola Gay dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, killing 70,000 people followed by the Bockscar,

**The social order and tolerance for war changed as a result of nuclear weapons, raising the significance of narrative space in warfare.**

which dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, August 9, killing 80,000 more people. In the coming years, tens of thousands of people died from the radiation fallout and exposure to the blast. Subsequently, not a single nuclear weapon has been employed against another state or non-state actor. The social order and tolerance for war changed as a result of nuclear weapons, raising the significance of narrative space<sup>5</sup> in warfare. Following World War II, the following three societal changes set the stage for the rise and importance of narrative's space in warfare: the threat of nuclear war, a change of political representation, and the desire to contain the violence of nuclear weapons through the practice of limited war. Today, the current conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria demonstrate narrative's importance to the state of warfare.

## ***Total War/Threat of Nuclear War***

Prior to the use of atomic bombs, total war theory (meaning civilians are legitimate targets with the intent of breaking their will to end the war quickly and the accepted use of all available weapons to achieve the desired end of the war) dominated military thought. The theory of total war for the following discussion is not attributed to any single theorist's prescription of total war, but rather accepts that whole societies are an acceptable target for military gain. The U.S. Civil War is one conflict that illustrates total war. General Ulysses S. Grant directed General William T. Sherman to attack the Confederacy's heartland and cut off their lines of communication to deny the Confederates desperately needed war resources. When marching into Alabama, General Sherman issued a warning to the residents:

The government of the United States has in North Alabama any and all rights which [it chooses] to enforce in war, to take [Confederate] lives, their houses, their lands, their everything, because they cannot deny that war exists there, and war is simply power unconstrained by constitution or compact.<sup>6</sup>

Following the American Civil War, the Industrial Revolution continued to increase war's destructive capability. Likewise, military theory in Western nations continued to accept little distinction between civilians and soldiers during war. When World War I occurred there were roughly ten million civilian deaths.<sup>7</sup> Despite this monumental loss of life total war theory did not drastically change as the dominant way to execute warfare.

In the time between World War I and World War II Italian General Giulio Douhet wrote his theoretical work on the potential impact of aerial capabilities in war titled, *Command of the Air*. Douhet's predictions of air power's effects were largely validated during World War II in

the aftermath of the atomic bombs. As Douhet wrote: “aerial warfare admits of no defense, only offense. We must therefore resign ourselves to the offensives the enemy inflicts upon us, while striving to put all our resources to work to inflict even heavier ones upon him.”<sup>8</sup> Although Douhet did not discernibly foresee nuclear bombs, they nonetheless personified the formidable power he predicted:

[T]ake the center of a large city and imagine what would happen among the civilian population during a single attack by a single bombing unit. For my part, I have no doubt that its impact upon the people would be terrible...What could happen to a single city in a single day could also happen to ten, twenty, fifty cities. And, since news travels fast, even without telegraph, telephone, or radio, what, I ask you, would be the effect upon civilians of other cities, not yet stricken but equally subject to bombing attacks? What civil or military authority could keep order, public services functioning, and production going under such a threat?<sup>9</sup>

Douhet was able to envision this because he, like his peers, accepted civilian populations as necessary military targets. Douhet also believed cities are hubs of everything a nation needs to conduct war: industry, productivity, finance, and population. Those who witnessed the aftermath of Little Boy and Fat Man around the world realized Douhet’s prediction. Douhet predicted that air power would change the way societies endured warfare by breaking societal resolve: “A complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in a country subjected to this kind of merciless pounding from the air. The time would soon come when, to put an end to horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war.”<sup>10</sup> As Douhet predicted, the entire social structure of the world arguably did break down after 1945

as societies tolerance for the violence of warfare diminished.

### *Changes in Political Representation*

The next significant change following August 1945 was the rise of democratic governments beginning with the creation of the United Nations (UN). The U.S. had never been considered a world leader, but after dropping the atomic bomb and declaring itself the sole arbiter of nuclear warfare, the U.S. unabashedly assumed the mantle of leadership directing the creation of the UN. The top priority of the UN was to summarily outlaw warfare. Article 1 section one of the UN charter reads:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.<sup>11</sup>

**In 1944... Democracy was the least used, and also the least populated form of government.**

In 1944, there were seventeen democracy-based governments, thirty-two anocracies,<sup>12</sup> and twenty autocracies.<sup>13</sup> Democracy was the least used, and also the least populated form of government. In effect, this equated to less than two thirds of the world population actively participating in their political bodies.<sup>14</sup> However, this began to change drastically after World War II as the U.S. began to play a leading role in global affairs. In 1948, there were twenty-four democracies and by 2009 there were eighty-seven, an increase of over 350

percent.<sup>15</sup> Societies who were now living in fear of nuclear annihilation, did not want to engage in war. Joining the UN was therefore believed to be a logical way to prevent war. When the UN was founded in 1945 as an international body dedicated to maintaining peace there were just fifty-one member nations.<sup>16</sup> As of 2011, there were 193 member nations,<sup>17</sup> each one self-interested, self-determined and influencing

**...the spreading idea of political equality and human rights resulted in the collapse of a multi-centuries-old practice by Western societies – colonialism.**

every international law brought forward. Each UN member nation is also entitled to their own sovereignty, protection of human rights, and ability to dictate terms to the international community on various legalities to international treaties. Therefore the desire of the people, who now have a monumentally greater say in the global political process, began to change the conduct of war itself.

### ***The Rise of Individualism and the Practice of Limited War***

A third significant change impacting war today is the global spread of individualism. According to Dr. Jay Ogilvy, “day by day, week by week, year by year we are experiencing a gradual but pervasive spread of individual autonomy and increasing confidence in personal judgment.”<sup>18</sup> Ogilvy draws his conclusions from multiple studies, but specifically identifies Ron Inglehart’s global values survey data and Moises Naim’s book, *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be*, as primary sources. Ogilvy presents three trends, the more revolution, the mobility

revolution, and the mentality revolution, that are causing the global rise of individualism:

The More Revolution is based on the fact that there are simply so many more people who have risen from poverty and servitude to join the middle class, such as the 660 million Chinese who have escaped poverty since 1981.... When people are more numerous and living fuller lives, they become more difficult to regiment and control.... The Mobility Revolution makes all those people harder to control. It also changes the distribution of power within and among populations, whether through the rise of ethnic, religious, and professional diasporas or as individual vectors of ideas, capital, and faiths that can be either destabilizing or empowering.... The Mentality Revolution: People who get more tend to want still more again: the effect of the More and Mobility revolutions has been to vastly broaden the cognitive, even emotional impact of more access to resources and the ability to move, learn, connect and communicate.<sup>19</sup>

This rise of individualism describes what soldiers encounter every day in the operating environment, individuals who know more is available to them, individuals who can rapidly travel to join a cause and fight or flee a war-torn environment, and individuals who are being cognitively impacted by exposure to a global environment. These same individuals are also increasing their roles in the political process, as democratic principles continue to spread. The battlefield is changing and soldiers are forced deal with this change every day in the absence of any capability to effectively impact it.

Now, with this understanding of the big social changes a look at some individual events can be made to see narrative’s rising application. For example, the spreading idea of political equality and human rights resulted in the collapse of a multi-centuries-old practice by

Western societies – colonialism. India’s unique approach to independence through non-violence should not be overlooked as a military revolution as it reflects the principle of supreme excellence defined by Sun Tzu, breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.<sup>20</sup> Following World War II Great Britain was a skeleton of its former glory. While at the time it may have seemed counterintuitive, based solely on technological disparity, it is not difficult to imagine the massive population of India overwhelming the entirety of the British Colonial forces in an armed revolution. However, Mahatma Gandhi presented a narrative of non-violence by speaking and practicing non-violence. Images of his non-violent protests legitimized his words and deeds, spreading his narrative of non-violence globally as an important means to securing India’s independence. Great Britain’s concession to a non-violent movement, one that never challenged the military capacity of Britain’s forces, is a strong statement in the affirmative that Western societies had changed their tolerance of warfare’s violence following World War II.

The Korean War is another example where a strategic narrative set the geopolitical stage for the Cold War to remain “cold” in terms of nuclear weapons. The U.S. limited the aims of the war by leading a UN coalition to, “call for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel; (and for the) United Nations Commission on Korea to... observe the withdrawal of North Korea forces to the 38th parallel”<sup>21</sup> limiting the aims of the war. The aim of the war referenced here was not to defeat or destroy any opposing force, but rather to return the status quo of a divided peninsula. General Douglas MacArthur chose to ignore this, of course, and fought the war in the only way that made sense to him. He allowed the UN forces to move past the 38th parallel and threatened to widen the war

into China while advocating for the use of nuclear weapons. In response to a request from the President on the subject of MacArthur’s command as a result of his actions in Korea, the Joint Chiefs sent the President the following statement:

In the very complex situation created by the decision to confine the conflict to Korea and to avoid the third World War, it was necessary to have a Commander-in-Chief more responsive to control from Washington. He (MacArthur) failed to comply with directives requiring that speeches, press releases, or other public statements concerning military and foreign policy be cleared by the appropriate department before being issued, and for officials overseas to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States.<sup>22</sup>

**The Korean War is another example where a strategic narrative set the geopolitical stage for the Cold War to remain “cold”...**

MacArthur’s command contradicted the strategic narrative of the Truman administration and it had to be dealt with. President Truman agreed and because of this MacArthur was fired. When that happened the U.S. effectively told the world that it would seek to contain the violence of war, by not widening it, and would not use nuclear weapons even when U.S. soldier’s lives were at great risk. In other words, Truman and the U.S. crafted a new strategic Cold War narrative. The front page news of General MacArthur’s farewell address, along with his picture and the crowds greeting him as he faded away solidified this new narrative: out with the old, in with the

new.

As anti-colonialism spread in the mid-1950s and onward, some colonies chose violent revolutions and tested the strategic Cold War narrative. There were no less than thirty-one guerrilla wars between 1945 and 1972.<sup>23</sup> Limited war continued through limited means, absent nuclear weapon use, over the decades as a means of combating the guerrilla forces. Within Vietnam there was a clear distinction of warfare from the strategic to the tactical level impacted by the narrative space. On January 31, 1968, some 70,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched the Tet Offensive (named

**The U.S. was a nuclear society fully capable of destroying the North Vietnamese within days, yet they rejected this extreme violence of warfare...**

for the lunar new year holiday called Tet), a coordinated series of fierce attacks on more than 100 cities and towns in South Vietnam. The Communist People's Army of Vietnam planned the offensive in an attempt both to foment rebellion among the South Vietnamese population and encourage the U. S. to scale back its support of the Saigon regime. Though U.S. and South Vietnamese forces managed to hold off the Communist attacks, news coverage of the offensive (including the lengthy Battle of Hue) shocked and dismayed the American public and further eroded support for the war effort:

Tactically and operationally, Tet was a major victory for the US and SVN.... the South Vietnamese government was intact and stronger; the armed forces were larger, more effective, and more confident; the people had rejected the idea of a general uprising; and the enemy forces... were much weaker.... Paradoxically, Tet was a major political psychological,

diplomatic, and strategic defeat for the armed forces of the (U.S.)... Tet and the events that followed destroyed the will of the American people and the Johnson Administration... the media portrayed the campaign as an overwhelming defeat.... At Hue the destruction caused by Marines and US airpower were shown without the context of the stubborn tenacity of the enemy and without stories of the atrocities of the NVA and VC, who killed thousands of unarmed people, including women and children.... This was dishonesty. In the aftermath, the press did little to correct the views it had created.... Americans watched other Americans being killed and wounded. They observed the behavior of the South Vietnamese. And they concluded that their government was lying to them, that Vietnam was not worth saving, and that the war could not be won.<sup>24</sup>

Despite heavy casualties, North Vietnam achieved a strategic victory with the Tet Offensive, as the attacks marked a turning point in the Vietnam War and the beginning of the slow, painful American withdrawal from the region.

The U.S. was a nuclear society fully capable of destroying the North Vietnamese within days, yet they rejected this extreme violence of warfare at its own peril not because they were losing, but because the story coming out of Vietnam was too contradictory to what the average American believed was happening. General Vo Nguyen Giap is credited as stating that the North Vietnamese were preparing to negotiate peace following his defeat during the Tet offensive, but it was the American media that presented the outcome of the battle as a loss by America giving him and the North hope. "After Tet, the U.S. reexamined and then changed its military policy, placing new limits on American participation and setting the stage for the withdrawal of American troops."<sup>25</sup> President Lyndon Johnson withdrew

his re-election efforts just a few months after Tet. Guerrilla fighters around the world noticed. “As an Algerian militant put it, if his fighters killed thirty soldiers in a village, this would be reported in a few lines on the back page of the world press whereas the noise of even a small bomb in a big city would reverberate throughout the world and make headlines.”<sup>26</sup> It is within the headlines that narrative dominates more than weapons.

Today, the U.S. military has the ability to strike against enemy combatants by delivering precision munitions with greater accuracy than ever before. With its ability to project combat power, precision guided munitions can be fired from land, air, or sea, drastically reducing any unintentional loss of life due to indiscriminate fires. This capability has enabled the U.S. to continue to be the dominant global military force, as evident by its complete destruction of the Iraqi Army both in 1991 and in 2003. Since 2001 the U.S. has been in a constant state of conflict with non-state actors in the Middle East. The military presents a narrative of precision warfare fully compliant with the international law of war. Between 2001 and 2014 the U.S. spent \$7.7 trillion on its military.<sup>27</sup> In spite of this capability and financial investment, the U.S. has been unable to decisively end its conflicts in the Middle East.

The inability to end these conflicts reflects a fundamental change in human interaction that is impacting the operational environment. It is through this conflict that the collective social changes, Western societies’ desire to limit war’s violence, the rise of democracies, and the growth of individual actors, can be seen as merging into a new form of warfare where firepower plays a less significant a role in achieving victory than in past generations. The narrative space is growing and redefining how people interact during times of war.

The media landscape has changed from a uni-directional to a peer-to-peer

environment. The participatory nature of social networks, real time connectivity, and mobile devices have changed the psychological assumptions and actions of media users—they are not just consumers, they are also producers and distributors. The power of social networks and mobile connectivity creates a myriad opportunities that facilitate motivation and encourage persistence, such opportunities foster empowerment, agency, social validation, affiliation, and a sense of mastery.<sup>28</sup>

**The narrative space is growing and redefining how people interact during times of war.**

## **The Power of Narratives**

Narratives are stories communicated from one person to another. In order to be of any significance they must propagate.

The Arab Spring illustrates that the increased capability to share narratives via mobile technology is increasing the impact of narratives, including their impact on warfare. It is apparent that over the last few years ISIS has studied the use and effectiveness of communication technology, as well as understanding what it takes to spread an idea.

ISIS has Twitter accounts, Facebook accounts, and other social media platforms it uses daily. It has publicized executions for a global audience. James Foley was beheaded and Muath Al-Kassabeh was burned to death in a cage. Even children shot captives in the back of their heads. These acts were recorded and posted online because ISIS is delivering a narrative: the act of killing is a righteous necessity, the words; executions are purposeful, the deeds; ISIS then publishes their acts to send a clear message legitimized by the graphic images accessible on every networked device to a global audience. They are operating in the narrative space because

they understand its value to achieving their strategic goals.

The propagation of ISIS narrative is not just impacting Middle Eastern nations. Even in the U.S., middle class college educated youths have been inspired by ISIS narrative. The Threat Knowledge Group reported in their November 2015 publication *ISIS: The threat to the United States*:

Between March 2014 and November 2015, 82 individuals in the United States affiliating with ISIS have been interdicted by law enforcement, whether traveling to fight, recruiting, fundraising, planning to travel, promoting ISIS, or initiating or carrying out attacks (including 7 unnamed minors and 4 killed in the course of an attack). This is an average of 4.1 ISIS arrests per month on American soil.<sup>29</sup>

## **Narratives enable radicalization's effects across continents.**

Narratives enable radicalization's effects across continents. Regardless of whether the narratives are a larger master narrative, a dominant or minority local narrative, or the personal narrative from a trusted mentor, friend, or family member, they impact the threat environment future U.S. military efforts will face.

President George Bush clearly pushed a narrative of a global war on terrorism that he passed on to the next administration. President Obama sought to end Bush's narrative by changing the words to overseas contingency operation, but after eight years of not calling it a war on terror the war continues. After sixteen years there is still no end in sight to this war and no American narrative that unifies action, drives operations, or challenges the opposition to do anything different in the narrative space they have been dominating.

The threat of nuclear weapons, the change of political representation alongside the rise of individualism, and the containment of violence through limited war has collectively elevated the importance of narrative in 21st century warfare. Simply put, Clausewitz's trinity of war has changed. The prospect of nuclear annihilation concerns the world to such an extent that non-proliferation treaties, resolutions, and initiatives have been enacted several times since their sole use in Japan. Since World War II, the physical destructive potential of nuclear warfare has not been released again, in spite of nuclear weapons proliferation to no less than nine nations in possession of 15,800 nuclear warheads.<sup>30</sup> The use of the atomic bombs in 1945 pushed Western societies to their capacity for tolerating violence in warfare. Western society's rejection of total war theory has dulled one of Clausewitz's three principles of war, the passion of the people to perform violence. This has aided the rise of narrative space, and it is likely to significantly impact warfare for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it must be considered that the current national security structure is not structured in a way to win not just wars, but peace in modern and future warfare.

## **Changing the National Security Structure – Background**

So how can a total change to the national security structure happen? Ostensibly, this task might simply seem to be too difficult to execute. However, monumental shifts such as this have already occurred twice since World War II, and learning how those shifts occurred will provide a framework for how to proceed this time. The combination of the National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments, especially the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, is the most significant change of this kind. Collectively, these actions created the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Air Force, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,

while eliminating the War Department, reducing the significance of the Service secretaries, and shifting authority from Service branches to combatant commanders. The following is an analysis of how the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed. Furthermore, three critical lessons then suggest how one might successfully codify the Department of Foreign Affairs into law: 1) failure is the most important catalyst for enacting reform, 2) Congress is the best vehicle for significant reform, 3) anticipate, and therefore overcome, more resistance from within the Departments than from Congress.

When things are going well there is little desire to change. On the other hand, when failures abound the necessity to change is apparent to all. The initial effort to reform the Department of Defense began almost as soon as the National Security Act was passed. President Truman was successful with a minor reform in 1949, but efforts continued with every new administration. These efforts were met with significant resistance that even prevented President Dwight Eisenhower, legendary general of World War II, from achieving the necessary reforms he had identified. Coming out of the Vietnam War, the first “war” not declared by Congress, the Department of Defense repeatedly had to justify its overwhelming capacity for lethality to the cost in human lives and tax dollars for little to no strategic gain for the nation. The Service Chiefs could easily continue to discuss how effective their respective branch was at killing the enemy while placing blame on political policy to explain why their outcomes failed to meet expectations. However, by 1980 events started to occur that did not allow for the Defense Department to deny its shortcomings.

The first of these events was the failed operation, *Desert One*. The attempted rescue mission of U.S. citizens taken hostage in the Iranian revolution required six months of planning and preparation and involved eight helicopters and six C130 transport planes.

Ultimately, the mission failed after two helicopters sustained maintenance issues and another crashed into a C130, killing eight and wounding four.<sup>31</sup> The second of these events was the Beirut barracks bombing that occurred on October 23, 1983. Approximately 1,800 Marines were in Beirut as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. Hezbollah claimed credit for the multi-national coordinated attack that killed 241 U.S. Marines at the airport barracks and 58 French soldiers in a second building. It was the most devastating loss of life in Marine Corps history since the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II.<sup>32</sup> President Regan quickly ended all U.S. military involvement in the peacekeeping operation as a result.

**The initial effort to reform the Department of Defense began almost as soon as the National Security Act [of 1947] was passed.**

These events had common failures: “poor military advice to political leaders, lack of unity of command, and inability to operate jointly.”<sup>33</sup> The identification of the reasons for these failures did not take long. A lack of inter-service training dominated to such an extent that the first time the Air Force and Army forces met during operation *Desert One* was at the rally point in Iran. Their radios could not communicate with each other, there was no identified mission commander, and there were no contingency plans in place. Bottom line: “the participating service units trained separately... it happened because the services were so separate and so determined to remain separate.”<sup>34</sup>

From their point of view, Congress summarily intended to reform six overarching problems within the Defense Department: an imbalance between service and joint interests, inadequate military advice to political leaders,

unqualified joint-duty serving officers, an imbalance between joint commander's responsibilities and authority, poor strategic planning, and congressional micro-management. Congressional hearings and inquiries identified these failures and helped to spur reform efforts.

If one believes that an equivalent scope of reform of today's foreign policy institutions is needed, then these glaring failures from the 1980's provide a basis from which to begin. Is there an imbalance between diplomatic and military efforts and resourcing today? Does the military train effectively with other departments to impact foreign policy outcomes in the same area of operation? Is military advice producing the military outcomes expected?

**From 1958 to 1986, there weren't any meaningful reforms of the National Defense Act.**

Are the right members of the military and diplomatic corps qualified for their positions and expectations? Is there an imbalance between military responsibilities and humanitarian responsibilities? Are the strategic plans working out? Is Congress executing its proper role? While all of these answers will differ from the answers of the 1980's inquires, after fifteen years of sustained conflict in the Middle East and growing threats of conflict in Europe and in Asia, asking these questions is just as important today as it was prior to the Goldwater-Nichols reform efforts.

The National Security Act of 1947 was born out of an identification to change the way military advice, operations, and capabilities were developed following the lessons learned during World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise him during the war, but the disputes between the Navy Department and the War Department "were too severe that the idea of unifying the two

military departments had to be put off until after the war."<sup>35</sup> Additionally, "the contributions of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) were lessened by its adoption on its own of the principle of reaching unanimous agreement before speaking."<sup>36</sup> The National Security Act took two years to become law after World War II and was amended three times over the next eleven years, all in the effort to strengthen the secretary of defense while reducing the importance of the service secretaries and "strengthen civilian control"<sup>37</sup> over the military.

From 1958 to 1986, there weren't any meaningful reforms of the National Defense Act. Perhaps not unsurprisingly, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was passed, it took "four years and 241 days – a period longer than U.S. involvement in World War II."<sup>38</sup> Calls for reform along the way, however, were not absent. The Kennedy administration produced the Symington report, the Nixon administration produced the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, and the Carter administration produced the Defense Organization Studies. The Symington report recommended three significant changes: "(1) abolish the military departments, (2) replace the JCS with a single chief of staff, and (3) establish three functional unified commands."<sup>39</sup> The Nixon Blue Ribbon Defense Panel had 113 recommendations, with the New York Times reporting the most significant as being "the removal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from involvement in military operations...(and) operations responsibilities of the chiefs would be taken over by a new civilian Deputy Defense Secretary with his own military staff."<sup>40</sup>

The Executive Branch repeatedly failed to reform the Defense Department. In no uncertain terms, it required assistance from Congress. The catalyst for Congress to take up the cause of reform was the testimony from General David Jones, chairman of the JCS, who spoke before the House Armed Service Committee in a closed session on February 3, 1982. There, he

stated, “The system is broken. I have tried to reform it from inside, but I cannot. Congress is going to have to mandate necessary reforms.”<sup>41</sup> Additional generals testified and the House Armed Service Committee began hearings on reform of the National Security Act resulting in the House passing a bill on August 16, 1982.

Change is fundamentally difficult, and in the event of significant change on the scale of creating a new Department of Foreign Affairs, one should anticipate that the senior members of the most significantly impacted institutions will most significantly resist the change. The Executive Branch has the power to appoint individuals to positions within the government, but it cannot reform itself in a meaningful way. Based on how our government was established, Congress must be involved in order to enact meaningful changes. From President Eisenhower to President Carter, the military services were able to outmaneuver and deflect changes they perceived as counter to their best interests. It didn’t matter how many administrations conducted well-informed research and present insightful evidence for promoting reform. Rather, what mattered was Congress taking up the cause. If another significant change within the organization of the Executive Branch is going to take place, then Congress *must* be the branch to force this change.

It took just six months for the House of Representatives to pass a bill reforming the Department of Defense following General Jones’ testimony. The following year, the Senate took up the effort in the Senate Armed Service Committee. The focus of the Senate was “on organization of the entire Department of Defense.”<sup>42</sup> By the time this happened, General John Wickham had taken over as the JCS and adamantly opposed reform. Joining General Wickham was the Marine Corps Commandant, General P.X. Kelley, now tallying “all five Joint Chiefs ... in opposition to reorganization.”<sup>43</sup>

The Chiefs were successful in convincing

Senator John Tower (R-TX), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the committee in the antireform corner through the whole period of 1983-1984, which effectively turned the effort into a partisan battle between the unified Republican President and Senate team and the Democratic House of Representatives. However, elections bring change and new Congresses allow for new priorities. Chief among these changes was Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) becoming chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee.

Senator Goldwater made “defense

**Change is fundamentally difficult... one should anticipate that the senior members of the most significantly impacted institutions will most significantly resist the change.**

reorganization” his top priority<sup>44</sup> and reached out to Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) for assistance. As both chambers of Congress worked toward reform, the Executive Branch jumped onboard by conducting its own study, the Packard Commission, which aligned them with Congress. Even three years after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress accused the Pentagon of failing to implement the required changes. As reported in the New York Times April 9, 1989, “The Pentagon has not undertaken improvements required by the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act...the House committee believes the Pentagon is dragging its heels on changes it never did like.”<sup>45</sup>

Running into resistance from within the Executive Branch should be the least of the Congress’s worries when taking up monumental reform. The proof of these reforms’ positive impact can now be seen in hindsight. There is little doubt that the U.S. Military is the most lethal fighting force today. Joint doctrine guides

multi-service operations like never before, as demonstrated by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last fifteen years. More importantly though, since 1986 there have been very few significant efforts by an administration or the Congress to reform the Department of Defense, unlike the administrations that immediately followed Truman after passing the National Security Act of 1947.

The efforts that created the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986 were born out of necessity. The world changed after World War II, as did the global role for the U.S. A National Defense apparatus was created to resist a nuclear Soviet Union and win a potential nuclear World War III. Today, the world has significantly changed once again. The threat comes out of the desert in sandals with a cell phone. A single murder can inspire immense reactions from a global audience. A webpage can manipulate facts and change the behavior of its audience. There was a time for monumental changes within the Executive Branch to deal with the threats it faced in the 1980's. These changes resulted from identified failures. They took years to enact and it took a willing Congress to get it done. If changes on the scale of the National Security Act or the Goldwater-Nichols Act are going to be done today than asking the tough questions that identify failure, planning for the long game, and working through Congress is a proven means of achieving this change.

### **Proposed Changes to the National Security Structure**


Now that it has been identified change is needed to the national security structure and how change to the national security structure has occurred before, what does that change look like? The following presents the creation of a "Department of Foreign Affairs" that realigns the chain of command of the Department of Defense and Department of State to enable more efficient

synchronization of effort, flow of information, and allocation of resources in support of strategic objectives. From lines of accounting, to reporting procedures, to information sharing, a single chain of command would reduce the inflated bureaucracy that slows and often delays actions, diminishing the President's efforts to carry out particular foreign policy initiatives.

The structure of national security capability proposed in Figure 2 leverages the bureaucratic organization of the Department of Defense, strategic policy formation capability of the Department of State, military expertise of military formations, and cultural expertise of regional diplomats. It is assumed by putting this capability under a singular chain of command the synchronization of resources, timing of operations, and execution of operations will more effectively execute warfare and thus achieve a sustainable peace that has been unachievable to date.

First, no longer would military commanders be free to avoid fighting in the narrative space which they have proven counter-productive at doing. The local ambassador/policy formation lead would be responsible for crafting a strategic narrative that all forces in the conflict area would have to synchronize efforts with. This act alone could provide the single greatest impact missing in current military capability.

Second, no longer would the Department of State be left to negotiate peace or cease fire agreements absent the military as previously attempted in Syria, Ukraine, Korea, and the Middle East. Such negotiations would fall on the Regional Commander and his staff who is fully informed of military and diplomatic efforts because the commander is responsible for both. When the Secretary of Foreign Affairs speaks to a counterpart about no fly zones he or she will do so with the ability to simultaneously put military assets in place to enforce those constraints unlike Secretary Kerry in the waning days of the Obama administration with regards to Syria.



**Figure 2. Proposed national security structure.**

Third, no longer will the Department of Defense budget overwhelm the Department of State budget. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs will allocate funding against the capabilities in greatest need based on a single regional commander's recommendation. Today the military has identified the need for greater cultural expertise, language skills, and diplomatic skills. All these capabilities reside within State, but are not funded to an amount that is scalable to military necessary in the Middle East. This would change at the discursion of the single chain of command responsible for employing these capabilities.

Fourth, executing operations in support of social issues such as climate change, human rights, and humanitarian aid/development issues would not be negatively impacted by the change. Administrations would have an equal, if not greater, capacity to support nations hit by national disasters or interdict genocidal acts by repressive governments.

Additionally, the National Security Council is structured in a way to maintain its place as the primary advisory council on policy for the administration. It maintains this place by taking a leading role of the intelligence agencies of the national security structure brining all intelligence collection efforts under a single chain of

command that reports directly to the President. This structure elevates the National Security Advisor to one of two primary advisors on all things national security related with command authority over subordinate organizations. The heads of the multiple intelligence agencies will lose an amount of autonomy currently enjoyed, but not to an extent that should compromise each organization's ability to execute their individual missions.

The Senate should take an oversight role in the appointment of both the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Advisor by providing their Constitutionally derived "consent" of individuals before any person assumes either of these positions. Additionally, Congress should maintain its current resourcing of oversight capacity, but will be able to consolidate some oversight due to the streamlining of command authority. By having the ability to focus on just two senior advisors to the President it is plausible that Congress with have an easier time with oversight of the Executive Branch increasing the American people's ability to influence foreign policy agenda's as well.

## Conclusion

The world is different from the one that existed following WWII. We face challenges that are drastically different from the Cold War era. Is it any wonder that yesterday's institutions are incompatible with new global dynamics? A new National Security Act that creates a single Department of Foreign Affairs, thereby unifying many efforts of the State Department and the Department of Defense under a single chain of command, will help future presidents manage and execute their foreign policy efforts. A Department of Foreign Affairs will synchronize foreign policy efforts that account for the growing influence of narrative on policy decisions, as well as unify diplomatic and military capabilities, thereby streamlining critical foreign policy advice to the President. The last twenty years have demonstrated significant gaps in results coming from the current national security infrastructure, which has largely not changed since its inception in 1947. Now is the time to take bold action and reconcile the challenges of today with the capabilities needed to meet the challenges of tomorrow. **IAJ**

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# Why We Can't All Just Get Along:

## Overcoming Personal Barriers to Inter-Organizational Effectiveness and Finding Your Personal Coupler for Success

**by William J. Davis, Jr.**

***DoD placed Pakistan and India in separate geographic combatant commands in order to foster U.S. military relationships with each country, given their history of tension and conflict. In contrast, State placed Pakistan and India in the same regional bureau because of political-military issues between the two nations, as well as other crosscutting issues that affect the region as a whole.<sup>1</sup>***

***– GAO Report on Interagency Collaboration, July 11, 2011***

***Please don't you rock my boat, cause I don't want my boat to be rockin'.<sup>2</sup>***

***– Bob Marley***

### Shared Disunity

The first quote above illustrates the differing cultural lenses through which organizations will view the same problem. However, as in the case of the India-Pakistan situation, it will take the resources and talents of a multitude of stakeholders working in unity to realize the interests of not only the U.S., but a world full of stakeholders. A question remains, however, as to how stakeholders with such dissimilar views, even though these organizations are within a single government can work together to solve complex problems. The second quote above embodies the spirit of most people in an organization – they learn to behave in certain ways and are reluctant to readily accept new ways. Increasing effectiveness when disparate inter/intra-government organizations must work together to solve problems is not easy. Many solutions have been offered, from increasing organizational cross-pollination within the United States government by enforcing Goldwater-Nichols-type legislation upon the executive branch, to standing up centers for inter-organizational cooperation. An example of a stunted view of how to solve the problems endemic to the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental,

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and Multinational (JIIM) environment is offered by the authors of *America's Army: A Model for Interagency Effectiveness*, which suggests that if every agency modeled its organization on that of the U.S. Army, inter-organizational operations might be more effective.<sup>3</sup> This ethnocentric approach is indicative of a common trap that ensnares quite a few participants of the JIIM and is a common barrier to successful leadership within. Although ensuring everyone does things the same way or has the same values may seem

**The lack of cross pollination of stakeholders makes it very unlikely that a leader will be indoctrinated into the knowledge necessary to understand the nuanced behaviors of other organizations.**

like a panacea solution, it is also impossible. Some will argue that the best way to overcome the unique environmental factors in the JIIM is through knowledge of the culture, capabilities, and limitations of each stakeholder. This is also a quite impossible feat because of the vast number and uniqueness of the participants in the JIIM. What I am offering within these pages is that the first and most critical step in becoming a successful leader in the JIIM is to not let your prejudices or lack of knowledge pervert or inhibit you from being able to effectively operate. Unfortunately, letting go of one's prejudices is easier said than done. Second, I will offer a more philosophical outlook on leading within the JIIM which relies on using the principles of the Six Cs – comprehension, consensus, cooperation, coordination, compromise and communication.

Barriers to effective leadership in the JIIM might not be so much about collective organizational differences, but about how the preferences and prejudices of individuals manifest in ethnocentric behaviors or

perspective that inhibit effective cooperation. The Departments of Defense (DoD) and State, both fairly large government bureaucracies, organizationally share a disdain for the values of innovation and adhocracy, and yet each views the other organization not only as more inflexible, but also at times, inferior.<sup>4</sup>

This ethnocentric phenomenon might be explained by looking to Edgar Schein, a respected theorist of organizational psychology, who defines organizational culture as, “A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems that has worked well enough to be considered valid and is **passed on to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems**”<sup>5</sup> (emphasis added). Those who have become invested in an organization have been taught **the correct way** to perceive, think, and act, so not only are they wary of any other way, but they also consider any other way of doing things as just plain wrong. The negative impact of such mistrust, even among individuals within organizations, has been thoroughly documented.<sup>6</sup> The prevalence of this normative thinking and subsequent exclusive behavior becomes amplified within the JIIM. Exposure to the culture, capabilities, and limitations of other stakeholders in the JIIM is limited. Even within agencies that reside in the federal government of the United States, job security is so strong that an employee is more likely to die than to go to work for another agency.<sup>7</sup> The lack of cross pollination of stakeholders makes it very unlikely that a leader will be indoctrinated into the knowledge necessary to understand the nuanced behaviors of other organizations.

However, recent studies point to some successes in overcoming the prejudice associated with ethnocentric thinking. For example, although DoD officers hold a significant amount of mistrust toward members of other agencies, that mistrust was negated whenever the officer spent significant time working with

other agencies.<sup>8</sup> In addition, Munsing and Lamb report that Joint Interagency Task Force South continues to effectively prosecute a counter-trafficking mission without the administrative burden of memorandum of agreements between agencies, thus establishing an environment of trust and unity of effort.<sup>9</sup> And additionally, it was determined that although from the same federal agency, members of the various Services within the DoD used to revile each other almost to the point of not being able to be effective when working together, they now, arguably, have an equal sense of community and trust among the Services as they do within their own Service.<sup>10</sup>

While the literature on cross-functional (inter-organizational) organizations is replete with social science theory that might be helpful to those who are charged with putting together one of these efforts, case studies of previous successes fail to come up with a cookie-cutter solution to make inter-organizational efforts a success.<sup>11</sup> Although a one-size-fits-all theory does not exist in social science,<sup>12</sup> identifying variables that consistently appear as keys to the environment is not a reach, and indeed, the literature is replete with best practices. However, organizational culture is one variable identified throughout the literature as having some sort of impact on inter-organizational effectiveness and it is posited that assumptions influenced by organizational culture are often the major source of conflict in any effort.<sup>13</sup> According to Schein, within the tenets of organizational culture is a built-in prejudice that one's organizational culture is the correct organizational culture. Overcoming ethnocentric prejudices manifested by organizational parochialism is the key to success for members operating in an inter-organizational environment. This paper is intended to provide some insight into the common cognitive obstacles that feed individual prejudices, in hopes that self-understanding will mitigate organizational parochialism and result in practices that will enhance interactions among

all organizations.

## **Self-Examination: A Difficult Task**

Overcoming one's prejudices is difficult under the best of circumstances and more complicated than most think. Perhaps even more difficult than overcoming prejudices is identifying organizational assumptions and differences among organizations that are potential friction points. How can an individual who works for DoD, a very hierarchical organization, realize and overcome prejudice against a non-hierarchical organization, especially if there is not individual self-awareness that it is the very idea of non-hierarchy that leads to feelings of contempt? Instead of focusing on the differences, an individual attempting to overcome ethnocentric prejudices needs to determine why those differences and subsequent feelings might exist. To overcome one's cultural biases, one must focus on the "whys" of cultural differences and not solely on the differences.

**To overcome one's cultural biases, one must focus on the "whys" of cultural differences and not solely on the differences.**

First, one needs to become acutely aware of the whys of one's own culture. This should provide insight into why one's organization is the way it is (why something or some way is taught as a correct way). Once that is determined, then one can analyze the "whys" of the partnering culture. Sun Tzu's aphorism that knowing oneself and the enemy will ensure victory is apropos in this instance. Typically, members of an organization make observations and jump to conclusions without examining the assumptions that they hold dear.<sup>14</sup> For example, the U.S. Army is a very planning-oriented culture, whereas the U.S. Navy has more of an emergent approach to operational decision making, and there

are good reasons for each cultural value. The Army has a mission to maneuver thousands of people in a defined battle space; so in order to avoid tragic outcomes such as fratricide in a chaotic environment where the leaders cannot control most decisions, the organization gives preeminence to planning. In contrast, the Navy's maneuver element usually consists of 6–8 ships with each one outfitted with a full communications suite and seasoned commanders able to communicate critical information to all involved. The operating environment for each is quite unique and requires different approaches to operations. If one were from the Army and did not understand what was just explained there might be a tendency to denigrate the Navy as a cowboy culture that does not properly plan; or likewise, someone from the Navy might have a tendency to label the Army as overly inflexible.

**Members who view inter-organizational efforts as unitary will be severely disappointed and frustrated...**

### **Ways of Viewing Inter-organizational Efforts and Cultures**

To be effective in the inter-organizational arena (i.e., accomplish the dictates of the effort while also protecting one's organizational interests), members of organizations within the JIIM must understand their own organizational cultures and how they view other cultures. Members often differ on how they view their roles in the inter-organizational arena.

Some members hold the naïve view that they and others can freely set aside their long-held perspectives and beliefs and just work together “to get the job done.” However, in the mind of each member, it often becomes *the other* organization's burden to set aside its cultural proclivities to make the effort more harmonious.

Members who view inter-organizational efforts as unitary will be severely disappointed and frustrated and, most likely, minimally effective when incorporating the capabilities and limitations of the various organizations to affect the mission.

Some members hold the view that although some differences in the cultures of the various organizations exist, all members of the effort are unitary in their purpose and will set aside those differences for the betterment of all. The members of an inter-organizational effort might believe that since all members are agencies of the U.S. that their purpose is singular; therefore, there should be a dominant goal and shared values. Although most inter-organizational efforts have some sort of shared purpose, that shared purpose does not always translate well into shared vision. A disparate frame of reference will most likely result in a tension-filled effort. Military joint doctrine emphasizes determining an end state and accompanying termination criteria for DoD. In contrast, the Department of State hopes to have a mission in the country without termination; therefore, its goal is to establish a position of continuing advantage and long-term benefits at the expense of immediate results. Although some long-term approach thinking as applied to crisis situations has manifested in the Theater Campaign Plan (the preeminent plan to which all United States' military operations will eventually transition),<sup>15</sup> in a cultural sense, the military still focuses on more immediate, measurable results. Any member of an inter-organizational effort who believes such organizational values will be set aside in pursuit of a common objective will also be frustrated.

Some members may be aligned completely with the purpose of the effort, while others may have cultures and agendas that lie outside the dominant effort. However, it is important to note that being a member of a culture on the periphery of the effort is not necessarily pejorative—it

is only different. DoD might concentrate on handling short-term challenges with the goal of handing off the effort to a long-term focused organization, while the long-term focused organization will most likely view problems through a different lens than those who are the first responders. Building consensus as to what values and purposes make up the inter-agency effort should be built through consensus.<sup>16</sup>

Most members share the interests of the larger inter-organizational effort; however, they also have their own interests. Organizations that make up a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) usually focus on immediate security, providing economic systems, providing basic services, and gaining support for representative government.<sup>17</sup> However, the same organizations whose primary efforts are this disparate will have significant differences. Accepting those cultural differences can make a PRT member more effective in accomplishing an agreed-upon vision and thus be better able to realize how the capabilities and limitations of one's organization might benefit the effort. Finally, some members become frustrated with the differences in culture among organizations, conclude there is no hope for the inter-organizational effort, and just go their own way. The key to success is realizing that an inter-organizational effort lies somewhere between the overly optimistic view that agencies will "just work together to get the job done" and the counter-productive attitude of dismissing the idea out of hand.

## **Other Bad Thoughts**

There is a tendency among members of any organization to view askance the members of another organization who are not similar, and in some cases even those organizations that are similar will view each other's motives as suspect. One of the most discouraging episodes of this country's recent inter-organizational history was the cultural fault line that appeared more often than it should have between State and

DoD during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Senior DoD officers made disparaging comments about State members who were having a difficult time filling personnel requirements in Iraq. However, what these DoD officers did not understand was that few sign up to work for State with the intent to go to war. State employees knew that austere environments or even some potentially hazardous working conditions might exist, but the idea of having one's life threatened at all times was incongruent with the assumed values of the organization.

**Oftentimes, members of distinct organizational cultures use visible cultural differences as a poor excuse for not getting things done in an inter-organizational effort.**

It is quite common for members of one organization to be critical of another organization's members because of a lack of understanding of the other (and one's own) organization's culture. One culture's perception of chaos might be another culture's perception of discipline, or one culture's bureaucracy might be another culture's order. Each organizational culture develops based on the group's unique operating environment and mission. As much ridicule that is often focused on the Air Force from other Services for being a "country club" culture, the fact is that the U.S. Air Force is the best Air Force in the world. Although the discipline displayed in that organization is quite different from the discipline displayed in the Marine Corps, it was developed pursuant to the optimization of the mission in its environment. Oftentimes, members of distinct organizational cultures use visible cultural differences as a poor excuse for not getting things done in an inter-organizational effort.

## Finding Your Personal Coupler

When members from disparate agencies of Joint Interagency Task Force South were asked if their culture was changed because of the inter-organizational environment, they replied with a very firm “no.” They said the secret to the success was in finding a “coupler” that allowed the different cultures to work together, not forgoing cultural individuality.<sup>18</sup> Potential couplers mentioned were building true consensus, communicating the environment and options for actions, coordinating harmoniously, cooperating in compliance with the aforementioned agreed upon consensus, and most importantly a comprehension of each other’s roles, limitations, and capabilities.<sup>19</sup> These couplers are interesting in that most leadership models do not mention them as critical leader attributes. However, in the JIIM, it is safe to posit that a leader who is not aware of these concepts, will most likely fail in any endeavor undertaken. That is why it is important to investigate and define these concepts further.

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### *Comprehend*

When I was the curriculum director of the Joint Forces Staff College, I conducted a needs assessment to determine the skills and knowledge needed for an effective Joint-qualified officer. From the perspective of those I interviewed, the most critical requirement was an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the other military services. However, I quickly learned that no matter the level of experience

of a military leader, he or she would never know enough about other military services in order to efficiently employ them. Working in an inter-organizational environment in the JIIM is no different. Participants must know about what each contributing organization “brings to the table,” but in a very complex environment such as the JIIM where there are innumerable players, one person cannot possibly know the capabilities and limitations of all participants. In a long-standing organization such as the Department of Defense’s United States Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), agencies share offices and use long-established procedures that involve all contributors so that participants can see the whole picture and determine what their agency might offer. The physical and virtual environment that JIATF South operates in is a catalyst for dialogue among the participants. The enduring nature of some inter-organizational relationships, such as JIATF South, will make it easier to comprehend the limitations and capabilities of partners, however, in the JIIM, most undertakings are ad hoc. In an ad hoc or crisis situation, dialogue among the participants is critical to unveiling the capabilities and limitations of each agency. In these situations, a physical space shared by all representatives from the various participants and an open and inquisitive approach from every member is necessary. If you do not take the initiative to communicate with others, do not assume that they will provide valuable and necessary information concerning their organization’s capabilities. So ironically, to comprehend is not so much about understanding others, but about understanding one’s limited ability to know all and effectively dialogue with others. In addition, do not assume that others in the JIIM are familiar with your capabilities and limitations. The most important dynamic that agency or military representatives can establish is open dialogue. Comprehension can only be gained through such dialogue.

## *Coordinate*

Participants in the JIIM often interpret “coordination” to mean “de-confliction,” but a dictionary definition tells us that the word means “to work or act together harmoniously.” This does not mean that each agency stays out of the others’ way, but that all agencies plan each action to maximize the effect of all other actions taking place. Military efforts to rebuild medical care in Mogadishu in Somalia during the early 1990s focused on the military providing free medical care to Somali nationals. However, the military failed to coordinate with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was working to ensure that Somali doctors returned to Mogadishu. Because the military and USAID did not coordinate their efforts, Somali nationals went to the free hospitals set up by the military, but Somali doctors lost clientele and left Mogadishu. If the military had coordinated their efforts with USAID, and supported the program to establish a long-term health care system, it is easy to venture a guess that the result might have been different.

## *Cooperate*

According to Webster, to cooperate is “to act jointly or in compliance with others.” While one can argue that cooperation is an organizational value displayed throughout most institutions, however, the cooperation that most often takes place within a single organization is specious at best. Remember, even a flat organization still has a hierarchical underpinning that provides a forcing function for cooperation. At one time, cooperation was so lacking among the military branches of the U.S. military Services that Congress had to enact the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to force those Services to sufficiently cooperate. There are those who argue that a similar act would force cooperation among the various agencies of the U.S. government. However, there will always remain the leadership challenge of

gaining cooperation of other nations, NGOs, and other players in the JIIM, even if the various members from the United States government were somehow co-opted or formed into a single-minded organization.

**...willingness to compromise is essential for success in the JIIM.**

## *Compromise*

Although the word “compromise” may have a negative connotation to the culture of many organizations<sup>20</sup>, willingness to compromise is essential for success in the JIIM. A common definition is “a settlement of differences reached by mutual concessions.” Most people compromise every day without realizing it just by living in society and making decisions.<sup>21</sup> For the leader in the JIIM, it is important to realize that often times, compromise of objectives is necessary to building consensus. In the long-term, it is necessary to compromise on organizational short-term objectives. The building of true consensus requires extensive dialogue and time. This is where understanding one’s culture is critical. A leader in the JIIM must be aware of his or her own cultural value towards dialogue and compromising on objectives.

## *Consensus*

The ability to have everyone agree—to build consensus—is a significant talent that must be mastered in order to become a successful leader within the JIIM. Building consensus takes time, and is garnered through dialogue. Going to Webster once again, it is found that consensus is “a collective opinion.” Consensus building is a skill that, for the most part, is foreign to many people who have had their primary leadership experiences in a single organization. A common principle or mantra of most leadership paradigms is that “it is fine to challenge the boss, but once the decision is made, you need to support the

decision as if it were your own.” Decisions in the JIIM are more complex and usually do not follow common leadership expectations. If an agency does not think a consensus has been reached, the agency may not participate in the proposed solution or it may even act in opposition to it, and the decision maker has little power to force compliance. Consensus is probably the most critical aspect of accomplishing national objectives during an interagency operation.

**Consensus is probably the most critical aspect of accomplishing national objectives during an interagency operation.**

One of my favorite examples of failing to embrace the leadership principles necessary for success in the JIIM is when a major general in the Army called me in to ask me why everyone (DoD civilians) was not supporting his vision. I discussed the need for dialogue to build consensus. He looked at me askance and said that he indeed did build consensus. That he had a meeting and told everyone what was going to happen and no one spoke up. This obviously was not building consensus, but the flag officer’s cultural bias did not allow him to understand the nuance of true consensus.

***Communication***

Having to communicate effectively to convince an individual or organization to do something is foreign to those who are used to the singular focus on an organization. The hierarchical design of most organizations, and in particular any military organization, is based upon the assumption that one will do what one is told by those higher in the organization. However, in the JIIM, such a hierarchy does not exist. To persuade others to follow an agreed upon plan, one must have evidence and a sound argument to prove that what is proposed will

actually contribute to solving identified problems (and also that it will not prove detrimental to the goals and objectives of the other participants). A commander of three multinational divisions in Bosnia had to visit each division commander after an operations order was published to convince them that the order would be good for the overall mission and their particular stake in it. Perhaps this commander may have avoided such visits by applying the six Cs before the order was published, but regardless, he recognized the need to effectively communicate. Likewise, in many disaster relief scenarios, the host nation and other national leaders need to be intimately involved with any actions being taken or what some organization thought they would be doing might be vetoed.

**Recommendations**

One thing is evident: Each coupler requires individuals who are able to overcome systemic problems associated with inter-organizational efforts. Anyone operating within the inter-organizational environment should consider incorporating the following recommendations into any actions taken to frame and operate in the environment:

- **Understand your culture.** All members of an organization should know the “whys” of their culture. For example, it is not enough to know that DoD is a planning culture, members must also understand the reason behind this proclivity and the subsequent limitations and capabilities associated with it. Knowing the “whys” will allow the member to better communicate the nuances of the culture to those of other organizations, thus enhancing communication and understanding.
- **Ask questions.** Members should ask questions of other participants to better appreciate the cultural and physical capabilities and limitations that an

organization brings. Cultivating a culture of inquisitiveness during inter-organizational operations is critical to success. Assumptions are dangerous in situations such as crisis response. Sometimes for DoD personnel, whose culture, most times, is a rapid action-oriented one, taking the time to understand the culture of the other participants can be frustrating. Likewise, a member of an organization more concerned with long-term success will become frustrated with an individual or organization that appears to be doing things without regard for “what happens next.”

- **Build consensus.** Consensus must be achieved through dialogue. This dialogue takes time and requires an ability that may not necessarily be fostered within a single organization. It is a special skill that should be cultivated for those operating in the inter-organizational environment. A lot of government organizations highly value their form of hierarchy, even though the hierarchies among organizations will look different to the casual observer.<sup>22</sup> An ambassador has no less hierarchical authority within State than a general officer has within DoD. The organizations may just internalize that hierarchy differently. Any form of consensus building will most likely involve waiting for those personnel involved in solving problems to gain permission to do things that are outside of their cultural norm.

As a reflective practitioner, understanding and making conscious one’s organizational assumptions will provide a basis for examining one’s biases, prejudices, or unfounded expectations toward another organization. It will only be through a mutual understanding of how group identity affects thoughts and behaviors that those involved in inter-organizational efforts will be able to effectively operate as a team. It is not a matter of creating like organizations, but of developing couplers that maximize the unique capabilities of each organization. Inter-organizational efforts begin with individuals meeting together to tackle problems that no single organization has the talent or resources to solve on its own. It will be those same individuals, creating personal couplers to overcome perceived barriers, who will ensure the effort is a success. **IAJ**

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# Adaptive Leadership: The Leader's Advantage

by **Bill McCollum and Kevin Shea**

***Truly adept leaders know not only how to identify the context they're working in but also how to change their behaviors to match.<sup>1</sup>***

The National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering statistics survey for fiscal years 2015–2017 estimates obligations for federally funded research and development programs and initiatives will exceed \$12 billion in 2017.<sup>2</sup> While this amount appears staggering, few in research and development question the efficacy of the programs to remain technologically competitive in an increasingly complex world. However, new programs, systems, and technologies are not the only variables necessary to address the complexities facing today's leaders. The most critical variable for maximizing the effectiveness of these investments lies in leaders' ability to think and lead adaptively. This article frames contemporary thought of the term "adaptive leadership," addresses ways of framing and understanding complexity, suggests challenges leaders and members face when confronted with adaptive challenges, and recommends leader behaviors and actions necessary for effectively leading organizations in adaptive environments. However, before proceeding one must ensure an understanding of the term "adaptive" in the context of adaptive leadership.

## Introduction to Adaptive Leadership

Peter Northouse addresses adaptive leadership by stating, "...adaptive leadership is about how leaders encourage people to adapt – to face and deal with problems, challenges and changes...

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focuses on the adaptations required of people in response to changing environments.”<sup>3</sup> Northouse draws heavily on the work of Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Linsky, who describe adaptive leadership as “...an iterative activity, an ongoing engagement between you and groups of people”<sup>4</sup> and “...the practice of mobilizing people to tackle tough challenges and thrive.”<sup>5</sup> Two considerations are key to understanding these descriptions. The first is the necessity for adaptive leadership when addressing the truly complex challenges facing organizations. Heifetz et al. refer to the word “adaptive” in terms of challenges faced by leaders, and they draw a distinct difference between technical and adaptive challenges. They state, “While technical problems may be very complex and critically important...they have known solutions that can be implemented by current know-how.”<sup>6</sup> In this sense, Heifetz describes technical challenges as those where solutions lie within the current ways of operating, current expertise is sufficient, authoritative decision-making and standard operating procedures suffice, and culturally informed behaviors are not challenged.<sup>7</sup>

**...Heifetz describes adaptive challenges as those where solutions lie outside the current way of operating, where the gap between the desired state and reality cannot be closed using existing approaches alone...**


In contrast, Heifetz describes adaptive challenges as those where solutions lie outside the current way of operating, where the gap between the desired state and reality cannot be closed using existing approaches alone, and “...exist when people themselves are the problem and when progress requires retooling of their own ways of thinking and operating.”<sup>8</sup>

Thus, adaptive challenges require leaders who understand and recognize complexity, are willing to change behaviors to lead differently, personally learn and develop learning organizations, are comfortable with shifting responsibility to stakeholders, have the courage to experiment, and are patient when addressing complexity. Central to this discussion is a common framing and understanding of complexity.

## Complexity

David Snowden and Mary Boone suggest the Cynefin framework as a means for helping leaders frame their actions when making decisions in environments of varying complexity.<sup>9</sup> Figure 1 provides Snowden and Boone’s five domains of the framework: simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, and disorder. However, most diagrams of the Cynefin framework portray the domains as entities with seemingly hard lines, or boundaries, separating each. Figure 1 provides a different perspective as it recognizes there are few problems that fit solely into one given definition or set of circumstances; thus, the use of clouds to represent less certainty of domain boundaries. Further, the diagram includes continuums that incorporate Heifetz et al.’s emphasis on technical and adaptive problems,<sup>10</sup> as well as Snowden and Boone’s emphasis on ordered and unordered conditions. Each of the domains are briefly addressed.

Snowden and Boone’s simple domain represents technical challenges routinely confronting leaders and their organizations. While the challenges may not be easy, they are ordered and have clear relationships between cause and effect. The authors refer to this domain as the known knowns; leaders know what needs to be done, and they know how to do it. Recommended actions for leaders are to simply sense the situation and environment, categorize the situation based upon previous experiences, and respond accordingly with proven processes, procedures, actions and decisions.<sup>11</sup>



**Figure 1. Five Domains of the Cynefin Framework.**

The complicated domain represents more difficult problems and situations where problems are still ordered, but leaders may not personally have the requisite knowledge and skills for making decisions. However they know that necessary experts are available to address them. In this domain, challenges increase in ambiguity and the cause and effect relationships are less clear. Additionally, the complicated domain represents the known unknowns; leaders know what needs to be done, but uncertainty exists in how and/or who will address them. Heifetz et al. allude to this when recognizing some challenges may actually have both technical and adaptive characteristics,<sup>12</sup> thus underscoring the importance of depicting the confines of the domains in a less discrete manner.

Snowden and Boone's complex domain

begins to represent the environment described by Heifetz et al.'s adaptive challenges; an environment where the exercise of adaptive leadership becomes essential. Problems in the complex domain present leaders with unordered situations where neither the leader nor members of the organizations have previous experiences in the environment, and where no clear cause and effect relationships exist to provide clarity to the situation. Further, in the complex domain no outside experts exist with the requisite knowledge to address the challenges. The complex domain represents unknown unknowns; leaders have no previous experience with the problem and ideas to move forward, there's no one to turn to for expert knowledge, and leaders are uncertain of types of information needed to start addressing the problems. Because of the uncertain nature

### What's the Problem: Research or Thinking?

After completing the Suez Canal, in the 1880s Frenchman Ferdinand De Lesseps led construction on the largest, most costly single effort ever attempted. He soon found building a 50 mile canal through the uncharted jungles of Panama would challenge both men and equipment in unimaginable ways. His efforts failed when he was unable to solve unexperienced financial, engineering, environmental and health challenges. More specifically, despite initial research efforts on the mosquito as an airborne transmitter of disease, De Lesseps and others ignored these indicators, contributing to the death of over 5,000 of 22,000 workers due to yellow fever.

De Lesseps was not alone. Upon assuming control of the canal project in 1903, U.S. leaders faced similar problems in protecting the health of its estimated 50,000 workers. Contributing was the refusal of Canal Commission and U.S. political leaders to believe mosquitoes carried diseases such as yellow fever and malaria, and believed the mosquito theory would only waste both time and money. Yet, between 1904 and 1913, almost 5,600 workers would die from environmental conditions.

Fortunately, Dr. William C. Gorgas thought differently and stood as an advocate for the eradication of the mosquito to mitigate yellow fever. In contrast to those who believed the theory of mosquito-borne infection as “balderdash”, he remained steadfast that mosquito transmission of disease was a “scientifically determined fact.” In the face of intense opposition, learned differently, took action eliminate breeding grounds, and eventually eradicated the threat of mosquito-transmitted diseases in the Canal Zone.

It seems inconceivable today the minds of men could be so closed. Dr. Gorgas' challenges underscore the importance of thinking differently. His experience also suggests ideas have a period of extrinsic incubation, particularly if they are contrary to what appears as common sense.<sup>16</sup>

### Narrative 1.

of the complex domain, the framework suggests leaders must probe to gain more information, sense and make sense of new information to build awareness and understanding, and respond with appropriate actions from both leader and organizational member perspectives. One can easily see how this environment would require different leader actions and behaviors.

Snowden and Boone provide two additional domains: chaotic and disorder. The authors describe the chaotic context as, “...searching for the right answers is pointless: The relationships between cause and effect are impossible...and no manageable pattern exists – only turbulence.”<sup>13</sup> Thus, chaotic represents the domain of the unknowables. Here, conditions are so unique and different that leaders have no previous frame of reference, no idea of the information needed, and no idea of how to find it. Understandably, when these conditions exist the best recommendation for leaders is to, “staunch the bleeding”<sup>14</sup> Not surprisingly, it also represents conditions that will, “...be the best place for leaders to impel innovation.”<sup>15</sup> One can easily see how conditions in the chaotic domain take complexity to higher

levels, as well as place significantly greater demands upon leaders.

If the chaotic domain represents the greatest conceivable challenges, disorder represents the scariest scenarios for leaders. Here, events are in such a state of disequilibrium that leaders can make no sense of the events, much less their causes or ways forward.

Narrative 1 above illustrates how building the Panama Canal presented multiple levels of complexity and costs. Construction of the canal in the late 1800s and early 1900s illustrates adaptive problems and Cynefin's domains. Ferdinand De Lesseps is credited for leading the construction of the Suez Canal in the late 1800s. Since the Suez was designed as a sea-level waterway, the challenges he faced were complicated, however engineering skills and processes existed to overcome the challenges. Further, although the desert conditions presented numerous environment problems, leaders and their workforce were up to the task with only minor adjustments to the status quo.

Unfortunately, when De Lesseps assumed

leadership of building a canal in Panama to link the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, conditions were anything but routine. Not only was Panama's terrain not conducive to a sea-level canal that challenged his existing engineering techniques and processes (most of which he never solved), his workers were decimated by health issues - yellow fever among the most deadly.

After De Lesseps' failure, the United States assumed control of the canal project and, not surprisingly, was confronted with the same engineering and health challenges. Focusing on the health issues, although medical research in Cuba had previously linked yellow fever and malaria with the mosquito, few chose to believe it. Worse yet, they accepted untold deaths as the cost of doing business in a jungle environment, and did little to address systemic causes. As the narrative's title asks, "What's the problem: research or thinking?"

## Leader Challenges

Cynefin's complex domain suggests the need for leaders to probe, sense and respond. Thus, a logical question emerges: what are the implications and considerations for leaders when exercising adaptive leadership? Heifetz et al. provide suggestions. The first is differentiating between leadership and authority. Most associate leadership with "...authoritative expertise, and...holding a high position in a political or organizational hierarchy."<sup>17</sup> Northouse suggests this orientation as leading through legitimate sources "Associated with having status or formal job authority."<sup>18</sup> However, effective adaptive leadership requires an inclusive approach to leadership. Because of the nature of a complex environment, it requires more than mere positional authority, as well as a fundamental belief that "...anyone can exhibit leadership."<sup>19</sup> It also demands a willingness to learn.

Heifetz states, "...adaptive challenges demand learning. An adaptive challenge exists when the people themselves are the problem

and when progress requires a retooling...of their own ways of thinking and operating."<sup>20</sup> While most organizations would cringe at the thought of not learning, that doesn't necessarily mean they embrace it. Some suggest hierarchical organizations may be the least receptive to new learning due to well-entrenched cultures. Writing specifically to militaries in general, British Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely suggests variables such as a tendency toward anti-intellectualism and the inability to accept and accommodate criticism as particularly important impediments to learning.<sup>21</sup> However, do not think militaries are unique in this regard. An unwillingness to learn represents a major hurdle for all organizations, hierarchical or not. This leads to shifting leadership responsibilities.

**...hierarchical organizations may be the least receptive to new learning due to well-entrenched cultures.**

As mentioned earlier, Snowden and Boone suggest the complex domain presents leaders with situations where neither the leader nor members of the organizations have previous experience, and where no clear cause and effect relationships exist to provide clarity.<sup>22</sup> Understandably, this environment presents unique challenges to leaders accustomed to providing directions to their organizations based upon their experience and expertise. Heifetz suggests an adaptive environment requires leaders to shift responsibility to the stakeholders, and requires "... a different form of deliberation and a different way of taking responsibility. In doing adaptive work, responsibility needs to be felt in a far more widespread fashion."<sup>23</sup> Additionally, the exercise of adaptive leadership also places greater demands on junior leaders, possibly accustomed to waiting for directives from the top before acting, as well as senior

## **Iraq: Technical or Adaptive?**

In 2003 the U.S. invaded Iraq on the basis of poor intelligence and even poorer planning at the national level. Intelligence was a house of cards. The Administration was determined to go to war with Iraq. It was stated that if inspectors find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), that would mean Saddam was cheating based on UN mandates. Conversely, if no WMDs were found it meant Saddam was hiding them; either way the U.S. was going to war.

These conditions led to distrust among the civilian and military leadership at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD). For example, when queried, the Army Chief of Staff suggested on Capitol Hill that the postwar occupation force should be on the order of 300,000 Soldiers to guarantee safety and security within Iraq. However, both the Secretary of Defense and his deputy downplayed this number citing a figure of 30,000, while excoriating the Army Chief in the press and on Capitol Hill. This bothered many, as most knew they lacked necessary information and experience to support such a decision with such “rock hard” certainty. They (DoD) asked for expert advice, they received it, and then they ignored it.

Postwar interagency planning also stumbled in early 2003. In February 2003, the head of post-war Iraq planning convened a meeting of government experts to discuss postwar Iraq. The session was notable because it was the sole occasion before the war when all factions within the U.S. government met; with over 155 attendees, including foreign representatives. This was the first time all the interagency organizations sat down and discussed in detail activities each had in the postwar efforts. Combat operations were initiated on the morning of 20 March 2003.

A 2005 Rand Study surmised that postwar reconstruction was only generally addressed, largely because that task was not considered difficult.<sup>24</sup>

## **Narrative 2.**

leaders willing to develop junior leaders with capacity to accept increased responsibilities.

To illustrate, U.S. leaders’ actions and decisions prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as described in Narrative 2 above effectively illustrate gaps in exercising adaptive leadership. While criticism of U.S. civilian and military senior leaders continue to this day, it is clear the real complexity of the problem was misread from the start. Did leaders frame the problems as technical or adaptive? The argument still rages and the decisions of those leaders are still debated. However, 14 years later the cost to U.S. lives and treasure continues to increase. Why wasn’t necessary change recognized and implemented? Adaptive leadership’s importance to affecting change may hold part of the answer.

Inherent in adaptive leadership is leading necessary change in organizations and overcoming resistance. In overcoming resistance, a major concern for leaders during periods of change is, “to distinguish between what is precious and essential and what is expendable within their culture.”<sup>25</sup> Naturally

this presents another significant challenge for leaders, as “adaptive work generates resistance in people because adaptation requires us to let go of certain elements of our past ways of working or living, which means to experience loss....”<sup>26</sup> Thus, “The source of resistance that people have to change is not resistance to change per se; it is resistance to loss.”<sup>27</sup> Adaptive leader behaviors can help mitigate member dissonance when retaining the essential elements of organizational culture while jettisoning the expendable, all while minimizing the perceptions of loss by members. However, there is one hidden element of an organization’s culture that may have the greatest impact; tolerance to mistakes.

Adaptive leadership, by necessity, requires a tolerance to mistakes. The Cynefin framework suggests in the complex domain the initial leader action required is to probe. Understandably, “probe” means to take chances; to experiment. Heifetz states, “...dealing with adaptive challenges requires a comfort with not knowing where to go or how to move next.”<sup>28</sup> This is not the domain for a zero defects mindset. Mistakes

## **Zika: Today's Adaptive Challenge**

The recent outbreak of the mosquito-borne Zika virus well illustrates a contemporary problem ripe for adaptive leadership. As described by National Geographic, Zika is "...a virus unknown to most people until recent days... and now suddenly the subject of somber warnings from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization, which announced on Thursday that the virus is 'spreading explosively.'"

Although experts know Zika's tragic effects on pregnant mothers and their babies, and that it is primarily spread by the *Aedes aegypti*, commonly referred to as the yellow fever mosquito, other contributing factors are not so well known. Rather, "This is a story of biogeography as well as medicine and public health, and of the consequences of human travel and transport." In short, easy answers do not exist, and technical solutions alone will not suffice to control mitigate Zika's spreading impact.

National Geographic concludes by stating, "This is not something that is merely happening to us, a cosmic misfortune, a one-off event over which we must get up on our hind legs and howl at our governments for insufficient diligence. It is, on the contrary, a result of things we do as a modern society—traveling, transporting people and things speedily around the globe, having babies to the point where there are more than seven billion of us on this planet, so that we now represent an irresistible resource for any virus that can adapt to preying upon us—and it's part of a longer, broader pattern."<sup>33</sup>

### **Narrative 3.**

and experimentation are inextricably linked. Further, adaptive challenges require leaders to tolerate disagreement, as "Conflict becomes an engine of innovation, rather than solely a source of dangerous inefficiency."<sup>29</sup> Leonard and Straus refer to creative abrasion as, "different approaches to grate against one another in a productive process..."<sup>30</sup> However, this abrasion, or conflict, has the potential to become a greater obstacle when considering the importance of time.

Leaders must understand adaptive challenges require time and patience to navigate. Whereas a top-driven "I want it now" leadership mentality may work when confronting technical challenges, it will not when confronted with an adaptive challenge. When reviewing the above discussions on new learning, developing leaders and shifting responsibility, distinguishing cultural imperatives, and experimentation, it becomes apparent these transformations will not occur overnight. They take time, and they require patience. Compounding the necessity for more time and patience is a requirement to not only interpret mind shifts from the technical to the adaptive, but also shifts from the benign to the conflictual, and the individual to the systemic.<sup>31</sup> These new interpretations require

time and patience not only from the leader, but also from organizational members. Heifetz writes, "Because it is so difficult for people to sustain prolonged periods of disturbance and uncertainty, human beings naturally engage in a variety of efforts to restore equilibrium as quickly as possible, even if it means avoiding adaptive work and begging off the tough issues."<sup>32</sup> This understanding further underscores the importance of effective adaptive behaviors in truly complex and adaptive environments.

### **Adaptive Behaviors and Activities**

As described in Narrative 3 above, the Zika virus' explosive spread throughout the world provides a problem ripe for the exercise of adaptive leadership. While many have addressed various means of identifying and categorizing complex and ambiguous problems, few have provided suggestions for addressing leader behaviors necessary for organizations to not only cope with new environments, but also succeed and thrive in those environments. Fortunately, forward-thinking organizations such as the Kansas Leadership Center,<sup>34</sup> and authors such as Northouse provide suggested intervention behaviors.<sup>35</sup> Which of the following behaviors and activities are essential for addressing Zika?

### **Battle of Ia Drang: Getting on the Balcony**

Hal Moore believed, “you had to soak up firsthand information for your instincts to operate accurately.”<sup>40</sup> This led him to lead from the front. However, this belief was sorely put to the test in the highly complex battle for the Ia Drang Valley.

As the battle’s tempo increased, Moore was standing in the open coordinating troop movements, air strikes and artillery, and had to resist the temptation to get involved in the direct fire fight surrounding him. As he was yelling, waving, hand-signaling and talking on the radio he felt his sergeant major’s hand on his shoulder while shouting at him, “Sir, if you don’t find some cover you’re going to go down-and if you go down, we all go down”<sup>41</sup>

#### **Narrative 4.**

Given the urgency of the problem, the first may present the most difficult for leaders.

#### ***Get on the Balcony.***

The first behavior of “getting on the balcony”<sup>36</sup> may appear difficult at first as it runs counter to the “leading from the front, hands-on approach” espoused throughout leadership careers. However, the behavior and discipline to do so are essentials to adaptive leadership. Northouse leans heavily on the work of Heifetz et al. and writes, “‘getting on the balcony’ is a metaphor for stepping out of the fray and finding perspective in the midst of a challenging situation.”<sup>37</sup> (See Narrative 4 above.)

Exercising over-watch behaviors outside the noise and confusion of the situation provides senior leaders much-needed reflection to gain big-picture awareness and understanding, as well as help to “...identify value and power conflicts among people, ways they may be avoiding work, and other dysfunctional reactions to change.”<sup>38</sup> However, just because a leader takes an over-watch position does not mean the leader disassociates from the challenge; quite the opposite. Instead, “getting on the balcony” allows perspective necessary for exercising the second activity: identify adaptive challenges.<sup>39</sup>

#### ***Identify Adaptive Challenges.***

“Identify adaptive challenges” appears intuitive given earlier discussions. However, the difficulty lies in tendencies for leaders to misinterpret situations where initially perceived technical challenges are actually adaptive.

Snowden and Boone suggest one of the greatest pitfalls for leaders is interpreting a problem as routine, when in reality it deserves much greater attention. They state, “...when things appear to be going smoothly, leaders often become complacent. If the context changes a leader is likely to miss what is happening and react too late... this shift can bring about catastrophic failure.”<sup>42</sup> Misdiagnosis is especially dangerous when addressing challenges related to organizational members. Northouse writes, “When people’s beliefs, attitudes, and values are affected by a problem, leaders need to take an adaptive approach.”<sup>43</sup> This holds especially true if organizational changes strike at core beliefs, emotions and required learning of the organization’s members.<sup>44</sup> This leads to the third activity and associated behavior: regulate distress.

#### ***Regulate Distress.***

Stress exists in all organizations, and rightfully so. Every individual or organization requires stress to achieve productivity. The term eustress recognizes this. Derived from the Greek word eustress consists of “eu,” meaning well or good, plus the word stress. Quick, Quick, Nelson, and Hurrell define eustress it as, “the healthy, positive, constructive outcome of stressful events and the stress response.”<sup>45</sup> Eustress contributes to positive inputs and variables that combine to contribute to success. However, stress can also have a down side. Quick et al. define distress as “the degree of physiological, psychological,

and behavioral deviation from an individual's healthy functioning."<sup>46</sup> While many variables create and contribute to distress, hopefully leaders themselves are not the primary source. McCollum and Broadbudd suggest leaders have the potential to unintentionally inject harmful stress into their organizations through their level of emotional intelligence, leadership styles, and application of power and control.<sup>47</sup>

Northouse provides leader actions to help regulate distress: creating a holding environment, providing direction and productive norms, and ensuring protection and reducing conflict. Adaptive leaders exercise most of these steps well before finding themselves facing true adaptive problems. For example, holding environments are established long before leaders and organizations find themselves in adaptive situations. A positive holding environment requires a culture conducive to growth and a climate of trust where, "people feel safe in tackling problems, but not so much they can avoid the problem."<sup>48</sup> In an adaptive leadership context, a holding environment is described as, "...structural, procedural, or virtual space formed by cohesive relationships between people... the space where adaptive work plays out."<sup>49</sup> The concept of a positive holding environment is not unique, however its benefits are essential during periods of increased stress caused by turbulent, adaptive situations.

Direction and productive norms are also established well in advance. The concept of direction aligns well with Northouse's transformational discussion of vision. Organizational vision provides, "...an image of an attractive, realistic, and believable future."<sup>50</sup> Another benefit of vision is it allows, "... people within the organization to learn how they fit in with the overall direction of the organization...."<sup>51</sup> While concepts such as vision and direction appear long-term in nature, they provide even greater value in stressful adaptive situations, as even the best of organizations

experience at least temporary dissonance caused by unknown, unclear, and competing goals.<sup>52</sup>

Along with direction comes expectations in the form of productive norms. Norms provide, "... rules of behavior that are established and shared by group members and are not easily changed."<sup>53</sup> Productive norms provide needed consistency for members during periods of adaptive stress, as well as established benchmarks for leaders when navigating adaptive issues under changing conditions.

**...leaders have a responsibility to regulate, or protect their organizations from the rate of adaptive change.**

Finally, protection and conflict management are each important considerations for regulating distress. While adaptive change is necessary, leaders have a responsibility to regulate, or protect their organizations from the rate of adaptive change. Too much, or too little, can have adverse implications. Similarly, conflict management remains a responsibility for leaders during periods of adaptive change. As mentioned earlier, Leonard's "creative abrasion" is necessary for creativity and innovation, as well as to spur and foster growth. Conversely, unmanaged conflict can understandably add to organizational distress.

### ***Maintain Disciplined Attention.***

Even in the best of organizations, Northouse suggests members may shy away from adaptive work. Since change is inherent in adaptive conditions, leaders must understand, "...people naturally do not want to confront change, particularly when it is related to changing their beliefs, values, or behaviors." This is especially important when organizational members are in a state of unanticipated disequilibrium. Their reluctance to change places unique demands on

leaders. When leading in this environment, to maintain disciplined attention leaders must realize there is no “one size fits all” leadership approach. While the purpose of this discussion is not to address all possible leadership styles, Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee provide six styles commonly found among executive leaders; visionary, coaching, affiliative, democratic, pacesetter, and commanding.<sup>55</sup> When applied correctly, each possesses utility given the environment and circumstances. However, one or two may not suffice to maintain disciplined attention. Instead, Goleman’s research concludes, “Leaders who have mastered four or more - especially the authoritative, democratic, affiliative, and coaching styles - have the very best climate and business performance.”<sup>56</sup> This conclusion may have even greater importance in highly complex environments requiring adaptive leadership to maintain disciplined attention.

### ***Give the Work Back to the People.***

While members of organizations naturally want guidance and direction, Northouse writes, “...too much leadership and authority can be debilitating, decrease people’s confidence to solve problems on their own, and suppress their creative capacities.”<sup>57</sup> Further, not only can too much leader control contribute to harmful stress,<sup>58</sup> it can also create an overdependence on leaders inhibiting their ability to do adaptive work. Instead of limiting delegation to others, Northouse suggests adaptive leaders should say, “This is your work – how do you want to handle it?”<sup>59</sup> In essence, giving the work back to the members contributes to empowerment necessary for commitment. However, in a true environment of empowerment, creativity often originates from unusual sources.

### ***Protect Leadership Voices from Below.***

This behavior means listening to and protecting thoughts and ideas from all sources, regardless of rank, power, position, or social acceptance. Leonard and Strauss allude to this when suggesting, “Look for the ugly duckling” when seeking creativity.<sup>60</sup> Adaptive work requires members who think differently. Whereas traditional thinkers may be well-suited for contributing to technical solutions, they may be ill-suited for the out-of-the-ordinary adaptive problems requiring creativity. By not protecting the unusual voices, regardless of rank or status, leaders may deprive the organization and themselves from creative minds with the capacity to excel in addressing adaptive problems.

## **Conclusion**

Historical examples in Panama and Iraq illustrate leader deficiencies in thinking and leading adaptively, and the jury is still out on Zika. Adaptive problems require leaders comfortable with leading and making decisions in highly complex environments, environments that require both survival and improvement. To do so, they must seek to understand and recognize adaptive problems, explore new behaviors and lead differently, personally learn and develop learning organizations, include all members in leading, experiment, and exercise patience when addressing complexity. If understood and well executed through effective behaviors and actions, adaptive leadership will make a difference. Moreover, investments in research and development will never reach their full potential without leaders capable of leading and navigating through the future’s uncharted complexities. To do so, adaptive leadership may well represent the leader’s advantage. **IAJ**

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# Avoiding a New Berlin Conference:

## A Framework for U.S. – Chinese Economic Cooperation in West Africa

*by Kevin Peel, Justin Reddick, John Hoeck and Cynthia Dehne*

In November 1884, representatives from 14 nations met in Germany to negotiate differences and formalize their colonial aspirations at the Berlin Conference. The result of the conference was to split the continent into spheres of influence of the main European powers, or what history has labeled the “Scramble for Africa.” The borders created for these colonies disregarded the ethnic, religious, or cultural identities of the native populations and had, in large part, become the borders of the modern nations of Africa, especially in the region of West Africa. While every representative to that conference would have spoken about how they worked the best agreement for their nation’s interests while preserving the peace among the major powers, the unintended consequences of their actions are still creating conflicts and costing lives over 130 years later.

Entering the second decade of the twenty-first century, a new “Scramble for Africa” has begun to emerge with a vast expansion of Chinese trade and investment on the continent, and

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the U.S. government looking to readdress its interests as it begins to fall behind. China's long-term presence posture has allowed Beijing to forge strong diplomatic relations with African governments and earn high favorability ratings among its populations, as it has grown into the continent's largest trading partner. However, there is growing concern among both foreign and West African observers that China's continued investment in the region is contingent on its ability to access natural resources, rather than on its intent to improve living conditions or economic growth. As the two global powers maneuver to secure their interests, it is critical that the interests of the local populations and the future development of their nations also be considered.

Despite the differences in approach, the U.S. and China have shared interests in West Africa—mainly, the building and maintaining of strong and secure nations. Through a cooperative, balanced strategy, the U.S. government and People's Republic of China (PRC) can achieve mutual economic success. Such cooperation brings four additional impacts, all adding to stability in the region:

- The containment or destruction of violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
- The ability to prevent and respond to pandemics or other serious health concerns.
- Increased ability of nations to effectively govern themselves, relatively free of corruption.
- An economic environment where the U.S., China, and the nations of West Africa can collectively prosper.

### **Chinese and U.S. Economics in West Africa**

The U.S. government and the PRC approach economic aid to West African nations with

two very different strategies. First, the U.S., through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), seeks to maintain elements of free and fair societies in countries that are recipients of aid. To do so, each agency stipulates conditions that must be met before any aid distribution. MCC looks at data points in three categories: ruling justly; investing in people; and encouraging economic freedom.<sup>1</sup> The goals of projects initiated by the MCC are reducing poverty and spurring economic growth in a country or region, geared toward increasing the quality of life of a population. The projects funded by MCC are tailored and highly supervised to ensure that each project does not fall victim to political corruption.

**Despite the differences in approach, the U.S. and China have shared interests in West Africa—mainly, the building and maintaining of strong and secure nations.**

While USAID shares MCC's commitment to economic growth and prosperity through aid projects, stipulations for aid distribution is more effect-based, rather than focused on qualities of free and fair government. In order for aid dispersal or project initiation, USAID requires that it specifically be tied to a criterion or criteria in one of the following broad categories: peace and security; democracy, human rights, and government; health, including education; economic growth, including environmental issues; humanitarian assistance; capacity building; gender; youth; and issues crossing multiple categories.<sup>2</sup> Because the U.S. government attaches certain conditions to aid in West Africa, many projects either never come to fruition or go unfinished due to changes in a country's political and human rights

environment.

The PRC, on the other hand, is mostly concerned with resource extraction from West African nations and the transportation/export of those resources back to China. To secure mineral rights, the PRC issues cash aid to pay off Western or international loans or develops infrastructure within a nation, mainly with the goal of easing resource export. While the PRC has funded and constructed other means of aid—ranging from hospitals and schools to university scholarships and cultural exchange centers—its foreign aid activity in West Africa is largely “no-strings attached” with regard to democratic governance and human rights.<sup>3</sup> As such, the PRC, using state-owned companies, gains easy and inexpensive access to West African minerals and resources, with little or no concern for the internal affairs of the nations at hand.

**The PRC... is mostly concerned with resource extraction from West African nations and the transportation/export of those resources back to China.**

According to a Congressional Research Service report in 2012, Chinese-African trade surpassed U.S.-African trade in 2009, and the gap has continued to widen since.<sup>4</sup> However, polls conducted by Gallup, Afrobarometer, and Pew Research reveal these investments have not had a proportionally negative affect on West African views of the U.S., despite marked improvements in West African perceptions of China.

The Spring 2015 Pew Research poll examined Chinese perceptions in Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. The percentage of respondents who held a favorable view of China were 70 percent in Nigeria and Senegal and 80 percent in Ghana. However, when asked about their views of the U.S., respondents from those nations were also

overwhelmingly positive. Nigerians held a 76 percent, Senegal an 80 percent, and Ghana an 89 percent favorable rating of the U.S., the second highest in the world.<sup>5</sup> From 2014–2015, Afrobarometer, an African-led research network, found that 67 percent of Liberians chose the U.S. when asked which country is the best model for future development. That was the highest of all 36 nations surveyed, and 15 percent higher than any other nation that responded in favor of the U.S.<sup>6</sup>

Of the nations in the 2015 Pew Research poll, the U.S. conducted the least trade and foreign investment with Senegal since 2006. However, there has been a significant increase in the volume of trade between the two countries. In 2006, the U.S. exported \$96.9 million worth of goods (in U.S. dollars) to Senegal and imported \$20.7 million. By 2016, those figures grew to \$169.6 million and \$51.3 million respectively.<sup>7</sup> Over that same period, foreign direct investment (FDI) between the U.S. and Senegal decreased, from \$19 million in stock in 2006 to \$14 million in 2015.<sup>8</sup>

Over the same period, there has been a significant increase in the favorability rating of the U.S. in Senegal. According to a 2006 Gallup poll, 66 percent of adults ages 15 and older surveyed expressed approval of the U.S.<sup>9</sup> However, the Pew Research Center poll of American favorability ratings in 2015 showed that 80 percent of Senegalese surveys held a favorable view of the U.S., despite the decreased FDI.<sup>10</sup> This corresponds with the aforementioned Afrobarometer survey regarding the best economic model for development, where 33 percent of Senegalese favored the U.S., compared to 28 percent for China.<sup>11</sup>

Over the same period, Senegal and China experienced a substantial increase in trade with total trade volume (exports and imports) increasing from \$196.7 million in 2005, to \$845.3 million in 2012, and then to over \$2.3 billion in 2015.<sup>12</sup> Chinese FDI stock in Senegal

rose from \$2.35 million in 2005 to \$45.03 million just five years later, according to the PRC Ministry of Commerce.<sup>13</sup> This increase in both trade and investment may account for the high favorability rating that China currently enjoys with Senegal. In the Pew Research survey conducted in 2015, 70 percent of Senegalese held a favorable view of China, with only 11 percent responding with an unfavorable view.<sup>14</sup> This is supported by the Afrobarometer poll, which asked the Senegalese if they thought that Chinese economic and political influence in their country was mostly positive, mostly negative, or if they had not heard enough to say. 65 percent of Senegalese surveyed responded that they felt Chinese influence was a positive influence on the country.<sup>15</sup>

In contrast to Senegal, Ghana has been one of the largest trading and investment partners of the U.S. in West Africa. In 2006, U.S. exports to Ghana totaled \$289.5 million, while imports were \$192.2 million. Ten years later, those numbers climbed to \$783.4 million and \$287.7 million respectively.<sup>16</sup> American FDI stock in Ghana dwarfs the totals of Senegal, with a total of \$3.1 billion reported in 2013, an increase from \$974 million in 2006. Ghana also has \$37 million in FDI within the U.S. and is one of the few West African nations with a reciprocal investment in the U.S.<sup>17</sup>

The result of this significant increase in American trade and investment is an improvement of already stellar favorability ratings among the Ghanaian people. According to the 2007 Pew Research Global Indicators Database, when polled on perceptions of the U.S., 80 percent of Ghanaians responded favorably. In 2015, the favorable response to the same question among Ghanaians climbed to 89 percent.<sup>18</sup> The 2014–2015 Afrobarometer survey further confirms this strong American favorability, with 37 percent choosing the U.S. as the best model for future development compared to only 15 percent that responded for China.<sup>19</sup>

This large increase in American trade with Ghana after 2006 pales in comparison with the explosion of trade between Ghana and China. In 2006, total trade between China and Ghana stood at an impressive \$882.8 million, with \$803.1 million being Chinese imports. By 2015, total trade volume had swelled to \$6.6 billion, with \$5.31 billion in Chinese exports to Ghana, compared to \$1.29 billion in Ghanaian exports to China.<sup>20</sup> Chinese investment in Ghana also increased significantly, from \$7.33 million in FDI stock in 2005 to \$202 million by 2010.<sup>21</sup>

**In contrast to Senegal, Ghana has been one of the largest trading and investment partners of the U.S. in West Africa.**

These significant increases in both trade and investment since 2005 have also led to an improvement in China's favorability score among the Ghanaian people. In 2007, the Pew Research Center survey found that 75 percent of Ghanaians surveyed held a favorable view of China, which increased to 80 percent in 2015.<sup>22</sup> However, the reaction to the rise in Chinese-Ghanaian trade, especially with Chinese imports, has not been entirely positive. The 2014–2015 Afrobarometer survey asked African citizens in 36 nations whether they thought Chinese economic and political influence in their country was mostly positive, mostly negative, or if they had not heard enough to say. 36 percent of Ghanaians responded that it was a negative influence, compared to 34 percent who said it was positive, the second lowest favorability of the 36 nations polled. The same survey also asked citizens if they believed Chinese economic assistance did a good or bad job of meeting their country's needs, with 41 percent responding negatively and only 30 percent responding positively.<sup>23</sup>

The resumption of peace in Liberia

corresponded to a significant boost in trade with the U.S., which stood at \$75.3 million in 2002, the final year of the civil war. In 2006, total trade volume between the two nations was \$207.7 million, with \$139.9 million being in Liberian exports to the U.S. Ten years later, that trade volume has increased slightly to \$240.6 million, with \$176.5 million in U.S. exports to Liberia.<sup>24</sup> The U.S. also increased its FDI in Liberia over that period from \$556 million in stock in 2006 to \$929 million in 2015.<sup>25</sup>

**...despite a significant increase in both trade and investment across West Africa, the gains China has made in public opinion polls have had no negative impact on perceptions of the U.S. or U.S. government in the same nations.**

Due to the historic ties with the U.S. dating back to the nation's founding, it is a common assumption Liberians have a natural favorability toward Americans. However, there have been few surveys available to gauge Liberian attitudes towards the U.S. outside of the 2014–15 Afrobarometer survey, as the Pew Research Center has not surveyed Liberians in any of its Global Attitudes Surveys in the last decade. Gallup has published just three polls including Liberia, but they centered on the opinion of the U.S. government, which can be different from attitudes towards the nation as a whole. In 2007, Liberians polled by Gallup held a 35 percent approval rating of American leadership, compared to a 12 percent disapproval. The majority of respondents, 53 percent, held no opinion of the U.S. government.<sup>26</sup> Following the election of Barak Obama in 2009, U.S. government approval in Liberia spiked to 90 percent in 2010, only to plummet to 65 percent in 2011.<sup>27</sup> In 2007, Pew Research conducted their own survey in Ghana, where the U.S.

received an 80 percent favorability rating as a whole; however, the U.S. government, and specifically the President, received only a 69 percent approval from the same respondents, which nearly matches the 70 percent result from the Gallup poll.<sup>28</sup>

China and Liberia have enjoyed a significant relationship since the turn of this century, marked by increasing levels of trade and investment. In 2006, Chinese-Liberian trade volume stood at \$531.7 million, increasing to \$1.54 billion in 2015. However, like the other two countries mentioned above, the trade is heavily weighted in China's favor, with \$1.36 billion of 2015 trade accounted for by Chinese exports to Liberia.<sup>29</sup>

Liberian opinions about China are limited by the same lack of survey data that was found for opinions on the U.S. The most in-depth survey of Liberian opinions over the last several years remains the 2014–2015 Afrobarometer survey, which did ask several questions about China. Its data revealed that Liberians largely welcomed the increased trade and investment from China. When asked how they felt about Chinese economic and political influence in their country, 81 percent of Liberians responded favorably, compared to only seven percent who responded negatively. The 81 percent favorable rating was the highest positive response of the 36 nations in the survey.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, 68 percent of Liberians believed that Chinese economic development assistance did a good job of meeting their country's needs, compared to only 20 percent who felt the Chinese were doing a poor job.<sup>31</sup>

As shown by these examples, despite a significant increase in both trade and investment across West Africa, the gains China has made in public opinion polls have had no negative impact on perceptions of the U.S. or U.S. government in the same nations. Therefore, in West Africa, it appears that influence among the populations is not a zero-sum game, removing one potential source of conflict between the two nations.

## PRC investment and West African Corruption

In 2000, *The Economist* published an article titled “The Hopeless Continent.” The article asserted that corruption would lead to an African future characterized by barbarism.<sup>32</sup> The overwhelming belief was that most African states were rife with corruption and incapable of effective governance—a belief that is still prevalent today. Western development strategies in Africa are dominated by altruism, usually focusing on humanitarian aid and the spread of liberal democratic ideas. In the past, Western strategies advocated a linear democratization approach that begins with free elections and ends when states evolve to a constitutional democracy. Western African strategies largely failed to account for culture, context, and the citizens of African nations. However, as Beijing recognized great economic opportunity in resource-rich Africa, China adopted a much different strategy that promoted complementary economic interests. With a comprehensive African strategy focused primarily on economic interests, Chinese investment in Africa grew rapidly to include trade and infrastructure aid. Instead of advocating an altruistic approach centered on “helping poor people,” they employ soft power tools and treat African states as equal trading partners. This approach allows China to quickly outmaneuver other nations, which concerns the Western powers. A broad assumption held by many in the West is that Chinese efforts—especially business ventures—increase corruption throughout the continent. When the root causes of corruption are understood, it is evident that PRC investment does not cause corruption in West Africa. Corruption in West Africa is caused by states with ineffective governance, limited transparency, and weak rule of law.

Although there is evidence that some business transactions between Africa and

China have been influenced by corruption, this does not indicate that PRC investment in West Africa directly increases corruption. However, as argued by Economist Angus Deaton, all investment aid from richer to poorer nations has the potential to cause corruption and hinder national development.<sup>33</sup> Because African governments receive aid directly, they “need no contract with their citizens, no parliament, and no tax-collection systems.”<sup>34</sup> The key to stability and preventing corruption is strengthening governance, transparency, and the rule of law. Without a solid foundation that includes these three tenets, states are weak and conflict-prone, economic development is hindered, and citizens remain poor.

**Though Africa is flush with resources, extraction and export of those resources rarely go toward improving citizens’ quality of life, mostly due to corrupt African governments.**

Though Africa is flush with resources, extraction and export of those resources rarely go toward improving citizens’ quality of life, mostly due to corrupt African governments. Corruption indexes continue to paint a dire picture, pointing to high rates of corruption in most West African nations.<sup>35</sup> The 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index show that Nigeria and Ghana failed to improve their scores. Additionally, Ghana’s score decline is the second largest in the Index, falling from a score of 47 in 2015 to 43 in 2016.<sup>36</sup>

Unfortunately, the root causes of corruption in Africa are often misunderstood. While it is easy to blame the roots of African corruption on weak institutions left in place by colonial powers, this does not address the problem in its entirety or provide any potential solutions. The international community, in tandem with leaders

from West African nations, should address corruption in the region actively. To mitigate corruption, institutions should be strengthened and governments must be held accountable. The U.S. and the PRC are in unique positions to tackle the problem of corruption, given the large economic presence each nation maintains in West Africa.

Unlike the West, China's strategy does not focus on saving or guiding a "desperate" Africa. Instead, China treats Africa as a business partner. While China directs investment efforts toward economic interests and resource extraction, the U.S. government directs aid toward the improvement of quality of life, to include humanitarian assistance, health and education, conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and rule of law programs. Both nations' efforts in West Africa are vital to building regional security and stability and paving the road for future prosperity.

**Unlike the West, China's strategy does not focus on saving or guiding a "desperate" Africa. Instead, China treats Africa as a business partner.**

In 2015, PRC President Xi Jinping unveiled a "win-win cooperation" strategy between China and Africa with a goal of fostering mutual prosperity, while allowing investors to "do good while doing right." Part of this strategy consisted of \$60 billion in Chinese aid in developing local economic capacity over three years.<sup>37</sup> The PRC also promised to cancel outstanding debts for Africa's least developed countries, provide aid for drought-stricken countries, and award scholarships to African students.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, President Xi agreed to assist with providing satellite reception to 10,000 African villages and upgrading health care facilities.

The U.S. and China can mutually benefit

from a stable and prosperous Africa. Both Beijing and Washington have crucial economic and political interests in West Africa, so peace and stability are essential. By cooperating, the U.S. and China can craft a long-term strategy that promotes peace and development ultimately advancing everyone's interests. China's presence in West Africa is not altruistically motivated, but China's involvement does not directly increase corruption. Moreover, Beijing has mobilized immense resources to advance infrastructure projects throughout the region. If projects such as these were part of a more comprehensive strategy developed in concert with the U.S. and other key international players, the benefits experienced by West Africa would be immense.

## **A Proposed Operational Approach**

For the U.S. government to maintain its level of influence and mind its interests in West African, while allowing the PRC to pursue its own interests, all while building a more stable and secure region, the following operational approach provides an option. This framework accounts for the current conditions in the region, proposes a desired end state, and relies on a whole-of-government approach, utilizing all instruments of national power.

The first step in this process is to build a sound understanding of the current conditions and desired end state for the region, taking into account current U.S. government interests and assumed PRC interests. As previously mentioned, several polls within West Africa have highlighted a positive perception of the U.S. government and its role in regional affairs, particularly after the 2014–2015 Ebola pandemic. This information was used to identify the roles currently being played by the U.S. government and the PRC in the region, and how best to achieve a desired end state that would be mutually beneficial to both nations and the region. The chosen time frame of five years represents the most realistic amount of time to fully mobilize and execute an operational

approach such as the one proposed.

To address the comparative effects of the operational approach, it is also necessary to highlight the disparity of current PRC actions in the region compared to those of the U.S. government. Also of note are the emerging West African governments that are the most susceptible to foreign influence. By using these current conditions along with the five-year time frame, the desired end states of sustained U.S. government influence in the region, greater U.S. government and PRC economic cooperation, and strong intra-regional partnerships between stable West African governments were developed, as those were achievable and sustainable. The result is an operational framework, allowing implementation that optimizes existing plans and available resources. The goal is to strengthen West African nations individually, and the region as a whole, which is in the interest of both the U.S. government and the PRC.

### ***Diplomacy: Laying the Groundwork***

**Emphasis of shared interests.** By initiating direct communication between respective diplomats and government leaders, the intent is to emphasize how cooperation vice competition can have the greatest benefit for all parties involved. It may require compromise on a number of fronts, but the establishment and continued underscoring of shared interests (in addition to mutually exclusive interests) provide a solid foundation for action.

**Initiation of joint ventures.** In this step, the U.S. government and the PRC undertake projects in West Africa by either combining efforts on a single project (new/upgraded port facilities, road ways, water treatment facilities, etc.) or by engaging in complementary efforts (U.S. government builds a hospital, PRC builds a road leading to it; U.S. government builds a school, PRC supplies busses to bring children to school, etc.). Alternatively, joint ventures

can ensure that structures are designed for and constructed with a standard voltage across an entire country or deconflict projects so both nations are not building duplicate roads, wells, or power grids. This step takes careful planning and consideration, especially with regard to how it impacts the host nation and region.

**Shared interests align.** Over time, from this strategy, currently unknown shared interests will begin to materialize. As more areas of cooperation in West Africa come to light and after the successes of joint ventures, opportunities and willingness for future cooperation will grow.

**...working with the Chinese,  
instead of competing with them,  
is to our long-term benefit.**

### ***Information: Preaching the Benefits***

**Promoting the benefits.** Perhaps the hardest part of this whole process is promoting the benefits, while simultaneously presenting policymakers on both sides with feasible and attractive options. By demonstrating the financial benefits of cooperation with Chinese projects to maximize the benefits toward local populations and host-nation government stability, decisionmakers will be more apt to provide their support. It is imperative that U.S. national interests as stated in the National Security Strategy and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa serve as the foundation to educate both decisionmakers and the U.S. population on how working with the Chinese, instead of competing with them, is to our long-term benefit. This will involve cost estimates, assessments on measures of effectiveness, and an unfiltered outlook of the impact—to both governments and to the host nations of West Africa.

**Achieve buy-in from the U.S. population.** Using U.S. tax dollars to improve other nations

is not always a popular idea and, frequently, meets staunch resistance from the U.S. population and media outlets. But this step is just as essential as the promotion of benefits, as without the support of the U.S. people, legislation authorizing actions taken in this framework would be quickly scuttled. Similarly, if the U.S. population is led to believe that the PRC is the recipient of the most benefit from cooperation, public perception would quickly sour.

**Promote successes and gains.** As projects begin to materialize and their impacts can be easily seen, a critical part of this process is displaying and selling those gains. In doing so, popular support is cemented for future ventures or areas for cooperation.

### *Military: Allowing Nations to Secure Themselves*

**Increased capacity.** Nuanced deployment of U.S. military forces can be tailored to increase the capacity of West African nations. Much of this is already taking root, via the U.S. Army National Guard State Partnership Program, the Regionally Aligned Forces construct, and a number of multinational exercises in West Africa. The focus, in line with the NSS and AFRICOM mission, is currently to counter VEOs and build capacity in some key nations in the region. With some alterations, the focus can shift to capacity building, to include training and equipping, to allow for the nations of West Africa to maintain their own physical security.

**Coordinate efforts with the AU.** Integration of coordination of efforts with the African Union (AU) will augment single-nation military capacities and forge a path for greater regional military cooperation. This places less of a counterterrorism burden on Western forces and builds stronger regional relations.

**Regional partnerships replace United Nations (UN) missions.** Ultimately UN missions in West Africa can be replaced by host-nation or regional forces. Regional nations that can contribute capable, professional forces toward the AU or handle small, regional crises themselves diminishes the need for outside nations, including the U.S. and China, to send large forces to West Africa, which will promote greater regional stability, responsible national militaries, and increased trust and support of local populations for their governments.

### *Economic: Sealing the Deal*

**Increase industry access to electricity.** Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, does not have reliable access to electricity. Considering that other cities of smaller scale in the neighboring nations likely experience the same rate of power or less, expanded access to electricity is an ideal starting point.

#### **Promote economic growth and diversification.**

Industrial access to economic diversification will not only strengthen the economy of any one nation, but the entire region. Combining Chinese investment with the U.S. Power Africa program could assist with broadening the reach of both nations' programs, while rapidly increasing power availability in targeted regions. By speeding up the access to dependable power, other investment projects from housing, to hospitals, to factories that rely on electricity could take shape through both the government and private sector and further stimulate economic growth.

## **Conclusion**

Building a secure and stable West Africa is in the mutual interests of the U.S. government and the PRC. Through cooperation between Washington and Beijing, West Africa will begin to

thrive in ways that benefit the region, the countries therein, the United States, and China alike. U.S. government and PRC leaders often tend to view their interests and approaches in the region as competitive and on a collision course. However, with cooperative and complementary efforts, each nation can continue to pursue mutual interests, while simultaneously improving the state of affairs in West Africa. **IAJ**

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# Contributors Wanted!

**The Simons Center is looking for articles that involve contemporary interagency issues at both the conceptual and the application level.**



The *InterAgency Journal* is a refereed national security studies journal providing a forum to inform a broad audience on matters pertaining to tactical and operational issues of cooperation, collaboration, and/or coordination among and between various governmental departments, agencies, and offices. Each issue contains a number of articles covering a variety of topics, including national security, counterterrorism, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and disaster preparation and response.

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# Worth Noting

## National Defense Strategy released

The first new National Defense Strategy in a decade was announced in January. The 2018 National Defense Strategy is described by Elbridge A. Colby, deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development, as “not a strategy of confrontation, but it is strategy that recognizes the reality of competition.”

The new National Defense Strategy focuses on deterring Russia and China from challenging the U.S. and its allies, and builds on the National Security Strategy announced in December 2017. In his remarks at the announcement of the strategy, Defense Secretary James N. Mattis stated that “Today, America’s military reclaims an era of strategic purpose and we’re alert to the realities of a changing world and attentive to the need to protect our values and the countries that stand with us.”

The Department of Defense’s (DoD) objectives as outlined in the strategy include:

- defending the homeland from attack;
- deterring adversaries from aggression against vital U.S. interests;
- defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense;
- dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction; and
- enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests.

Interagency cooperation is a key part of the new National Defense Strategy, which calls for the Department of Defense (DoD) to work with other U.S. government entities to “employ all dimensions of national power.” These agencies include but are not limited to the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development, intelligence community, and law enforcement. The ability to understand interagency decision-making is also recognized as a vital part of leader development.

**- Department of Defense**

## Brown-Bag lectures feature State, FEB, CIA

After August’s “standing room only” inaugural lecture, Simons Center’s InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series continued to draw crowds into Academic Year 2018.

Mr. Andrew B. Mitchell, a career Foreign Service Officer, led the discussion on November 14, providing attendees with an overview of the U.S. Department of State mission, its history and how it is currently organized. He also discussed how State operates as an important element of the U.S. national security team, as well as how it conducts foreign policy as the face of our nation around the world.

On December 12, Mr. Larry A. Hisle, executive director of the Greater Kansas City Federal Executive Board (FEB), outlined the roles and missions of the FEB and discussed the role of the FEB in the Kansas City area. He also spoke about how FEB contributes to emergency preparedness and facilitates workforce development and alternative dispute resolution.

Mr. Kevin Rousseau, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Distinguished Chair for National Intelligence Studies, conducted a presentation on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the latest lecture on January 18. Rousseau briefed on the CIA's mission as part of national security and emphasized the importance of the CIA's Associate Director for Military Affairs, which coordinates, plans, executes, and sustains worldwide activities that support CIA and DoD interaction to achieve National Security objectives.

The InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series, which is co-hosted by the CGSC Foundation's Simons Center with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS), is an extracurricular, interagency topic-focused series that is designed to enhance and enrich the CGSS curriculum. The CGSC Foundation and the Simons Center have received support for all brown-bag lectures in academic year 2018 from First Command Financial Services in Leavenworth, Kansas.

All lectures in the series are open to the public. Attendees are welcome to bring their own lunches into the conference room for the presentation. A schedule for future InterAgency Brown-Bag Lectures can be found on the Simons Center website.

- **Simons Center**

## **Interagency Counterterrorism Task Force bill moves to Senate**

The House of Representatives reviewed, debated, and passed the DHS Interagency Task Force Act of 2017 on January 9. The bill, which would authorize the participation in overseas interagency counterterrorism task forces of personnel of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was originally introduced to the committee by Representative John Rutherford (R-FL) on December 5, 2017.

The DHS Interagency Counterterrorism Task Force Act of 2017 amends Section 102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, adding subsections that state the DHS Secretary is authorized to assign department personnel to participate in overseas interagency counterterrorism task forces to facilitate the sharing of counterterrorism information, and combat the threat of terrorism and associated risks to the United States stemming from overseas sources of conflict or terrorism.

The bill was debated for forty minutes before being passed as amended in committee. It now moves on to the Senate.

- **Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives**

## **CALL highlights lessons learned from State personnel**

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) recently published a new installment in their "News From The Front" series focused on the experiences of Department of State personnel in interagency operations.

*Leveraging the Interagency: Insights from the U.S. Department of State Leadership* is a collection of articles related to U.S. national security. The articles focus on counterterrorism and interagency leadership, including articles on the Japanese embassy hostage crisis, what Foreign Service personnel need to know about working with the military, the role and history of the Foreign Policy Advisor Program, and national security policy after Iraq and Afghanistan.

Also included in *Leveraging the Interagency* is "A Window on State-Defense Relations: The POLAD System," which was originally published by the Simons Center after their March 2013 Political Advisor Conference.

*Leveraging the Interagency* provides insights, informed perspectives, and lessons and best

practices of seasoned State personnel meant to inform higher level Army and Department of Defense (DoD) personnel about the skills of State Department personnel and aims to better facilitate interagency cooperation.

**- Simons Center**

## **Africom tool helps advance women, peace, and security**

A new tool recently developed by U.S. Africa Command (Africom) is being used to measure progress in advancing women, peace, and security (WPS). The assessment tool was developed by Cori Fleaser, Africom's gender advisor, to better integrate WPS efforts into Africom's security cooperation activities.

Africom has made strides to better incorporate WPS activities when working with African security forces, however, integrating WPS into existing military planning, execution, and assessment processes is still a challenge. Fleaser's assessment tool uses open source data sets from international organizations such as the United Nations and World Health Organization to craft tailored approaches to working on WPS implementation through security cooperation activities.

While the tool has its limitations – the data used can not provide a full picture of WPS efforts – Fleaser says that it is useful to security cooperation planning in that it will point Africom in the right direction. Says Fleaser, "It does not provide a binary good/bad assessment of African partner nations. Rather, it enables the command to better understand how gender influences the security sector using quantitative data to support that analysis and opens the opportunities for working together with our partner nations to advance a mandate critical to achieving our mutual security objectives."

**- Department of Defense**

## **National Security Strategy released**

President Trump announced the new National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 18, saying "With every decision and every action, we are now putting America first." The NSS is supported by four pillars – protect the homeland, promote American prosperity, preserve peace through strength, and advance American influence.

The new NSS emphasizes strength, particularly military and economic strength, as well as increased border security and immigration reform, deterrence of cyber actors, and a commitment to "pursue terrorist threats to their source." The NSS also promises to address trade imbalances, protect American intellectual property, and "pursue cooperation with reciprocity" with other nations.

**- White House**

## **Ambassador McCarthy visits Fort Leavenworth**

In December, Ambassador (Ret.) Deborah A. McCarthy visited Fort Leavenworth as the DACOR Visiting Professor of Diplomacy for CGSC class of 2018. Ambassador McCarthy had a distinguished career of more than 30 years as a U.S. diplomat, serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania from 2013 to 2016, and directing the expansion of U.S. military and strategic communications in the Baltic region.

While at Fort Leavenworth, Ambassador McCarthy met with students and faculty of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), participating in a seminar discussion focusing on civil-military relations and leading a panel of interagency representatives in a discussion on the agencies comprising a Country Team at an overseas U.S. Embassy. McCarthy also met with students and

faculty from CGSC and the University of Saint Mary, and delivered the keynote remarks at Park University's annual Pearl Harbor Commemoration ceremony.

The DACOR Visiting Professor of Diplomacy Program is conducted in partnership with the Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired, Inc. (DACOR) organization located in Washington D.C., and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Foundation. The DACOR Visiting Professor of Diplomacy program for academic year 2018 has been made possible with support from the University of St. Mary and Park University.

**- Simons Center**

## **DHS cyber bill approved by House**

In early December 2017, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3359, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2017. The bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and creates a cybersecurity agency at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The bill streamlines the National Protection and Programs Directorate, re-designating it the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). According to Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), who introduced the bill in July, CISA "will achieve DHS's goal of creating a stand-alone operational organization, focusing on and elevating its vital cybersecurity and infrastructure security missions to strengthen the security of digital America and our nation's critical infrastructure."

CISA will be headed by a Director of National Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, staffed by personnel from various related agencies, and will consist of a cybersecurity division, an infrastructure security division, and an emergency communications division.

**- U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee**

## **USAID Administrator testifies before House Subcommittee**

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Ambassador (Ret.) Mark Green spoke on the subject of USAID's role in international development and U.S. national security at a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs on November 1.

In his opening statement, Green spoke about the necessity of Department of Defense and USAID cooperation in U.S. foreign policy, citing the agencies' recent combined efforts responding to disasters in Latin American and the Caribbean. When later speaking about his experience at USAID, Green said that he was "struck by the level of humanitarian need" and noted the growing level of need. Green answered questions about proposed changes to the budget, including programs that have been eliminated, and USAID's plans to address pressing humanitarian problems. Members of the subcommittee inquired after the empowerment of women and girls, wildlife trafficking as a form of terrorist financing, famine aid, and bolstering diversity in programming, among other soft power diplomacy efforts.

Chairman Hal Rogers (R-KY) asked about USAID's "chronic management problems," including coordinating with other agencies and communicating about their programs and funding. Green stressed USAID's commitment to congressional consultation, constant dialog, and the sharing of ideas. Chairman Rogers also expressed concern about the planned reorganization of USAID, for which Rogers said the committee has not received updates. Green promised the committee would be consulted in the future.

**- U.S. Agency for International Development**

## **Interagency response needed for opioid crisis**

On October 26, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Elaine Duke released a statement on DHS's role in responding to the opioid crisis. Duke's statement followed President Trump's announcement that he would direct the Department of Health and Human Services to declare the opioid crisis a public health emergency.

In her statement, Duke stated that DHS will focus primarily on supply reduction, working with international and U.S. interagency partners to stem the flow of illicit opioids into the U.S. She also laid out DHS's tasks, including Coast Guard Patrols, Customs and Border Protection apprehensions, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement investigations.

**- Department of Homeland Security**

## **New office at DHS to counter WMDs**

Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen announced in December 2017 the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office. The new office is established at a time when "The United States faces rising danger from terrorist groups and rogue nation states," said Secretary Nielsen.

According to Nielsen, "DHS is moving towards a more integrated approach, bringing together intelligence, operations, interagency engagement, and international action. As terrorism evolves, we must stay ahead of the enemy and the establishment of this office is an important part of our efforts to do so."

The mission of the CWMD Office is to counter attempts by terrorists to other threat actors to carry out an attack against the United States or its interests using a WMD. The office will lead DHS efforts to counter WMD threats and allow for greater policy coordination and strategic planning, while providing greater visibility for DHS's CWMD mission.

The CWMD Office will be led by Mr. James McDonnell, Director of the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.

**- Department of Homeland Security**

## **Interagency task force created to combat illicit opioids**


On October 23, U.S. Representative Evan Jenkins (R-W.Va.) introduced legislation aimed at combating the opioid epidemic. The Fentanyl and Heroin Task Force Act creates an interagency task force focused on eradicating the illicit fentanyl and heroin trade.

Representative Katherine Clark (D-Mass.) co-sponsored the legislation. In her remarks, Rep. Clark spoke about how the opioid crisis has ravaged communities, saying "We hear it in the painful cries of ailing newborns, we see it on the faces of desperate parents, and we grieve it in our ever-expanding cemeteries."

The task force would be made up of representatives from multiple U.S. government and law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, among others. The task force would also work with state and local law enforcement agencies.

**- Congressman Evan Jenkins**

# Book Review




## **A Life in Code: Pioneer Cryptanalyst Elizebeth Smith Friedman** **G. Stuart Smith**

McFarland Publishing, 2017, 240 pp..

## **Code Warriors: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union**

**Stephen Budiansky**

Vintage Books, 2017, 432 pp.



**Reviewed by Kevin Rousseau**

**Central Intelligence Agency**

*Distinguished Chair for National Intelligence Studies*

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College*

After more than a decade grappling with non-state actors, U.S. intelligence officers turned to consider how to support the military in major combat operations against a peer threat, something the U.S. had not experienced in over 20 years. The time was 1941, and the world of U.S. cryptanalysis<sup>1</sup> was about to undergo some dramatic changes. As General David Perkins recently described it, “in 1940, the U.S. Army began to learn the hard way to become a modern military force. We face indications of similar challenges today.”<sup>2</sup> The fledgling intelligence community shared that history with the military, and today faces its own comparable challenges.

Two recent books cover that shared experience as it unfolded in the world of intelligence, each by exploring the early history of cryptanalysis and signals intelligence (SIGINT). A biography, *A Life in Code: Pioneer Cryptanalyst Elizebeth Smith Friedman* by G. Stuart Smith, chronicles the career of one of the intelligence community’s early trailblazers.<sup>3</sup> Honing her skills in the 1920s and 30s against rum-runners and organized crime, Elizebeth played a significant role refocusing the U.S. intelligence effort toward the Axis powers. For example, in 1941 the U.S. Navy absorbed the Coast

Guard cryptanalysis unit that Elizebeth helped stand up and develop during the pre-war years.<sup>4</sup> What challenges did she face adjusting to a new strategic environment and a changing military culture? What obstacles did she overcome adapting her civilian law enforcement cryptanalysis skills into an expanding military? Smith gives us a highly readable account of one woman's experience during this time of transition.

Of interest to readers from the military and the intelligence community will be the rocky start to interagency cooperation that emerged as various civil and military organizations worked out how to share SIGINT and cooperate to exploit it during the early years of WWII. Smith stresses Elizebeth's role bridging law enforcement and defense, and her recognition of the importance of breaking down organizational barriers by having analysts work closely with collectors and operators. Smith describes wasteful turf battles that distracted from the mission, and cumbersome bureaucratic processes that undermined the effectiveness of intelligence, driving home lessons in interagency cooperation that arguably had to be relearned again decades later.<sup>5</sup>

Partially obscured these days in the shadow of her husband—the “Dean of American Cryptology” William Friedman<sup>6</sup>—Elizebeth had a storied career of her own that was much more publicized in its time.<sup>7</sup> For her work bridging an array of various agencies, Elizebeth has been called the “Mother of the Fusion Center.”<sup>8</sup> Smith also highlights the bias against women prevalent during Elizebeth's career.<sup>9</sup> Bias that inspired the public's curiosity about her, but ironically also kept her in the background, paid her less than her male colleagues, and sometimes hindered the dissemination of her work.<sup>10</sup>

In *The Code Warrior: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union*, Stephen Budiansky approaches a similar subject from a broader perspective, examining the long history of U.S. SIGINT collection on our Soviet adversary. Picking up the story of cryptanalysis and SIGINT as it developed during and after WWII, Budiansky's history describes how the early intelligence community responded to a changing strategic environment characterized by the “global nature of communications, and thus of intelligence opportunities ripe to be exploited.”<sup>11</sup> He addresses the challenge of reviving atrophied wartime intelligence skills in Vietnam, where the National Security Agency (NSA) had to relearn “forgotten lessons about signals intelligence in a real war.”<sup>12</sup> Budiansky also notes that “all of the old fights over control of signals intelligence in the field resurfaced. The hard-won lessons from previous wars of the importance of centralization seemed to have been utterly forgotten; it was as if Korea or World War II had never happened.”<sup>13</sup>

Both authors highlight how the increasing complexity of technology gradually overwhelmed the art of the original cryptanalysts, leading to massive databases beyond the ability of a human being to calculate, and to the cryptanalyst's ever-growing reliance on computers for breaking codes. While both authors describe the technology race that drove this trend, Smith—openly acknowledging his lack of background on the technical facets of cryptanalysis—puts a more human face on his account as he traces Elizebeth's path for us. Budiansky on the other hand cannot entirely resist the temptation to overload the reader by fixating on the technology, and too many details on cryptology and its associated equipment sometimes obscure his main message. Mercifully, Budiansky has weeded out many technical aspects that are of interest but not germane to the story by compiling them in a series of five useful appendices.

Another common theme is transparency. Americans value transparency, especially by our government. We also expect our government to keep us safe and protect our national security. This creates a dilemma when we realize that some information can't be revealed if our security is to be

preserved. Budiansky describes how the “Russia Problem”—particularly the efforts to break the Soviet codes—aggravated this dilemma. The twin legacies of the dogged pursuit to stay ahead of Soviet security practices, Budiansky argues, are that NSA’s requirements were a consistent spur to technological development as well as a weight balanced in the scales between transparency and security.

Budiansky opens his book on a controversial note. It initially seems questionable that the introduction to a history of the NSA from its WWII roots to the fall of the Berlin Wall should center on Edward Snowden. Given the roles played by SIGINT and cryptanalysis in so many important events encompassed by those decades, why would anyone provide Snowden’s “reckless exposure” of national secrets such prominence? Surely there must be other more illustrative moments to highlight from NSA’s history? Indeed there are, for that name is never mentioned again beyond the author’s introductory note. As Budiansky’s history unfolds, a shadow of suspicion lingers that Snowden was thrown in to serve as a hook to the current reader, for it is clear that the story of NSA’s origins and its Cold War legacies is a story that needs no such introduction.

However, this reminder about a recent leaker of classified information does arguably have some merit. It at least supports the idea that studying the roots of the intelligence community might be helpful in analyzing our current counter-intelligence challenges, particularly the insider threat. He links Snowden to a troubling past of similar incidents, attributing their transgressions in part to an organizational culture of excessive secrecy. Budiansky discusses other analysts who, decades before Snowden, also fled to Moscow after betraying U.S. secrets, and eventually came to deeply regret their decision when they discovered that life in the Soviet Union was not so pleasant after all.<sup>14</sup>

One of Budiansky’s themes is that the characteristics NSA exhibits today stem from its earliest history and include both its impressive technical skills and its “impulse to push to the very limits claims of legal authority.”<sup>15</sup> The author argues that NSA’s eagerness to press these limits contributed to an erosion of public trust in the U.S. government. For example, Budiansky criticizes NSA sharply for “habits of mind and institutional culture that drove the agency to engage in such a breathtakingly comprehensive technological intrusion into private communications.”<sup>16</sup>

Budiansky acknowledges that the WWII SIGINT community was just one actor among many that felt compelled to pursue what was described as “justifiable wartime measures.”<sup>17</sup> Budiansky argues that the Cold War merely continued this descent down a slippery slope and “even signals intelligence could not escape the moral black hole that secrecy drew everything into.”<sup>18</sup> If there is one glaring blind spot to the story as Budiansky tells it, it is his propensity to lean toward a conspiracy-theory point of view. Not everything that goes wrong derives from nefarious intent or represents deliberate manipulation. Sometimes, like the amateurish blunders Budiansky describes during some intelligence operations in WWII, things go off the rails simply because of poor analysis, bad luck, or human error.<sup>19</sup> People make honest mistakes despite the best of intentions. There is no need to look for a conspiracy behind every mishap or wrong turn.

Smith also notes the need for official secrecy, but doesn’t address whether it affects public trust in government. That is probably because his book focuses on the life of a single individual, and the time in which she worked was one when Americans arguably had a higher degree of confidence that their government knew what was best for them. For Elizebeth, the need for secrecy surrounding her profession was never in doubt. As Elizebeth became more prominent because of her connection to some famous criminal prosecutions, reporters flocked to tell her story. People were especially interested in her because she was a woman whose expertise had lifted her to a leading role in the

emerging field of intelligence. The publicity troubled Elizebeth, however, and Smith describes her growing concern that widespread knowledge of her methods and the potential exposure of sensitive information weakened her effectiveness.<sup>20</sup>

Budiansky rounds out his history with insights into how NSA grappled with some of the more routine tasks faced by any growing organization, such as the never-ending need to find and promote good managers.<sup>21</sup> Other challenges are more unique to the intelligence world, such as maintaining objectivity and avoiding the politicization of intelligence.<sup>22</sup> His description of the challenges and trials of the SIGINT community and NSA as it expanded its role and workforce ring true. It is Budiansky's recognition of these familiar elements that gives his history an added touch of authenticity, especially for anyone who has ever served in a bureaucracy.

Budiansky is not entirely negative and does balance his account to give NSA and the SIGINT community credit for many positive accomplishments. He especially highlights the impetus SIGINT and cryptanalysis provided to the development of the U.S. computer industry.<sup>23</sup> Budiansky highlights another positive NSA trait that is not necessarily apparent to the average American: NSA employees are ordinary citizens with typical lives just like any other American.<sup>24</sup> His accounts of the social life at NSA are an interesting perspective on its history, adding a bit of humanity to his tale of technology and bureaucracy. Finally, for anyone involved in providing distance education, it will no doubt be encouraging to learn that graduates of the Army's correspondence course in cryptology contributed significantly to codebreaking triumphs.<sup>25</sup>

Smith and Budiansky's stories mesh well, and together their two books provide a complementary description of the early days of the intelligence community. As Smith and Budiansky's histories progress, they both touch upon the same systemic problems that bedeviled the intelligence community as it expanded to embrace a new strategic operating environment. It's instructive to reflect on how institutional biases, interagency rivalries, and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures emerge time and again to frustrate the effectiveness of intelligence operations.<sup>26</sup> Budiansky and Smith have done us a service by illuminating the roots of some of today's complex intelligence and interagency issues. **IAJ**

## NOTES

1 David Kahn defines cryptanalysis as "the methods of breaking codes and ciphers." David Kahn. *The Codebreakers: the Science of Secret Writing* (New York: Scribner, 1996), xvii.

2 David G. Perkins, "Multi-Domain Battle: The Advent of Twenty-First Century Warfare," *Military Review* 97, no. 6 (November-December 2017): 10.

3 Her mother intentionally spelled her first name with an 'e' after the 'z' so that she would not be called 'Eliza.' G. Stuart Smith, *A Life in Code: Pioneer Cryptanalyst Elizebeth Smith Friedman* (North Carolina: McFarland Publishing, 2017), 15.

4 Ibid., 11, 119.

5 Ibid., 128.

6 David Kahn calls William Friedman "the world's greatest cryptologist." He pioneered the field during WWI, authored leading textbooks on cryptanalysis during the interwar years, and led the team that broke the Japanese diplomatic cipher PURPLE just prior to WWII. Kahn, *The Codebreakers*, 21-23.

7 Righting an historical wrong, interest in Elizebeth Friedman's career seems to have increased. For

further reading see another recent biography of Elizebeth: Jason Fagone, *The Woman Who Smashed Codes: A True Story of Love, Spies, and the Unlikely Heroine Who Outwitted America's Enemies* (New York: Harper Collins, 2017).

8 Smith, *A Life in Code*, 6.

9 Ibid., 6.

10 Smith, *A Life in Code*, 36, 83, 123, 126, 176.

11 Stephen Budiansky, *Code Warriors: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union* (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 15.

12 Ibid., 262.

13 Ibid., 261.

14 Ibid., 220-221.

15 Ibid., xix.

16 Ibid., xviii.

17 Ibid., 35.

18 Ibid., 79.

19 Ibid., 6, 35.

20 Smith, *A Life in Code*, 105, 108.

21 Budiansky, *Code Warriors*, 176.


22 Ibid., 253.

23 Ibid., 208.

24 Ibid., 158.

25 Ibid., 48.

26 For example, in February 2016, the Central Intelligence Agency released its *Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019*, showing that although progress has been made in the intelligence world since Elizebeth's time, promoting a diverse and inclusive culture remains an important concern. The report notes that the "critical national security mission necessitates that we embrace all perspectives, honor all differences, and ensure all officers have the opportunities and tools to contribute to their full potential." "CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Releases Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019," CIA website, 9 February 2016, accessed 15 December 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2016-press-releases-statements/cia-releases-diversity-and-inclusion-strategy-for-2016-2019.html>.



## **War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Success into Political Victory**

**Nadia Schadlow**

Georgetown University Press, 2017, 344 pp.

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*War and the Art of Governance* by Dr. Nadia Schadlow is a timely and welcome book that bolsters the study of American war planning and execution. Schadlow focuses on the difficult, costly, and time-consuming reconstruction efforts often undertaken after major combat operations cease, which she refers to as “governance operations.” Governance operations are those efforts to consolidate military gains into lasting political order by controlling territory, building local institutions and governing structures, and supporting economic renewal and social service delivery. Schadlow contends that American politicians and military leaders “have consistently failed to devote appropriate attention and resources to organizing for the political requirements of military interventions.”<sup>1</sup> She argues that when “civilian and military leaders debate the use of force, they must also determine whether the U.S. has the will, organizations, and resources to go from combat successes to achieving political outcomes.”<sup>2</sup>

Schadlow begins the book by describing America’s on-and-off-again aversion to preparing for the long-term reestablishment of political order after major combat operations cease. Despite some notable successes discussed later in the book, she claims there has consistently been antipathy on the part of political and military leaders for long-term political commitments after war. She coins the phrase “American Denial Syndrome” to describe the “denial of governance activities as integral to war.”<sup>3</sup> Schadlow attributes this denial syndrome to several themes rooted in America’s political and military values and history. These themes include: “discomfort in a democracy with the idea of the military taking the lead in political activities, American concerns about colonialism, the view that civilians could take the lead in governance operations, and traditional views about what constituted war and the military profession...”<sup>4</sup>

Historically, Schadlow argues, there have been some situations where the U.S. military has effectively sought to consolidate military success into longer-term political stability. For instance, she demonstrates that the Army was relatively effective at administering governance operations during and after the Mexican-American War, Civil War, Spanish-American War, and World War I despite much of any clear guidance from political leaders in Washington D.C. Although each situation was vastly different, prominent Army generals and their staffs oversaw the reestablishment of territorial constitutions, rule of law, and administrative and judicial bodies along with, in some cases, the building of schools, roads, wells, and other public works projects. These experiences, however, highlighted the difficulty of when civilian authorities were introduced into the post-war mix, causing confusion regarding where military and civilian responsibilities began and ended. These challenges foreshadowed the tensions around unity of command and unity of effort that continue to

confound the American government today.

By the beginning of World War II (WWII), Schadlow explains, the Army had further developed its view of, and preparation for, governance operations. She claims that the Army's leadership in the reconstruction of Germany, Italy, and Japan further demonstrated it "served as a key instrument of political change in Europe and Asia, as well as a key instrument for shifting the strategic landscape to favor U.S. interests."<sup>5</sup> These experiences also highlighted that the U.S. government anticipated that substantial political and physical reconstruction, along with ensuring security, would be required after combat operations concluded. As a result, the Army put substantial resources into research and planning for that eventuality while WWII was still ongoing, illustrating the prevailing view at the time that post-hostility reconstruction was part of the overall war effort. In many respects, the planning for and execution of governance operations in postwar Europe and Asia represented America's most successful endeavor to transition from military victory to a durable political order, enabling long-term strategic success.

With the notable exception of Vietnam, Schadlow goes on to highlight several more examples of the Army ably performing stabilization activities in Korea, the Dominican Republic, and Panama during the Cold War era. Though much smaller in scale compared with governance operations in Italy, Germany, and Japan, in these cases, the Army once again undertook governance operations with scant guidance and in lieu of other civilian agencies. Civil instability in these countries demanded the Army continue to lead these operations despite ongoing concerns from politicians and civilian personnel that the army was not well-equipped to do so. Experiences in these countries, along with the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command in 1987, furthered the "separation of governance operations from 'regular war' and general-purpose forces"<sup>6</sup> and hardened the view that civil affairs activities were "purely temporary and secondary" to the "traditional combat role of the Army."<sup>7</sup>

Schadlow ends the case studies by covering the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one gets the sense that she has constrained herself from using more colorful language to describe her view of America's performance in consolidating military gains into long-term strategic victories in these theaters. She underscores the complexities of these wars and documents the struggle to maintain unity of effort and overcome bureaucratic inertia and civilian-military rivalries. Schadlow laments that these conflicts "revealed the 'missing middle'— the gap between combat operations and the steps required to achieve stability, forge a sustainable outcome, and permit the withdrawal of U.S. military forces."<sup>8</sup> She argues America's approach in these conflicts ignored hard-learned lessons from the previous 150 years and "perpetuated the belief that governance operations were not part of war."<sup>9</sup> She calls attention to the ongoing reluctance to give the responsibility for governance operations to the Army despite, in her opinion, it being the only organization that has the capability to effectively assume these responsibilities.

Schadlow concludes her book with several recommendations for political and military leaders. First, she argues "American policymakers must accept that the political dimension is indispensable across the full spectrum of war."<sup>10</sup> This means, in practice, that political and military leaders should consider governance operations as part of conventional war, not as separate and secondary to the main war effort. Second, "unity of command is essential to operational and strategic success."<sup>11</sup> She contends that civilian-military unity of effort is almost exclusively driven by personalities and relationships, concluding that in war, it is just not an effective concept. Third, she calls for civilian leaders to "give the army operational control over governance operations in war,"<sup>12</sup> because only the

Army has the size, resources, and ability to operate in dangerous environments, and logistic networks to manage such large-scale operations. Fourth, Schadlow warns American leaders to not be “seduced by the idea that they can achieve policy objectives from afar by kinetic means alone.”<sup>13</sup> Short-term military achievements without corresponding longer-term political gains will not lead to lasting victory. Finally, “the U.S. Government, especially the military, must have some standing capabilities and organizations that are prepared to conduct key governance tasks.”<sup>14</sup> She argues the Army’s core competencies must expand to include capabilities which would enable transition to a durable political outcome.

What makes this book so timely is that Dr. Nadia Schadlow is currently the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Strategy at the National Security Council. This is a perch from where Mrs. Schadlow should be able to influence how the United States prepares for and executes future wars. Amidst the escalating rhetoric of “fire and fury” between the leaders of the United States and North Korea, American military leaders have made it well-known they are prepared to fight and win any war with North Korea. What goes unmentioned is how the U.S. government would approach the ensuing humanitarian disaster that would take place on the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of war, especially if it goes nuclear. Given her high-level position within the U.S. government and the views she expresses in this book, the American public should have some hope that American political and military leaders are fully preparing for the mother of all reconstruction efforts that could result from war with North Korea. If not, it would demonstrate that American Denial Syndrome is alive and well and that the hard lessons of previous American-sponsored governance operations continue to go unlearned. **IAJ**

*The opinions expressed in this review are solely those of the author and do not reflect a broader consensus or views within the USAID or of its management.*

## NOTES

1 Schadlow, Nadia. *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Success into Political Victory*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017, p. 2.

2 Ibid., p. 12.

3 Ibid., p. 15.

4 Ibid., p. 22.

5 Ibid., p. 102.

6 Ibid., p. 176.

7 Ibid., p. 207.

8 Ibid., p. 220.

9 Ibid., p. 263.

10 Ibid., p. 273.

11 Ibid., p. 274.

12 Ibid., p. 275.

13 Ibid., p. 277.

14 Ibid.

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