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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for the coordination of military operations with US Government agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
VADM, USN
Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08
DATED 17 MARCH 2006

• Changes the publication title from Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations to Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations

• Reorganizes the publication from two volumes into a single volume

• Revises the discussion on organizing for successful interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination

• Updates the discussion on the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and National Security Staff

• Updates the discussion for federal interagency coordination during homeland defense and civil support

• Updates descriptions of federal agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations

• Adds a discussion on a whole-of-government approach

• Adds a discussion on strategic communication

• Adds a discussion of the private sector

• Adds coverage on forming a joint interagency task force


• Modifies the definitions of the terms “disaster assistance response team,” “interagency,” and “joint interagency coordination group”
Summary of Changes

- Adds definitions for the terms “development assistance” and “interorganizational coordination”

- Removes the terms “chancery,” “civil affairs activities,” “complex contingency operations,” “developmental assistance,” “diplomatic and/or consular facility,” “resolution,” and “US Defense Representative” from Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Describes the Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination
• Addresses Key Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination
• Covers Conducting Interorganizational Coordination
• Presents Domestic Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination
• Provides Foreign Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination

Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination

A commitment to interorganizational coordination will help to achieve desired end states by facilitating cooperation in areas of common interest or avoiding unintended negative consequences when working in the same space as other stakeholders.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and structures. This is especially pronounced for domestic and foreign operations, which are governed by different authorities and have considerably different US Government (USG) governing structures and stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination aids in this by enabling participants to do one or more of the following:

Facilitate Unity of Effort. Achieving national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by interorganizational coordination.

Achieve Common Objectives. Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives.

Provide Common Understanding. Interorganizational coordination is critical to understanding the roles and relationships of participating military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced. Such common understandings will be essential to enable stakeholders to
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operate effectively in the same space, identifying opportunities for cooperation and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

**Interagency Coordination**

Within the context of DOD involvement, **interagency coordination** is the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the US military and the other instruments of national power.

**Interorganizational Coordination**

Similarly, within the context of DOD involvement, **interorganizational coordination** is the interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector.

**The Need for Unity of Effort**

Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations. Problems arise when each USG agency interprets National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC) policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act in concert. Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively employ the appropriate instruments of national power.

**Coordinating Efforts**

**Providing Strategic Direction.** Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide policy and strategic guidance to DOD. Strategic direction is provided in a number of national level documents, some of which include the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Response Framework (NRF), National Strategy for Maritime Security, National Incident Management System, and Unified Command Plan.
Because the solution to a problem seldom resides within the capability of one agency, joint campaign and operation plans should be crafted to recognize and leverage the core competencies of other agencies while providing support, as appropriate. Each interorganizational partner brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the task of coordination. Each USG agency has different authorities, which govern the operation of the agency and determine the use of its resources.

**Working Relationships and Practices**

Within the USG, military and civilian agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles. However, this is not the support command relationship described in Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Relationships between military and civilian agencies cannot be equated to military command authorities (e.g., operational control, tactical control, support). Although there is no equivalent command relationship between military forces and civilian agencies and organizations, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between the participants. The incident command system is a standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.

**Considerations for Effective Cooperation**

Military policies, processes, and procedures are very different from those of civilian organizations. Cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector is often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement. Many NGOs are signatory to various codes of conduct that include the responsibility to share information for effectiveness, safety, and other reasons. Private sector entities might only coordinate if such coordination supports their business model.

**Key Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination**

One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual relationships are not established. Carefully crafted memorandums of agreement can specify detailees’ rating and reviewing chains, tasking authority, and other clauses
that are explicitly designed to overcome this potential source of friction.

**Organizational Environments**

To facilitate success, the interests, resources, efforts, and goals of all the engaged military and civilian organizations must be drawn together. This cohesion is often more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. The essence of interorganizational coordination is the effective integration of multiple stakeholders with diverse perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and objectives.

**Strategic Communication**

The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to coordinate use of the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

**Conducting Interorganizational Coordination**

When campaign planning, deliberate planning, or crisis action planning (CAP) is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on its efficiency and success. To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), and tactical levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues.


The NSC is the President’s principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. The HSC is an entity within the Executive Office of the President of the United States to advise the President on homeland security (HS) matters.
A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of the full range of available USG capabilities and resources that reinforce progress and create synergies.

The joint operation planning process (JOPP) is used by combatant commanders (CCDRs) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan. The commander should coordinate with relevant entities throughout the JOPP to consider all the instruments of national power. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

The crux of interorganizational coordination is in understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive. While the military normally focuses on reaching clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a command and control (C2) structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling changeable political, economic, social, and humanitarian interests using dialogue, bargaining, risk taking, and consensus building. They may be more adept at negotiation, bargaining, and consensus decision making, thus potentially acting as agents of change within that society.

An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. IGOs may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. They are formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states.

NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives.
The Private Sector

The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. The private sector can assist the USG by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in deliberate planning and CAP, and providing other assistance as appropriate.

Joint Task Force Considerations

When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to establish a JTF, the establishing authority is normally a CCDR. Depending on the type of operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency, IGO, and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the joint field office, the civil military operations center (CMOC), or the humanitarian operations center.

Other JTF considerations are intelligence collection and dissemination, force protection, logistic support, and legal issues.

Information Management and Sharing

Other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state. However, the cultures of non-USG organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military activities. By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, the commander, joint task force (CJTF), can help encourage active IGO and NGO cooperation in resolving the crisis.

Domestic Considerations

The HSC is made up of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, SecDef, and such other individuals as may be designated by the President. For the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the USG relating to HS, the HSC assesses the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest of HS and makes resulting recommendations to the President; oversees and
reviews HS policies of the USG and makes resulting recommendations to the President; and performs such other functions as the President may direct.

**Key Roles of United States Government Stakeholders**

As the primary agency for HS, the Department of Homeland Security leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the Nation. **Within DOD, SecDef** has overall authority for DOD and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS). **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy** provides the overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of DOD resources for HD and CS. The two geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) with major HD and CS missions are **US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)** and **US Pacific Command (USPACOM)**, as their AORs include the United States and its territories. **CJCS** has numerous responsibilities relating to HD and HS. These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses to threats or an act of terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation orders to provide assistance to the primary agency. CJCS ensures that HD and CS plans and operations are compatible with other military plans.

**Homeland Defense and Civil Support**

Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in some respects, fall into two mission areas: HD—for which DOD serves as the lead federal agency and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and CS—for which DOD serves in a supporting role to other agencies by providing defense support to civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal, and local level. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.

**Joint Force Considerations**

When an event occurs and the President or SecDef approves defense support of civil authorities, the appropriate GCC is designated as the supported
commander. In most situations, the Commander, USNORTHCOM, or Commander, USPACOM, will be designated as the supported commander.

State, Local, and Tribal Considerations

When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may request federal assistance. If DOD support is required as part of that federal assistance, then DOD may support local and state authorities in a variety of tasks. However, the majority of DOD assistance will typically be provided in support of a primary agency in accordance with the NRF. For federal assistance for disaster situations taking place on tribal lands, state governors must request a Presidential disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the Stafford Act. However, federal departments and agencies can work directly with tribes within existing agency authorities and resources in the absence of such a declaration.

Nongovernmental Organizations

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (http://www.nvoad.org) is the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparation, response, and recovery—to help disaster survivors and their communities.

The American Red Cross is a support agency under the NRF in a number of emergency support functions (ESFs), most notably ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services.

The Private Sector

Critical infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility among federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the owners and operators of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources. Partnership between the public and private sectors is essential, in part because the private sector owns and/or operates approximately 85% of the Nation’s critical infrastructure.

Interorganizational Coordination with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas

Canada. The North American Aerospace Defense Command, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Command share the task of defending North America and seek cooperative approaches to ensure the security of North America.

Mexico. USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military and civil response partners to increase mutual long-term capacity building to enhance our ability
to counter common security threats to both the US and Mexico and build an effective consequence management capability.

**Bahamas.** USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and the National Emergency Management Agency civil response partners to increase mutual long-term capacity building to enhance our ability to counter common security threats to both the US and the Bahamas and build an effective consequence management capability.

**Foreign Considerations**

**The National Security Council System**

**DOD Role in the National Security Council System** (NSCS). SecDef is a regular member of the NSC and the NSC Principals Committee. The NSCS is the channel for the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC.

CJCS acts as spokesperson for the CCDRs, especially on their operational requirements, and represents combatant command interests in the NSCS through direct communication with the CCDRs and their staffs. CCDRs and their staffs can coordinate most of their standing requirements with the chief of mission (COM) and their JIACG (or equivalent organization).

**Structure in Foreign Countries**

**The Diplomatic Mission.** The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a signatory. The Department of State (DOS) provides the core staff of a diplomatic mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in the country. A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times the chargé d’affaires (the chargé), when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral mission, or an IGO. The COM provides recommendations and considerations for CAP directly to the GCC and CJTF. While forces in the field under a GCC are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM
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confers with the GCC regularly to coordinate US military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the host nation (HN).

**DOS Plans.** Each US mission prepares an annual mission strategic resource plan (MSRP) that sets country-level US foreign policy goals, resource requests, performance measures, and targets.

**The Country Team.** The country team, headed by the COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. It is composed of the COM, deputy chief of mission, section heads, the senior member of each US department or agency in country, and other USG personnel as determined by the COM. The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US programs and policies.

**Geographic Combatant Commands.** To effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, geographic combatant commands are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies.

**Intergovernmental Organizations**

**The United Nations (UN).** Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the US ambassador to the UN, officially titled the Permanent Representative. The ambassador has the status of cabinet rank and is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). USG coordination with UN peace operations missions or agencies in-theater is through the US country team.

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).** NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. The alliance is committed to defending its member states against aggression or the threat of aggression and to the principle that an attack against one or several members would be considered an attack against all. NATO’s most
important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council, which brings together representatives of all the Allies at the level of ambassadors, ministers, or heads of state and government.

**Nongovernmental Organizations**

**The Role of NGOs.** Working alone, alongside the US military, with other US agencies, or with multinational partners, NGOs are assisting in many of the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. Many NGOs view their relationship with the military under the UNOCHA *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief*, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Guidelines,” that emphasize the principle of “humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality, and impartiality). Some organizations employ a more strident interpretation of these nonbinding guidelines, applying them not just to humanitarian assistance, as specifically referenced, but also to advocacy, development, and civil society work. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably.

**Military Support of NGOs.** SecDef may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) IGOs and NGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants.

**The Private Sector**

A number of DOD instructions (DODIs) regulate the conduct of private military and security companies operating with DOD. These include DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*; DODI 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations*; and DODI 5525.11, *Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed by or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members*.

**Foreign Operations**

Within the executive branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. As such, DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external political-military (POLMIL) relationships with overall US foreign policy. In addition to DOS, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead agency for development and carries
out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, disaster response, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance.

The GCC implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within the AOR. GCC’s theater campaign plan, containing nested country plans, should complement DOS MSRP and other plans developed by the country teams and USG interagency partners in the GCC’s AOR. In a crisis response and limited contingency operation, coordination between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur within the NSC interagency policy committee and, if directed, during development of the USG strategic plan.

**Joint Task Force Considerations**

A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present, multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives. USAID, because of the extensive contacts it develops in carrying out development work at the community level, can provide key situational awareness for JTF assessments. The CJTF should consider the establishment of C2 structures that account for and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements as well as IGOs, NGOs, and the media. An assessment team’s mission analysis will assist the CJTF in the establishment of an executive steering group, CMOC, and liaison teams.

**Civil-Military Operations Center**

The CMOC is a mechanism for the coordination of civil-military operations that can serve as the primary coordination interface and provide operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. For foreign operations, the CMOC may be the focal point where US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**

A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of an HN local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential
It is vitally important that the PRT leadership ensure that the guidance provided by multiple agencies is carefully coordinated and mutually reinforcing, and that they report to higher headquarters when there are inconsistencies or when difficulties occur.

**Strategic Communication**

SC is a whole-of-government effort involving much more than military activities, and therefore requires a high level of coordination and synchronization among interagency partners to achieve unity of effort. CCDRs should provide input into theme, message, and story development and delivery through their CJCS representative to the NSC, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. JFCs oversee execution of actions and communication of themes and messages. CCDRs and staffs should include SC considerations in planning for joint operations and in the interagency process. Each of the communication activities under the direction of the CCDR has the ability to influence and inform key foreign audiences through words, images, and actions to foster understanding of US policy and advance US interests.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides joint doctrine for the coordination of military operations with USG agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; IGOs; NGOs; and the private sector.
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CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

“When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved.”

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

This publication provides information to guide interorganizational coordination during joint operations among engaged stakeholders. These stakeholders are inclusive of the Armed Forces of the United States; United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and entities of the private sector. Further, the term interagency coordination is limited to the interaction between USG departments and agencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of operations with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and structures. This is especially pronounced for domestic and foreign operations, which are governed by different authorities and have considerably different USG governing structures and stakeholders.

SECTION A. FOUNDATIONS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

1. Purposes of Interorganizational Coordination

A commitment to interorganizational coordination will help to achieve desired end states by facilitating cooperation in areas of common interest or avoiding unintended negative consequences when working in the same space as other stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination aids in this by enabling participants to do one or more of the following:

a. Facilitate Unity of Effort. The translation of national strategic objectives into unified action is essential to unity of effort and ultimately mission success. Achieving national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by interorganizational coordination. At the President’s direction, military power is integrated with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, DOD agencies interact with non-DOD agencies gaining a mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in which military and civilian capabilities best complement each other. The National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) play key roles in the integration of all instruments of national power.
by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation. Further, the unified actions of military and civilian organizations in sharing information, cooperating, and striving together to accomplish a common goal is the essence of interorganizational coordination that makes unity of effort possible.

b. Achieve Common Objectives. A large number of civilian agencies and organizations—many with indispensable practical competencies and significant legal responsibilities—interact with the Armed Forces of the United States and its multinational counterparts. Joint and multinational operations must be strategically integrated and operationally and tactically coordinated with the activities of participating USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, host nation (HN) agencies, and the private sector to achieve common objectives. Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the US military and the other instruments of national power. Similarly, within the context of DOD involvement, interorganizational coordination is the interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; IGOs; NGOs; and the private sector. Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives.

**KEY TERMS**

interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.

intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union.

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

private sector—An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations.
c. Provide Common Understanding

(1) Sometimes, the joint force commander (JFC) draws on the capabilities of external organizations; at other times, the JFC provides capabilities to those organizations or the JFC deconflicts his activities with them. These same organizations may be present during some or all phases of a joint operation or campaign. In any case, interorganizational coordination will be critical to understand the roles and relationships of participating military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced. Such common understandings will be essential to enable stakeholders to operate effectively in the same space, identifying opportunities for cooperation, and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

(2) It is important that DOD speak with a single voice in exchanges with other stakeholders to minimize confusion. DOD elements—including Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DOD agencies and field activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands—should develop a common position on the appropriate military role in interagency coordination before broadening the discussion to include other agencies, departments, and organizations. DOD’s established common culture, procedures, and hierarchical structure, may facilitate consensus building and development of a DOD position prior to engaging in interagency coordination, especially at the strategic level. However, this DOD internal consensus building may still require significant effort and some degree of compromise. OSD and the Joint Staff (JS) have a key role in interorganizational coordination efforts, as DOD’s representatives to the NSC, HSC, and given their roles in developing national security policy. In order to facilitate increased interagency coordination at all levels, it is critical that the JFCs work with and through their JS and OSD (particularly the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)]) counterparts, establishing an ongoing dialogue on issues of interest. OUSD(P) and JS involvement helps to ensure that engagement with other stakeholders is consistent with existing policy and priorities. Greater visibility of DOD-wide engagement with other USG agencies will enable the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to better balance competing global requirements and ensure DOD presents a unified position.

(3) Combatant commanders (CCDRs) and other subordinate JFCs must consider the potential requirements for interorganizational coordination as a routine part of their activities.
2. The Need for Unity of Effort

   a. Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations. Within the USG alone, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by organizational “stovepiping,” crisis-driven planning, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. These differences have certain benefits, but are not well-suited for addressing the range of conventional and irregular challenges that cut across available organizational expertise. Problems arise when each USG agency interprets NSC and HSC policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act in concert. These issues are exacerbated by the competing interests and practices of participating foreign governments and military forces, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector entities.

   b. Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively employ the appropriate instruments of national power. A comprehensive approach seeks to stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while facilitating a shared understanding of the situation. In its simplest form, a comprehensive approach should invigorate existing processes and strengthen interorganizational relationships. This approach should forward the respective goals of all parties, ensuring stakeholders do not negate or contradict the efforts of others. Several factors contribute to success in this effort:

      (1) Continual dialogue among national leadership, agencies, and departments in ascertaining the problem, defining success, and developing feasible direction and acceptable courses of action (COAs).

      (2) Collective recognition of the complex, interconnected nature of the operational environment.
(3) Including all stakeholders promotes a common understanding of the environment, problem, issues, goals, and objectives. Stakeholders have unique perspectives and expertise. Together they build a more enriched overall assessment. Including civilian stakeholders from the beginning in assessment, estimates and planning, or military participation in civilian processes facilitates a more complete understanding of the nature of the problem to be solved and actions required to solve it.

(4) Collective recognition that the commander is ultimately accountable for the assigned mission, regardless of the resources provided and the degree of support by others.

c. In military (e.g., joint) operations, unity of effort is ensured by establishing unity of command. **Unity of command** is based on the designation of a single commander with the authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned forces in pursuit of a common objective. Commanders exercise military command and control (C2) to ensure that military operations are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the President and SecDef in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or multinational leadership). In operations involving interagency partners and other stakeholders, where the commander may not control all elements, he seeks cooperation and builds consensus to achieve unity of effort.

(1) Unity of command can be difficult to achieve when working with multiple stakeholders. To compensate, commanders concentrate on working with the participating national forces to obtain unity of effort. Consensus building is the key element to unity of effort.

(2) Commanders must be prepared to accommodate differences in operational and tactical capabilities by nations within a multinational force (MNF). The commander must clearly articulate his intentions, guidance, and plans to avoid confusion that might occur due to differences in language, culture, doctrine, and terminology. Detailed planning, exchange of standing operating procedures and liaison officers (LNOs), and rehearsals help overcome procedural difficulties among nations.

d. While unity of command and the exercise of C2 apply strictly to military forces and operations, **unified action** among all interorganizational participants is necessary to achieve unity of effort in military operations involving engaged civilian organizations and foreign military forces or military participation in civilian-led operations. **Unified action** is the **DOD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach.** It begins with national strategic direction from the President and includes a wide scope of actions including interorganizational coordination techniques, information sharing, collaborative planning, and the synchronization of military operations with the activities of all the civilian stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination depends on a spirit of cooperation, while military efforts depend on C2 and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can facilitate unified action when adjusted to the dynamics of interorganizational coordination and different organizational cultures. Military leaders should work with civilian stakeholders with skill, tact, and persistence. Unified action is promoted through close, **continuous coordination and cooperation**, which are necessary to overcome
confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.

e. Achieving **unity of effort** requires the application of a comprehensive approach that includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and deconfliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. An inclusive approach of working closely with stakeholders is often more appropriate than a military C2 focused approach. Taking an authoritative, military approach may be counterproductive to effective interorganizational relationships, impede unified action, and compromise mission accomplishment. Gaining unity of effort is never settled and permanent; it takes constant effort to sustain interorganizational relationships.

3. Whole-of-Government

   a. Within the USG, elements aspire to a whole-of-government approach. This approach implies the integration of USG efforts with a plan that identifies and aligns USG goals, objectives, tasks, and supporting structures, with designation of lead, primary, coordinating, cooperating, and supporting federal agencies.

   b. This approach may also be used to refer to formally USG-agreed structures and processes intended to facilitate whole-of-government efforts. These include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) processes, and reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) structures.

   c. Well-integrated USG operations and relationships, preferably using a whole-of-government approach, will facilitate USG engagement with non-USG stakeholders, fostering a broader comprehensive approach to security.

4. Coordinating Efforts

   a. **Providing Strategic Direction.** Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of JS, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, SecDef, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide policy and strategic guidance to DOD. The President, assisted by the NSC and HSC, also provides strategic direction to guide the efforts of USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power. Strategic direction is provided in a number of national level documents some of which include, among others, the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Response Framework (NRF), National Strategy for Maritime Security, National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Unified Command Plan.

      (1) Within the USG, the NSS guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national security objectives. The President signs the NSS, and the NSC is the principal forum responsible for coordinating the strategic-level implementation of the NSS. This effort provides strategic guidance for
the combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies, and forms the foundation for operational and tactical level guidance.

(2) The **NRF** presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. The NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. 

For additional information, see the National Strategy for Homeland Security; Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, Homeland Defense; and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

(3) The **National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction** states that “weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and terrorists, represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.” A systematic interagency approach is required to respond to the growing volume and complexity of the WMD trade.

(4) The **National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the DOD Implementation Plan** provides procedures to ensure interorganizational coordination to mitigate the effects of a novel influenza strain.

b. **Applying the Military Component.** Military forces have long coordinated with USG agencies to include, but not limited to, the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Transportation (DOT), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the intelligence community (IC), along with the adjutants general (TAGs) of the 50 states, District of Columbia, and three territories. Increasingly, relationships are being developed and institutionalized with state and local government agencies, additional USG agencies (e.g., DHS), multinational partners, IGOs such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NGOs, and HN agencies.

(1) Because the solution to a problem seldom resides within the capability of one agency, joint campaign and operation plans should be crafted to recognize and leverage the core competencies of other agencies while providing support, as appropriate. Annex V (Interagency Coordination) of specific joint operation plans (OPLANs) is the section that captures much of this information. Additionally, other sections (e.g., annex A [Task Organization], annex B [Intelligence], annex C [Operations], annex G [Civil Affairs], and annex W [Contingency Contracting]) also should contain pertinent interagency information.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats, for sample formats.

(2) In a national emergency, civil support (CS) operation, or crisis response and limited contingency operation, DOD often serves in a supporting role. Thus, commanders and their staffs may need to adjust and adopt procedures, especially planning and reporting, to coordinate and harmonize military operations with the activities of other agencies and organizations to optimize the military’s contributions and support. Communication,
coordination, and cooperation with external agencies and organizations by DOD commands is normally accomplished with the appropriate knowledge, approval, assistance, and cooperation of the chief of mission (COM) in foreign lands and DHS (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]) in the homeland. DOS, USAID, and DHS may facilitate military interaction with IGOs, NGOs, state, local, and tribal authorities, and the private sector.

c. Capitalizing on Organizational Diversity. Each interorganizational partner brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the task of coordination. This diversity can be made into an asset through a collective forum and process that considers the many views, capabilities, and options of the interagency partners.

d. Gathering the Right Resources. A challenge to commanders is to recognize what resources are available and how to work together to effectively apply them. Despite potential philosophical, cultural, and operational differences, efforts should be coordinated to foster an atmosphere of cooperation that ultimately contributes to unity of effort. Pursuit of interorganizational coordination as a process should be viewed as a means to mission accomplishment.

e. Determining the Authorities. Each USG agency has different authorities, which govern the operation of the agency and determine the use of its resources. These authorities derive from several sources: the US Constitution, their federal charter, Presidential directives, congressional mandates, and strategic direction. It is important that early in the joint operation planning process (JOPP) the definition of these authorities be clearly understood and documented. Congress provides funding to the agencies for various activities under titles of the United States Code (USC). This controls what the agencies, including DOD, can and cannot do. IGO authorities are based on their formal agreement among member governments. NGOs are independent of the USG; each has its own unique and individual governance system. Other private sector organizations respond to various forms of authority.

f. Providing Command Focus. JFCs ensure that joint operations are integrated and synchronized (as much as possible) in time, space, and purpose with the actions of supporting or supported MNFs and civilian partners. Activities and operations with civilian organizations may be complex and require considerable coordination by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders. The extent of cooperation and coordination from civilian agencies and organizations with the joint force will vary and be contingent on the nature of the agency or organization mission and role (e.g., offensive/defensive operations, peacekeeper, humanitarian).

5. Working Relationships and Practices

a. Supported and Supporting Roles. Within the USG, military and civilian agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles. However, this is not the support command relationship described in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Relationships between military and civilian agencies cannot be equated to military command authorities (e.g., operational control [OPCON], tactical control
During combat operations such as Operation DESERT STORM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other USG agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide CS, its forces typically perform in a supporting role such as after Hurricane Katrina. When military support is requested by civil authorities and approved by the President or SecDef, DOD and its responsible combatant commands—United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and/or United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)—will typically support FEMA or another civilian agency (e.g., Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS] in support of NRF Emergency Support Function [ESF] #8, Public Health and Medical Services). Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between USG agencies is key.

b. Coordination. Although there is no equivalent command relationship between military forces and civilian agencies and organizations, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between the participants. Civilian agencies tend to operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than C2 structures. However, when the incident command system (ICS) is used, it is typically under a unified command structure used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. The ICS is a standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IGO hierarchies. However, the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs often occupy the same operational space and there is an increased risk of confusion if that space is in a hostile or uncertain environment.

c. Collaboration. Effective joint operations require close coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among multiple organizations. The most common technique for promoting this collaboration is the identification or formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams and other enduring or temporary cross-functional staff organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. They facilitate planning by the staff, decision making by the commander, and execution by the headquarters (HQ). They mostly fall under the principal oversight of the joint force staff directorates. This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JFC in mission execution. Inclusion of participating civilian agency and organization representatives in the various cross-functional staff organizations enhances collaboration. JFCs should consider selective integration of participating civilian agencies into day-to-day operations.

d. Liaison. Direct, early liaison is a valuable source of accurate, timely information on many aspects of a crisis area, especially where involvement by civilian agencies and organizations is likely to precede that of military forces and presents an opportunity to significantly enhance early force effectiveness. A key additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based upon trust and open communications amongst all organizations. For that reason, ongoing liaison and exchange of liaison personnel with engaged organizations is equally important.
Chapter I

NOTIONAL RANGE OF INTERACTION TERMS

The following terms are a range of interactions that occur among stakeholders. There is no common interorganizational agreement on these terms, and other stakeholders may use them interchangeably or with varying definitions. A consensus of dictionary definitions is provided as a baseline for common understanding.

Coordination can be described as the process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved and bring their contributions together to form a coherent or efficient whole. It implies formal structures, relationships, and processes.

Consensus can be described as a general or collective agreement, accord, or position reached by a group as a whole. It implies a serious treatment of every group member's considered position.

Cooperation can be described as the process of acting together for a common purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between organizations. It is the alternative to working separately in competition. Cooperation with other agencies does not mean giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.

Collaboration can be described as a process where organizations work together to attain common goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and building consensus. Be aware that some attribute a negative meaning to the term “collaboration” as if referring to those who betray others by willingly assisting an enemy of one's country, especially an occupying force.

Compromise can be described as a settlement of differences by mutual concessions without violation of core values; an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing positions, by reciprocal modification of an original position. Compromise should not be regarded in the context of win/lose.

Consultation can be described as seeking the opinion or advice of other organizations, which may include discussion, conferring, and deliberation.

Deconfliction can be described as the elimination of undesirable overlap among entities, especially where two or more entities perform the same function or occupy the same physical space.

For further details concerning LNOs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

6. Considerations for Effective Cooperation

a. Military policies, processes, and procedures are very different from those of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination

interorganizational coordination. The various USG agencies often have different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques, which make unified action a challenge. Still more difficult, some IGOs and NGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military. In addition, many NGOs may not be hostile to DOD goals but will not cooperate with DOD or USG efforts in order to maintain the NGO’s perception of neutrality.

b. The military relies on structured and hierarchical decision-making processes; detailed planning; the use of standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures; and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies may employ similar principles, but may not have the same degree of structural process as the US military, and their organizational structure is more horizontal. Decision processes may be more ad hoc, collaborative, and collegial. Cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector is often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement. Many NGOs are signatory to various codes of conduct which include the responsibility to share information for effectiveness, safety, and other reasons. Private sector entities might only coordinate if it supports their business model. A continuous information exchange among engaged departments and agencies is necessary to avoid confusion over objectives, differences in procedures, resource limitations, and shortfalls or overlaps of authorities. Action will follow understanding.

c. The Armed Forces of the United States have unique capabilities that provide significant contributions to the overall USG effort. These include established military-to-military working relationships, extensive resources (e.g., logistics), and trained and ready personnel able to rapidly respond to multiple global crises. Additional unique military capabilities include C2 resources supported by worldwide communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructures; robust organizational and planning processes; civil affairs (CA) personnel and their unique civilian-acquired skills; training support for large numbers of individuals on myriad skills; and air, land, and sea mobility support for intertheater or intratheater requirements.

d. Operations involving extensive USG and multinational involvement represent an enormous coordination challenge. Successful execution is dependent on a mutual understanding of mission objectives and clear lines of authority. Normally, existing authorities dictate the primary or lead coordinating agency. In cases where the USG lead is unclear, an agency may be designated by the President or NSC.

e. An inclusive view and a desire to leverage comparative advantage should guide a JFC’s collaboration with civilian counterparts of USG agencies. Each agency has special expertise, authorities, access, and resources that can be brought to bear to support JFC activities. The reciprocal also applies. The contributions of US military forces can reinforce the initiatives undertaken through diplomatic, development, law enforcement, and other activities. The challenge lies in leveraging comparative advantages and then integrating efforts under a coherent strategy with synergy as a result. A proven model is the complementary character of DOS embassy mission strategic resource plans (MSRPs) and geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) theater campaign plans (TCPs).
f. Interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation, persuasion, compromise, and consensus contribute to obtaining unified action in a military-civilian effort. Successful commanders and staff build personal relationships to inspire trust and confidence. The challenges of gaining consensus and creating synergy among the engaged USG agencies and multinational partners are greater, as there are no clear authorities directing the relationship. Commanders and their staffs can mitigate this risk by developing personal relationships, using liaison elements, and making conscious decisions on the degree of reliance on those stakeholders for critical tasks. Personal relationships are essential. Inspiring trust and confidence is a conscious act that does not just happen—it must be planned, actively built through words and actions, and continually reinforced. Development of strong personal relationships and the requisite trust and confidence that the engaged stakeholders will respond when their help is needed to accomplish assigned tasks is key.

**THE VALUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS**

General Jacob Devers, US Army commander of the 6th Army Group in World War II, wrote that in coalition operations the personalities and the ambitions of the senior commanders of each of the Armed Services of the Allied Powers under his command were critical toward making the coalition work.

General Norman Schwarzkopf and Saudi Arabia’s Lieutenant General Khaled were able to forge the bonds of mutual respect and create an atmosphere that permeated both of their staffs and impacted on every action and every decision.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, which assisted in the reconstruction of Kuwait after the Gulf War, was able to obtain interagency cooperation based largely on personal relationships. Colonel Randall Elliot, US Army Reserve (USAR), who put the organization together, was also the senior analyst in the Near East Division of the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He knew the US Ambassador-designate to Kuwait, Edward “Skip” Gnehm, and was able to recruit Major Andrew Natsios, USAR, whose civilian job was Director of United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. Major Natsios brought Mr. Fred Cuny from INTERTEC, a contractor specializing in disaster relief, into the task force. Thus, USAID and its contractors were integrated into the operation based on these personal relationships.

US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and the top US military commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, benefited from a close personal and professional relationship.

Successful interagency cooperation rests in no small part on the ability of those on the ground, the ambassador, the geographic combatant commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the US Government departments and agencies to personally work together.

Various Sources
Recognize that it is not necessary to “own” every asset to ensure access. The long-term institutionalization of personal relationships should be a goal.

SECTION B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

7. United States Agency Engagement

a. One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual relationships are not established. Organizational differences exist between the US military and USG agencies’ hierarchies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to the JFC seldom exist. Further, overall lead authority in a crisis response and limited contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the GCC, but by a US ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation.

b. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent organizations. Physical or virtual interagency teaming initiatives such as joint interagency task forces (JIATFs), joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), or routine interagency video teleconferences improve reachback and expedite decision making. Figure I-1 depicts comparative organizational structures using the three levels of war.

c. Combatant commands engage civilian agency representatives in a variety of formal and informal venues. There are, however, two primary engagement venues. The first is through a representative (part- or full-time depending on position requirements), where the individual retains parent agency identity and a direct reporting relationship to that agency while representing the parent agency to the CCDR as a LNO or as a member of an organizational entity, such as a member of one of the CCDR’s cross-functional staff organizations such as the JIACG (or equivalent organization). The second is through an arrangement where the individual is directly assigned (i.e., civilian agency detail) to the command, serving in a combatant command billet (in the same capacity as a DOD employee). In this case, the individual brings the skill sets of a parent agency, but reports through the military chain of command. USG agencies may deploy relatively junior personnel compared to their military counterparts to fill key positions. This difference should not be allowed to cause unnecessary friction. Carefully crafted memorandums of agreement (MOAs) can specify detailees’ rating and reviewing chains, tasking authority, and other clauses that are explicitly designed to overcome this potential source of friction.

d. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) officers serve as special operations support team (SOST) members with other federal agencies or organizations principally in the National Capital Region. Pursuant to the Interagency Partnership Program, senior grade military officers are assigned to a SOST at numerous governmental agencies and organizations. The SOST contributes to a synergistic network of USSOCOM personnel working with each other and their assigned agencies to accomplish mutually assigned tasks.
in the President’s National Implementation Plan. SOST members work within the interagency community, leverage requirements in the IC, facilitate reporting, and process information requests.

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**Figure I-1. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures**

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<th>ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES</th>
<th>STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT</th>
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<td>Governor</td>
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<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Country Reconstruction and</td>
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**NOTES**

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector toward theater strategic objectives.

2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector toward theater operational objectives.

3. The ambassador and embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and may support joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF, or may lead an integrated planning team.

4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander’s staff.

5. USAID’s OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters.
8. Organizational Environments

a. To facilitate success, the interests, resources, efforts, and goals of all the engaged military and civilian organizations must be drawn together. This cohesion is often more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. When other instruments of national power—e.g., diplomatic, informational, and economic—are applied, the complexity and the number and types of interactions expand significantly. **The essence of interorganizational coordination is the effective integration of multiple stakeholders with diverse perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and objectives.**

b. **The Nature of Interagency Coordination.** The executive branch of the USG is organized by function with each department performing certain core tasks. In executing national security policy, the NSC and HSC play a critical role in unifying the efforts of the interagency community through a strategic collaborative process. Both the NSC and HSC principals and deputes are supported in their policy functions by the National Security Staff. Combatant commands must be proactive in seeking OSD and JS assistance to access the National Security Staff to enable interagency coordination.

(1) **Core Values and Authorities.** Each agency has specific core values and authorities that scope their operations. These authorities and values influence how the agency functions. In any interaction, all participants must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and maneuver to protect its core values.

(2) **Agency Focus.** Individual agency perspectives and agendas complicate policy development. **Pursuit of institutional objectives is an important driver of the various USG agencies’ positions,** which may not always coincide with a common approach to international security issues. It is important to note that this issue applies equally to DOD personnel, especially when operating in nontraditional environments. Military personnel must understand the context of their role and ensure they do not assume lead decision-making responsibilities when DOD is not the lead or primary agency and they are in a supporting role.

(3) **Reduction of Uncertainty.** Generally agencies are not set up to handle crises as their core or defining missions. Crises require participating agencies to divert attention, resources, and personnel away from other priorities and to work out accommodations with other agencies to achieve overall USG goals. Differing agency perspectives, capabilities, and interests will cause conflicts on how best to execute a mission and carry out policy in a crisis. Sharing such information among agency participants is critical to ensure that no participating agency is handicapped by a lack of situational awareness, that uncertainties inherent in crisis dynamics are reduced as much as possible, and that interagency decision making is empowered by a common operational picture (COP).

c. **Unified DOD Position.** Before attempting to gain consensus in the interagency arena, a unified position must first be attained within DOD.
d. Establishing Unifying Goals. Reaching consensus on unifying goals is an important prerequisite for success. Consensus must be constantly nurtured, which is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. At the national level, this consensus is usually attained by the National Security Staff and usually results in an NSC or HSC committee meeting statement of conclusions, a Presidential policy directive (PPD), or a political-military (POLMIL) USG strategic plan which establishes the goals of an operation and interagency responsibilities. The objective is to ensure all USG agencies clearly understand NSC or HSC policy objectives and responsibilities. Some compromise that limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus. A zeal for consensus should not concede the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies. The greater the number of agencies and the more diverse the goals, the more difficult it is to reach consensus. Because a common unifying goal is so important, a great deal of time should be spent on clarifying and restating the goals. When a common threat brings an MNF together, the differences often revolve around ways and means. Many techniques that have been developed in previous MNFs may be useful in facilitating interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector cooperation.

e. Mutual Needs and Interdependence. In determining the needs of all participating agencies and stakeholders, a full appreciation and clear understanding of the other agencies is required. Organizations strive to maintain their interests, policies, and core values. These must be considered to facilitate interagency cooperation. Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to employ its resources to attain the objective. This interdependence facilitates a strong working relationship among agencies, departments, and organizations. For example, IGOs and NGOs effectively conducted relief operations in Somalia and the early evolutions in the Balkans in the 1990s with the security provided by the Armed Forces of the United States. Similarly, DOS facilitates DOD overseas deployment by negotiating transit and basing agreements. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money, and establishes a framework for cooperation. These interdependencies can develop over time and lead the way to true interagency cooperation. Working together to enable individual efforts creates a synergy that increases with each operation. Ensuring that all organizations share the responsibility for the job and receive appropriate recognition strengthens these bonds of interdependence. The purpose of such recognition is to encourage each stakeholder to participate in the process by validating and reinforcing their roles and responsibilities. Sharing of resources among USG agencies is governed by law (e.g., the Economy Act), policy, and regulation. The staff judge advocate (SJA) and comptroller should be involved to ensure compliance. Appendices in this publication describe the authority, responsibilities, organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many of these agencies, departments, and organizations.

f. Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives. The relationship between long- and short-term objectives provides continuity between the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, OSD and JS work with the HSC and NSC interagency policy committees (NSC/IPCs) setting long-term policy goals. The GCC addresses short-term
operational objectives through coordination with ambassadors, their country teams, multinational and agency staffs, and task forces.

g. An understanding needs to be forged between civilian and DOD/military counterparts. When both the military and civilian agencies share the same operational environment, tension may exist due to numerous factors. Military commanders strive for immediate results that reduce the risk of violence. Development specialists often focus on repairing the structural faults in recipient country institutions, which have or could produce, a crisis in government legitimacy leading to the need for US military involvement. These approaches are not necessarily compatible, and tension between the two often leads to disjointed programming and disparate results.

(1) During a US intervention, there will frequently be a contest between near-term military imperatives and those actions that support longer-term development objectives. To the extent possible, military activity should support the objectives established by the development community without compromising the military mission. The commander may consider creating an integrated planning team or other temporary entity to address how military activities may be better synchronized and complement the work of the development community.

(2) On the other hand, military commanders should accept that not all development resources can be allocated to achieving short-term results, and recognize that investments that seek to repair underlying structural faults are essential if short-term gains are to be sustainable. These longer-term efforts need to begin at the same time as the short-term interventions if they are to be properly synchronized and sequenced.

9. Strategic Communication

The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to coordinate use of the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all
instruments of national power. For its part, DOD must be a full participant in developing a
government-wide approach that implements a more robust SC capability. This is primarily
accomplished through public affairs (PA), defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), and
information operations (IO).

See Chapter IV, “Foreign Considerations;” JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning; and US Joint
Forces Command (USJFCOM) Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and
Communication Strategy, for more information on SC.
CHAPTER II
CONDUCTING INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

"The Department’s vision is to support maturation of whole of government approaches to national security problems. Solutions to address strategic and operational security challenges will be based on employing integrated flexible, mutually-supporting interagency capabilities."

Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, 2009

1. General

a. The continually changing global security environment requires increased and improved communications and coordination among the numerous agencies and organizations working to achieve national security objectives. This cooperation is best achieved through active interagency involvement, building on the core competencies and successful experiences of all. While portions of this chapter are described in other JPs, this material is captured here to provide a common frame of reference that reflects all levels of interagency involvement.

b. When campaign planning, deliberate planning, or crisis action planning (CAP) is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on its efficiency and success. To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset. The CCDR, through his strategic concept, works with the engaged civilian organizations to build annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the joint operation plan. Subordinate JFCs also build civilian organization participation into their OPLAN, and increasingly, participate in integrated civil-military campaign planning with the embassy. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, joint task force (JTF) HQ, and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This chapter will suggest meaningful tools for the commander to organize for successful interorganizational coordination, whether in domestic or foreign operations, and focus on the operational level and below.


a. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

b. The HSC is an entity within the Executive Office of the President of the United States to advise the President on homeland security (HS) matters. The HSC is the President’s principal forum for HS issues.
For more information on the HSC and its membership, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

3. Whole-of-Government Approach

   a. A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of the full range of available USG capabilities and resources that reinforce progress and create synergies. This approach facilitates all USG capabilities and resources being shared, leveraged, synchronized, and applied toward the strategic end state. In order to do this, interagency members must, to the greatest degree possible, resist seeing their resources (e.g., financial, diplomatic, military, development, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, consular, commerce) as belonging to a single agency, but rather as tools of USG power.

   b. Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC/HSC-sponsored processes by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address critical challenges to national interests. The NRF commits the USG, in partnership with local, tribal, and state governments and the private sector, to complete both strategic and operational plans for the incident scenarios specified in the National Preparedness Guidelines. Whole-of-government planning is distinct from the contributions of USG departments and agencies to DOD planning, which remains a DOD responsibility.

   c. It is imperative that all stakeholders in an operation participate in the planning and consultation processes to optimize the use of various instruments toward achievement of the operation’s goals. Maximum inclusion of all stakeholders (i.e., federal, state, local, and tribal governments, IGOs, NGOs, the private sector, HN partners, as applicable) is desired whether the operation is USG-only or multinational. Typically, policy and strategy are determined through a civilian-led process which is supported by military participants wherein the USG defines its strategic objectives, integrates them with partners (federal, state, local, tribal, multinational, and HNs, as applicable), and collaborates with IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector to achieve coherency.

   d. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military planning into a whole-of-government process is addressing the different planning capacity and culture in civilian agencies in contrast to DOD. Individual agency initiatives along with the broader interagency process seek to address many of the cultural differences and resource constraints to sustained civilian presence in planning. For example, DOD uses JOPES, while DHS uses the Integrated Planning System (IPS). While different, both of these systems are evolving to improve interagency planning efforts.

   e. Successful whole-of-government planning and operations require:

      (1) A designated lead or primary agency with all USG instruments of national power represented, actively participating, and integrated into the process;

      (2) A common understanding of the environment and the problem USG activities are seeking to solve;
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination

WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT PLANNING

By law, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) conducts strategic operational planning for counterterrorism (CT) activities across the United States Government (USG), integrating all instruments of national power. NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 government departments and agencies engaged in the War on Terrorism, through a single and truly joint planning process.

NCTC’s planning efforts include broad, strategic plans such as the landmark National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism (NIP). First approved by the President in June 2006 and then again in September 2008, the NIP is the USG’s comprehensive and evolving strategic plan to implement national CT priorities into concerted interagency action. NCTC also prepares far more granular, targeted action plans to ensure integration, coordination, and synchronization on key issues.

SOURCE: National Counterterrorism Center

(3) A shared USG goal and clearly stated objectives to achieve results through comprehensive integration and synchronization of activities at the implementation level;

(4) A common determination of what resources and capabilities are to be aligned to achieve the planning objectives; and

(5) A defined desired strategic end state.

f. Application of a whole-of-government approach ensures that:

(1) Commanders and civilian decision makers consider all possible USG capabilities to achieve identified objectives;

(2) Planning groups include necessary personnel from all relevant sectors and agencies;

(3) Planners approach problems in a holistic way and avoid stovepiped responses;

(4) Ongoing or existing policies and programs are reassessed and integrated into new objectives and desired outcomes; and

(5) Planners consider and incorporate interagency capabilities, activities, and comparative advantages in the application of the instruments of national power.

4. Joint Operation Planning and Interorganizational Coordination

a. JOPP is used by CCDRs and subordinate JFCs to translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an OPLAN. Joint operation planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and
available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or SecDef selects the COA during CAP. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. Thus, a campaign plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the desired end state.

(1) **Strategic Guidance.** CCDRs develop intermediate objectives based on strategic guidance provided by the President and SecDef. CCDRs, in conjunction with their counterparts in DOS, USAID, and other USG agencies, and other non-USG organizations and sectors, will determine how to coordinate planning and operations, actions, and activities and resources at the theater strategic and operational level to achieve strategic objectives.

(2) The commander should coordinate with relevant entities throughout the JOPP to consider all the instruments of national power. The commander is guided by the interagency provisions of the USG strategic guidance and planning and disseminates that guidance to the joint force in annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the CCDR’s OPLAN. Appendix V (Planning Guidance, Annex V—Interagency Coordination) to CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats, is an essential ingredient at the NSC and IPC in conducting POLMIL planning. It notes that interagency participation could be involved at the earliest phases of the operation or campaign starting with flexible deterrent options (FDOs). Linking the interagency actions with the phases of the operation assists in the scheduling and coordination. Crucially important to the plan is the orderly flow of operations to the desired end state and an efficient end of direct US military involvement. The development of annex C should enhance early operational coordination with planners from the other USG agencies that will be involved in the operation’s execution or its policy context. During planning, CCDR involvement, participation, and coordination will be critical to success. Increasingly, integrated civil-military plans are being co-developed by a JFC and US embassy.

(3) **FDOs** are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence an adversary’s actions. The basic purpose of FDOs is to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—but they are most effective when used to combine the influence across instruments of national power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision making, rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths.

For additional information on FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. **Plan Development and Coordination.** Although deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there may be crisis situations which call for an immediate US military response (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation or FHA). CCDRs frequently develop COAs based on recommendations and considerations originating in one or more US embassies. In this regard, the country team is an invaluable partner because of its interagency experience and links to Washington. The JIACG (or equivalent
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination

organization), in conjunction with the integration planning cell if deployed, can provide additional collaboration with operational planners and USG agencies. Emergency action plans in force at every embassy cover a wide range of anticipated contingencies and crises and can assist the commanders in identifying COAs, options, and constraints to military actions and support activities. The GCC’s staff also consults with JS and other key agencies to coordinate military operations and support activities. Maintaining a dialogue with OSD and JS counterparts is especially important in CAP, as they will serve as the decision-making representatives to HSC and NSC meetings at the Washington HQ level.

(1) **Initial concepts of military operations may require revision based on feasibility analysis and consideration of related activities by USG agencies, IGOs, or NGOs, particularly regarding logistics.** For example, primitive or damaged seaport and airport facilities may constrain operations by limiting the throughput of the envisioned amounts of personnel and supplies. Such information is frequently provided by the country team that, in turn, may be in contact with relief organizations in country. Directly or indirectly, refinement of the military mission should be coordinated with USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to identify the required capabilities in order to achieve unity of effort across all organizations involved.

(2) **Planning** conducted by the combatant command should be coordinated with all stakeholders and USG departments and agencies, through the OSD and the JCS. Planning for military activities will align with wider USG policy and, in coordination with US diplomatic missions, seek to complement or synchronize with parallel interagency activities. Contingency plans, where possible, will identify assumed contributions and requested support of interagency partners while complying with the guidance issued in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) related to incorporating interagency input into DOD planning. Planning will focus on:

   (a) Identifying any requests for additional policy direction;

   (b) Operational capabilities, security cooperation activities, and development and diplomacy efforts of interagency partners;

   (c) Legal and administrative agreements with interagency partners that must be in place before executing operations;

   (d) Requirements (e.g., resources, people, and authorities) to improve interagency contributions or effectiveness (done in consultation with OSD, JS, and interagency partners); and

   (e) Criteria for shifting between DOD supported and supporting roles, as appropriate.

(3) **Interagency Involvement in DOD Plan Development.** The quality of DOD campaign and contingency planning will improve with the early and regular participation of other US departments and agencies. USG departments and agencies, however, currently only have the capacity to support development of a limited number of DOD plans. During planning, CCDRs and their staffs:
(a) Develop options, tasks, and coordination requirements for specific operations and activities directly with affected COM and/or state and local authorities.

(b) Share information with and rely on the subject matter expertise of LNOs and representatives from other departments and agencies detailed to the combatant command.

(c) Conduct internal planning with LNOs and representatives from other departments and agencies detailed to the combatant command.

(4) In coordination with the CJCS, CCDRs will seek SecDef intent/guidance before beginning development of OPLANs with other departments and agencies.

(5) OUSD(P) and JS Joint Staff Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate (J-7) will facilitate and support combatant command planning conferences and workshops involving multiple USG agencies or departments. OUSD(P) via JS J-7 may authorize direct liaison between combatant command planners and their HQ-level counterparts in other USG agencies for campaign and joint operation planning. The Promote Cooperation process ensures that DOD speaks with one voice as well as ensuring that plan content sharing/release with other USG agencies is fully vetted and authorized. Combatant commands will work through OUSD(P) and JS to organize and coordinate these conferences/meetings. Efforts to integrate other agencies into DOD planning efforts are complementary to whole-of-government planning, which is directed by the NSC or HSC, or a designated lead agency.

(6) With SecDef’s approval in coordination with the CJCS, combatant commands will work in coordination with OUSD(P) and JS to involve other USG departments and agencies in DOD campaign plan development.

c. The GEF translates the national security objectives and high-level strategy into DOD priorities and comprehensive planning direction. The GEF identifies SecDef’s strategic priorities and policy, and provides direction in the form of force allocation and defense posture guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) implements the strategic

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**INTEGRATING INTERAGENCY PLANNING**

*We will continue to work with other US Departments and Agencies, state and local governments, partners and allies, and international and multilateral organizations to achieve our objectives. A whole-of-government approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals. Examples such as expanding US Southern Command’s interagency composition and the establishment of US Africa Command will point the way. In addition, we will support efforts to coordinate national security planning more effectively, both within DOD and across other US Departments and Agencies.*

**SOURCE:** National Defense Strategy 2008
policy guidance provided in the GEF and initiates the planning process for the development of campaign, contingency, and posture plans. Together, the GEF and JSCP provide guidance and task CCDRs and staffs to develop TCPs, global campaign plans, and support plans that integrate posture plans, security cooperation (Phase 0 and other military engagement activities), contingency plans, and crisis action plans. Posture plans seek to align and synchronize access and needs across GCC areas of TCPs, contingency plans, and crisis action plans. The linking of security cooperation, military engagement, deterrence activities, deliberate planning, and CAP products within the campaign plans allows CCDRs to efficiently allocate resources and direct operations in alignment with theater strategic and national strategic objectives. JOPES provides planning policy and procedures that support the formal interaction between Joint Planning and Execution Community members during deliberate planning and CAP and execution.

d. USG agencies do not want to react to a military plan after the fact. USG agencies want a seat at the table to conduct strategic assessment, policy formulation, and planning.

(1) Annex V (Interagency Coordination) should be consistent with the planning requirements contained in CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats*. A supported commander is responsible for developing annex V for each OPLAN. Annex V should specify for participating USG agencies the following: the capabilities desired by the military, the shared understanding of the situation, and the common objectives required to accomplish the mission. Annex V also provides a single location in a plan to capture potential contributions of USG agencies, identify potential DOD supporting roles to USG departments and agencies, and frame mutually agreeable integrating relationships (coordination and collaboration processes), linkages, and methods. This enables interagency planners to rigorously plan in concert with the military, to determine better their support requirements, and to suggest other USG activities or organizations that could contribute to the operation. This implies a collaboratively produced, releasable annex V.

(2) DOD plans are endorsed by SecDef (or his designee). While they are not “cosigned” by other departments and agencies, DOD typically seeks inputs from other departments and agencies to avoid developing a military plan in isolation.

(3) The military plan may be in support of a wider USG effort. In this case, annex V may approach the same level of effort and importance as annex C (Operations).

(4) The following considerations should guide annex V development:

(a) Coordination with interagency partners should occur early in the process;

(b) Annex V should be collaboratively developed, reflecting an integrated approach involving all instruments of national power;

(c) Annex V should capture DOD and interagency cooperative activities toward mutual goals and objectives;

(d) Aim for greater specificity; and
Chapter II

BEYOND ANNEX V

Joint force commanders today are working hand-in-hand with civilian agencies to move beyond the traditional annex V construct in campaign planning. In Iraq, beginning in 2007, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander General David Petraeus and the Iraq Chief of Mission Ambassador Ryan Crocker published a Joint Campaign Plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with both of their signatures. This document, developed collaboratively by the MNF-I staff and the country team (led by a special office in the embassy—the Joint Strategic Plans and Assessment office—stood up specifically to conduct collaborative planning with the Department of Defense), served as the comprehensive, government-wide plan to guide US efforts in Iraq. Rather than relegating “interagency” tasks to annex V, the entire plan was integrated and responsibilities, lead and supporting, for execution were assigned. On 10 August 2009, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal signed the “United States Government Integrated Civilian–Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan,” which provides guidance from the US Chief of Mission and the Commander of US Forces-Afghanistan to US personnel in Afghanistan. The plan represents the collaborative effort of all the US Government departments and agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of different equities, resources, and approaches.

Various Sources

(e) Where possible, an unclassified and releasable annex V should be developed and shared with agency and coalition partners. Classified annexes should be developed and maintained separately when needed.

e. In concert with the NSC or HSC as appropriate, DOD, and JS, CCDRs should:

(1) **Recognize all USG agencies, departments, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector that are or should be involved in the operation.** In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, HSC, DOD, the Services, and JS.

(2) **Understand the interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector relationships,** to include the lead or primary agency identified at the national level. Understand the differences between roles and responsibilities of DOD, the CJCS, JS, combatant commands, and the Services in domestic and foreign operations. Understand the different command arrangements in domestic and foreign operations.

(3) **Define the objectives of the response.** These should be broadly outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, HSC, NSC/Principals Committee (PC), or NSC/Deputies Committee (DC) meetings that authorized the overall USG participation. Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated in tasking orders that include the commander’s intent.
Define COAs for the assigned military tasks, while striving for unity of effort with other USG agencies.

Cooperate with each agency, department, or organization and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays. In many situations, participating agencies, departments, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or colocated with the CDDR’s staff. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can identify and make contact with the appropriate agency or department. It may then be advisable for the CDDR to request temporary assignment of agency representatives or LNOs from the participating agencies, departments, and organizations to the combatant command or JTF HQ. In some cases, it may also be useful or even necessary for the military to send LNOs to select other organizations. Obtaining representatives from agencies or offices within departments is often key.

Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities or authorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. If the obstacles cannot be resolved they must immediately be forwarded up the military chain of command for resolution.

Military and civilian planners should identify resources relevant to the situation. Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations (to include HN) are committed to providing resources in order to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

Define the desired end states, plan for transition between phases, and recommend termination criteria.

Maximize the joint force assets to support long-term goals. The military’s contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, state, national, or international response to a crisis.

“In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN [United Nations] and NGO [nongovernmental organization] community in-theater literally ‘met on the dance floor.’ Given that a JTF [joint task force] commander’s concern will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors. The commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support…”

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, US Army
Commander, JTF SUPPORT HOPE
(10) **Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams** that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral teams or teams organized under the auspices of an IGO such as the UN or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

(11) **Develop and implement an information sharing strategy**, methods, and tools that enable the interagency coordination process to occur. Information sharing is critical to successful planning and execution. Identify and resolve interoperability issues to assure seamless sharing of information.

(12) **Incorporate, support, and participate in interagency planning processes**, such as the IPS and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to the greatest extent possible.

f. **The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.** Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG (or equivalent organizations) provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs (or equivalent organizations) complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the DOD and the NSC and HSC systems. Members participate in deliberate planning and CAP, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.

(1) JIACG is a common DOD term across combatant commands. The operational environment and differing missions for each combatant command has resulted in unique organizations (e.g., interagency partnering directorate, interagency group), but with similar functions.

(2) If augmented with other partners such as IGOs, NGOs, and/or multinational representatives, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) enhances the capability to collaborate and coordinate with those organizations and the private sector.

(3) When activated under the interagency management system (IMS), the integration planning cell is a civilian planning cell integrated with the relevant GCC’s HQ. The cell can be organized or tailored to operate 24/7 to assist in and support interagency planning and/or coordination in crisis and/or contingency situations. During such situations the cell will enable a coherent, efficient, and responsive planning and coordination effort through “focused or targeted” participation by interagency subject matter experts and dedicated agency representatives. The relationship between the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and the integration planning cell should be developed and documented in standard operating procedures. Procedures should be developed to facilitate the rapid reception and integration into the GCC’s staff of the members of the cell. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can “host” the integration planning cell: receiving them, providing office space and administrative support, providing a guide/assistant, and facilitating their linkup with various staff entities. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can invite the
integration planning cell to attend their daily battle rhythm event with the embassies and other interagency participants. Integration planning cell members can also informally confer with the agency representatives assigned to the GCC’s staff and resident within the JIACG (or equivalent organization).

For additional information on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

5. Interorganizational Coordination and Collaboration

a. The Civil-Military Relationship. The crux of interorganizational coordination is in understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive. The most productive way to look at this relationship is seeing the comparative advantages of each of the two communities—military and civilian. While the military normally focuses on reaching clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a C2 structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling changeable political, economic, social, and humanitarian interests using dialogue, bargaining, risk taking, and consensus building. Civilian organizations may have a better appreciation of the political-social-cultural situation, and have better relief, development, and public administration. They may be more adept at negotiation, bargaining, and consensus decision making, thus potentially acting as agents of change within that society. While the ways and means between military and civilian organizations may differ, they share many purposes and risks, and the ultimate overall goal may be shared. Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with different priorities and procedures is a daunting task. The following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination and collaboration:

(1) Forge a Collective Definition of the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem. A shared understanding is difficult because operational environments can be complex, ambiguous, confusing, and dynamic. Appropriate representatives from relevant agencies, departments, and organizations, to include field offices, should be involved at the onset of the planning process and share their perspectives. This may include the deployment of an interagency assessment team to the affected area. Stakeholders should be included to the maximum extent during planning, execution, and assessment.

(2) Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for Each Involved Organization or Agency. Commanders and decision makers should establish a clearly defined end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria. Not all agencies and organizations will necessarily understand or agree to clearly define the objective with the same sense of urgency or specificity as military planners.

(3) Develop a common, agreed set of assumptions that will drive the planning among the supported and supporting agencies. Collectively amend the assumptions as necessary throughout the planning and execution of operations.

(4) Understand the differences between US national objectives, end state and transition criteria, and the objectives of other governments, IGOs, NGOs, the private
sector, and the parties to the conflict. Although IGOs and NGOs may participate at some level in defining the problem, their goals and objectives may not align with those of DOD.

(5) **Understand and appreciate the differences between federal, state, tribal, private sector, and NGO objectives and desired end states when US military forces perform homeland defense (HD) or CS missions on US territory.** After a major disaster, there may be hundreds of different federal, state, tribal, and/or local governments, agencies, and organizations involved, as well as many private sector organizations (i.e., 85% of the US critical infrastructure is owned and/or operated by the private sector) and NGOs. The disparate jurisdictions, objectives, viewpoints, and cultures can present severe challenges to effective coordination and collaboration in support of assigned missions and efforts.

(6) **Establish a Common Frame of Reference.** Differences in terminology and—in the case of foreign organizations—the lack of a common language complicates coordination. The meaning of terms such as “safe zone,” “impartial,” or “neutral” to a JFC may have completely different connotations to another organization’s representative. The operational implication of this potential for misunderstanding is grave. The semantic differences commonly experienced among the Services grow markedly in the interagency, IGO, and NGO arenas. Terms such as “shaping,” “pre-conflict,” and “irregular warfare” can have negative effects on relationships. To mitigate this problem, commanders and their staffs must anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage. A good start is to provide common access to JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and the Services’ supplements. This clarification is particularly important for the establishment of military objectives. Combatant command staffs should also strive to learn terminology used by other departments, agencies, and organizations. A good start is to review the *USAID Primer* at http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html and/or the *US Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan* at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf.

(7) **Capitalize on Experience.** Review the after-action reports and lessons learned using the joint and Services lessons learned systems, Center for Complex Operations, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to develop proposed COAs. Although usually less formal, organizations outside DOD frequently have their own systems in place, which should be reviewed whenever possible to capitalize on operational experience.

(8) **Develop Courses of Action or Options.** A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. Additionally, it gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. Resource-sensitive problems require a flexible and unified approach to planning to develop viable options. A robust information exchange within the interagency, IGO, and NGO community facilitates the formulation of viable options. Synchronization is achieved when interagency coordination includes consideration from all stakeholders. The military planner or commander’s voice will be but one among many at the interagency, IGO, and NGO table.
(9) **Support a Comprehensive Approach.** In broad terms, develop unified action by building a strategy to integrate all instruments of national power with multinational partners, HNs, and other participants. Identify the key objectives necessary to attain the strategic end state. In military terms, this is the development of a shared concept of operations (CONOPS). The pursuit of multiple objectives needs a coherent plan to simultaneously guide military and civilian agency efforts.

(10) **Establish Responsibility.** A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs to be done and agree upon the means to accomplish it. The resources required for a mission must be clearly identified, with specific and agreed upon responsibilities assigned to the providing agencies. To receive proper reimbursement from USG agencies or IGOs for materiel support, detailed lines of authority and accounting procedures must be established.

Refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management in Support of Joint Operations, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 4000.19, Interservice and Intragovernmental Support.

(11) **Establish an interorganizational coordination office, staff element, or process tailored to the mission and situation.** Organizations such as JIACGs (or equivalent organization), interagency coordination directorates, special staff offices, civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), JIATFs, and other recognized structures and processes are organizational elements focused on enabling interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector coordination and shared situational awareness. Under the IMS for R&S, participation in structures such as the country reconstruction and stabilization group (CRSG), integration planning cell, and the advance civilian team (ACT) help integrate personnel from all relevant agencies. They serve as a “middle ground” or “meeting place” for non-DOD representatives and joint force personnel to enhance communication, collaboration, and cooperation, and find/work toward common mission objectives and end states. A continuously operating center, forum, or process that serves as the “focal point” of information for all the stakeholders enhances planning and execution. This is not necessarily a military-run function and can help overcome bureaucratic impediments to typical coordination tasks.

(12) **Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions.** In most multiagency operations, civilian organizations remain engaged long after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the operational area. Therefore, prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military commanders to civilian authorities. This process must begin at the national level. When interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector transition planning does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted. As campaign plans, OPLANs, and orders are developed, effective transition planning should also be a primary consideration. Commanders and their staffs should anticipate the impact of transition on the local populace and other organizations.

(a) Transitions should be carefully planned in detail with a clear articulation of responsibilities (who, what, where, when, and how), be it military or civilian led. Eliminate as much ambiguity as possible while retaining a degree of flexibility as conditions will undoubtedly change during execution. As the lead transitions from the military to the civil
authorities, significant military resources may be diverted to support civil operations, and there may be a requirement to provide military staff augmentation to the civilian HQ.

(b) Unity of effort is particularly important in the latter phases of a campaign, but is very difficult to achieve as more and more organizations get involved in the transition process. Important to success during transitions is continuity on the military side.

(13) Direct All Actions Toward Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is achieved when all actions are being directed to a common purpose. Because DOD will often be in a supporting role, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies and organizations. Effective organization, communications, exchange of information, and most important, an understanding of the objectives all contribute to unity of effort.

(14) Develop an Information Sharing Strategy. Effective information sharing is a critical enabler for success. Identify, acquire, and implement information sharing strategies, methods, and tools that support and enable the interagency process. Information sharing is making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems). Information sharing includes the cultural, managerial, and technical behaviors by which one participant leverages information held or created by another participant. Improving DOD’s ability to share information helps to realize the power of information as a strategic asset. Benefits include, but are not limited to:

(a) Achieving unity of effort across mission and multinational operations,

(b) Improving the speed and execution of decisions,

(c) Achieving rapid adaptability across mission and multinational operations, and

(d) Improving the ability to anticipate events and resource needs, providing an initial situational advantage, and setting the conditions for success.

b. The following are key focus areas for interorganizational coordination to foster a comprehensive approach:
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination

(1) **Dialogue.** Continual dialogue with national leadership helps identify national objectives, desired end states, risks, and feasible policy direction. Continue commander and staff dialogue with national and international leaders, and then translate what they see, hear, and feel into solid, logical combatant command level objectives. This takes much effort and never ends. National and international positions and objectives change. GCC’s HQ recognizes this and should maintain a dialogue to ensure they remain nested within these national and international objectives.

(2) **Analysis.** Recognize the complex, interconnected, and largely unpredictable nature of the environment and the need to work to better understand it and the problem. Be inclusive with our partners in gaining a common understanding of this environment, the associated often changing problem, and determination of necessary conditions or desired outcomes to achieve success. This analysis helps provide common visualization and better achieve unity of effort with our partners—it bridges the gap between all instruments of national and international power.

(3) **Actions.** Harmonize military actions with those of the stakeholders. Use mission type orders coupled with guidance and intent to empower decentralized military operations that are synergized with those of our partners. Establishing a command climate and organizational capability that facilitates inclusion is important.

(4) **Accountability.** The commander is ultimately held accountable for success of military operations in the end, regardless of earlier higher direction, lack of resources, or absence of support by others.

6. Intergovernmental Organizations

An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. **IGOs may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis** for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. They are formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, NATO, Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union. NATO and the OSCE are regional security organizations, while the European Union (EU), the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity), and the OAS are general regional organizations. A new trend toward sub-regional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination.

7. Nongovernmental Organizations

a. NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in both the domestic and international arenas. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military. They may have a long-term established presence in the crisis area. NGOs frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. They will most likely remain
long after military forces have departed. **NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations.**

b. NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although philosophical differences and divergent agendas may exist between military forces and NGOs, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering common ground with NGOs is essential; they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives. For US forces, there are legal restrictions on the provision of support to NGOs, which must be carefully considered in any military-NGO cooperation. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.

8. The Private Sector

a. The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. Such organizations can be large and multinational or small with limited resources and focused on one country. In addition there may be a plethora of small private sector entities and NGOs in a country. Inside the US, the private sector owns and/or operates some 85% of our Nation’s critical infrastructure. The private sector can assist the USG by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in deliberate planning and CAP, and providing other assistance as appropriate. The scope in which private organizations can be involved includes theater security cooperation, combat support, and reconstruction.

*For more information, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and National Infrastructure Protection Plan.*

b. **Multinational Corporations (MNCs).** MNCs are separate and distinct entities from the “not-for-profit” NGOs. MNCs may offer civil-military operations (CMOs) much in the way of local insight, in-country equipment and resources, preestablished organization, and a means by which to assist with reconstruction of devastated areas. During an operation, MNCs existing in-country prior to the event which initiated DOD intervention are often well-postured to advise the COM and JFC on matters of working with the local government, culture, terrain, and logistics needs. The Department of Commerce (DOC) can be instrumental in providing advice and contacts in dealing with MNCs. In addition, MNCs will likely be highly motivated to protect their investments and revive their own business operations. Although CMO should avoid being driven by an MNC’s agenda or profit motives, these motives will not often be far removed from the overarching objectives of all civilian and military operational planners—resolving the crisis, helping the region to recover, and building a more secure future. Coordinating operations with MNCs will be inherently
complex and possibly radically different in scope and objective than the typical NGO interaction. While NGOs may have a limited mission and a small “footprint” in-country, MNCs could be very complex operations as MNCs are often integrated with national, regional, and local governments, with many investments and holdings, and with a large and diverse work force. At times, MNCs may be candidates for providing CMO with contracted services or may be brought into the country as contracted entities after the operation begins. Many examples exist outside of purely military operations.

c. Academia. Universities, think tanks, and research organizations are an important resource for DOD. The work these organizations provided in conjunction with DOD in Iraq to recover archeological items and protect historical sites is a good example. In the US, academic organizations and consortiums, such as the Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institute for Defense and Business, and the University of Colorado Natural Hazards Center, provide a means for research, a source of knowledge and ideas, and a means of establishing common dialogue between DOD and academia.

d. Operational Contract Support. Military forces will often be significantly augmented with contracted support. Successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area. This is a complex and very challenging process. Commanders and their staffs need to have a working knowledge of key joint contract support integration and contractor management related terms, since these terms are not widely known outside of the professional acquisition community. Contracting is commonly used to augment organic military and other sources of support, such as multinational logistic support, HN support, and to provide support where no organic capability exists. However, contracting is often not properly planned for or integrated into the overall joint force logistic support effort. Operational contracts may also support stability operations through local awards, which strengthen the local economy. Time permitting, operational contracts should be coordinated among relevant DOD, USG agencies (e.g., DOS, USAID), IGOs, and NGOs to minimize risk, inefficiencies, duplication, and competition between agencies.

For more information, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

e. The Department of Labor (DOL) provides the interface of government with the workforce. DOL can provide advice on how to increase effectiveness of the organizations’ ability to meet the needs of the indigenous population and any foreign workers in the operational area.

9. Joint Task Force Considerations

a. When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to establish a JTF, the establishing authority is normally a CCDR (see Figure II-1). The CCDR develops the mission statement and CONOPS based upon direction from SecDef as communicated through the CJCS. If developed, the NSC’s interagency plan may affect the mission statement. The CCDR appoints a commander, joint task force (CJTF), and, in
conjunction with the CJTF, determines the necessary military capabilities required to accomplish military objectives. A CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ as necessary to accomplish the objectives.

## JOINT TASK FORCE ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES

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<td>Appoint the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assign the mission and forces, and exercise command and control of the joint task force (JTF).</td>
<td>In coordination with the CJTF, determine the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.</td>
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<td>Allocate or request forces required.</td>
<td>Provide the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed military operations.</td>
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<td>Define the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified.)</td>
<td>Ensure freedom of action, communications, personnel recovery, and security for forces moving into or positioned outside the JOA.</td>
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<td>Ensure the development and approval of rules of engagement or rules for the use of force tailored to the situation.</td>
<td>Monitor the operational situation and keep superiors informed through periodic reports.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execute orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).</td>
<td>Promulgate changes in plans and modify mission and forces as necessary.</td>
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<td>Ensure administrative and sustainment support.</td>
<td>Recommend to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.</td>
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<td>Establish or assist in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.</td>
<td>Determine supporting force requirements.</td>
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<td>Prepare a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).</td>
<td>Approve CJTF plans.</td>
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<td>Delegate directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).</td>
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**Figure II-1. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities**
b. **JTF Attributes.** The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and the forces required to execute the mission. The JTF construct provides organizational flexibility, is task organized, reflects the mission’s requirements and the unique and necessary capabilities of the Service and functional components, and provides for the phased introduction of forces and the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment. A JTF is normally designated when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. **The mission assigned to a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but, increasingly, the mutual support of numerous USG agencies, and collaboration with IGOs and NGOs.** Normally, a JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The JTF HQ commands and controls the joint force and coordinates military operations with the activities of other government agencies, MNFs, IGOs, NGOs, and the HN forces and agencies.

c. **JTFs in the Interagency Process.** Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level. The USG interagency process requires the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of USG agencies, IGOs, the HN, and NGOs. The JTF HQ provides an important basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Depending on the type of operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency, IGO, and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the joint field office (JFO), the CMOC, or the humanitarian operations center (HOC). JTF personnel may also participate actively or as observers in a civilian-led functional coordinating group, concentrating on a specific issue or project.

1. Upon activation of a JTF overseas, its role must be clarified with the CCDR regarding direct liaison authority with the affected COM(s) and with the senior defense official (SDO) in terms of speaking with one voice to the COM and the country team.

2. Sending LNOs to an embassy is a negotiated process; it is not automatic. There are a number of reasons that a COM may not want additional military in and around the embassy.

3. Avoid overwhelming interagency partners with JTF coordination and planning demands by channeling most communications through the LNO team.

4. Designate the staff office responsible for interagency coordination. Many JTFs designate their plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) or CMOC with this responsibility. Provide appropriate resources for this function.

5. Where both a large country team or JFO and a military JTF exist side-by-side, detailed procedures should be developed for staff coordination.
(6) For CS operations, the JTF HQ is ideally collocated with the JFO per NRF guidance. All ESFs are represented in the JFO.

(7) Consider also how to integrate military elements that may not be part of core JTF (e.g., special operations forces, to include those conducting train and advise missions).

*For further guidance on the forming and composition of a JTF, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

d. A JIATF may be formed when the mission requires close integration of two or more USG agencies. Formation of a JIATF requires significant coordination among the participating agencies. Refer to Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.”

e. A joint support force (JSF) may be formed when the mission is a CS operation and DOD is operating in support of one or more USG agencies. Although the JSF is organized similar to a JTF with a commander, command element, and forces, the title is more agreeable to the interorganizational community.

10. Other Joint Task Force Considerations

a. **Intelligence Collection and Dissemination.** The primary function of joint intelligence is to provide information and assessments to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. Information sharing is critical and the architecture for intelligence dissemination must facilitate joint, multinational, and interagency consumers.

(1) The CCDR, if required, should request a national intelligence support team (NIST) to support the JTF during a crisis or contingency operation. **NIST is a nationally sourced team** composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other IC agencies as required. The support provided by a NIST provides commanders access to national-level databases and to agency-unique information and analysis.

(2) Collection of intelligence during military operations is conducted in accordance with JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*. **Managing the intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination for a JTF may be complicated** by non-USG civilians, especially members of IGOs and NGOs, who may be sensitive to the perception that they are being used to gather intelligence. Intelligence gathering may be regarded as an act of direct participation in hostilities under the law of war and the involvement or perception of involvement by NGOs may result in them losing their protection from attack, and if captured, they may be prosecuted for their belligerent acts under the domestic law of the captor. However, general information provided by personnel from IGOs and NGOs may corroborate intelligence gained from other sources. Generally, the best approach to information sharing with the NGOs and international civilian community is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the objectives to accomplish the mission. However, classified information will only be shared with or
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination

released to official representatives of foreign governments with the appropriate security clearance and need to know.

(3) Procedures for control and disclosure of classified information, as practiced by DOD and other USG agencies, normally do not exist with IGOs and NGOs. Under the USC, it is unlawful to disclose classified information to foreign governments without proper authorization. Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals until the appropriate designated disclosure authority receives a security assurance from the recipient foreign government on the individuals who are to receive the information. Guidance for the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments is contained in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.

(a) In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate the receipt of intelligence from those forces. Release procedures should be established in advance, and the JFC participating in the MNF must tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance. In order to share critical intelligence information with multinational partners efficiently, US intelligence information should be written for release at the lowest possible classification level and given the fewest possible dissemination restrictions within foreign disclosure guidelines. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) must establish procedures and training programs for separating intelligence from sources and methods to downgrade the classification of information but not necessarily declassify it. Intelligence production agencies often print highly classified reports in such a manner that compartmented information is separated from intelligence that can be widely disseminated by a “tear line” (the J-2 and component intelligence staff officers keep information above the tear line and disseminate the intelligence below). Having intelligence production agencies use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligence sharing.

(b) Consideration must also be given to control of sensitive or classified information in fora such as the CMOC that include representatives of non-USG agencies.

(c) The joint force J-2, or delegated representative, obtains all the necessary foreign disclosure authorization from DIA, national agencies, and other originators of controlled classified information as soon as possible to effect seamless transfer of information to foreign partners engaged in joint operations. All JS personnel should be knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The efficient flow of classified and sensitive information will be enhanced by the assignment of formally trained personnel who are knowledgeable of foreign disclosure. The foreign disclosure officer may also be required to train all newly assigned personnel on techniques and procedures for disclosure of classified, unclassified, and FOUO (for official use only) information.

b. Force Protection (FP). FP planning considerations are based on joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), the multinational nature of the operation, and the nonmilitary organizations operating in an operational area. The COM’s
regional security office sets FP standards for all country team personnel. Other aspects of FP that the CJTF must consider are:

1. **Other nations do not necessarily execute FP in the same manner as the US military.** If a joint force is under the OPCON of a MNF commander, the JFC is still responsible for implementing the appropriate FP measures in accordance with CCDR directives.

2. **Special measures may be required for joint force personnel who must interact with local populations and NGOs.** Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference increase the risk to these joint force personnel.

3. Because US forces often assume the leadership role in multinational operations, joint force personnel can potentially be a greater target.

4. In addition to actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against the joint force, the **JFC may provide security for other personnel and assets.** These requirements must be clearly stated in the mission. An MOA may be required to document protection of:
   - Personnel and equipment belonging to USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs;
   - Affected country personnel and assets;
   - Relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes;
   - Relief distribution centers;
   - Stocks of supplies; and
   - Ports and airfields.


c. **Logistic Support.** Logistic requirements, resource availability, and financial authority determination are vital to sustain a joint force operation.

   1. USG agencies, the UN, IGOs, NGOs, and MNFs are responsible to provide for their own logistic support. However, US military logistic capabilities are frequently requested and provided to these organizations. **Pursuant to the Economy Act, the JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival.** This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, and management of air, land, or sea transportation nodes. In situations where there is limited or denied access and civilian transportation infrastructure is degraded or otherwise limited, DOD-provided transportation may be the only viable mode. Identifying USG agency, IGO, and NGO intertheater and
intratheater movement requests to a GCC’s responsible organization and deconfliction of all movement executions are vital to ensure the needs of all operational partners are met. An MOA should be crafted between two agencies whenever resources are changing hands, and should comply with relevant DOD instructions and the Economy Act.

For additional information on intertheater and intratheater movement processes, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

(2) Unity of effort is essential to coordinate logistic operations in joint and multinational environments, requiring coordination not only between Services and US agencies, but also among all relief and humanitarian organizations in theater. Authority for logistics matters should be clearly stated in the OPLAN and supporting plans and the JFC should validate these on a continual basis throughout the operation, making changes when and where required. If the JTF has been designated in the OPLAN as the primary source of movement support, then the CJTF is responsible for establishing movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of USG agencies, the country team, multinational or UN forces, NGOs, and any international joint logistic center (e.g., UN Joint Logistic Center) that may be established. The GCC’s joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC) or equivalent logistics management organization is the joint capability that integrates, synchronizes, and optimizes strategic and theater deployment and distribution operations within a GCC’s AOR. The JDDOC is critical to control of the theater segment and must coordinate and synchronize distribution that is responsive to the needs and capabilities of the tactical segment of intratheater movement. Close communications should be established with all elements (e.g., USG agency, IGO, NGO) to ensure that their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

(3) Normally, joint forces are supported through a combination of scheduled US resupply, contingency contracting, HN support, and UN logistic support.

(4) When joint forces participate in a UN operation, many of the costs incurred by the US are reimbursable by the UN.

(5) In a multinational, non-UN sponsored operation, a single nation may be responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support for all forces on a reimbursable basis.

(6) Operational contract support is commonly used to augment organic military and other sources of support such as multinational logistic support, HN support, and to provide support where no organic capability exists. Normally, the JFC establishes contracting related boards. In order to facilitate CMO, other agencies and organizations operating in the JOA with contracting interests should be represented at these boards.

For additional information on contracting, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(7) Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements are agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with multinational partners that allow US forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment.
See DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2120.01A, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements; and JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, for more information on acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.

(8) **Economy Act.** The Economy Act provides agencies the authority to provide services to, or secure the services of, another executive agency for in-house performance or performance by contract where there is no other statutory authority. The head of an agency or major organizational unit within an agency may place an order with a major organizational unit within the same agency or another agency for goods or services if the agency has available funds; the order is in the best interests of the USG; the agency filling the order can provide, or acquire by contract, the ordered goods or services; and the head of the agency decides that the ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise (see Title 31, USC, Section 1535[a]).

(a) The FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] Subpart 17.5 and the DFARS [Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement] Subpart 217.5 govern use of the Economy Act. It can be a valuable tool if used correctly; however, violations may result in criminal penalties.

(b) The regulations require two primary documents. The first is a determination and findings that establishes the Economy Act as the authority for the transaction. The second document is the order constituting the agreement between the requiring and servicing agencies on the statement of work, payment for supplies or services, and related terms and conditions.

d. **Legal Issues.** Legal services are provided to the JFC and staff by the SJA. The SJA should possess a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and laws applicable to military forces as well as familiarization with regulations and laws applicable to other governmental and nongovernmental entities, domestic and international, and be a point of contact (POC) with IGOs and NGOs, a negotiator with foreign officials, and a draftsman for command policies, orders, and international agreements. **The SJA must be an active participant in the interagency mechanisms to obtain the firsthand knowledge necessary to identify and resolve interagency and multinational legal issues including but not limited to:**

(1) Legal authority for US military and USG agency participation and support;

(2) International law;

   (a) Dislocated civilians, immunity and asylum, arrests and detentions;

   (b) War crimes, status-of-forces agreements, law of war;

(3) Military justice system;

(4) Environmental law;
(5) Intelligence oversight;

(6) Disaster relief and claims;

(7) Contract and fiscal law;

(8) Rules of engagement and rules for use of force;

(9) Authorization for, and limitations on, use of military forces to support civilian authorities;

(10) State, local, and tribal laws and jurisdictional issues; and

(11) Cooperative military agreements and other authorizations for, and limitations on, assistance to foreign militaries and vice versa.

11. Information Management and Sharing

a. All military operations are information intensive. Other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state. However, the cultures of non-USG organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military activities. By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, the CJTF can help encourage active IGO and NGO cooperation in resolving the crisis. Locally stationed IGO and NGO personnel are usually well-qualified individuals who understand the local culture and practices and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. Commanders at all levels should determine and provide guidance on what information needs to be shared with whom and when. DOD information should be appropriately secured, shared, and made available throughout the information life cycle to appropriate mission partners to the maximum extent allowed by US laws and DOD policy. Commanders, along with their staffs, need to recognize the criticality of the information sharing function at the outset of complex operations, and not as an afterthought. The relief community is an important source of information regarding the following:

(1) Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand.

(2) Local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces with the populace.

(3) Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders.

(4) Security situation.

(5) Role and capabilities of the HN government.
b. This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. Therefore, it is important to not compromise the position of the IGOs and impartiality of the NGOs and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are part of an intelligence gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

c. Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of unity of effort and a common purpose. A collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue—effective, low-cost network equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. The least common denominator among them with respect to communication capability is the Internet. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities.

d. The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task sharing and collaborative planning—all of which depend on communications and management of data and information. The following issues, however, often complicate effective civilian-military coordination:

1. A lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation;
2. Suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence gathering;
3. Tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data for operations security (OPSEC) and “need to know” versus the civilian need for transparency;
4. Differences in the C2 style of military operations versus civilian activities; and
5. The compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civil-military organization cultures.

e. The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding source—whether it is an NGO, IGO, assisting country government, or host government—can be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to dismantle traditional institutional stovepipes and facilitate the sharing of information among civilian and military organizations.

f. The JFC should be equipped with the capability to access the Internet to ensure effective collaboration with the external mission participants (e.g., IGOs, NGOs). The JFC establishes interoperable and compatible communications by using available commercial telecommunications networks, military satellite channels, C2 radio and radar coverage, and
conventional military communications systems to support the exchange of orders, directions, and information among all participants. Establishment of direct communications between commanders, interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), and the private sector facilitates effective coordination and decision making. Information protection for nonsecure communications must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning must consider the termination or transition of US involvement and the transfer of responsibility to the UN, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations.

**g.** The DOD Information Sharing Strategy provides the common vision, goals, and approaches that guide the many information sharing initiatives and investments for DOD. The Information Sharing Strategy guides DOD’s exchange of information within DOD and with federal, state, local, tribal, coalition partners, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector.

**h.** The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (http://www.ise.gov) supports five communities (i.e., intelligence, law enforcement, defense, HS, and foreign affairs) by leveraging existing capabilities and aligning policies, standards, and systems to ensure those responsible for combating terrorism have access to timely and accurate information.


**i.** National Operations Security Program (http://www.ioss.gov) is a means to identify, control, and protect unclassified information and evidence associated with US national security programs and activities. Adversaries or competitors working against the interests of the United States can exploit this information if it is not properly protected. The NSA is the executive agent for interagency OPSEC training and is responsible for the Interagency Operations Security Support Staff (IOSS). IOSS acts as a consultant to USG agencies by providing technical guidance and assistance that will result in self-sufficient OPSEC programs for the protection of US operations. IOSS members assess OPSEC programs, assist in OPSEC program development, conduct surveys, and provide training.

*For more information, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.*

**12. Training and Readiness**

**a.** While numerous humanitarian and complex crises during the previous several years have provided opportunities for military and civilian agencies to exercise their mission skills, there is a clear requirement for continuous integrated interagency, IGO, and NGO planning and training in order to synchronize all components of a US response. Interagency training and training with non-USG stakeholders should provide for individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in a formal joint program.

**b.** CCDRs should coordinate interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector involvement as a part of routine training and exercise participation and as training for a specific operation. The training audience should include members of the humanitarian
assistance coordination center (HACC), CMOC, joint logistics operations center (JLOC), the liaison section, NGOs, the UN, and USG agencies. This training before deployment will greatly enhance operational capability. Commanders may also avail their commands to the training offered by some government agencies, IGOs, and the FHA community. Interagency, IGO, and NGO training should focus on identifying and assessing military and agency capabilities and core competencies, and identifying procedural disconnects. Rotations and visits to a command improve mutual awareness of agency missions, objectives, cultures, corresponding activities, and programs. Even short rotations prove beneficial, enhancing reachback capability and facilitating staff position agreements.

c. To improve USG readiness by maximizing the benefit of multiagency participation in training, education, exercises, and experiments, JS J-7 chairs a DOD interagency working group, which coordinates DOD interagency participation requirements/opportunities and presents them to the Interagency Training Coordinator Working Group. This facilitates interagency participation in the CJCS’s Exercise Program and requirements for DOD participation in the National Exercise Program.

d. USAID is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs, many of which receive USAID funding to carry out programs. First, it maintains an Advisory Committee of Private Voluntary Aid, established after World War II by Presidential directive to serve as a link between the USG and NGOs engaged in economic development or relief efforts. Also, with some exceptions, most NGOs must register to receive USAID funding to ensure they meet certain standards; currently 568 US and 70 international NGOs are registered with USAID.

e. Interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination is also available to US NGOs through a consortium called InterAction which helps represent NGO interests at the national level. InterAction coordinates with various USG agencies and involves NGOs in realistic peace operations (PO) simulation conducted by the Joint Readiness Training Center. The military and participating NGOs benefit from this training by gaining a better understanding of each organization’s culture, capabilities, and procedures. InterAction has also briefed CA units and US military schools to improve their understanding of NGO activities. The use of NGOs as role players falls well short of meeting their desire to make more useful contributions to training. This is seen by them as an indication of a lack of understanding of their activities and experience. It is important to recognize that for NGOs, this is not the best use of either their knowledge or the limited time available for activities outside of their normal work. This use also assumes that the scenario being acted out by the role players (often prepared without NGO input) reflects real-life situations. NGO personnel should participate in after-action reviews when the opportunity arises. This would allow feedback in an open forum and contribute to developing ways to avoid polarization of positions.

f. Increasingly, interagency, IGO, and NGO training is also available through the senior Service schools (including the DOS’s Foreign Service Institute [FSI]) and other civilian institutions. For example, the United States Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides courses on interagency and whole-of-government planning. Interagency training is also provided on the job through exchange programs between DOD and other USG agencies.
(1) National Defense University is responsible for providing interagency, IGO, and NGO training for civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to a combatant command JIACG (or equivalent organization). The National Defense University provides educational events including policy simulations and exercises to members of the Executive branch strategic decision-making community in the National Capital Region and at the combatant command JIACGs (or equivalent organization). The Institute for National Strategic Studies uses simulations that stress regional and functional crisis management and conflict resolution issues, as well as after-action review, to provide participants a non-threatening environment in which to discuss and test innovative approaches to complex crises and also encourage interagency cooperation.

(2) The FSI is the USG primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the US foreign affairs community, preparing American diplomats and other professionals to advance US foreign affairs interests overseas and in Washington. At the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the FSI provides several courses with an interagency focus to enrollees from DOS and more than 40 USG agencies, including the military.

For more information, refer to The Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125956.htm.

g. The UN conducts training and education at various levels to improve the responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of international humanitarian relief operations. Training is available to leaders of the military, civil defense, and civilian relief organizations, or for personnel of countries and organizations with no prior experience in international emergency and disaster response situations. One example is the UN-Civil-Military Cooperation Course that trains individuals in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and how to effectively manage the employment of military and civilian resources.

h. Joint Special Operations University educates special operations executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, research, and outreach in the science and art of joint special operations. The Joint Special Operations University’s Interagency Division runs several courses each year.

i. The Center for Complex Operations (http://www.ccoportal.org) is a network of civilian and military educators, trainers, and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to improving education and training for complex operations. Principal roles of the center are to serve as an information clearinghouse and to cultivate a civil-military community of practice for complex operations training and education.

j. Established in May 2007 by Executive Order 13434, the National Security Professional Development program (http://www.cpms.osd.mil/lpdd/nspd/nspd_index.aspx) is a government wide initiative to develop a cadre of national security professionals who possess a broad understanding of our Nation’s national security objectives beyond their own agency’s missions, and the knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to lead and execute coordinated, effective national security operations.
CHAPTER III
DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

“I believe that the challenges confronting our Nation cannot be dealt with by military means alone. They instead require whole of government approaches…”

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense Senate Testimony, 30 April 2009

1. The Homeland Security Council

The HSC is an entity within the Executive Office of the President of the United States to advise the President on HS matters and is the principle policy-making forum responsible for the strategic level implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The HSC is made up of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, SecDef, and such other individuals as may be designated by the President. The CJCS (or, in his absence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) may, in the role of the CJCS as principal military advisor to the HSC and subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the HSC. The day-to-day work of the HSC and NSC is accomplished by the combined National Security Staff who work in the Executive Office of the President. For the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the USG relating to HS, the HSC assesses the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest of HS and makes resulting recommendations to the President; oversees and reviews HS policies of the USG and makes resulting recommendations to the President; and performs such other functions as the President may direct. Both the NSC and HSC principals and deputies are supported in their policy functions by the National Security Staff and their individual departmental or agency staffs.

2. Key Roles of United States Government Stakeholders

   a. As the primary agency for HS, DHS leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the Nation. Within DOD, SecDef has overall authority for DOD and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning HD and CS. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) within OUSD(P) provides the overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of DOD resources for HD and CS. Responsibilities include: strategic planning; employment policy, guidance, and oversight; support to civil authorities in accordance with the NRF; assistance to civilian agencies conducting HS missions; and serving as the principal staff assistant delegated the authority to manage and coordinate HS and CS functions at the SecDef level. The two GCCs with major HD and CS missions are USNORTHCOM and USPACOM, as their AORs include the United States and its territories. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM HD missions include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interest within the assigned AOR; and, as directed by the
Chapter III

President or SecDef, provide military assistance to civil authorities. GCCs who have responsibility for HD of the United States and have US territory in their AOR may also have a senior DHS representative assigned to the command as an HS advisor. The senior DHS representative advises the commander and staff on HS and CS issues and requirements, and helps facilitate information sharing and coordination/collaboration between the command and the operational agencies (e.g., FEMA, United States Customs and Border Protection [CBP], United States Coast Guard [USCG]) of DHS.

b. **Secretary of Defense.** Authority for the conduct and execution of the HD mission resides with SecDef. For CS missions, SecDef retains approval authority for the use of federal military forces, personnel, units, and equipment. SecDef has the primary responsibility within DOD to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of a domestic incident.

c. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.** The Office of the ASD(HD&ASA) is established within the OUSD(P). ASD(HD&ASA) is responsible for the overall supervision of all DOD HD and CS activities. ASD(HD&ASA) ensures internal coordination of DOD policy direction, assists SecDef in providing guidance, through CJCS, to CCDRs for HD and CS missions and conducts coordination with DHS.

d. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]).** ASD(SO/LIC&IC) provides civilian oversight for special operations core tasks. This oversight includes supervision of policy, program planning, and allocation and the use of resources. ASD(SO/LIC&IC) also represents SecDef on combating terrorism matters outside the DOD.

e. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]).** ASD(RA) is responsible for monitoring Reserve Component readiness. In coordination with ASD(HD&ASA), JS, the Services, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the appropriate integration of reserve and National Guard forces into HD and CS operations.

f. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]).** ASD(PA) is responsible for coordinating PA planning with ASD(HD&ASA) and DHS prior to an HD or CS response. In coordination with ASD(HD&ASA), JS, and the Services, ASD(PA) ensures appropriate DOD PA capabilities and forces are identified for potential response.

g. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** CJCS has numerous responsibilities relating to HD and HS. These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses to threats or an act of terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation orders to provide assistance to the primary agency. CJCS ensures that HD and CS plans and operations are compatible with other military plans. CJCS also assists CCDRs in meeting their operational requirements for executing HD missions and for providing CS that has been approved by SecDef. In the CS area, CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to SecDef and the President in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) incidents, ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the primary agency for incident response, and provides strategic guidance to the CCRDs for the conduct of counterdrug operations.

h. **Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRNORAD).** By international agreement (The North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] Agreement and Terms of Reference, and the Canadian/US Basic Security Document 100/35), CDRNORAD leads a binational command composed of Canadian and US forces with the mission to conduct persistent aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America. NORAD’s relationship with USNORTHCOM is unusual in that while they have separate missions defined by separate sources, a majority of USNORTHCOM’s AOR overlaps with NORAD’s operational area. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are two separate commands, and neither command is subordinate to the other, but they share staff and work very closely together.

i. **Commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM).** CDRUSNORTHCOM has specific responsibilities for HD and for assisting civil authorities. USNORTHCOM is also responsible for theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas, synchronizing DOD global pandemic influenza planning, and supporting combating WMD efforts. USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct HD, CS, and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests. USNORTHCOM embodies the principles of unity of effort and unity of command as the single, responsible, designated DOD commander for overall C2 of DOD support to civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM takes all operational orders from and is responsible to the President through SecDef.

j. **Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM).** CDRUSPACOM serves as DOD’s principal planning agent and supported commander for HD in Hawaii, Territory of Guam, Territory of American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, US administrative entities, and US territorial waters within USPACOM. CDRUSPACOM is the supported commander within the designated AOR for HD missions. CDRUSPACOM is also responsible for combating terrorism actions, FP, and performing defense critical infrastructure protection. This command is also responsible for support planning for pandemic influenza and combating WMD. When directed by the President, CDRUSPACOM is responsible for conducting combat operations within the AOR to deter, prevent, and defeat an incursion of sovereign territory. CDRUSPACOM is also responsible for planning for CS operations within the AOR.

k. **Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB).** Provides liaison and serves as the channel of communications among the National Guard joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State), JS, the combatant commands, the Military Departments, and DOD components when the NG JFHQs-State are operating under the authority of a governor. The NGB Joint Coordination Center provides mutual, shared situational awareness among the NG JFHQs-State, the NGB, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM during a CBRN incident or other major or catastrophic incidents. It enables the NGB to coordinate National Guard assistance to the supported state on a national level. Sourcing solutions are coordinated through the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) with state ARNG and ANG.
3. Homeland Defense and Civil Support

a. Mission Areas. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in some respects, fall into two mission areas: HD—for which DOD serves as the lead federal agency (LFA) and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and CS—for which DOD serves in a supporting role to other agencies by providing defense support to civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal, and local level. The President and SecDef determine when DOD will be involved in the HD and CS missions. The interorganizational coordination process is essential when HD and/or CS operations are to be conducted in proximity to our domestic population and critical infrastructure. While the HD and CS missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities overlap, and operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting agencies. HD and CS operations may occur in parallel and require extensive integration and synchronization. In addition, operations may also transition from HD to CS to HS or vice versa (e.g., maritime security) with the lead depending on the situation and USG’s desired outcome. **While the lead may transition, a single agency has the lead at any given time for a particular activity.** However, in the areas of overlapping responsibility, the designation of federal agency with lead responsibility may not be predetermined. In time-critical situations, on-scene leaders are empowered to conduct appropriate operations in response to a particular threat. The interrelationship between HD, HS, and CS operations, and the potential for transition between the missions, creates a dynamic environment where interorganizational coordination becomes an essential focal point.

b. Homeland Defense. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. **DOD is responsible for the HD mission, and therefore leads the HD response, with other departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts.** DOD’s capability to respond quickly to any threat or situation places a high demand on the same resources. For example, the same trained and ready force constituted to achieve strategic objectives outside the homeland may also be required to execute HD missions within the homeland. For HD missions the President authorizes military action to counter threats to and within the United States. An example of an ongoing HD operation is Operation NOBLE EAGLE, which provides enhanced air defense of the United States.

(1) HD operations may be conducted in a complex environment characterized by numerous and varied threats, multiple jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state, tribal, and local), nontraditional partners (e.g., IGOs, NGOs, and private sector), and international partnerships. **This environment makes coordination with interagency and multinational partners imperative to ensure synchronized and integrated operations.** DOD must be prepared to operate in concert with other USG forces that are conducting HS or other law enforcement activities to counter threats to the homeland. This may mean HD operations will be coincidental in time or geography to DHS forces to counter terrorist threats, such as those of a hijacked commercial aircraft or attempts to perpetrate attacks using WMD carried on maritime conveyances, among others. The overlap in departmental roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities amongst USG organizations requires an approach that promotes early identification of the desired USG outcome and subsequent collaboration with operational partners.
Within the US homeland, DOD and US military forces must effectively deal with time compression of actions, potential impacts on the US domestic population and defense critical infrastructure, and unique legal and policy guidelines. These forces face continuous media scrutiny, must be sensitive to sovereignty and jurisdictional as well as civil rights and civil liberties considerations, and mindful of political dimensions of a domestic response, yet responsive enough to deal with the varied threats to the homeland. This environment necessitates an effective interagency process and program.

**DOD Requests for Interorganizational Assistance in Support of the HD Mission.** HD missions may result in DOD requesting assistance or support from other USG agencies. This process occurs under the authorities of the Economy Act, which provide for USG department/agency to department/agency support. It is important to train and exercise the HD mission and the requirements process for interorganizational assistance, in order to ensure an expedited, coordinated, and collaborative response to HD threats. Refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, for more information on HD.

c. Civil Support

(1) The Armed Forces of the United States are authorized under certain conditions to provide assistance to US civil authorities. This assistance is CS and will always be in support of a primary agency. Requests for assistance from another agency may be predicated on mutual agreements between agencies or stem from a Presidential designation of a federal disaster area or a federal state of emergency. The military typically only responds after the resources of other federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments have been exhausted or when specialized military assets are required.

(2) Within the CS mission area, circumstances may arise that fall into the realm of emergency and temporary nonemergency incidents. In emergency circumstances, such as managing the consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, critical infrastructure protection, or other events, DOD could be asked to provide capabilities that other agencies do not possess, cannot employ in a timely manner, or that have been exhausted or overwhelmed. The provision of defense support is evaluated by its legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and impact on readiness. When federal military and civilian personnel and resources are authorized to support civil authorities, command of those forces will remain with SecDef. However, control may be delegated in accordance with DOD policy, doctrine, and standing agreements. In the absence of delegated control, DOD elements in the incident area of operations and National Guard forces under the command of a governor will coordinate closely with response organizations at all levels.

For further guidance on CS, see JP 3-28, Civil Support.

d. Planning Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination. DOD works closely with other federal agencies, in particular DHS and its subordinate organizations, when planning. The purpose of the IPS is to further enhance the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. IPS incorporates lessons learned from both the development of the former National Planning
and Execution System and the planning process and elements of the *FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/cpg_101_layout.pdf). The supported GCCs are DOD principal planning agents and have the responsibility to provide joint planning and execution directives for peacetime assistance rendered by DOD within their assigned AORs. Thorough joint operation planning requires that a GCC’s operations and activities align with functional and theater national security end states contained in the National Defense Strategy and the GEF. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD has responsibilities under the NRF. The GEF prioritizes these theater strategic end states for each GCC who then develops a TCP. The salient frameworks and directives that will guide CS operations are the following:

(1) The President implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which provides the authority for the USG to respond to a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency. The act gives the President the authority to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response support, which is delegated to DHS. The NRF, which is applicable to Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act incidents, is a guide that details how the Nation conducts all-hazards response—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. It establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. The NRF identifies the key response principles, as well as the roles and structures that organize national response. It describes how communities, states, the USG, private sector, and US NGO partners apply these principles for a coordinated, effective national response. In addition, it describes special circumstances where the USG exercises a larger role, including incidents where federal interests are involved and catastrophic incidents where a state would require significant support. It lays the groundwork for first responders, decision makers, and supporting entities to provide a unified national response. In addition to releasing the NRF base document, the ESF Annexes and Support Annexes are available online at the NRF Resource Center (www.fema.gov/nrf). The 23 annexes provide a CONOPS, procedures, and structures for achieving response directives for all partners in fulfilling their roles under the NRF.

(2) The NIMS and its associated ICS, provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment. NIMS works hand in hand with the NRF. NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides...
the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management. NIMS is a tested system that interagency partners utilize and practice regularly. Leaders must have a full understanding of its principles, structures, and techniques.

(3) To ensure DOD planning supports the needs of those requiring CS, DOD coordinates with interagency partners and the states/territories—for National Guard matters—through the NGB. Coordination will align with the NRF, NIMS, and interagency coordination guidelines provided in the GEF.

(4) The domestic operating environment for military CS presents unique challenges to the JFC. It is imperative that commanders and staffs at all levels understand the relationships, both statutory and operational, among all USG agencies involved in the operation. Moreover, it is equally important to understand DOD’s role in supporting other USG agencies. **DOD will provide defense assistance to the primary agency upon request by the appropriate authority and approval by SecDef or President.** The NRF, and associated concept plans (CONPLANS) and OPLANs (as specified by the IPS), detail the roles and missions of various USG departments and agencies in the event of a domestic crisis. There are also specific USNORTHCOM and USPACOM domestic plans (e.g., defense support to civil authorities, civil disturbance operations) where the responsibilities of various USG entities are described in detail.

(5) While not all-inclusive, the following provide examples of plans associated with CS:

(a) The **United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan** is designed to provide overall guidance to federal, state, and local agencies concerning how the USG would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving WMD. The plan outlines an organized and unified capability for a timely, coordinated response by USG agencies to a terrorist threat or act.

(b) **Operation Plan Vigilant Sentry** is a comprehensive DHS contingency plan for a unified response to a mass migration event in the Caribbean. This plan’s success depends upon full interagency cooperation and coordination, including assistance from the State of Florida and local agencies.

(c) **The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan** (Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations [CFR], Part 300), more commonly called the National Contingency Plan is the USG’s blueprint for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance releases. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) serves as the ESF Coordinator and as one of two primary agencies (i.e., EPA for incidents on land and DHS/USCG for incidents on water) within the national response team. In the case of a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, where the release is on, or the sole source of the release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of DOD, then DOD will be the lead agency.
(d) **The National Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan** provides for the effective use of all available resources in all types of civil SAR missions to enable the United States to satisfy its humanitarian and national and international legal obligations. These resources include aircraft, vessels, pararescue and ground rescue teams, and monitoring emergency locator transmitter signals. Under the plan, the USCG is responsible for the coordination of SAR in the maritime region, the CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible in the inland region of the contiguous US, and CDRUSPACOM is responsible for the noncontiguous regions. To carry out these responsibilities, the USCG and USNORTHCOM have established rescue coordination centers to direct SAR activities within their regions. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides satellite alerting in support of the National SAR Plan.

(e) **The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan** provides a coordinated USG response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain. The MOTR agencies use the network of integrated national-level maritime command centers, as designated by the MOTR agencies, for coordinated, unified, timely, and effective information flow, in support of MOTR execution, including interdiction and disposition. Threats include terrorism, piracy, and other criminal, unlawful, or hostile acts committed by foreign states and non-state groups/individuals. DHS is the lead MOTR agency for the interdiction of maritime threats to the homeland. DOJ, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is the lead MOTR agency for investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside of the US, or as directed at US citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the US. DOD is the lead for nation-state threats and overseas.

(f) **The Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC)** Web site provides the combating WMD community a Web-based strategic level reference for understanding combating WMD roles, authorities, and capabilities of the DOD and USG departments and agencies. INDRAC is designed to be a strategic reference tool to aid coordination and collaboration among USG departments and agencies, integrating and synchronizing applicable interagency-wide combating WMD efforts to include planning, advocacy, training, and exercises. The INDRAC system contains USG department and agency validated information that is available to USG authorized users at http://indrac.dtra.mil and https://indrac.dtra.smil.mil. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency also makes available upon request at http://www.dtra.mil/staffoffices/gc/index.cfm, the *Foreign Consequence Management Legal Deskbook*, which outlines joint and interagency coordination responsibilities and authorities, as well as legal references associated with foreign consequence management, and the *Domestic WMD Incident Management Legal Deskbook*, which identifies legal authorities available to USG departments and agencies responding to a WMD event involving terrorism or an accident. To submit a request for hard copies or electronic versions of the deskbooks, visit www.dtra.mil or e-mail dtra.publicaffairs@dtra.mil.

(6) Per the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department Of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security, SecDef has authorized
CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, and Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) to transfer forces to operate under TACON of Commandant USCG, USCG Atlantic Area, and USCG Pacific Area for maritime HS operations in the USNORTHCOM and USPACOM AORs, as described in the annexes attached to the MOA. This authority may be further delegated to appropriate flag officer/general officer commanders subordinate to CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, Commander, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and CDRUSJFCOM.

e. Under certain circumstances, military commanders are allowed to take necessary action under immediate response authority.

(1) DOD components and agencies are authorized to perform “immediate response” to save lives, protect property and the environment, and mitigate human suffering under imminently serious conditions, as well as to provide support under their separate established authorities, as appropriate. As soon as practical, the military commander, or responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such assistance, reports the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center.

(2) Responses to requests from civil authorities prior to receiving authority from the President or chain of command are made when immediate support is critical to save lives, prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage. Under these circumstances, support elements advise the DOD Executive Secretary (EXECSEC) through command channels by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or additional authorizations. The EXECSEC will notify SecDef, the CJCS, and any other appropriate officials. Typically, if this support continues beyond 48 to 72 hours, then such support should fall under the coordination of the appropriate GCC (i.e., USNORTHCOM supporting in the contiguous 48 states, Alaska, and the Caribbean territories, or USPACOM supporting in Hawaii and Pacific island territories).

f. Military forces may also conduct missions to help DOJ or other federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist federal, state, or local LEAs when required guidelines, discussed below, are met. This includes military assistance in response to civil disturbances. In addition to emergency or disaster assistance, DOD assistance may be requested from other agencies as part of HS. Such assistance may be in the form of information and intelligence sharing, mapping, or damage assessment assistance. Other types of operations include counterdrug, combating terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and infrastructure protection. Military commanders should review, with the assistance of legal counsel when appropriate, each request for domestic aid to ensure that it conforms with statutory limitations, especially in law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. SecDef must personally approve any request to assist LEAs in preplanned national events. Requests for DOD assets in support of law enforcement will require careful review during the planning phase to ensure that DOD support conforms to legal guidelines and does not degrade the mission capability of CCDRs. However, the US Constitution, federal laws, and USG policies and regulations all affect the employment of the military in domestic operations. For this reason, requests should be
coordinated with the supporting organization’s legal counsel or SJA. Examples of laws that may impact this type of support include:

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, USC, Section 1385) and DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, provide the authority and define the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the USCG and members of the National Guard in state service (Title 32, USC, or state active duty), **military personnel are normally prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil laws in the United States unless the President otherwise authorizes such participation.** Several other statutes authorize DOD assistance to civilian law enforcement, including Insurrection Act (Title 10, USC, Sections 331–335), counterdrug assistance (Title 10, USC, Sections 371–381), case of crimes involving nuclear materials (Title 18, USC, Section 831), and emergency situations involving chemical or biological WMD (Title 10, USC, Section 382). The restrictions in the Posse Comitatus Act do not apply to the USCG when not operating under DOD authorities (Title 14, USC), which is not a DOD component. Under the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD policy, military personnel are prohibited from:

(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

(b) A search or seizure.

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

(d) Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

(2) Significant national events may be perceived by adversaries as terrorist targets. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the NSC/HSC, has the authority to designate important public events, such as the Olympic Games or the Presidential inauguration, as national special security events. Once so designated, an event becomes the focal point for interagency planning and the primary agency may request support from DOD.

Refer to DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials; DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect

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**Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed following a Presidential Executive Order, which also invoked the Insurrection Act, on the evening of 1 May 1992. The Executive Order federalized units of the California National Guard (CANG) and authorized active military forces to assist in the restoration of law and order. JTF-LA formed and deployed within 24 hours, assembled from US Army and Marine Forces. It operated in a domestic disturbance environment, while working with city, county, state, federal agencies, and the CANG.**

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*Various Sources*
United States Persons; and DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.

g. **CBRN Consequence Management.** Managing the consequence of a CBRN incident is a USG level effort generally described as the preparation for and response to CBRN incidents. The US military has acquired experience and developed expertise in protecting its members from CBRN hazards and in operating in a contaminated environment. This experience and expertise is available when requested by domestic civil authorities and approved by the President or SecDef.

*For more information, refer to CJCSI 3125.01B, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for Domestic Consequence Management (CM) Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incident, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Consequence Management.*

h. For domestic missions, the focus on effective SC will be to “inform” and not “influence” our domestic audiences. Additionally, for HS and CS missions, DOD will typically be in support of other federal lead agencies, and our SC and PA programs will need to be coordinated with them, especially if they focus on domestic audiences. Civil authority information support elements under direction and authority of a designated LFA are legally authorized to provide support to civil authorities only by broadcasting and disseminating public information. Federal law prohibits conducting influence activities against a domestic audience, not the use of IO assets and capabilities. Conversely, if the focus is on foreign audiences, even for domestically related missions (e.g., HD), then the methods and objectives of SC can be more flexible and more in line with those methods discussed for foreign missions.

4. **Joint Force Considerations**

a. When an event occurs and the President or SecDef approves DSCA, **the appropriate GCC is designated as the supported commander.** In most situations, the CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM will be designated as the supported commander. As necessary, the GCC activates and deploys an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to serve as the C2 node for the designated DOD forces responding to an event or incident. Figure III-1 provides a model for coordination among military and nonmilitary organizations.

(1) While DOD response to domestic emergencies is normally coordinated through SecDef, **the military may also respond when an interdepartmental MOA is in effect.** For example, the US Navy (USN) agrees to rapid deployment of oil containment and recovery equipment to the USCG under an interdepartmental MOA. The MOA bypasses negotiations at the HQ level and sets forth procedures for deployment and employment of equipment and personnel and for reimbursement of operational costs. Once a decision to employ military assets is made, the supported GCC uses the capabilities of each component to accomplish the mission. The organization of the joint force will be based on the capabilities required for the optimum response. Frequently, the response will require
Figure III-1. Model for Coordination Among Military and Nonmilitary Organizations—Domestic Civil Support
nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources, such as land forces fighting wild land fires.

(2) DHS, the FEMA regions, and their associated regional interagency steering committees, which typically meet on a quarterly or monthly basis, provide supporting GCCs with an additional opportunity to interface with USG agencies and their regional and state partners through regional interagency steering committees for planning, coordinating, and supporting preparations for disaster and relief efforts. In the USNORTHCOM AOR, regional interagency steering committee meetings are typically attended by the defense coordinating officer (DCO)/defense coordinating element personnel who are already located at or colocated at the FEMA region offices.

(3) The USCG and many other federal, state, tribal, and local response agencies and organizations have adopted ICS as their standard response system for nonmilitary incident management. Non-DOD entities, including local civil authorities and first responders, are generally not familiar with US military terms and doctrine. When working with non-DOD entities/partners, especially in an emergency, clear, effective, and mutually understandable communication is essential. DOD elements will be able to work more seamlessly, efficiently, and productively by employing operational concepts and terms that other departments, agencies, and authorities already understand. The main sources of these concepts and language include the NRF, NIMS, ICS, and other federal and national standards. US military forces that might be involved in emergency or major disaster operations should be prepared to provide CS in accordance with the NRF, NIMS, and ICS.

b. USNORTHCOM through its Army Service component, US Army North, has pre-staged DCOs/defense coordinating elements at the FEMA regions to facilitate coordination and collaboration between DOD and FEMA for DSCA. During disaster operations, the supported GCC normally activates a DCO upon receipt of a request for assistance (RFA) from the primary agency sent through the CCDR to the DOD EXECSEC. The DCO is normally the initial DOD representative on-site. The DCO serves as DOD’s single POC at the JFO for requesting assistance from DOD. Upon federal declaration of a disaster, FEMA sets up a JFO in or near the affected area to coordinate federal recovery activities with those of state and local governments. The DCO works with the federal coordinating officer (FCO) and state coordinating officer at the JFO to integrate DOD efforts in support of the operation and serves as the on-scene military POC for the FCO and principal representatives of other USG agencies and NGOs. The DCO is the primary interface for US military support to the unified coordination group at a JFO. The DCO coordinates DOD support to civilian agencies through the FCO at the JFO. When a JTF is employed during CS operations, it is essential for commanders to understand the relationship between the JFO and the JTF. The JFO is the primary federal incident management field structure normally located close to a specific disaster location, and it functions as an interagency element, while the JTF is the deployed joint HQ for federal military forces in support of the CS operation. The NRF states that if a JTF is established, consistent with operational requirements, its C2 element will be colocated at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The colocated of the JTF C2 element does not replace the requirement for a DCO as a part of the JFO coordination staff and it will not coordinate requests for assistance for DOD. The DCO normally colocates in the JFO, and is the DOD single POC at the JFO. Depending on the
size or area of a disaster site, there may be more than one JFO coordinating federal disaster response and support (e.g., there were three JFOs operating in support of Hurricane Katrina response operations—one each in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana). The JFO is a temporary federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination among federal, state, tribal, and local governments, NGOs and the private sector with primary responsibility for response and recovery. The DCO normally collocates in the JFO. When a DOD C2 HQ is deployed (e.g., JTF), its commander accepts OPCON of the DCO if the GCC directs. However, the DCO remains the POC for the FCO in the JFO in accordance with the NRF. Once DOD forces have been deployed, requests from civilian agencies are coordinated through the DCO under the procedures delineated in the NRF. Some factors in the provision of DSCA include:

(1) Federal agencies or state, tribal, and local governments request DOD capabilities to support their emergency response efforts by using a formal RFA process. DOD handles RFAs depending on various factors, such as Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act situation and evaluated by the factors of legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and impact on readiness.

(2) In general, the FCO at the incident site receives RFAs from civil authorities and submits them to the DCO for initial validation in accordance with the factors discussed in paragraph 4.b(1) above. The RFA, once validated by the DCO, is designated a Mission Assignment (if the primary agency is a FEMA request) and flows via automated systems through the CCDR to the Joint Director of Military Support to OSD for approval. Once SecDef approves the request, an order is issued to combatant commands, Services, and/or DOD agencies to accomplish the mission.

(3) If a JTF is activated, it is important to understand the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, DCO, CJTF, and CCDR relative to a Presidential disaster or emergency declaration under the Stafford Act when interacting with the JTF. The DCO continues to perform his duties of liaison, situational awareness and reporting, and RFA validation, even when a JTF is established. The CJTF is normally a member of the Unified Coordination Group at the JFO during CS operations. The CJTF should provide robust liaison to the DCO to help share situational awareness, and ascertain current and future support requirements.

(4) An understanding of the NIMS framework is essential, specifically how the incident command posts and area command centers relate to the multiagency coordination centers for operational information sharing and resource coordination (particularly the RFA process).

(5) The JFO is a scalable organization (i.e., the management, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration sections). A clear understanding of this structure enhances DOD integration within the JFO.

(6) Offer assistance to the FCO with JTF staff planning, monitoring, and assessment capabilities in the JFO. This staff support may often be provided along ESF lines.
(7) Use an existing or establish a common unclassified information sharing mechanism to collaborate and share information with other stakeholders. DHS uses the Homeland Security Information Network as one of its main information networks.

c. The JTF is the command element through which personnel, equipment, and supplies to a disaster area for an approved mission assignment are provided. Through the DCO, the JTF is oriented on identifying tasks; generating forces; prioritizing assets against requirements; assisting federal, state, tribal, and/or local authorities; and providing disaster response support to the local government based on FEMA mission assignments.

d. Organizational tools that may assist interagency support of civil authorities include:

   (1) Interagency Planning Cell. An interagency planning cell is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the GCC. The interagency planning cell is established to provide timely advice to the supported CCDR about the resources and requirements of other agencies in the relief effort. It is typically a planning cell of the JIACG (or equivalent organization). An interagency planning cell will enable a coherent and efficient planning and coordination effort through the participation of interagency subject matter experts. Moreover, the burden of coordination at the JTF level could also be lightened. Consideration should also be given to establishment of interagency planning cells on the staffs of supporting CCDRs, such as Commander, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The interagency planning cell should not be confused with the integration planning cell deployed under the IMS or the NSC IPC.

   (2) Liaison Section. Liaisons provided to the primary agency and other USG agencies, as necessary, act as spokespersons for the CCDR, to clarify operational concepts and terminology, and to assist in the assessment of military requirements. The LNO can better articulate the intrinsic capabilities of military units to perform in nontraditional roles and better describe the military contribution to the federal response. NGB LNOs colocated with the DCO maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of coordinated federal and state military support to civil authorities. Conversely, agency liaisons working with the military can assist the commander in maximizing agency core competencies and concentrating the resources of engaged agencies.

   (a) Emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) are reserve officers performing planning and liaison responsibilities between DOD components and USG agencies, USG regional HQ, and state or US territory emergency service HQ, including interface with the civil sector, as directed by their DOD component through the Service planning agent. Each Military Department is authorized to assign one or more EPLOs at FEMA national and regional HQ, at military HQ that serve as the DOD, Service, or regional planning agents for domestic emergency support, and state or US territorial HQ. EPLOs:

   1. Provide DOD and Service liaison with USG agencies and organizations, and between the Services.

   2. Facilitate planning, coordination, and training for military support to civil authorities and national security emergency preparedness.
3. Advise USG agencies and organizations on DOD and Service capabilities and resources.

4. Advocate mutual support required by DOD.

5. On order, augment DOD response to domestic emergency operations.

(b) Supported commanders, such as CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM, are responsible for a liaison structure at the state level within their respective AORs.

(3) **Media Operations Center (MOC).** A MOC may be established at each echelon of command with representatives from all agencies involved to provide information to the public. The primary goal is to disseminate accurate and timely information to assist the public in dealing with the event. Promoting the federal effort is also important, but as a secondary goal. DOD media operations should be complementary to and supportive of the primary agency’s and/or joint information center’s media plan or effort.

5. **State, Local, and Tribal Considerations**

   a. When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may request federal assistance. If DOD support is required as part of that federal assistance, then DOD may support local and state authorities in a variety of tasks. However, the majority of DOD assistance will typically be provided in support of a primary agency in accordance with the NRF. Any incident can have a mix of public health, economic, social, environmental, criminal, and political implications with potentially serious long-term effects. Significant incidents require a coordinated response across agencies and jurisdictions, political boundaries, sectors of society, and multiple organizations.

   b. **National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State.** NG JFHQ-State gives DOD, through the NGB, a focused communication channel between OSD, JS, and CCDRs (e.g., CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM) and the non-federalized National Guard; joint C2 for non-federalized National Guard operations; and a contingent joint C2 capability in each state for Title 10, USC (federal) HD, CS, and other related operations. In this respect, NG JFHQ-State is able to bridge the state and federal levels of government.

   c. Army and ANG forces have primary responsibility for providing military assistance in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia in civil emergencies, and are under the command of the governor through the state or territory TAG. National Guard personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be ordered to active duty for annual training, or be called to active duty under the authority of the governor or the President. **DOD support is generally provided in the form of assistance or augmentation of skills and resources to the USG agency field office or to a state or local agency having responsibility for a particular activity.**

   d. Each US state and territory has an office of emergency services (OES) or an equivalent office responsible for preparedness planning and assisting the governor in directing responses to emergencies. The OES coordinates provision of state or territorial
assistance to its local governments through authority of the governor or TAG. The OES operates the state emergency operations center during a disaster or emergency and coordinates with federal officials for support, if required. The state will usually designate a state coordinating officer, with similar authorities to the FCO to coordinate and integrate federal and state activities.

e. DOD counterpart relationships to those of DCO, FCO, and state coordinating officer are established at lower echelons to facilitate coordination.

f. The emergency management assistance compact (EMAC) is an interstate agreement that enables entities to provide mutual assistance during times of need. The EMAC mutual aid agreement and partnership between member states exist because—from hurricanes to earthquakes, wildfires to toxic waste spills, and terrorist attacks to CBRN incidents—all states share a common enemy: the threat of disaster. Since its ratification and signing into law in 1996 (Public Law 104-321), 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the US Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become EMAC members. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association, which provides the day-to-day support and technical backbone for EMAC education and operations.

g. The United States recognizes certain Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations under its protection, recognizes the right of Indian tribes to self-government, and supports tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Federal agencies shall respect Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, honor tribal treaty and other rights, and strive to meet the responsibilities that arise from the unique legal relationship between the USG and Indian tribal governments. For federal assistance for disaster situations taking place on tribal lands, state governors must request a Presidential disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the Stafford Act. However, federal departments and agencies can work directly with tribes within existing agency authorities and resources in the absence of such a declaration. Federal departments and agencies comply with existing laws and executive orders mandating that the USG deal with Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis, reflecting the federally recognized tribes’ right of self-government as sovereign domestic dependent nations. A tribe may opt, however, to deal directly with state and local officials. Federal departments and agencies involved in potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response shall consult and collaborate with tribal governments on matters affecting the tribes and must be aware of the social, political, and cultural aspects of an incident area that might affect incident management operations. Federal departments and agencies recognize the unique political and geographical issues of tribes whose aboriginal and contemporary territory is on or near the current international borders of Canada and Mexico. Federal departments and agencies shall include tribes in all aspects of incidents requiring a coordinated federal response that affect tribes and incident management operations. For incidents that directly impact tribal jurisdictions, a tribal representative shall be included in the unified coordination group, as required. A tribe may appoint a member of the tribe to serve as a tribal liaison in the JFO.
6. Nongovernmental Organizations

   a. National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (http://www.nvoad.org) is the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparation, response, and recovery—to help disaster survivors and their communities. It is a leader and voice for the nonprofit organizations and volunteers that work in all phases of disaster—preparedness, response, relief, recovery, and mitigation. It is the primary POC for voluntary organization in the National Response Coordination Center (at FEMA HQ). Inside the US, the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters has a membership of 50 national member organizations, and 55 state and territory equivalents.

   b. The American Red Cross (ARC) (http://www.redcross.org) is a support agency under the NRF in a number of ESFs, most notably ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services. The ARC works with state, tribal, and local authorities to function as a direct provider of disaster relief services including emergency sheltering, feeding, basic first aid support, mental health counseling, and disaster assessment. Under ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services, the ARC serves to support the DHHS in the provision of blood products.

7. The Private Sector

   a. Critical infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility among federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the owners and operators of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources. Partnership between the public and private sectors is essential, in part because the private sector owns and/or operates approximately 85% of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. Additionally, government agencies have access to critical threat information, and both the government and private sector control security programs, research and development, and other resources that may be more effective if discussed and shared, as appropriate, in a partnership setting. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan provides the overarching framework for a structured partnership between government and the private sector for protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. Information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs), sector coordinating councils, and state and local fusion centers play a key part in information sharing and security efforts for the various key sectors of our Nation’s critical infrastructure. It is imperative that DOD include the private sector in planning and collaboration for CS.

   b. Private sector authorities have sector, facility, and installation responsibilities for security. They play a role in protecting critical infrastructure and telecommunications systems. DOJ has overall primary ESF #13 responsibility (i.e., ESF coordinator and primary agency), and along with DHS, state and local authorities and police, and state National Guard, assists the private sector in protecting our Nation’s critical infrastructure. DOD also assists the private sector by supporting security efforts at those facilities, which are identified as part of the Nation’s Defense Critical Infrastructure. These entities are coordinated through DHS/Office of Infrastructure Protection during a response. The private sector under ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery, defines and addresses risk reduction and long-term community recovery priorities, and supports the community recovery planning process.
c. **Information Sharing and Analysis.** The DHS takes the lead in evaluating vulnerabilities and coordinating with other federal, state, local, and private entities to ensure the most effective response. Much of this task involves assessing critical infrastructure, the physical and virtual assets, systems, and networks so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health, or safety. Central to this task is collecting, protecting, evaluating, and disseminating information to the American public, to state and local governments, and to the private sector.

(1) Many of the critical infrastructure sectors have established formal processes and structures to support sector-wide information sharing activities.

(2) Some sectors have designated ISACs, which are private sector operational organizations, as key channels for information sharing, to collect, distribute, analyze, and share sensitive and/or proprietary information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, alerts, and best practices.

(3) Other sectors have developed alternate mechanisms to communicate with their members, their government partners, and other sectors about threat indications, vulnerabilities, and protective strategies. Many of these information sharing mechanisms work together to better understand cross-industry dependencies and to account for them in emergency response planning.

(4) State and regional fusion centers have a primary role for geographically relevant information sharing with the critical infrastructure owners and operators in their jurisdictions. Many of the fusion centers currently have infrastructure analyst staff embedded in their centers to produce risk analyses germane to their regions or local areas.

8. **Interorganizational Coordination with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas**

a. **Canada.** NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Command share the task of defending North America and seek cooperative approaches to ensure the security of North America. North American defense is a collaborative effort among the three commands and other mission partners. USNORTHCOM and Canada Command are national commands reporting to their respective governments while NORAD is a binational command reporting to both governments (see Figure III-2). The commands have complementary missions and work closely together to meet their individual and collective responsibilities for the defense and security of North America. NORAD has mission responsibilities in the aerospace and maritime domains while the national commands have responsibilities in the air, land, and maritime domains, including extensive responsibilities to support civil authorities when directed. Unity of effort, situational awareness, and coordination with a variety of mission partners are important to all commands.

(1) The commanders establish close relationships among themselves, their staffs, and supporting and partner agencies. In this way, the commands ensure a timely and coordinated response to defense and security challenges to North America, respecting national sovereignty while leveraging the capabilities and common cause they share.
(2) The Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan serves as the framework for forces from one nation providing support to forces of the other nation providing timely, effective, and efficient support to their respective civil authorities. NORAD also provides tailored air defense for national special security events in the United States and similar events in Canada.

b. **Mexico.** USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military and civil response partners to increase mutual long-term capacity-building to enhance our ability to counter common security threats to both the US and Mexico and build an effective consequence management capability. This is accomplished primarily through USNORTHCOM’s TCP, and executed through normal security cooperation and disaster preparation/response programs. Taken together, these efforts serve to strengthen the Mexican security and response forces’ operational capacity and improve security and disaster preparation/response in the Western Hemisphere. While there is no formal military
agreement between the US and Mexico, USNORTHCOM works closely with the Mexican Armed Forces and civil agencies through coordination with the embassy country team, LNOs, and interagency partners. These relationships facilitate a whole-of-government approach to a wide range of programs, events, and activities that strengthen the bilateral relationship and the collective defense of our respective homelands. It is important to note there are broad Mexican law enforcement and intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration for HS and humanitarian support activities.

c. **The Bahamas.** USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and their National Emergency Management Agency civil response partners to increase long-term capacity-building to support the Government of the Bahamas’ strategy to counter security threats to both the Bahamas and the US and build cooperative consequence management capabilities.

(1) Goals are accomplished primarily through USNORTHCOM’s Theater Campaign Plan; Building Partnership Capacity Program; Overseas Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program; and Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, which provides equipment, training, and intelligence support to the Royal Bahamas Defence Force to strengthen its operational capacity and improve security in the northern Caribbean and southeastern maritime approaches to the United States.

(2) Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos is a cooperative counterdrug mission supported by Royal Bahamas Defence Force, Royal Bahamas Police Force, USCG, CBP, and US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with USNORTHCOM assistance.
CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN CONSIDERATIONS

“We also can’t do this alone. This is an effort that is going to be important for all of us to be engaged in. We are going to look for broad and deep contributions, not only across the US Government, but also from other sectors, from NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], from think tanks, from the private sector and also from our allies and international partners abroad.”

Michèle Flournoy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
US Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan
21 April 2009

1. The National Security Council System

   a. DOD Role in the National Security Council System (NSCS)

      (1) Key DOD players in the NSCS come from within the OSD and JS. SecDef is a regular member of the NSC and the NSC/PC. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the NSC/DC. If appointed, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair an NSC/IPC.

      (2) The NSCS is the channel for the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC. CJCS regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity. The other members of the JCS may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that of the CJCS or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice provided by the CJCS.

      (3) The Military Departments, which implement but do not participate directly in national security policy-making activities of the interagency process, are represented by the CJCS.

   b. The Joint Staff Role in the NSCS

      (1) CJCS acts as spokesperson for the CCDRs, especially on their operational requirements, and represents combatant command interests in the NSC system through direct communication with the CCDRs and their staffs.

      (2) JS provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS (or designee) for policy decisions made by the OSD. It coordinates with the combatant commands, Services, and other agencies and prepares appropriate directives, such as warning, alert, and execute orders, for SecDef approval. These orders include definitions of command and interagency relationships.

      (3) Within JS, the offices of the CJCS, Secretary of the Joint Staff, and the Operations Directorate (J-3), Logistics Directorate (J-4), J-5, and J-7 are focal points
for NSC-related actions. The J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the J-4 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the J-5 often focuses on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each of JS directorates coordinates with the Military Departments to solicit Service input in the planning process. SecDef may also designate one of the Service Chiefs or functional CCDRs as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities in support of specific mission areas.

For more information, refer to CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

c. The CCDRs’ Role in the NSCS. Although JS represents combatant command equities at the NSC/HSC, they may, as necessary, selectively request and leverage combatant command participation at key NSC/HSC forums, including IPCs, NSC/DCs, NSC/PCs, and other events such as cabinet-level exercises. Execution of TCPs requires a more robust daily interaction with interagency partners based on standing authorities. JS and OSD will coordinate required permissions through the NSC/HSC systems. CCDRs and their staffs can coordinate most of their standing requirements with the COM and their JIACG (or equivalent organization).

2. Structure in Foreign Countries

a. The Diplomatic Mission. The US has bilateral diplomatic relations with 190 of the world’s other 193 independent states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a signatory. DOS provides the core staff of a diplomatic mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in the country. A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times the chargé d’affaires (the chargé), when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM. For countries with which the US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of another country represents US interest and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees. In countries where an IGO is headquartered, the US may have a multilateral mission to the IGO in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.

   (1) The Ambassador. The ambassador is the personal representative of the President to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which accredited and, as such, is the COM, responsible for recommending and implementing national policy regarding the foreign country or IGO and for overseeing the activities of USG employees in the mission. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the ambassador. While the majority of ambassadors are career members of the Foreign Service, many are appointed from outside the Foreign Service. The ambassador has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior USG official on the ground during crises.

      (a) The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral mission, or an IGO. The COM may be accredited to more than one country. The COM interacts daily with DOS’s
strategic-level planners and decision makers. The COM provides recommendations and considerations for CAP directly to the GCC and commander of a JTF. While forces in the field under a GCC are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM confers with the GCC regularly to coordinate US military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the HN. The COM’s political role is important to the success of military operations involving the Armed Forces of the United States. Generally, each COM has a formal agreement with the GCC as to which DOD personnel fall under the security responsibility of each.

(b) The COM has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a US area military commander or on the staff of a foreign organization. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element of the Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. The COM has the right to see all communications to or from Mission elements, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or Executive decision. The COM has full responsibility for the security of the Mission and all personnel, whether inside or outside the chancery gate. The COM reviews programs, personnel, and funding levels regularly, and ensures that all agencies do likewise. Every executive branch agency under COM authority must obtain approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate of its staff. All USG personnel other than those in country under command of a US area military commander or on the staff of an international organization must obtain country clearance before entering the country on official business.

(2) The Deputy Chief of Mission. The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career foreign service officers through a rigorous selection process to be the principal deputy to the ambassador. Although not appointed by the President, the DCM wields considerable power, especially when acting as the COM while in chargé. The DCM is usually responsible for the day-to-day activities of the embassy.

(3) The Embassy. The HQ of the mission is the embassy, located in the political capital city of the HN. Although the various USG agencies that make up the mission may have individual HQ elsewhere in the country, the embassy is the focal point for interagency coordination. The main building of the embassy is termed the chancery; the ambassador’s house is known as the residence. The chancery and residence usually enjoy extraterritorial privileges (i.e., exemption from the jurisdiction of local law). Each embassy has an associated consular section, frequently located in the chancery, to provide services to US citizens and to issue visas to foreigners wishing to travel to the US.

(4) Consulates. The size or principal location of commercial activity in some countries necessitates the establishment of one or more consulates—branch offices of the mission located in key cities, often at a distance from the embassy. A consulate is headed by a principal officer. In addition to providing consular services, the consulate is usually a mirror of the embassy, albeit on a much smaller scale. It is the focal point of interagency coordination for the assigned consular district.
b. **DOS Plans.** Each US mission prepares an annual MSRP that sets country-level US foreign policy goals, resource requests, performance measures, and targets. The MSRP is a concise, streamlined document that facilitates long-term diplomatic and assistance planning. They are coordinated among the agencies represented on the country team, both in their embassy and in the Washington, DC interagency community. DOS bureau strategic resource plans (BSRPs) cover geographic regions that are not consistent with the GCC’s AORs. However, the differences between geographic combatant command, DOS, and USAID regional boundaries create challenging seams and may pose significant coordination problems. Each DOS bureau geographic region and the countries included in each region can be viewed at the DOS Web site (http://www.state.gov/p/) by clicking on the respective bureau or “Countries & Regions” and selecting the region. Although unclassified, BSRPs are available for review on the DOS Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) Web site (http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Mission Strategic Plans).

“No organization has more competent leaders than the Department of Defense (DOD). But when you’re in the wars that we’re in now in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it’s not a traditional battlefield, you also need some followers, not just leaders. You need to recognize the civilian police training expertise of some of the people in the State Department. You need to recognize the rule of law expertise at the Department of Justice. There are other very good leaders in areas that are outside DOD’s expertise, and DOD also needs some good followers who are willing to enable the experts in the civilian area to do their jobs, because you can’t build a courthouse in Iraq or Afghanistan without some military support—not military direction or leadership, but military support.”

The Honorable Thomas A. Schweich
Ambassador in Residence, Washington University
March 2009

c. **The Country Team.** The country team, headed by the COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. It is composed of the COM, DCM, section heads, the senior member of each US department or agency in country, and other USG personnel as determined by the COM. Each member presents the position of his or her parent organization to the country team and conveys country team considerations back to the parent organization. The COM confers with the country team to develop and implement foreign policy toward the HN and to disseminate decisions to the members of the mission.

   (1) The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US programs and policies. Under the country team construct, agencies are required to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their activities. Country team members who represent agencies other than the DOS are routinely in contact with their parent agencies. Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally or when they have broader national implications. Prior to providing any DOD logistical support, the reimbursement mechanism and policies must be clearly specified, understood, and
coordinated with the supporting comptroller per DODI 4000.19, *Interservice and Intragovernmental Support.*

(2) **In almost all bilateral missions, DOD is represented on the country team by the SDO as the principal DOD official in US embassies.** The SDO is the US defense attaché (DATT) and chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO). The SCO is called by various names (e.g., the office of defense cooperation, the security assistance office/organization, the military group); largely governed by the preference of the receiving country. The SDO/DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, and the single POC for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. All DOD elements assigned or attached to or operating from US embassies are aligned under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT. Where separate SCO and DATT offices currently exist, they will remain separate with distinct duties and statutory authorities. SDO/DATT duties include the following:

(a) Act as the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, and/or executing US defense issues and activities in the HN, including theater security cooperation programs under the oversight of the GCC.

(b) Serve as the principal embassy liaison with HN defense establishments and actively participate in national security and operational policy development and coordination.

(c) Represent SecDef and DOD components to HN counterparts and foreign diplomats accredited to the HN, and act as the principal in-country DOD diplomatic representative of SecDef and DOD components.

(d) Present coordinated DOD views on all defense matters to the COM and act as the single DOD POC to the COM to assist in carrying out the COM’s responsibilities.

(e) Represent SecDef and the appropriate CCDR for coordination of administrative and security matters for all DOD personnel not under the command of a US area military commander.

(f) Carry out the duties and instructions as set forth in CJCSI C-3310.01C, *Representational Responsibilities of the Defense Attaché System.*

(g) Exercise coordinating authority over DOD elements under the direction and supervision of the COM. This shall not preempt the authority exercised over these elements by the COM, the mission authority exercised by the parent DOD components, or the command authority exercised by the GCC under the Unified Command Plan.

(h) As required, provide information to USG officials on the general scope of in-country activities for all DOD component command elements assigned to the mission. This includes the missions, locations, organization, and unique security requirements.
(3) Sending LNOs to an embassy is a negotiated process and requires close coordination with the COM. There are a number of solid reasons why a COM may not want additional military in and around their embassy—including in-country political concerns (e.g., a nation might balk at the notion as many nations limit the number of military members allowed in US embassies as a quid pro quo to how many are allowed into their embassies in the US), space and communications limitations, and confusing new coordination requirements.

For more information, refer to DODD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies; DODI C-5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies (U); and CJCSI 5205.01B, Implementing Instructions for Defense Attaché Offices and Security Assistance Organizations (U).

d. Geographic Combatant Commands. To effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, GCCs are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies.

(1) GCCs and, increasingly, JTF commanders are assigned a policy advisor (POLAD) by DOS. The POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establishes linkages with US embassies in the AOR or JOA and with DOS. The POLAD supplies information regarding objectives of DOS that are relevant to the GCC’s theater strategy or CJTF’s plans. The POLADs are senior DOS officers (usually flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to leading US military leaders/commanders to provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’ military responsibilities. Therefore, the POLAD is directly responsible to the CCDR or CJTF and can be of great assistance in interagency coordination.

(2) USAID has also placed senior development advisors at most GCCs to coordinate overall relations with USAID HQ and field missions. Senior development advisors are senior USAID Foreign Service officers (usually flag-rank equivalents like POLADs), who provide information about USAID programs and processes that should be considered during planning and operations.

(3) Appointing non-DOD civilian deputies to the GCC and designing integrated staff sections throughout the HQ is the model used by USSOUTHCOM, US Africa Command, and now US European Command (USEUCOM).

(4) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) participates in deliberate planning and CAP. Representing USG agencies at the HQ of the geographic and selected functional combatant commands, each JIACG (or equivalent organization) is a multifunctional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of interagency activities. It may provide products and inputs that feed planning, assessment, and the CCDR’s decision cycle.

See Appendix D, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” for more information.
(5) **Other USG agencies may detail liaison personnel to combatant command staffs to improve interagency coordination.** For example, intelligence representatives may be assigned to staffs of geographic combatant commands to facilitate intelligence and antiterrorism support.

(6) Combatant commands’ “think tanks” and centers (e.g., USEUCOM’s Marshall Center, USPACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center, and US Strategic Command’s Global Innovation and Strategy Center) are formal venues for communication with interagency and multinational partners, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector. Symposia, conferences, strategic advisory groups, defense contractors, and training with industry are other fora for coordination.

(7) Two interagency tools that support whole-of-government planning for stability operations include DOS’s IMS for post-conflict reconstruction/stabilization efforts and USAID’s ICAF that addresses conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization activities.

(a) The purpose of the IMS is to provide a whole-of-government process for planning and implementing a response to an international crisis when the President and Congress determine that a response is in the national strategic interest. The NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC can activate the IMS operating through the Secretary of State who acts as the “custodian” of the IMS process.

Refer to Appendix G, “The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization.”

(b) The ICAF is a framework that can be used to help different USG departments and agencies work together to reach a shared understanding of a country’s conflict dynamics and consensus on potential entry points for additional USG efforts. This assessment will provide for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in the country or region.

Refer to Appendix H, “The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.”

### 3. Intergovernmental Organizations

The following describes formal or informal United States ties between the United Nations and NATO.

a. **The United Nations.** Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the US ambassador to the UN, officially titled the Permanent Representative. The ambassador has the status of cabinet rank and is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). USG coordination with UN PO missions or agencies in-theater is through the US country team. In some countries, US UN military observers attached to some UN PO missions may be a discreet source of information and advice through the US country team.
INTERAGENCY PARTICIPATION DURING THE 2008 GEORGIA-RUSSIA CONFLICT

The US Government (USG) deployed several personnel from multiple agencies to support the national response to the military conflict between the Republic of Georgia and Russia and its aftermath in early August 2008. This engagement, at one time involving interagency staffs at the national, geographic combatant command, and embassy/country levels, is the closest example of the use of the Interagency Management System (IMS) through the formation of the three main structures similar to the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group, Integration Planning Cell, and Advance Civilian Team. It is also an example of ongoing interagency participation in USG operations during times of crisis in lieu of officially establishing an IMS.

In August 2008, a decision was taken to create a coordinating body to support Washington leadership called the Georgia Coordinating Group (GCG), involving a staff composed of several USG agencies. The GCG was responsible for supporting leaders in Washington, DC, as well as coordinating interagency communications. The GCG tracked actions, cables, and answered requests for information. The GCG also developed a Web portal based on the Georgia Crisis Portal and established a common operational picture for all interagency participants.

The USG had officers from interagency participants located at US European Command (USEUCOM) headquarters operating in information and liaison roles, interacting with the necessary staff in USEUCOM, and participating in joint task force planning. The USG also deployed a team to Tbilisi, Georgia, consisting of a team leader, two experienced government planners, and one conflict prevention officer. In the team's three week deployment in support of the USG efforts in Georgia, it accomplished a variety of valuable actions assisting the embassy to include:

Documents and information needed for parallel planning with the GCG and Washington, DC, planners;

The most up-to-date breakdown of the $1 billion Georgia assistance package; and

Additional guidance on conditionality issues related to possible cash transfers.

The interagency capability to support USG planning and operations for conflicts and crises goes beyond the capacity of IMS. The USG has and continues to deploy numerous interagency staff officers from across the USG to work together in IMS-like structures to assist with a variety of conflicts/crises to include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Yemen, and Haiti.

SOURCE: After Action Review
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Georgia Engagement - August 11 through October 31, 2008
January 30, 2009
(1) **The UN normally conducts PO under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly.** FHA is conducted under standing authority from the General Assembly and does not require a resolution to authorize each response. Mandates are developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, and sometimes results in ambiguity. As with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented by US forces through orders issued by SecDef through the CJCS. During such implementation, the political mandates are converted to workable military orders.

(2) As part of a broader UN strategy, the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) provides guidelines for a comprehensive and inclusive UN system approach to the planning of integrated PO (hereafter “integrated missions”). IMPP is the authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integrated mission plans, for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds, and programs.

   (a) If a UN peacekeeping mission is authorized, UNDPKO is responsible for providing UN peacekeeping operations with policy guidance and strategic direction. In the field, the head of mission (HOM) exercises operational authority over the UN peacekeeping operation’s activities, including military, police, and civilian resources. In the case of military personnel provided by member states, these personnel are placed under the OPCON of the UN force commander or head of military component, but not under UN command. In integrated missions, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)/HOM is a civilian who reports to the Secretary-General (SYG) through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at UN Headquarters. The SRSG/HOM is given significant delegated authority to set the direction of the mission and to lead its engagement with the political process on the ground. The SRSG/HOM is responsible for coordinating the activities of the entire UN system in the field.

   (b) Prior to a UN peacekeeping mission being authorized or if no such mission is launched, the UN will provide a resident coordinator (RC). In the initial stages of a complex emergency or natural disaster, the UN RC plays a critical role in coordinating the policies, programs, and actions in all countries with a UN presence. The RC is typically the most senior UN representative in-country. The RC is appointed by the SYG and represents all organizations of the UN unless they have a presence on the ground. As such, the RC often represents UNOCHA in the early warning and initial response phase of an emergency. The RC is also typically the resident representative for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and usually in place and familiar with the nature of the crisis when an emergency occurs. In his or her coordinating role, the RC convenes regular meetings of the UN country team, composed of the representatives of the operational UN agencies on the ground. In a crisis, the RC will also organize broader coordination forums comprised of NGOs, the Red Cross Movement, donors, and other IGOs, including subcommittees that help coordinate humanitarian relief in a particular sector or region. If a UN peacekeeping mission is authorized, an integrated mission is launched under the leadership of an SRSG and in that case the RC will be designated the deputy of the SRSG and is responsible for the coordination of both humanitarian operations and UN development operations, and for maintaining links with governments and other parties, donors, and the broader humanitarian and development communities for this purpose.
(c) In certain situations the UN SYG may appoint a special representative who reports directly to the SYG but also advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN HQ. The special representative may direct day-to-day operations.

(3) United States Military Support. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(a) US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.


(b) UN conducts operations employing military forces as contingent units under the OPCON of the head of the military contingent, as staff augmentation to the mission HQ, or as “experts on mission” as UN military observers. The US has provided military forces and personnel to each of these categories. Additionally, the US can support the UN by conducting parallel missions (called hybrid missions by the UN) under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter under US OPCON in collaboration with UN forces such as was done in Haiti in 2004 or as the UK did in Sierra Leone in 2000, Operation PALLISER. In the later circumstance, the US military structure that is used to conduct multinational operations normally is a JTF. The CJTF should expect to conduct operations as part of an MNF. US forces may participate across a range of military operations in concert with a variety of USG agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, IGOs, and NGOs.

(c) The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate. On a case-by-case basis, the President may place US forces participating in multilateral PO under UN control under the OPCON of UN mission in accordance with the memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed between the US and the UN. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. OPCON for UN multilateral PO is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign UN commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.

(d) US UN Military Observers. A potentially important source of information and advice for both the US country team and JFCs are US UN military observers attached to UN PO missions. US UN military observers are of great strategic and operational importance in that they directly represent the commitment of US national interest in these missions, fostering their legitimacy and encouraging the participation of other nations. Through a discreet relationship with the US country team, they can help improve understanding of the situation and the international intervention on the ground. Being both
Foreign Considerations

observers and members of the UN military staff, they also act as strategic and operational enablers through professional military contributions to the UN mission and provide advice and coordination assistance to the US country team. US UN military observers are not under the command of a GCC or the authority of a COM. They are OPCON to the Commander, US Military Observer Group – Washington, a joint command.

b. **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It provides a forum in which countries from North America and Europe can consult together on security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them. The Alliance is committed to defending its member states against aggression or the threat of aggression and to the principle that an attack against one or several members would be considered as an attack against all. NATO remains an IGO in which each member country retains its sovereignty. All NATO decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of consensus. NATO’s most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which brings together representatives of all the Allies at the level of ambassadors, ministers, or heads of state and government. NATO has no operational forces of its own other than those assigned to it by member countries or contributed by partner countries for the purpose of carrying out a specific mission. It has a number of mechanisms available to it for this purpose – the defense planning and resource planning processes that form the basis of cooperation within the Alliance, the implementation of political commitments to improved capabilities, and a military structure that combines the functions of a MNF planning organization with an Alliance-wide system of C2 of the military forces assigned to it.

*For more information, refer to Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine, and Annex A, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” to Appendix B, “Intergovernmental Organizations.”*

4. **Nongovernmental Organizations**

   a. **The Role of NGOs.** Working alone, alongside the US military, with other US agencies, or with multinational partners, NGOs are assisting in many of the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. **The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another.** NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development programs, human rights, and conflict resolution. The sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international communities. In fact, individual organizations are often funded by national and international donor agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions. Similarly, internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups as local implementing partners.
b. **The Increasing Number of NGOs.** A JTF or MNF may encounter scores of NGOs in a JOA. In 1999 in Kosovo, more than 150 IGOs and NGOs had applied to be registered in the province. Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID. InterAction, a US-based consortium of NGOs, has a membership of over 160 private agencies that operate in 180 countries. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) has a predominantly European membership numbering in the hundreds. Over 1,660 NGOs around the world are registered with the UN’s Department of Public Information, while over 3,000 have consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

c. **Military and NGO Relations.** In a hostile or uncertain environment, the military’s initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces. **NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state, which they had no part in determining.** Many NGOs view their relationship with the military under the UNOCHA *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief*, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Guidelines,” that emphasize the principle of “humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality, and impartiality) as defined in the “Oslo Guidelines.” Some organizations employ a more strident interpretation of these nonbinding guidelines, applying them not just to humanitarian assistance, as specifically referenced, but also to advocacy, development, and civil society work. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably. NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, accept only minimal necessary assistance from the military, and ensure that military actions in the relief and civic action are consistent with the standards and priorities agreed on within the civilian relief community. In a permissive environment, military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities may coincide with NGO objectives.

(1) The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make NGOs valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such information on the basis of collegiality. Virtually all NGO operations interact with military operations in some way—they use the same (normally limited) lines of communications; they draw on the same sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for buildings and storage space. Effective two-way communication between the US military and NGOs promotes US national interests/policy and objectives. CMO, through establishing and maintaining communications, is one of the best ways to unify military and public and private partnerships and best practices to improve the HN’s internal security and promote stability operations in the operational area. The private sector, even in some developing countries, possesses the skills and expertise to contribute to the overall US objectives. Thus, sharing of operational information in both directions is an essential element of successful CMO.

(2) While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational area, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, impartial operations. This is particularly the case if US military forces are a participant in a conflict in the operational area. Many NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for communications and personal security, preferring instead to rely upon the good will of
the local populace for their safety; however many larger NGOs have very capable communications capabilities. Some NGOs provide considerable support and assistance in the security arena. Any activity that strips an NGO’s appearance of impartiality, such as close collaboration with a particular military force, may well eliminate that organization’s primary source of security. Therefore, it is essential that the military recognize an NGO’s request for independence in order to avoid compromising their security. NGOs may also avoid cooperation with the military out of suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Commanders and their staffs should be sensitive to these concerns and consult these organizations, along with the competent national or international authorities, to identify local conditions that may impact effective military-NGO cooperation.

(3) During large scale operations, dealing directly with myriad NGOs may be impractical. Some NGOs may be reluctant to coordinate directly with the military. Under some circumstances military coordination with NGOs may be facilitated by USAID as an intermediary due to their established relationships with NGOs in the operational area.

(4) PA planning should include the identification of POCs with NGOs that will operate in the JOA. Military spokespersons should comment on NGO operations based on approved PA guidance and make referrals of media queries to the appropriate organization’s spokesperson.

d. Military Support of NGOs. SecDef may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) IGOs and NGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and military forces should be the primary goal. The secondary goal would be establish as good a rapport as possible with NGOs maintaining neutrality. The tertiary goal (although often critical) is to monitor openly hostile NGOs and, when applicable, develop mitigation strategies. The creation of a framework for structured civil-military interaction, such as a CMOC, allows the military and NGOs to meet and work together in advancing common goals. Taskings to support IGOs and NGOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces should be to enable, not perform, IGO and NGO tasks. Military commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and other organizations may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

e. The Guidelines for Relations between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments agreed by the DOD, InterAction, and the United States Institute of Peace should facilitate interaction between the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs. They were developed by a working group, which included InterAction, OSD, JS, DOS, and USAID, and facilitated by the US Institute of Peace. The guidelines seek to mitigate friction between military and NGO personnel over access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to assess and meet humanitarian needs in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. They are an example of guidelines
that may be helpful even though they are not joint doctrine, or expressed in correct doctrinal terms. They also serve as an example for civil-military relations in other types of operations and a baseline for the development of guidelines for a specific operation in hostile or uncertain environments. During operations in a permissive environment, documents such as *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Guidelines” may be more applicable. When developing guidelines for a specific operation, the following considerations apply:

1. How should the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military be conducted: in confidence or transparently?

2. What would the implications be of public knowledge of such liaison arrangements on the perception of the impartiality of humanitarian activities?

3. How can transparency of the civil-military liaison arrangements be ensured while maintaining the understanding of a clear distinction between the military and humanitarian organizations?

4. How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions be prevented regarding the nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?

5. Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements? When is it better to maintain liaison on an ad hoc basis?

6. What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison component?

7. When, if ever, should the LNOs of the humanitarian and military communities be colocated?

*See Appendix J, “Example Guidelines for Relations Between the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Organizations,” and Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, for more information. See Appendix C, “Nongovernmental Organizations,” for more information.*

## 5. The Private Sector

A number of DODIs regulate the conduct of private military and security companies operating with DOD. These include DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, which establishes and implements policy and guidance, assigns responsibilities, and serves as a comprehensive source of DOD policy and procedures concerning DOD contractor personnel authorized to accompany the Armed Forces of the United States. DODI 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations*, regulates the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract during contingency operations. It also assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for incident reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, rules for the use of force, and a process for administrative action or the removal, as appropriate, of PSCs and PSC personnel.
DODI 5525.11, *Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed by or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members*, provides policy for exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over civilians employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.

6. Foreign Operations

   a. The Political-Military Dimension. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. As such, DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external POLMIL relationships with overall US foreign policy. In addition to DOS, USAID is the lead agency for development and carries out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, disaster response, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance. External POLMIL relationships of DOD include:

      (1) Bilateral military relationships.

      (2) Multinational military forces.

      (3) Multilateral mutual defense alliances.

      (4) Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests, such as technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, international aviation, law of the sea, nuclear regulation, and environmental pollution.

      (5) Use of US military assets for FHA or PO (including those conducted under UN auspices).

   b. Theater Focus. The GCC implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within the AOR. Thorough joint operation planning requires that a GCC’s operations and activities align with functional and theater national security end states contained in the National Defense Strategy and the GEF. The GEF prioritizes these theater strategic end states for each GCC who then develops a TCP. GCC TCP–nested country plans should complement the current DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan, BSRRPs, and applicable MSRRPs. The GCC’s regional focus is similar to the regional focus of DOS’s regional bureaus, though the geographic boundaries differ and DOS regional bureaus are located in Washington, DC, and practice a more bilateral approach. Most other USG foreign affairs agencies are regionally organized as well, again with varying geographic boundaries. Within a theater, the GCC is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination. In contrast, the DOS focal point for formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination is the regional bureau headed by an assistant secretary at DOS HQ in Washington, DC. USAID has a similar structure, with geographic bureaus headed by assistant administrators in Washington, DC. Although the GCC will often find it more expeditious to approach the US bilateral COMs for approval of an activity in regional HNs, often the political effect of the proposed US military activity goes far beyond the boundaries of the individual HN. In such cases, the GCC should not assume that the approval of the
COM corresponds to region-wide approval of DOS. The GCC’s DOS foreign POLAD can assist in ascertaining whether the activity has regional bureau approval.

c. Theater Campaign Plans, Crisis Response, and Limited Contingency Operations. GCC’s TCP–nested country plans should complement DOS MSRP and other plans developed by the country teams and USG interagency partners in the GCC’s AOR. In a crisis response and limited contingency operation, coordination between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur within the NSC/IPC and, if directed, during development of the USG strategic plan. During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the GCC’s staff may deal directly with a COM or members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some operations, a special envoy of the President or an SRSG may be involved.

“Interaction with the US Department of State [DOS] and the United Nations was critical throughout the operation. Ambassador Oakley and I spoke regularly to coordinate the efforts of the DOS and our military operations in the ARFOR [Army forces] sector. His support for our operation was superb and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. We followed his lead in operations, just as we fully supported the operations of the DOS.”

Major General Steven L. Arnold, US Army
Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army: Lessons From Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994
d. The GCC and staff should be continuously engaged in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination by establishing working relationships with relevant organizations and agencies and conduct joint operation planning long before CAP and military resources are required. As situations requiring CAP develop, the normal flow of DOS and other agencies reporting from the field will increase significantly. This may be amplified by informal contacts between the CCDR’s staff (e.g., POLAD, senior development advisor, JIACG [or equivalent organization]) and appropriate embassies as well as the relevant bureaus at DOS. Such informal communications greatly facilitate the development of viable COAs, but should not be used to circumvent established, authoritative planning, and direction processes (see Figure IV-1). Military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns.

e. Crisis Action Organization. The combatant command crisis action organization is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the CCDR. Activation of other crisis action cells to administer the specific requirements of task force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination. Liaison and coordinating mechanisms that the CCDR may elect to establish to facilitate the synchronization of military and nonmilitary activities include:

(1) Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). Early in a developing crisis, an assessment may be required to determine what resources are immediately required to stabilize a humanitarian crisis. The supported CCDR may organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information for planning. This information may include an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should be provided the current threat assessment; current relevant intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and embassy, DOS, and USAID points of contact. The disaster assistance response team (DART) and USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the relationship with and authority of the government of the affected country; identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration; determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be used for FP purposes; and coordinate specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The HAST works closely with the DART to prevent duplication of effort.

(2) USAID and its Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) DART is the lead for foreign disaster response. OFDA may deploy a DART into the crisis area to assist coordination of the FHA effort and activate an on-call Washington, DC-based response management team. DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to a foreign disaster. The DART will also work closely with the US military during FHA operations. DARTs assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend follow-up actions.
Figure IV-1. Notional Structure for Coordination Among Military and Nonmilitary Organizations—Foreign Operations
For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center.** The supported GCC may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. **The HACC provides the critical link between the GCC and USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs that may participate in an FHA operation** at the theater strategic level. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or civilian HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the GCC’s staff and crisis action organization. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, an OFDA advisor or liaison if available, a public affairs officer (PAO), an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (e.g., POLAD, a preventive medicine physician, veterinarian) when required. Liaisons from USG agencies, US Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies also may be members of the HACC in large-scale FHA operations.

(4) **Joint Logistics Operations Center.** The JLOC supports the GCC’s joint operations center (JOC) and the operations planning teams. The CCDR reviews requirements of the joint forces and establishes priorities to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively. The GCC may also be responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel. Formed at the discretion of the GCC and operated by the GCC’s J-4 current operations division, a JLOC functions as the single POC for coordinating timely and flexible logistic response into the AOR, relieving the JTF, if formed, of as much of this function as possible. The JLOC may also perform continuous coordination with strategic-level providers such as the Defense Logistics Agency, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and the GCC’s staff to ensure the required flow of support to the JTF.

For further details on the JLOC, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(5) **Liaison Section.** The liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. A liaison section assists the JFC in coordinating military activities among MNFs, other USG agencies, engaged IGOs and NGOs, the HN, and indigenous populations. Military forces, engaged agencies, and the HN should consider exchanging liaison personnel in order to maximize information flow and interagency coordination. Information should flow in both directions. NGO liaisons should have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGO capabilities, plans, and infrastructure as well as disposition in the JOA. The CMOC facilitates coordination and exchange of information. Alternatively, the HN may establish a coordination center to organize and provide liaison personnel.

(a) Area-qualified CA personnel are well suited for liaison tasks. Commanders should be aware that close participation of civilian agencies with uniformed military in hostile and uncertain environments may result in those same civilian organizations being targeted by adversaries. This can lead to hesitation by some organizations to meet and liaise with the military. In situations where open civilian organizational contact with the military
may cause a concern for security, coordination, cooperation, and information sharing can still be attempted through less visible means of communication to achieve unity of effort.

(b) **Establishing liaison relationships.** Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Various types of liaison coordination models may be used, depending upon level of commonality between stakeholders (is relationship cooperative or based on coexistence?). In establishing the liaison relationship, the JFC should be clear on the liaisons’ roles and authorities, and ability to speak for their home agency or organizations. Liaisons should not replace standing DOD processes, especially at the strategic level, but they can help to flatten bureaucratic structures by streamlining information flows. Liaisons can assist by providing advice and information, translation between organizational cultures, and reachback to a home agency or organization. DOD should consult with interagency coordination cell/JIACG (or equivalent organization).

(c) Types of liaison relationships to consider:

1. Colocation: this is the most intimate liaison relationship. Care should be given to understand the liaison’s role and authorities.

2. Liaison Exchange: temporary or permanent exchange of LNOs.

3. Limited Liaison: exchange of officers for a limited time period; normally limited to meetings or specified hours.

4. Interlocutor: using appropriate bridge organization liaison or coordination officers to bridge or buffer civilian and military members.

(6) The **Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT)** program is a cooperative multinational effort to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of a **multinational task force HQ**. The MPAT provides responsive multinational expertise in CAP. It is a validated process for integration of other nation’s militaries, IGOs, and NGOs. This structure reinforces the use of a trained cadre that have worked with IGOs and NGOs prior to a crisis within an AOR and that deploys to the task force HQ once a crisis occurs. The MPAT program develops and practices multinational planning and execution procedures for operational level task forces. By necessity, this includes coordination, collaboration, and cooperation with USG organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and HN government agencies. MPAT exercises, workshops, and deployments to actual disaster responses have validated the MPAT program and its comprehensive, integrated approach to multinational, multiagency, and humanitarian community crises responses.

*For more information, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and http://www1.apan-info.net/mpat.*

(7) When IMS is activated, an **integration planning cell** may deploy from the CRSG and colocate with the designated GCC’s HQ. The integration planning cell should be established in conjunction with the development of a US strategic plan. It supports the GCC in integrating the military plan with the civilian components of the US strategic and
“The 24th MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] had a unique mission and reporting relationship. We fell under NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and were operating in the Task Force Helmand AO [area of operations]; consequently “CIMIC” [civil-military cooperation] (CA) [civil affairs] and PRT [provincial reconstruction team] responsibility for Helmand Province belonged to the British. On the military side, the CA coordination involved ISAF headquarters in Kabul, Regional Command South (RC South) in Kandahar, Task Force Helmand and also the PRT in Lashkar Gah. Outside the military channels were USAID [US Agency for International Development] (the major redevelopment entity in Afghanistan), the United Nations (UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], WHO [World Health Organization] and UN [United Nations] Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 'UNAMA') and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Also operating in Afghanistan are hundreds of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. In addition to all these actors, the Afghan government itself is in the early stages of its redevelopment and its ministries, which control most programs centrally from Kabul, are fledgling enterprises with varying degrees of competency.

We hit the ground in Kandahar somewhat blind of this highly complex mixture of governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations involved in stabilization and reconstruction/redevelopment activities. It was only near the end of the deployment did I fully ascertain the depth and breadth of agencies and plans at play in Afghanistan.

The impact to any unit deploying to Afghanistan is that there needs to be awareness of the agencies, organizations, plans, and programs that are or will be in play within an area of operations. This is no small task as there is no entity wholly responsible for all these actors and programs; consequently, activities can occur within an AO without knowledge of the PRT or even the responsible Ministry. Interagency coordination is a constant endeavor and will be essential to ensuring unit efforts are integrated with big-picture plans.”

SOURCE: After Action Review
Detachment 4-3
4th Civil Affairs Group
2 October 2008
f. Interorganizational Roles and Relationships. USG agency, IGO, and NGO preparation, planning, and participation in operations should occur at the earliest phases of an anticipated operation.

(1) The NSC, through the interagency committee system, using IMS if activated, designates a lead government agency (normally DOS) for the mission to ensure coordination among the various USG agencies. The USG, via the NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC, may develop and promulgate a plan for an operation. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs participate in POLMIL planning through JS.

(2) Within the theater, the GCC is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. In developing joint operation plans, CCDRs may also (and on OPLANs are directed to) develop annex V (Interagency Coordination) to request and guide interagency, IGO, and NGO activities with military operations. GCCs should coordinate with OSD and JS to develop annex V with the relevant USG agencies. Annex V is moving toward a product, which is developed in collaboration with other relevant USG agencies, which participate at the onset of the planning process. COAs developed by the GCC’s staff should consider, and incorporate as appropriate, relationships that have been developed with USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.

(a) When developing joint operation plans, planners should seek to identify opportunities to support and promote a unified USG approach to achieving national security objectives.

(b) Where appropriate, joint operation plans will synchronize the CCDR’s military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities with the major national security engagement operations, activities, and actions of USG agencies in the AOR.

(c) When developing and assessing joint operation plans, planners should consider analysis of the effectiveness of USG military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities by country in meeting US national security policy objectives. Planners should identify where the application of DOD resources could be used to address shortfalls in achieving priority policy objectives, to include conflict prevention.

(d) During the development of contingency plans, planners should identify decision points and desired interagency preparatory activities required to transition from a DOD-supporting to DOD-supported role.

(e) Contingency plans will establish a framework for estimating interagency support to DOD activities and DOD support to civilian activities and then validating, by agency, projected support with regard to agency capacity and intentions.

g. Public Affairs and Media Support. The JFC’s PAO plays a major role in keeping USG agencies and NGOs informed on the capability and intent of the joint force and coordinating public information activities to ensure consistency of messages.
(1) At the national level, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD[PA]) interfaces with USG agencies in the NSC/DC and issues PA guidance.

(2) At the theater level, PA planning includes coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, the ambassador, the country team (particularly the embassy PAO), the HN, national and international media, and media elements of member forces. It is essential that the overall OPLAN be developed with consideration given to the public communication requirements of the operation and associated capabilities needed for execution. Additionally, a PA and media plan should be developed before the operation begins. A MOC may be established to facilitate the dissemination of information and media coverage of operations and promote coordination and responsiveness. When a MOC is established, it is often appropriate to include media and PA representatives from the aforementioned organizations.

(3) **Public Affairs Planning with Intergovernmental Organizations.** The OASD(PA) provides overall PA guidance and coordinates PA actions affecting IGOs. Planning for support to UN missions will normally include coordination with UN press office personnel through OASD(PA). JTF PA efforts should include the identification of POCs and authorized spokespersons within each IGO.

*For additional information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.*

7. **Joint Task Force Considerations**

   a. **Mission Analysis**

      (1) **JTF Assessment Team.** A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present, multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives. USAID, because of the extensive contacts it develops in carrying out development work at the community level, can provide key situational awareness for JTF assessments. **The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST** and, if provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST. The CJTF determines the composition of the assessment team and should include staff members who are subject matter experts and representatives from Service and functional components expected to participate in the actual operation. USG agency representation may include the USAID/OFDA DART for purposes of FHA operations. Special operations force personnel who possess necessary cultural, language, and technical skills may be included. The assessment team may also assist in clarifying the mission and determining force requirements and force deployment sequences for the JTF.

      (2) **Coordinated Operations.** Operations by USG agencies, the equivalent agencies of other national governments, IGOs, and NGOs, in concert with or supplementing those of HN entities, will normally be in progress when US forces arrive in a JOA.

      (3) **Priority Task.** This may be a military action, a humanitarian task, or a combination of both. In certain situations, interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination must be a top priority of the CJTF.
(4) **Regional Strategy.** In further analyzing the mission, consider how the regional strategy will affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA. The NSC, DOS, COM, and the GCC will provide the regional strategy and an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations. This may affect COA development, SC themes and messages, and planning and execution activities. A well-defined regional strategy will delineate the military mission and assist in determining force requirements and defining the end state.

(5) **Political Considerations.** The assessment team should include sufficient expertise to realistically evaluate the political situation. The JFC should quickly establish a relationship with the COM, the country team, the USAID mission director, and USG agency representatives in country. To the extent that USG agencies are not present, consideration should be given to placing representatives of relevant USG agencies on the assessment team.

(a) Situation permitting, the JFC and key staff members should meet with the regional and functional elements of the involved USG agencies, JS, and the embassies (in Washington, DC) of the nations involved. Establishing an effective working relationship with the COM will help in any foreign endeavor. Each US mission, as well as the various DOS geographic and functional bureaus involved, will likely provide different perspectives and issues to consider.

(b) Information-sharing relationships between the JTF, local and national authorities, the country team, USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should be established at the earliest stages of planning. One of the most important ways to develop confidence and facilitate mutually beneficial information exchange with non-USG agencies is to establish a clear intent to share information. In this regard, clear guidelines are promulgated to the JFC staff in order to avoid over-classification of information and to allow information to be declassified as early as operational conditions permit. Commanders should consider local and organizational sensitivities to information-gathering activities by joint forces—especially those that may be interpreted as ‘intelligence collection.’ Additionally, commanders may consider providing the appropriate means (e.g., accessible portal, communication equipment, and technical support) to IGOs and NGOs to allow for better information sharing. It is also desirable to share a COP with personnel from non-DOD agencies. Because most COPS are classified, commanders should seek technological solutions that offer an unclassified version of the COP to share with participants who do not have security clearances. The capacity to access classified information is an issue for USG agencies such as USAID. Classified computers may be limited in US embassies and not all staff may have access to them.

(6) **JTF HQ.** The location of the JTF HQ, whether afloat or ashore, is important. Not only should it be defensible, it should be geographically positioned to work with the HN political and private sectors, relief organizations, the media, and MNFs, if present. Proximity to the American embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination.
b. **Organizational Tools for the JTF.** The CJTF should consider the establishment of C2 structures that account for and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements as well as IGOs, NGOs, and the media. The CJTF should ultimately consider how joint force actions and those of engaged organizations contribute toward the desired end state. This consideration requires extensive liaison and routine contact with all involved parties as well as reliable communications. An assessment team’s mission analysis will assist the CJTF in the establishment of an executive steering group (ESG), CMOC, and liaison teams.

(1) **Executive Steering Group.** The ESG is composed of senior military representatives from the JTF, principals of the embassy (e.g., ambassador, DCM, political or POLMIL counselor), the HN, IGOs, and possibly NGOs present in the JOA. It is the high-level outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies and for resolution of difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG is charged with interpreting and coordinating strategic policy. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the CJTF and ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to provide information and policy guidance to engaged agencies.

(2) **Civil-Military Coordination Board.** This board is the CJTF’s vehicle for coordinating civil-military support. Membership is typically restricted to key representatives from the JTF staff sections involved in CMO. The board can assist commanders in refining their intent for CMO in their commander’s intent or recommend a separate intent statement just for CMO. CMO is a commander’s responsibility, not the responsibility of the CA staff/unit assigned to the JTF. Under certain conditions, the civil-military coordination board may include representatives from key IGOs and NGOs.

c. JFCs are responsible to conduct CMO but they may establish a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond that which the organic CMO capability could accomplish. By design, the US Army CA command and brigade, the USN maritime CA group, or the Marine Corps CA group organizational structure can provide the operational C2 system structure to form a JCMOTF. NGOs in the operational area may not have a similarly defined structure for controlling activities. Further, many of these organizations may be present in the operational area at the invitation and funding of the HN. As such, they may be structured to conform with HN regulations or restrictions which may conflict with military operations.

*For additional information on the JCMOTF, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.*

8. **Civil-Military Operations Center**

a. The ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to mission accomplishment. A relationship normally should be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, IGOs, NGOs, and the population. **The CMOC is a mechanism for the coordination of CMO** that can serve as the primary coordination interface and provide operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other
stakeholders. Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. In reality, the CMOC may be physical or virtual and conducted collaboratively through online networks. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent—flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task organized based on the mission.

(1) A CMOC is formed to:

(a) Carry out guidance and JFC decisions regarding CMO.

(b) **Exchange Information.** Sharing information is a key function of the CMOC, but military staff must be careful to avoid the impression that stakeholder organizations are being used for intelligence gathering.

(c) Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

(d) Provide a forum for military and other participating organizations. It is important to remember that these organizations may decide to attend CMOC meetings but may choose not to consider themselves members of the CMOC to better maintain their impartiality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for informal stakeholder discussions but not as a stakeholder coordination forum.

(e) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, IPI, the private sector, and regional organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.

(2) **CMOCs are tailored for each mission.** When a CMOC is established, the CJTF should invite representatives of other agencies, which may include the following:

(a) USAID/OFDA representatives.

(b) DOS, country team, and other USG representatives.
(c) Military liaison personnel from participating countries.

(d) HN or local government agency representatives.

(e) Representatives of IGOs, NGOs, IPI, the private sector (as appropriate), and regional organizations.

(3) For foreign operations, the CMOC may be the focal point where US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs. In many cases, however (particularly in FHA), an IGO may have already established coordination centers such as the UN cluster system. In these cases, the JFC should consider how to leverage such extant structures to perform CMOC functions rather than trying to duplicate coordination structures. A JFC may employ a CMOC if needed, or provide CMOC capabilities to support HN or civilian partners if required to accomplish coordination. If possible, NGO LNOs should be identified to work within the CMOC. Often, NGO representatives who are unwilling to come to a military or USG facility are more comfortable engaging at a UN or HN run site. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military. They may, however, accept grant funding from IGOs or USG agencies like USAID, thereby taking the role of “implementing partners.” While this relationship is not as strong as command authority or even a contract, it does give the granting agency some oversight authority over how the funds are spent for the activities specified in that agreement.

For additional information on the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. During large-scale FHA operations, US forces may organize using the CMOC (see Figure IV-2). When possible, if both are established, the CMOC should collocate with the HOC to facilitate operations and assist in later transition of any CMOC operations to the HOC.

c. In FHA operations, the UN organizes along key “clusters” for FHA response. Coordination meetings hosted by UN elements may supplant the need for a US-military run CMOC. Commanders should be careful to complement rather than compete with the UN cluster meetings; NGOs are far more likely to participate in UN-sponsored meetings than US- (especially US military) sponsored coordination and deconfliction meetings.

(1) The UN cluster approach provides the coordination and decision-making structures to enhance humanitarian response capacity, predictability, accountability, and partnership. The cluster approach aims to ensure that, within the international humanitarian response, there is a clear system of leadership and accountability for all the key sectors or
The cluster approach is intended, therefore, to strengthen rather than to replace sectoral coordination under the overall leadership of the humanitarian coordinator, with a view to improve humanitarian response in emergency situations. The global clusters include: agriculture; camp coordination/management; early recovery; education; emergency shelter; emergency telecommunications; health; logistics; nutrition; protection; and water, sanitation, and hygiene. Some or all clusters may be used or modified based on the situation.

(2) The UN may also form a combination of a UN disaster assessment and coordination (UNDAC) team, an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC), or a
Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC was colocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center that coordinated the activities of the UN and other humanitarian relief organizations. The CMOC was coequal with the traditional J-staff sections. CMOC military officers coordinated activities with both State Department officials and relief workers. The CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept. It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

**SOURCE:** Operations Other Than War, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance, Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1992

humanitarian operations coordination center (HOCC). These operations centers assist the local emergency management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. In NATO or multinational operations the CMOC may be called CIMIC [civil-military cooperation].

*For more information, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

d. The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC. Security, FP, and easy access for agencies and organizations are all valid considerations. The location should be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if geographically colocated. If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC “outside the wire” in order to maximize participation by IGOs and NGOs that want to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

e. Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions. Additionally, the CMOC forum provides stakeholders a single point of coordination with the military, which facilitates the unified efforts of a joint force and the relief community.

(1) It is incumbent on the military not to dictate what will happen but to coordinate a team approach to problem resolution.

(2) A JFC cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies. However, working together at the CMOC on issues like security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

f. A CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify participants capable of fulfilling needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action. Figure IV-3 depicts some of the CMOC functions.
g. Liaison Teams. Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOC, or HOC, if established, liaison teams work to foster a better understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork.

(1) **Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2.** Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. In multinational operations, liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces.

(2) **The need for effective liaison is vital when a JTF is deployed and operating in conjunction with MNFs.** The likelihood that a JTF may operate with not only traditional allies, but also with nations with which the US does not have a long history of formal military cooperation, requires the CJTF to plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements.

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**Figure IV-3. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions**

- Providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and matters that are civilian related
- Coordinating relief efforts with US or multinational commands, United Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies
- Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies
- Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command
- Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support
- Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service components
- Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support
- Coordinating with Disaster Assistance Response Team deployed by USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers
- Convening follow-on assessment groups
Foreign Considerations

(3) Qualifications of a JTF LNO assigned to a national or multinational operation include a solid knowledge of doctrine, force capabilities, language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. CA or multinational support teams may be available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment a liaison team may be another option.

h. Humanitarian Operations Center. During large-scale FHA operations, when it becomes apparent that the magnitude of a disaster will exceed a HN’s capacity to manage it unilaterally, the HN may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of international aid.

(1) Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant difference. The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or control authority, where all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. The US ambassador or designated representative will have a lead role in the HOC. Additionally, the HOC operates at the senior, national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity of effort, while the CMOC works at the local level coordinating US actions to achieve operational and tactical unity of effort.

(2) The HOC membership should consist of representatives from the affected country, the US embassy or consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, IGOs, NGOs, and any other major organizations.

(3) The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy, identifies logistic requirements for the various organizations, and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to appropriate agencies. Requests for military support may be submitted to the JTF through the CMOC.

(4) An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the HN is self-sufficient in providing for the population’s humanitarian needs, and no longer requires external assistance.

For further information on HOC, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

i. CMOC–JIACG (or Equivalent Organization) Relationship. A CA command has the capabilities to provide theater-level analysis of civil considerations in coordination with the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and to develop strategic-level civil input to the supported JFC. A CMO staff section plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and civilian component issues through direct coordination with the supported unit’s J-3. Throughout the process, this staff section’s plans officer continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and HN sources (private/non-private sectors) to the JFC COP. The integration of CMO into the staff or working group is imperative. The capabilities of the
private sector partnership when orchestrating interagency coordination can and may prove to be highly valuable.

9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams

a. A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of an HN local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. PRTs vary in structure, size, and mission. PRTs extend the reach, capability, and capacity of governance and facilitate reconstruction. While the PRTs are primarily concerned with addressing local conditions, they also work on

<table>
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<th>CLUSTER SYSTEM IN HAITI</th>
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<td>Following the devastating earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010, the international humanitarian community has made significant progress in establishing humanitarian coordination structures. USAID [US Agency for International Development] Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/DART) staff highlight the critical role of the internationally recognized humanitarian cluster system in coordinating response efforts.</td>
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<td>Clusters provide a forum for humanitarian organizations to coordinate response efforts by sector and are led by designated agencies with relevant technical expertise. The cluster system seeks to ensure greater predictability and accountability in response efforts, while simultaneously strengthening partnerships between agencies. Application of the cluster system has contributed to significant progress on a range of issues, including broadened partnerships with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]; agreement on common sector standards, tools, and guidance; development of common training modules; creation of common stockpiles; and development of surge deployment rosters.</td>
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<td>OCHA [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] activated twelve sector-specific clusters within the first ten days following the crisis. The active clusters include: Camp Coordination and Camp Management; Education; Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items; Food Aid; Logistics; Nutrition; Protection; WASH [water, sanitation, and hygiene]; Agriculture; Early Recovery; Emergency Telecommunications; and Health. Ten international humanitarian agencies and the Government of Haiti (GoH) are currently serving as lead agencies managing the twelve clusters.</td>
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<td>Most NGOs operating in Haiti are participating in the cluster coordination structure, due in large part to a consistent message from the UN [United Nations], donors, other NGOs, and the GoH that if agencies want to be involved in the response, participation in the coordination and planning structure is critical.</td>
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Various Sources
building and improving communication and linkages among the central government, regional, and local agencies.

b. In an uncertain environment, a PRT is a civil-military organization that assists with development and governance below the national level. PRTs operate by combining security forces for protection with other military and civilian personnel for support, development, and governance into one cohesive team. PRTs can be led by either a military or DOS officer depending on the situation. DOD personnel comprise the security element and personnel from appropriate USG agencies comprise the civilian element. PRTs facilitate campaign plans in a collapsed state setting or the internal defense and development strategy in an HN.

c. It is vitally important that the PRT leadership ensure that the guidance provided by multiple agencies is carefully coordinated and mutually reinforcing, and that they report to higher HQ when there are inconsistencies or when difficulties occur. The PRT is an important “ground truth” check on interagency coordination at higher levels; if differing guidance cannot be integrated at the PRT level, it may indicate disjointed coordination or planning at the regional or national level. The PRT’s activities are developed through a common assessment of the situation and integrated implementation plan.

See Appendix F, “Provincial Reconstruction Team,” for a detailed discussion of PRTs.

d. Other civil-military teams of interagency experts can be formed to conduct specific missions such as agricultural, economic, and counterterrorism (CT). The field advance civilian teams (FACTs) described in the IMS are one example; JIATFs are another (see Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.”

10. Strategic Communication

a. SC is a whole-of-government effort involving much more than military activities, and therefore requires a high level of coordination and synchronization among interagency partners to achieve unity of effort. This is a continuous process that occurs at all levels and across the range of interagency operations in order to communicate with friends, general populaces, governments, adversaries, and domestic audiences alike, within statutory restrictions. The NSC is the overall mechanism by which SC is coordinated across the interagency community. CCDRs should provide input into theme, message, and story development and delivery through their CJCS representative to the NSC, in coordination with OSD. JFCs oversee execution of actions and communication of themes and messages.

b. Effective communication by the United States must build upon coordinated actions and information at all levels of the USG to maintain credibility and trust. This will be accomplished through an emphasis on accuracy, consistency, veracity, timeliness, and transparency in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building relationships that advance our national interests.

c. All departments and agencies throughout the USG share responsibility for effective SC. Efforts led by the DOS improve the integration of information as a vital instrument of national power. This includes developing the most effective processes for communication assessment and analysis, and for delivering information to key audiences, both internal and
external. The predominant military activities that support SC themes, messages, images, and actions are IO, PA, and DSPD. While CCDRs directly control assigned PA and IO assets, they do not direct those assets engaged in public diplomacy, which are the responsibility of DOS or the local US embassy. This highlights the interagency nature of SC.

d. The synchronized application of IO enables the JFC to affect and influence a situation by enabling joint forces freedom of operation across the information environment. While IO is focused on creating effects against adversaries for the JFC and preventing adversaries from doing the same to us, there is a broader set of DOD information activities that serve USG interests. For example, DOD may collaborate with other agencies for public diplomacy programs that directly support DOD’s mission.

e. What the media reports has a substantial influence on public attitudes about operations, which in turn can drive policy decisions. Most USG agencies have media engagement representatives dedicated to reporting their activities, each with multiple sources within the respective organization. DOD primary representatives for this effort are PA. At the slightest indication of a potential operation, the media will be asking for information and having a dramatic influence on the interagency, IGO, and NGO process—whether at the strategic decision-making level of the NSC or in the field as IGOs and NGOs vie for public attention and necessary charitable contributions. Responding to competing or contradictory news reports can divert valuable resources from planning and execution. **It is imperative for commanders and their staffs to consider the impact that information has on the operation and in the interagency process, to ensure that plans adequately address PA, and that there is substantial PA expertise involved in crisis planning for operations.**

The White House Office of Global Communications facilitates White House and interagency efforts to communicate with foreign audiences. The DOS Bureau of International Information Programs is the international communications service for the US foreign affairs community. Commanders and their staffs should plan for PA activities to function in coordination with national-level communication initiatives. All participating agencies and organizations need to establish and agree early in the planning process on procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, briefing, escorting, and transporting of media members and their equipment. Planners must include the development of PA guidance as part of the interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination before executing the plan. This guidance provides a common reference for all military and USG organizations. Clearly established responsibility for interaction with the media ensures, to the extent possible, the media hears a constant theme. Commanders should identify appropriate spokespersons, and plans should include when, how, and from which locations they will address media.

f. The need for clear and coordinated whole-of-government themes is paramount. Equally important is that the subordinate themes, messages, or story are appropriately delivered and tailored to the target audience. Cultural understanding and knowledge of the key communicators within the operational area are essential. For example, it is imperative to understand (or at least have an appreciation for) the values system of the target audience. This understanding enables a better connection with the people and gives us an advantage with which to discredit adversary IO. What worked in one environment will not necessarily work due to central versus decentralized government, different value systems, completely different media and communication means, and the sophistication level of the population.
With the greater dispersion of units and the decentralized nature of operations, more junior leaders will be engaging with the leaders in the indigenous population and with the media. Execution of SC includes synchronizing themes, messages, images and actions; selecting the proper delivery vehicle; optimizing types of media; and integrating beliefs and attitudes that influence the intended audience. Leaders should work to understand the media landscape, but also consider the impact of timing and tempo of any information released to the media, and how the information will be received by the intended and unintended audiences.

g. CCDRs and staffs should include SC considerations in planning for joint operations and in the interagency process. Each USAID country mission also has a communications and outreach strategy. Each of the communication activities under the direction of the CCDR have the ability to influence and inform key foreign audiences through words, images, and actions to foster understanding of US policy and advance US interests. Collaboratively, they can help shape the operational environment. CCDRs plan, execute, and assess these activities to implement security cooperation plans in support of US embassies’ information programs, public diplomacy, and PA programs directly supporting DOD missions. However, as for any mission or operation, close coordination with the CCDR’s legal office, and affected staff office (e.g., PA) or agency representative (e.g., DOS, DHS) is prudent.

h. DSPD are those activities and measures taken by the DOD components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG.

(1) DSPD ensures DOD supports a coherent and compelling DOS “diplomacy of deeds” in concert with other USG agencies. DOS maintains the lead for public diplomacy with the DOD in a supporting role. Through DSPD, DOD collaborates with other USG agencies for public diplomacy programs that directly support the DOD mission. It is critical that all DOD information activities be conducted in concert with the broader USG SC effort and support the NSS.

(2) DSPD can collaboratively shape the operational environment in support of USG information activities through security cooperation efforts.

(3) DSPD activities can also collaboratively shape the operational environment in support of USG information activities through efforts that may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian and civic assistance, FHA, counterdrug activities, and activities supporting global CT.

(4) DSPD activities should be documented in paragraph 3.b.(5) of annex Y, (Strategic Communication), of the joint operation plan.

(5) DSPD activities include:

(a) Identify target audiences, assign responsibility, and outline specific plans for communicating key public diplomacy programs and policies to target audiences.

(b) Identify partners with whom DOD works.
(c) Identify subject matter experts who can explain and advocate US policy.

(d) Identify workers who speak foreign languages and could translate/participate in interviews.

(e) Recommend envoys to advance public diplomacy efforts.

(f) Outline current activities and programs that can be linked to support global public diplomacy.

(g) Develop criteria to evaluate effectiveness.

For more information, refer to the US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication and Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication.
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Annex A Department of Agriculture
B Department of Commerce
C Department of Defense
D Department of Energy
E Department of Homeland Security
F Department of Justice
G Department of State
H Department of Transportation
I Department of the Treasury
J Central Intelligence Agency
K National Security Council
L Peace Corps
M United States Agency for International Development
N Environmental Protection Agency
O General Services Administration
P Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Q Department of Labor
R Department of Health and Human Services

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

1. This appendix provides descriptions of USG agencies with which DOD has frequent interaction or that a deployed joint force may encounter during operations.

2. The description of individual agencies is limited to those components that DOD may normally encounter. Issues of mutual interest and considerations are highlighted.

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

1. Overview

The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) (http://www.usda.gov) provides leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. Within the USDA, most day-to-day international responsibilities are exercised by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). FAS has the primary responsibility for USDA’s international activities—market development and agricultural trade agreements, food aid programs, and agricultural development assistance.

b. The agency is represented by agricultural counselors and attachés working with US embassies throughout the world. FAS has a global network of agricultural economists, marketing experts, negotiators, and other specialists that few organizations can equal. FAS agricultural counselors, attachés, trade officers, and locally employed FAS staff stationed in over 90 countries support US agricultural interests. In addition to agricultural affairs offices in US embassies, agricultural trade offices also have been established in a number of key markets and function as service centers for US exporters and foreign buyers seeking market information. FAS overseas offices serve as the USDA’s “eyes and ears” for monitoring international issues. FAS counselors and attachés work hand-in-hand with the country’s ambassador and other members of the country team. They work to ensure that agriculture’s market access, food aid, capacity building, biotechnology, and information gathering remain at the forefront.

3. Organizational Structure

For field coordination, initial contact should be made through the FAS agricultural counselor or attaché, or directly to FAS, Office of Capacity Building and Development (OCBD), if there is no agricultural office. To coordinate agricultural development and emergency technical assistance, the FAS/OCBD has major responsibilities. The Deputy Administrator for FAS/OCBD has the authority to accept funding and implementation responsibilities on behalf of the USDA technical agencies, and to assist in the implementation process. FAS/OCBD also coordinates USDA relations with a variety of governmental organizations, IGOs, and NGOs.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. FAS carries out a broad array of international training, technical assistance, and other collaborative activities with developing and transitional countries to facilitate trade and promote food security. In order to increase the benefits to developing nations participating in global agricultural markets, FAS offers numerous trade capacity-building programs.
b. FAS helps nations understand and prepare for meeting World Trade Organization requirements. FAS helps countries focus on the critical role science and technology can play in raising agricultural productivity in an environmentally sustainable way. This includes assistance in developing appropriate policies and institutions to facilitate research and technology transfer in order to increase incomes, reduce hunger, and improve nutrition.

c. The FAS Cochran Fellowship Program brings agriculturists to the United States to give them exposure to such areas as US economic policies, agricultural business practices and products, and biotechnology benefits and safeguards.

d. Around the globe, FAS responds to special needs as they arise, such as contributing to reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, including helping them develop appropriate agricultural institutions and policies.

5. Department of Defense/United States Department of Agriculture Coordination

USDA maintains surveillance of agricultural products and guards against potential plant or animal infestations entering the United States through global distribution ports of debarkation. All forces and materiel returning to the United States and its territories through the global distribution network require USDA inspection. Retrograde and return planning must include arrangements for cleaning and USDA inspection prior to shipment from the theater. Failure to do so may result in serious delays to the shipment and significant costs to the shipper Service. Coordination with USDA will be especially important in the event of exposure to a CBRN environment. USDA also provides ongoing agricultural technical assistance in many overseas areas and can develop coordinated DOD CMO and USDA projects for given countries or regions.
1. Overview

The mission of DOC is to promote job creation, economic growth, sustainable development, and improved living standards for all Americans by working in partnership with businesses, universities, communities, and workers to:

a. Build for a future and promote US competitiveness in the global marketplace, by strengthening and safeguarding the Nation’s economic infrastructure.

b. Keep America competitive with cutting-edge science and technology and an unrivaled information base.

c. Provide effective management and stewardship of our Nation’s resources and assets to ensure sustainable economic opportunities.

2. Capacity Building Roles

a. DOC is the primary USG agency for challenges and opportunities in the following areas:

   (1) Building government to government relationships with HN ministry level representatives from trade, industry, and economic development related ministries.

   (2) Resolving international trade issues.

   (3) Understanding the economic impact of weather and protecting maritime resources.

   (4) Advising HNs on government economic statistical reporting, census, and measures of standards and weights.

   (5) Developing private sector economic growth and job creation strategies.

   (6) Developing telecommunications policies to encourage infrastructure development and to leverage e-commerce, e-government, and educational goals.

b. DOC has an international presence through several different bureaus. The International Trade Administration (ITA) has Foreign Commercial Service officers in most embassies and has resident country desk expertise. The NOAA has worldwide weather monitoring capability and participates in a wide variety of international, scientific, technical, policy, and political forums. Internationally, NOAA supports and promotes national policies and interests in ecosystem-based management, climate change, earth observation, and weather forecasting and will seek to maximize the mutual benefits of international exchange with its global partners. NOAA also has Uniformed Services personnel who can provide liaison support to DOD. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Annex B to Appendix A

(NTIA) routinely participates in US delegations globally and works directly with foreign colleagues around the world, particularly with respect to information sharing and technical assistance.

c. The DOC has a number of intelligence and national security functions to include overseeing the export of sensitive technology, reviewing the Coastal Zone Management Act for national security impact, assessing the financial health and economic competitiveness of US industries that support defense capabilities and requirements under the Defense Production Act of 1950 and its amendments, and supporting measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

3. Organizational Structure

DOC has numerous agencies that are capable of supporting R&S operations in a GCC’s area:

a. ITA’s mission is to help assure the continued ability of US firms and workers to compete and win in the global marketplace and to create prosperity by strengthening the competitiveness of US industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring fair trade and compliance with trade laws and agreements.

b. NOAA is an environmental science agency whose mission is to understand and predict changes in the Earth’s environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine resources to meet the Nation’s economic, social, and environmental needs. The DOC works to advance the Nation’s role in the global economy through NOAA’s responsibilities for maintaining and improving the viability of marine and coastal ecosystems; delivering valuable weather, climate, and water information and services; understanding the processes and consequences of climate change; and supporting the global commerce and transportation upon which everyone depends.

c. Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) helps achieve economic US foreign policy goals in developing and post-conflict countries through commercial legal reforms accomplished with direct government-to-government technical assistance programs developed by CLDP in collaboration with the HN to affect meaningful and lasting change to the legal and judicial environment in those countries.

d. Economics and Statistics Administration’s mission is to: help maintain a sound federal statistical system that monitors and measures America’s rapidly changing economic and social arrangements; improve understanding of the key forces at work in the economy and the opportunities they create for improving the well-being of Americans; develop new ways to disseminate information using the most advanced technologies; and support the information and analytic needs of the DOC and the Executive Branch.

e. National Institute of Standards and Technology’s mission is to advance measurements and standards so that the next wave of innovation can peak and reach its full potential in the marketplace and in terms of practical application and social utility.
f. NTIA is responsible for the development of domestic and international telecommunications and information policy for the Executive Branch, for ensuring the efficient and effective use of the federal radio spectrum, and for performing state-of-the-art telecommunications research, engineering, and planning. In addition, Congress has assigned to NTIA significant roles in the transition to digital television, the development of public safety interoperable communications, and most recently the deployment of broadband services under the authority of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. NTIA’s policy, spectrum management, research, and grant programs support emerging technologies and uses of spectrum resources for affordable, alternative communications services. NTIA programs support an environment that fosters private sector innovation in telecommunications.

g. Bureau of Industry and Security’s mission is to advance US national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system and by promoting continued US strategic technology leadership.

h. US Patent and Trademark Office fosters innovation and competitiveness by providing high quality and timely examination of patent and trademark applications, guiding domestic and international intellectual property policy, and delivering intellectual property information and education worldwide.

i. Economic Development Administration’s (EDA) mission is to lead the federal economic development agenda by promoting innovation and competitiveness, preparing American regions for growth and success in the worldwide economy. EDA gives funding priority to investment proposals that support: long-term, coordinated, and collaborative regional economic development approaches; innovation and competitiveness; entrepreneurship; and connecting regional economies with the worldwide marketplace.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. ITA can conduct capacity building in the HN by encouraging economic reforms that foster private sector development, economic growth, and job creation. ITA has staff in most embassies. ITA comprises the following divisions:

(1) Market Access and Compliance Division is focused on obtaining market access for American firms and workers and achieving full compliance by foreign nations with trade agreements signed with the ITA and is a key player in promoting trade initiatives aimed at fostering economic growth and stability in a region. Creating market access for American firms in a region often means working to strengthen the overall business climate including the rule of law, thus clearing the way for improved bilateral and multilateral commercial relationships. Market Access and Compliance Division has been involved with reconstruction opportunity zones and reconstruction investment task forces in post-conflict and fragile countries. Market Access and Compliance Division houses in-country and issue experts whose primary focus is on gaining market access for American firms and workers.

(2) Manufacturing and Services Division has ITA’s industry sector expert desks where industry experts and economists perform strategic research and analysis in order to
shape and implement trade policy, create conditions that encourage innovation, lower the cost of doing business, and promote US economic growth.

(3) US and Foreign Commercial Service Division is the trade promotion unit of ITA that has a presence in most embassies. Services provided include business counseling, “matchmaking” with HN businesses, direct introduction to key decision makers, and advocacy assistance for US companies. It publishes “country commercial guides” for doing businesses in countries where they have a presence.

(4) Import Administration Division has a Subsidies Enforcement Office that consults with developing countries on ways that they can setup laws and establish certain economic policies that do not run afoul of World Trade Organization subsidies obligations. The Office of Policy conducts technical exchanges on trade remedies with trading partners, including developing countries. The purpose of these exchanges is to engage trade law authorities in other countries on the implementation and administration of trade law remedies, including antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Many of these exchanges are held with developing countries to promote familiarity with rule of law principles and transparency. Import Administration Division also has expertise on privatization of state-owned enterprises and market mechanisms. Import Administration Division has extensive knowledge of general business practices, including product flow (e.g., distribution chain/logistics), marketing practices, export strategies, international subsidy disciplines, and management and accounting practices, for a wide range of foreign industries, including both manufacturing and agriculture.

b. NOAA

(1) National Weather Service (NWS) provides weather, hydrologic, and climate forecasts and warnings for the United States, its territories, adjacent waters, and ocean areas for the protection of life and property and enhancement of the national economy. NWS data and products form a national information database and infrastructure which can be used by other governmental agencies, the private sector, the public, and the global community. Several specialized organizations within the NWS provide support to DOD.

(a) The Aviation Weather Center delivers consistent, timely, and accurate weather information for the world airspace system to enhance safe and efficient flight.

(b) The Climate Prediction Center delivers climate prediction, monitoring, and assessment products for timescales from weeks to years to the Nation and the global community for the protection of life and property, and the enhancement of the economy.

(c) The Hydro-meteorological Prediction Center provides nationwide forecast, guidance, and analysis products and services in support of the daily forecasting activities of the NWS and its customers, and tailored weather support to other government agencies in emergency and special situations.

(d) The Ocean Prediction Center (OPC) primary responsibility is the issuance of marine warnings, forecasts, and guidance in text and graphical format for maritime users. Also, the OPC quality controls marine observations globally from ship, buoy, and automated
marine observations for gross errors prior to being assimilated into computer model guidance. The OPC also provides forecast points in coordination with the National Hurricane Center. OPC originates and issues marine warnings and forecasts, continually monitors and analyzes maritime data, and provides guidance of marine atmospheric variables for purposes of protection of life and property, safety at sea, and enhancement of economic opportunity.

(e) The Space Weather Prediction Center delivers space weather products and services that meet the evolving needs of the Nation.

(f) The Storm Prediction Center exists solely to protect life and property of the American people through the issuance of timely and accurate watch and forecast products dealing with tornadoes, wildfires, and other hazardous meso-scale weather phenomena.

(g) The National Hurricane Center mission is to save lives, mitigate property loss, and improve economic efficiency by issuing the best watches, warnings, forecasts, and analyses of hazardous tropical weather, and by increasing understanding of these hazards. Through international agreement, the center has responsibility within the World Meteorological Organization to generate and coordinate tropical cyclone analysis and forecast products for twenty-four countries in the Americas, Caribbean, and for the waters of the North Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern North Pacific Ocean. Its products are distributed through a close working relationship with the media and emergency management communities.

(h) Central Pacific Hurricane Center issues tropical cyclone warnings, watches, advisories, discussions, and statements for all tropical cyclones in the Central Pacific from 140 Degrees West Longitude to the International Dateline.

(i) The NWS operates the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center, Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, and International Tsunami Information Center. The International Tsunami Information Center monitors and recommends operational improvements to the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, and by working with countries to increase tsunami awareness and preparedness, and promote education and research.

(j) NOAA shares weather and climate data with a number of countries and is actively involved in the Global Earth Observing System of Systems.

(2) National Marine Fisheries Service is responsible for the management and conservation of living marine resources within the US Exclusive Economic Zone. It also provides critical scientific and policy leadership in the international arena and plays a key role in the management of living marine resources in coastal areas under state jurisdiction. The service implements science-based conservation and management measures and actions aimed at sustaining long-term use and promoting the health of coastal and marine ecosystems. It is responsible for conducting environmental permitting or consultations related to the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Essential Fish Habitat under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and other statutes. It can also apply its expertise in restoration planning, technology, and
implementation to serious ecological challenges, including ecological risk assessment of contamination in key areas, recommend appropriate remedial actions, and provide training and capacity building.

(3) National Ocean Service provides science-based solutions through collaborative partnerships to address evolving economic, environmental, and social pressures on our oceans and coasts.

(a) The Center for Operational Oceanographic Products and Services collects and distributes oceanographic observations and predictions to ensure safe, efficient, and environmentally sound maritime commerce, sound coastal management, and recreation.

(b) The National Geodetic Survey develops and maintains a national system of positioning data needed for transportation, navigation, and communications systems; land record systems; mapping and charting efforts; and defense operations. The centerpiece of this system is the National Spatial Reference System. It is a national coordinate system that defines position (latitude, longitude, and elevation), distances, directions between points, strength of gravitational pull, and how these change over time.

(c) The Office of Coast Survey is the Nation’s nautical chart maker. It promotes safe navigation, meets the challenges of providing navigational products to deep draft ships and those that carry hazardous cargo, and provides data for geographic information system analysis, coastal stewardship, management decisions, shoreline change analysis, and marine boundary issues. It produces hydrographic surveys that support commercial shipping, fishing industry, USN and USCG operations, state and local governments, geographic information system users, and recreational boaters throughout the US.

(d) The Office of Response and Restoration provides scientific support to prepare for and respond to oil and chemical spills and marine debris. It determines injury to natural resources from contaminant releases; protects and restores marine and coastal habitat at hazardous waste sites; assesses the environmental impact of marine debris on our trust resources and navigational waterways; and applies scientific expertise to address environmental challenges on a local and regional level.

(4) The Office of Marine and Aviation Operations operates a wide variety of specialized aircraft and ships to complete NOAA’s environmental and scientific data-gathering missions. The Director of the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations is also the director of the NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps.

(a) NOAA’s Aircraft Operations Center located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida is the home to NOAA’s fleet of aircraft. These aircraft support NOAA’s atmospheric, marine resource, coastal mapping, and hurricane surveillance/research programs.

(b) NOAA’s ship fleet provides hydrographic survey, oceanographic and atmospheric research, and fisheries research vessels to support NOAA’s missions. The
vessels are home-ported in various locations throughout the US. The ships are managed by the Marine Operations Centers in Norfolk, Virginia, and Seattle, Washington.

(c) The NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps is one of seven Uniformed Services of the United States. The Service, consisting of approximately 320 commissioned officers, provides a cadre of professionals trained in engineering, earth sciences, oceanography, meteorology, fisheries science, and other related disciplines. Officers operate ships, fly aircraft, manage research projects, conduct diving operations, and serve in staff positions throughout NOAA. The Corps provides officers technically competent to assume positions of leadership and command in NOAA and DOC programs. Statutory authority exists to transfer NOAA Corps Officers to the Armed Forces during times of war or national emergency (Title 33, USC, Section 3061).

(5) The National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service is dedicated to providing timely access to global environmental data from satellites and other sources to promote, protect, and enhance the Nation’s economy, security, environment, and quality of life.

(a) The Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking program is an integral part of a worldwide SAR system. NOAA operates the system to detect and locate mariners, aviators, and recreational enthusiasts in distress almost anywhere in the world at anytime and in almost any condition. The US mission control center sends distress alerts to rescue coordination centers in the US operated by the USCG and United States Air Force (USAF) and other SAR authorities.

(b) The Office of Satellite Operations manages and directs the operation of NOAA’s environmental satellites and the acquisition of remotely sensed data. The Office has operational responsibility for the Satellite Operations Control Center at Suitland, Maryland, and the Command and Data Acquisition facilities at Wallops, Virginia, and Fairbanks, Alaska, to control the satellites, and to acquire their data. The Office of Satellite Operations supports the launch, activation, and evaluation of new satellites and the in-depth assessment of satellite and ground systems anomalies. In addition, it operates the polar orbiting satellites in the Defense Meteorology Satellite Program under a MOA between the USAF Space Command and the National Satellite and Information Service Integrated Program Office.

(c) The Cooperative Operational Processing Centers are the principal agents of the Interdepartmental Committee for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research. As such, they work to coordinate the open exchange of information concerning numerical weather and ocean prediction modeling efforts; data resources or problems; and atmospheric, oceanographic, and satellite products. It represents the three components of the USG most engaged in the coordination of the operational ingest and processing of environmental data; as well as data assimilation, analysis, and prediction efforts. The standing committee is comprised of members from NOAA, represented by the National Centers for Environmental Protection and NOAA’s Office of Satellite Data Processing and Distribution; the USN represented by the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center and the Naval Oceanographic Office; and the USAF represented by the USAF Weather Agency.
c. CLDP has extensive capacity development initiatives in developing regions. CLDP has partnered with several agencies to conduct programs. CLDP uniquely provides government-to-government, regulator-to-regulator technical assistance across a broad spectrum of commercial law issues. CLDP programming is demand driven, led by foreign language fluent attorneys and responds to the needs of key legislators and regulators to enable them to reach their economic reform goals. CLDP programs include lawmakers, regulators, judges, lawyers, and educators from around the world. Examples of technical assistance programs conducted are intellectual property protection, commercial law consultations, model investment law, alternative dispute resolution, judicial training and court management, model regional ethics code, and promoting doing business with the US seminars.

d. **Economics and Statistics Administration**

   (1) The Bureau of Economic Analysis produces economic accounts statistics that enable government and business decision makers, researchers, and the American public to follow and understand the performance of the Nation’s economy. It has provided advice and training for economists and statisticians from HNs on topics related to national economic accounting such as measures of gross domestic product.

   (2) The US Census Bureau has aided HNs in developing and ensuring sound statistical practices that include data collection on the Nation’s people and its economy. Technical assistance has included assisting countries in preparing for a national census.

e. The National Institute of Standards and Technology promotes US innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life. The agency’s technical contributions open the way to progress in areas ranging from nano-technology and solar energy to fire protection, HS protection, and cybersecurity. In addition, it is an integral component of the global trading system. Along with its counterpart national measurement institutes in other countries, it forms the foundation of the international measurement system. The institute can coordinate internally and with the American National Standards Institute as the primary interface for the US private sector standards and conformity assessment systems to identify US based standards developers that have expertise and/or standards to contribute to the reconstruction effort, particularly in the building and construction sectors.

f. NTIA serves as the President’s principal advisor on telecommunications and information/communications policies. NTIA manages the federal use of the telecommunications spectrum; performs cutting-edge telecommunications research and engineering, including resolving technical telecommunications issues for USG and private sector; and administers infrastructure and public telecommunications facilities grants. The Office of International Affairs develops and implements policies to enhance US companies’ ability to compete globally in the information and communication technology sectors. In consultation with USG agencies and the private sector, the office participates in international and regional forums to promote policies that open information and communication technology markets and encourage competition. NTIA is an active partner in telecommunications policy and economic development activities in many emerging markets.
NTIA serves on the board and provides instructors for the US Telecommunications Training Institute. NTIA serves on the US delegation with DOS and the Federal Communications Commission to the International Telecommunication Union, discussing issues of global importance. NTIA serves on US delegations to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, which oversees its provisioning of life-line connectivity to developing countries. NTIA is also active on telecommunications policy development projects in the International Telecommunication Union’s Development sector, and serves on the US delegation to the quadrennial assembly. NTIA can assist HNs in the drafting of regulations for an independent telecommunications regulator, establishing universal service or access goals, understanding issues relating to Internet governance, and building capacity in cybersecurity. NTIA advises HNs in granting of wireless service licenses.

g. The **Bureau of Industry and Security** can send export control professionals to the HN to assist in the development of an effective export control system. It works with the HN on its compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention. It will also create expedited licensing processes or amend its regulations to allow other USG agencies to export dual-use items to the HN with minimal delays, particularly if the destination is subject to an embargo. The bureau has conducted export control training for HNs.

h. **US Patent and Trademark Office** administers the patent and trademark laws of the US and promotes improved protection for intellectual property rights (patents, trademarks, copyrights, designs, plant varieties, trade secrets, etc.) worldwide. Improved intellectual property systems serve as a tool for economic, cultural, and social development and stimulate domestic and foreign investment and technology transfer. In support of the US Trade Representative and other USG agencies, it assists in the negotiation of intellectual property rights provisions of free trade and other international agreements. The office also coordinates, organizes, and participates in intellectual property rights training, trade capacity building, and technical assistance programs throughout the world to aid the development of effective legal regimes. The office’s Global Intellectual Property Academy conducts approximately 35 domestic-based educational programs annually for foreign government officials responsible for national intellectual property office administration, copyright administration, intellectual property and trade policy, law enforcement, and/or judicial administration.

i. **EDA** was established to generate jobs, help retain existing jobs, and stimulate industrial and commercial growth in economically distressed areas of the US. In fulfilling its mission, EDA is guided by the basic principle that distressed communities must be empowered to develop and implement their own economic development and revitalization strategies. EDA works in partnership with state and local governments, regional economic development districts, public and private nonprofit organizations, and Indian Tribes. EDA helps distressed communities address problems associated with long-term economic distress, as well as sudden and severe economic dislocations including recovering from the economic impacts of natural disasters, the closure of military installations and other federal facilities, changing trade patterns, and the depletion of natural resources.
5. Interagency Relationships

a. DOC is assigned as the support agency for several ESFs within the NRF. The type of assistance provided by DOC is determined by the nature of the emergency.

b. DOC is a participant in the whole-of-government approach to R&S operations led by S/CRS. DOC, along with other executive agencies, is identifying its R&S capabilities, bureau expertise, and potential resources that can be contributed to an integrated USG R&S response.

c. DOC provides ongoing technical assistance in many countries and can develop coordinated DOD CMO and DOC projects for given countries or regions. NOAA is engaged with the USN in the Global Fleet Station pilot program, SAR satellite aided tracking rescue coordination centers with the USN and USAF, and providing scientific support to the USCG and USN on oil spill cleanup and recovery for both inland and coastal areas. EDA has developed economic recovery strategies for communities impacted by base closings.

d. DOC has demonstrated its ability to support post-conflict operations through its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan:

(1) Iraq/Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force.


(3) Advisors to the Coalition Provisional Authority advising the transitional Iraqi government on free market reforms. The Office of General Counsel provided assistance that liberalized Iraq’s rules on foreign investment. The US Patent and Trademark Office advised on the amendments made to Iraqi laws on trademarks, patents, and copyrights. NTIA advised on establishing an independent telecommunications regulator, the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission. NTIA advised on the licensing of three wireless service operators in Iraq leading to the first major foreign investment in Iraq.

(4) ITA continues to develop trade policy and capacity-building initiatives for Iraq and Afghanistan. CLDP is providing technical assistance to Iraqi authorities on laws and regulations governing Iraq’s oil and gas sector to ensure that they comply with international legal standards. Office of General Counsel continues to advise an NSC-led interagency lawyers group on economic legal issues of Iraq’s economic transformation.

e. DOC has significant capacity building capabilities that have been and can be used to promote “smart power” when working with HNs in the pursuit of national security objectives.

f. DOD use of DOC capacity building efforts may be on a reimbursable basis.
Annex C to Appendix A
Department of Defense

1. Overview

   a. The mission of DOD is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.

   b. The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

   a. As prescribed by higher authority, DOD will maintain and employ Armed Forces to fulfill the following aims:

      (1) Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
      
      (2) Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests.
      
      (3) Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

   b. The President of the United States. The President exercises authority and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through SecDef, to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

   c. Secretary of Defense. SecDef is the principal assistant to the President for all DOD matters, with authority, direction, and control over the entire DOD.

   d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and SecDef. CJCS functions under the authority, direction, and control of SecDef, transmits communications between SecDef and CCDRs, and oversees activities of CCDRs as directed by SecDef.

   e. The Military Departments. The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the President through SecDef to the Secretaries. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service component commanders assigned to the combatant commands and to the commanders of forces not assigned to the combatant commands. This administrative control provides for the preparation of military forces and their administration and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically assigned by SecDef to another DOD component.
f. **Combatant Commanders.** CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.

### 3. Organizational Structure

a. DOD is composed of the OSD, the JCS and JS, the Military Departments and the Services within those Military Departments, the unified combatant commands, the defense agencies and DOD field activities, and other offices, agencies, activities, and commands that may be established or designated by law or by the President or SecDef.

b. **Office of the Secretary of Defense.** OSD is the principal staff element in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities.

c. **Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The JCS includes the CJCS, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The collective body of the JCS is headed by the CJCS (or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the CJCS’s absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. CJCS is the principal military advisor. The other members of the JCS are military advisors to the President, the NSC, and SecDef. JS assists the CJCS in his responsibilities to assist the President with national strategic direction and unified operation of the Armed Forces. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the CJCS, JS also assists other members of the JCS in carrying out their responsibilities.

d. **Military Departments.** The Military Departments are the Departments of the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), and Air Force. Each Military Department is separately organized under a civilian Secretary, who supervises the Chief (or Chiefs) of the Service in matters of a Service nature. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control (through the individual Chiefs of the Services) of their forces not specifically assigned to CCDRs. The Military Departments are responsible for training, organizing, providing, and equipping forces for assignment to combatant commands.

e. **Unified Combatant Commands.** A unified combatant command has a broad continuing mission under a single commander and is composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

f. **Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities.** These organizations provide support and services in specific functional areas to the unified combatant commands and the rest of the DOD.

(1) The DOD agencies perform selected support and service functions on a DOD-wide basis. DOD agencies that are assigned wartime support missions are designated as combat support agencies.
(2) DOD field activities are established to perform selected support and service functions of a more limited scope than DOD agencies.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending the United States against all adversaries and serving the Nation as a bulwark and the guarantors of its security and independence. When called to action, the Armed Forces support and defend national interests worldwide. The Armed Forces embody the highest values and standards of American society and the profession of arms. The Armed Forces fulfill their roles, missions, and functions within the American system of civil-military relations.

b. The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the range of military operations. These operations may take place with the military forces of multinational partners, US and foreign government agencies, state and local government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. The challenges are best met when the unified action of the Armed Forces elicits the maximum contribution from each Service and DOD agency and their unique but complementary capabilities. The resulting synergy from their synchronized and integrated action is a direct reflection of those capabilities.

c. Joint warfare is team warfare. Effective integration of joint forces exposes no weak points or seams to an adversary. Joint forces rapidly and efficiently find and exploit the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and other weak points as they contribute most to mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. JFCs may choose the capabilities they need from the forces at their disposal.

d. As the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their adherence to US values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms. The United States wields the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations.

(1) Integrity is our foremost value. It is the cornerstone for building trust. American Service men and women must be able to rely on each other, regardless of the challenge at hand; they must individually and collectively say what they mean and do what they say. Integrity inspires confidence in others to carry out assigned tasks and is a fundamental requirement for building effective teams.

(2) Competence is at the core of the profession of arms and of the relationship of the profession with the American people. Competent performance includes both the technical competence to perform the relevant task to standard as well as the ability to integrate that skill with others according to joint doctrine. The American people and multinational partners expect US military competence in every aspect of warfare. Service men and women deserve no less from those who lead them into battle. Successful joint action relies on each of the Services to deliver trained and ready, competent and confident forces and leaders, able to fight decisively under JFCs. For the
dedicated professional, building Service competence is an intense, lifelong affair. Moreover, many serve in assignments requiring additional competency in joint skills, and all members of the Armed Forces must understand their fellow Services to the extent required for effective operations. Those who will lead joint operations must develop skill in integrating forces into smoothly functioning joint teams.

(3) **Physical courage**, throughout the history, has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, whose courage knows no boundaries. Even in warfare characterized by advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for teamwork.

(4) **Moral courage** is also essential in military operations. This includes the willingness to stand up for what one believes to be right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve **risk taking** and **tenacity**: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties. Competence is an essential foundation for moral courage. Competence separates the professional from the foolhardy. Military power must be wielded in an unimpeachable moral fashion, with respect for human rights and adherence to the Geneva Conventions. This morality should not be a matter of legality, but of conscience. Moral behavior is essential for gaining and maintaining the positive worldwide reputation of American fighting men and women as well as the confidence and support of the American people, a basic source of American military strength.

(5) **Teamwork** is the cooperative effort by the members of a group to achieve common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States—every military organization to the lowest level—are a team. Deterring adversaries, and when necessary, winning the Nation’s wars are the team’s common goals. Americans respond to and respect teamwork as an important value. This societal approval provides to the Armed Forces of the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams.

(a) **Trust and confidence** are central to military unity of effort. A highly effective team is based on the team members having trust and confidence in each other. This trust does not result from good feelings or devout wishes. Trust is based on the mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team. Trust and confidence within a joint force are built the same way as within a Service tactical unit, by hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together.

(b) Successful teamwork requires **delegation of authority** commensurate with responsibility. This is a necessary part of building and maintaining the trust based on competence that characterizes the successful team. Over supervision disrupts teamwork. Delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where Service expertise is an essential building block.
(c) Successful teamwork also requires cooperation. While this aspect of teamwork can be at tension with competition and both are central human characteristics, the nature of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation within the team in order to compete successfully with the adversary. Higher echelons should never have to mandate cooperation. Cooperation requires team players and the willingness to share credit with all team members.

(6) When the members of the Armed Forces of the United States internalize and embody these values of joint warfare, their attitude about joint warfighting produces a synergy that multiplies the effects of their individual actions. A freely developed cooperative attitude is the key to the most productive integration of all force competencies and capabilities, and to the effective prosecution of the campaign.

5. Interagency Relationships

DOD has a major role in the interagency arena. It interacts with almost every government agency and department and is involved in interagency coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. SecDef is a member of the NSC, and CJCS serves as an advisor to the NSC. DOD is significantly involved in the entire NSC interagency process, with representatives (i.e., OUSD[P] and JS) assigned to all NSC subgroups (i.e., NSC/PC and NSC/DC) and most NSC/IPCs.
1. Overview

The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) (http://www.energy.gov) overarching mission is to advance the national, economic, and energy security of the United States; to promote scientific and technological innovation in support of that mission; and to ensure the environmental cleanup of the national nuclear weapons complex. DOE’s strategic goals to achieve the mission are designed to deliver results along five strategic themes.

a. **Energy Security:** Promoting America’s energy security through reliable, clean, and affordable energy.

b. **Nuclear Security:** Ensuring America’s nuclear security.

c. **Scientific Discovery and Innovation:** Strengthening US scientific discovery, economic competitiveness, and improving quality of life through innovations in science and technology.

d. **Environmental Responsibility:** Protecting the environment by providing a responsible resolution to the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production.

e. **Management Excellence:** Enabling the mission through sound management.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

DOE brought together not only most of the government’s energy programs, but also science and technology programs and defense responsibilities that included the design, construction, and testing of nuclear weapons. A principal DOE mission assigned by the NRF is maintaining continuous and reliable energy supplies for the United States through preventive measures and restoration and recovery actions.

3. Organizational Structure

a. The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence provides the Secretary, his staff, and other policymakers within DOE timely, technical intelligence analyses on all aspects of foreign nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and energy issues worldwide.

b. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a separately organized agency within DOE responsible for the management and security of the Nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Additionally, NNSA federal agents provide safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and components and special nuclear materials along with other missions supporting national security.

(1) The NNSA’s national security missions are:
(a) To enhance United States national security through the military application of nuclear energy;

(b) To maintain and enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test, in order to meet national security requirements;

(c) To provide the USN with safe, militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and to ensure the safe and reliable operation of those plants;

(d) To promote international nuclear safety and nonproliferation;

(e) To reduce global danger from WMD; and

(f) To support national leadership in science and technology.

(2) Defense Programs. One of the primary missions of NNSA is to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA, through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures that the US nuclear arsenal meets the country’s national security requirements and continues to serve its essential deterrence role. In partnership with the DOD, NNSA’s Defense Programs provides the research, development, secure transportation, and production activities necessary to support the US nuclear weapons stockpile. Robust security protects weapons and weapons material both at each facility and through securely transporting materials and weapons between facilities and military locations.

(3) Nuclear Nonproliferation. One of the gravest threats the United States and the international community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other WMD. Their continued pursuit of these weapons, along with related technologies, equipment, and expertise, increases the urgency of NNSA’s efforts to: detect nuclear and radiological materials, and WMD-related equipment; secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials; and dispose of surplus weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials. NNSA, through its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, works closely with a wide range of international partners, key US federal agencies, the US national laboratories, and the private sector to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material, and related WMD technology and expertise.

(a) Detect. NNSA is taking steps to deter and detect illicit transfers of weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment, prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear weapons technology and develop cutting-edge nuclear detection technologies. NNSA’s work enhances the capabilities of our foreign partners to interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials by deploying radiation detection systems at high-risk border crossings, airports, and seaports. NNSA is particularly concerned that terrorists could use the global maritime shipping network to smuggle nuclear and radiological materials or warheads. By installing radiation detection systems at major seaports throughout the world, NNSA strengthens the detection and interdiction capabilities of our partner countries. NNSA also provides export control and WMD-awareness training.
to both domestic and foreign export control and customs officials, which strengthens the ability to deter and detect WMD-related technology transfers. The tools that NNSA provides to partnering countries help prepare officials to recognize and identify dangerous materials and technologies that could be diverted for use against the United States and its allies. In the area of nuclear detonation detection, NNSA provides operational hardware and software for national security systems.

(b) Secure. Preventing terrorist access to WMD remains one of NNSA’s highest priorities. NNSA helps to keep the world’s most dangerous materials out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people by securing nuclear weapons and nuclear and radiological materials at their source, and improving security practices around the world. NNSA’s weapons and materials security programs have focused principally on Russia. NNSA will continue work at sites recently added to the program, and will continue to work cooperatively with Russia to ensure the long-term sustainability of the systems and procedures already in place. NNSA is working with other partners to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials in other parts of the world and to strengthen security at civil nuclear and radiological facilities. NNSA converts research reactors around the world from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel and returns highly enriched uranium to the country of origin, either the US or Russia. Further, NNSA is also working to remove or secure significant quantities of excess, vulnerable radiological materials that exist worldwide and could be used to make a dirty bomb.

(c) Dispose. An integral part of NNSA’s strategy to meet nonproliferation challenges has been to eliminate dangerous material altogether by encouraging other states to stop producing it, and to dispose of excess nuclear and radiological material.

(4) Countering Nuclear Terrorism and Trafficking. The convergence of heightened terrorist activities and the ease of moving materials, technology, and information across borders have made the potential for terrorism involving WMD the most serious threat facing the United States and the international community as a whole. Preventing WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists is a top national security priority. NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs reflect the need to protect the United States and its allies from this threat.

(5) Border and Port Security. NNSA strengthens the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system. NNSA works collaboratively with foreign partners to equip border crossings, airports, and seaports with radiation detection equipment. NNSA also provides training in the use of the systems for appropriate law enforcement officials and initial system sustainability support as the host government assumes operational responsibility for the equipment.

(6) Interdiction. NNSA provides real-time technical and policy support for efforts by the USG to facilitate a wide range of counterproliferation and CT interdiction options. NNSA’s Nonproliferation and International Security program has developed a comprehensive capability to extract actionable information dealing with proliferation networks, technology transfers, and the involvement of entities and persons of interest in
proliferation and terrorism. The backbone of this capability is comprised of various customized electronic database applications that exploit information and provide rapid, real-time technical support to the USG on illicit transfers of proliferation-sensitive technology and commodities; technology assessments at NNSA, the DOE, and US industry; updates on proliferation network off-shoots; support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) role of investigating proliferation networks; and evaluation of the impact of proliferation networks on global safeguards and export controls systems.

(7) **Controlling WMD Materials and Expertise.** Keeping WMD out of the hands of state and non-state actors requires a coordinated effort on the part of suppliers of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment, and technologies. NNSA prevents and counters WMD proliferation by strengthening export control systems in other countries and transitioning WMD expertise and infrastructure in partner countries to peaceful purposes.

(8) **Emergency Operations.** NNSA ensures that capabilities are in place to respond to any NNSA and DOE facility emergency. It is also the Nation’s premier responder to any nuclear or radiological incident within the United States or abroad and provides operational planning and training to counter both domestic and international nuclear terrorism.

(a) NNSA houses the nuclear incident team (NIT), which is responsible for deploying assets at the request of coordinating agencies in response to a nuclear or radiological incident. The NIT’s mission is to coordinate NNSA assets for deployment, continually monitor deployment activities, and provide situational awareness of activities to NNSA management. The NIT is staffed and fully operational within two hours of notification.

(b) NNSA’s nuclear/radiological advisory team (NRAT) provides an emergency response capability for on-scene scientific and technical advice for both domestic and international nuclear or radiological incidents. The NRAT’s mission is to provide nuclear and radiological expert advice to the coordinating agency in charge of the radiological or nuclear incident. The NRAT is the NNSA part of the interagency advisory team that deploys with the Domestic Emergency Support Team in support of the FBI, or the foreign emergency support team when deployed under the auspices of the DOS. The NRAT is also the primary NNSA team for conducting sophisticated radiological search and identification operations aboard ships at sea.

(9) **Responding to Emergencies.** NNSA protects the public, environment, and emergency responders from both terrorist and non-terrorist events by providing a responsive, flexible, efficient, and effective radiological emergency response framework and capability for the Nation. When the need arises, NNSA is prepared to respond immediately to any type of nuclear or radiological accident or incident. NNSA provides technical support to the DHS, DOJ, DOS, and DOD for nuclear terrorism events and domestic nuclear weapon accidents and incidents. The NNSA emergency response assets also provide support to nuclear site and facility accidents and incidents. The goal of the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Response program is to respond to and mitigate nuclear and radiological incidents worldwide. This is accomplished through the seven unique emergency response assets.
These assets encompass four core competencies: core knowledge of US nuclear weapons, “dirty bombs” and crude nuclear devices; core knowledge of use and interpretation of specialized radiation detection equipment; core technical operations; and core technical support requirements. The seven emergency response assets follow:

(a) The Aerial Measuring System characterizes ground-deposited radiation from aerial platforms. These platforms include fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircrafts with radiological measuring equipment, computer analysis of aerial measurements, and equipment to locate lost radioactive sources, conduct aerial surveys, or map large areas of contamination.

(b) The Accident Response Group provides technical guidance and responds to US nuclear weapons accidents. The team assists in assessing weapons damage and risk, and in developing and implementing procedures for safe weapon recovery, packaging, transportation, and disposal of damaged weapons.

(c) National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC). The NARAC’s mission is to provide timely and accurate real-time assessment advisories to emergency managers for rapid decision making during an emergency response involving a CBRN release. The NARAC’s computer-based system provides realistic plots and maps of radiation dose and exposure assessments, and estimates the amount of radiation contaminants released into the environment. For sites with NARAC supported direct interactive services, radiation contamination plots can be provided as soon as five minutes after the incident information is received. For nonsupported sites, the time to deliver radiation contamination plots is between approximately one and two hours.

(d) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). FRMAC is an interagency entity that coordinates federal offsite radiological monitoring and assessment activities for nuclear accidents or incidents. FRMAC is responsible for providing a single source of compiled, quality controlled monitoring and assessment data to the LFA involved in the incident response.

(e) Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). RAP provides advice and radiological assistance for incidents involving radioactive materials that pose a threat to the public health and safety or the environment. RAP can provide field deployable teams of health physics professionals equipped to conduct radiological search, monitoring, and assessment activities. The RAP mission is to provide first response radiological assistance to protect the health and safety of the general public and the environment. They assist federal, state, tribal, and local agencies in the detection, identification, analysis, and response to events involving the release of radiological materials in the environment. The primary responsibility for the incident remains with the owner of the radioactive material.

(f) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). REAC/TS provides medical advice, specialized training, and onsite assistance for the treatment of all types of radiation exposure accidents. REAC/TS’s mission is to maintain 24-hour response operations to provide assistance and/or deploy personnel and equipment for provision of direct medical care in support of a radiological emergency.
(g) Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). NEST provides technical assistance to a primary agency to deal with incidents, including terrorist threats, which involve the use of nuclear materials. NEST has been structured to address threats by domestic and foreign terrorists that may have the will and means to employ WMD. NEST would assist in the identification, characterization, rendering safe, and final disposition of any nuclear weapon or radioactive device.

1. The NEST mission is to provide specialized technical expertise to the federal response in resolving nuclear or radiological terrorist incidents. This expertise is provided by well-trained personnel who form specialized response teams to work in coordination with teams from other federal agencies to resolve a nuclear terrorist crisis. The NEST specialized response teams include coordination, liaison, advisory teams, search teams, technical operations teams, and planning support teams. These teams have been structured to provide a rapid, flexible response and to seamlessly integrate with the LFA or the DOD to help resolve all technical aspects of the crisis.

2. NEST capabilities include search and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in support of render safe procedures, and packaging for transport to final disposition. NEST capabilities are drawn from the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Response teams vary in size from a five person technical advisory team to a tailored deployment of dozens of searchers and scientists who can locate and then conduct or support technical operations on a suspected nuclear device. NEST personnel and equipment are ready to deploy worldwide at all times.

3. Because a nuclear terrorist incident could arise with little or no warning, NEST response teams are prepared to deploy rapidly upon notification. DOE HQ directs all response team activations and deployments after coordination with other concerned agencies. This interagency process may involve strict operational security to protect classified or sensitive details of the response operation. The FBI or DOS coordinates USG assistance to support the resolution of the crisis with state and local officials or foreign governments. A NRAT deploys as part of an FBI led domestic emergency support team or as part of a DOS led foreign emergency support team for an incident overseas to provide nuclear scientific and technical advice to the LFA. A senior energy official, responsible for coordinating activities with the LFA, will deploy with the NRAT.

(h) In addition to the above seven assets, a “home team” capability called Triage provides 24/7 on-call analysis support to first-response teams. Typical response times are 10 minutes to begin an analysis and 30-60 minutes for an answer back to the field. This capability not only minimizes the cost of a false alarm, but also accurately identifies real threats so that, if needed, additional resources can be appropriately utilized.

(10) **Counterterrorism.** NNSA’s Nuclear CT Program, in concert with other offices in the DOE, as well as other domestic and international government agencies, develops and implements preemptive strategies to eliminate terrorist improvised nuclear device threats through assessment of vulnerabilities and through identification and
development of appropriate protective measures. The Nuclear CT Program contributes to this effort by:

(a) Anticipating and preventing nonessential dissemination of improvised nuclear device design information;

(b) Identifying and characterizing potential improvised nuclear device material and designs that pose a threat to US citizens, assets, and infrastructure;

(c) Characterizing the improvised nuclear device threat through intelligence and material security analysis;

(d) Identifying signatures of sensitive improvised nuclear device designs and developing technologies to detect and characterize these threats; and

(e) Identifying vulnerabilities in sensitive improvised nuclear device designs and developing technologies for render-safe and consequence mitigation.

(11) Engaging the International Community. NNSA engages the international community by working with more than 60 foreign governments and 10 IGOs, plus several regional organizations, to improve nuclear emergency management systems worldwide. It provides direct emergency management assistance or participates and collaborates to provide effective early warning and notification, and consistent emergency plans and procedures worldwide. NNSA sponsors cooperation and projects aimed at harmonizing differences between worldwide emergency plans, procedures, systems, and capabilities.
1. Overview

The DHS’s mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America; to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation; and to secure US national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade. While DHS was created to secure the United States against those who seek to disrupt the American way of life, its charter also includes preparation for and response to all hazards and disasters (http://www.dhs.gov).

2. Department of Homeland Security Organization

DHS has several components, which interact with DOD. Its structure is outlined at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm.

   a. The Directorate for National Protection and Programs works to advance DHS’s risk-reduction mission. Reducing risk requires an integrated approach that encompasses both physical and virtual threats and their associated human elements. Within the directorate, four divisions impact on DOD.

      (1) The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications has the mission of assuring the security, resiliency, and reliability of the Nation’s cyberspace and communications infrastructure.

      (2) The Office of Infrastructure Protection leads the coordinated national effort to reduce risk to US critical infrastructures and key resources posed by acts of terrorism. In doing so, DHS increases the Nation’s level of preparedness and the ability to respond and quickly recover in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.

      (3) The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs has the mission of promoting an integrated national approach to HS by ensuring, coordinating, and advancing federal interaction with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.

      (4) The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is a federal LEA that provides integrated security and law enforcement services to federally owned and leased buildings, facilities, properties, and other assets. The FPS mission is to render federal properties safe and secure for federal employees, officials, and visitors in a professional and cost effective manner by deploying a highly trained and multi-disciplined police force. As the federal agency charged with protecting and delivering integrated law enforcement and security services to facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA), FPS employs 1,225 federal staff (including 900 law enforcement security officers, criminal investigators, police officers, and support personnel) and 15,000 contract guard staff to secure over 9,000 buildings and safeguard their occupants. FPS provides comprehensive coverage for these facilities nationwide.
b. The Office of Health Affairs coordinates all medical activities of DHS to ensure appropriate preparation for and response to incidents having medical significance. Within the office, the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense office integrates the bio-monitoring activities of USG departments including biosurveillance, aerosol detection, clinical syndrome detection, mailroom observation, and suspicious substance management. In conjunction with the Science and Technology Directorate, the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense office leads responsibilities for veterinary and agro-defense activities, covering animal and zoonotic diseases and agricultural security issues related to livestock, food, and water.

c. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is a member of the national IC and ensures that information related to HS threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the full spectrum of HS customers in DHS, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private sector and in the IC. It works closely with DHS component intelligence organizations as well as state, local, tribal, and private sector entities to ensure nontraditional streams of information are fused with traditional IC sources to provide a complete assessment of threats to the Nation. Many states and larger cities have created fusion centers, which provide state and local officials with situational awareness. DHS provides personnel and tools to the fusion centers to enable the National Fusion Center Network. The office has five analytic thrusts, aligned with the principal threats to the homeland addressed by DHS.

(1) Threats related to border security.

(2) Threat of radicalization and extremism.

(3) Threats from particular groups entering the United States.

(4) Threats to the homeland’s critical infrastructure and key resources.

(5) WMD and health threats.

d. The Office of Operations Coordination is responsible for monitoring the security of the United States on a daily basis and coordinating activities within DHS and with governors, HS advisors, law enforcement partners, and critical infrastructure operators in all 50 states and more than 50 major urban areas nationwide. The Office works to deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts by coordinating the work of federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector partners and by collecting and fusing information from a variety of sources. The Office is responsible for:

(1) Conducting joint operations across all organizational elements;

(2) Coordinating activities related to incident management;

(3) Employing all DHS resources to translate intelligence and policy into action; and
(4) Overseeing the National Operations Center which collects and fuses information from more than 35 federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector agencies.

e. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office works to enhance the nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments and the private sector and to ensure a coordinated response to such threats. It works to improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.

3. Operational Components

a. United States Coast Guard. The USCG (http://www.uscg.mil) is the Nation’s primary maritime operating agency with resources organized, trained, and equipped to be “multi-mission capable.” The USCG is unique as it is a branch of the Armed Forces at all times and an agency within DHS. The USCG may also operate under the Department of the Navy during time of war or when directed by the President. The USCG protects the public, the environment, and US economic interests—in the Nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support national security. There are two senior operational commanders in the Atlantic Area (Portsmouth, Virginia) and Pacific Area (Alameda, California). Under these two commanders are nine district offices (operational commanders for their geographic areas) and two maintenance and logistics commands (Atlantic and Pacific). USCG operational units include: 25 air stations (with over 200 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft), three Polar Class icebreakers, 12 high endurance cutters, 28 medium endurance cutters, over 100 - 110 foot and 87 foot patrol boats, approximately 90 other types of cutters (vessels over 65 feet in length, including buoy tenders), and over 1,400 boats (vessels less than 65 feet in length). Additionally, the USCG manages the National Pollution Funds Center in Arlington, Virginia; the National Strike Force Coordination Center in Elizabeth City, North Carolina; and the USCG Academy in New London, Connecticut. The USCG’s major roles in support of national security are: maritime safety, maritime law enforcement, maritime environmental protection, ports, waterways, and coastal security, and national defense. Through an agreement between DOD and DHS, the USCG’s unique defense capabilities in support of the National Military Strategy include: maritime interception operations; deployed port operations, security and defense; environmental defense operations, and peacetime military operations. Interagency agreements between the USCG and other USG agencies are listed in Commandant, USCG, Instruction P5850.2, Legal Authorities. The USCG’s roles include the following:

(1) Naval, coastal, and harbor defense.

(2) Port security, including the deployment of port security units, cutters, and patrol boats for overseas military operations to perform the port and harbor security mission (waterside patrols, vessel escort, surveillance, and interdiction).
(3) Ports, waterways, and coastal security for the protection of the US maritime domain and the US Marine Transportation System and those who live, work, or recreate near them; the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, or subversive acts; and response to and recovery from those that do occur.

(4) **Conduct Alien Migrant Interdiction and Counterdrug Operations.** The USCG has broad maritime law enforcement authority, including the power to stop, board, investigate, inspect, examine, search, and seize any vessel subject to US jurisdiction wherever located. USCG law enforcement officers are also officers of the customs and are, therefore, able to stop persons and vessels to conduct a warrantless border search at the US border or its functional equivalent. Operations can be conducted in waters subject to US jurisdiction, foreign waters with HN consent, and in international waters.

(5) Living Marine Resources Enforcement within the Nation’s EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] and conservation and management of living marine resources and their environments, including protected species, protected areas, and critical habitats.

(6) SAR operations.

(7) Flood relief and removal of hazards to navigation.

(8) Enforcement of applicable federal laws and treaties and other international agreements, including maritime interception operations to enforce sanctions.

(9) Investigation of suspected violations of such laws and international agreements.

(10) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy as the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction.

(11) Enforcement of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Title 33, USC, Section 1251) and various other laws relating to the protection of the marine environment that prohibit foreign vessels from entering US waters unless they have insurance release for delivery or other guarantees that potential pollution liability for cleanup and damages will be met.

(12) Provision of a National Response Center to receive reports of terrorism and oil and hazardous substance spills, investigate spills, initiate subsequent civil penalty actions, and coordinate federally funded spill response operations.

(13) Administration of the Port Safety Program through the USCG captains of the port to enforce rules and regulations governing the safety of ports and anchorages as well as the movement of vessels and prevention of pollution in US waters.

(14) Supervision of cargo transfer operations.
(15) Inspection of harbor patrols and waterfront facilities; establishment of security zones as required.

(16) Administration of a licensing and regulatory program governing the construction, ownership (international aspects), and operation of deepwater ports on the high seas to transfer oil from tankers to shore.

(17) Provision of personnel, equipment, and expertise to the harbor defense commands. These are co-staffed by USCG and USN personnel that exercise C2 of naval coastal warfare forces, supplying port safety and security, vessel traffic control and safety, SAR, surveillance and interdiction, and aids to navigation capabilities.

(18) Establishment and maintenance of the US aids to navigation system, including lights, buoys, day beacons, fog signals, marine radio beacons, and radio navigation aids such as Differential Global Positioning System.

(19) Broadcast and publication of marine information as well as local Notice to Mariners and Light Lists.

(20) Operation of the Nation’s icebreaking vessels to facilitate maritime transportation and aid in prevention of flooding and to support logistics to US polar installations, and to support scientific research in Arctic and Antarctic waters.

(21) Support peacetime military and civil engagement activities of the National Military Strategy.

(22) Assist DOD in performance of any mission for which the USCG is especially qualified (Title 14, USC, Section 141).

b. **Federal Emergency Management Agency.** The primary mission of FEMA (http://www.fema.gov) is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. FEMA prepares the Nation for hazards, manages federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident, and administers the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA has more than 4,000 full-time employees. They work at FEMA HQ in Washington DC, at regional and area offices across the country, the Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center, and the National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. FEMA also has nearly 8,000 standby disaster assistance employees who are available for deployment after disasters. Often FEMA works in partnership with other organizations that are part of the Nation’s emergency management system. These partners include state and local emergency management agencies, 27 federal agencies and the ARC. FEMA’s functions include:

(1) **Service to Disaster Victims.** Responsive and compassionate care for disaster victims is FEMA’s top priority. FEMA provides rapid, ready, clear, and consistent access to disaster assistance to all eligible individuals and communities.
(2) **Integrated Preparedness.** FEMA works closely with federal, tribal, state and local governments, voluntary agencies, private sector partners, and the American public to ensure the Nation is secured and prepared to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

(3) **Operational Planning and Preparedness.** Working closely with federal, state, local, and tribal partners, FEMA’s operational planners assist jurisdictions in developing planning capabilities and writing area- and incident-specific operational plans that will guide local response activities.

(4) **Incident Management.** With a forward-leaning posture, FEMA can respond more swiftly and decisively to all hazards with around-the-clock support. The agency continues to professionalize its workforce by training and certifying staff in emergency management skills and techniques. FEMA also works closely with external partners to improve and update standards, and support the enduring efforts of America’s first responders.

(5) **Disaster Logistics.** FEMA implements 21st century logistics and procurement systems to help efficiently and effectively plan, identify, track, and distribute supplies needed by disaster victims, emergency responders, and other users on the ground. Working with an array of public and private strategic partners, donors, and prearranged contractors, a businesslike FEMA provides improved logistics integration and customer support.

(6) **Hazard Mitigation.** FEMA works proactively to reduce the physical and financial impact of future disasters through improved risk analysis and hazard mitigation planning, risk reduction, and flood insurance. FEMA helps implement effective hazard mitigation practices in order to create safer communities, promote rapid recovery from floods and other disasters, and reduce the financial impact at the federal, tribal, state, and local levels.

(7) **Emergency Communications.** FEMA is a leader in emergency communications by working with federal, tribal, state, and local partners to establish and facilitate consistent disaster emergency communications standards, plans, and capabilities. As part of this leadership role, FEMA works to forge an integrated operational link before, during, and immediately after an event and is an advocate for disaster emergency communications at the national level on behalf of first responders.

(8) **Public Disaster Communications.** FEMA coordinates all hazards messaging before, during, and after national emergencies using three strategies: public risk communications, partnership management, and employee communications. By successfully managing these elements, FEMA supports operational efforts and ensures clear, consistent, and effective information for disaster victims and emergency management partners and stakeholders.

(9) **Continuity Programs.** FEMA supports upgrades to and implementation of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. It is the lead agent for the Nation’s
programs in ensuring the continuity of government operations and essential functions and the endurance of the US constitutional form of government in a catastrophic event.

c. The United States Secret Service (http://www.secretservice.gov) safeguards the Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy and protects national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and national special security events.

(1) When an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a national special security event, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan. The Secret Service has developed a core strategy to carry out its security operations, which relies heavily on its established partnerships with law enforcement and public safety officials at the local, state, and federal levels. The goal of the cooperating agencies is to provide a safe and secure environment for Secret Service protectees, other dignitaries, the event participants, and the general public. There is a tremendous amount of advance planning and coordination in preparation for these events, particularly in the areas of venue and motorcade route security, communications, credentialing, and training.

(2) The agency’s primary investigative mission is to safeguard the payment and financial systems of the United States. This has been historically accomplished through the enforcement of counterfeiting statutes to preserve the integrity of United States currency, coin, and financial obligations. The Secret Service’s investigative responsibilities also include crimes that involve financial institution fraud, computer and telecommunications fraud, false identification documents, access device fraud, advance fee fraud, electronic funds transfers, and money laundering as it relates to the agency’s core violations.

d. CBP (http://www.cbp.gov) protects US borders from terrorism, human and drug smuggling, illegal migration, and agricultural pests while simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade.

(1) CBP’s priority mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorists’ weapons, including WMD, from entering the United States. CBP apprehends people for attempting to enter the country illegally or for other crimes. CBP deploys 20,000 officers at 327 points of entry, including land, air, and sea ports, as well as more than 11,000 Border Patrol agents charged with securing almost 7,000 miles of border between ports of entry.

(2) CBP prevents the introduction of harmful pests into the United States that would cripple or destroy segments of US farming or food production industry. CBP agricultural specialists are trained to prevent the entry of organisms that could be used for biological warfare. These specialists also are prepared to protect against the introduction of such harmful diseases as Avian Flu.

(3) The CBP Air and Marine, the world’s largest law enforcement air force, protects the American people and Nation’s critical infrastructure through the coordinated use of integrated air and marine forces to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism.
and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or across the borders of the United States. This specialized law enforcement capability allows CBP Air and Marine to make significant contributions to the HS efforts of DHS, as well as to those of federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. To accomplish this mission, CBP Air and Marine utilizes over 700 pilots and 267 aircraft including the use of unmanned aircraft systems, over 130 mariners, and over 200 vessels. CBP Air and Marine has the following missions:

(a) Provide support to CBP’s antiterrorism mission at US borders, including air-to-ground interception of people and contraband illegally crossing land borders, air-to-air interception of aircraft, and air-to-water interception of transportation vessels.

(b) Provide support for CBP’s traditional work, such as border interceptions unrelated to terrorism and other DHS missions as well.

(c) Conduct air operations in support of other federal, state, and local needs, such as disaster relief.

(4) CBP attachés are critical to the success of CBP’s strategy of extending America’s zone of security beyond the US borders. These individuals are the CBP subject matter experts at US embassies around the world. They serve as advocates for several CBP international programs (e.g., Capacity Building, Container Security Initiative, Immigration Advisory Program, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, Proliferation Security Initiative).

(a) CBP representatives support CBP in the planning, organization, administration, and coordination of all CBP international activities, and are recognized as the experts on CBP policies and activities.

(b) They represent CBP in negotiations with foreign officials regarding controversial issues, and provide advice and guidance to CBP management on matters of mutual cooperation between CBP and HN agencies.

(c) They coordinate CBP programs that provide training and technical assistance on border security, and cargo and passenger security.

(d) They assist foreign governments in developing and strengthening their own security initiatives.

(e) They serve as liaisons between the embassy and their foreign counterparts to ensure that cooperation and solid working relationships are established and maintained.

e. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (http://www.ice.gov) primary mission is to protect national security, public safety, and the integrity of the US borders through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. ICE has approximately 19,000 employees in
over 400 offices, including 63 Attaché offices in 44 countries around the world. The agency’s law enforcement authorities encompass more than 400 US federal statutes that ICE is responsible for enforcing in its commitment to ensuring national security and public safety. Within ICE, the Office of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is the principal criminal investigative arm of DHS. ICE’s HSI directorate comprises the offices that are primarily devoted to criminal investigation, which also includes the Office of Intelligence and Office of International Affairs. This directorate has responsibility for ICE’s national security programs and ICE’s investigative authority over criminal violations of US law relating to illicit trade, travel, immigration, and finance. In addition, HSI investigates violations of employment verification laws and visa violations in the US and abroad. ICE gathers information, provides assistance, and investigates the illicit trans-border movement of people, material, and finances throughout the world.

f. The Transportation Security Administration (http://www.tsa.gov) protects the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.

g. US Citizenship and Immigration Services (http://www.uscis.gov) is the government agency that oversees lawful immigration to the United States. Refugee status or asylum may be granted to people who have been persecuted or fear they will be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, and/or membership in a particular social group or political opinion. US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officers conduct interviews overseas, so the military could be interacting with them in some joint operations. For example, officers were interviewing Iraqi nationals, many of whom had associations with the USG and the US military in particular, for refugee resettlement to the United States. In some cases a USCIS officer may believe a refugee has information that the military should hear, or USCIS may request information from the military that might support an applicant’s refugee claim or identify a ground of ineligibility. USCIS asylum officers posted to one of eight domestic asylum offices interview aliens physically present in the United States who are applying for asylum status.

4. Maritime Domain Awareness

a. Maritime domain awareness (http://www.gmsa.gov) is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the United States’ security, safety, economy, or environment. A range of federal departments and agencies must coordinate closely to identify threats as early and as distant from US shores as possible. Unifying USG efforts and supporting international efforts will help achieve maritime domain awareness across the USG, with the private sector and civil authorities within the US, and with US allies and partners around the world. Maritime domain awareness is the integration of global maritime intelligence and global maritime situational awareness.
b. Global maritime intelligence is the product of legacy, as well as changing intelligence capabilities, policies, and operational relationships used to integrate all available data, information, and intelligence in order to identify, locate, and track potential maritime threats.

c. Global maritime situational awareness results from the persistent monitoring of maritime activities in such a way that trends and anomalies can be identified.
ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. Overview

DOJ enforces the law and defends the interests of the United States according to the law; ensures public safety against threats foreign and domestic; provides federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; seeks just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and ensures fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The Attorney General is the head of DOJ and chief law enforcement officer of the USG. He represents the United States in legal matters generally and gives advice and opinions to the President and to the heads of the executive departments of the USG when so requested. In matters of exceptional gravity or importance, the Attorney General appears in person before the Supreme Court.

3. Organizational Structure

a. DOJ personnel include nearly 8,000 attorneys located primarily in the Antitrust, Civil, Civil Rights, Environment and Natural Resources, and Tax Divisions. The bulk of the remaining litigation is performed by the nearly 100 US attorneys and their staffs dispersed throughout the country.

b. The Criminal Division develops, enforces, and supervises the application of all federal criminal laws except those specifically assigned to other divisions. The Criminal Division and the 93 US attorneys have the responsibility for overseeing criminal matters under the more than 900 statutes as well as certain civil litigation. Criminal Division attorneys prosecute many nationally significant cases. In addition to its direct litigation responsibilities, the Criminal Division formulates and implements criminal enforcement policy and provides advice and assistance. For example, the Criminal Division approves or monitors sensitive areas of law enforcement such as participation in the Witness Security Program and the use of electronic surveillance; advises the Attorney General, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and the White House on matters of criminal law; provides legal advice and assistance to federal prosecutors and investigative agencies; and provides leadership for coordinating international as well as federal, state, and local law enforcement matters.

(1) The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) works with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. ICITAP supports both national security and foreign policy objectives. ICITAP works in close partnership with DOS, USAID, DOD, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. These agencies fund ICITAP’s programs. ICITAP programs are designed in partnership with the HN, and program implementation
methods include on-the-ground, preprogram assessments; program planning, management, and review; curriculum development; classroom training, seminars, and workshops; internships; equipment donations; donor coordination; and on-the-job training and mentoring provided by embedded long-term advisors.

(2) **Domestic Security Section** safeguards the security of US citizens here and abroad by prosecuting international crimes of violence committed by and against them. It is DOJ’s central POC regarding Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act investigations and prosecutions. Through the Act, the section coordinates, investigates, and prosecutes federal crimes committed overseas. The section has developed strong relationships with LEAs within the DOD and the DOS to ensure that individuals employed by or accompanying the US military overseas who commit murder, sexual crimes, and other serious federal felony offenses are brought to justice where jurisdiction exists.

(3) The **Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training** develops and administers technical assistance designed to enhance the capabilities of foreign justice sector institutions and their law enforcement personnel, so they can effectively partner with the DOJ in combating terrorism, trafficking in persons, organized crime, corruption, and financial crimes. It carries out justice sector institution building, including technical assistance, and skills development support, to enhance foreign justice sector cooperation. The rule of law and the rights of individuals are the cornerstones of any free society. Crime and misuse of the public trust undermine confidence in government and discredit free market economies. The effective and fair administration of justice offers to the state and its citizens the greatest protection from lawlessness and support for basic human rights, and, when extant in foreign countries, provides the US with a stronger base of foreign cooperation in the fight against organized crime, illegal narcotics, and terrorism.

c. **National Security Division** merges the primary national security elements of DOJ. The National Security Division consists of the CT and Counterespionage Sections; the Office of Intelligence, which consists of three sections (i.e., Operations Section, Oversight Section, and Litigation Section); the Law and Policy Office; the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism; and an Executive Office.

(1) The **Counterespionage Section** supervises the investigation and prosecution of cases affecting national security, foreign relations, and the export of strategic commodities and technology. The Counterespionage Section has executive responsibility for authorizing the prosecution of cases under criminal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, neutrality, and atomic energy. It provides legal advice to US attorney’s offices and investigative agencies on all matters under its responsibility, which includes 88 federal statutes affecting national security. It also coordinates criminal cases involving the application of the Classified Information Procedures Act. In addition, the Counterespionage Section administers and enforces the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 and related disclosure statutes.

(2) The **CT Section** is responsible for the design, implementation, and support of law enforcement efforts, legislative initiatives, policies, and strategies relating to
combating international and domestic terrorism. The CT Section seeks to assist, through investigation and prosecution, in preventing and disrupting acts of terrorism anywhere in the world that impact on significant United States interests and persons.

d. The DEA is the primary narcotics enforcement agency for the USG. The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to recommend and support non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets. In carrying out its mission as the agency responsible for enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States, the DEA’s primary responsibilities include:

(1) Investigation and preparation for the prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws operating at interstate and international levels.

(2) Investigation and preparation for prosecution of criminals and drug gangs who perpetrate violence in our communities and terrorize citizens through fear and intimidation.

(3) Management of a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with federal, state, local, and foreign officials to collect, analyze, and disseminate strategic and operational drug intelligence information.

(4) Seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from, traceable to, or intended to be used for illicit drug trafficking.

(5) Enforcement of the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act as they pertain to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled substances.

(6) Coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials on mutual drug enforcement efforts and enhancement of such efforts through exploitation of potential interstate and international investigations beyond local or limited federal jurisdictions and resources.

(7) Coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local agencies, and with foreign governments, in programs designed to reduce the availability of illicit abuse-type drugs on the United States market through nonenforcement methods such as crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials.

(8) Responsibility, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and US ambassadors, for all programs associated with drug law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries.
(9) Liaison with the UN, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and other organizations on matters relating to international drug control programs.

e. The FBI’s (http://www.fbi.gov) mission is to uphold the law through the investigation of violations of federal criminal law; to protect the United States from foreign intelligence and terrorist activities; to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to federal, state, local, and international agencies; and to perform these responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to the Constitution of the United States.

(1) In executing the following priorities, the FBI will produce and use intelligence to protect the Nation from threats and to bring to justice those who violate the law.

(a) Protect the United States from terrorist attack.

(b) Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.

(c) Protect the United States against cyberspace-based attacks and high-technology crimes.

(d) Combat public corruption at all levels.

(e) Protect civil rights.

(f) Combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises.

(g) Combat major white-collar crime.

(h) Combat significant violent crime.

(i) Support federal, state, local, and international partners.

(j) Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission.

(2) National Security Branch. The FBI’s national security mission is to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United States. The FBI’s goal is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats and penetrate national and transnational networks that have a desire and capability to harm us. Such networks include: terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, those that seek to proliferate WMD, and criminal enterprises. In order to be successful, the FBI must understand the threat, continue to integrate our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities in every FBI operational program, and continue to expand our contribution to the IC knowledge base. Because national security and criminal threats are often intertwined, our ability to integrate intelligence and investigations makes us uniquely situated to address our Nation’s threats and vulnerabilities. The branch is composed of
the CT Division, Counterintelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, and Terrorist Screening Center.

(a) **The CT Division** provides a centralized, comprehensive, and intelligence-driven approach to address both international and domestic terrorism-related matters. It works with its trusted partners from the intelligence and law enforcement communities, and oversees the joint terrorism task forces, which are multiagency task forces around the country that the FBI established to address terrorism.

(b) **The Counterintelligence Division** is charged with the prevention and investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States. It targets both traditional and emerging nontraditional, asymmetric threats, integrating both intelligence and law enforcement techniques, and investigating espionage activities.

(c) **The Directorate of Intelligence** is the FBI’s dedicated national intelligence workforce with responsibility for all FBI intelligence functions. It carries out its functions through embedded intelligence elements at FBI HQ and in each field division through the Field Intelligence Groups. The groups also have personnel embedded in fusion centers around the country to share information with the FBI’s federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence partners.

(d) **The Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate** is charged with preventing and disrupting the acquisition of WMD capabilities and technologies for use against the US homeland by terrorists and other adversaries, including nation-states. The directorate integrates and links all the necessary CT, intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and scientific and technical components to accomplish the FBI’s overall WMD mission. The Terrorist Screening Center consolidates the government’s approach to terrorist screening and creates a single comprehensive watchlist of known or suspected terrorists. The center ensures that local, state, and federal terrorist screeners have ready access to information and expertise.

(3) **International Offices.** The threats posed by criminal and terrorist organizations that cross borders require the FBI to work seamlessly with law enforcement and intelligence agencies around the world. The critical work of coordinating these activities is primarily conducted in the FBI’s 62 international offices known as legal attachés, or “legats,” and 14 legat sub-offices.

(a) Each legat works with law enforcement and security agencies in their HN to coordinate investigations of interest to both countries. The rules for joint activities and information sharing are generally spelled out in formal agreements between the United States and the legat’s HN.

(b) In addition to the routine work of legats, the FBI now routinely deploys agents and crime scene experts to assist in the investigation of attacks, such as the May 2003 bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and the July 2005 bombings in London. Agents, analysts, and forensics experts stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan work directly with our international partners.
f. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) is a principal LEA within the DOJ dedicated to preventing terrorism, reducing violent crime, and protecting our Nation. The men and women of ATF perform the dual responsibilities of enforcing federal criminal laws and regulating the firearms and explosives industries. ATF is committed to working directly, and through partnerships, to investigate and reduce crime involving firearms and explosives, acts of arson, and illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products.

g. The International Criminal Police Organization, United States National Central Bureau (INTERPOL-USNCB)—serves as the United States’ representative to the INTERPOL. The INTERPOL-USNCB is the central POC for all INTERPOL matters in the United States, including secure communications with police authorities in INTERPOL’s 187 member countries and access to INTERPOL’s various databases containing information on wanted persons, terrorists, missing persons, stolen and lost passports and travel documents, stolen vehicles, and other law enforcement information. On a daily basis, the INTERPOL-USNCB coordinates and transmits requests for criminal investigative and humanitarian assistance between United States federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities and their foreign counterparts.

h. The United States Marshals Service is the Nation’s oldest and most versatile federal LEA. The US Marshals Service is the enforcement arm of the federal courts, and as such, it is involved in virtually every federal law enforcement initiative.

(1) Presidentially appointed US marshals direct the activities of 94 districts—one for each federal judicial district. More than 3,320 deputy marshals and criminal investigators form the backbone of the agency. Among their many duties, they apprehend more than half of all federal fugitives, protect the federal judiciary, operate the Witness Security Program, transport federal prisoners, and seize property acquired by criminals through illegal activities.

(2) The Tactical Operations Division carries out special missions that are related to the Marshals Service’s broad federal law enforcement and judicial security responsibilities. They respond to national emergencies as well as crises involving HS. The division directs, coordinates, manages, and supports the following Marshals Service entities: the Special Operations Group, Office of Emergency Management, Office of Inspection, Emergency Operations Center, and the Marshals Service Communications Center.

(a) The Special Operations Group is a highly trained force of deputy marshals with the responsibility and capability of responding to emergency situations where federal law is violated or where federal property is endangered.

1. Specially trained deputy marshals provide security and law enforcement assistance to DOD and the USAF when Minuteman and cruise missiles are moved between military facilities.
2. The Special Operations Group participates in the International Stabilization and Reconstruction and Rule of Law programs working closely with DOD, DOJ, and DOS personnel in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In these endeavors, it has designed and constructed courts, judicial housing, and witness protection safe sites in Iraq and the Central Narcotics Judicial Center in Afghanistan. It provides technologically advanced security equipment and programs to improve judicial and witness security in order to provide a more democratic judicial system and assist in the stabilization.

(b) Office of Emergency Management is the primary POC when the Marshals Service is involved in sensitive and classified missions. It has primary responsibility over the agency’s actions involving HS, national emergencies, and domestic crises.

(c) The Office of District Affairs temporarily assigns deputy marshals when a district’s permanently assigned deputies need assistance in carrying out their missions. For example, hundreds of deputies from across the country augmented the manpower of districts hit hard by hurricanes. These mobilization orders come from the Attorney General.

3. Investigations Operations Division. The Marshals Service has memoranda of understanding to assume fugitive investigations for most federal LEAs to include the various investigative services within the DOD. The Marshals Service has been designated by the DOJ as the primary agency to apprehend fugitives that are wanted by foreign nations and believed to be in the United States. Fugitive apprehension efforts have expanded abroad with Marshals Service offices in Mexico, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. Also, the Marshals Service is the primary agency responsible for tracking and extraditing fugitives who are apprehended in foreign countries and wanted for prosecution in the United States.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

Some of DOJ’s key interagency components include the following:

a. The Office of Intelligence advises the Attorney General on all matters relating to the national security activities of the United States. The Office of Intelligence prepares all applications for surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, assists USG agencies by providing legal advice on matters of national security law and policy, and represents DOJ on a variety of interagency committees, such as the National Foreign Intelligence Council.

b. The FBI has six priority investigative areas: organized crime, drugs, CT, white collar crime, foreign CI, and violent crime. The FBI has extensive intelligence and operational assets available, both domestically and overseas.

c. The US Marshals Service, through its Special Operations Group, can respond to a number of emergency circumstances, including civil disturbances, terrorist incidents, and riot and mob-violence situations.
d. **The DEA** operates with the Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the USCG, and the 11-agency National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. It also manages the El Paso Intelligence Center, using personnel from 13 USG agencies.

e. **The Department of Justice Mission in Iraq.** DOJ has been actively engaged in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM since May 2003. DOJ leadership is actively engaged in this mission, and the Deputy Attorney General has appointed a Rule of Law Counselor who reports directly to him and coordinates with leadership in the Embassy in Baghdad. Working closely with the DOS, DOJ is assisting in a variety of efforts to promote freedom and security, from reconstruction programs to facilitating capacity development activities, with the ultimate goal of establishing the rule of law throughout Iraq. DOJ officials are engaging with their Iraqi and American counterparts in a variety of tasks including: rebuilding the judicial infrastructure; providing guidance in the investigation and prosecution of major crimes and acts of terrorism; providing technical assistance to Iraqi law enforcement entities; and training justice personnel on issues ranging from corrections procedures to international human rights laws.

f. ICITAP and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) are two key offices that focus on HN capacity building within the criminal justice sector. As result their program implementation activities are closely coordinated with partner agencies and departments, embassies in countries they are implementing programs, and with official representatives of a HN. OPDAT carries out its mission in close coordination with the ICITAP. Both OPDAT and ICITAP consider overseas criminal justice training and development as an integrated whole. Other components of DOJ are also engaged in providing technical assistance and training overseas. Among them, the FBI and DEA are the most active.

g. OPDAT establishes judicial and prosecutorial assistance programs that are appropriate for particular countries. The appropriateness of a program for a particular country is determined through consultation with host country officials, DOS and USAID, other DOJ officials, and those familiar with the country’s criminal justice infrastructures. Based upon this determination OPDAT prepares a project implementation plan that describes the nature, goals, duration, and cost of the proposed project.

h. Working with DOS, ICITAP ensures that US foreign assistance advances both the international rule of law and the strategic law enforcement priorities of the United States, by placing federal law enforcement development experts in US embassies overseas. These ICITAP experts serve as highly valued resources in the embassies’ policy and planning processes. They use their knowledge of US law enforcement interests in the region; their expertise in assessing the needs of the host country; their experience in implementing law enforcement assistance programs; and their ability to develop collaborative relationships with host country law enforcement officials to help both the host country and the United States achieve their peace and security objectives.

(1) ICITAP engages other USG and international organizations in program activities (such as training events and internships), and creates opportunities for professional relationships to develop with HN law enforcement. They collaborate with
representatives of the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) in US embassies.

(2) ICITAP also teams with law enforcement attachés in US embassies—including federal prosecutors and agents of the FBI; US DEA; US Marshals Service; ATF; DHS; and Internal Revenue Service—to improve the relevance and effectiveness of capacity-building programs in the host country.
1. Overview

DOS is the department of the USG responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States. As the lead US foreign affairs agency, DOS formulates, represents, and implements the President’s foreign policy. The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President’s principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for US representation abroad.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to make treaties, to receive foreign emissaries, to appoint diplomatic and consular officials, and to exercise other authority provided by legislation. To assist the President in the exercise of these duties, Congress created the DOS in 1789, with the Secretary of State as its head. DOS’s mission is to advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.

b. DOS manages America’s relationships with foreign governments, international organizations, and the people of other countries. The management of all of these relationships is called diplomacy. DOS diplomats carry out the President’s foreign policy and help build a more free, prosperous, and secure world. DOS is a vital part of the USG because it:

   (1) Represents the United States overseas and conveys US policies to foreign governments and international organizations through American embassies and consulates in foreign countries and diplomatic missions;

   (2) Negotiates and concludes agreements and treaties on issues ranging from trade to nuclear weapons;

   (3) Coordinates and supports international activities of other US agencies, hosts official visits, and performs other diplomatic missions;

   (4) Leads interagency coordination and manages the allocation of resources for foreign relations; and

   (5) Promotes mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries around the world.

c. DOS has four main foreign policy goals:

   (1) Protect the United States and Americans;
(2) Advance democracy, human rights, and other global interests;

(3) Promote international understanding of American values and policies; and

(4) Support US diplomats, government officials, and all other personnel at home and abroad who make these goals a reality.

3. Organizational Structure

a. Department of State Headquarters. The DOS’s HQ provides policy guidance to DOS and USAID.

(1) Subordinate to the Secretary of State are two deputy secretaries and the under secretaries, who are responsible for management and coordination of the foreign policy process. There is an under secretary for each of the following:

(a) Political Affairs. Responsible for the general conduct of political relations and for representing DOS and the Secretary of State at the NSC deputies level.

(b) Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs. Responsible for foreign policy decisions in these areas.

(c) Arms Control and International Security. Charged with the responsibility for policies in these areas, including all policy matters relating to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

(d) Democracy and Global Affairs. Responsible for all matters on global issues, including democracy, human rights, and labor; environment, oceans, health, and science; population, refugees, and migration; women’s issues; and trafficking in persons and avian and pandemic influenza.

(e) Management. Responsible for DOS’s resource management, including personnel.

(f) Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Leads America's public diplomacy outreach, which includes communications with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, international visitor programs, and USG efforts to confront ideological support for terrorism.

(2) The Director of US Foreign Assistance is charged with directing the transformation of the USG approach to foreign assistance. The Director of US Foreign Assistance holds a rank equivalent to deputy secretary and is responsible for the effective use of foreign assistance to meet broad foreign policy objectives.

(3) To address the diverse issues in US foreign relations, DOS is organized into regional and functional bureaus. The six regional bureaus, responsible to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, formulate and implement regional foreign policy and
bilateral policy toward each individual country of the world. These bureaus are headed by assistant secretaries:

(a) African Affairs.
(b) East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
(c) European and Eurasian Affairs.
(d) Near Eastern Affairs.
(e) Western Hemisphere Affairs.
(f) South and Central Asian Affairs.

(4) Two additional bureaus responsible to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs are the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which develops policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime, and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which formulates and implements multilateral foreign policy toward IGOs, particularly the agencies of the UN, and provides guidance and support for US participation in IGOs, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, human rights, economic and social affairs, technical agencies, international development, US citizen employment in international organizations, and international conferences.

(5) The other bureaus in DOS are functionally oriented; their assistant secretaries are responsible to other under secretaries for specific matters. Bureaus are subdivided into offices headed by directors. The offices of the six regional bureaus are organized by country or group of countries (e.g., the Office of Mainland Southeast Asia Affairs, the Office of Canadian Affairs). Regional office directors are often also called country directors, and they supervise the work of desk or country officers. Country (or “desk”) officers are responsible for the day-to-day coordination with the US mission, and the other elements of the DOS and the broader interagency community. Directors head the offices of the other bureaus for the specific function they perform.

(6) DOS relies on the Foreign Service, a corps of career foreign affairs experts, to operate its overseas missions, formulate foreign policy, and perform diplomatic engagement. Foreign Service officers of the United States hold Presidential commissions and are recruited through a difficult examination and entry process, with an up-or-out promotion system akin to that of military officers. Foreign Service officers serve on an assignment basis, frequently serving two to four years at a US mission or in DOS. In addition to the Foreign Service officer corps, there is a wide range of Foreign Service specialists with expertise in security, communications, information technology, medical specialties, management, and budgeting.

b. **Functional Bureaus and Offices.** Several bureaus and offices have frequent interaction with DOD.
(1) The mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization reports directly to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to lead and coordinate integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct R&S activities, including ensuring harmonization with any planned or ongoing military operations.

   (a) The Conflict Prevention Office oversees a broad-based global monitoring program to identify states at risk of instability, coordinates conflict prevention and mitigation efforts within the USG, and actively consults with NGOs and international partners on best practices and new policy tools to help define policies and programs to strengthen fragile states.

   (b) The Planning Office works with USG civilian and military agencies, nongovernmental, and multilateral partners to refine and implement the whole-of-government approach to the reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation of fragile and failed states.

   (c) The Office of Civilian Readiness and Response is responsible for the hiring, management, readiness, deployment, logistical support, and after-action coordination for the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).

   (d) The Conflict Prevention Office, the Planning Office, and the Civilian Readiness and Response Office interface with four regional coordination teams to assure functional and geographic integration across S/CRS.

(2) The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the DOS’s principal link to DOD. PM provides guidance and coordinates policy formulation on national security issues including regional stability, military operations and arms transfers, and defense trade. It is the DOS lead for defense trade controls, defense relations, security cooperation, military operations and exercises, diplomatic clearance approvals for foreign ships and aircraft entering the US and its territories, conventional weapons destruction including humanitarian demining assistance, man-portable air-defense systems threat reduction, and analyzing broad trends in international security affairs to determine their effect on US policies. It ensures effective coordination of related policies and joint operations plans, oversees operations and programs, and advises and supports senior officers of DOS in their formal relationships with the OSD and JCS. It serves as principal liaison with the DOD on policy issues, including security cooperation, and on coordination of US military related activities with US foreign policy implications. It is responsible for developing, managing, and implementing military security cooperation programs and providing advice on crisis management, military operations, base access and pre-positioning of US materiel, and other aspects of US defense relations. It provides overall direction for the fulfillment of DOS’s responsibilities for the State-Defense Exchange Program and for POLADs assigned to military commands, the Pentagon, and JIACGs (or equivalent organization).
(3) The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism heads USG efforts to improve CT cooperation with foreign governments. The Coordinator for Counterterrorism chairs the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism and the DOS’s task force to coordinate responses to international terrorist incidents. The Coordinator for Counterterrorism has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing American CT policy. The office leads the Regional Strategic Initiative which seeks to create a flexible network of coordinated country teams, to deny terrorists safe haven.

(a) The goals are to identify key CT issues and concerns across a region; develop a common strategic approach to address CT issues; pool resources and tasks to generate unified effort across the USG; create ongoing interagency partnerships to address CT issues; form a basis for closer cooperation between regional partner nations; and leverage resources from such partners as the Group of Eight Counterterrorism Action Group, and other IGOs.

(b) To maximize the impact of USG CT efforts, S/CT has initiated the Regional Security Initiative, a series of regionally-based, interagency, strategy planning activities, hosted by US embassies. The key concepts underpinning the Regional Strategic Initiative are to bring all instruments of statecraft to bear, in a calibrated fashion, through coordinated interagency strategy; create a shared diagnosis as a basis for interagency self-synchronization; build trusted networks to displace enemy networks; promote field-driven interagency cooperation; and operate as theater, not-bureau-based.

(4) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, drawing on all-source intelligence, provides value-added independent analysis of events to DOS policymakers; ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes; and serves as the focal point in DOS for ensuring policy review of sensitive CI and law enforcement activities. Its primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve US diplomacy. The bureau also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues. The bureau is a member of the IC. The humanitarian information unit (HIU) is an element of the bureau. HIU serves as a USG interagency center to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate unclassified information critical to USG decision makers and partners in preparation for and response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide, and to promote best practices for humanitarian information management. To accomplish this mission, the HIU performs the following tasks:

(a) Identifies key sources of geospatial and geo-referenced data best suited to meet the information requirements of our consumers;

(b) Collects timely, verifiable, and relevant data utilizing an extensive network of information partnerships;

(c) Analyzes data using multiagency expertise and applying proven technologies to determine significant trends and relationships; and
(d) Disseminates information of value to all levels of consumers, from national-level policymakers to operational field managers.

(5) The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation is responsible for managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counter proliferation, and arms control functions. It leads US efforts to prevent the spread of WMD (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) and their delivery systems. The bureau spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. It addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions, and actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative. The bureau also coordinates the implementation of key international treaties and arrangements, working to make them relevant to today’s security challenges; and works closely with the UN, the Group of Eight, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the IAEA, and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD. The bureau also supports efforts of foreign partners to prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists.

(6) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The mission of the bureau is to provide protection, life-sustaining relief, and durable solutions for refugees and conflict victims, working through the multilateral humanitarian system to achieve the best results for refugees and conflict victims on behalf of the American taxpayer. The bureau has primary responsibility within the USG for formulating policies on population, refugees, and migration, and for administering US refugee assistance and admissions programs. It coordinates DOS’s policy on global population, refugees, and migration issues and manages migration and refugee assistance appropriations. The bureau is at the center of a cooperative effort among the DOS, USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to implement a more comprehensive international population policy, including broadening of population assistance programs to cover a wider range of reproductive health services; provide assistance to refugees in first-asylum countries and admit refugees to the United States for permanent resettlement; and develop bilateral and multilateral approaches to international migration issues.

(7) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is the security and law enforcement arm of DOS and is responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of US foreign policy. Overseas, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develops and implements effective security programs to safeguard all personnel who work in every US diplomatic mission around the world. In the United States, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security personnel protect the Secretary of State and high-ranking foreign dignitaries and officials visiting the United States, investigates passport and visa fraud, and conducts personnel security investigations.

(8) The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the President, Secretary of State, other bureaus in DOS, and other USG departments and agencies on the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. Its programs support two of the DOS’s strategic goals: to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States; and to minimize the impact of international crime on
the United States and its citizens. Counternarcotics and anticrime programs also complement CT efforts, both directly and indirectly, by promoting modernization of and supporting operations by foreign criminal justice systems and LEAs charged with the CT mission.

c. The DOS Overseas. The United States has diplomatic relations with some 180 of the 191 countries in the world and with many IGOs. DOS takes the leading role in maintaining and improving relationships with these countries and organizations. DOS is represented by its core staff of Foreign Service personnel at every one of the nearly 260 US embassies, consulates-general, consulates, and missions to international diplomatic organizations overseas.

(1) A US mission is the basic unit for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments overseas. They are headed by a COM, normally an ambassador—who is a Presidential appointee and the President’s personal representative. As such, the COM is the senior US official in the country. By law, COMs coordinate, direct, and supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which they are accredited. COMs do not; however, exercise control of US personnel attached to and working for the head of a US mission to an IGO (e.g., US Ambassador to NATO) or US military personnel operating under the command of a GCC. Generally, each COM has an agreement with the GCC delineating which DOD personnel fall under the responsibility of each for security.

(2) Overseas, the Foreign Service is assisted by another 10,000 career Foreign Service National employees, who are mostly citizens of the HN. Also, more than 1,300 US Marines are under OPCON of DOS COMs as Marine security guards.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. As the lead foreign affairs agency, DOS has the primary role in:

(1) Leading interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy.

(2) Managing the foreign affairs budget and other foreign affairs resources.

(3) Leading and coordinating US representation abroad, conveying US foreign policy to foreign governments and IGOs through US embassies and consulates in foreign countries and diplomatic missions to international organizations.

(4) Conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties on issues ranging from trade to nuclear weapons.

(5) Coordinating and supporting international activities of other US agencies and officials.

b. All foreign affairs activities—US representation abroad, foreign assistance programs, countering international crime, foreign military training programs, the services
DOS provides, and more—are paid for by the foreign affairs budget, which represents little more than 1% of the total federal budget. This small investment is key to maintaining US leadership, which promotes and protects the interests of our citizens by:

1. Promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest.
2. Creating jobs at home by opening markets abroad.
3. Helping developing nations establish stable economic environments that provide investment and export opportunities.
4. Bringing nations together to address global problems such as cross-border pollution, the spread of communicable diseases, terrorism, nuclear smuggling, and humanitarian crises.

c. The services DOS provides include:

1. Protecting and assisting US citizens living or traveling abroad.
3. Coordinating and providing support for international activities of other US agencies (local, state, or USG), official visits overseas and at home, and other diplomatic efforts.
4. Keeping the public informed about US foreign policy and relations with other countries and providing feedback from the public to administration officials.

d. A key DOS function is assembling coalitions to provide military forces for US-led multinational operations. In coordination with the NSC and DOD, DOS contacts foreign governments at the highest level to request participation of their forces in a planned multinational operation. When forces are offered, DOS formally accepts them from the foreign government and arranges for military-to-military contact between the foreign and US forces. Once a foreign government has committed its forces to the multinational effort, DOS includes its representatives in a political forum to ensure that the foreign government remains informed of the direction of the effort and committed to participation.

5. Interagency Relationships

a. The DOS’s principal roles in its relationship with DOD are to ensure that defense activities support national foreign policy and to facilitate defense activities overseas. In performance of the first role, DOS attends interagency meetings, responds to requests from JS and OSD for a foreign policy review of DOD proposed activities, and alerts DOD to defense activities of foreign policy concern that have come to DOS attention. In its role as facilitator of defense activities overseas, DOS approaches foreign governments through high-level visits, diplomatic representations by US missions overseas, or contact
with foreign government representatives in the US to negotiate agreements or obtain authorization for defense activities in the sovereign territory of the foreign country.

b. In recognition of the impact that DOD activities have on US foreign affairs, DOS has assigned a single bureau, PM, to be its primary interface with DOD. PM manages POLMIL relations throughout the world, including training and assistance for foreign militaries, and works to maintain global access for US military forces. PM promotes responsible US defense trade, while controlling foreign access to militarily significant technology, through export controls. PM also coordinates US programs that help rid countries of landmines and other conventional weapons. PM helps protect national security by leading interagency efforts to plan for future crises — including planning US responses to cyberspace-attacks against vital computer networks or to CBRN attacks overseas.

c. DOS is also the coordinator of the process for interagency consideration of proposals to enter into treaties or other formal agreements with foreign governments, known as the Circular 175 process (US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 11— Political Affairs, chapter 720). No USG agency is permitted to enter into a formal agreement of any kind with a foreign government, nor even propose an agreement, until it has received Circular 175 authorization.

d. Overseas, DOS provides the support structure for the representatives of DOD, DOC, USDA, DOJ, and DHS; the Peace Corps; USAID; and other USG foreign affairs agencies to enable them to conduct US relations with foreign governments and IGOS. In missions that conduct bilateral affairs with the government of a foreign country, the COM coordinates the efforts of the interagency country team, composed of the chief in-country representative of the foreign affairs agencies, to achieve a unified, consistent foreign policy toward the HN.
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ANNEX H TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

1. Overview

DOT serves the United States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, and convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the American people, today and into the future.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The national objectives of general welfare, economic growth and stability, and security of the United States require the development of transportation policies and programs that contribute to providing fast, safe, efficient, and convenient transportation at the lowest cost consistent with those and other national objectives, including the efficient use and conservation of the resources of the United States.

b. DOT is necessary in the public interest and to:

   (1) Ensure the coordinated and effective administration of the transportation programs of the USG;

   (2) Make easier the development and improvement of coordinated transportation service to be provided by private enterprise to the greatest extent feasible;

   (3) Encourage cooperation of federal, state, and local governments, carriers, labor, and other interested persons to achieve transportation objectives;

   (4) Stimulate technological advances in transportation, through research and development or otherwise;

   (5) Provide general leadership in identifying and solving transportation problems; and

   (6) Develop and recommend to the President and Congress transportation policies and programs to achieve transportation objectives considering the needs of the public, users, carriers, industry, labor, and national defense.

3. Organizational Structure

a. DOT consists of the Office of the Secretary, the Surface Transportation Board, and 10 operating administrations that are organized generally by mode of travel (e.g., air, rail, and other methods): Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Federal Highway Administration; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; Federal Railroad Administration; Federal Transit Administration; Maritime Administration (MARAD); National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation; Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; and Research and Innovative Technology Administration.
b. The Office of the Secretary oversees the formulation of national transportation policy and promotes intermodal transportation. Other responsibilities range from negotiation and implementation of international transportation agreements, assuring the fitness of US airlines, enforcing airline consumer protection regulations, issuance of regulations to prevent alcohol and illegal drug misuse in transportation systems, and preparing transportation legislation.

c. **Federal Aviation Administration.** The mission of the FAA is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.

(1) The safety mission of the FAA is first and foremost and includes the issuance and enforcement of regulations and standards related to the manufacture, operation, certification, and maintenance of aircraft. The agency is responsible for the rating and certification of airmen and for certification of airports serving air carriers. It also regulates a program to protect the security of civil aviation, and enforces regulations under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for shipments by air. The FAA, which operates a network of airport towers, air route traffic control centers, and flight service stations, develops air traffic rules, allocates the use of airspace, and provides for the security control of air traffic to meet national defense requirements. Other responsibilities include the construction or installation of visual and electronic aids to air navigation and promotion of aviation safety internationally. The FAA, which regulates and encourages the US commercial space transportation industry, also licenses commercial space launch facilities and private sector launches.

(2) The FAA is responsible for all DOD flight inspection requirements. Through a MOA, the USAF maintains a staff of active and reserve aircrews to perform flight inspection missions worldwide, including missions in support of combat and contingency operations. The DOD Flight Inspection office coordinates flight inspection requirements and develops national policy for the conduct of flight inspection of all navigation aids and air traffic control facilities owned or controlled by the military departments of the USG throughout the world.

(3) The FAA leads and supports the development of civil aviation systems worldwide (e.g., Afghanistan). Civil air traffic control systems have numerous military applications and provide significant economic advantages to a partner nation.

d. **Maritime Administration.** MARAD promotes development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced, United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry the Nation’s domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its waterborne foreign commerce, and capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. MARAD also seeks to ensure that the United States enjoys adequate shipbuilding and repair service, efficient ports, effective intermodal water and land transportation systems, and reserve shipping capacity in time of national emergency.

(1) **Military Cargoes.** The MARAD initiates and recommends regulations and procedures for the DOD to follow in administering cargo preference. Program efforts concentrate on meetings and discussions with DOD component commands, contractors,
suppliers, freight forwarders, and shipping companies to focus attention on meeting the needs of all constituents within the context of US-flag carriage requirements. Cargo shipping for DOD is subject to the Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904 which requires that items procured for, intended for use by, or owned by military departments or defense agencies, must be carried exclusively (100 percent) on US-flag vessels, if available at reasonable rates. Most DOD containerized cargo is booked on US-flag vessels by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command for the various DOD shipper services as part of the Defense Transportation System. Shipping via the system allows DOD shippers access to pre-negotiated ocean shipping contracts providing cost and convenience benefits.

(2) **NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping.** The MARAD is the United States representative to NATO’s Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). Additionally, MARAD’s Office of Emergency Preparedness provides the Secretariat for PBOS and the Assistant Administrator currently serves as the Chairman of PBOS. PBOS is responsible for developing and maintaining plans for civil shipping support to the Alliance in crisis and war. PBOS planning takes into account the international character of merchant shipping and seeks to facilitate access to worldwide shipping. Its planning responsibilities include planning for the provision of shipping resources to support military lift requirements through appropriate shipping crisis management arrangements, and planning for the availability of marine war risks insurance for merchant ships supporting the alliance. PBOS plans for the use of merchant shipping in crises or wars affecting the interests of the Alliance. All other sealift activities in peacetime are solely a national responsibility.

(3) **Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement.** The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program is a partnership between the USG and the maritime industry to provide the DOD with “assured access” to commercial sealift and intermodal capacity to support the emergency deployment and sustainment of US military forces. Intermodal capacity includes dry cargo ships, equipment, terminal facilities, and intermodal management services. The VISA program provides for a time-phased activation of state-of-the-art commercial intermodal equipment to coincide with DOD requirements while minimizing disruption to US commercial operations. The VISA program can be activated in three stages as determined by DOD with each stage representing a higher level of capacity commitment. In Stage III participants must commit at least 50 percent of their capacity. Dry cargo vessels enrolled in the Maritime Security Program must commit 100 percent during Stage III.

(4) **Maritime Security Program.** The Maritime Security Program is a fleet of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately-owned vessels to meet national defense and other security requirements. Participating operators are required to make their ships and commercial transportation resources available upon request by SecDef during times of war or national emergency. The program maintains a modern US-flag fleet providing military access to vessels and vessel capacity, as well as a total global, intermodal transportation network. This network includes not only vessels, but also logistics management services, infrastructure, terminals facilities, and US citizen merchant mariners to crew the government owned/controlled and commercial fleets.
(5) **Office of Ship Operations.** The Office of Ship Operations formulates national policies and programs for the operation, maintenance, and repair of government-owned or acquired merchant ships especially the maintenance and readiness of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). It develops and administers programs, policies, and activities for the maintenance and readiness of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships in order to ensure that these ships can be activated within 4, 5, 10, or 20 days of notification; preservation work plans for each reserve fleet site; and the acquisition, allocation, and operation of merchant ships in time of national emergency. It administers ship preservation programs for the NDRF and conducts fleet service activities and engineering studies for improved methods, techniques, equipment, and materials.

(a) The NDRF serves as a reserve of ships for national defense and national emergency purposes. NDRF vessels are located at the James River, Beaumont and Suisun Bay anchorages, and at designated port facility berths. The program primarily consists of dry cargo ships with some tankers and military auxiliaries. In addition to maintaining ships for USTRANSCOM logistics, the Missile Defense Agency sponsors two ships for missile tracking. There are five additional ships that are dedicated for military and HS training. There are 30 vessels in retention status, which are preserved in a way that keeps them in the same condition as when they entered the fleet. In response to hurricane Katrina and Rita landfalls in 2005, FEMA used the MARAD’s vessels to support relief efforts. Nine ships supported the recovery mostly with messing and berthing for refinery workers, oil spill response teams, and longshoremen.

(b) The RRF program is a subset of the MARAD’s NDRF to support the rapid worldwide deployment of US military forces. As a key element of DOD strategic sealift, the RRF primarily supports transport of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment, combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the critical surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled. The RRF provides nearly one-half of the government-owned surge sealift capability. Management of the RRF program is defined by a MOA between DOD and DOT.

1. The RRF now consists of 51 ships including: 35 roll-on/roll off vessels with eight fast sealift ships, four heavy lift or barge carrying ships, six auxiliary craneships, two tankers, two aviation repair vessels, and two special mission ships. Most RRF ships are berthed at various US ports. These outported locations are coordinated with military planners and chosen to minimize sailing time to strategic loadout ports. Outported RRF ships are also used as training platforms for cargo handling by USN and Army units and for HS training by various LEAs.

2. RRF ships are expected to be fully operational within their assigned 5- and 10-day readiness status and sail to designated loading berths. Commercial US ship managers provide systems maintenance, equipment repairs, logistics support, activation, manning, and operations management by contract. Ships in priority readiness have reduced operating status maintenance crews of about 10 commercial merchant mariners that are supplemented by additional mariners during activations. Readiness of the RRF is periodically tested by DOD directed activations of ships for military cargo operations and exercises.
4. Interagency Relationships

   a. DOT maintains relationships with many components of DOD.

   b. DOT has considerable expertise involving the civilian and military use of the Nation’s transportation system. For this reason, DOT can redirect the Nation’s transportation assets and change priorities, usually through Presidential executive order or emergency decrees.

   c. The FAA and DOD have significant mutual interests with regard to military aviation, aeronautical charts and publications, Notices to Airmen, military airport operations and certification, airspace management during national crises, and airspace control and certification of expeditionary aviation facilities overseas during military contingency operations.
ANNEX I TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

1. Overview

The Department of the Treasury (TREAS) (http://www.ustreas.gov) serves the American people and strengthens national security by managing the USG’s finances effectively, promoting economic growth and stability, and ensuring the safety, soundness, and security of the US and international financial systems.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

TREAS is the executive agency responsible for promoting economic prosperity and ensuring the financial security of the United States. TREAS is responsible for a wide range of activities such as advising the President on economic and financial issues, encouraging sustainable economic growth, and fostering improved governance in financial institutions. TREAS operates and maintains systems that are critical to the Nation’s financial infrastructure, such as the production of coin and currency, the disbursement of payments to the American public, revenue collection, and the borrowing of funds necessary to run the USG. TREAS works with other federal agencies, foreign governments, and international financial institutions to encourage global economic growth, raise standards of living, and to the extent possible, predict and prevent economic and financial crises. TREAS also performs a critical and far-reaching role in enhancing national security by implementing economic sanctions against foreign threats to the US, identifying and targeting the financial support networks of national security threats, and improving the safeguards of our financial systems.

3. Organizational Structure

a. TREAS is organized into two major components: the departmental offices and the operating bureaus. The departmental offices are primarily responsible for the formulation of policy and management for TREAS as a whole, while the operating bureaus carry out the specific operations assigned to TREAS. The bureaus make up 98% of the TREAS work force.

b. The basic functions of the TREAS include:

(1) Managing federal finances.

(2) Collecting taxes, duties, and monies paid to and due to the US and paying all bills of the US.

(3) Currency and coinage.

(4) Managing government accounts and the public debt.

(5) Supervising national banks and thrift institutions.
Annex I to Appendix A

(6) Advising on domestic and international financial, monetary, economic, trade, and tax policy.

(7) Enforcing federal finance and tax laws.

(8) Investigating and prosecuting tax evaders, counterfeiters, and forgers.

c. The mission of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is to marshal TREAS’s policy, enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence functions in order to sever the lines of financial support to international terrorists, proliferators of WMD, narcotics traffickers, and other threats to our national security. There are financial networks that underlie all of these threats, and those networks are sources of valuable intelligence and present vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

(1) The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of WMD, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. OFAC acts under Presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on UN and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments.

(2) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign CI information related to the operation and responsibilities of TREAS. The office is a member of the US IC. Its mission is to support the formulation of policy and execution of TREAS authorities by providing expert analysis and intelligence production on financial and other support networks for terrorist groups, proliferators, and other key national security threats; and timely, accurate, and focused intelligence support on the full range of economic, political, and security issues.

(a) The Iraq Threat Finance Cell is jointly led by TREAS and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Baghdad. It performs financial intelligence analysis concerning insurgent and terrorist elements in Iraq. It collects, processes, and disseminates financial intelligence to support efforts to detect, identify, and disrupt insurgent or terrorist elements. Assignments to the cell are voluntary and provide valuable opportunities to work with military, diplomatic, IC, and law enforcement elements while serving overseas.

(b) Liaison Positions. In order to enhance integration and collaboration with other IC elements, Office of Intelligence and Analysis deploys personnel to organizations such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), FBI, CIA, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, and USEUCOM. These liaisons serve as valuable points of contact at their respective posts and provide guidance, advice, and expertise to these organizations regarding TREAS-related matters.
(c) Treasury attachés enable TREAS to collaborate with foreign counterpart agencies in order to advance US policies in the economic and illicit financing arenas. An attaché represents TREAS for a one to three year period and assists the US ambassador by providing analytical support and policy advice regarding TREAS issues. TREAS currently has positions established throughout the world including in Europe, Asia, South America, and the Middle East.

(3) Protecting charities from terrorist abuse is a critical component of the global fight against terrorism. Charities provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need around the world. Unfortunately, terrorists have exploited the charitable sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organizations and operations. This abuse threatens to undermine donor confidence and jeopardizes the integrity of the charitable sector, whose services are indispensable to the world community. The charitable sector is one that has consistently faced a high risk of abuse from terrorists and terrorist organizations. Charities operating overseas in areas of high risk are especially vulnerable to this abuse. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has designated several charities worldwide as supporting terrorist activity. A list of these charities can be found at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement. In addition, the United States has designated several foreign terrorist organizations that have operated under various names that appear as potential fundraising front organizations for terrorist activity. Terrorist abuse of the charitable sector can take many forms, including:

(a) Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of terrorist organizations;

(b) Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across geographical boundaries;

(c) Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support terrorist organizations; and

(d) Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for terrorist organizations and their ideology.

d. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network supports law enforcement investigative efforts and fosters interagency and global cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes. It also provides US policy makers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide trends and patterns. The network’s International Programs Division works to establish and strengthen mechanisms for the exchange of information globally, and to engage, encourage, and support international partners in taking necessary steps to construct regimes to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes.

(1) The network offers a wide array of technical assistance to foreign governments, providing policy recommendations and guidance, analytical training, technological advice, and staff support in order to foster the implementation of anti-
money laundering and CT financing regimes worldwide. The network supports US bilateral and multilateral efforts to join with other nations in a concerted fashion to combat transnational crime.

(2) The International Programs Division responds to requests from Egmont financial intelligence units, as well as acts as a conduit for requests from domestic law enforcement to foreign financial intelligence units. Financial intelligence units offer LEAs around the world an important avenue for information exchange. There are currently 108 countries with recognized operational units, with others in various stages of development. Financial intelligence units, at a minimum, receive, analyze, and disclose information by financial institutions to competent authorities of suspicious or unusual financial transactions. Most financial intelligence units can exchange information with foreign counterparts.
ANNEX J TO APPENDIX A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. Overview

a. The CIA is an independent agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior US policymakers. The CIA’s primary mission is to collect, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the president and senior USG policymakers in making decisions relating to the national security. The CIA does not make policy; it is an independent source of foreign intelligence information for those who do. The CIA may also engage in covert action at the president’s direction in accordance with applicable law.

b. The CIA is the Nation’s first line of defense. The CIA accomplishes what others cannot accomplish and goes where others cannot go. The CIA carries out its mission by:

   (1) Collecting information that reveals the plans, intentions, and capabilities of US adversaries and provides the basis for decision and action.

   (2) Producing timely analysis that provides insight, warning, and opportunity to the President and decision makers charged with protecting and advancing America’s interests.

   (3) Conducting covert action at the direction of the President to preempt threats or achieve US policy objectives.

c. As a separate agency, CIA serves as an independent source of analysis on topics of concern and also works closely with the other organizations in the IC to ensure that the intelligence consumer—whether Washington policymaker or battlefield commander—receives the best intelligence possible.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 restructured the IC by abolishing the position of Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and creating the position of Director of the CIA (D/CIA). The act also created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which oversees the IC and the NCTC.

b. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The D/CIA serves as the head of the CIA and reports to the DNI. The D/CIA is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The D/CIA manages the operations, personnel, and budget of the CIA and acts as the National Human Source Intelligence Manager.
c. CIA Responsibilities. The CIA, under the direction of the President or the NSC, is responsible for the following:

(1) Collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that it shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.

(2) Correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence.

(3) Providing overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the IC authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the USG which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensuring that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection.

(4) Performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the DNI may direct.

3. Organizational Structure

The CIA is separated into four basic components: the National Clandestine Service (NCS), the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Directorate of Support. They carry out the process of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence to top USG officials.

a. The NCS has responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, primarily human source intelligence. The NCS serves as the national authority for coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of clandestine human source intelligence operations across the IC, consistent with existing laws, executive orders, and interagency agreements. The NCS is the front-line source of clandestine intelligence on critical international developments ranging from terrorism and weapons proliferation to military and political issues. To gather this important intelligence, CIA operations officers live and work overseas to establish and maintain networks and personal relationships with foreign “assets” in the field.

b. The Directorate of Intelligence analyzes all-source intelligence and produces reports, briefings, and papers on key foreign intelligence issues. This information comes from a variety of sources and methods, including US personnel overseas, agent reports, satellite photography, foreign media, and sophisticated sensors. The directorate is responsible for timeliness, accuracy, and relevance of intelligence analysis that is of concern to national security policymakers and other intelligence consumers. While the CIA does not make foreign policy, its analysis of intelligence on overseas developments feeds into the informed decisions by policymakers and other senior decision makers in the national security and defense arenas.
c. The Directorate of Science and Technology accesses, collects, and exploits information to facilitate the execution of the CIA’s mission by applying innovative, scientific, engineering, and technical solutions to the most critical intelligence problems. The directorate incorporates over 50 different disciplines ranging from computer programmers and engineers to scientists and analysts. It partners with many other organizations in the IC, using best practices to foster creative thinking and working level coordination. The directorate continually seeks to push the boundaries of the state-of-the-art, infusing cutting-edge technologies with effective targeting and tradecraft.

d. The Directorate of Support provides support that is critical to the CIA’s intelligence mission. The directorate delivers a full range of support, including: acquisitions, communications, facilities services, financial management, information technology, medical services, logistics, and the security of CIA personnel, information, facilities, and technology. Its services are international in focus, clandestine in nature, and offered on a 24/7 basis. Its responsibilities extend well beyond the CIA, into the greater IC.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The CIA’s reconnaissance and intelligence assessment capabilities are essential ingredients to interagency strategic and operational planning. They provide real-time response in the quest for essential information to form the basis for interagency action.

b. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) provides the full range of the CIA’s intelligence and operational capabilities to support deployed US forces. The Office is composed of CIA personnel from all directorates and of military detailees from all the uniformed Services. The OMA is the only CIA component with the exclusive mission of supporting military plans and operations and has the mandate to coordinate overall IC support to military customers.

5. Interagency Relationships

The CIA is involved with other agencies of the USG on a regular basis, to include the following:

a. National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC, managed by a Chairman and Vice Chairman for Evaluations and a Vice Chairman for Estimates, is comprised of national intelligence officers—senior experts drawn from all elements of the IC and from outside the USG. The national intelligence officers concentrate on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of particular functional areas, such as economics and weapons proliferation. They produce national intelligence estimates.

b. National Intelligence Support Team. A NIST provides national level, all-source intelligence support from throughout the IC to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. NISTs are comprised of intelligence and communications experts from DIA, CIA, NGA, NSA, and other agencies as required to support the specific needs of the JFC. DIA’s Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center is
the NIST program’s executive agent and has delegated the NIST mission to the Deployable Support Branch. The Deployable Support Branch manages daily operations and interagency coordination for all NISTs. The NIST’s reach back capability can provide answers to time-sensitive requests for information, special assessments, indications and warnings, immediate access to national databases, direct geospatial production support, and deployed/resident agency analyst coordination.

*For more information, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*
ANNEX K TO APPENDIX A
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Overview

The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the NSC’s function has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The NSC gives advice on integrating foreign, economic, and military policies as they relate to national security. It develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The national security staff is the President’s principal staff for national security issues. NSC documents are established to inform USG departments and agencies of Presidential actions.

b. Each administration typically adopts different names for its NSC documents. For example, The Reagan Administration used the terms NSDD [national security decision directive] and NSSD [national security study directive]. The George H. W. Bush Administration used NSR [national security review] and NSD [national security directive], while the Clinton Administration used the terms PDD [Presidential decision directive] and PRD [Presidential review directive]. The George W. Bush Administration used NSPD [national security Presidential directive] and homeland security Presidential directive [HSPD]. The Obama Administration uses the terms PPD and PSD [Presidential study directive].

c. The NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 235 - 61, Statute 496; Title 50, USC, Section 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Title 50, USC, Section 401). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the NSC was placed in the Executive Office of the President.

For more information on the NSC and its membership, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

3. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The NSC (Figure A-K-1) is responsible for managing the interagency process with respect to all national security related issues. At its core, the purpose of the interagency process is to advance the President’s policy priorities and, more generally, to serve the national interest by ensuring that all agencies and perspectives that can contribute to achieving these priorities participate in making and implementing policy.
Those who participate in the interagency process—regardless of position—do so as representatives of their respective agencies. They also serve the Nation’s greater interests by being participants in a unique process to resolve common problems and advance common policies. The interagency process therefore must advance the interests of the Administration as a whole and all participants should engage in the process from that perspective. The NSC’s role is to manage an interagency process that is strategic, agile, transparent, and predictable—all in order to advance the national security interests of the United States.

b. **NSC Functions.** The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council [NEC])—enabling the
military services and the other USG departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in national security matters. Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC is the President’s principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development of national security policy. The NSC subsequently monitors the implementation of national security policy. The NSC assesses and appraises the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power; and considers policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the USG concerned with national security, and makes recommendations to the President.

c. NSC Organization. The members of the NSC constitute the President’s personal and principal staff for national security issues. The council tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President. It takes a central coordinating or monitoring role in the development of policy and options depending on the desires of the President and the National Security Advisor. There are three levels of formal interagency committees for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues as listed below. Participation among USG agencies in the NSCs and these advisory bodies are depicted in Figure A-K-2. The advisory bodies include:

(1) The NSC/PC is the senior Cabinet-level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC meets at the call of and is chaired by the National Security Advisor.

(2) The NSC/DC is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary-level) interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC interagency process including NSC/IPCs. The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The NSC/DC shall focus significant attention on policy implementation. Periodic reviews of the Administration’s major foreign policy initiatives shall be scheduled to ensure that they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner. Such reviews should periodically consider whether existing policy directives should be revamped or rescinded. Finally, the NSC/DC shall be responsible for day-to-day crisis management, reporting to the NSC. Any NSC principal or deputy, as well as the National Security Advisor, may request a meeting of the NSC/DC in its crisis management capacity. The NSC/DC meets at the call of and is chaired by the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor.

(3) NSC/IPCs are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. NSC/IPCs manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSCS, and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The NSC/IPCs shall be established at the direction of the NSC/DC, and be chaired by the NSC (or NEC, as appropriate); at its discretion, the NSC/DC may add co-chairs to any NSC/IPC if desirable. The NSC/IPCs shall convene
## PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES

### PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE</th>
<th>JOINT STAFF</th>
<th>DEPARTMENT OF STATE</th>
<th>OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>President, Vice President, Dir National Intelligence, National Security Advisor, US Rep to UN, Sec of TREAS, Asst for Economic Policy, Chief of Staff to the President, Attorney General, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary for Policy</td>
<td>Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary for International Affairs</td>
<td>National Security Advisor to the Vice President, Other Deputies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERAGENCY POLICY COMMITTEES**

Representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the National Security Council/Deputies Committee.

### LEGEND

- **ASST**: assistant
- **DNI**: Director of National Intelligence
- **DIR**: director
- **REP**: representative
- **SEC**: secretary
- **TREAS**: Department of the Treasury
- **UN**: United Nations
- **US**: United States

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**Figure A-K-2. Participation in National Security Council System Activities**
on a regular basis to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas. Strict guidelines shall be established governing the operation of the IPCs, including participants, decision-making paths, and time frame.

(a) **During a rapidly developing crisis**, the President may request the National Security Advisor to convene the NSC. The NSC reviews the situation and takes appropriate action.

(b) **Under more routine conditions, concerns focus on broader aspects of national policy and long-term strategy perspectives.** Policy and strategy documents outline specific national interests, overall national policy objectives, and tasks for the appropriate components of the executive branch.
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1. Overview

The Peace Corps’ (http://www.peacecorps.gov) mission has three simple goals.

a. Helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women.

b. Helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served.

c. Helping promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The Peace Corps is an independent federal agency committed to meeting the basic needs of those living in the countries in which it operates. President John F. Kennedy created the Peace Corps by executive order in 1961.

3. Organizational Structure

The Peace Corps is headquartered in Washington, DC. Approximately 7,800 Peace Corps volunteers and trainees serve in over 76 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Europe.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

Peace Corps volunteers work in a wide variety of areas.

a. Agriculture. Work with small farmers to increase food production while promoting environmental conservation practices.

b. Education, Youth Outreach, and Community Development. Introduce innovative teaching methodologies, encourage critical thinking in the classroom, and integrate issues like health education and environmental awareness into English, math, science, and other subjects.

c. Environment. Work on a wide variety of activities, from teaching environmental awareness to planting trees within a community.

d. Health. Educate and promote awareness issues such as malnutrition and safe drinking water.
e. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Provide hope and meaningful assistance to people affected by HIV/AIDS.

f. Business Development. Work in education, private businesses, public organizations, government offices, cooperatives, women’s and youth groups, and more.

g. Information and Communications Technology. Help communities capitalize on technologies by teaching computer and multimedia skills, developing regional databases, and implementing networks for NGOs, businesses, and government offices.

5. Interagency Relationships

a. Peace Corps volunteers, by nature of their commitment and responsibilities, traditionally work as members of a team. Through its collaborative agreements with USG agencies and ongoing cooperation and coordination with NGOs and with self-help grants to indigenous groups, the Peace Corps strengthens and increases its impact.

b. Although working in a broad sense to further USG foreign policy and development goals, the Peace Corps is an independent federal agency. As such, although its projects are coordinated with the relevant HN organizations and the appropriate elements of the embassy, it works independently with little day-to-day contact with the US mission or other USG organizations. In many countries, Peace Corps coordinates its efforts with local NGOs.

c. To fulfill its responsibilities successfully and to retain its unique people-to-people character, the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of foreign policy. The Peace Corps’ role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the US mission are not comparable to those of other USG agencies. Peace Corps activities must be completely and absolutely separated from intelligence activities. There should be no contact whatsoever between anyone in the IC and any Peace Corps volunteer or trainee. Peace Corps staff should not be included in meetings where defense or intelligence issues are discussed, unless volunteer safety is at issue.
1. Overview

   a. USAID (http://www.usaid.gov) is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. It is the principal US agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. USAID supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances US foreign policy objectives by supporting economic growth, agriculture, and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance. USAID works in agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, the environment, education, health, global partnerships, and humanitarian assistance in more than 100 countries to provide a better future for all.

   b. USAID provides assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia. USAID’s strength is its field offices in many regions of the world. USAID works in close partnership with NGOs, IGOs, IPI, universities, American businesses, other governments, trade and professional associations, faith-based organizations, and USG agencies. USAID has working relationships, through cooperative agreements, contracts, and grant agreements, with more than 3,500 companies and over 300 US-based NGOs.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

   a. USAID works largely in support of DOS and manages a worldwide network of country programs for economic and policy reforms that generates sound economic growth, encourages political freedom and good governance, and invests in human resource development.

   b. USAID plays a vital role in promoting US national security, foreign policy, and the war on terrorism. It does so by addressing poverty fueled by lack of economic opportunity, one of the root causes of violence today. As stated in the NSS, USAID’s work in development joins diplomacy and defense as one of three key pieces of the Nation’s foreign policy apparatus. USAID efforts to improve the lives of millions of people worldwide represent US values and advance US interests for peace and prosperity.

   c. USAID is also the principal agency charged with coordinating the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide. Through its OFDA, USAID administers the President’s authority to provide emergency relief and long-term humanitarian assistance in response to disasters as declared by the ambassador within the affected country or higher DOS authority. USAID/OFDA may also expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through NGOs, IGOs, and other sources of relief capacity.

   d. When a disaster declaration has been made by the Ambassador, USAID coordinates the USG response. The Director of OFDA has primary responsibility for
initiating this response. The Administrator of USAID, as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, has delegated the authority to coordinate response to international disasters to OFDA, which is organized under USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). USAID/OFDA responsibilities include:

(1) Organize and coordinate the total USG disaster relief response.

(2) Respond to embassy and/or mission requests for disaster assistance.

(3) Initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.

(4) Coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs.

3. Organizational Structure

a. At its Washington, DC HQ, USAID’s mission is carried out through four regional bureaus: Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia. These are supported by three technical (or pillar) bureaus that provide expertise in democracy promotion, accountable governance, disaster relief, conflict prevention, economic growth, agricultural productivity, environmental protection, education reform, and global health challenges such as maternal/child health and AIDS.

(1) USAID operating units located overseas are known as field missions. Full field missions usually consist of 9–15 US direct-hire employees, along with a varying number of other personnel. They conduct USAID’s major programs worldwide, managing a program of four or more strategic objectives. Medium-sized missions (5–8 US direct-hire) manage a program targeting two to three strategic objectives, and small missions (3–4 US direct-hire) manage one or two strategic objectives. These missions assist their HN based on an integrated strategy that includes clearly defined program goals and performance targets. USAID missions operate under decentralized program authorities (legal powers) allowing missions to design and implement programs and negotiate and execute agreements. These authorities are assigned to senior field officers in accordance with each officer’s functions. In countries with a US embassy, the USAID mission director reports directly to the ambassador, who serves as the COM for all USG agencies in a given country. As a key member of the country team, the USAID mission director is often called upon to stand in for the ambassador or the DCM during their absences.

(2) Regional support missions (typically 12–16 US direct-hire), also known as regional hubs, provide a variety of services. The hubs house a team of legal advisors, contracting and project design officers, and financial services managers to support small and medium-sized missions. In countries without integrated strategies, but where aid is necessary, regional missions work with NGOs to implement programs that help to facilitate the emergence of civil society, alleviate repression, head off conflict, combat epidemics, or improve food security. Regional missions can also have their own program of strategic objectives to manage.
b. The Bureau for Global Health is USAID’s center of excellence and focal point in providing worldwide leadership and technical expertise in the areas of child and maternal health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, infectious disease, population, family planning and related reproductive health, and health systems. As such, the Bureau aligns resources with identified public health and development needs, and influences the global health priorities of the US private sector, US-based foundations, other donor organizations, HN governments, and HN civil society organizations. It also serves as the primary source of technical expertise and intellectual capital to USAID and other US foreign affairs agencies. The Bureau for Global Health is USAID’s repository for state of the art thinking in biomedical, social science, and operations research and works to produce technical advances and innovations that can be disseminated and replicated at USAID Missions throughout the world.

c. The Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade provides a central USAID focus for the design, implementation, review, coordination, and evaluation of worldwide activities in the areas of economic growth, poverty reduction, education, economic infrastructure, agriculture, environment, natural resources management, and women in development and for supporting nationally or regionally implemented activities in these areas.

d. DCHA provides technical leadership and expertise in coordinating USAID’s democracy programs; international disaster assistance; emergency and developmental food aid; aid to manage and mitigate conflict; and volunteer programs. DCHA provides technical leadership, support, and advice in developing policy and programs to assist countries transitioning out of crisis and administers disaster assistance, preparedness, and mitigation. DCHA also provides capacity building for US NGOs and aid to American schools and hospitals abroad. DCHA provides technical advice and support to the USAID Administrator, regional bureaus, field missions, and other offices with regard to these programs.

(1) The OMA addresses areas of common interests between defense and development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness programs and coordination. Program areas of common interest include, but may not be limited to, FHA, CT, SC, conflict prevention and mitigation, counterinsurgency, post-conflict R&S, and transformational development. OMA serves as the USAID-wide unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship and consists of two divisions.

(a) The Planning Division serves as the overall coordination unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship, and for planning and developing effective operations. This includes developing a joint information network; prioritizing requests for participation in events, exchanges, and exercises; and overseeing program planning and development for priority regions and countries. It coordinates USAID civilian-military planning and analysis with DOD, S/CRS, and USG agencies. It manages training programs for selected military and civilian audiences; develops guidance on USAID and NGOs for use in the civilian-military context; and develops and manages staff, budgets, contracts, grants, and other mechanisms required to perform division duties, including program development, planning, training, and
exercises. Finally, the Planning Division serves as the base for USAID personnel trained in the war colleges or other DOD institutes.

(b) The Operations Division serves as the lead unit to develop operational readiness, leadership, and coordinated response capacity for field operations requiring joint USAID-military action. Its functions include developing a network of contacts in the military as needed for operational readiness; supporting combatant commands during major operations; and conducting liaison with the Planning Division to develop a joint planning capacity within the combatant commands. It develops and leads the implementation of annual work plans with geographic and functional combatant commands; develops and maintains at least two rapid deployment teams that manage emergency responses; and develops a common logistics platform with OFDA, field missions, and DOD for R&S initiatives. It keeps USAID bureaus informed of pending and ongoing field operations involving the US military; works with NGO and military personnel and organizations to strengthen field coordination; and develops a leadership training program, including long-term and short-term modules.

(2) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) supports local partners to advance peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. At the request of and in coordination with the Congress, DOS, and the appropriate in-country US ambassadors and USAID field missions, OTI seizes critical windows of opportunity to provide on-the-ground, fast, flexible, catalytic short-term assistance that promotes movement toward political and social stability and democracy. OTI programs in such countries should continue until reasonable stability is established and an effective hand-off is completed to longer-term institutional development efforts.

(a) The management and program operations team enhances and facilitates OTI activities worldwide by contributing to OTI’s strategic plan and managing OTI’s policy formulation; monitoring and evaluation of activities; internal communications and public outreach; budget formulation; tracking and reconciliation; procurement planning and processing; and general operations support and administrative services.

(b) The field operations team develops and oversees OTI country programs, including country strategies, program design, implementation, and donor coordination; and conducts liaison with USAID bureaus, field missions, and USG agencies to ensure policy compliance and coordination.

(3) Office of Food for Peace provides leadership, coordination, and operational support for international food activities. It develops USG policy, formal positions, and funding levels for grants and cooperative agreements to the World Food Programme (WFP), NGOs, and in selected instances governments, implementing food programs. It provides assistance for emergency operations and support for USAID food security and developmental objectives. The office implements legislation and policies governing the donation of US agricultural commodities. It manages a budget of over a billion dollars annually, and also oversees the procurement and shipping of over two million metric tons of food annually. The Famine Early Warning System is also part of the office.
(4) OFDA coordinates and ensures that the needs of disaster victims are met by providing all forms of relief and rehabilitation. OFDA provides technical support to the Administrator, who serves as the President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in coordination with USG agencies. OFDA works with national and international foreign affairs agencies, DOD, DOS, UN agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector in disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation. OFDA funds and procures relief supplies and administrative support for short- and long-term disaster situations and provides humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance to foreign disaster victims.

(a) The Disaster Response and Mitigation Division coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies and humanitarian assistance. It plans for the level of response needed for an emergency and implements and manages USG disaster relief and rehabilitation programs worldwide. It devises, coordinates, and implements program strategies for the application of the most current science and technology to prevention, mitigation, and national and international preparedness for a variety of natural and man-made disaster situations. It evaluates the impact of previous disaster response initiatives/programs and ensures the integration of this information into future planning and response activities. It coordinates with other USAID geographic bureaus’ donor organizations, UN agencies, and NGOs.

(b) The Operations Division develops and manages logistical, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. It identifies sources for procurement of relief supplies and manages the stockpiling and transportation of those supplies. It maintains readiness to respond to emergencies through several mechanisms, including managing SAR teams, maintaining the operational status of the ground operations team, and developing and maintaining the capability to field DARTs and response management teams in Washington. It develops and maintains OFDA’s relationship with DOD, FEMA, DOS, and DOE.

(c) The DART was developed by USAID’s OFDA to provide rapid response to foreign disasters. A DART provides a variety of trained specialists to assist US embassies and USAID missions with managing the USG response to foreign disasters. DART activities vary according to the nature, magnitude, and complexity of each disaster and are staffed accordingly.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. **Agriculture.** USAID works with all participants in agricultural development to support efforts to increase productivity.

b. **Democracy and Governance.** Expanding the global community of democracies is a key objective of US foreign policy. USAID provides technical leadership and strategic support in promoting sustainable democracies.
c. **Economic Growth and Trade.** USAID economic growth and trade programs provide support both to government and private sector partners in lower-income countries to improve the levels of income their citizens enjoy.

d. **Environment.** USAID takes an integrated approach to natural resources management. Land and water must be managed skillfully so that they are able to maintain our basic ability to produce food for the nine billion people that the world is expected to have by 2050.

e. **Education and Training.** USAID emphasizes programs of support for basic education and places a special emphasis on improving opportunities for girls, women, and other underserved and disadvantaged populations.

f. **Global Health.** USAID’s programs in global health represent the commitment and determination of the USG to prevent suffering, save lives, and create a brighter future for families in the developing world.

g. **Global Partnerships.** USAID works in cooperation with US and international partners to improve conditions for people around the world. USAID is committed to an approach that recognizes and incorporates the efforts of partnership and private giving, focusing on grassroots support, local ownership, sustainability, accountability, and—not least—passion and commitment.

h. **Humanitarian Assistance.** The United States gives more to those in crisis than any other country in the world. USAID is the USG agency that is responsible for directing these contributions to thousands of nonprofit partners and international organizations. USAID ensures that all of this assistance is spent in the way that most effectively helps those who are in need.

i. **Cross-Cutting Programs.** Some parts of USAID’s work are best implemented by working through USAID’s key sectors to implement their goals in a coordinated fashion and to call attention to these issues in each programmatic area. These are called cross-cutting programs, and include:

   (1) **Transition Initiatives.** Provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance to take advantage of windows of opportunity to build democracy and peace. This program lays the foundations for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting economies, and helping stable democracy take hold.

   (2) **Private and Voluntary Cooperation.** USAID has forged critical ties with US NGOs committed to participating in development. It has used competitive grants and programs to help deliver essential services in underserved communities.

   (3) **Conflict Management.** Violence, or the imminent threat of violence, can destabilize a society in ways that traditional USAID programs are often ill-prepared to identify and address. USAID takes a lead role in designing development assistance programs that better address the causes and consequences of violent conflict.
(4) **Urban Programs.** USAID’s urban programs improve the living conditions of the urban poor, while protecting the well-being of future generations.

(5) **Water.** USAID has made the preservation and environmentally sound development of the world’s water resources a top priority.

(6) **Women in Development.** The contributions that women make to the economic, social, and political lives of their nations, communities, families, and the next generation make them key actors in effective development. USAID’s approach to gender is to design programs that take both women’s and men’s participation into account.

5. **Interagency Relationships**

USAID/OFDA has established relationships with several USG agencies and dozens of NGOs and IGOs. In carrying out its responsibilities, USAID/OFDA draws on these agencies and organizations, as required, to coordinate the USG’s response to foreign disasters. Similarly, these agencies and organizations look to USAID/OFDA for advice and assistance, as appropriate, in handling their assigned responsibilities. USAID/OFDA currently has agreements with the following:

a. USDA’s US Forest Service and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management, for emergency managers, logisticians, communicators, and firefighting experts.

b. Commissioned Corps of the US Public Health Service (USPHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for health assessment and to provide medical personnel, equipment, and supplies.


d. NOAA, for typhoon, hurricane, and cyclone reporting and assessment.

e. FEMA, for training in disaster management, emergency preparedness, and relief for HN disaster specialists.

f. DOD, for matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected country and for arranging DOD transportation.

(1) DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID/OFDA. OUSD(P) is DOD’s primary POC. JS POC is the Chief, JLOC (J-4).

*For more information on FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

(2) Although USAID is concerned primarily with development and civic assistance, many programs it administers, particularly in weak or fragile states, are security related. The USAID representative in the HN coordinates USAID managed
assistance programs with other members of the country team, including the DOD representative. Coordination is also with all other assistance programs managed by USG departments or agencies active in the HN. The USAID representatives in a HN help coordinate US foreign assistance with other multilateral, bilateral, and US private assistance programs to that country.

*For more information on USAID, see USAID Primer.*

## 6. District Stability Framework

a. The District Stability Framework (DSF) is a methodology designed for use by both military and civilian personnel to identify the underlying causes of instability and conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the root causes of instability and conflict, and measure the effectiveness of programming. It is employed to gather information using the following lenses: operational environment, cultural environment, local perceptions, and stability/instability dynamics. This information then helps identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust programming targeted at diminishing the causes of instability or conflict.

b. The DSF has four major components: gaining situational awareness (from the four lenses of data mentioned above); analyzing that data; designing effective programming based on that analysis; and monitoring and evaluating programming.

c. USAID conducts training for deploying personnel on DSF. Wherever possible, USAID seeks to raise awareness of development and conflict mitigation and to help preempt these issues before military and civilian personnel are sent into hostile areas in reaction to them.

EPA’s mission is to protect human health and the environment. EPA leads the Nation’s environmental science, research, education, and assessment efforts. EPA works closely with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and Indian tribes to develop and enforce regulations under existing environmental laws. EPA is responsible for researching and setting national standards for a variety of environmental programs and delegates to states and tribes responsibility for issuing permits, and monitoring and enforcing compliance. Where national standards are not met, EPA can issue sanctions and take other steps to assist the states and tribes in reaching the desired levels of environmental quality. EPA also works with businesses, nonprofit organizations, and state and local governments through dozens of partnerships in a wide variety of voluntary pollution prevention programs and energy conservation efforts. EPA, along with the USCG, also has significant responsibilities under the NRF for ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) and under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Title 40, CFR, Part 300. EPA, depending upon the location of the incident, is generally the lead for directing the USG’s response to assessing and cleaning up CBRN, industrial material, and numerous other source contaminate responses. EPA leads interagency and intergovernmental planning and response teams to that end. DOD has membership on those teams to varying degrees. During significant disaster and routine responses, EPA often activates the regional response team, an interagency support team, to support the federal on-scene coordinator. The national response team may also be activated. Information on the teams can be found in Title 40, CFR, Part 300 and at http://www.nrt.org. The federal on-scene coordinator will utilize the ICS to manage the response. Often, the federal on-scene coordinator will establish a unified command structure under ICS to bring in other parties that have a significant interest in the response. Other agencies may be in the command post in planning positions, as liaisons, or in other capacities. In addition, the federal on-scene coordinator may establish a command post where tactical planning takes place. The command post is most often located much closer to the incident than the JFO.

For additional information, refer to the DODIs in the 4715 series concerning environmental programs, compliance, and coordination.
Intentionally Blank
1. US General Services Administration

The GSA (http://www.usa.gov) leverages the buying power of the USG to acquire best value for taxpayers and federal customers. GSA exercises responsible asset management; delivers superior workplaces, quality acquisition services, and expert business solutions; and develops innovative and effective management policies. GSA oversees the business of the USG. GSA’s acquisition solutions supply federal purchasers with cost-effective, high-quality products and services from commercial vendors. GSA provides workplaces for federal employees, and oversees the preservation of historic federal properties. Its policies covering travel, property, and management practices promote efficient government operations. GSA helps keep the Nation safe by providing tools, equipment, and non-tactical vehicles to the US military, and providing state and local governments with law enforcement equipment, firefighting and rescue equipment, and disaster recovery products and services. GSA provides direct access to a wide range of government services, as well as consumer protection information through the official Web portal of the USG.

2. Office of Emergency Response and Recovery

The Office of Emergency Response and Recovery helps to ensure that GSA maintains a constant state of readiness to perform its essential functions in response to natural or man-made disasters or catastrophic emergencies in support of national continuity responsibilities, and to quickly resume normal operations. It is composed of four divisions and one team, and reports directly to GSA’s Chief of Staff through its Training and Exercise Division. It coordinates GSA participation in international as well as state and local disaster exercise programs.
1. Overview

The mission of the ODNI is to create decision advantage. It integrates foreign, military, and domestic intelligence capabilities through policy, personnel, and technology actions to provide decision advantage to policy makers, warfighters, HS officials, and law enforcement personnel.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. DNI serves as the head of the IC, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the NSC, and the HSC for intelligence matters related to national security. ODNI’s goal is to effectively integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence in defense of the homeland and of United States interests abroad.

b. With this goal in mind, Congress provided the DNI with a number of authorities and duties, as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. These charge the DNI to:

   (1) Ensure that timely and objective national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch; CJCS and senior military commanders; and Congress.

   (2) Establish objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence.

   (3) Ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the IC.

   (4) Develop and ensure the execution of an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program based on budget proposals provided by IC component organizations.

   (5) Oversee coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security services of foreign governments and international organizations.

   (6) Ensure the most accurate analysis of intelligence is derived from all sources to support national security needs.

   (7) Develop personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint operations and to facilitate staffing of community management functions.

   (8) Oversee the development and implementation of a program management plan for acquisition of major systems, doing so jointly with SecDef for DOD programs, that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program milestone criteria.
3. Organizational Structure

Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the DNI reports directly to the President. The DNI through the efforts of the Principal Deputy Director, the Director of the Intelligence Staff, four deputy directors, (i.e., Analysis; Collection; Policy, Plans, and Requirements; and Acquisitions and Technology), and assisted by several country specific mission management teams and a number of support activities and centers, coordinates the activities of the 16 US intelligence agencies to achieve critical national objectives.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The National Intelligence Emergency Management Activity’s mission is to plan and manage the ODNI’s Emergency Management and Continuity programs and build an enduring, collaborative strategic system to ensure the ODNI can perform its primary mission essential functions and the DNI can:

   (1) Head and lead the IC.
   (2) Serve as the President’s principal intelligence advisor.
   (3) Direct the National Intelligence Program.
   (4) Reduce the loss of ODNI lives and resources.
   (5) Maintain situational awareness of ODNI and IC personnel, resources, and capabilities.

b. The NIC is the IC’s center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking. Its primary functions are to:

   (1) Support the DNI in his role as head of the IC.
   (2) Provide a focal point for policymakers to task the IC to answer their questions.
   (3) Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the IC’s perspective.
   (4) Contribute to the IC’s effort to allocate its resources in response to policymakers’ changing needs.
   (5) Lead the IC’s effort to produce national intelligence estimates and other NIC products.

c. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive is part of the ODNI and is staffed by senior CI and other specialists from across the national intelligence and security communities. The office develops, coordinates, and produces:
(1) Annual foreign intelligence threat assessments and other analytic CI products.

(2) An annual national CI strategy for the USG.

(3) Priorities for CI collection, investigations, and operations.

(4) CI program budgets and evaluations that reflect strategic priorities.

(5) In-depth espionage damage assessments.

(6) CI awareness, outreach, and training standards policies.

d. The NCTC leads our Nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.

For more information, see Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.”

e. The ISE is an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information. It is a trusted partnership among all levels of government in the United States, the private sector, and our foreign partners, in order to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United States by the effective and efficient sharing of terrorism and HS information. The ISE aligns and leverages existing information sharing policies, business processes, technologies, systems, and promotes a culture of information sharing through increased collaboration.

f. Special Security Center (SSC). The SSC exists to assist the DNI, in his dual role as head of the IC, and as the Security Executive Agent for USG security clearance programs (pursuant to Executive Order 13467). The SSC assists in the execution of DNI responsibility to share and protect national intelligence information throughout the IC, the USG, US contractors, state and local officials, and our foreign partners.

(1) The SSC’s objectives include:

(a) Fostering IC security uniformity and reciprocity.

(b) Performing policy review, coordination, and formulation.

(c) Promoting uniform application of security policy.

(d) Assessing, advising, and reporting to the DNI on the implementation of security policies.

(e) Enabling IC-wide exchange of critical security data.

(f) Providing services of common concern in the areas of security research, training and database management.
(2) The SSC also executes DNI’s responsibilities as Security Executive Agent to drive efforts to achieve government-wide improvements to clearance process timeliness and effectiveness, reciprocal recognition of security clearances and access approvals, and to modernize security business practices in the USG. The SSC hosts a joint program management activity (“Joint Team”) to develop and implement reforms across the Executive Branch, to include the IC. Joint Team reform efforts are responsive to the direction of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council.

g. The National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) was founded to help counter the threats caused by proliferation of CBRN weapons. NCPC works with the IC to identify critical holes in our WMD knowledge—resulting from shortfalls in collection, analysis, or exploitation—and then develop solutions to reduce or close these gaps. In conjunction with the policy community, NCPC also helps to identify long-term proliferation threats and requirements and develops strategies to ensure that the IC is positioned to address these over-the-horizon threats.

h. The National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C). The NIC-C was established to foster efficient strategic management of the national collection enterprise. The NIC-C provides the DNI a mechanism to optimize collection to satisfy the country’s most important intelligence priorities. It accomplishes this by managing collection and analysis activities as an integrated enterprise focused on the highest priorities. Products and services include assessments, strategic collection postures, and support to senior policy makers.

5. Oversight of the Intelligence Community

a. The IC is subject to external oversight from the Executive and Legislative branches. Within the Executive, the IC works closely with the NSC. Other Executive organizations involved in oversight include the following organization.

b. The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. The board is an entity within the Executive Office of the President formed “to assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy” of intelligence collection, analysis, CI, and other activities of the IC. It reports directly to the President, and provides recommendations for actions to improve and enhance the performance of intelligence efforts. It also examines issues raised by the President or the DNI and can make recommendations directly to the DNI.
1. The DOL fosters and promotes the welfare of the job seekers, wage earners, and retirees of the United States by improving their working conditions, advancing their opportunities for profitable employment, protecting their retirement and health care benefits, helping employers find workers, strengthening free collective bargaining, and tracking changes in employment, prices, and other national economic measurements. In carrying out this mission, the DOL administers a variety of Federal labor laws including those that guarantee workers’ rights to safe and healthful working conditions; a minimum hourly wage and overtime pay; freedom from employment discrimination; unemployment insurance; and other income support. DOL can provide valuable insight through labor statistics, occupational safety and health, office of the inspector general, and other agencies that will promote recovery from war or other disasters. DOD contractors at overseas locations are required to comply with DOL regulations. Bringing DOL into the interagency process better ensures quality performance of DOD contractors.

2. For purposes of interorganizational coordination, DOD may likely coordinate with the Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) who leads the DOL’s efforts to ensure that workers around the world are treated fairly and are able to share in the benefits of the global economy. ILAB’s mission is to use all available international channels to improve working conditions, raise living standards, protect workers’ ability to exercise their rights, and address the workplace exploitation of children and other vulnerable populations. The ILAB is consists of:

   a. Office of Trade and Labor Affairs implements trade-related labor policy and coordinates international technical cooperation in support of the labor provisions in free trade agreements; develops and coordinates DOL positions regarding international economic policy issues and to participate in the formulation and implementation of US policy on such issues; and provides services, information, expertise, and technical cooperation programs that effectively support the international responsibilities of the DOL and US foreign labor policy objectives.

   b. Office of International Relations represents or facilitates representation of the USG in the International Labor Organization and the labor components of international organizations; provides expertise, research and advice on labor and employment trends and issues in foreign countries; and helps facilitate the sharing of information between specialized DOL agencies and other countries.

   c. Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking supports USG labor and foreign policy objectives and congressional mandates, performs public outreach by promoting the elimination of the worst forms of child labor, and increases knowledge and information on child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking.
ANNEX R TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

1. Overview

DHHS (http://www.hhs.gov) is the USG’s principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves.

2. Organizational Structure

a. DHHS comprises staff divisions and operating divisions. Staff divisions are subdivisions of Office of the Secretary that provide direct support to the Secretary’s initiatives. Operating divisions are agencies that perform a wide variety of tasks and services, including research, public health, food and drug safety, grants and other funding, health insurance, and many others.

b. The Office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) (http://www.hhs.gov/aspr) coordinates with the DOS and other federal and international public health and medical response agencies on emergency response issues. The ASPR is also responsible for ensuring that DHHS response personnel from its multiple agencies are enrolled in programs to be registered, credentialed, organized, trained, equipped, and able to deploy as federal public health and medical responders. ASPR establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and as needed, directs and coordinates DHHS’s efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the public health and medical consequences of disaster or emergency. Under the direction of the Secretary, the ASPR may designate and deploy DHHS personnel into a variety of response, support, and liaison roles to other response cells. DHHS international response activities are conducted in support of, and as requested by, the DOS, USAID, or DOD.

(1) The Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response is the primary contact for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of DHHS for international preparedness and emergency operations. ASPR will use the most updated information to make key decisions, direct and deploy DHHS resources to support the DOS, USAID, DOD, or the UN, and to assist any response to international and public health and medical emergencies.

(2) The ASPR Office of Medicine, Science, and Public Health (OMSPH) serves as the focal point in ASPR for international activities related to public health emergency preparedness and response. The OMSPH International Response Coordination and Policy Team partnered closely with the ASPR Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations (OPEO) to develop the DHHS International Emergency Response Framework and international pandemic influenza assessment and containment plans and exercises. OMSPH coordinates ASPR’s overall international influenza pandemic efforts and works closely with other DHHS components, the DOS, the USDA, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Additionally, OMSPH is the principal liaison to the DOS and USG departments and agencies that may seek DHHS assistance in
responding to public health and medical emergencies internationally. The International Health Regulations Program within OMSPH coordinates USG implementation of International Health Regulations and monitors USG compliance to the regulations. OMSPH is also the lead for R&S initiatives within DHHS.

(a) DHHS leads all federal public health and medical response to public health and medical emergencies and incidents covered by the NRF. Under the NRF, DHHS leads ESF #8, the mechanism for coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, tribal, and local resources in response to a public health and medical disaster, potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, and/or during a developing potential health and medical emergency.

(b) Under the same authority, ASPR is the principal advisor to the DHHS Secretary on all matters related to federal public health and medical preparedness and response for public health emergencies or biological incidents (whether natural or deliberate) and has strategic, tactical, and operational responsibilities which include (but are not limited to) serving as the Incident Manager for ESF #8 during activation; responsibility for coordination of preparedness and response planning with DHHS operating divisions, with ESF #8-supporting agencies and also with state, local, and private sector; managing the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and directing the deployment, employment, and release of any needed Strategic National Stockpile personnel and materiel; mobilization of public health and medical assets at the direction of the DHHS Secretary; in response to a directive from DHS/FEMA in accordance with the NRF or under a mission assignment issued by FEMA under the Stafford Act; in response to designated national security special events; and at ASPR’s own discretion when an incident requires coordinated action by two or more DHHS response assets in the absence of an emergency declaration.

(3) The ASPR OPEO leads and supports domestic and international preparedness and emergency operations efforts at the DHHS HQ level. OPEO ensures that ASPR has the plans, procedures, logistical support, systems, and training to support domestic and international emergency operations and response needs. The ASPR/OPEO Emergency Management Group is the primary HQ-level element involved in incident management, directly supports DHHS’ emergency response activities as part of a comprehensive multiagency incident management system. Domestically ASPR leads public health and medical responses under ESF #8 of the NRF. OPEO also manages the NDMS.

(a) The NDMS is a federally coordinated system that augments the Nation’s medical response capability. The overall purpose of the NDMS is to supplement an integrated national medical response capability for assisting state and local authorities in dealing with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters and to provide support to the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs medical systems in caring for casualties evacuated back to the US from overseas armed conventional conflicts.

(b) NDMS temporarily supplements federal, state, local, and tribal capabilities by funding, organizing, training, equipping, deploying, and sustaining a
specialized and focused range of public health and medical capabilities. NDMS comprises medical response to a disaster area in the form of personnel, teams and individuals, supplies, and equipment; patient movement from a disaster site to unaffected areas of the Nation; and definitive medical care at participating hospitals in unaffected areas.

(c) The NRF utilizes the NDMS, as part of the DHHS ASPR, under ESF #8, Health and Medical Services, to support federal agencies in the management and coordination of the federal medical response to major emergencies and federally declared disasters including: natural disasters, major transportation accidents, technological disasters, and acts of terrorism including WMD events. NDMS teams include medical assistance, veterinary, mortuary, and international surgical teams.

(4) DHHS has the lead responsibility within the USG to protect the civilian population against the adverse health effects of CBRN, pandemic influenza, and emerging infectious disease threats by providing leadership in research, development, acquisition, and deployment of effective medical countermeasures. The **ASPR Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority** provides an integrated, systematic approach to the development and purchase of the necessary vaccines, drugs, therapies, and diagnostic tools for public health medical emergencies. It manages Project BioShield, which includes the procurement and advanced development of medical countermeasures for CBRN agents, as well as the advanced development and procurement of medical countermeasures for pandemic influenza and other emerging infectious diseases that fall outside the auspices of Project BioShield. In addition, the authority manages the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise. The enterprise is responsible for defining and prioritizing requirements for public health emergency medical countermeasures; focusing research, development, and procurement activities on identified requirements; and establishing deployment and use strategies for medical countermeasures in the Strategic National Stockpile.

c. The **Office of Global Health Affairs** is the staff division responsible for overall policy leadership, development and coordination for DHHS’s engagement with multilateral organizations, at which domestic priorities for health, public health and science are increasingly central to the global policy dialogue. It is also responsible for the DHHS Secretary’s interaction bilaterally with foreign governments, including Ministries of Health and Social Development. The office represents and protects domestic interests within multilateral organizations of which the United States is a member state and in areas in which a global component, multilaterally or bilaterally, could enhance or contribute to DHHS domestic programs and benefit the people of the United States, including at-risk populations. It engages with foreign governments and multilateral organizations on a wide range of policy and programmatic objectives of relevance and importance to DHHS domestically.

d. The **Office of Public Health and Science** directed by the Assistant Secretary for Health (ASH), is comprised of 12 core public health offices. The ASH serves as the primary advisor to the Secretary of DHHS on matters involving the Nation’s public health. The ASH also provides the executive leadership and policy guidance for the
Commissioned Corps of the US Public Health Service (Corps) and is assisted by the Office of the Surgeon General and the Office of Commissioned Corps Force Management in this activity.

(1) The Office of the Surgeon General, under the direction of the Surgeon General, oversees the operations of the Corps and provides support for the accomplishment of the Surgeon General’s other duties. The Surgeon General serves as America’s chief health educator by providing Americans the best scientific information available on how to improve their health and reduce the risk of illness and injury. The Surgeon General provides leadership and management oversight of the Corps’ involvement during DHHS emergency preparedness and response activities.

(2) The Corps, comprising more than 6,000 health professionals, is one of the seven uniformed services. Corps officers are well-trained, highly qualified public health professionals dedicated to delivering the Nation’s public health promotion and disease prevention programs and advancing public health science. Corps officers fill essential public health leadership and service roles within USG agencies and programs.

(a) Corps officers are assigned to DHHS and other USG agencies to include the DOD. The Corps has engaged with the USN on humanitarian and health diplomacy missions and during international emergencies such as the response to the tsunami in Indonesia in 2005. During emergencies, Corps officers may be deployed domestically to provide applied public health, mental health, and direct medical support to affected regions, states, and localities. Internationally, Corps officers have worked side by side with DOD, for example, as health attachés, consultants on PRTs, and LNOs within a geographic combatant command.

(b) At the direction of the Surgeon General, the Office of Force Readiness and Deployment exercises oversight and management related to training, rostering, and response activities of the entire Corps. It is responsible for facilitating and overseeing all Corps deployments to domestic public health emergencies and international humanitarian assistance missions. To do this, the office ensures that Corps officers, and the teams into which they are rostered, are appropriately trained, suitably equipped, professionally competent, and physically prepared to effectively deploy to provide public health and medical care during disasters, terrorist attacks, urgent public health threats, and special security events. In addition, the Office director serves as the Senior Advisor to the Surgeon General and the Assistant Secretary for Health on Commissioned Corps preparedness and response activities.

e. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (http://www.cdc.gov) is responsible for conducting disease surveillance activities, detecting and investigating disease outbreaks and other health conditions, and developing strategies for dealing with the public health aspects of domestic and international emergencies. When requested in response to international disease outbreaks, CDC staff, either through relationships established at the national level and/or through established relationships in the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, provide technical assistance to help characterize the outbreak, investigate risk and protective factors, and assist in efforts to control the
disease. The CDC’s role in natural disaster response operations has grown in recent years. CDC personnel and supplies, including materiel from the Strategic National Stockpile, may be called upon to assist in a public health emergency. US based units must coordinate with state and local public health offices to request CDC Strategic National Stockpile support. Overseas units must have established plans to coordinate CDC Strategic National Stockpile support through the GCC to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

(1) In order to mitigate the risk of importation and spread of communicable diseases to or within the United States, CDC quarantine stations are located at 20 US ports of entry, covering approximately 85% of all entering and exiting air travel and a substantial portion of the southern border land crossings in San Diego and El Paso. Central to the quarantine stations’ mission to protect the US from communicable disease introduction and spread at ports of entry is the development of strong partnerships with state and local health departments and law enforcement to create a public health safety network addressing border health issues. The quarantine program works closely with DHS, particularly CBP, Transportation Security Administration, ICE, and USCG, and partners with travel industry to plan, prepare, and respond to illnesses in travelers. The quarantine program is responsible for border pandemic planning as the technical lead, in collaboration with DHS as the lead agency.

(2) DHHS/CDC has more than 300 CDC permanent staff members assigned to long-term assignments in 50 countries around the world. CDC also employs approximately 1,400 local staff members (citizens of the HN) to support global programs. The staff is a mix of epidemiologists, clinicians, health scientists of many types, including laboratory, behavioral, and informatics scientists, operations managers, administrative staff, and others. Approximately 80 percent of these staff work primarily on major endemic (nonemergency) diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB [tuberculosis], and malaria. A smaller number work in areas such as emerging infectious diseases, influenza, and training programs in surveillance and outbreak response that are intrinsically focused on epidemics and emergency response. DHHS/CDC offices with long-term staff members usually become trusted advisors to local public health officials. This familiarity and resulting long-term trusting relationships are critical assets that help to establish access to provide assistance in the context of emergencies.

(3) CDC also manages the Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The LRN is a network of more than 160 laboratories affiliated with federal agencies, military installations, international partners, and state/local public health departments that provide the laboratory infrastructure and capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism, and other public health emergencies by providing clinical and environmental sample testing as well as limited supporting analysis of food samples that may be implicated as part of epidemiological investigations associated with incident response to cases of human illness.

f. The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, the Nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products
that emit radiation. In response operations, it may be called upon to assist with assessments and inspections, and provide subject matter expertise. It conducts inspections of medical products produced overseas. It has expertise in many areas, and experts occasionally assist foreign governments in developing regulatory oversight systems.

**g. The Health Resources and Services Administration** supports DHHS’s emergency response through its National Health Service Corps Ready Responder Program. The Ready Responders, also Commissioned Corps officers, are primary care clinicians delivering quality health care to populations in under-served domestic areas. They are trained to respond quickly and effectively in the event of a large-scale regional or national emergency and may be potentially deployed internationally.

**h. The Indian Health Service** provides a comprehensive health service delivery system to tribal communities, to include personal and public health care, mental health issues, environmental health, engineering, dental, pharmaceutical, nursing, laboratory, and community health and varied surveillance activities that involve disease outbreaks and other health problems during national and international disasters and emergencies. They serve as a source of skilled health care professionals who can augment DHHS response teams, and can serve as a resource to DOD as advisors for how to support tribal communities and cultures, while honoring and protecting the inherent sovereign rights of tribes.

**i. The Administration for Children and Families** (http://www.acf.hhs.gov). In the event of a massive evacuation from overseas, DHHS is the LFA responsible for arranging through state agencies for the reception, temporary care, and onward transportation to the final destination of noncombatant evacuees returned to the US from a foreign country. The Repatriation Program within the Office of Refugee Resettlement is responsible for the National Emergency Repatriation planning and implementation of the emergency plan.

**j. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration** provides consultation, technical assistance, and grants to state and local entities as part of emergency response through NRF ESF #8. It liaises with state and community behavioral health public and private officials and service providers, as well as voluntary organizations. Personnel consult on a variety of behavior health issues including, but not limited to, chronic mental and substance abuse disorders, normal reactions to “abnormal” situations, grief reactions and treatment, traumatic stress, suicide prevention, public anxiety and stress reduction, assistance to emergency responders, psychological factors in medical surge, public education, risk communication, grief reactions, and traumatic stress. It also offers technical assistance and consultation to international communities when requested and approved by DOS.

**k. The National Institutes of Health**, which consists of 27 institutes and centers, plays a key role in public health emergencies through their research and development of countermeasures against potential CBRN agents of terrorism. While many of the Institutes conduct and support research that helps provide the evidence base for medical
and public health interventions related to bio-defense, the lead institute engaged in such research is the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. It plays a key role in the research and development of CBRN medical countermeasures. It works closely with DOD biomedical research components that focus on infectious disease and immunology research. In response to public health emergencies, it may be called upon to provide subject matter experts and/or to redirect its research efforts to address important scientific issues related to the emergency. Such response is accomplished in coordination with DHHS and sister agencies. The Fogarty International Center provides research grants for collaborative research and capacity building projects relevant to low- and middle-income nations, as well as Institutional training grants designed to enhance research capacity in the developing world, with an emphasis on institutional partnerships and networking. The Disease Control Priorities Project develops recommendations on effective health care interventions for resource-poor settings. The Fogarty International Center also conducts regional activities and programs in biomedical and behavioral sciences throughout the world.

1. The **Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality** is responsible for supporting research, preparing models and practices that enhance the preparedness efforts of national, state, and local jurisdictions through the development and assessment of alternative approaches that ensure health surge capacity for mass casualty events, protocols, and technologies to enhance interoperability among health care systems, the public health systems, and other organizational participants in the emergency response network and training and information needs of health care providers for enhanced emergency response.

2. The **Federal Occupational Health Service** provides comprehensive, high-quality, customer-focused occupational health services in strategic partnership with federal agencies nationwide to improve the health, safety, and productivity of the federal workforce. Services include the following: Employee Assistance Services, which provides Specialized Behavioral Health Services, and Work/Life Services; the Program Support Center Joint Health Services to USAID’s OFDA which includes hazardous material and safety training courses, maintaining and deploying hazardous material/safety stockpile, conducting safety assessments of disaster zones for federal response teams, and designing personal protective clothing kits.

3. **Interagency Relationships**

   a. DHHS can provide consultation on public health and medical issues that span the breadth of expertise within DHHS. DHHS can provide technical advice and perspective on relevant health sector issues.

   b. **Global Disease Detection.** To make early disease detection and containment a reality around the world, DHHS/CDC is developing a network of global disease detection centers in partnership with ministries of health. Additional partners include WHO, DOS, DOD, USAID, and academic institutions. Centers currently in place are located in China, Egypt, Guatemala, Kenya, Thailand, and Kazakhstan.
c. **Stability Operations**

(1) DHHS is an active participant in the interagency working groups supporting R&S operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, and other civil-military coordinative operations, planning, and exercises.

(2) DHHS supports whole-of-government R&S efforts by contributing members to the Civilian Reserve Corps. DHHS is standing up a 5-member active component, and 10-member standby component, with expertise in health care service delivery and system administration, information management and health education, medicine, pharmacy, disease prevention and epidemiology, environmental health and safety, immunizations, infection control, reproductive health services, occupational health and injury prevention, nursing, veterinary health, noncommunicable diseases, and communicable diseases.

(3) DHHS can provide regional and country-specific perspective on existing health systems’ capabilities and infrastructure. Health sector issues are of increasing importance worldwide and a DHHS civilian or USPHS representative can add valuable perspective in collaboration with the command surgeon and USAID representatives.

d. **Domestic Response.** USPHS officers are assigned to DHHS and other federal agencies to include DOD. During emergencies, USPHS officers are deployed domestically to provide applied public health, mental health, and direct medical support to affected regions, states, and localities. DHHS works alongside DOD during domestic civil-military response operations. USPHS officers are involved when there is a Stafford Act declaration with domestic public health CS operations.

e. **International Response**

(1) DOD and DHHS work alongside each other in support of several programs. DHHS supports the following USG interagency partners during international emergencies:

(a) DHHS is the technical lead for international pandemic influenza assessment and containment response supporting DOS in international pandemic influenza planning and prevention activities.

(b) DHHS appoints representatives to the USG foreign emergency support team that is led by the DOS Foreign Consequence Management Program.

(c) DHHS supports USAID/OFDA by providing technical assistance and support on public health issues such as large disease outbreaks.

(d) DHHS provides technical assistance on refugee health and mental health issues to the DOS Office of Population, Migration, and Refugees.

(e) DOD may request support of DHHS to assist in FHA, as well as stability operations. The ASPR is the primary contact for international preparedness and
emergency operations within DHHS. The ASPR can direct and deploy DHHS resources to support the DOS, USAID, DOD, or the UN to assist response to international and public health and medical emergencies.

(2) USPHS officers work side by side with DOD, for example as health attachés, consultants on PRTs, or as LNOs within a geographic combatant command. DHHS currently has two full-time LNOs assigned to USNORTHCOM, and is currently working towards assigning LNOs to each of the GCCs. Collectively DHHS has personnel either permanently assigned, or deployed, to each of the GCCs’ AORs from its component staff and operating divisions.

f. **Repatriation.** The US Repatriation Program is committed to helping eligible repatriates referred from the DOS by providing them with effective and efficient temporary assistance necessary for their transition and reestablishment in the United States (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/repatriation.htm). While DHHS is responsible for the National Emergency Repatriation planning and implementation of the emergency plan, provision relies on state and local governments to carry out operational responsibility for the reception, temporary care, and onward transportation for the noncombatant evacuee.

g. **Training and Exercises**

(1) Operating divisions and staff divisions throughout DHHS may support and interrelate with DOD by providing subject matter expertise in training and exercise events. DHHS routinely participates in DOD-led disaster preparedness and response training and exercises.

(2) The DHHS Office of Force Readiness and Deployment engages with DOD and its service components, including but not limited to: USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM, USAFRICOM, US Army South, and USAF South, USN 4th and 7th Fleets as participants in Continuing Promise, Pacific Partnership, Medical Readiness and Training exercises, and other operations and planning missions.

(3) The US Army Office of the Surgeon General assigns an LNO to ASPR to help facilitate DHHS-DOD coordination and joint planning. The CDC also has DOD liaisons for this same purpose.

APPENDIX B
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

This appendix includes the descriptions of key IGOs.

Annex  A  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
       B  United Nations
       C  United Nations Children’s Fund
       D  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
       E  United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
       F  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
       G  United Nations World Food Programme
       H  United Nations World Health Organization
       I  United Nations Development Programme
       J  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
       K  European Union
       L  Organization of American States
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

1. Background and Objectives

a. NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. The fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. NATO is playing an increasingly important role in crisis management and peacekeeping. NATO is currently undergoing a comprehensive reorganization and current information can be obtained at: http://www.nato.int.

b. The Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks.

(1) Provide one of the indispensable foundations for stable security in Europe based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

(2) Seek to create an environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any member nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

(3) Serve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues affecting the vital interests of its members, in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including developments, which might pose risks to their security.

(4) Facilitate appropriate coordination of members’ efforts in fields of common concern.

(5) Provide deterrence and defense against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

(6) Contribute to effective conflict prevention and engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

(7) Promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.

c. To fulfill these tasks, member nations:

(1) Provide continuous consultation and cooperation in political, economic, and other nonmilitary fields.

(2) Formulate joint plans for the common defense.

(3) Establish the infrastructure needed to enable military forces to operate.

(4) Arrange joint training programs and exercises.
(5) Coordinate communications needed to facilitate political consultation, C2 of military forces, and their logistic support.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organizational Structure

a. NATO HQ. NATO’s HQ in Brussels is the home of the NAC. It houses permanent representatives (PERMREPs) and national delegations, the Secretary General and the International Staff, national military representatives, the Chairman of the Military Committee and the International Military Staff, and a number of NATO agencies. NATO’s civil and military organizational structure is shown in Figure B-A-1.
b. **NAC.** The supreme authority of the Atlantic Alliance is the NAC, which has effective political authority and powers of decision and consists of PERMREPs of the 28 member countries who meet together at least once a week. The NAC also meets at higher levels involving foreign ministers or heads of government, but it has the same authority and powers of decision making and its decisions have the same status and validity at whatever level it meets. The Chairman of the NAC, at both the ministerial and PERMREP levels, is the Secretary General. The presidency, held by the foreign ministers of each member country in turn, rotates annually. The NAC has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiques explaining its policies and decision to the general public and to governments of countries which are not members of the Alliance.

c. **PERMREPs.** Each member nation is represented on the NAC by an ambassador or PERMREP with ambassadorial rank. Each PERMREP is supported by a national delegation composed of advisers and officials who represent their country on different NATO committees. The delegations are similar in many respects to small embassies. Their collocation within the same HQ building enables them to maintain formal and informal contacts with each other, as well as with NATO’s international staffs, easily and without delay.

d. **Defense Planning Committee (DPC).** The DPC is normally composed of PERMREPs, but meets at the level of defense ministers at least twice a year and deals with most defense matters and subjects related to collective defense planning. All member countries are represented in this forum. The DPC provides guidance to NATO’s military authorities and, within the area of its responsibilities, has the same function and attributes and the same authority as the NAC. An Executive Working Group is responsible to the DPC for the principal aspects of defense and the overall conduct of the long-term defense program.

e. **Nuclear Planning Group.** The Nuclear Planning Group meets at the same level and with the same status as the DPC. It is the principal forum for consultation on all matters relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO’s security policy. The Nuclear Planning Group follows a similar pattern of meeting at the ambassadorial level and at the level of ministers of defense and has the same functions and authority for decisions on nuclear matters as the NAC and DPC have in their own spheres. All member countries except France participate. Iceland participates only as an observer.

f. **Secretary General**

   (1) The Secretary General is a senior international statesman nominated by the member nations both as Chairman of the NAC, DPC, Nuclear Planning Group, and of other senior committees and as Secretary General of NATO. The Secretary General also acts as principal spokesman of the Organization, both in its external relations and in communications and contacts between member governments. As such, the Secretary General is responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and decision making through the Alliance.
(2) The Secretary General has under his direct control a Private Office and the Office of the Secretary General. The Private Office supports the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General in all aspects of their work. Its staff includes a legal advisor and a special advisor for Central and Eastern European Affairs.

g. International Staff. The work of the NAC and its many committees and working groups is supported by an International Staff. This staff comprises the Office of the secretary general, five operational divisions, the Office of Management and the Office of the Financial Controller. Each of the divisions is headed by an Assistant Secretary General, who is normally the chairman of the main committee dealing with subjects in his field of responsibility.

h. National Military Representatives. The members of the Military Committee (Chiefs of Staff) are represented at NATO HQ by senior officers acting as military representatives, each supported by a national staff varying in size. The military representatives constitute the Military Committee in Permanent Session. France is represented by a Military Mission to the Military Committee.

i. Military Committee

(1) The Military Committee is the highest military authority in the Alliance and is responsible to the NAC, DPC, and the Nuclear Planning Group for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance. It provides for the maximum consultation and cooperation between member nations on military matters relating to the Treaty and is the primary source of military advice to the Secretary General and to the NAC, DPC, and Nuclear Planning Group.

(2) The Military Committee is composed of the Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of JS, or Chiefs of Defense Staff of each member country. Iceland has no military forces, but may be represented by a civilian. The Chiefs of Staff meet at least twice a year. At other times, member countries are represented by national military representatives appointed by the Chiefs of Staff.

(3) The Presidency of the Military Committee rotates annually among the nations in the order of the English alphabet.

(4) The Chairman of the Military Committee chairs both the Chiefs of Staff and permanent sessions and is elected by the Chiefs of Staff, normally for a 3-year term. The Chairman is the spokesperson and representative of the Committee, directs its day-to-day activities, and represents the Military Committee at meetings of the NAC, DPC, and the Nuclear Planning Group, providing advice on military matters. The Chairman is assisted by the Deputy Chairman and by the Director of the International Military Staff.

j. International Military Staff

(1) The Military Committee is supported by an integrated International Military Staff made up of military personnel seconded from national military establishments and of supporting civilian personnel. Members of the International Military Staff have a
similar status within the Organization as the International Staff, but come under the administrative authority of the Director of the International Military Staff or the head of the independent NATO agency within which they are employed. The national military status of personnel transferred from national armed forces is not affected by their temporary assignment to NATO.

(2) The International Military Staff is headed by a Director of three-star rank who is nominated by the member nations and is selected by the Military Committee. The Director must be of a different nationality than the Chairman of the Military Committee.

(3) As the executive agent of the Military Committee, the International Military Staff is tasked with ensuring that the policies and decisions of the Military Committee are implemented as directed. In addition, the International Military Staff prepares plans, initiates studies, and recommends policy on matters of a military nature referred to NATO or to the Military Committee by national or NATO authorities, commanders, or agencies.

k. Integrated Military Structure

(1) The integrated military structure remains under political control and guidance at the highest level. It includes a network of major and subordinate military commands covering the whole of the North Atlantic area.

(2) The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is currently divided among two Major NATO Commands (European and Transformation) and a Regional Planning Group for Canada and the United States. Two regional commands are within Allied Command Europe, and are responsible for the Southern and Northern regions.

(3) The Major NATO commanders are responsible for the development of defense plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements and for the deployment and exercise of the forces under their command. Their reports and recommendations regarding the forces assigned to them and their logistic support are referred to the NATO Military Committee. The Major NATO commanders are also responsible for the development and conduct of their military contacts with cooperation partners.

3. NATO Command Structure

a. Strategic Level

(1) At the strategic level, there is one command with operational responsibilities, Allied Command Operations commanded by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is dual-hatted as Commander USEUCOM. Allied Command Transformation, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation is responsible for promoting and overseeing the continuing transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities.
(2) **Allied Command Operations**, with its HQ, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, near Mons, Belgium, is responsible for all Alliance operations. The operational level consists of two standing joint force commands—one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy—which can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based combined JTF HQ and a robust but more limited standing joint HQ in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based combined JTF HQ capability can be drawn. The organizational structure of Allied Command Operations is depicted in Figure B-A-2.

![Figure B-A-2. Allied Command Operations](image-url)
b. Component/Tactical Level

(1) The component or tactical level consists of six joint force component commands, which provide Service-specific—land, maritime, or air—expertise to the operational level. Although these component commands will be available for use in any operation, they will be subordinated to one of the joint force commands. For the joint force command in Brunssum, there is an air component command at Ramstein, Germany; a maritime component command at Northwood in the United Kingdom; and a land component command at Heidelberg, Germany. For the joint force command in Naples, there is an air component command at Izmir, Turkey; a maritime component command in Naples; and a land component command at Madrid, Spain.

(2) In addition to these component commands, there are four static combined air operations centers (CAOCs)—in Uedem, Germany; Finderup, Denmark; Poggio Renatico, Italy; and Larissa, Greece; and two deployable CAOCs—in Uedem and Poggio Renatico. The deployable CAOCs exercise their capability to mobilize and deploy at the current facilities at Torrejon Air Base in Spain. A small NATO air facility support staff is stationed at Torrejon to support this capability.

c. Transformation Command

(1) Allied Command Transformation, with its HQ in Norfolk, Virginia, oversees the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities. In doing so, it enhances training, improves capabilities, tests and develops doctrine, and conducts experiments to assess new concepts. It also facilitates the dissemination and introduction of new concepts and promotes interoperability.

(2) An Allied Command Transformation Staff Element in Belgium is primarily responsible for resource and defense planning issues.

(3) Allied Command Transformation includes the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway, the Joint Force Training Centre in Poland, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal. Allied Command Transformation HQ also supervises the Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy. There are direct linkages between Allied Command Transformation, Alliance schools, and NATO agencies, as well as USJFCOM. In addition, a number of nationally- or multinationally-sponsored centers of excellence focused on transformation in specific military fields support the command.

4. Combined Joint Task Force Concept

a. Should a crisis occur, the NAC might consider the formation of a combined JTF composed of forces drawn from member states. A combined JTF is a multinational JTF, task organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance’s military missions, which the commander, combined JTF, commands from a multinational and joint HQ. The JTF may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations.
b. The purpose of creating an Alliance combined JTF capability is to:

(1) Provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice, rapidly deployable combined JTFs, with dedicated C2 capability.

(2) Facilitate operations in concert with partners and other non-NATO nations in situations not related to collective defense.

(3) Enable the Alliance, based on the principle of ‘separable but not separate capabilities’, to support the development of European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance by the provision of a combined JTF HQ and associated capabilities or elements thereof for operations under the political control and strategic direction of the EU or as otherwise agreed.

For additional information on NATO’s combined JTF concept, see AJP-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine.

5. Non-Article 5 Operations

a. NATO activities falling outside the scope of Article 5 are referred to collectively as non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs). One principal difference between Article 5 operations and NA5CROs is that there is no formal obligation for NATO nations to take part in a NA5CRO while in case of an Article 5 operation, NATO nations are formally committed to take the actions they deem necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

b. NA5CROs range from support operations primarily associated with civil agencies through operations in support of peace, to Alliance combat operations. In the framework of a NATO-led operation, Alliance forces could additionally conduct extraction operations, and tasks in support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, SAR, or support to noncombattant evacuation operations. Operations that involve the use of military force or the threat of force include military action ranging from freedom of navigation and overflight enforcement, sanction and embargo enforcement, support to stabilization and reconstruction activities, and counter irregular threat operations—to military combat operations. Military Committee 327/2, NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, establishes the guidance for conducting NA5CROs within the Alliance.

6. NATO Response Force

a. The NATO response force is a joint, trained, and certified force package, held at high readiness, that is tailored for an assigned mission. The NATO response force is capable of performing certain missions on its own, as well as participating in an operation as part of a larger force, or serving as an initial-entry force that prepares the JOA for follow-on forces. However, the NATO response force is limited in size, composition, and capabilities, thus it is not always the solution to emerging crises.
b. To be responsive to rapidly developing crises, the NATO response force relies on NATO and national procedures for the political decision-making process and for the preparations for employment. The NATO response force, when alerted by the NAC, can start deploying on five days notice and operate as a stand-alone force for up to 30 days using embedded logistic capabilities, or longer if resupplied.
1. Introduction

The UN (http://www.un.org/en) is a unique international organization of 192 sovereign states, representing virtually every country in the world. It was founded towards the end of the Second World War. The member states are bound together by the principles of the UN Charter, an international treaty that spells out their rights and duties as members of the world community.

2. Purpose

The purposes of the UN, as set forth in the Charter, are to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; to cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends. The UN is not a world government and it does not make laws. It does, however, provide the means to help resolve international conflicts and formulate policies on matters affecting all of us. At the UN, all the member states—large and small, rich and poor, with differing political views and social systems—have a voice and a vote in this process.

3. United Nations Charter

The Charter is the constituting instrument of the organization, setting out the rights and obligations of member states, and establishing the UN organs and procedures. There are 19 chapters in the UN Charter containing 111 articles, as shown in Figure B-B-1. Amendments to the Charter enter into effect when they have been adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the UN, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. The amendments introduced so far have related to the expansion of two main organs, the Security Council and the ECOSOC.

4. Organization

a. There are six principal organs of the UN: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The UN family, however, is much larger, encompassing 15 agencies and several programs and bodies. The UN family of organizations (the “UN system”) consists of the UN Secretariat, the UN funds and programs (e.g., UN Children’s Fund [UNICEF] and UNDP), the specialized agencies (e.g., WHO), and related organizations. The funds and programs are subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly. The specialized agencies are linked to the UN through special agreements and report to the ECOSOC and/or the General Assembly. The related organizations—including IAEA and the World Trade Organization—address specialized areas and have their own legislative bodies and
b. General Assembly. The General Assembly is the chief deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ and consists of all the members of the UN, each country having one vote and being entitled to be represented at meetings by five delegates and five alternates. It provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. Decisions on such key issues as international peace and security, admitting new members, and the UN budget are decided by two-thirds majority. Other matters are decided by simple majority. In
recent years, a special effort has been made to reach decisions through consensus, rather than by taking a formal vote. The Assembly cannot force action by any state, but its recommendations are an important indication of world opinion and represent the moral authority of the community of nations. It also plays a significant role in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law. According to the Charter of the UN, the General Assembly may:

1. Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament.

2. Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council, make recommendations on it.

3. Discuss, with the same exception, and make recommendations on any questions within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the UN.

4. Initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in the economic, social, humanitarian, cultural, educational and health fields.

5. Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair friendly relations among nations.

6. Receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other UN organs.

7. Consider and approve the UN budget and establish the financial assessments of member states.

8. Elect the nonpermanent members of the Security Council and the members of other UN councils and organs and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, appoint the SYG.

9. The Assembly may also take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member, in a case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The Assembly can consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to members for collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.

c. Security Council. The UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council may convene at any time, whenever peace is threatened. Under the Charter, all member states are obligated to carry out the Security Council’s decisions.
(1) There are 15 Security Council members. Five of these—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent members. The other 10 are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. It is organized to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be present at all times at UN HQ. Decisions of the Security Council require nine yes votes. Except in votes on procedural questions, a decision cannot be taken if there is a no vote, or veto, by a permanent member. The Presidency of the Security Council rotates monthly, according to the English alphabetical listing of its member states.

(2) Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:

(a) To maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN;

(b) To investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;

(c) To recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;

(d) To formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;

(e) To determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;

(f) To call on members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;

(g) To take military action against an aggressor;

(h) To recommend the admission of new members;

(i) To exercise the trusteeship functions of the UN in “strategic areas;” and

(j) To recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the SYG and, together with the Assembly, elect judges of the International Court of Justice.

(3) When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Security Council’s first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Security Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the SYG to do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement.

(4) When a dispute leads to fighting, the Security Council’s first concern is to bring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, the Security Council has issued cease-fire directives which have been instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. It also sends UN peacekeeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keep
opposing forces apart, and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought. The Security Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes), or collective military action.

(5) A member state against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. A member state which has persistently violated the principles of the Charter may be expelled from the UN by the Assembly on the Security Council’s recommendation.

(6) A state which is a member of the UN but not of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Security Council considers that that country’s interests are affected. Both members of the UN and nonmembers, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Security Council, are invited to take part, without a vote, in the Security Council’s discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation by a nonmember state.

d. **Economic and Social Council.** The ECOSOC, under the overall authority of the General Assembly, coordinates the economic and social work of the UN and the UN family of organizations. As the central forum for discussing international economic and social issues and for formulating policy recommendations, the ECOSOC plays a key role in fostering international cooperation for development. It also consults with academics, business sector representatives, and more than 3,000 registered NGOs, thereby maintaining a vital link between the UN and civil society.

(1) It is responsible for:

(a) Promoting higher standards of living, full employment, and economic and social progress;

(b) Identifying solutions to international economic, social, and health problems;

(c) Facilitating international cultural and educational cooperation; and

(d) Encouraging universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(2) The ECOSOC’s subsidiary bodies meet regularly and report back to it. These bodies focus on such issues as social development, the status of women, crime prevention, narcotic drugs, and sustainable development. Five regional commissions promote economic development and cooperation in their respective regions.

e. The Trusteeship Council was established to provide international supervision for Trust Territories administered by member states. By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence. Its work completed, the Trusteeship Council
now consists of the five permanent members of the Security Council and meets when the occasion may require.

f. The International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, is the main judicial organ of the UN. Its 15 judges are elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, voting independently and concurrently. The World Court was established by the UN Charter, which provides that all member states of the UN are *ipsos facto* parties to the World Court’s Statute. The composition and functioning of the World Court are organized by this Statute, and by the Rules of the Court, which are drawn up by the World Court itself. The World Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies. The World Court may entertain two types of cases: legal disputes between states submitted to it by them (contentious cases) and requests for advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by UN organs and specialized agencies (advisory proceedings).

g. The Secretariat carries out the substantive and administrative work of the UN as directed by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the other organs. At its head is the SYG, who provides overall administrative guidance. The Secretariat consists of departments and offices with a total staff of about 8,100 under the regular budget, drawn from some 170 countries. Duty stations include UN HQ in New York, as well as UN offices in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, and other locations.

h. **The UN System.** The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 13 other independent organizations known as “specialized agencies” are linked to the UN through cooperative agreements. These agencies are autonomous bodies created by intergovernmental agreement. They have wide-ranging international responsibilities in the economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields. Some of them, like the International Labour Organization and the Universal Postal Union, are older than the UN itself.

(1) In addition, a number of UN offices, programs and funds—such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UNDP, and the UNICEF—work to improve the economic and social condition of people around the world. They report to the General Assembly or the ECOSOC.

(2) All these organizations have their own governing bodies, budgets, and secretariats. Together with the UN, they are known as the UN family, or the UN system. Together, they provide technical assistance and other forms of practical help in virtually all economic and social areas.
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX B
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND

1. Overview

UNICEF (http://www.unicef.org) is the driving force that helps build a world where the rights of every child are realized. Nurturing and caring for children are the cornerstones of human progress. UNICEF was created with this purpose in mind – to work with others to overcome the obstacles that poverty, violence, disease, and discrimination place in a child’s path. UNICEF advocates for measures to give children the best start in life, because proper care at the youngest age forms the strongest foundation for a person’s future. UNICEF promotes girls’ education—ensuring that they complete primary education as a minimum—because it benefits all children, both girls and boys. UNICEF acts so that all children are immunized against common childhood diseases, and are well nourished, because it is wrong for a child to suffer or die from a preventable illness. UNICEF works to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among young people because it is right to keep them from harm and enable them to protect others. UNICEF helps children and families affected by HIV/AIDS to live their lives with dignity. UNICEF involves everyone in creating protective environments for children. UNICEF is present to relieve suffering during emergencies, and wherever children are threatened, because no child should be exposed to violence, abuse, or exploitation. UNICEF upholds the Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNICEF works to assure equality for those who are discriminated against, girls and women in particular. UNICEF works for the Millennium Development Goals and for the progress promised in the UN Charter. UNICEF strives for peace and security. UNICEF works to hold everyone accountable to the promises made for children. UNICEF is part of the Global Movement for Children – a broad coalition dedicated to improving the life of every child. UNICEF works in 190 countries through country programs and national committees.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. UNICEF is mandated by the UN General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children’s rights, to help meet their basic needs, and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential.

b. UNICEF is guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and strives to establish children’s rights as enduring ethical principles and international standards of behavior towards children.

c. UNICEF insists that the survival, protection, and development of children are universal imperatives that are integral to human progress.

d. UNICEF mobilizes political will and material resources to help countries, particularly developing countries, ensure a “first call” for children, build their capacity to form appropriate policies, and deliver services for children and their families.
e. UNICEF is committed to ensuring special protection for the most disadvantaged children—victims of war, disasters, extreme poverty, all forms of violence and exploitation, and those with disabilities.

f. UNICEF responds in emergencies to protect the rights of children. In coordination with UN partners and humanitarian agencies, UNICEF makes its unique facilities for rapid response available to its partners to relieve the suffering of children and those who provide their care.

g. UNICEF is nonpartisan and its cooperation is free of discrimination. In everything it does, the most disadvantaged children and the countries in greatest need have priority.

h. UNICEF aims, through its country programs, to promote the equal rights of women and girls and to support their full participation in the political, social, and economic development of their communities.

i. UNICEF works with all its partners towards the attainment of the sustainable human development goals adopted by the world community and the realization of the vision of peace and social progress enshrined in the UN Charter.

3. Organizational Structure

a. The heart of UNICEF’s work is in the field. Each country office carries out UNICEF’s mission through a unique program of cooperation developed with the host government. This five-year program focuses on practical ways to realize the rights of children and women. Their needs are analyzed in a situation report produced at the beginning of the program cycle. Regional offices guide this work and provide technical assistance to country offices as needed. UNICEF’s work is fully integrated with other UN activities in a country.

b. Overall management and administration of the organization takes place at the UNICEF HQ in New York, where global policy on children is shaped. Specialized offices include the Supply Division, based in Copenhagen, which provides such essential items as the majority of life-saving vaccine doses for children in developing countries.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. Increasing numbers of children and women are being affected by natural disasters, conflict, or other forms of crisis. In 2003, UNICEF clarified what it would do to protect and assist such children and women by revising its Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies. In so doing, it distinguished between those vital, life-saving interventions that should be done in the first six to eight weeks of any crisis and the broader spectrum of activities that may be added following that initial response.

b. Guiding the response of UNICEF in humanitarian situations is the principle that children in the midst of armed conflict and natural disasters have the same needs and rights as children in stable situations.
c. In the first six to eight weeks following the outbreak of a crisis, and in coordination with its national, UN, and NGO partner organizations, UNICEF will work to:

1. Assess, monitor, report, and communicate on the situation of children and women. Conduct a rapid assessment, including on severe or systematic abuse, violence, or exploitation, and report through the appropriate mechanisms.

2. Provide measles vaccinations, vitamin A, essential drugs, and nutritional supplements. Vaccinate children between 6 months and 14 years of age against measles. Provide vitamin A supplementation as required. Provide essential drugs, basic and emergency health kits, oral rehydration, fortified nutritional products, and micronutrient supplements. Provide post-rape-care kits, including post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV, where appropriate. Provide other emergency supplies (e.g., blankets, tarpaulins).

3. Provide child and maternal feeding and nutritional monitoring: with the WFP and NGO partners, support infant and young child feeding, therapeutic and supplementary feeding. Introduce nutritional monitoring and surveillance.

4. Provide safe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene including emergency water supply and purification, provision of basic family water kits, safe disposal of feces, and hygiene education.

5. Assist in preventing the separation and facilitate the identification, registration, and medical screening of children separated from their families. Ensure family tracing systems are put in place and provide care and protection. Prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of children and women.

6. Initiate the resumption of schooling and other child learning opportunities: set-up temporary learning spaces and reopen schools; start reintegrating teachers and children (with a focus on girls); and organize recreational activities.

d. Once this initial emergency response is well established, other activities may be introduced to address other elements of the Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies, as the situation evolves:

1. Monitoring and advocating on the situation of children:

   a. Ensure that information on the situation of children and violations of their rights is collected and updated.

   b. Make this information available to relevant partners, child rights advocates, the public, and the media, as appropriate.

   c. Use UNICEF’s voice on behalf of children.
(2) Survival:

(a) Expand support to vaccination and preventive health services.

(b) Support infant and young child feeding, including breastfeeding and complementary feeding and, when necessary, support therapeutic and supplementary feeding programs.

(c) Establish, improve, and expand safe water and sanitation facilities and promote safe hygiene behavior.

(3) Organizing Child Protection:

(a) Continue to identify and register unaccompanied and orphaned children. Support communities to provide for their protection and care.

(b) Establish child friendly spaces and provide psychosocial support.

(c) Monitor, report on, and advocate against abuse and exploitation of children including recruitment of child soldiers and other exploitative forms of child labor.

(d) Initiate work on the release and reintegration of child combatants.

(e) Promote activities that prevent and respond to sexual violence against children and women.

(f) Lead in the organization of mine risk education.

(4) Resuming primary education services: reestablish and/or sustain primary education as well as establishing community services within schools (such as water supply and sanitation).

(5) Preventing HIV/AIDS:

(a) Provide access to relevant information on HIV/AIDS using three primary prevention methods.

(b) In collaboration with relevant partners, facilitate young people’s access to comprehensive HIV prevention services including treatment for sexually transmitted infections.

For more information, refer to UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies.
5. Interagency Relationships

UNICEF works in collaboration with local and international partners, including governments, UN agencies, and civil society. These partnerships are crucial to ensuring comprehensive and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. They also permit the diverse array of programs necessary to address the full spectrum of children’s rights, a fact that is especially important in emergencies, when these rights are most under threat.
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX B
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

1. Overview

UNOCHA’s (http://ochaonline.un.org) mission is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international entities in order to: alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocate for the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and prevention; and facilitate sustainable solutions.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. UNOCHA facilitates the work of operational agencies that deliver humanitarian assistance to populations and communities in need. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator has overall responsibility for ensuring coherence of relief efforts in the field. UNOCHA supports the Humanitarian Coordinator in needs assessments, contingency planning, and the formulation of humanitarian programs. UNOCHA also provides response tools, and advocacy and information services. The head of UNOCHA, as the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator, chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which comprises all major humanitarian entities, including the Red Cross Movement and three NGO consortia. By developing common policies, guidelines and standards, the IASC assures a coherent interagency response to complex emergencies and natural and environmental disasters. UNOCHA also chairs the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), which develops common UN positions on humanitarian issues.

b. IASC (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc) is a unique interagency forum for coordination, policy development, and decision making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. IASC serves as the primary mechanism for interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance. Under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. Together with ECHA, the IASC forms the key strategic coordination mechanism among major humanitarian entities.

3. Organizational Structure

UNOCHA, a department of the UN Secretariat, is headquartered in New York, with a small policy staff and an Emergency Liaison Branch divided into geographical sections. UNOCHA HQ in New York is concerned with policy decisions about humanitarian responses and the coordination of agencies. UNOCHA’s Geneva office is the operational section. All funding requests and donations are handled by Geneva as are issues of the deployment of personnel to humanitarian emergency sites. UNOCHA’s Disaster Mitigation Branch, also in Geneva, is the office that handles natural disaster responses.
UNOCHA operates through a network of field offices, which support UN humanitarian coordinators and UN country teams. It also maintains regional support offices and regional disaster response advisors in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia Pacific.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. UNOCHA plays a key role in raising funds for emergencies and disasters.

(1) UNOCHA solicits donor support mainly through the Consolidated Appeals Process and issues emergency appeals on behalf of countries affected by disasters. The Consolidated Appeals Process, through the consolidated humanitarian action plan, is the UN’s foremost tool for coordination and strategic planning during complex emergencies. It also provides an opportunity for advocacy. The UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and UN country team are responsible for preparing, implementing, and reviewing the Consolidated Appeals Process. On average, some 15 appeals are launched annually to meet the requirements of nearly 40 million people. In sudden-onset disasters, UNOCHA may issue flash appeals for a three to six-month period.

(2) In addition, UNOCHA manages the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), established by the UN to enable agencies to jump-start relief activities and ensure more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and armed conflicts. The CERF is funded by voluntary contributions from around the globe from member states of the UN, private businesses, foundations, and individuals. The CERF is intended to complement not substitute, existing humanitarian funding mechanisms such as the UN Consolidated Appeals.

b. In today’s complex emergencies, civilians are often the direct targets of violence. UNOCHA works with key stakeholders to develop policies and advocacy strategies designed to ensure the protection of civilians in armed conflict and respect for international human rights. It also seeks to draw attention to “neglected crises” that are not in the media spotlight. Finally, UNOCHA works with operational agencies to aid an estimated 26 million internally displaced people in the world (almost one percent of the world’s 6.7 billion people).

c. UNOCHA maintains an in-house emergency response capacity, supported by a 24-hour monitoring and alert system, to deploy staff at short notice to disaster areas. In addition, UNOCHA supports several “surge capacity” mechanisms and networks that enable the humanitarian community, as a whole, to respond quickly to emergencies and disasters. These include:

(1) The UNDAC can dispatch teams within 12 to 24 hours of a natural disaster or sudden-onset emergency to gather information, assess needs, and coordinate international assistance.

(2) The OSOCC, run by the UNDAC team, assists local authorities with coordinating international response teams during disasters. In addition, an internet-based
virtual OSOCC facilitates information exchange between responding governments and organizations throughout the relief operation.

(3) The Environment Standby Experts, a joint venture with the UN Environment Program, functions in environmental disasters the same way UNDAC does in natural disasters.

(4) The Civil-Military Coordination Section ensures military resources, when available and appropriate, are effectively used to respond to humanitarian emergencies.

(5) The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group is a global platform for developing standards for urban SAR teams and coordinating international rescue operations.

d. An important part of UNOCHA’s work is to gather, analyze, and disseminate information from the field to key stakeholders. UNOCHA monitors and issues situation reports on natural disasters on a 24-hour basis. The tools used to collect and share information include:

(1) http://www.ReliefWeb.int – provides comprehensive information on emergencies on natural disasters to the global humanitarian community on a 24-hour basis.


(3) http://www.humanitarianinfo.org – the gateway to humanitarian information centers and other field-based sources which provide accurate information and data to relief workers and decision-makers.

(4) http://ochaonline.un.org – a corporate platform for advocacy, information sharing, a repository of humanitarian and UNOCHA-related information and a donor solicitation platform. The site includes an online guide to help businesses identify ways to support UN emergency relief efforts.

5. Interagency Relationships

a. UNOCHA has close interagency relationships through a variety of forums, but especially through the IASC, the Consolidated Appeals Process, and the ECHA. Through the ECHA, UNOCHA maintains close contact with the Department of Political Affairs and UNDPKO with regard to security, political and humanitarian dimensions of complex emergencies to promote joint policy planning, and coordination. UNOCHA coordinates operational organizations of the UN system (like UNICEF and WFP) and other humanitarian agencies. In the event of a complex emergency, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, UNOCHA under the SYG, consults with IASC members before either confirming the RC as humanitarian coordinator or designating another official to perform that function.
b. UNOCHA works closely with NGOs as indispensable implementers of emergency programs. UNOCHA operates under the assumption that NGOs often have more detailed knowledge of, and are closer to, affected populations, and should therefore be part of the overall coordination effort.

c. UNOCHA realizes that the use of military and civil defense assets should be employed by humanitarian agencies as a last resort, (i.e., only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required).

*For more information, refer to Guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies and Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief—“Oslo Guidelines.”*
1. Overview

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN (http://www.fao.org/index_en.htm) leads international efforts to defeat hunger. Achieving food security for all is at the heart of FAO’s efforts—to make sure people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives. FAO’s mandate is to raise the levels of nutrition, improve agricultural productivity, better the lives of rural populations, and contribute to the growth of the world economy. Serving both developed and developing countries, FAO acts as a neutral forum where all nations meet as equals to negotiate agreements and debate policy. FAO is also a source of knowledge and information. FAO helps developing countries and countries in transition modernize and improve agriculture, forestry, and fisheries practices and ensure good nutrition for all. Since its founding in 1945, it has focused special attention on developing rural areas, home to 70 percent of the world’s poor and hungry people.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

   a. FAO is governed by the Conference of Member Nations, which meets every two years to review the work carried out by the FAO and approve a program of work and budget for the next biennium. The Conference of Member Nations elects a council of 49 member nations to act as an interim governing body.

   b. FAO provides the kind of behind-the-scenes assistance that helps people and nations help themselves. If a community wants to increase crop yields but lacks the technical skills, FAO introduces simple, sustainable tools and techniques. When a country shifts from state to private land ownership, FAO provides the legal advice to smooth the way. When a drought pushes already vulnerable groups to the point of famine, FAO mobilizes action. In a complex world of competing needs, FAO provides a neutral meeting place and the background knowledge needed to reach consensus.

3. Organizational Structure

FAO is composed of eight departments: Agriculture and Consumer Protection; Economic and Social Development; Fisheries and Aquaculture; Forestry; Human, Financial, and Physical Resources; Knowledge and Communication; Natural Resources Management, and Environment; and Technical Cooperation.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

   a. **Putting information within reach.** FAO serves as a knowledge network. FAO uses the expertise of its staff—agronomists, foresters, fisheries and livestock specialists, nutritionists, social scientists, economists, statisticians, and other professionals—to collect, analyze, and disseminate data that aid development. A million times a month, someone visits the FAO internet site to consult a technical document or read about FAO’s
work with farmers. FAO also publishes hundreds of newsletters, reports, and books; distributes several magazines; creates numerous compact disks; and hosts dozens of electronic fora.

b. **Sharing policy expertise.** FAO lends its years of experience to member countries in devising agricultural policy, supporting planning, drafting effective legislation, and creating national strategies to achieve rural development and hunger alleviation goals.

c. **Providing a meeting place for nations.** On any given day, dozens of policy-makers and experts from around the globe convene at HQ or in FAO field offices to forge agreements on major food and agriculture issues. As a neutral forum, FAO provides the setting where rich and poor nations can come together to build common understanding.

d. **Bringing knowledge to the field.** FAO’s breadth of knowledge is put to the test in thousands of field projects throughout the world. FAO mobilizes and manages millions of dollars provided by industrialized countries, development banks, and other sources to make sure the projects achieve their goals. FAO provides the technical know how and in a few cases is a limited source of funds. In crisis situations, FAO works side-by-side with the WFP and other humanitarian agencies to protect rural livelihoods and help people rebuild their lives.

5. **Interagency Relationships**

The FAO helps national governments cooperate through regional and subregional groupings, such as the Economic Community of West African States, South African Development Coordination Conference, Center for Integrated Rural Development in Asia and the Pacific, and Organization of Andean Pact Countries. The FAO cooperates with practically all the major multilateral funding institutions, including the World Bank, International Fund for Agriculture Development, African Development Bank and Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the UN Capital Development Fund, most of the major Arab banks, and subregional institutions. The World Bank is the single most important source of financing for investment projects prepared by the FAO.
ANNEX F TO APPENDIX B
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

1. Overview

The Office of the UNHCR (http://www.unhcr.org) is the UN Refugee Agency. UNHCR is mandated by the UN to lead and coordinate international action for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems. UNHCR’s primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. In its efforts to achieve this objective, UNHCR strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state, and to return home voluntarily. By assisting refugees to return to their own country or to settle permanently in another country, UNHCR also seeks lasting solutions to their plight.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

UNHCR’s efforts are mandated by the organization’s statute, and guided by the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. International refugee law provides an essential framework of principles for UNHCR’s humanitarian activities. In support of its core activities on behalf of refugees, UNHCR’s Executive Committee and the UN General Assembly have authorized the organization’s involvement with other groups. These include former refugees who have returned to their homeland; internally displaced people; and people who are stateless or whose nationality is disputed.

3. Organizational Structure

UNHCR is headquartered in Geneva. The UNHCR Branch Office for the United States is located in Washington, DC. UNHCR employs over 6,600 people, including short-term staff. UNHCR, funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions from donor governments, has offices in over 111 countries. UNHCR helps 34.4 million people worldwide.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. UNHCR seeks to reduce situations of forced displacement by encouraging states and other institutions to create conditions which are conducive to the protection of human rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In pursuit of the same objective, UNHCR actively seeks to consolidate the reintegration of returning refugees in their country of origin, thereby averting the recurrence of refugee-producing situations.

b. UNHCR is an impartial organization, offering protection and assistance to refugees and others on the basis of their needs and irrespective of their race, religion, political opinion, or gender. In all of its activities, UNHCR pays particular attention to the needs of children and seeks to promote the equal rights of women and girls.

c. In its efforts to protect refugees and to promote solutions to their problems, UNHCR works in partnership with governments, regional organizations, IGOs, and
NGOs. UNHCR is committed to the principle of participation, believing that refugees and others who benefit from the organization’s activities should be consulted over decisions, which affect their lives.

d. By virtue of its activities on behalf of refugees and displaced people, UNHCR also endeavors to promote the purposes and principles of the UN Charter: maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

5. Interagency Relationships

a. From the outset, UNHCR’s work was intended to be undertaken jointly with other members of the international community. As its activities have increased and diversified, UNHCR’s relations with other organs and agencies of the UN system, IGOs, and NGOs have become increasingly important. As humanitarian crises have become more complex, UNHCR has expanded both the number and type of organizations with which it works. UN sister agencies and offices include the WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, UNOCHA, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

b. When the security situation allows UNHCR to perform its Core Competencies, a symbiotic relation can arise between UNHCR and the joint force. Security in post-conflict regions often requires joint or coalition military force, but emergency humanitarian response and long-term resolution of underlying grievances of refugees and displaced persons is often best addressed by the UNHCR and other independent agencies. Strategic objectives which cannot be accomplished through military force alone or current USG interagency processes may be addressed by UNHCR functions. Enabling the UNHCR to do its job can help accomplish political and national strategic objectives.
1. Overview

The WFP (http://www.wfp.org) is the UN frontline agency in the fight against global hunger. It is the world’s largest humanitarian organization. In emergencies, WFP gets food to where it is needed, saving the lives of victims of war, civil conflict, and natural disasters. After the cause of an emergency has passed, WFP uses food to help communities rebuild their shattered lives. WFP’s five objectives are: save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; prepare for emergencies; restore and rebuild lives after emergencies; reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition everywhere; and strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger. WFP food assistance reaches an average of 100 million people in 80 countries every year. Almost 12,000 people work for the organization, most of them in remote areas, directly serving the hungry poor.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. WFP is the food aid arm of the UN system. Food aid is one of the many instruments that can help to promote food security, which is defined as access of all people at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. The policies governing the use of WFP food aid must be oriented towards the objective of eradicating hunger and poverty. The ultimate objective of food aid should be the elimination of the need for food aid.

b. Targeted interventions are needed to help to improve the lives of the poorest people—people who, either permanently or during crisis periods, are unable to produce enough food or do not have the resources to otherwise obtain the food that they and their households require for active and healthy lives.

c. Consistent with its mandate, which also reflects the principle of universality, WFP will continue to:

   (1) Use food aid to support economic and social development;

   (2) Meet refugee and other emergency food needs, and the associated logistics support; and

   (3) Promote world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the UN and FAO.

d. The core policies and strategies that govern WFP activities are to provide food aid:

   (1) To save lives in refugee and other emergency situations;

   (2) To improve the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives; and
(3) To help build assets and promote the self-reliance of poor people and communities, particularly through labor-intensive works programs.

e. In the first case, food aid is essential for social and humanitarian protection. It will be used in a way that is as developmental as possible, consistent with saving lives. To the extent possible, the provision of relief food aid will be coordinated with the relief assistance provided by other humanitarian organizations. In the second case, food aid is a pre-investment in human resources. In the third, it uses poor people’s most abundant resource, their own labor, to create employment and income and to build the infrastructure necessary for sustained development.

f. WFP is well placed to play a major role in the continuum from emergency relief to development. WFP will give priority to supporting disaster prevention, preparedness, and mitigation and post-disaster rehabilitation activities as part of development programs. Conversely, emergency assistance will be used to the extent possible to serve both relief and development purposes. In both cases, the overall aim is to build self reliance.

g. In carrying out its mandate, WFP will concentrate on what it is best suited to do with the resources available as cost-effectively as possible. WFP will focus on those aspects of development where food-based interventions are most useful. It will make all necessary efforts to avoid negative effects on local food production, consumption patterns, and dependency on food aid. WFP will continue to play a major and significant role in providing transport and logistics expertise and assistance to ensure rapid and efficient delivery of humanitarian aid.

h. WFP’s multilateral character is one of its greatest strengths. WFP will exploit its capability to operate virtually everywhere in the developing world, without regard to the political orientations of governments, and to provide a neutral conduit for assistance in situations where many donor countries could not directly provide assistance. WFP will provide services: advice, good offices, logistic support and information, and support to countries in establishing and managing their own food assistance programs.

i. WFP, on request, will provide bilateral services to donors, UN agencies, and NGOs on the basis of full cost recovery. These will be administered and accounted for separately. Such services will complement WFP’s regular operations to the extent possible.

j. WFP will concentrate its efforts and resources on the neediest people and countries to provide at least 90 percent of WFP’s development assistance to low-income, food-deficit countries and at least 50 percent of its development assistance to the least developed countries.

k. WFP will ensure that its assistance programs are designed and implemented on the basis of broad-based participation. Women in particular are key to change; providing food to women puts it in the hands of those who use it for the benefit of the entire household, especially the children. WFP assistance will aim to strengthen their coping ability and resilience.
1. To be truly effective, food aid should be fully integrated into the development plans and priorities of recipient countries and coordinated with other forms of assistance. WFP’s starting point is the national policies, plans, and programs of developing countries, including their food security plans. WFP will pull together its activities in an integrated way at the country level so that it can respond to urgent needs as they occur while retaining core development objectives. The country strategy note, where this exists, should provide the framework for an integrated response by the UN system. In some special cases, WFP will adopt a multi-country or regional approach, particularly for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

m. No single agency has either the resources or the capacity to deal with all the problems of hunger and underdevelopment. Hence, the importance WFP attaches to collaboration with other agencies, particularly with its parent bodies, the UN, and FAO. WFP will continue to work closely with the UNOCHA, UNHCR, other relevant agencies, and NGOs in the response to emergencies and humanitarian crises. WFP will also collaborate closely with the Rome-based UN food and agriculture agencies, FAO and International Fund for Agricultural Development, especially in using food aid for achieving household food security. WFP will continue to forge effective partnerships of action with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, regional bodies and institutions, bilateral donors, and NGOs in support of economic and social development.

n. WFP will play its part as an active member of the UN system to bring the issue of hunger to the centre of the international agenda. In its dialogue with recipient governments and the aid community, WFP will advocate policies, strategies, and operations that directly benefit the poor and hungry.

3. Organizational Structure

WFP is headquartered in Rome, Italy. At WFP HQ, the Operations Department has six regional bureaus coordinated by three divisions for development, emergencies, and transport and logistics. Operational responsibilities for emergency operations are integrated into the regional bureaus, which receive technical support from the Emergency Division. The Transport and Logistics Division has line responsibility for transport, logistics, and insurance operations. Country offices fall under the six regional bureaus. WFP is governed by the WFP Executive Board, which consists of 36 member states. The organization has an Executive Director, who is appointed jointly by the UN SYG and the Director-General of FAO.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. As the UN frontline agency in the fight against hunger, WFP is continually responding to emergencies. It saves lives by getting food to the hungry fast. In an emergency, the hungry look to WFP for an immediate response. After the local government has requested WFP help, this is what happens:

(1) First, emergency assessment teams are sent in to ask how much food assistance is needed for how many beneficiaries and for how long. They must also work
out how food can best be delivered to the hungry. Equipped with the answers, WFP draws up an Emergency Operation, including a plan of action and a budget. This lists who will receive food assistance, what rations are required, the type of transport WFP will use, and which humanitarian corridors lead to the crisis zone.

(2) Next, WFP launches an appeal to the international community for funds and food aid. The agency relies entirely on voluntary contributions to finance its operations, with donations made in cash, food, or services. Governments are the biggest single source of funding. As funds and food start to flow, WFP’s logistics team works to bridge the gap between the donors and the hungry.

(3) Ships carry the largest WFP cargo, their holds filled with tons of grain, cans of cooking oil, and tinned food; every day, the agency has 30 ships on the high seas, frequently rerouting vessels to get food fast to crisis zones. In extreme environments, WFP also uses the skies to reach the hungry, airlifting, or airdropping food directly into disaster zones.

(4) Before the aid can reach its country of destination, logistics experts often need to upgrade ports and secure warehouses. Trucks usually make the final link in WFP’s food chain—transporting food aid along the rough roads that lead to the hungry. Where roads are impassable or simply nonexistent, WFP relies on less conventional forms of transport: donkeys in the Andes, speedboats in the Mozambique floods, camels in Sudan, and elephants in Nepal.

(5) When the food reaches designated distribution sites—refugee camps, therapeutic feeding centers, and other emergency shelters—WFP teams up with governments and NGOs to deliver food into the hands and mouths of the hungry. WFP works with about 3,000 international and local NGOs to distribute food aid. At this stage, local community leaders work closely with WFP to ensure rations reach the people who need it most: women, pregnant mothers, children, and the elderly.

b. WFP also works to help the hungry gain food security for the future. WFP does this through programs that use food as a means to build assets, spread knowledge, and nurture stronger, more dynamic communities. Before intervening in a country, the first priority for WFP is to analyze the food security situation of the population. WFP’s food security analysis work is commonly known as vulnerability analysis and mapping and is carried out by 120 analysts around the world. Be it an emergency or otherwise, WFP needs to answer some critical questions. Who is hungry or vulnerable? How many of them are there? Where do they live? Why are they hungry? Only when they have these answers can WFP experts decide on the scale of intervention, the type of intervention, and the most appropriate responses required to save people’s lives and livelihoods.

c. To achieve its objectives, WFP has developed expertise in a range of areas including food security analysis, nutrition, food procurement, and logistics. The WFP works in the following areas:

(1) Have precise information on where the hungry are and how many there are.
(2) Ensure the right sort of food and nutrition is provided for each situation.

(3) Buy the right sort of food as near as possible to where it is needed.

(4) Organize food transport to the most inaccessible places on earth.

d. Thanks to its expertise in all these areas, WFP reaches an average of 100 million people a year with food assistance. WFP currently has operations in 77 countries. WFP has four major types of operations:

(1) Emergency operations provide immediate assistance.

(2) Relief and rehabilitation operations rebuild after an emergency.

(3) Development operations improve food security for communities.

(4) Special operations create the specific infrastructure needed for emergency operations.

e. In places where hunger strikes most often, communication is essential to saving lives. Local communications are at best primitive or at worst unpredictable. Only when communication systems are in place can WFP’s aid workers effectively manage the movement, delivery, and monitoring of critical food assistance while ensuring their own safety at the same time. WFP information and communication technology allows staff to communicate with field offices and HQ wherever they are—be it the jungles of Cambodia, the Angolan bush, or the deserts of Yemen. WFP information and communication technology rapid response teams can be dispatched to emergencies with the equipment necessary to get communications up and running within 48 hours. In between crises, the crews travel to WFP’s operations, providing the necessary technical support and continuous upgrading of the information and communication technology network.

f. WFP transports more food than any other international organization. In 2007 alone, it distributed 3.3 million metric tons of food by sea, air, river, road, and rail. Moving food assistance, a bulk commodity, thousands of miles at a moment’s notice, often into some of the world’s most inhospitable places, is a skill, which WFP has turned into a fine art. Ocean transport forms the backbone of WFP’s transportation system, with some 90 percent of its food moved by ship. But as complex as shipping arrangements can be, that’s just the easy part. The hard bit lies in getting the food from the ships to the people who need it. To achieve this, WFP’s transport officers stretch a logistical lifeline across deserts, mountains, and rivers deep into the heart of the world’s poorest countries. If there are no roads or bridges, WFP builds them. Where there is no landing space for aircraft, it arranges an airdrop. WFP even rehabilitates entire ports and railways. Once the supply line is secure, WFP brings in its emergency food supplies via wing, wheel, and wagon. It uses whatever means are available: ships, barges, dug-out canoes; trucks and trains; planes, helicopters and air drops; even the backs of donkeys, yaks, and elephants.
5. Interagency Relationships

a. WFP cooperates with other UN agencies, NGOs, and regional and international organizations. WFP also works with the international financial institutions (especially the World Bank) and bilateral agencies.

b. WFP collaborates with about 3,000 NGOs in emergencies to get food through to the needy. NGOs are often contracted to transport and distribute food. Special measures have been emphasized to form stronger partnerships with NGOs. These include more formal arrangements in countries where collaboration with NGOs has taken place on an ad hoc basis. The grassroots and technical knowledge of these NGOs is invaluable when it comes to assessing how to deliver food to the right people. Among other things, these arrangements cover monitoring, reporting, and financial accountability in the implementation of actual food distribution, while also maintaining some flexibility to allow freedom of action of partners. For example, WFP has signed country-specific agreements with the Mozambican Red Cross, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, World Vision, Oxfam, and Save the Children Federation.

c. Particularly close interagency coordination has been established with the UNOCHA and with the UNHCR in responding to emergency situations. WFP actively participates in UNOCHA-led meetings, particularly the IASC and the IASC Working Group. WFP also strongly supports UNOCHA through the temporary assignment of senior emergency management staff to UNOCHA’s New York and Geneva offices, participation in UNOCHA’s Consolidated Appeals Process and in UNOCHA-led interagency assessment missions, and the use of UNOCHA’s CERF.

d. WFP and UNHCR have working arrangements, which make the former responsible for the mobilization of all basic food commodities and the funds for meeting transport costs for all UNHCR-managed refugee relief operations.

e. The program’s involvement in conflict zones results in greater interaction with UN peacekeeping forces around the world. Such interaction is instrumental in ensuring the demining of access routes, a key requirement for the delivery of large amounts of relief supplies. Peacekeeping forces also assist in the delivery of relief aid in humanitarian convoys across military lines.

f. The WFP is the UN logistics cluster lead (http://www.logcluster.org).
1. Overview

WHO (http://www.who.int/en) is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the UN system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring and assessing health trends. In the 21st century, health is a shared responsibility, involving equitable access to essential care and collective defense against transnational threats.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. WHO’s objective, as set out in its Constitution, is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. The Constitution defines health as a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.

b. WHO fulfils its objectives through its core functions:

   (1) Providing leadership on matters critical to health and engaging in partnerships where joint action is needed.

   (2) Shaping the research agenda and stimulating the generation, translation, and dissemination of valuable knowledge.

   (3) Setting norms and standards and promoting and monitoring their implementation.

   (4) Articulating ethical and evidence-based policy options.

   (5) Providing technical support, catalyzing change, and building sustainable institutional capacity.

   (6) Monitoring the health situation and assessing health trends.

3. Organizational Structure

a. WHO is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. It performs its functions through three principal bodies: the World Health Assembly, the Executive Board, and the Secretariat. The WHO Liaison Office to the UN is located in New York City.

b. WHO operates in six regions, each consisting of a regional committee and a regional office headed by a regional director. The regional offices are responsible for formulating regional policies and for monitoring regional activities. In 147 countries there is a resident WHO representative, who is responsible for WHO’s activities in the
country and who supports the government in the planning and management of national health programs.

c. The six regional offices are:

(1) Africa (Regional Office for Africa; Brazzaville, Congo).

(2) Americas (Regional Office for the Americas/Pan American Health Organization; Washington, DC).

(3) South-East Asia (Regional Office for South-East Asia; New Delhi, India).

(4) Europe (Regional Office for Europe; Copenhagen, Denmark).

(5) Eastern Mediterranean (Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean; Nasr City, Cairo, Egypt).

(6) Western Pacific (Regional Office for the Western Pacific; Manila, Philippines).

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. WHO operates in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing landscape. The boundaries of public health action have become blurred, extending into other sectors that influence health opportunities and outcomes. WHO responds to these challenges using a six-point agenda. The six points address two health objectives, two strategic needs, and two operational approaches. The overall performance of WHO will be measured by the impact of its work on women’s health and health in Africa.

b. Promoting Development. During the past decade, health has achieved unprecedented prominence as a key driver of socioeconomic progress, and more resources than ever are being invested in health. Yet poverty continues to contribute to poor health, and poor health anchors large populations in poverty. Health development is directed by the ethical principle of equity: Access to life-saving or health-promoting interventions should not be denied for unfair reasons, including those with economic or social roots. Commitment to this principle ensures that WHO activities aimed at health development give priority to health outcomes in poor, disadvantaged, or vulnerable groups. Attainment of the health-related Millennium Development Goals, preventing and treating chronic diseases and addressing the neglected tropical diseases is the cornerstone of the health and development agenda.

c. Fostering Health Security. Shared vulnerability to health security threats demands collective action. One of the greatest threats to international health security arises from outbreaks of emerging and epidemic-prone diseases. Such outbreaks are occurring in increasing numbers, fuelled by such factors as rapid urbanization, environmental mismanagement, the way food is produced and traded, and the way antibiotics are used and misused. The world’s ability to defend itself collectively against
outbreaks has been strengthened since June 2007, when the revised International Health Regulations came into force.

d. Strengthening Health Systems. For health improvement to operate as a poverty-reduction strategy, health services must reach poor and underserved populations. Health systems in many parts of the world are unable to do so, making the strengthening of health systems a high priority for WHO. Areas being addressed include the provision of adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff, sufficient financing, suitable systems for collecting vital statistics, and access to appropriate technology including essential drugs.

e. Harnessing Research, Information, and Evidence. Evidence provides the foundation for setting priorities, defining strategies, and measuring results. WHO generates authoritative health information, in consultation with leading experts, to set norms and standards, articulate evidence-based policy options, and monitor the evolving global health situation.

f. Enhancing Partnerships. WHO carries out its work with the support and collaboration of many partners, including UN agencies, other international organizations, donors, civil society, and the private sector. WHO uses the strategic power of evidence to encourage partners implementing programs within countries to align their activities with the best technical guidelines and practices, as well as with the priorities established by countries.

g. Improving Performance. WHO participates in ongoing reforms aimed at improving its efficiency and effectiveness, both at the international level and within countries. WHO aims to ensure that its strongest asset—its staff—works in an environment that is motivating and rewarding. WHO plans its budget and activities through results-based management, with clear expected results to measure performance at country, regional, and international levels.

5. Multilateral Relationships

a. As a cooperative organization, WHO is the collective expression of the health aspirations and actions of the UN membership. Besides providing technical cooperation for individual UN member states, WHO facilitates technical cooperation between countries, both developed and developing. For example, WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS works with more than 150 countries to provide financial and technical support. WHO’s Action Programme on Essential Drugs collaborates with all countries to ensure the regular supply of drugs at the lowest possible cost and the rational use of a select number of safe and effective drugs and vaccines of acceptable quality.

b. Since WHO has a constitutional requirement to “establish and maintain effective collaboration with the UN,” it coordinates its international activities with the UN system in the field of health and socio-economic development, working closely with other UN organizations, including:

(1) UNICEF.
(2) UN Environment Program.

(3) IAEA.

(4) International Labor Organization.

(5) International Programme on Chemical Safety.

(6) FAO of the UN and the Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues.

(7) The Joint WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission that ensures the safety of food moving in trade and provides guidelines for national food control.

c. WHO maintains close working relationships with NGOs. Some 160 NGOs have official relations with WHO. In addition, more than 1,000 leading health-related institutions around the world are officially designated as WHO collaborating centers.
1. Overview

The UNDP (http://www.undp.org) is the UN’s global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience, and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and a wide range of partners.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The UNDP is an executive board within the UN General Assembly. The UNDP Administrator is the third highest ranking member of the UN after the SG and Deputy Secretary General.

3. Organizational Structure

In each country office, the UNDP resident representative normally also serves as the RC of development activities for the UN system as a whole. Through such coordination, UNDP seeks to ensure the most effective use of UN and international aid resources.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. Capacity development—the “how” of development—is the overarching contribution of UNDP. Within the framework of national ownership, UNDP efforts support program countries in developing national and local capacities for human development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, characterized by effective aid management and South-South solutions. Capacity development cuts across all of the UNDP focus areas.

b. Poverty Reduction and Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. While economic growth is essential to human progress, it is not the only important factor in achieving the goals. UNDP supports countries in formulating, implementing, and monitoring national development strategies centered on inclusive growth and gender equality to ensure equitable, broad-based human development. UNDP works closely with the UN Conference on Trade and Development and other organizations to ensure that the globalization process—international trade, investment regime, and development finance—is inclusive and supportive of goal achievement. Reaching the target of halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015 is also critical to achieving the other goals, particularly targets related to poverty, education, gender equality, and child and maternal mortality. As a founding co-sponsor of the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS, UNDP is responding to the multi-sectoral challenges of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and contributing to comprehensive UN system action, addressing dimensions of HIV/AIDS
relating to development, governance, mainstreaming, legislation, human rights, and gender.

c. **Democratic Governance.** More countries than ever before are working to build democratic governance. Their challenge is to develop institutions and processes that are more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poor, and that promote development. UNDP helps countries strengthen electoral and legislative systems, improve access to justice and public administration, and develop a greater capacity to deliver basic services to those most in need. Through its programs, UNDP brings people together within nations and around the world, fostering partnerships and sharing ways to promote participation, accountability, and effectiveness at all levels.

d. **Crisis Prevention and Recovery.** Many countries are increasingly vulnerable to violent conflicts or natural disasters that can erase decades of development and further entrench poverty and inequality. Through its global network, UNDP seeks out and shares innovative approaches to crisis prevention, early warning, and conflict resolution. Because UNDP is on the ground in almost every developing country it can help bridge the gap between emergency relief and long-term development when a crisis occurs.

e. **Environment and Sustainable Development.** The poor are disproportionately affected by environmental degradation and lack of access to clean, affordable energy services. UNDP’s goal in this area is to strengthen national capacity to manage the environment in a sustainable manner while ensuring adequate protection of the poor. Energy and environmental issues are also global, as climate change, loss of biodiversity and ozone layer depletion cannot be addressed by countries acting alone. UNDP, through programs such as the Equator Initiative, and the Global Environment Facility—a partnership with the UN Environment Program and the World Bank—helps countries strengthen their capacity to address these challenges at the global, national, and community levels, seeking out and sharing best practices, providing innovative policy advice, and linking partners through pilot projects.

f. In each of these areas, UNDP advocates for the protection of human rights and especially the empowerment of women. UNDP, through its global network, seeks out and share ways to promote gender equality as an essential dimension of ensuring political participation and accountability; economic empowerment and effective development planning; crisis prevention and conflict resolution; access to clean water, sanitation, and energy services; and society-wide mobilization against HIV/AIDS.

5. **Interagency Relationships**

One of UNDP’s most important roles is to support participatory and accountable management of the RC system through enhanced UN system coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness, and the strategic integration of development efforts within the context of national development priorities. UNDP, together with its UN and other development partners, helps to support the most effective use of UN and international aid resources.
ANNEX J TO APPENDIX B
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Overview

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping) is dedicated to assisting the member states and the SYG in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. The department’s mission is to plan, prepare, manage, and direct UN peacekeeping operations so that they can effectively fulfill their mandates under the overall authority of the Security Council and General Assembly, and under the command vested in the SYG.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. UNDPKO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. The department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. UNDPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action, and other relevant issues to other UN political and peace building missions.

b. Each UN peacekeeping operation has a specific set of mandated tasks, but all share certain common aims—to alleviate human suffering and create conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining peace. The substantial presence of a UN peacekeeping operation on the ground contributes to this aim by introducing the UN as a third party with a direct impact on the political process. In exercise of its tasks, UNDPKO aims to minimize the many risks to which peacekeepers may be exposed in the field.

c. UN peacekeeping operations may consist of several components, including a military component, which may or may not be armed, and various civilian components encompassing a broad range of disciplines. Depending on their mandate, UN peacekeeping missions may be required to:

(1) Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;

(2) Stabilize conflict situations after a cease fire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;

(3) Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and

(4) Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance, and economic development.

3. Chapter VI and Chapter VII Operations

a. UN collective security operations span a broad operational spectrum from unarmed peace observation to full-fledged combat enforcement missions. However, most UN missions fall between these extremes and have acquired the rather elastic label of peacekeeping. The term “peacekeeping” is not defined anywhere in the Charter.

b. **Chapter VI—“Peacekeeping.”** Chapter VI of the Charter, titled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” gives the UN the power to mediate international disputes between states and recommend terms of a settlement. It sets out a series of procedures that may be used by the Council in seeking to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes. Under Article 34, it may investigate a dispute or situation to see whether it is likely to endanger international peace and security. The Security Council did this, for example, in sending commissions to the Balkans in order to investigate disturbances on the Greek border, and more recently to investigate tension in the Israeli-occupied territories (1979 and 1980). Under Article 35, it may consider any dispute or situation brought to its attention by any member. Under Article 36, the Security Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment on any dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 37, it may consider a dispute which it thinks likely to endanger international peace and security and determine whether to “recommend . . . terms of a settlement.” And it may, under Article 38, make such a recommendation at the request of all the parties to a dispute, but no such request has ever been made to the Council under Article 38.

c. **Chapter VII—“Peace Enforcement.”** Chapter VII of the Charter, titled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” is more powerful, and Article 42 of this chapter gives the UN authority to use the armed forces of member states to maintain or restore international peace and security. It sets out the procedures that may be used when a dispute has become a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression (terms that are never clearly defined in the Charter). Under Article 39, the Security Council is to determine the existence of such a state of affairs and decide what recommendations to make. Under Article 40, it can decide to call for certain provisional measures by the parties without prejudice to their rights, claims, or position. A ceasefire or mutual withdrawal from a border might be a measure of this kind, and the Council used this Article in ordering a ceasefire in Palestine in July 1948. If this has no effect, the Council can decide to use sanctions of various kinds, including the interruption of economic relations or communications (Article 41). Finally, if these are inadequate, it can decide to take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, because the multilateral agreements for the provision of such forces have never been concluded (Article 43), UN peace enforcement operations have always been hastily improvised, much like peacekeeping missions. Although no Security Council force has ever been established, Article 42 speaks only of air, sea, or land forces, and does not specify that they must be a preexisting or a “standing” UN force. The reason that Article 43 has never been used is because of the political difficulties and dangers of making such a call on member states that hold widely varying opinions on the merits of every dispute, and who are not usually willing to commit themselves to armed action in conflicts in
which they may have no overriding national interest. This long-recognized difficulty facing any collective security system has not yet been overcome by the words of the Charter binding members to obey Security Council decisions. The UN operation in Korea (1950-1953) was conducted under purposefully vague Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, generally without specific reference to UN Charter provisions. Even the campaign to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait as part of Operation DESERT STORM was not conducted “strictly” under the provisions of Article 42; however, the Security Council did cite Chapter VII as the authority to permit the use of coercive force in carrying out its resolutions.

4. Types of United Nations Peace Operations

a. UN PO as they are emerging today are different from those that took place during the Cold War.

b. Some of these new operations have been of the traditional, largely military type, deployed to control unresolved conflicts between states. Their principal task was to help the parties stop fighting and to prevent any resumption of hostilities, thus helping to create conditions in which the peacemakers could negotiate a lasting settlement. But most of the new operations have been set up to help implement negotiated settlements of long-standing conflicts, as in Namibia, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique. Except for Namibia, each of these operations has involved an internal conflict, albeit with significant external dimensions, within a sovereign member state of the UN. Another aspect to these new operations is the eruption of savage conflicts in, and sometimes between, newly emerging independent states. The former Yugoslavia has become the UN’s largest peacekeeping commitment to date. Ethnic conflict across political borders and the killing of civilians there are similar to the ordeals that UN peacekeeping forces faced in the 1960s in the former Congo.

c. Although peacekeeping operations still invariably include military personnel, since 1988 the emphasis has changed, and these operations now frequently contain substantial civilian elements that are playing a more important role. This is mainly because the UN is more often involved in internal conflicts than in inter-state ones. As was proven in the Congo, internal conflicts are risky and complicated affairs in which success is hard to achieve and more than military skills are required. Helping to end a civil war is likely to involve a third party in a whole range of civilian activities, which are less often required in the inter-state context. In either case, though, experience has shown that there is a greater role for civilian peacekeepers than had been apparent in earlier years.
ANNEX K TO APPENDIX B
EUROPEAN UNION

1. Overview

   a. The EU is a regional IGO comprised of 27 European countries (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Current candidate countries are Croatia, Iceland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia are officially recognized as potential candidates. Kosovo is also listed as a potential candidate but the European Commission does not list it as an independent country because not all member states recognize it as an independent country separate from Serbia.

   b. Originally established as an economic union following World War II, it developed into the European Economic Community or “common market” in 1957. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty formed the foundation for a political and economic union that has become the EU.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

   a. Among the many facets of the EU is a Common Foreign and Security Policy which was established by the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty gives the Common Foreign and Security Policy the aims of promoting both the EU’s own interests and those of the international community as a whole. This includes promoting international cooperation, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

   b. The Amsterdam Treaty created the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to coordinate the EU’s foreign policy. The High Representative, in conjunction with the current Presidency, which rotates between member states every six months, speaks on behalf of the EU in foreign policy matters. The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires unanimity among the now 27 member states on the appropriate policy to follow on any particular issue. The unanimity and difficult issues treated under the Common Foreign and Security Policy makes disagreements, such as those which occurred over the war in Iraq, not uncommon.

   c. Member states are responsible for their own territorial defense. Many EU members are also members of NATO although some member states follow policies of neutrality. The Western European Union is a European security organization related to the EU. Elements of the Western European Union are currently being merged into the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the President of the Western European Union is currently the EU’s foreign policy chief.
d. In order to enable the EU to fully assume its responsibilities for crisis management, the European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish permanent political and military structures:

(1) The Political and Security Committee meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European Security and Defense policy (http://ue.eu.int/showPage.aspx?id=261&lang=EN). It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

(2) The EU Military Committee is the highest military body set up within the Council of the EU. It is composed of the chiefs of defense of the member states, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EU Military Committee provides the Political and Security Committee with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.

(3) In parallel with the EU Military Committee, the Political and Security Committee is advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. This committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the Political and Security Committee on civilian aspects of crisis management.

(4) The EU Military Staff composed of military and civilian experts seconded to the Council Secretariat by the member states.

(5) The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, which is part of the Council Secretariat, is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian European Security and Defense Policy operations. Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian European Security and Defense Policy crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks.

e. Following the Kosovo War in 1999, the European Council agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” To that end, a number of efforts were made to increase the EU’s military capability. The most concrete result was the EU Battlegroups initiative, each of which is planned to be able to deploy quickly about 1,500 men. EU forces have been deployed on peacekeeping missions from Africa to the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. EU military operations are supported by a number of bodies, including the European Defense Agency, satellite center and the military staff.
f. Members of the EU are increasingly involved in peacekeeping (Kosovo) and are playing an important role in the full range of development activities. In post-conflict or peacekeeping missions, the EU activities may be coordinated by an EU Special representative, whose office would include the various EU elements contributing to the mission. The various offices of the EU Special representative would be the primary participants in any intergovernmental coordination efforts.

For more information, refer to Europa Online (http://europa.eu/index_en.htm).
ANNEX L TO APPENDIX B
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

1. Overview

The OAS (http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp) brings together nations of the Western Hemisphere to strengthen cooperation on democratic values, defend common interests, and debate the major issues facing the region and the world. The OAS is the region’s principal multilateral forum for strengthening democracy, promoting human rights, and confronting shared problems such as poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs, and corruption. It plays a leading role in carrying out mandates established by the hemisphere’s leaders through the Summits of the Americas. All 35 independent countries of the Americas have ratified the OAS Charter and belong to OAS (i.e., Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Barbados; Belize; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; Bolivia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Commonwealth of the Bahamas; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; St. Kitts & Nevis; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago; United States of America; and Uruguay).

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The member countries set major policies and goals through the General Assembly, which gathers the hemisphere’s ministers of foreign affairs once a year in regular session. Ongoing actions are guided by the Permanent Council, made up of ambassadors appointed by the member states.

3. Organizational Structure

The OAS General Secretariat carries out the programs and policies set by the political bodies. Four specialized secretariats coordinate OAS efforts in several broad areas:

a. **Secretariat for Multidimensional Security.** Coordinates OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs, and other threats to public security.

b. **Secretariat for Political Affairs.** Directs efforts to promote democracy, strengthen democratic governance, and prevent democratic crises.

c. **Executive Secretariat for Integral Development.** Includes departments that promote social development, sustainable development, trade and tourism, and education, culture, science, and technology. Also handles follow-up actions from the region’s ministerial meetings.

d. **Secretariat for Administration and Finance.** Provides support services to the General Secretariat, in areas that include human resources, information and technology, and budgetary affairs.
e. **Department of International Legal Affairs.** Promotes legal cooperation among the member states by helping to develop and implement international treaties.

4. **Inter-American Defense Board**

   a. The Inter-American Defense Board is an international committee of nationally appointed defense officials who develop collaborative approaches on common defense and security issues facing the Americas.

   b. The organization is an international forum consisting of civilian and military representatives appointed by the member states, that provides technical, consultative, and educational advisory services in military and hemispheric defense related matters consistent with the mandates of the OAS General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, and the OAS Permanent Council in their respective areas of jurisdiction.

   c. The Inter-American Defense Board comprises the following entities: the Council of Delegates; the Secretariat, and the Inter-American Defense College.

   d. Current programs include humanitarian demining in Central America, reporting on confidence and security building measures, and developing educational programs on regional security.
APPENDIX C
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Annex A International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
B International Committee of the Red Cross
C International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
D American Red Cross

1. Overview

a. An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. It may be local, national, or transnational; employ thousands of individuals or just a handful; and utilize a large management structure or no formal structure at all. Although listed in this appendix, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is neither an IGO, nor NGO, but an organization with a hybrid nature.

b. DOD uses the term NGO along with USG agencies and IGOs; however there is no consistent definition within the USG and among IGOs. As a point of reference, USAID uses the terms private voluntary organization and public international organizations along with NGOs.

c. There are thousands of NGOs. The JFC, through his legal counsel, must verify that US persons are not prohibited from dealing with a particular organization by virtue of its inclusion on the list of individuals and entities subject to the various economic sanctions programs administered by the TREAS Office of Foreign Assets Control. A list is located at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement.

2. Sources of Information

a. JFCs should be aware of all NGOs within their operational area. NGOs operate both domestically inside the United States and in most foreign countries. Overseas, the country team should already have good situational awareness of all NGOs that are present. Country desk officers on JS, GCCs, and IC agencies can also be a good source of information. The USAID mission, if present, will have developed relationships with NGOs. The office of the UN mission/UN RC/UNDP Resident Representative will have good visibility of NGOs working in that country.

b. InterAction (http://www.interaction.org) is the largest coalition of US based international NGOs focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people. Collectively, InterAction’s over 180 members work in every developing country. Members assist in expanding opportunities and supporting gender equality in education, health care, agriculture, small business, and other areas.
c. **The International Council of Voluntary Agencies** (http://www.icva.ch) is a global network that brings together humanitarian and human rights NGOs as an advocacy alliance for humanitarian action. ICVA is a nonprofit global association of NGOs that works as a collective body, to promote, and advocate for, human rights and a humanitarian perspective in global debates and responses. The heart of the ICVA mission is to support NGOs to protect and assist people in need, to address the causes of their plight, and to act as a channel for translating patterns and trends into advocacy. Focusing on humanitarian and refugee policy issues, ICVA draws upon the work of its members at the field level and brings their experiences to international decision-making forums. ICVA provides a means for the collective body of its members to work together to effect change, and also assists members to improve their own work through access to initiatives and tools that help to increase quality and accountability. Through its cooperative and catalytic nature, it gathers and exchanges information and raises awareness on the most vital matters of humanitarian concern before policy-making bodies.

d. **The Union of International Associations** (http://www.uia.be) is a research institute and documentation center, based in Brussels. Nonprofit, apolitical, independent, and nongovernmental in nature, the union has been a pioneer in the research, monitoring, and provision of information on international organizations, international associations, and their global challenges. Its *Yearbook of International Organizations* provides the most extensive coverage of nonprofit international organizations available today. Directly reflecting a dynamic international arena, it contains entries on 60,000 civil society organizations in 300 countries and territories, in every field of human endeavor.

e. **The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response** (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-schr) is an alliance for voluntary action of eight major international humanitarian organizations and networks. The committee’s mission is to bring together the major international humanitarian networks with common values to make this vision reality. Its members pool experience and use their collective weight to carry out effective humanitarian action.

f. **The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations** (WANGO) (http://www.wango.org) is a global organization whose mission is to serve its member organizations, strengthen and encourage the nongovernmental sector as a whole, increase public understanding of the nongovernmental community, and provide the mechanism and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, and multiply their contributions to solve humanity’s basic problems. WANGO unites NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing peace and global well being. WANGO helps to provide the mechanism and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, share, inspire, and multiply their contributions to solve humanity’s basic problems. WANGO publishes the NGO Handbook (http://www.ngohandbook.org) which is designed to provide leaders of NGOs an ever-expanding resource. Emphasis in particular is placed on practical information of relevance for the success of NGOs.

g. **The Alliance for Peacebuilding** (http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org) is a coalition of diverse organizations working together to build sustainable peace and
security worldwide. Its members are directly engaged in applied conflict prevention and resolution. They provide negotiation and mediation services, train negotiators, facilitate communication to break down barriers, and help find solutions to the issues and pressures that otherwise drive groups and nations to achieve their objectives through violent force. Members also conduct research and provide evaluation and education. The role of the alliance is to bring these organizations together for collaborative peacebuilding.

h. **National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster** ([http://www.nvoad.org](http://www.nvoad.org))

members form a coalition of nonprofit organizations that respond to disasters as part of their overall mission. Together they foster more effective service through the four C’s—communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration—by providing convening mechanisms and outreach for all people and organizations involved in disasters. It is an organization acknowledged as the leader in the Nation when it comes to integrating the efforts of nonprofit voluntary agencies for the purpose of enhancing their services to disaster survivors. This is accomplished through the national members as well as local and state affiliates. The mission is realized through the creation of trust, knowledge, shared information, standards, plans, and forums. Its vision has been one that seeks to maximize the effectiveness of the voluntary agencies as they work together toward their common goal of bringing help to disaster impacted communities across the country.

3. **Building Unity of Effort**

The following factors may assist in building unity of effort among NGOs and JFCs.

a. **Increase awareness** and **encourage contact** between the military and NGOs through symposia, meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions.

b. **Incorporate selected NGO training** into Service and joint training and exercise programs; and conversely, incorporate interaction with military units and personnel into NGO training.

c. **Review lessons learned** as recorded in both the joint and Services’ lessons learned databases.

d. **Clearly articulate the role of the military to the NGOs.** It is imperative that these organizations understand the military mission, the level of support it can provide, and the process to receive support. Explain what NGOs may be able to receive from DOD forces (e.g., medical care, FP, transportation). Explain who determines what priority NGO personnel and equipment will be moved. NGOs desire transparency; which implies openness, communication, and accountability; when dealing with the military. Assets such as the crisis action team, HOC, HACC, CMOC, and LNOs can be used to provide such information.

e. Ensure the joint force understands their support role. While UN and NGO guidelines provide that requesting assistance from the military is a last resort, some NGOs may **assume the military has an inexhaustible resource reservoir** and inundate the JFC with requests for various types of support. Members of the joint force must have a clear understanding of the nature and amount of support they will be authorized to
provide. Normally, requests from NGOs should come to DOD through the DOS at the EXECSEC level. When the JFC has been delegated authority to fill certain types of requests from these organizations, the granting of that authority, and guidance on its use, should be included in the execute order (or a modification thereto). Keep in mind that equivocal responses, such as “we’ll try,” can be interpreted as an affirmative response, and establish unrealistic expectations. Failure to meet expectations (real or not) can adversely affect relationships in both current and future operations.

f. Be aware that not all NGOs appreciate military assistance or intervention. Some NGO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces based on political mandate, neutrality, religious, or impartiality concerns. JFCs need to honor this fact, while still striving for unity of effort.

(1) Most NGOs follow humanitarian principles when giving aid; all aid is based on need alone. Military aid does not follow the principles of humanitarian aid (impartiality, independence, humanitarianism, and neutrality), is politically motivated, and conditional. Therefore, NGOs do not see military aid—even aid in the form of humanitarian assistance—as “humanitarian aid.”

(2) The USG and NGOs may not share common objectives.

(3) CDRs may find it beneficial to use a third party to establish liaison with NGOs reluctant to establish direct contact with military organizations. USAID is critical to this effort.

g. Be cognizant of legal requirements and regulations that apply to relationships between the military and NGOs.

h. Ensure that agreements and MOUs fully address funding considerations, delineate authority, and define negotiation channels. Agreements may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products, telecommunications, labor, security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support.

i. Exchange NGO and military unit operating procedures and capabilities.

j. Exercise due diligence in dealing with NGOs that do not adhere to accepted professional standards. Most NGOs follow the UN Principles of Humanitarian Assistance and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Disaster-affected communities have a right to expect those who seek to assist them to measure up to these standards. In maintaining these standards, it is important that CMOC officers are not perceived as favoring a particular relief organization, particularly at the expense of other organizations.

k. Seek the assistance of an individual from the NGO community to serve on the US force staff as an LNO to the NGO community. Such an LNO can perform duties such as initial collaboration activities with the humanitarian relief community prior to deployment, representation of the humanitarian relief perspective during planning, and
advice to the joint force through membership in the CMOC or other coordinating mechanisms during operations.

1. Post information on the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site. ReliefWeb is a global hub for time-critical humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters. ReliefWeb is widely used by NGOs and other participants in humanitarian assistance operations to share and coordinate information. The humanitarian information center (HIC), if established, is also a site for information, as are the NGO websites themselves, and bulletin boards at the OSOCC or HOCC location.

m. Share information with NGOs to the greatest extent possible, especially regarding the security environment. Using information and communications technology will allow NGOs to plan their response with up to date and accurate information and to integrate into the overall response more efficiently.

n. When working with NGOs in an uncertain or hostile operational environment, guidelines found in the United States Institute of Peace Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments, will help mitigate friction between military and NGO personnel.

See Appendix J, “Example Guidelines for Relations Between the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Organizations,” for more information.

o. Identify and collaborate with the first responders to a disaster. While the US military may be the largest single organization on the ground in a disaster area, it is critical to understand that the US military will not be the first one on the ground. The NGOs that normally operate in the disaster region or those that can respond quickly to a disaster will be present prior to the US military arrival on the ground.

4. Consultative Status with the United Nations

a. NGOs take a role in formal UN deliberations through the ECOSOC (http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo). Nearly 3,200 NGOs today have consultative status. The consultative relationship includes: eligibility requirements for consultative status; rights and obligations of NGOs in consultative status; procedures for the withdrawal or suspension of consultative status; the role and functions of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs; and the responsibilities of the UN Secretariat in supporting the consultative relationship. ECOSOC grants consultative status upon recommendation of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, which is comprised of 19 member states.

b. Consultative relationships may be established with international, regional, sub regional and national nongovernmental, nonprofit public, or voluntary organizations. NGOs affiliated to an international organization already in status may be admitted provided that they can demonstrate that their program of work is of direct relevance to the aims and purposes of the UN.
c. To be eligible for consultative status, an NGO must have been in existence (officially registered with the appropriate government authorities as an NGO/nonprofit) for at least two years, must have an established HQ, a democratically adopted constitution, authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate mechanisms of accountability, and democratic and transparent decision-making processes. The basic resources of the organization must be derived in the main part from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members.

5. Faith-Based Nongovernmental Organizations

The USG supports faith-based organizations, but USG policy strictly states that USG assistance must be distributed based on need, not based on religious affiliation or for the purpose of influencing the religious beliefs of a population. Reports of USG assistance being distributed in violation of this policy should be reported to the embassy, DOS, and/or USAID.

6. Terrorist and Insurgent Abuse of Charities

a. Protecting charities from terrorist abuse is a critical component of the global fight against terrorism. Charities provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need around the world. Unfortunately, terrorists have exploited the charitable sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organizations and operations. This abuse threatens to undermine donor confidence and jeopardizes the integrity of the charitable sector, whose services are indispensable to the world community. The government and the charitable sector share fundamental interests in promoting and protecting charitable giving. Through active engagement, the government and private sector can identify terrorist financing risks, clarify obligations and best practices, facilitate compliance with US law, and help promote charitable giving while reducing the threats of terrorist abuse. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the USG has conducted a comprehensive campaign against terrorists and their support networks, including the sources and conduits of terrorist financing. Investigations carried out during this campaign have revealed consistent terrorist abuse of the charitable sector through the diversion of charitable funds and services to terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and Hamas. The United States has designated several charities worldwide as supporting terrorist activity. A list of these charities can be found at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement. In addition, the United States has designated several organizations that have operated under various names that appear as potential fundraising front organizations for terrorist activity.

b. Terrorist and insurgent abuse of the charitable sector can take many forms, including:

(1) Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of terrorist organizations.

(2) Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across geographical boundaries.
(3) Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support terrorist organizations.

(4) Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for terrorist organizations and their ideology.

c. A small number of NGOs have been co-opted in funding and facilitating the travel of terrorist elements. While this is not the norm, it is an issue that merits consideration in the interagency, IGO, and NGO operations environment.
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

1. Overview

a. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (http://www.redcross.int) is a term covering two international institutions with HQ in Geneva and national societies in 186 countries. The two institutions are the ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The National Societies comprise most of the more than 97 million Red Cross workers—the world’s biggest volunteer force. The ICRC, the IFRC, and the National Societies are independent bodies. Each has its own individual status and exercises no authority over the others.

b. With the advent of more and more complex humanitarian emergencies, the work of both institutions can require response to certain crises. When this is the case, the work of both is governed by an agreement signed in Spain in November of 1997, known as “the Seville Agreement”—it establishes one of the institutions, or a National Society, as the ‘lead agency’ responsible for spearheading the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s work overall.

c. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is guided by the same seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Likewise, all Red Cross and Red Crescent activities have a central purpose—to help those who suffer without discrimination and thus contribute to peace in the world.

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross

The ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization with an exclusively humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and internal violence or tensions and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates in situations of conflict the International Movement. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian aspects of international law. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

3. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

The IFRC works on the basis of the Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to inspire, facilitate, and promote all humanitarian activities carried out by its member National Societies to improve the situation of the most vulnerable people. The IFRC directs and coordinates international assistance of the Movement to victims of natural and technological disasters, to refugees, and in health emergencies. It acts as the official representative of its member societies in the international field. It promotes cooperation between National Societies, and works to strengthen their capacity to carry out effective disaster preparedness, health, and social programs.
4. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies embody the work and principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 186 countries. National Societies act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, health, and social programs. During wartime, National Societies assist the affected civilian population and support the army medical services where appropriate.

5. The Emblems

a. The Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal emblems (see Figure C-A-1) are symbols of protection in times of armed conflict and may be used as a protective device only by:

(1) Armed forces medical services;

(2) National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies duly recognized and authorized by their governments to lend assistance to the medical services of armed forces; the National Societies may use the emblem for protective purposes only for those of their personnel and equipment assisting official medical services in wartime, provided that those personnel and equipment perform the same functions and only those functions and are subject to military law and regulations;

Figure C-A-1. The Emblems of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
(3) Civilian hospitals and other medical facilities recognized as such by the government and authorized to display the emblem for protective purposes (e.g., first-aid posts, ambulances); and

(4) Other voluntary relief agencies subject to the same conditions as National Societies: they must have government recognition and authorization, may use the emblem only for personnel and equipment allocated exclusively to medical services, and must be subject to military law and regulations.

b. Each state party to the Geneva Conventions is required to take steps to prevent and punish misuse of the emblem in wartime and peacetime alike, and to enact a law on the protection of the emblem.

c. Use of the emblem

(1) Use of the emblem for protective purposes is a visible manifestation of the protection accorded by the Geneva Conventions to medical personnel, units, and transports.

(2) Use of the emblem for indicative purposes in wartime or in times of peace shows that a person or item of property has a link with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

(3) The ICRC is entitled at all times to use the emblem for both protective and indicative purposes.

d. Misuse of the emblem. Any use not expressly authorized constitutes a misuse of the emblem. There are three types of misuse.

(1) Imitation is the use of a sign, which, by its shape and/or color, may cause confusion with the emblem.

(2) Usurpation is the use of the emblem by bodies or persons not entitled to do so (e.g., commercial enterprises, pharmacists, private doctors, NGOs, and ordinary individuals). If persons normally authorized to use the emblem fail to do so in accordance with the rules in the Conventions and Protocols, this also constitutes usurpation.

(3) Perfidy is the making use of the emblem in time of conflict to protect combatants or military equipment. Perfidy is a violation of the law of war.

e. Misuse of the emblem for protective purposes in time of war jeopardizes the system of protection set up by the Geneva Conventions. Misuse of the emblem for indicative purposes undermines its image in the eyes of the public and consequently reduces its protective power in time of war. The states, party to the Geneva Conventions, have undertaken to introduce penal measures for preventing and repressing misuse of the emblem in wartime and peacetime alike.
6. The Seven Fundamental Principles

   a. Proclaimed in Vienna in 1965, the seven fundamental principles bond together the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC, and the IFRC. They guarantee the continuity of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work.

   b. **Humanity.** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation, and lasting peace among all peoples.

   c. **Impartiality.** It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

   d. **Neutrality.** In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.

   e. **Independence.** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

   f. **Voluntary Service.** It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

   g. **Unity.** There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

   h. **Universality.** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

1. Overview

The ICRC (http://www.icrc.org/eng) is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization with an exclusively humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates in situations of conflict the International Movement. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian aspects of international law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The ICRC has a legal mandate from the international community. That mandate has two sources:

   (1) The Geneva Conventions, which task the ICRC with visiting prisoners, organizing relief operations, reuniting separated families, and similar humanitarian activities during armed conflicts.

   (2) The ICRC statutes, which encourage it to undertake similar work in situations of internal violence, where the Geneva Conventions do not apply.

b. The Geneva Conventions are binding instruments of international law, applicable worldwide. The ICRC statutes are adopted at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which takes place every four years, and at which states that are party to the Geneva Conventions take part.

c. The ICRC receives its funding from voluntary contributions from governments, supranational organizations, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and private sources.

d. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols confer on the ICRC the right to take action (e.g., to visit prisoners of war) and to make proposals to states (e.g., to offer its services). Additionally, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s statutes recognize that the ICRC has a right of humanitarian initiative in situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions or their protocols. All of these “rights” constitute the permanent mandate conferred on the ICRC by much of the international community. This specific mandate distinguishes it from other humanitarian organizations. However, while the ICRC may argue that the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have gained universal application through the formative custom of international law, the United States does not agree. The United States has not ratified the 1977 Protocols and may not always agree with nor recognize as authoritative ICRC actions based on the Protocols. Other nations that have acceded to these Protocols are bound to them. This leads to a major problem for the legal counsel in the
international arena; not all participants accept that they are similarly bound to international law on very basic matters. There are numerous conventions of wide but not universal application. Adherence or non-adherence can make a mismatch of potential partners in humanitarian ventures.

e. The ICRC is the guardian of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.

3. Organizational Structure

a. The ICRC is the founding institution of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Founded in 1863, the ICRC is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. This neutral Swiss association, with international influence, applies the provisions of humanitarian aspects of international law in armed conflicts. It undertakes its tasks and derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional Protocols of 1977.

b. The ICRC is sometimes referred to as a NGO. In fact, it is not – but neither is it an IGO. The ICRC has a hybrid nature. As a private association formed under the Swiss Civil Code, its existence is not in itself mandated by governments. Yet its functions and activities—to provide protection and assistance to victims of conflict—are mandated by the international community of states and are founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, which are among the most widely ratified treaties in the world.

(1) Because of this the ICRC, like any IGO, is recognized as having an “international legal personality” or status of its own. It enjoys working facilities (privileges and immunities) comparable to those of the UN, its agencies, and other IGOs. Examples of these facilities include exemption from taxes and customs duties, inviolability of premises and documents, and immunity from judicial process.

(2) The ICRC can only do its job of providing protection and assistance to conflict victims if its working principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality are respected. It is through recognition of the ICRC’s privileges and immunities that states and international organizations acknowledge their respect for those principles. Thus, in line with its international legal mandate, the ICRC’s privileges and immunities are widely recognized by governments, by the UN and by other organizations. This means that the ICRC is not treated as a private entity or an NGO, but as an IGO for the work it does under its international mandate.
(3) In the nearly 80 countries in which the ICRC carries out significant operations, its international legal personality, judicial immunity, and testimonial privilege (right not to be called as a witness) is recognized either by treaty or by legislation.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

ICRC’s tasks include the following:

a. Visits and interviews, without witness, to prisoners of war and detained or interned civilians;

b. Search for missing persons;

c. Transmit messages between family members separated by conflict, including from prisoners of war and detained civilians;

d. Reunification of dispersed families;

e. Provision of basic-health care services;

f. Provision of urgently needed food, water, sanitation, and shelter to civilians without access to these basic necessities;

g. Monitor compliance with and contribute to the development of humanitarian aspects of international law; and

h. Spreading knowledge of humanitarian aspects of international law.

5. Interagency Relationships

a. The ICRC and the IFRC keep each other informed of their respective activities and consult with each other regularly on the coordination and distribution of their work and on all matters of interest to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The ICRC has been granted permanent observer status at the UN General Assembly since 1991 and enjoys similar status with IGOs.

b. The terms neutrality and independence acquire a specific meaning when related to the activities of the ICRC. The ICRC applies almost exclusively to armed conflicts, disturbances, and tensions. It strictly avoids any involvement in hostilities or in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature as an imperative for humanitarian action. This strict and specific neutrality that fosters and maintains universal trust also requires the ICRC to act openly and in good faith toward the nations and parties to the conflict. To discharge the mandate conferred by the Geneva Conventions and to take the humanitarian initiatives fundamental to its role as neutral intermediary, the ICRC must remain independent. Therefore, the ICRC adopts a special structure that allows it to resist political, economic, and other pressures and to maintain its credibility in the eyes of the governments and the public that support its activities.
c. In terms of civil-military relations, ICRC’s humanitarian activities aim to protect human dignity and lives. ICRC humanitarian activities cannot be subordinated to political or military objectives. The ICRC must maintain a role independent of such influence or association.
1. Overview

a. The IFRC (http://www.ifrc.org) is the world’s largest humanitarian organization, providing assistance without discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. As part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, its work is guided by seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.

b. Founded in 1919, the IFRC comprises 186 member Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, a Secretariat in Geneva, and more than 60 delegations strategically located to support activities around the world. There are more societies in formation. The Red Crescent is used in place of the Red Cross in many Islamic countries.

c. The IFRC’s mission is to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity. Vulnerable people are those who are at greatest risk from situations that threaten their survival, or their capacity to live with an acceptable level of social and economic security and human dignity. Often, these are victims of natural disasters, poverty brought about by socio-economic crises, refugees, and victims of health emergencies.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member National Societies. The IFRC’s work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

b. The unique network of National Societies—which covers almost every country in the world—is the IFRC’s principal strength. Cooperation between National Societies gives the IFRC greater potential to develop capacities and assist those most in need. At a local level, the network enables the IFRC to reach individual communities.

3. Organizational Structure

a. The role of the Secretariat in Geneva is to coordinate and mobilize relief assistance for international emergencies, promote cooperation between National Societies, and represent these National Societies in the international field.

b. The role of the field delegations is to assist and advise National Societies with relief operations and development programs, and encourage regional cooperation.
4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

   a. The IFRC’s programs are grouped into four main core areas: promoting humanitarian principles and values; disaster response; disaster preparedness; and health and care in the community.

   b. The IFRC promotes individual and community humanitarian values which encourage respect for other human beings and a willingness to work together to find solutions to problems. From the seven fundamental principles to the “power of humanity” slogan, the aim is to influence the behavior of the people the IFRC works with.

   c. Disaster response continues to represent the largest portion of the IFRC’s work, with assistance to around 30 million people annually from refugees to victims of natural disasters. This includes emergency response units and issues relating to humanitarian policies as the IFRC strives to improve the quality of its immediate response and long-term rehabilitation work.

   d. The sharp increase in the number of natural disasters worldwide in recent years has prompted the IFRC to devote more attention to disaster preparedness activities. These aim to make National Societies and communities more aware of the risks they face, how to reduce their vulnerability, and how to cope when disaster strikes.

   e. Too many people die as a result of no access to even the most basic health services and elementary health education. Health and community care has become a cornerstone of humanitarian assistance, and accounts for a large part of Red Cross and Red Crescent spending. Through these programs, the IFRC aims to enable communities to reduce their vulnerability to disease, and prepare for and respond to public health crises. Guiding and supporting the development of its member National Societies is one of the IFRC’s fundamental tasks, and runs through these four core areas and other programs. Capacity building programs include management and volunteer training, branch structures, planning, fund-raising, and gender equality. Creating the opportunity for National Societies to network and work together is one of the IFRC’s key roles.

5. Interagency Relationships

   The IFRC Secretariat in Geneva is at the heart of a global network that helps national societies to develop and to coordinate their work at the international level. Through its regional delegations and its many country delegations, the Secretariat is in regular contact with the national societies and keeps abreast of current field conditions. It enjoys consultative status (Category I) with the ECOSOC of the UN. In 1994, the UN General Assembly invited the IFRC to become a permanent observer and participate in the work of the Assembly. Through its many delegations, the IFRC maintains permanent contact, both in Geneva and in the field, with UN agencies, governments, the EU (especially the Humanitarian Office), and other NGOs. The IFRC has a delegation in New York City to maintain relations with UN agencies and diplomatic missions. In the field, IFRC delegates maintain very close contact with other humanitarian agencies, particularly with
the ICRC, that are engaged in operations complementary to those of the IFRC. The IFRC, funded by annual contributions from all member national societies, represents the Societies at the international level.

6. Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief is being used by the IFRC to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards. The Code of Conduct is voluntary and applicable to any NGO; and lays down 10 points of principle which all NGOs should adhere to in their disaster response work, and goes on to describe the relationships agencies, working in disasters, should seek with donor governments, host governments, and the UN system.

**Code of Conduct** for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief.

**Principle Commitments:**

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
4. We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
7. Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.
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1. Overview

   a. The National Society in the United States is the ARC (http://www.redcross.org). Since its founding in 1881 by visionary leader Clara Barton, the ARC has been the Nation’s premier emergency response organization. As part of a worldwide movement that offers neutral humanitarian care to the victims of war, the ARC distinguishes itself by also aiding victims of devastating natural disasters. Over the years, the organization has expanded its services, always with the aim of preventing and relieving suffering.

   b. Today, in addition to domestic disaster relief, the ARC offers compassionate services in five other areas: community services that help the needy; support and comfort for military members and their families; the collection, processing, and distribution of lifesaving blood and blood products; educational programs that promote health and safety; and international relief and development programs.

   c. The ARC is where people mobilize to help their neighbors—across the street, across the country, and across the world—in emergencies. Each year, in communities large and small, victims of some 70,000 disasters turn to neighbors familiar and new—the more than half a million volunteers and 35,000 employees of the ARC. Through over 700 locally supported chapters, more than 15 million people gain the skills they need to prepare for and respond to emergencies in their homes, communities, and world.

   d. Some four million people give blood through the ARC, making it the largest supplier of blood and blood products in the United States. The ARC helps thousands of US Service members separated from their families by military duty stay connected. As part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, a global network of 186 national societies, the ARC helps restore hope and dignity to the world’s most vulnerable people.

2. Mission Statement and Charter

   a. The ARC, a humanitarian organization led by volunteers and guided by its Congressional Charter and the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross Movement, will provide relief to victims of disaster and help people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.

   b. The purposes of the ARC, as stated in its Congressional Charter are:

      1) To provide volunteer aid in time of war to the sick and wounded of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the spirit and conditions of the conference of Geneva of October 1863; the treaties of the Red Cross, or the treaties of Geneva, August 22, 1864, July 27, 1929, and August 12, 1949, to which the United States of America has given its adhesion; and any other treaty, convention, or protocol similar in purpose to which the United States of America has given or may give its adhesion;
(2) To perform all the duties devolved on a national society by each nation that has acceded to any of those treaties, conventions, or protocols;

(3) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the military authorities as a medium of communication between the people of the United States and the Armed Forces of the United States and to act in those matters between similar national societies of governments of other countries through the ICRC and the USG, the people, and the Armed Forces of the United States; and

(4) To carry out a system of national and international relief in time of peace, and to apply that system in mitigating the suffering caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry out measures for preventing those calamities.

3. Responsibilities

The ARC’s role as the Nation’s largest mass care service provider is separate and distinct from its role in the NRF. As the United States’ largest mass care service provider, the ARC provides sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution of needed items, basic first aid, welfare information, and casework, among other services, at the local level as needed. In its role as a service provider, the ARC works closely with local, tribal, and state governments to provide mass care services to victims of every disaster, large and small, in an affected area. In providing these services, the ARC fulfills its humanitarian mission, acting on its own behalf and not on behalf of the USG or any other governmental entity.
APPENDIX D
JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

1. Introduction and Overview

a. This appendix presents major aspects of enhancing interagency coordination at the strategic and operational levels through the JIACG (or equivalent organization) at the combatant commands. It is intended to provide sufficient detail to help CCDRs, subordinate JFCs, their staffs, and interagency partners understand the JIACG (or equivalent organization) as a capability to enable the coordination of all instruments of national power with joint operations.


b. A JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant command, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. One size does not fit all. Each combatant command has implemented and tailored their JIACG (or equivalent organization) based on their unique requirements, AORs, and missions to include titles and organizational schemes, to suit their needs (e.g., interagency partnering directorate, commander’s interagency engagement group, commander’s JIACG.)

c. Faced with challenges to national interests, the United States, along with its multinational partners, can respond by using the capabilities resident in one or more of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). A strategic, top-down approach aligns and harmonizes a variety of ways and means with a set of desired strategic ends. These ends provide the fundamental purpose and context for committing the military and other instruments of national power. Figure D-1 identifies those USG agencies with which CCDRs have frequent interaction or that a deployed joint force may encounter across the full range of military operations.

d. Joint and multinational operations against contemporary adversaries or supporting civil authorities during catastrophic disasters require unified action in planning and execution with interagency and multinational partners who are not under US military command authority. This effort depends on building and sharing a common understanding of the strategic purpose and end state; developing relevant objectives; a common understanding of the operational environment; and harmonization of the actions required to resolve the problem.

e. Increased and efficient organizational cooperation between and among the myriad organizations performing their roles to achieve national strategic objectives is essential. Challenges to effective interagency coordination caused by partners having conflicting
policies and procedures further complicates efforts at achieving unity of effort. Typically, each agency develops its own agency-specific plans at varying levels of detail in response to an issue or event. The challenge to the interagency community is to take
single agency planning efforts and meld them into a collaborative, multiagency planning process that exploits the core competencies of all the interagency partners. Figure D-2 shows the complexities of multiagency planning versus single agency planning.

f. The JIACG (or equivalent organization), with its tools, processes, and procedures, is an important organization supporting the overall DOD effort to strengthen its capability to conduct joint operations. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) supports the entire range of military operations. Representing USG agencies at the combatant command HQ, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) is a multifunctional, advisory element that facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. JIACG (or equivalent organization) members provide two-way links back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts of USG agencies and departments. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can significantly improve security cooperation, deliberate planning and CAP, and recovery and reconstitution. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides each CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness of interagency activities and keep the military and other USG agencies and departments informed of each other’s efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activities.

**UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING**

**Single Versus Multiagency Planning**

- **Single-Agency**
  - Diplomatic Engagement (DOS)
  - Combat Operations (DOD)
  - Elections (USAID)
  - Humanitarian Relief (USAID)

- **Multiagency**
  - Disarmament (DOS, DOD, USAID)
  - Counterterrorism (DOS, DOD, DOJ, TREAS, DHS)
  - Anticorruption (DOS, DOD, DOJ, TREAS)

**LEGEND**

- DHS Department of Homeland Security
- DOJ Department of Justice
- DOS Department of State
- DOD Department of Defense
- USAID United States Agency for International Development
- TREAS Department of the Treasury

*Figure D-2. United States Government Operational Level Planning*
Appendix D

2. Purpose

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is the CCDR’s lead organization for interagency coordination, providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) interacts with DOS, which has primary responsibility for IGOs; USAID, which is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs (many of which receive USAID funding to carry out programs); and other USG departments and agencies. For combatant commands who have US domestic missions, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) interacts with DHS and its NRF ESF coordinator agencies (e.g., DOT, EPA, DOJ) for the 15 different ESFs, as well as state, tribal, local government, private sector, and NGOs playing key parts in HS and HD. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) will help the CCDRs and staffs gain a common picture and shared understanding of the operational environment that promotes unified action with all interagency partners.

b. Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at all levels of war. The military coordinates at the strategic-national level (OSD and JS), strategic-theater level (combatant command), operational level (combatant command and JTF), and at the tactical level of war. Most USG agencies operate at the strategic-national level (Washington, DC home offices) and field level (country team). For example, although some regional coordination and projects occur within the bureaus of DOS and USAID, detailed regional operational level planning is less common as it relates to foreign missions. For domestic missions, most agencies (e.g., DHS, FEMA, EPA) have regional staffs involved in operations and planning. Consequently, combatant command and JTF staffs may find themselves interacting with USG agency representatives who are coordinating their organizations’ activities at multiple levels. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) at the operational level can potentially mitigate the effects of this problem.

c. JIACGs (or equivalent organization) are maturing as collaboratively-enabled, multi-disciplined teams that coordinate support across the range of military operations. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is an advisory element on the CCDR’s staff that facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) does not make policy or task interagency elements; nor is it designed to alter existing lines of authority or reporting. However, when properly staffed and collaboratively-enabled, it provides a powerful tool to improve awareness and better integrate planning and coordination between the CCDR and the larger interagency community.

d. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) effort is focused on acquiring, vetting, and managing the flow of information to enhance joint operation planning by offering a broader decision-making context that includes other USG agencies both in Washington, DC, and in the AOR. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should interact with the command group and the combatant command staff directorates on a daily basis to stay abreast of changing issues. It draws on the command’s planning and operations expertise within the HQ to ensure relevant and timely connections are made with USG agencies.
and activities. It leverages the experience, expertise, and core competencies of members by having selective USG agency representatives permanently assigned to the JIACG (or equivalent organization). The result is a fusing of USG agency operational intentions and capabilities with military planning and operations to support unity of effort.

3. Organization

a. Roles and Responsibilities. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides the CCDR with the primary and readily available integration venue for coordinating interagency efforts with joint force actions at theater strategic and operational levels. Its role is to enhance the interchange among USG agencies and military organizations. Accordingly, the JIACG (or equivalent organization):

   (1) Participates in combatant command theater campaign and joint operation planning and assessment.

   (2) Advises the CCDR on USG policies, positions, and strategic planning efforts, as appropriate. JIACG (or equivalent organization) members provide information to combatant command planners on their parent agencies’ current policies, positions on developing policies, and potential resources and assets that may be useful.

   (3) Provides interagency planning perspective during joint operations.

   (4) Informs the combatant command of interagency approaches, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations.

   (5) Establishes habitual relationships and collaborative links to planners within USG agencies.

   (6) Arranges interfaces for planning and rehearsal exercises and other joint operation planning activities.

   (7) Facilitates communications with JTF staff and component planners regarding interagency issues.

   (8) For foreign missions, supports the deployment and employment of DOS, USAID, and other USG teams (e.g., integration planning cell, FACT, DART) within the AOR. For domestic HS/CS missions, an approved mission assignment is required in most cases (except for immediate response actions) to facilitate and support key domestic partners (e.g., DHS, DOJ).

b. Combatant Command Staff and JIACG (or equivalent organization) Relationships

   (1) Within the staff, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) can provide the greatest value-added when authorized to operate across a CCDR’s staff and components. The greatest efficacy of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) is as a separate staff
element reporting directly to the deputy commander or the chief of staff on behalf of the CCDR.

(2) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be task-organized to support the entire combatant command staff and should be prepared to contribute staff members to participate in appropriate boards, centers, bureaus, cells, and working groups established and operating within the command’s battle rhythm. The closest possible working relationship between the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and staff directorates should be established and nurtured. As an operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping planning horizons: future plans, future operations, and current operations. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) must be engaged in all three planning horizons. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should have functional relationships with multiple staff elements, to include:

(a) JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners should be fully engaged with joint operation planners to ensure, among other issues, that operational level plans under development are synchronized and fully supportive of broader interagency goals. JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners can assist in harmonizing military plans with US embassy mission strategic plans and USAID country strategic plans or with DHS domestic response plans and operations.

(b) Habitual interaction with home departments and agencies will enable JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners to facilitate the development of combatant command strategic plans and policies and enhance the timeliness of ongoing POLMIL or domestic response planning. Commands employing a systems perspective of the operational environment to support joint operation planning and JIPOE should coordinate with JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners for confirmation of underlying assumptions and analyses. A systems perspective can support the principle of achieving unity of effort in any operation by providing a common frame of reference for planning with USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power. This view can facilitate the combatant command staff collaboration with counterparts from USG agencies to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the CCDR’s command authority.

(c) **Senior Policy Advisors**

1. The unique and highly individualized relationship between the CCDR and the POLAD can be enhanced by the JIACG (or equivalent organization)’s habitual interaction with Washington, DC-based agencies and field offices in the AOR. JIACG (or equivalent organization) support to this relationship should remain highly flexible and responsive to combatant command requirements. Ultimately, the organizational relationship of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) with the POLAD is at the discretion of the CCDR.

2. Senior DHS Representative. GCCs with HD and CS missions (i.e., USNORTHCOM, USPACOM) have a Senior Executive Service level senior DHS
representative assigned to the command to help facilitate operational and planning coordination and collaboration in regards to domestic missions and issues.

(d) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides a conduit for interagency inputs to the standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ), assists in identifying and facilitating access to non-DOD centers of excellence for SJFHQ analysts, and contributes to joint operation planning. The POLMIL planner on the SJFHQ staff is the primary linkage between the SJFHQ and the JIACG (or equivalent organization).

c. Management

(1) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be a permanent part of the command staff, including specification of roles, missions, and promulgation of appropriate guidance or regulations for the AOR.

(2) CCDRs should provide their intent and oversight for JIACG (or equivalent organization) operations. The staff should develop and refine the following for the JIACG (or equivalent organization):

(a) Quality assurance/quality control procedures;
(b) Standard operating procedures;
(c) Assessment measures;
(d) Feedback systems;
(e) Selection process and qualifications for members;

SOURCE: US Southern Command Exercise BLUE ADVANCE ‘04
(f) Continuing education requirements for members; and

(g) Individual and collective training requirements.

(3) The CCDR should engage relevant members of the interagency community, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in support of JIACG (or equivalent organization) sustainment.

(4) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be included in the command’s joint training plan.

(5) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be included in existing command readiness evaluations.

4. Structure

a. Design. When joint strategic planning—and its subsets of security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning—is required, the degree to which military and USG agencies are integrated and harmonized will bear directly on efficiency and success. Joint operation planning should include key participants from the outset. The CCDR, through the strategic concept, builds interagency activities into annex V (Interagency Coordination), of the joint OPLAN. Annex V is required for all CJCS approved OPLANs and provides a single source reference for the CCDR to request interagency activities and to lay the groundwork for interagency coordination. For domestic operations, military planners should coordinate and collaborate with their civilian counterparts at DHS and partner USG agencies regarding combatant command implications related to DHS OPLANs and CONPLANs. Plans developed under the IPS may identify requirements for DOD support which also may impact on DOD’s missions and resources. These impacts must be resolved during the earliest steps in the planning process. Subordinate JFCs and components should also build interagency participation into their operations. Within the AOR, appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, JTF HQ, and tactical levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides the CCDR the means for organizing for successful interagency coordination focused at the operational level and below.

(1) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is fully integrated into the combatant command staff and is a primary participant in the planning process. It provides the CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness of USG agency activities and to keep all engaged USG agencies informed of each other’s efforts to prevent the undesired consequences of uncoordinated and redundant activity.

(2) A full-time, fully resourced operational JIACG (or equivalent organization) broadens the CCDR’s understanding of the operational environment and the range and availability of response options. If the decision is made to employ joint forces, the CCDR may retain the JIACG (or equivalent organization) in-place at the combatant command HQ and integrate selected members of the JIACG (or equivalent organization)
into the JTF. Individual agency considerations must be taken into account before deploying non-DOD USG civilians.

b. Collaboration

(1) Effective C2 requires that commanders, their staffs, and the JIACG (or equivalent organization) collaborate in developing, understanding, and communicating the CCDR’s intent and determining the mission, operational objectives, desired effects, and tasks. In addition, the CCDR and staff must synchronize execution across all domains and the information environment by coordinating with USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, multinational partners, and the private sector and continually assess the operational environment. Capabilities that improve long distance collaboration among dispersed agencies and organizations can enhance both planning and execution of joint operations. Information management can be more effective within a collaborative environment that integrates JIACG (or equivalent organization) participation with the combatant command staff.

(2) Collaboration enables military and JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners to build interagency plans in discrete parts concurrently rather than sequentially, and integrate the results into OPLANs. Collaboration also provides planners with a view of the whole planning process as they work on various sections of the OPLAN, which helps them identify and resolve planning shortfalls and conflicts early.

(3) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) develops and maintains relationships through collaboration with key USG agencies and departments that can provide specific expertise. The effective integration of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) into the collaborative environment will result in an improved understanding of the CCDR’s intent, objectives, effects, and required tasks, and, if properly managed, contribute to more effective interagency coordination and planning and increased execution efficiency.

c. Notional JIACG (or equivalent organization) Structure. To effectively bring all instruments of national power to bear on theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and OPLANs, CCDRs are augmented with representatives from USG agencies that may be assigned to the combatant command’s JIACG (or equivalent organization).

(1) Each combatant command has assigned missions and, as such, each JIACG (or equivalent organization) is structured with the requisite capabilities to support them. Figure D-3 offers a baseline organizational structure for a JIACG (or equivalent organization) at the combatant command. This structure can be augmented as the combatant command transitions from planning to execution and to an even more robust capability when engaged in stability operations. However, regardless of structure, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) must provide regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of interagency activities. Specific objectives of this organizational structure are to:
**NOTIONAL JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP STRUCTURE**

- Washington Agency Planners
- Combatant Commander Staff Directorates
- International and Regional Planners
- Joint Interagency Coordination Group Core Element
- Mission Augmentation (as needed)
- Integration Planning Cell
- Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF), JTF Staff
- US Ambassador Country Team

**Group Functions**
- Participate in combatant command engagement, deliberate, crisis, and transition planning.
- Advise on civilian agency planning efforts.
- Work military-civilian operational issues.
- Present civilian agency perspectives, approaches, capabilities, and limitations.
- Provide communication links to Washington and regional planners.
- Arrange interface on interagency activities.
- Coordinate with regional players.

**Notional Core Staffing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Senior Civilian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of State Regional Expert</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of State Functional Expert</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Agency for International Development Officer</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
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<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Military</td>
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</tbody>
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**Figure D-3. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure**
(a) Improve combatant command interagency joint operation planning and execution.

(b) Exercise secure collaboration processes and procedures.

(c) Promote habitual relationships among the combatant command and interagency partners.

(2) USG agencies may assign liaison personnel to combatant command staffs to improve interagency coordination. For example, LNOs may be assigned to combatant command staffs to facilitate intelligence and antiterrorism support. These liaison personnel should be used to augment the core JIACG (or equivalent organization) staff.

d. Manning. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is viewed as a relatively small, full-time core element consisting primarily of civilian personnel with extensive interagency coordination experience. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is typically led by a full-time Senior Executive Service level civilian director. The core element is responsible for providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities within the AOR. As a staff directorate of approximately 12 personnel within the HQ of the combatant command, it can be augmented with virtual or additional colocated members, as required.

5. Key Interagency Participants at the Combatant Command

In addition to the JIACG (or equivalent organization), it is important to understand the roles and functions of other interagency participants in the AOR.

a. US Mission and Country Team. It is imperative that JIACG (or equivalent organization) members identify their counterparts within the mission and country team and establish the procedures necessary to conduct efficient and effective coordination. This should be in coordination with the combatant command’s country desk officers.

b. Interagency Executive Steering Group

(1) JIACG (or equivalent organization) and interagency integration is emphasized within the combatant command staff by the establishment of an interagency ESG. The ESG is usually co-chaired by the deputy commander and the POLAD or Senior DHS representative and attended by the chief of staff, JIACG (or equivalent organization) director, special staff, and JTF or components, as required. In addition, there may be US embassy country team representatives, as required, and multinational representatives when appropriate. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) director may serve in a dual capacity as both a member and EXECSEC of the ESG.

(2) The ESG provides JIACG (or equivalent organization) oversight and will meet periodically to review interagency posture, operations, and plans, and offers a forum to identify, discuss, and determine the way ahead and an office of primary responsibility. The ESG provides face-to-face interaction between senior interagency operational leaders
that can overcome some bureaucratic obstacles to cooperation and further develop a reservoir of understanding before a crisis develops.

c. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) must be prepared to facilitate and support the link between the combatant command staff and S/CRS teams and other civilian contingency teams. S/CRS teams may include: the CRSG, integration planning cell, and ACT.

d. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) must be prepared to facilitate and support the link between the combatant command staff and DHS organizations under the NRF.

e. JIACG (or equivalent organization) members may need to develop relationships with multiple agency counterparts. Members should know who their counterparts are that support the MOTR Plan, the maritime interdiction process, and have an understanding of their roles and responsibilities in support of maritime security.) JIACG (or equivalent organization) members who understand their agency’s roles in these important processes will enhance the CCDR’s understanding and situational awareness.

6. Strategic Communication

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can assist in the CCDR’s implementation of SC-directed effort by ensuring planning for IO, PA, DSPD, and military-to-military actions are consistent with overall USG SC objectives. CCDRs should consider including their JIACG (or equivalent organization) in processes to support SC-directed planning and actions that are directly related to the CCDR’s intent. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can facilitate coordination and synchronization among interagency partners to ensure consistent themes and messages facilitate unity of effort. Although IO is not its primary duty, JIACG (or equivalent organization) connectivity to the Washington, DC, interagency community is an important enabler during development of the SC annex (Y).

b. USG agencies and departments may have a role in planning and executing IO that supports SC. The expertise, programs, and activities of a wide variety of USG agencies should be considered as part of IO planning, when appropriate. CCDRs establish staff procedures specific to their AORs for requesting interagency support and coordination of various aspects of joint operations. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is well positioned to help the CCDR and IO planners coordinate a “single voice.”

7. Interagency Connectivity

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) develops and maintains habitual relationships with key civilian individuals, organizations, and agencies. These relationships are established through collaboration early in the planning process and become the basis for expanding the JIACG’s (or equivalent organization’s) core capabilities and situational awareness as a crisis develops. A robust, established two-way communication and reachback capability allows the JIACG (or equivalent organization) to maintain these relationships during operations. JIACG (or equivalent organization) connectivity should include, but not be limited to:
(1) The operational and planning environment in the CCDR’s JOC, operations planning group, crisis action center, joint planning group, the joint intelligence operations center, and the SJFHQ. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) closely monitors these organizations but does not duplicate their efforts.

(2) USG agencies and departments and for domestic missions, select state, tribal, and local associations (e.g., National Emergency Managers Association, National Governor’s Association).

(3) Combatant command Service components.

(4) USG offices and missions located within the AOR.

(5) Centers of excellence, which may include organizations or institutions such as NGOs, academia, and industry and private sector organizations that have particular expertise in areas such as governance. Examples include the National Defense University, FSI, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the various IASCs, and the Kennedy School of Government. However, the inclusion of centers of excellence may present challenges to the JIACG (or equivalent organization) relative to security classification and limitations related to the sharing of operational information.

b. The inclusion of USG civilian agency personnel into the JIACG (or equivalent organization) allows for the integration of expertise into command planning and enhances information sharing between USG agencies and the military. The responsibilities of USG agency representatives in the JIACG (or equivalent organization) do not alter current civilian agency relationships. Agency involvement in the JIACG (or equivalent organization) does not:

(1) Replace any USG civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the CCDR’s staff or bypass any existing USG agency lines of authority and communications.

(2) Provide USG agency concurrence with internal DOD staffing actions.

(3) Interfere with existing MOU for requests for assistance and other formal interagency request process.

(4) Challenge or replace the statutory and President-directed relationships for developing, implementing, or executing US national security and foreign policy.

(5) Create policy.

(6) Task personnel or USG agency elements.

(7) Unilaterally commit USG agency resources.
8. Planning

a. Security Cooperation Planning. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) maintains an understanding of the AOR, allowing it to make major contributions to the CCDR’s security cooperation portion of the global or theater campaign plan. Guided by the plan, the JIACG (or equivalent organization), in concert with the POLAD’s linkage to the DOS regional bureau and US ambassadors and COMs in the AOR, ensures the intent of other Washington, DC, agencies is identified and integrated into the work of the combatant command staff. The goal is to establish an enhanced level of interagency cooperation in the combatant command to prevent a crisis or mitigate its effect. Collaboration and close coordination with USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power, particularly with the ambassadors/COMs in the GCCs’ AOR is essential.

b. Joint Operation Planning. Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation—the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces. Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint operations and link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the end state.

(1) Deliberate Planning. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) core element maintains a comprehensive understanding of potential crisis regions in the AOR. JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners will be key participants in developing and updating contingency plans. Their expertise will be a crucial backstop against which combatant command planners can clarify and confirm strategic guidance, planning assumptions, and engaged USG agency roles and missions. Their expertise will be particularly useful during transition operations, plan congruence and support to US embassy mission strategic plans, USAID mission strategic plans, and USG agency regional planning goals. For domestic missions, a similar tie-in to key NRF agencies (e.g., DHS, DOJ, EPA) as well as state, tribal, and local leadership is equally important.

(a) JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners should be closely involved with the combatant command planners’ efforts to update existing plans and interagency coordination annexes (annex V), as well as developing new plans for crisis response and deterrence. Typically the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign).

(b) Each instrument of national power has a finite capacity. Interagency activities must be planned in a synchronized manner to maximize and focus the efforts of multiple USG agencies toward the desired end state. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) role in advising the CCDR of interagency priorities and actions is important in setting the stage for handoff from the preponderant military phases of the operation to the USG civilian agency dominated phases.
(2) Crisis Action Planning

(a) Pre-Crisis

1. Designated members of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) monitor events in the AOR as part of their daily activities. They are responsible for enhancing the CCDR and the combatant command staff’s understanding of USG agency activities, both in the AOR and in Washington, DC, that impact current and future operations.

2. JIACG (or equivalent organization) members augment and are integrated into the combatant command prior to and during operations. The number and assignment of JIACG (or equivalent organization) members are mission and event dependent, particularly in planning and execution efforts that require interagency coordination. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) tracks and recommends adjustments to the military tasks in collaboration and coordination with engaged USG agencies and multinational partners to create and reinforce unified action across all mission areas.

3. In a developing crisis, the JIACG’s (or equivalent organization’s) knowledge and understanding of the planning and policy objectives at the national level assist the combatant command staff in developing and recommending an OPLAN that harmonizes military and civilian operational response actions. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is the one mechanism that collectively frames the plan with the CCDR’s staff for interagency coordination. The daily roles and responsibilities of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) shift to focus on the potential crisis and expand to become an integral part of the overall crisis resolution effort.

4. The JIACG (or equivalent organization), through its continuing coordination with external USG civilian agencies, refines its collaboration by aligning the right membership to support the developing OPLANS and OPORDs. JIACG (or equivalent organization) crisis response activities and actions facilitate the initial situational awareness of the crisis action team and operations planning group, support FDO and force enhancement execution, and make preparations to deploy designated member(s) to the crisis area or forward HQ, as required.

(b) Crisis

1. When a crisis occurs, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) continues to monitor the evolving situation by maintaining a physical and/or virtual presence in the CCDR’s JOC, joint planning group, and joint intelligence operations center. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) augments these centers, as required. Once a situation is identified as a crisis, JIACG (or equivalent organization) members are integrated into the combatant command staff as prescribed in local instructions and directives. In the case where a R&S event necessitates the employment of the IMS, and an integration planning cell is deployed to a geographic combatant command, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides support necessary for the integration planning cell.
to integrate into the geographic combatant command to synchronize and coordinate national level planning with the military plan. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) assists the SJFHQ and the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by either deploying or providing reachback. Some combatant commands may stand up an interagency coordination cell or group as the 24/7 planning cell for the JIACG (or equivalent organization). This interagency coordination cell or group consists of resident and augmented agency representatives, command LNOs, and interagency subject matter experts positioned together to enhance two-way information flow, coordination, and collaboration between the CCDR, staff and components, interagency partners, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) becomes the responsible staff element for integrating information and understanding of USG agency activities. Its members respond to and assist in answering information requirements that fill critical gaps in the CAP effort.

2. JIACG (or equivalent organization) actions are generally most dynamic during the stabilize and transfer to civil authority phases. Its virtual network builds on the previous collaborative planning efforts and adjusts to changing mission tasks. This underscores the need to identify the right interagency participants, engage them in the military plan, surface issues and discontinuities, and get agreement on task responsibility early in the process. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) continually reviews the specific objectives within the lines of operation/lines of effort and validates assessment measures so that interagency objectives are jointly achieved.

3. Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future operations planning).

4. As the transition process continues, the roles of USG agencies will likely evolve as intermediate military objectives are achieved. These role adjustments will include the transfer of responsibilities and relationships among military and USG agencies. JIACG (or equivalent organization) collaboration and coordination with USG agencies assists the operations team in sorting accountability among the participants at the operational level for execution of multi-functional tasks.

(c) Post-Crisis

1. Post-crisis recovery and reconstitution implementation, like transition, build on the OPLAN and/or OPORD and adjust to events on the ground. Moreover, the tasks and accountability among various agencies and donors will likely change over time. These adjustments may modify supported and supporting roles among military and civilian, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector organizations. JIACG (or equivalent organization) habitual relationships and collaboration with USG agencies can assist the CCDR in adapting to the changing roles and responsibilities among the participants.

2. When preplanned conditions are met, the recovery and reconstitution authority will transfer to civilian leadership. This civilian authority should have immediate access to the JFC and consultations on interagency planning and
execution. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) role as an interlocutor is substantial. The expanding number of civilian organizations and agencies that will have actual or perceived equities in post-crisis operations may need immediate access to military planning and/or resources for coordinating support requirements.

c. **Force Planning.** The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be involved in the force planning process due to the potential for competition for scarce resources and footprint among USG agencies. The amount of personnel, spares, resources, and capabilities physically present and occupying space at a deployed location comprise the footprint of the force. The scale of any operation determines the footprint, but the proper balance of people and equipment and using reachback can minimize the impact of deployed forces. Increases in footprint size require more support for those forces. Diplomatic restrictions may affect the size of a footprint. A HN may limit the number of foreign personnel on its soil, making the need for reachback support even more crucial.

### 9. Employment

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) serves as the locus for facilitating the synchronization of interagency efforts in joint strategic planning. As a fully integrated element of the combatant command staff, it facilitates the implementation of DOD external POLMIL relationships in the AOR. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) concentrates its efforts in five primary areas:

1. Maintain continuous connectivity with USG agencies and departments, IGOs, and NGOs, and the private sector;
2. Assist in security cooperation planning;
3. Collaborate in joint operation planning;
4. Support joint operations; and
5. Participate in training and exercises.

b. In joint operations, interagency coordination will normally occur within the NSC/HSC. During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the GCC’s staff or JIACG (or equivalent organization) may deal directly with a COM or members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some operations, a special envoy of the President or an SRSG may be involved.

c. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners in the AOR. Composed of USG civilian and military experts and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported GCC, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides the commander with the capability to collaborate with USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs (or equivalent organization) complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSC/HSC. Members participate in contingency, crisis, and transfer to civil authority planning and provide
links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize operations with them. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can aid military planners at all levels by focusing on the following:

(1) Identify interagency partners that are or should be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and coordination with other USG agencies will have occurred in the NSC/HSC, DOD, JS, and Services.

(2) Understand and clarify, if required, the interagency relationships. Draft an authoritative interagency hierarchy diagram, including the lead USG agency having primary responsibility, so that relational lines and decision pathways can be easily identified.

(3) Clarify the objectives of the response that should be outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC/HSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings that authorized the overall USG participation.

(4) Review COAs for the assigned military tasks and determine the operational compatibility with USG agencies.

(5) Cooperate with each interagency participant and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays. In some situations, they may not have representatives either in theater or be collocated with the combatant command’s staff. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can advise and recommend that the GCC request temporary assignment of LNOs from the participating agencies and departments. Given limited staff in civilian agencies; however, placement of temporary liaisons may be difficult.

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting priorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency or department. If the obstacles cannot be resolved by the JIACG (or equivalent organization), they may be forwarded up to the appropriate level for resolution.

(7) Identify resources relevant to the situation. Determine which interagency participants are committed to provide these resources to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

(8) Assist military planners in defining the appropriate military end state, plan for the transfer to civil authority, and recommend redeployment considerations.

(9) Recommend the ways and means to optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-term objectives during and after the response to a crisis.

(10) Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation.
(11) Participate and contribute to CAP for incidents or situations involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, and military forces or vital interests that may require interagency coordination to achieve US objectives.

d. For domestic interagency coordination where DOD does not have the lead, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) acts as the focal point for collectively assisting in coordination and unification of the campaign plan between the primary agency and DOD so that senior national agency and military officials at the strategic level can possess a working architecture which achieves objectives. Architecture similar to that in the DHS/FEMA Annual National Hurricane OPLANs/CONPLANs, with lines of operations for both military and governmental agencies must be developed.

10. Training and Exercises

a. Integration of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and linkage to interagency partners with the combatant command staff provides an opportunity to train together and develop working relationships essential to efficient staff work and successful joint operations. Training opportunities include:

   (1) Training JIACG (or equivalent organization) members on processes and procedures for joint operation planning, their responsibilities, staff relationships, collaborative tools, and interagency coordination and integration with military operations. JIACG (or equivalent organization) training is available on Joint Knowledge Online (http://jko.cmil.org).

   (2) Training selected personnel external to the JIACG (or equivalent organization) on the use of communication and collaboration tools to optimize mutually supportive decision-support systems of participating USG agencies and departments.

   (3) Training USG agency partners that would potentially augment JIACG (or equivalent organization) planning and operations. This augmentation may be on-site, virtual, or deployed. The training is aimed at developing a coherent team requiring minimum predeployment training with emphasis on the CCDR’s contingency planning and implementation processes.

b. During the initial stages of a developing crisis, the CCDR may direct the staff to coordinate and participate in crisis-specific training. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is an integral element of this training. This training may range from a small internal staff training exercise to training with a potential JTF and components. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is responsible for identifying the appropriate USG agency participants, surfacing the relevant issues, and coordinating the necessary training. Depending on the timeline and venue, this training may be onsite or virtual. Finally, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) continues to conduct internal training as required for individual replacements and augmentation personnel to maintain core skills proficiency.
c. JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners should ensure that interagency concerns, priorities, and requirements are a part of any exercise or training plan. Consideration should be given to drafting a comprehensive listing of master scenario events that contains both routine events and, when possible, scenario-specific events to stress the interagency linkages with combatant command operations.
APPENDIX E

JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE

1. Introduction and Overview

a. The joint interagency task force (JIATF) is a force multiplier that uses a unique organizational structure to focus on a single mission. A JIATF is typically formed for a specific task and purpose as are most task forces. JIATFs are formal organizations usually chartered by the DOD and one or more civilian agencies and guided by a MOA or other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the JIATF’s members. The JIATF is staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies under a single commander or director.

b. Forming a national level JIATF takes a national charter that lays out authorities and mandates membership and resourcing. An executive order, national level directive, or mandate from the NSC/HSC that directs all agencies involved to support the JIATF with actual resources may be required. SecDef may, in cooperation with other Cabinet members, form a JIATF through the establishment of detailed memoranda of agreement. JFCs can form JIATFs with one or more USG agencies based on mutual cooperation and agreement.

c. The establishment of functional and enduring JIATFs transcends the internal capabilities and authorities of combatant commands and JTFs. Based upon the analysis and the desire to establish JIATFs, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) or another designated staff entity should document the requirements for formal submission through command channels to JS and OSD for approval and pursuit through the NSC or HSC system. Success would be manifest in interagency consensus, commitment, and MOAs or MOUs that infuse JIATFs with supporting policy, legitimacy, defined purpose, authorities, leadership parameters, functional protocols, and resources.

d. Coordinating authorities, channels, and terms of reference must be carefully established and documented for JIATFs, with the aim of facilitating their missions and flexibility while not promoting duplication of effort and confusion. Such authorities constitute the rules of the road for JIATFs, and they must contribute to unity of effort and common situational awareness.

e. Increasingly, JIATFs are being formed to achieve unity of effort and bring all instruments of national power to bear on asymmetric threats. JIATFs are often created to address problems such as militias, “bad neighbors,” and foreign fighters, all of which complicate the security environment. JIATFs may be separate elements under the JFC, or they may be subordinate to a functional component command, a joint special operations task force, or a staff section such as the J-3. JIATF members can coordinate with the country team, their home agencies, JIACGs (or equivalent organization) in the area of interest, and other JIATFs in order to defeat complex hostile networks. Because they use more than the military instrument of national power, JIATFs are generally not a lethal asset, but rather develop and drive creative nonlethal solutions and policy actions to accomplish their mission.
2. Joint Interagency Task Force South

a. Located in Key West, Florida, JIATF South serves as the catalyst for integrated and synchronized interagency counterdrug operations and is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. JIATF South also collects, processes, and disseminates counterdrug information for interagency and partner nation operations. JIATF South conducts counter illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation; and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic. JIATF South is USSOUTHCOM’s executive agent for DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

b. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy produces the National Drug Control Strategy which directs the Nation’s anti-drug efforts and establishes a program, a budget, and guidelines for cooperation among federal, state, and local entities. The office also evaluates, coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic anti-drug efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures that such efforts sustain and complement state and local anti-drug activities.

c. While traditional joint operations focus on efforts among the Services, JIATF South has gone past these traditional boundaries, becoming a fully integrated interagency command. Whereas most organizations count on LNOs to represent them, JIATF South takes this concept much further. The top command structure demonstrates total integration, with the Director being a USCG rear admiral and the Vice Director coming from CBP. Integration also exists through the lower levels of the command: both the Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, but their Deputies are from the DEA and CBP. Intelligence analysts from the DEA, CBP, and FBI are located in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to ensure that LEAs are involved in daily operations and that information is not stovepiped.

d. JIATF South incorporates a wide range of governmental and international organizations in addition to those previously mentioned. The NGA, DIA, CIA, and LNOs from the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and a host of Latin American countries all play an important role in intelligence, operations, and planning. The United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands provide ships and aircraft to the task force; and the Flag officer of the Netherlands Forces Caribbean commands one task group in the task force.

e. The focus of the command is a Joint Operations Command Center where intelligence and operations functions are fused in a state of the art command, control, communications, and intelligence facility. The JIATF coordinates the employment of USN and USCG ships and aircraft, USAF aircraft, and aircraft and ships from allied nations and LEAs—a complete integration of sophisticated multi-agency forces committed to the cause of interdicting the flow of illicit drugs.
3. **Joint Interagency Task Force West**

JIATF West combats drug-related transnational organized crime to reduce threats in the Asia-Pacific region in order to protect national security interests and promote regional stability. To accomplish this mission, JIATF West provides US and foreign law enforcement with fused interagency information and intelligence analysis, and with counterdrug training and infrastructure development support. The JIATF West staff consists of uniformed and civilian members of all five military Services as well as representatives from the national IC and US federal LEAs. Law enforcement representatives include the DEA, FBI, and ICE. JIATF West is Commander USPACOM’s executive agent for DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the USPACOM AOR. JIATF West is closely aligned with USPACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation, War on Terrorism, and Maritime Security priorities in planning, developing, and implementing counterdrug programs in Asia and the Pacific.

4. **National Counterterrorism Center**

   a. The NCTC leads the USG efforts to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with NCTC partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.

   b. NCTC was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 and codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. NCTC implements a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission: “Breaking the older mold of national government organizations, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”

   c. The Director of NCTC is a Deputy Secretary-equivalent with a unique, dual line of reporting: to the President regarding Executive branch-wide CT planning, and to the DNI regarding intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy direction of the President, and NSC/HSC.

   d. NCTC is staffed by more than 500 personnel from more than 16 departments and agencies (approximately 60 percent of whom are detailed to NCTC). NCTC is organizationally part of the ODNI.

   e. NCTC serves as the primary organization in the USG for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to CT (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism).

   f. NCTC serves as the USG’s central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terrorist groups. NCTC also provides USG agencies with the terrorism intelligence analysis and other information they need to fulfill their missions. NCTC houses more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement, and HS networks under one roof to facilitate robust information sharing. NCTC is a model of interagency information sharing.
g. NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for CT activities across the USG, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, HS, and law enforcement to ensure unity of effort. NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 government departments and agencies engaged in the war on terrorism, through a single and truly joint planning process.

5. National Joint Terrorism Task Force

a. The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) acts as a liaison and conduit for information on threats and leads from FBI HQ to local joint terrorism task forces and to participating agencies.

b. The NJTTF is located in the multi-agency NCTC, where it performs its mission while also working with NCTC personnel to exchange information, analyze data, and plan antiterrorism strategies.

c. A vital aspect of the NJTTF’s mission is sharing information among its 80 members—officers, agents, and analysts—who then pass the information onto the 48 different agencies they represent. Those agencies—from the law enforcement, intelligence, HS, defense, diplomatic, and public safety sectors—include the DHS, the US military, and federal, state, and local partners. Men and women from the US Secret Service, Federal Air Marshals, New York City Police Department, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Amtrak Police, and dozens of other organizations work together every day in the global war on terrorism.


The Secretary of Homeland Security, under Title 6, USC, Section 465, may establish and operate a permanent Joint Interagency Homeland Security Task Force composed of representatives from military and civilian agencies of the USG for the purposes of anticipating terrorist threats against the United States and taking appropriate actions to prevent harm to the United States.

7. United States Special Operations Command Interagency Task Force

USSOCOM has established an interagency Task Force with liaison personnel from 11 different DOD and non-DOD agencies.

8. Considerations for Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force

a. Resolve the dual civilian and military chains of command to ensure both fall under the same directive authority, which ensures all departments and agencies work together.

b. The JIATF must be empowered, within the missions specified, to be the USG national authority to direct departments and agencies to collaborate, coordinate, plan, prioritize, and integrate resources provided from the USG and willing multinational and
multilateral partners. Some operational level JIATFs utilize a more collaborative approach with less clearly defined C2 to great effect.

c. Establish operating procedures and protocols that are simple, general, and open to review and modification to accommodate the authorities that participating agencies bring with them. The authorities establishing the organization must also clearly define the role, responsibilities, and authorities of the HN on whose territory it operates.

d. Although agency requirements can serve as the basis for JIATF procedures and formats, reporting procedures and doctrinal nomenclature must be developed and evolved to support the mission rather than individual agency requirements.

e. Ideally, commanders of JIATF and agency representative equivalents must have control (OPCON, TACON, or another arrangement) to commit dedicated resources to operations and mission outcomes, likely requiring an Executive Branch mandate and relief from restrictions on application of resources, and cabinet level agreement and/or MOAs/MOUs among agencies. Operational level commanders of JIATFs often do not have the authority to commit resources but use reachback and networking to attain necessary assets and guidance when needed.

f. The JIATF must establish operating procedures to “make space” for an empowered coordination node and direct that certain, specified coordination processes run through the organization. The authority must specify how internal processes will be structured to make them effective and adaptable to accommodate the participation of a wide variety of agencies and nations.

g. The JIATF should adapt existing authorities and process models, as appropriate to the mission, of other JIATFs.

h. JIATF must have specified, appropriate staff analysis and decision-making processes (internal, higher authorities, or delegated) depending on the line of operation or mission assigned.

i. The establishing authority should consider the types of missions and lines of operation that the JIATF will be assigned and ensure that staff analysis and decision-making processes are either in place or will be developed to ensure the success of the organization.

j. Specify the least cumbersome and restrictive system for information sharing among USG and multinational partners.

k. Consult with participating agencies and nations to establish a set of metrics which are appropriate to the mission or lines of operation assigned to the new organization.

l. A JIATF should be a truly interagency staff and leadership body, with cross-trained interagency staff and senior representatives who have the authorities to commit resources. The leadership of the organization should be balanced, have the authority to direct actions within the staff and field elements operating for the organization, regardless
of home agency (e.g., civilian deputies, watch officers can direct military units, and military officers can direct civilian organizations, in the name of the JIATF-like entity and its authorities).

m. A JIATF should have the internal organizational capability to administratively support LNOs to leverage their expertise.

n. The JIATF should be an operational HQ, (not a staff element) with an interagency operations center that plans, prioritizes, synchronizes, integrates, executes, and assesses operations on a continuous basis.

o. The JIATF must have access to national intelligence assets and products as a routine input to their own intelligence fusion requirements and capabilities.

p. Whatever mission or line(s) of operation are assigned to a JIATF, dedicated resources to be provided from each participating agency and/or nation should be specified in advance, with the authority to employ those resources assigned to the JIATF. When this authority does not reside in a JIATF, reachback and networking can serve this purpose.

q. Establishment and operation of a JIATF should be a separate, additional line item of funding for the establishing authorities. Costs should be allocated on an equitable basis. The JIATF should have its own resource management capability and administrative capability.
APPENDIX F
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

1. Introduction and Overview

   a. The focus of the PRT is on the provincial government and local infrastructure in the area assigned. Normally, PRTs are assigned by province, but may be assigned to local governments within a province or to more than one province. Both the effectiveness and legitimacy of provincial governments will vary widely from country to country and even from province to province within a country. As such, the focus of the PRT’s effort will largely depend on the needs of the government in place. In an area where the government lacks legitimacy (possibly because it has not existed previously or is perceived as corrupt and ineffective), it may be necessary for the PRT to take on initial stabilization activities without the presence of the HN government until initial trust can be established and relationships built that will help enhance the legitimacy of the provincial government as progress continues. In another area where the government enjoys some measure of legitimacy but is largely ineffective (and therefore in danger of losing legitimacy as well), the PRT will focus on helping HN government institutions develop the capacity to govern.

   b. USG PRTs exemplify the nature of a true joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operational environment: Potential compositions of PRTs mandate interoperability and interdependence of the military and interagency components. Even though the mission sets of PRTs vary, their objectives are tactical with a strategic focus. Subject matter expert and critical skills provide the foundation for the PRT to function. Manning these skill sets requires contributions from the various Services, interagency partners, private sector/academia, and contractor capabilities. The most valued lesson learned within PRTs is the ability to train and work together as a team.

2. Organization

   a. The organization and size of the PRT will vary largely depending on the operational environment and required tasks. In addition to organization and size, PRTs differ in roles, interagency participation, contractor staffing, capabilities, capacities, funding, and chain of command. Military participation is often the driving factor in PRT size.

   b. The PRT leader is normally a DOS official with a DOD deputy; however, a military officer may lead the PRT with a DOS official as deputy. Personnel serving in a PRT continue to work for their parent agency and are subject to operating guidelines of their original chain of command for performance and discipline, but are expected to follow the PRT leadership team’s directions, rules, policies, and procedures. Although the agency providing the PRT leader may differ from one PRT to the next, the DOD, DOS, and USAID senior members generally form a command group/senior management team. Maintaining consensus within this command group is key to the integration of all the organization’s elements.
c. Functional groups within the PRT will also vary, but are generally similar to JTF directorates (e.g., operations, logistics, plans). The operations group (or groups) may be organized by lines of operations/lines of effort (e.g., rule of law, economic development), by capabilities (e.g., engineer, USAID office, security), or by a combination thereof. When multinational partners are included in a PRT, they may function as a distinct organization within the PRT. The PRT organization typically includes a CMOC to coordinate and share information with other CA teams, NGOs, and IGOs operating in the area.

d. Agencies participating in addition to DOD, DOS, and USAID may include, but are not limited to, USDA, DOJ, DHHS, and DOC as well as HN national government agencies (such as the Interior Ministry or multinational equivalent). Interagency (and possibly international) MOAs may be required in the establishment of PRTs to define roles, responsibilities, command relationships, and funding lines. When possible, PRT command team/senior leadership team and members should receive their training as a unit prior to deployment to facilitate team building and unity of effort upon arrival in country.

e. Military support to a PRT normally includes CA representation and other forces for CMO. Additionally, the military may provide a security element as well as a quick reaction force. Military support may also include, but is not limited to, mobility, sustainment, engineering, administrative, and communication. The PRT may contract for many of these functions, including security, rather than drawing on direct military support. This will be most prevalent as the security environment becomes more stable. Alternatively, when the security environment dictates the location of the PRT on a forward operating base, the local military commander may provide some of these support capabilities.

3. Command and Control

a. The nature of command and coordinating relationship is complex and should be addressed early and continuously. Direction and coordination of PRTs can be conducted by a national level interagency steering committee, under the supervision of the COM, a multinational executive committee, or JFC.

b. Funding is perhaps the most difficult issue for PRT management. Funding will come from several different sources (e.g., multinational, USG, and HN), even within a single executive department. PRT leaders should carefully track and understand sources of funding lines and legal restrictions on their use. The success of interagency coordination at the highest levels will be reflected in the ability of the PRT to coordinate interagency funding lines in the field.

4. Employment

a. Participation in planning by the core PRT staff should begin as early as possible to build coordinating relationships. Although PRTs are employed primarily for the purpose of stability operations (which can occur in each phase), PRTs typically focus
their efforts on achieving objectives in the stabilize phase of a joint operation, facilitating the transition to enable the civil authority phase. It should be noted that the stabilize phase may come at different times for different provinces or operational areas based on the design and/or progress of the operation. Normally, the PRT should enter the operational area before the joint force begins the transition from dominate to stabilize.

b. As HN civil authority is established and the environment is stabilized, military support generally decreases. Eventually the PRT will transition to a DOS ACT or FACT team, another international organization/entity, or HN; the other components of the PRT may transition to more traditional means of providing development assistance.

c. Governance. The primary focus of a PRT in any area of operations is to improve the provincial government’s ability to provide democratic governance and essential services, and linking central government with the population.

(1) **Assistance Specialists.** The USAID typically contracts a three-person team of civilian specialists to provide training and technical assistance programs for PRTs. The program aims to improve the efficiency of provincial governments by providing policy analysis, training, and technical assistance to national ministries, their provincial representatives, provincial governors, and provincial councils. The team of civilian specialists works directly with provincial officials to increase competence and efficiency. For example, they assist provincial council and provincial development committee members with the conduct of meetings, budget development, and oversight of provincial government activities. The team also encourages transparency and popular participation by working with citizens and community organizations, hosting conferences, and promoting public forums. However, DOD must be prepared to execute this function, via CA functional specialty teams, in the absence of USAID and/or HN specialists.

(2) **Other Expertise.** The USAID team contains members with expertise in local government, financial management, and municipal planning. Up to seventy percent of the contracted staff members come from regional countries and include local professionals. Additional contracted experts are on call from regional offices. The USAID requires contract advisors speak the HN language and possess extensive professional experience. USAID-trained instructors present training programs based on professionally developed modules in the HN language. The training and technical assistance programs emphasize practical application with focus areas in computers, planning, public administration, and provision of public services.

d. **Security.** The absence of security impacts the effectiveness of PRT operations and efforts to develop effective local governments.

(1) **Security Impacts.** Provincial governors and other senior officials may be intimidated, threatened, and assassinated in limited or unsecure areas. Provincial councils may potentially reduce or eliminate regular meetings if security deteriorates. Additionally, provincial-level ministry representatives could become reluctant to attend work because of security concerns. PRT personnel and local officials may lose the ability to meet openly or visit provincial government centers and US military installations.
in limited security environments. During security alerts, PRT civilian personnel may be restricted to base, preventing interaction with HN counterparts. Unstable security situations limit PRT personnel from promoting economic development by counseling local officials, encouraging local leaders and business owners, and motivating outside investors.

(2) Secure Movement and Presence. The movement of PRT personnel with heavily armed military escorts contributes to the overall security presence and reassures citizens in the areas where they operate. However, the PRT does not normally conduct military operations, nor do they assist HN military forces. However, PRTs must be prepared to conduct defensive military operations when under attack. The only security role assigned to a PRT is FP by providing armored vehicles and an advisor to escort PRT personnel to meetings with local officials. US military assigned to escort civilian PRT members receive training in providing PRT civilian personnel protection under an agreement with the DOS. The training is designed to reinforce understanding of escort responsibilities and to prevent endangerment to PRT civilian personnel. US military escorting PRT personnel should not combine this responsibility with other missions. The problem of providing PRT civilian personnel with security is compounded by competing protection priorities preventing dedicated security teams in most situations limiting security teams to available personnel.

e. Reconstruction. The USAID representative of the PRT has the primary responsibility for developing the PRT economic development work plan including its assistance projects. The PRT partners with the HN to develop their capacity which results in the development of infrastructure including schools, clinics, community centers, and government buildings. The PRT also focuses on developing human capacity through training and advisory programs.

5. Fundamental Guidelines

a. Objective. The mission of a PRT is to stabilize the operational environment, creating conditions for development, laying the foundations for long-term stability, and enabling the civil authorities. PRT planners for a particular area must define decisive and achievable goals for that province that meet the objective of stability, giving direction to all PRT operations. These goals will define the lifespan of the PRT, facilitating its transition to more traditional development mechanisms.

b. Unity of Effort. The success of the PRT depends on its ability to operate as a composite unit. Unity of effort is the goal and members must lay aside interagency differences to focus on the common objective. Additionally, members of the PRT must ensure higher agency organizations understand and support the unified effort required. PRT development and capacity building activities should be coordinated with the military commander responsible for security in the area the PRTs is operating. Beyond interagency integration, the PRT must also work with IGOs and NGOs in the area to share information, reduce duplication of work (or counterproductive efforts), and communicate about civil-military sensitivities.
c. **Promotion of Legitimacy and Effectiveness.** The key to achieving long-term stability and development is the establishment of the local government as the legitimate and effective governing authority. To achieve this, the PRT will often need to “lead from behind and underneath,” building capacity and working behind the scenes to ensure HN ownership and promoting HN primacy and legitimacy. This will often mean accepting local government solutions rather than imposing expertise. Legitimacy may be partly achieved by facilitating the visibility of HN presence in the province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation, communications). Another key element will be the engagement of HN officials, the local communities, and the population through established and traditional bodies.

   d. **Restraint.** PRTs establish realistic objectives and balance the tempo of operations to maintain the primacy of HN legitimacy and effectiveness. SC efforts must be aimed at managing expectations—promising only what can be delivered. Planning for all programs and projects must include long-term sustainability. Additionally, efforts at the local level must be coordinated with national level processes to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the entire HN government.
APPENDIX G
THE INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

1. Introduction and Overview

a. The Secretary of State may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct R&S activities, including ensuring harmonization with any planned or ongoing military operations, and by convoking an IMS response to a crisis.

b. The IMS for R&S is designed to assist Washington, DC, policymakers, COMs, and military commanders manage complex R&S engagements by ensuring coordination among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical/field levels. The lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrate that the US must employ an approach in these types of engagements that draws upon the full range of diplomatic, development, defense, intelligence, and economic resources available to the USG.

c. The IMS is designed for highly complex crises and operations, which are national or security priorities, involve widespread instability, may require military operations, and where multiple US agencies will be engaged in the policy and programmatic response. It is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively handled through the current Washington, DC, and embassy systems.

d. The system is designed to provide policymakers in Washington, DC, COMs, and military commanders with flexible tools to ensure unity of effort as laid out through whole-of-government strategic and implementation planning for R&S. The system is intended to facilitate and support:

   (1) Integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic and implementation plans, including funding requests;

   (2) Joint interagency deployments; and

   (3) A joint civilian operations capability including shared communications and information management.

e. This system is a crisis response mechanism. It does not preclude interagency scenario-based prevention or contingency planning, which may occur independently. The system will draw upon such plans when they exist.

f. When a significant crisis occurs or begins to emerge, the Secretary of State may decide to convene an IMS response, with input from regional bureaus, ambassadors, and other relevant USG leadership and possibly at the request of NSC/PC and NSC/DC.

g. The IMS consists of the following:
(1) **Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group.** A Washington, DC-based secretariat to support an IPC or another interagency decision-making body established to manage a crisis;

(2) **Integration Planning Cell.** A civilian planning cell integrated with relevant GCC(s) or with equivalent multinational HQ; and

(3) **Advance Civilian Team.** One or more interagency field management and coordination teams to support COMs in the field.

h. These structures are flexible in size and composition to meet the particular requirements of the situation and integrate personnel from all relevant agencies. Recruitment of personnel may require additional flexible hiring authorities, training, and resources not presently available. International partners may also be represented. Each team is designed to support and augment, not replace, existing structures in Washington, DC, at the GCC, and in the field. The DOS’s Executive Secretariat will continue to establish and manage interagency task forces, monitor crises worldwide, promote contingency planning and emergency preparedness, and support overseas evacuations.

2. **Components**

   a. The IMS consists of the following components:

   (1) **Washington, DC**

      (a) The CRSG serves as a secretariat to the central interagency coordinating body for the USG effort, such as a crisis-specific NSC/IPC co-chaired by the regional assistant secretary, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the relevant NSC director. This NSC/IPC would cover any country-specific concerns related to the R&S operation. It would augment any existing regional or country-specific NSC/IPC for the purposes of the crisis response.

      (b) The group prepares the whole-of-government strategic plan. The plan will include a common USG strategic goal, a CONOPS, the major essential tasks the USG must undertake, including with international partners, and resource requirements to achieve stability. This can build off of earlier interagency scenario-based planning. The CRSG manages the interagency process that prepares and forwards strategic guidance recommendations for decision by the crisis-specific NSC/IPC, NSC/DC, and, as appropriate, the NSC/PC to ensure USG guidance. This plan can be coordinated and synchronized with the development of military planning with the GCC’s HQ and JTF HQ through an IPC and ACT, respectively.

      (c) Once the USG integrated strategic plan is approved, the CRSG may facilitate preparation and integration of interagency implementation planning. It also facilitates operations support, information management, international/coalition partnership development, and resource mobilization.
(2) GCC’s HQ (or equivalent multinational HQ). An integration planning cell can be deployed to a GCC’s HQ. The CRSG may establish and deploy an integration planning cell at the request of the GCC through DOD. The integration planning cell assists in harmonizing the civilian and military planning processes and operations. If DOD issues a warning/planning order to the GCC, the CRSG sends to the command an integration planning cell made up of relevant interagency planners, and regional and sectoral experts. The integration planning cell supports the commander in harmonizing military plans with USG civilian strategic and implementation plans. In the case of a multinational led mission, an integration planning cell could also be deployed to its HQ to advise and support as appropriate.

(3) **Embassy/US Field Presence**

(a) To support existing field operations and/or establish new operations, the CRSG may deploy an ACT at the request of the COM and approval of the interagency crisis decision-making body (e.g., NSC/IPC). The ACT forms the R&S interagency general staff under COM authority to coordinate and support execution of US R&S plans. The team can operate with or without US military involvement. Under any circumstances, all US civilian field operations are conducted under the COM’s authority, and the COM bears ultimate responsibility for implementation of the USG R&S strategic plan.

(b) The ACT and its operations will be integrated with existing embassy and USAID mission structures and personnel as appropriate to support the COM’s implementation of the USG R&S strategic plan. In the absence of an existing USG civilian presence, the senior member of an ACT will act as COM, which will have the additional task of standing up a more permanent, formal USG presence.

(c) If the COM determines field units are necessary, the ACT can deploy a number of FACTs, which provide the COM with maximum capacity to implement R&S programs at the provincial or local level. When required, FACTs will integrate with US or other military forces to achieve optimal USG/coalition unity of effort.

b. This system participants at all levels have similar visibility in the provinces, providing a foundation for a COP, that the COM has a coherent framework for R&S decision making, and that all agency activities are synchronized in time, space, and purpose, limiting duplication of effort. The current roles and responsibilities of each of these components are outlined below. Guides are under development that will further clarify the roles and structures of the IMS.

3. **Washington, DC: Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group**

a. The CRSG is an interagency planning, operations, and coordination staff that acts as a secretariat to the lead interagency crisis response body (NSC/IPC). The CRSG is drawn from interagency participants as necessary to provide expertise in strategic assessment and planning, operations support, knowledge sharing, resource mobilization, and strategic monitoring, as well as field team support and partner coordination.
b. **The CRSG** assists interagency leadership (e.g., NSC/IPC) with the following tasks:

(1) **Informs and Presents Options.** Channels interagency input and provides recommendations to NSC/PC and NSC/DC in the form of a country-specific R&S strategic plan; ensures that NSC/PC and NSC/DC understand the full range of interagency consensus, interests or divergence of opinion;

(2) **Unifies Effort.** Integrates all relevant regional and functional capabilities across the USG into one focused process for planning and implementation;

(3) **Identifies and Mobilizes Resources.** Uses integrated planning to identify, mobilize, and coordinate human resources and funding as well as additional resource requirements to meet the needs of the evolving mission. Works closely with the Director of Foreign Assistance country core team, which currently serves as the focal point for all foreign assistance prioritizing and programming for a given country as well as other agencies which do not fall under Director of Foreign Assistance. Works also with agency budget, legal, Congressional, and human resources offices to facilitate any necessary flexible personnel authorities, supplemental requests, or legislation;

(4) **Manages Strategy.** Ensures that the range of diplomatic, development, defense, economic and trade strategies, Congressional consultations, resources decisions, and PA strategies are integrated and managed as part of overall engagement efforts;

(5) **Drives Implementation.** Drives implementation of policy decisions by NSC/PC and NSC/DC through appropriate interagency entities in close coordination with the COM and military commanders;

(6) **Resolves Disputes.** As needed, resolves disputes among interagency partners or raises disputes to higher decision-making authority, (i.e., NSC/PC, NSC/DC);

(7) **Monitors Security.** Working closely with the COM, assesses evolving security environment, assists the DOS’s Diplomatic Security to alter security requirements/support and review safety of civilians on the ground in coordination with Diplomatic Security, and the regional security officer, taking into account any military assessments.

c. A CRSG does not direct field operations. The COM retains control of all USG activities in country not under the GCC.

d. **The CRSG Secretariat**

(1) **Plans.** Develops with the interagency community, for senior decision, an overall US R&S strategic plan. This plan lays out policy goals, program requirements, institutional responsibilities, base funding requirements, and supporting plans for diplomatic engagement (including public diplomacy) and intelligence support. From the
strategic plan, the CRSG secretariat staff may work with agency planners and the COM to develop and update a US interagency R&S implementation plans.

(2) **Informs.** Ensures widespread situational awareness within USG of all agencies’ activities and of the field perspective, coordinating assessments, and disseminating information (including situation and progress reports) through the Washington, DC, community, Congress, and the field.

(3) **Supports the NSC/IPC.** Supports decision making and activities of the CRSG through organizational support (e.g., agendas, papers, records, paper preparation, clearance), NSC/PC or NSC/DC meeting preparation, management of sub-NSC/IPCs and teams charged with developing the strategic plan’s major mission elements (i.e., strategic objectives), and dissemination of information.

(4) **Supports Operations.** Supports mobilization, activities, and policy requirements of integration planning cells and USG field elements. Provides support for these teams in information management, incorporating best practices, policy review and guidance, and logistical support.

(5) **Facilitates Partnerships.** Facilitates international relationships and partner coordination.

(6) **Monitors and Evaluates.** Establishes and tracks strategic-level metrics, assumptions, and other trend indicators to assess progress.

e. **Structure of the CRSG Secretariat.** In order to perform these tasks, the Secretariat may form the following groups, drawing on personnel from across interagency participants.

(1) **Strategic Planning.** An interagency team which develops the integrated strategic plan, as well as any required budget proposals outside the regular Director of Foreign Assistance/Resource Management and Office of Management and Budget cycles for the NSC/IPC, NSC/DC, and Congress.

(2) **Planning Integration.** While most specific implementation planning will occur within individual agencies, this group will coordinate with the strategic planners and work closely with the COM to integrate these programs and operations into a single US R&S implementation plan, which will include the scope and requirements for deploying integration planning cells and ACTs.

(3) **Operations Support/Information Management.** This group is responsible for coordinating with agency operations centers to ensure the CRSG has a single COP and civilians in the field receive the required operations support. It also monitors and reports strategic-level metrics.

(4) **Resource Mobilization.** A resource management team that coordinates resource planning; expedites recruitment, flexible hiring waivers and authorities, mobilization, and deployment; facilitates interagency logistics; and informs budget and
Appendix G

legislation development. A supply chain management team that identifies key reconstruction material requirements, facilitates relationships with global suppliers, and promotes efficient logistic networks.

(5) **Partner Development.** A team, which works to establish or leverage partnerships for R&S with multinational, multilateral, bilateral partners, international financial institutions, and the UN.

f. The DOS Executive Secretariat and Operations Center, as well as agency watch centers, will continue to function as necessary by their guidelines and to stand up short-term task forces and/or monitoring groups as needed. The CRSG Secretariat coordinates closely with and draws upon the DOS’s Operations Center staff and expertise; the two could be located in close proximity in some instances.

g. **Staffing of the crisis-specific NSC/IPC.** Co-chairs will include the appropriate DOS Regional Assistant Secretary and/or Special Envoy, S/CRS Coordinator, and NSC Director. All agencies with involvement in programs or policy relating to the crisis should be represented on the CRSG at the Assistant Secretary-level including DOD, USAID, DOS, DOJ, and other agencies as appropriate. Agency representatives to the CRSG must be able to speak authoritatively on behalf of their agencies or bring issues for decision to their leadership.

h. **CRSG Secretariat.** The secretariat may be managed by a policy director (DOS regional bureau) or a chief operations officer (S/CRS) or jointly by both. The NSC/IPC will ultimately approve CRSG leadership proposed by itself or by S/CRS. Interagency staff for the Secretariat should include:

(1) Regional experts (ideally the desk officer or agency equivalent) from all participating agencies. The DOS country desk officer is considered the COM’s representative on the CRSG Secretariat, except when other officers are designated;

(2) S/CRS planning and operations staff;

(3) Agency planners, sectoral and resource experts including DOS’s Director of Foreign Assistance and Diplomatic Security staff, DOD, USAID, DOJ, and others;

(4) Additional full-time and part-time staff, including interagency technical experts provided as the situation requires; and

(5) Interagency team members to be deployed in the integration planning cell or ACT, as necessary, prior to deployment.

i. The CRSG will seek members with recent experience in the affected country, taking advantage of USG personnel who may have been evacuated from the country. In some cases staff working part- or full-time on a CRSG may continue to reside in their regular offices and contribute to the interagency process and products as agreed with each agency.
j. The Secretariat can be located in an expanded country desk or elsewhere within DOS. It will be operational as required during low-intensity periods, ramping up to 24 hours a day and 7 days a week if required. The staffing schedules and procedures for after-hours coverage will be worked out and communicated in advance.

k. **Activation of the CRSG.** Interagency planning is necessary for effective conflict or crisis response. Therefore, in the case of an emerging crisis, even if a CRSG is not yet established, the core Secretariat planning staff must be immediately identified with clear lines of communications and guidance. With the concurrence of the relevant DOS regional assistant secretary or more senior DOS leadership, S/CRS may decide in advance of and in expectation of a formal decision, to establish the core secretariat planning staff. A CRSG should be established as soon as possible while follow-on staffing arrangements are made.

l. Establishing a CRSG must take into account any international or political sensitivity surrounding prospective interventions and steps must be taken to minimize any potential negative implications of public knowledge of the effort.

m. A CRSG does not necessarily need to remain in place throughout the entire US engagement; rather, it should be in place for coordination during the intensive phases of planning and early implementation, allowing for downsizing or transition to a traditional NSC/IPC.

n. Generally, a CRSG Secretariat could be disbanded by the NSC when US involvement has ‘normalized’ such that: agencies are focusing on longer term program and policy implementation; standing US institutions have sufficient management or resources capacity for the effort; and program resources are integrated into regular budgeting processes. A NSC/IPC-level body should oversee completion of the plan and any follow-on activities. Regular budget planning will continue so that essential programs will be resourced as the strategic R&S plan phases out.

4. **Integration Planning Cell in Support of a Geographic Combatant Command**

a. The integration planning cell is an interagency team of R&S specialists; empowered by the Washington, DC-based strategic planning process and the CRSG, it can deploy to support integration of civilian and military planning at a GCC, or at an equivalent multinational HQ. The size and composition can be adjusted to the circumstances. The purpose of the integration planning cell is to harmonize civilian and military R&S efforts.

b. An integration planning cell may be established in response to an emerging crisis potentially requiring military intervention or support, a DOD RFA with R&S planning, or a request from an equivalent multinational HQ.

c. The integration planning cell should also ensure planning integration and ongoing communication between civilian and military R&S implementation planning teams. This mechanism is not designed to create a USG civilian R&S operations/tactical plan. R&S
operations that do not involve significant military engagement may not require the establishment of an integration planning cell.

d. The integration planning cell provides:

(1) Country-specific expertise and analysis;

(2) R&S functional expertise;

(3) Insight on policy guidance and assumptions;

(4) Liaison with Washington, DC, agencies and civilian field elements; and

(5) Assistance drafting relevant aspects of the military plan.

e. If the crisis does not involve the US military, but does involve a multinational military or peacekeeping force, the integration planning cell can help coordinate planning.

f. The team assigned to the integration planning cell should have appropriate sectoral and regional experts empowered to represent their agencies. If agencies are not able to provide requested personnel to the integration planning cell, they should designate a member of the integration planning cell to represent their interests and act as liaison.

g. **Organization of the Integration Planning Cell.** The size and composition of the integration planning cell can be determined and adjusted with the approval of the CRSG and participating agencies as requirements dictate. IPCs can consist of a single official or as many as 50 officials. A robust team will focus on the following functions:

(1) **Leadership.** Senior level officer responsible for setting priorities and communicating with the CRSG and COM. This officer normally should have direct access to the CCDR;

(2) **Operations and Information Management.** Management of the integration planning cell, information flow, and coordination with the host HQ’s staff; ensure integration planning cell’s integration with host networks;

(3) **Plans.** Coordinates interaction with all relevant planning teams, boards, working groups, or cells;

(4) **Support.** Management of administrative functions for the team to include coordination of travel, billeting, meals, transportation, office space, supplies, and communications; and

(5) **Provision of Sectoral and Regional Expertise.**

h. The integration planning cell leadership should be of an appropriate civilian rank that allows peer interaction with the commander or leader of the organization with which
the integration planning cell intends to integrate and plan. The experts may include specialists in the country/foreign policy, transitional security/policing, rule of law, governance, economic stabilization, administration and logistics, communications, education, health, SC, migration and internally displaced persons, infrastructure, urban planning, finance and banking, diplomatic security, and legal issues.

i. S/CRS maintains rosters of potential team members and develops supporting MOUs with appropriate DOS bureaus and other federal agencies. When possible, US personnel with recent experience in the country in question (such as those evacuated/drawn down from a US embassy) will be attached to the integration planning cell to provide country-specific expertise. The integration planning cell team members’ agencies may be responsible for providing funds for appropriate housing, transportation, and per diem when the integration planning cell is deployed.

j. Authorities of the Integration Planning Cell. The integration planning cell reports to the CRSG. It has neither oversight of nor control over USG field operations. The integration planning cell will have a coordinating relationship with the relevant ACT and embassy.

k. If deployed to a foreign country with the GCC’s HQ or equivalent multinational HQ, the integration planning cell will fall under COM authority in the country of deployment.

l. Establishment of an Integration Planning Cell. The CRSG, or in the absence of it, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization identifies the necessary capabilities for the integration planning cell in consultation with the GCC’s HQ, embassy, and other relevant agencies and bureaus with required knowledge and expertise appropriate for the developing crisis.

m. The integration planning cell will work closely with the GCC’s HQ, JIACG (or equivalent organization), and the POLAD to ensure coordination and unity of purpose. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) and POLAD facilitate the coordination of integration planning cell efforts with the GCC’s HQ. The IPC maintains a distinct identity, independent chain of command (to the IPC leader and CRSG), and purpose from its interlocutors at the GCC’s HQ.

n. Deployment of an Integration Planning Cell. Integration planning cell members should prepare to deploy to the GCC’s HQ as long as necessary to complete initial planning integration. Estimates range from one to six months, depending on the scale and complexity of the crisis and associated planning.

o. The integration planning cell leadership should continuously evaluate the size and composition of the team in the context of the host HQ’s requirements and integration planning cell needs. The integration planning cell will maintain the intensity of its efforts until the locus of planning shifts to field-level management (subordinate HQ) and the normal (steady state) functions can be fully supported by existing structures.
As necessary, DOS will develop an MOU with each GCC’s HQ or multinational HQ to ensure effective and timely attachment of the integration planning cell to the HQ as well as MOUs between DOS and supporting departments and agencies to identify security requirements expected by each agency. In the case of an international deployment, specific security arrangements will be identified. While deployed, members will fall under the security rules of the appropriate host HQ based on the signed MOUs, but will otherwise fall under the authority of the COM in country of deployment.

When major planning is accomplished, individual team members may either:

1. Return to Washington, DC;
2. Deploy to join the ACT staff, with COM approval; or
3. Remain at the host HQ to continue advising planning cells and boards on ACT activities, inform HQ elements of other agency plans, modify planning, and otherwise assist the host HQ mission.

The integration planning cell will deploy with as complete an understanding of the approved USG strategic plan and resources available to implement it as possible. It will maintain a situational awareness of changes in USG strategic planning as plans evolve and share new developments with military counterparts. Ideally, this will include a national policy goal and major mission elements (i.e., strategic objectives), and performance indicators, based on an assessment of conflict drivers.

In the absence of an approved plan or plan in progress, the integration planning cell will identify potential policy issues and make recommendations for major mission elements (i.e., strategic objectives) of the strategic plan to the CRSG, in consultation with the host HQ leadership. These recommendations will take into account military and agency objectives, and resource capabilities. Key to achieving success in this process is working from a common interagency planning framework.

To fulfill these functions effectively, integration planning cell members ideally should participate in Washington, DC-based strategic planning processes prior to deploying to the military command or multinational agency HQ.

Coordination of the Integration Planning Cell. The integration planning cell leadership will have frequent communications with and seek guidance from the ACT and CRSG regarding:

1. The strategic plan and its integration with the military operational plan;
2. Identifying and addressing gaps and deficiencies between the civilian and military plans;
3. Identifying impacts of planned military operations on future R&S efforts; and
(4) Recommending processes and criteria to ensure a smooth transfer of military to civilian lead, if appropriate, by function and region as the environment is stabilized.

v. The integration planning cell leadership will keep the host HQ leadership apprised of communications with the CRSG. The integration planning cell and DOD representatives on the CRSG keep the CRSG informed of military planning and operations so that the planning process can take into account the military operations and their potential effects. The integration planning cell will also coordinate with the ACT. Coordination between the integration planning cell and CRSG does not obviate the defense policy guidance and plan approval process as established by DOD procedures.

w. The integration planning cell may require frequent coordination with and guidance from key implementing agencies. Ideally, such communication should be channeled through the CRSG to implementing agencies in order to facilitate the development of timely, field-informed recommendations for program development, and supplemental budget requests. Recommendations should be based on an understanding of the host HQ plans, field-identified R&S conditions and requirements. If necessary, disputes among interagency partners within the integration planning cell or between the integration planning cell and the host HQ can be referred to the CRSG.

x. Integration planning cell leadership will determine which information and policy guidance requests from the host HQ have sufficient importance or interagency implications that they should be channeled through the CRSG. The integration planning cell will maintain regular communication with the ACT to ensure the host HQ leadership is informed of field assessments, program status, new requirements, and other related R&S issues.

y. **Training the Integration Planning Cell.** It is essential that core integration planning cell staff develop planning expertise through professional training and regular exercise participation with military commands, and multinational equivalents as appropriate. S/CRS offers a basic and intermediate R&S curriculum and provide opportunities for potential integration planning cell members to participate in planning seminars/workshops, iterative planning exchanges, and selected military exercises to refine integration planning cell procedures, hone civilian-military planning processes, become familiar with military planning templates, and develop habitual relationships with the GCCs. Integration planning cell members must also be familiar with the capabilities of their own agency as well as other USG capacity in their field of expertise in relation to R&S operations.

5. **Advance Civilian Teams**

   a. ACTs are rapidly deployable, cross-functional interagency teams that are flexible in size and composition. ACTs are formed to quickly set up, coordinate, and conduct field R&S operations, in conjunction with country teams where extant. This can include performing assessments, and coordinating and conducting USG operations in uncertain and hostile environments. They serve under COM authority and can operate with or
without US military deployment. An ACT may deploy alone or with one or more FACTs, which can assess, coordinate, and conduct USG operations from provincial and local levels (field/tactical).

b. For unity of effort, ACTs integrate and coordinate the execution of the US R&S Implementation Plan with existing USG civilian and military operations. ACTs fill gaps in existing civilian operations. ACTs provide core R&S implementation planning and operations expertise to COMs and military commanders. They also may extend the USG’s civilian presence via FACTs reporting to the ACT HQ. ACTs will work to ensure that US efforts focus on supporting joint USG and HN’s goals and interests.

c. FACTs are usually deployed to establish a US presence, provide direct information about conditions on the ground, and support those R&S operations conducted at a provincial and local level. In this regard, FACTs build upon the lessons learned from PRTs and provide assessments, first-response, and management of the full range of R&S operations. They are equipped and trained to perform their tasks in hostile environments, including combat environments. While remaining under COM authority, FACTs may integrate with US or foreign military forces when appropriate to maintain maximum US/coalition unity of effort. As required, they may coordinate the field execution of projects that involve USG resources. They will also coordinate with UN, other IGOs, NGOs, or HN entities to execute projects as appropriate.

d. **Tasks of the ACT.** The ACT, located at the embassy, JTF HQ, or alternate site, serves as the COM’s general R&S staff, supporting the COM, as he or she deems appropriate, in executing the USG interagency R&S implementation plan. The ACT is strategic and operational in nature, assisting the COM to direct R&S planning and operations. As directed by the COM, primary tasks may include:

1. **Coordinate and Conduct R&S Operations.** Working with embassy staff and as directed by the COM, coordinates and conducts nation-wide US R&S operations with all US elements, HN, and international officials based in country (e.g., NGOs, other donors, the UN);

2. **Field-HQ Direction.** In support of the COM, directs and synchronizes the activities of the FACTs and/or other national and local level USG civilian and military R&S units in time, space, and purpose;

3. **Knowledge Sharing.** Consolidates and transmits regular ACT/FACT reporting, including planning and programming recommendations, to the embassy, military JTF, integration planning cell, and CRSG; and

4. **Progress Monitoring.** Performs monitoring and evaluation and recommends program adjustments as necessary to support implementation of the US interagency strategic plans.

e. In the absence of a functioning HN government, the ACT supports the management of transitional administration and governance with the objective of rapidly developing legitimate local capacity. Additionally, ACTs may be provided to support
multinational operations. In this instance, the COM will provide guidance regarding the ACT’s relationship with the COM in that country.

f. In the absence of an existing COM, the individual designated as COM is dual-hatted as ACT leader, and establishes a platform for diplomatic and R&S operations as directed by the Secretary of State.

g. **Tasks of the Field ACTs.** Acting under the authority of the COM, FACTs’ primary tasks may include, but are not limited to:

   (1) **Direction of R&S activities.** Based on the plan, synchronizing, integrating, conducting, and advising on US civilian and military R&S operations in its operational area, in coordination with HN authorities, IGOs, NGOs, other donors;

   (2) **Assessments.** Assessing conditions for implementing the US R&S country strategy and monitoring existing plans and programs to ensure that they are consistent with US strategy and reflect ground realities;

   (3) **Negotiations and Support to Local Governance.** Based on COM guidance, leading negotiations or political discussions with local leaders to advance R&S operations and support/develop local governance capacities; and

   (4) **Information.** Providing situation reports directly to the ACT, and responding to ACT guidance and requests for information.

h. ACTs may also be deployed in support of an international mission or in regional operations covering more than one country. These missions have additional requirements for authorities, logistics, security, and guidance beyond the scope of operations described above. These requirements will be developed as needed following further consultation.

i. **ACT/FACT Staffing.** The ACT/FACT structure and composition should be adapted to conditions on the ground in order to meet objectives of USG R&S plans. ACT/FACT personnel may be drawn from DOS, USAID, other USG agencies as required, military personnel, members of a civilian reserve (if formed), and contractors, as well as international and HN personnel when appropriate. ACT/FACT deployment may require additional flexible hiring authorities, training, and resources not presently available.

j. Although an ACT or FACT may be composed of a single individual, larger deployments will organize themselves in similar structures. Both should have a staff covering the following functions:

   (1) **Leadership.** Providing a leader and a deputy;

   (2) **Sectoral Expertise.** Providing expertise to manage the implementation of major mission elements (strategic objectives) of the US R&S plan;

   (3) **Operations.** Conducting and coordinating current ACT/FACT operations;
(4) Plans/Evaluation. Maintaining and revising the R&S implementation plan as appropriate, and monitoring and reporting on implementation;

(5) Support. Managing logistics, information technology, contracting, and administration;

(6) Knowledge Sharing. Maintaining and disseminating a COP throughout the ACT/FACT;

(7) SC. Supporting PA, DSPD, and IO associated with R&S operations; and


k. Staff functions should be performed by trained and qualified personnel from appropriate US agencies (including the US military) to augment existing embassy staff. Depending on the magnitude of the operation and resources available, these tasks could be divided among a few officers in a small organization, or each could be a separate staff office with multiple personnel in a very large organization.

l. ACT/FACT Structure. With COM guidance, ACTs/FACTs may augment existing embassy structures and working groups or create new structures based on major mission elements (strategic objectives), rather than by individual separate agencies. Each objective should have a single team coordinator selected from any one of the participating agencies. This integrated structure supports unity of effort in operations, while simplifying integration of operations with military, international, and HN organizations working to achieve similar objectives.

m. As an example, the hypothetical strategic objective “Increased internal security and consolidated territorial control,” might assign various US implementation tasks to the DOS regional bureau, DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, USAID, DOD, DHS, and DOJ. All of these agencies and bureaus may assign personnel to the ACT and its FACTs to execute or oversee their particular tasks as defined in the R&S strategic plan. The Plan will identify one lead agency for each strategic objective. The lead agency will select a representative to ensure program coordination and unity of effort for achieving the strategic objective within the appropriate ACT or FACT.

n. ACT/FACT Authorities. The COM is responsible for the execution of all elements of the US R&S implementation plan tasked to agencies operating under COM authority. The ACT works under COM authority to support and enhance the COM’s effort. The ACT both conducts R&S operations and synchronizes and integrates operations conducted by its members, the participating agencies.

o. COM Authority and the ACT. Because of the centrality of the COM’s role in the execution of US policy, in countries without an existing US presence the ACT will take direction from an individual designated by DOS. In such conditions, the individual designated as COM will also hold the position of ACT leader until a more normal
mission structure is established. Under any circumstances, the COM is responsible for the safety and security of all ACT/FACT personnel.

p. The ACT deployment derives its authority by being the COM’s R&S general staff. It assists him/her in implementing R&S plans by organizing interagency operations around the strategic objectives, and synchronizes and integrates the field implementation of interagency programs through the FACTs. The ACT also serves as the mechanism by which the COM, integration planning cell, and CRSG can be informed of the progress of plan implementation, or of any changes required to the plans.

q. The COM determines the ACT command structure. Notionally, an ACT leader could report through the DCM to the COM. FACT leaders, regardless of agency affiliation, report to the ACT and through it to embassy leadership. ACT and FACT members are under the OPCON of the ACT/FACT leader, though they may remain in contact with their parent agencies and may still be rated/evaluated by their parent agencies, with input from the ACT/FACT leader. Alternately, if agreed in advance, ACT/FACT members may be rated directly by the ACT/FACT leadership and reviewed by their parent agency.

r. **Operational Control.** As an interagency body, the ACT leader, as directed by the COM, exercises authority over interagency personnel assigned or attached to it. The COM’s authority in no way denies or alters any military team member’s right and duty to remain in communication with his/her parent agency, to exchange information and recommendations with that agency, and to appeal to more senior parent agency representatives when necessary. While formal R&S guidance, decision making, and reporting will move through the CRSG-embassy/ACT FACT chain, informal communications are essential for rapid implementation and reporting on R&S operations.

s. A COM may delegate, in writing, specific authorities as appropriate to FACT leaders within their geographic areas of operation. FACT leaders are most effective when viewed as field directors for R&S operations within their operational area, reporting to the COM through the ACT leader and DCM.

t. Optimally, a COM may designate a well-resourced ACT to coordinate all US R&S operations in country, including FACTs, to maintain unity of effort. In this manner, challenges requiring interagency resolution can be identified and resolved. Every agency involved in the R&S operation should have the capability to keep informed of and control field-level operations within their sectoral responsibility, while keeping those operations coordinated within the overall US effort.

u. In supporting the COM in the execution of the R&S plan, all agencies and programs retain their existing legal authorities and responsibilities for the commitment of the funds controlled by that agency and the implementation of that agency’s programs. Existing US funds and programs, as well as those created under the aegis of a particular agency to execute the implementation plan, will be managed by officers of the responsible agencies assigned/attached to the ACT or FACTs, in accordance with appropriate agency procedures and regulations.
v. Within the operational area of an ACT and its FACTs, control of resources and programs is the responsibility of the implementing agencies. Depending on R&S program requirements, agencies may conduct activities centrally from the ACT (with FACT personnel handling monitoring and evaluation), or may delegate implementation authority to their representatives on the FACTs.

w. It is an agency’s responsibility to ensure it has sufficient personnel to implement, monitor, and/or oversee agency projects. Failing this, agencies need to consider what other FACT personnel may have the most appropriate qualifications to implement, monitor, and/or oversee an agency’s operations on its behalf. For example, when a FACT officer from Agency A has an additional task of monitoring a project funded/implemented by Agency B, that officer receives his/her guidance regarding that project’s implementation from an officer designated by Agency B at the ACT/embassy. Within the approved R&S plan, responsibility for implementing individual programs lies with the agency funding the program.

x. **Formation of ACTs.** Although interagency teams may deploy under a variety of circumstances with ACT-like roles and responsibilities, an ACT requires that a CRSG has been formed in Washington, DC, to develop interagency strategic and implementation plans, and that the CRSG has concluded that an ACT will be required for the implementation of R&S plans. Establishment of an integration planning cell is not a prerequisite to the formation of an ACT and may not be required if the ACT is deployed without a military presence. The strategic planning process will task agencies with personnel requirements and establish mission-specific roles, responsibilities, and relationships.

y. Considerations for ACT formation may include:

1. **Mandate.** The USG has determined that an enhanced R&S effort is in the national interest;

2. **Plans.** The CRSG has developed a comprehensive R&S strategic plan and R&S implementation plan (or is in the process of developing one), which assesses that field platforms for R&S activities will increase the effectiveness of US efforts to achieve stability and begin reconstruction;

3. **Deployment Mechanism.** The plans have determined that field platforms for R&S activities will facilitate coordination with multinational operations; and

4. **HN Support.** The host government (when appropriate) supports the plan.

z. ACTs and FACTs deploying into a country to work with military units should join those units at their home base whenever possible prior to deployment for orientation, integration, and mission planning. Given differing tours of duty and the desirability of maintaining strong, consistent relationships with HN governments, deploying with a military unit does not necessarily imply redeploying with that unit.
aa. **Operations In-Country.** The COM has ultimate responsibility for the effective allocation of personnel for the accomplishment of those elements of the R&S plans under COM authority. In consultation with the COM, the ACT leader reviews the R&S plans and recommends what, if any, allocation or exchange of personnel may be necessary between the ACT and other sections/agencies of the embassy. Ideally, many of these issues may be decided during predeployment planning. While this will be very mission-specific, and the COM ultimately decides upon whatever ACT roles, responsibilities, and structures the COM deems desirable, the following notional guidelines may be useful:

(1) **Reporting.** An ACT leader may report through the DCM to the COM. The ACT should be represented on the country team.

   (a) Where a country team lacks a representative from an agency now participating in the R&S operation, the ACT’s representative from that agency may, in addition to their responsibilities to achieve their specific strategic objective, be dual-hatted as their agency’s senior representative in-country, reporting directly to the COM in this capacity;

   (b) Conversely, where an embassy already has an agency representative, that agency’s officer/s on the ACT (if required) may focus their efforts on implementation;

   (c) When appropriate, previously evacuated, or draw-down embassy personnel may be attached to the ACT as it deploys into country;

   (d) Existing embassy personnel with appropriate skills may be designated the lead for specific strategic objectives; and

   (e) Where an ACT requires more area expertise, an embassy may attach officers or local hires to support the ACT or FACTs, as needed.

(2) **Other Deployed Elements.** Where there are other US civilian and military field teams in operation, the COM may authorize the ACT or FACTs to synchronize the operations of those teams in time, space, and purpose in support of the R&S plans. This requires careful consideration as to whether these other teams are conducting operations related to implementation of the R&S plans.

bb. **Military/ACT Integration.** When operating with military forces, ACT/embassy and FACT delineated operational areas should mirror those of the military forces deployed, so that each operational area has a dual US civilian and military leadership structure, starting at the COM-JFC level and working to the lowest tactical level feasible/necessary.

cc. When appropriate, US civilian and military HQ at each level should be co-located for maximum coordination and effectiveness. ACT personnel will remain under COM authority throughout their deployment.
Specific leadership relationships between civilian and military organizations will be established initially in the planning process based on the requirements of the particular mission. Regardless of the particular relationship, it is essential that civilian leaders and military commanders at the ACT, FACTs, and their corresponding military units exchange LNOs. The function of LNOs is to maintain the intercommunication between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Additionally, they should come equipped with the full range of communications capabilities required to maintain contact with their parent organization. When colocated with military operations, agreements should be made to share basic communications infrastructure.

When necessary to support implementation of the R&S plan, ACT personnel may be attached directly to military units, and military units or personnel may be attached to the ACT, at the discretion of the appropriate level of civilian-military leadership.

Coordination with Host Nation. The primary objective in any R&S operation is to identify and work to reduce drivers of conflict and instability and build HN government capacity sufficient to put the country on a path towards sustainable peace. Although specific ACT and FACT operations could range from direct governance to advisory missions to reporting and program-implementation functions, all ACT and FACT operations should be conducted with a view towards creating local host government capabilities to sustain stable and functional governance.

Operational Tempo. The pace of R&S operations, particularly in the initial weeks and months and when operating with military forces, far exceeds that of conventional US overseas operations. It is incumbent on ACT and FACT leaders to balance activities to meet planning and reporting requirements, while also providing for adequate rest.

Interagency “Contingency Fund” Programming. When available and authorized, program funds may be directly managed by an ACT/FACT, or by an agency participating in an ACT/FACT for small-scale local programs to enhance R&S efforts. For the purpose of this appendix, these funds will be termed “contingency funds.” These funds would be distinct from operating funds the ACT/FACT may have for internal operations and management. They would also be distinct from program funds for centrally managed programs, which FACTs may evaluate or monitor, but not directly control.

Any ACT/FACT allotted contingency funds for use within its operational area allocates such funds through a consultative process involving representation from all agencies involved in the ACT/FACT.

The ACT/FACT regularly reviews the progress of ongoing projects, and review project proposals for use of contingency funds under their direct control. By doing so, ACTs/FACTs can synchronize the activities of disparate funding streams, draw upon the knowledge of team personnel who have relevant expertise but not direct funding of their
own, and ensure that all projects are synchronized in time, space, and purpose to execute the implementation plan.

kk. Decisions to use contingency funds should be consensus-based, relying on a shared understanding of the COP, the R&S plans, and the military operational plan. All decisions and disputes should be put in writing and can be raised to higher levels for resolution as required. To ensure rapid program implementation, ACTs/FACTs, in coordination with appropriate military units, may agree to set parameters or thresholds on programming contingency funds, such as:

(1) **Dollar Thresholds.** Only programs exceeding a certain agreed amount should be consulted on;

(2) **Timing.** Projects need not be referred to the ACT in the first 30 days (for example); or

(3) **Key Priority.** A certain issue is so time-sensitive that projects directed to addressing it need not be referred to the ACT for approval (this does not imply the projects should not be reported or scrutinized to ACT/embassy).

ll. The ACT/FACT reviews projects and resources to determine which type of available contingency funds would best fill the gap. The ACT/FACT may identify which agency may be the most appropriate to fund and perform a particular project. In any case, agencies retain their own program and financial authorities.

mm. **Phase-out.** ACTs are organized to assist the COM in implementing the US R&S plans. Planning should anticipate some level of ACT/FACT involvement in the country over this time period, or until the crisis subsides or efforts are effectively manned through regular USG staff assignments. This presence may, if appropriate, transition into a more traditional US presence. Factors to influence the phase-out of ACTs/FACTs may include:

(1) Achieving benchmarks set in the R&S plan which justify phasing out relevant elements of the ACTs/FACTs; and

(2) An improved security or transportation environment allows the embassy or other capital-based US presence to visit and/or influence a local area on a sufficiently regular basis as to render a field presence there unnecessary.

nn. In addition, the COM or appropriate DOS Regional Assistant Secretary may recommend that the ACT/FACTs should be phased out and responsibility for implementing the R&S plans transferred to regular embassy staff.

oo. It is essential that steady state country planning continue in order to ensure the conventional budget process be ready to support normal operations.

pp. Additional work is required to determine how ACTs will operate in conjunction with multinational operations and for regional deployments.
6. **Civilian Response Corps**

   a. The CRC provides the USG with a pool of qualified, trained, and ready to deploy civilian professionals to support overseas R&S operations. Additionally, the CRC reinforces regular standing staff in Washington, DC, and overseas in support of R&S operations in countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from conflict or civil strife. The CRC consists of three complementary components:

   (1) Active Component officers are full-time USG employees whose specific job is to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict prevention efforts. They are able to deploy within 48 hours and focus on critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, management, administrative, logistical, and resource mobilization.

   (2) Standby Component officers are full-time employees of their departments who have specialized expertise useful in R&S operations and are available to deploy within 30 days in the event of a reconstruction and/or stabilization operation.

   (3) Reserve Component officers are US citizens who have committed to be available within 45-60 days of call-up to serve as USG temporary employees in support of overseas R&S operations. Reserve officers are critical to efforts to bring “normalcy” to countries by filling capabilities career USG employees simply cannot match in expertise or in number.

   b. Because no single USG entity has all of the relevant expertise to deal with these threats, the CRS is a partnership of seven departments and agencies: DOS, USAID, USDA, DOC, DHHS, DHS, and DOJ.
APPENDIX H
THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

1. Overview

a. Addressing the causes and consequences of weak and failed states has become an urgent priority for the USG. Conflict both contributes to and results from state fragility. To effectively prevent or resolve violent conflict, the USG needs tools and approaches that enable coordination of US diplomatic, development, and military efforts in support of local institutions and organizations/individuals seeking to resolve their disputes peacefully.

b. A first step toward a more effective and coordinated response to help states prevent, mitigate, and recover from violent conflict is the development of shared understanding among USG agencies about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. Achieving this shared understanding of the dynamics of a particular crisis requires both a joint interagency process for conducting the assessment and a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information. The ICAF is a tool that enables an interagency team to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively. It supports USG interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization.

2. Purpose

a. Using the ICAF can facilitate a shared understanding across relevant USG departments and agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country that informs US policy and planning decisions. (Note: agencies will be used in this appendix in place of departments and agencies.) It may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. It is available for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency planning.

b. The ICAF draws on existing methodologies for assessing conflict currently in use by various USG agencies as well as IGOs and NGOs. It is not intended to duplicate existing independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the IC. Rather, it builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework through which USG agencies can leverage and share the knowledge from their own assessments to establish a common interagency perspective.

c. The ICAF is distinct from early warning and other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk of instability or collapse and describe conditions that lead to outbreaks of instability or violent conflict. The ICAF builds upon their results by assisting an interagency team to understand why such conditions may exist and how to best engage to transform them. The ICAF draws on social science expertise to lay out a process by which an interagency team will identify societal and situational dynamics known to increase or decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, the ICAF provides a shared, strategic snapshot of the conflict against which future progress can be measured.
3. When to Use the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

a. An ICAF should be part of the first step in any interagency planning process. It can help to inform the establishment of USG goals, design or reshape activities, implement or revise programs, or reallocate resources. The interagency planning process within which an ICAF is performed determines who initiates and participates in an ICAF, the time and place for conducting an ICAF, the type of product needed and how the product will be used, and the level of classification required.

b. Whenever the ICAF is used, all of its analytical steps should be completed. However, the nature and scope of the information collected and assessed may be constrained by time, security classification, or access to the field.

c. The ICAF is a flexible, scalable interagency tool suitable for use in:

   (1) Engagement and conflict prevention planning.

   (2) USG R&S contingency planning.

   (3) USG R&S crisis response planning.

d. **Engagement/conflict prevention planning** may include, but is not limited to: embassy preparation for National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1207 funding; request by an embassy or combatant command for interagency assistance in understanding and planning to leverage US interests in fragile or at-risk countries; development of the CCDRs’ TCP; development of country assistance strategies or mission strategic plans; designing interagency prevention efforts for countries listed on State Failure Watchlists and Early Warning Systems. In an engagement or conflict prevention effort, there normally will be sufficient time and a sufficiently permissive environment to allow a full-scale assessment such as a several day Washington, DC-based tabletop and several weeks of an in-country verification assessment.

e. **Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingency Planning.** The ICAF provides relevant background concerning existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The ICAF should be a robust element of contingency planning by providing critical information for the situation analysis. A several-day-long Washington, DC-based tabletop and/or an in-country verification assessment might prove useful when conducting an ICAF as part of this planning process. Additional information on R&S contingency planning can be found in the following S/CRS documents: Triggering Mechanisms for ‘Whole-of-Government’ Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation and Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.

f. **Reconstruction and Stabilization Crisis Response Planning.** The ICAF provides critical information for the initial step of whole-of-government planning, the situation analysis. The ICAF may be updated as more information and better access become available to inform the policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation planning steps of the ICAF. When used for crisis response,
The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

the ICAF might be a Washington, DC-based tabletop assessment that could be accomplished in as little as one and one-half days or, with longer lead-times to the crisis, could take place over several weeks with conversations back and forth between Washington and any USG field presence. For additional information on R&S crisis response planning, see Triggering Mechanisms for ‘Whole-of-Government’ Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation and Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.

4. Roles and Responsibilities

a. The process within which an ICAF is used determines which agencies and individuals should serve on the team and in what capacities they should serve. For example, an established country team may use the ICAF to inform country assistance strategy development, or USAID and S/CRS may co-lead an interagency team to assist in developing a NDAA Section 1207 request. In whole-of-government crisis response under the IMS for R&S, an ICAF normally will be part of the strategic planning process led by the CRSG Secretariat. The ICAF might also be used with a key bilateral partner as part of collaborative planning. The agency/individual responsible for managing the overall planning process is responsible for proposing the ICAF and requesting necessary agency participation.

b. Participants in an ICAF assessment should include the broadest possible representation of USG agencies with expertise and/or interest in a given situation. An ideal interagency field team would represent diverse skill sets and bring together the collective knowledge of USG agencies. Participants would at a minimum include relevant: regional bureaus, sectoral experts, intelligence analysts, and social science or conflict specialists. When used as part of the planning processes outlined in Principles of the USG Planning Framework, the team will normally include members of the strategic planning team. This team could be expanded as needed to include local stakeholders and international partner representatives.

c. Members of the interagency team are responsible for providing all relevant information held by their respective agencies to the team for inclusion in the analysis, including past assessments and related analyses. These representatives should also be able to reach back to their agencies to seek further information to fill critical information gaps identified by the ICAF.

5. The Elements of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

a. The ICAF can be used by the full range of USG agencies at any planning level. Conducting an ICAF might be an iterative process with initial results built upon as the USG engagement expands. For example, an ICAF done in Washington at the start of a crisis might be enhanced later by a more in-depth examination in-country. The level of detail into which the ICAF goes will depend upon the conflict and type of USG engagement.
b. The two major components of the ICAF are the conflict diagnosis and the segue into planning.

6. Conflict Diagnosis

a. Using the conceptual framework for diagnosing a conflict (see Figure H-1), the interagency team will deliver a product that describes the context; core grievances and social/institutional resilience; drivers/mitigators of conflict; and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.

(1) Context. The team should evaluate and outline key contextual issues of the conflict environment. Context does not cause conflict but describes often long-standing conditions resistant to change. Context may create preconditions for conflict by reinforcing fault lines between communities or contribute to pressures making violence appear as a more attractive means for advancing one’s interests. Context can shape
perceptions of identity groups and be used to manipulate and mobilize constituencies. Context may include environmental conditions, poverty, recent history of conflict, youth bulge, or conflict-ridden region.

(2) **Core Grievances and Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience.** The team should understand, agree upon, and communicate the concepts of core grievance and sources of social/institutional resilience and describe them within the specific situation being assessed.

(a) **Core Grievance.** The perception, by various groups in a society, that their needs for physical security, livelihood, interests, or values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions.

(b) **Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience.** The perception, by various groups in a society, that social relationships, structures, or processes are in place and able to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through nonviolent means.

(3) **Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors.** The team should understand and outline drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and enumerate those identified within the specific situation being assessed.

(a) Drivers of conflict refers to the dynamic situation resulting from the mobilization of social groups around core grievances. Core grievances can be understood as the potential energy of conflict. Key individuals translate that potential energy into active drivers of conflict.

(b) Mitigating factors describe the dynamic situation resulting from the mobilization of social groups around sources of social/institutional resilience. Mitigating factors can be understood as the actions produced when key individuals mobilize the potential energy of social and institutional resilience.

(4) **Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity.** The team should specify opportunities for increasing and decreasing conflict as defined here and describe those expected in the near-term, and where possible, in the longer-term.

(a) Windows of vulnerability are moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power. Elections, devolution of power, and legislative changes are examples of possible windows of vulnerability. Key individuals/organizations may seize on these moments to magnify the drivers of conflict.

(b) Windows of opportunity are moments when over-arching identities become more important than sub-group identities, for example, when a natural disaster impacts multiple groups and requires a unified response. These occasions may present openings for USG efforts to provide additional support for a conflict’s mitigating factors.
b. **Conflict Diagnosis Steps.** To determine the preceding elements of the conflict dynamic, the designated interagency conflict assessment team (ICAT) should follow a series of analytical steps.

(1) **Step 1: Establish Context.** All ICAF steps begin with acknowledging the context within which the conflict arises. This is depicted (see Figure H-1) by placing each analytical task within a larger circle labeled “Context.” The arrows going in and out of the concentric circles, the rectangle, and the triangle remind the analyst that context affects and is affected by each of the other components.

(2) **Step 2: Understand Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience.** Interacting with Context in Step 1 are the concentric circles labeled “Identity Groups,” “Societal Patterns” and “Institutional Performance” (see Figure H-1). In Step 2, the ICAT:

(a) Describes identity groups that believe others threaten their identity, security, or livelihood. Identity groups are groups of people that identify with each other, often on the basis of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them (e.g., ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, economic activity, or socio-economic status). Identity groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other groups’ interests, needs, and aspirations compete with and jeopardize their identity, security, or other fundamental interests.

(b) Articulates how societal patterns reinforce perceived deprivation, blame, and intergroup cleavages and/or how they promote comity and peaceful resolution of intergroup disputes. Societal patterns associated with conflict reinforce group cleavages, for example: elitism, exclusion, corruption/rent-seeking, chronic state capacity deficits (e.g., systematic economic stagnation, scarcity of necessary resources, ungoverned space), and unmet expectations (e.g., lack of a peace dividend, land tenure issues, disillusionment, and alienation). Impacts of societal patterns often include negative economic consequences for disadvantaged groups.

(c) Explains how poor or good institutional performance aggravates or contributes to the resolution of conflict. Institutional performance considers formal (e.g., governments, legal systems, religious organizations, public schools, security forces, banks and economic institutions) and informal (e.g., traditional mechanisms for resolving disputes, family, clan/tribe, armed groups, and patrimonialism) social structures to see whether they are performing poorly or well and whether they contribute to conflict and instability or manage or mitigate it. In assessing institutional performance, it is important to distinguish between outcomes and perceptions. Institutional outcomes are results that can be measured objectively; perceptions are the evaluative judgments of those outcomes. Understanding how outcomes are perceived by various groups within a society, especially in terms of their perceived effectiveness and legitimacy, is an important component of conflict diagnosis.

(d) The ICAT completes Step 2 by listing Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience.
(3) **Step 3: Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors.** In Step 3 of the analysis, the ICAT identifies key individuals/groups that are central to producing, perpetuating, or profoundly changing the societal patterns or institutional performance identified in Step 2. The ICAT should identify whether they are motivated to mobilize constituencies toward inflaming or mitigating violent conflict and what means are at their disposal. To perform the analysis in Step 3, the ICAT:

(a) Identifies:

1. **WHO.** People, organizations, or groups who, because of their leadership abilities and/or power (e.g., political position, moral authority, charisma, money, weapons):
   
   a. Have an impact on societal patterns/institutional performance.
   
   b. Are able to shape perceptions and actions and mobilize people around core grievances or social and institutional resilience.
   
   c. Are able to provide the means (money, weapons, information) to support others who are mobilizing people around core grievances or social and institutional resilience.

2. **WHERE.** Look for key individuals in leadership positions in governing, social or professional organizations or networks (either within or external to a state or territory), including private business, religious organizations, government positions (including police forces, judicial system, and military), informal and illicit power structures, media, and academic institutions.

3. **WHAT and HOW.** Understand key individuals’ motivations and means by describing:
   
   a. What motivates them to exert influence on each of the political, economic, social and security systems in a country or area.
   
   b. How they exert influence (e.g., leadership capacity, moral authority, personal charisma, money, access to resources or weapons, networks or connections).

(b) Determines key individuals’:

1. Objectives that promote violence or promote peaceful alternatives.

2. Means and resources available to accomplish those objectives, including:
   
Appendix H

b. Financial resources (including taxes, “protection” fees, support from external individuals/groups).

c. Valuable primary commodities (e.g., labor, information, forest products, minerals, high value crops).

d. Control of media outlets.

e. Mass support.

c) Using the information generated on key individuals/groups, the ICAT drafts brief narrative statements describing “why” and “how” they mobilize constituencies around core grievances and, separately, around sources of social and institutional resilience. Each statement relating to core grievances becomes an entry in the list of drivers of conflict, and each relating to sources of social and institutional resilience becomes an entry in the list of mitigating factors.

d) The ICAT completes Step 3 of the analysis by listing the drivers of conflict and, separately, the mitigating factors by the strength of their impact on the conflict.

(4) Step 4: Describe Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity. “Windows” are moments in time when events or occasions provoke negative or positive changes in the status quo. In Step 4, the ICAT:

(a) Identifies potential situations that could contribute to an increase in violent conflict. Windows of vulnerability are potential situations that could trigger escalation of conflict (e.g., by contributing to confirmation of the perceptions underlying core grievances) and often result from large-scale responses to an increase of uncertainty during elections or following an assassination, an exclusion of parties from important events such as negotiations or elections, or attempts to marginalize disgruntled followers.

(b) Identifies potential situations that might offer opportunities for mitigating violent conflict and promoting stability. Windows of opportunity describe the potential situations that could enable significant progress toward stable peace (e.g., through conditions where core grievances can be reconciled and sources of social and institutional resilience can be bolstered) such as those where overarching identities become important to disputing groups, where natural disasters impact multiple identity groups and externalities require a unified response or a key leader driving the conflict is killed.

(c) The ICAT completes Step 4 by considering windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity and prioritizing drivers and mitigating factors identified in Step 3. The ICAT uses the list of prioritized drivers and mitigating factors as the basis for its findings whether those findings are: priorities for the whole-of-government assistance working group setting parameters for a DOS Office of Foreign Assistance country assistance strategy; recommendations to a country team preparing an application
for NDAA Section 1207 funding; or recommendations to a whole-of-government R&S crisis response planning or R&S contingency planning team.

7. Segue into Planning

   a. When an ICAF is undertaken to support R&S crisis response planning or R&S contingency planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into situation analysis and policy formulation steps of the planning process in *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.*

   b. When an ICAF is undertaken to support interagency engagement or conflict prevention planning, after completing the diagnosis, the ICAT begins preplanning activities. During the segue into these types of planning, the ICAT maps existing diplomatic and programmatic activities against the prioritized lists of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors to identify gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics, it is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or value of any program or initiative. The ICAT uses these findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for USG activities.

   c. Steps for Engagement and Conflict Prevention Planning

      (1) Specify current USG activities (listing USG agencies present in the country and the nature and scope of their efforts).

         (a) Identify the impact of these efforts on drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.

         (b) Identify efforts that target similar outcomes and coordination mechanisms in place.

      (2) Specify current efforts of non-USG participants, including bilateral agencies, multi-lateral agencies, NGOs, the private sector, and local entities.

         (a) Identify the impact of the efforts on the drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.

         (b) Identify efforts that target similar outcomes (including USG efforts) and coordinating mechanisms in place.

      (3) Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors not sufficiently addressed by existing efforts (i.e., gaps).

      (4) Specify challenges to addressing the gaps.

      (5) Referring to windows of vulnerability, describe risks associated with failure to address the gaps.
(6) Referring to windows of opportunity, describe opportunities to address the gaps.

d. The ICAT draws on the information generated in segue into planning to determine potential entry points for USG efforts. The description of these entry points should explain how the dynamics outlined in the ICAF diagnosis may be susceptible to outside influence.
APPENDIX J
EXAMPLE GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

The US Institute of Peace facilitated the development of the following guidelines with the participation of the Armed Forces of the United States, DOS, USAID, and the NGO community.

GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN US ARMED FORCES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

On March 8, 2005, the heads of major US humanitarian organizations and US civilian and military leaders met at the US Institute of Peace (USIP) to launch a discussion on the challenges posed by operations in combat and other nonpermissive environments. The Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by USIP, was created as a result of this meeting.

InterAction, the umbrella organization for many US nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), has coordinated the non-governmental delegation. Representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the US Agency for International Development have participated on behalf of the US Government.

1 Recommended Guidelines

The following guidelines should facilitate interaction between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations (see Key Terms) belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (For the purposes of these guidelines, such organizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines were developed between the DOD and InterAction, DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its dealings with the broader humanitarian assistance community. These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance endorsement or approval by either party of particular missions of the other but are premised on a de facto recognition that US Armed Forces and NGHOs have often occupied the same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does occur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that operational necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and avoid distraction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a population in need.

A. For the US Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:
1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHO representatives. US Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military clothing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. US Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations.

2. Visits by US Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement.

3. US Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites.

4. US Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with US Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.

5. US Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as “force multipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion that could compromise their independence and their goal to be perceived by the population as independent.

6. US Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfering with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.

7. US Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the desire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.

B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:

1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protective gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from US Armed Forces issue items.

2. NGHO travel in US Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to liaison personnel to the extent practical.

3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities inhabited by US Armed Forces personnel.

4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.
5. NGHO personnel’s visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement.

6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with US Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their independence.

7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such military support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable US law.

C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the extent feasible, that will minimize the risk of confusion between military and NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments, subject to military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements are:

1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified security briefings conducted by the US Armed Forces.

2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison officer on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and unexploded ordnance, humanitarian activities, and population movements, insofar as such unclassified information sharing is for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations and the security of staff and local personnel engaged in these operations.

3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and during military operations to deconflict military and relief activities, including for the purpose of protection of humanitarian installations and personnel and to inform military personnel of humanitarian relief objectives, modalities of operation, and the extent of prospective or ongoing civilian humanitarian relief efforts.

4. Military provision of assistance to NGHOs for humanitarian relief activities in extremis when civilian providers are unavailable or unable to do so. Such assistance will not be provided if it interferes with higher priority military activities.

2 Recommended Processes

A. Procedures for NGHO/military dialogue during contingency planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or potentially hostile environment:
1. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command for discussions with the contingency planners responsible for designing relief operations.

2. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command (e.g., one liaison was stationed at United States Central Command for 6 of the first 12 months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was in Kuwait City before US forces entered Iraq in 2003).

3. The relevant military planners, including but not limited to the Civil Affairs representatives of the relevant commander, meet with humanitarian relief NGHO liaison officers at a mutually agreed location.

B. Procedures for NGHOs and the military to access assessments of humanitarian needs. US military and NGHO representatives should explore the following:

1. Access to NGHO and military assessments directly from a DOD or other US Government Web site.

2. Access to NGHO and military assessments through an NGO serving in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site.


C. Procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with combatant commands that are engaged in planning for military operations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (NGHO liaison personnel are provided by the NGHO community):

1. The NGHO liaison officer should not be physically located within the military headquarters, but if feasible should be close to it in order to allow for daily contact.

2. The NGHO liaison officer should have appropriate access to senior-level officers within the combatant commands and be permitted to meet with them as necessary and feasible.

3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO liaison officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, infrastructure if any, plans, concerns, etc. The military should provide appropriate details regarding minefields, unexploded ordnance, other hazards to NGHOs, access to medical facilities, evacuation plans, etc.

4. The NGHO liaison officer should have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGHO objectives, the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines, country-specific guidelines based
Example Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Other Organizations

on the IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. US Armed Forces personnel should have the opportunity to brief NGHOs, to the extent appropriate, on US Government and coalition goals and policies, monitoring principles, applicable laws, and rules of engagement, etc.

5. The NGHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at higher headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or similar mechanism is established in-country. Once this occurs, liaison officers of individual NGHOs could begin coordination in-country through the CMOC for civil–military liaison.

D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between NGHOs and US Armed Forces in the field, e.g., US Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Military Affairs, State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator:

1. If the US Agency for International Development or the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be prepared to work with the broader NGHO community in addition to US Government implementing partners.

2. The UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her representative could be a strong candidate to serve as a liaison because he/she normally would be responsible for working with all NGHOs and maintaining contact with the host government or a successor regime.

Key Terms

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): In wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any nonprofit organization that is independent from government. However, for the purposes of these guidelines, the term NGO refers to a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08/JP 1-02)

Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHOs): For the purposes of these guidelines, NGHOs are organizations belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. NGHOs are a subset of the broader NGO community.

Independence for NGHOs: Independence is defined in the same way as it is in the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief; independence is defined as not acting as an instrument of government foreign policy. NGHOs are agencies that act independently from
governments. NGHOs, therefore, formulate their own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except insofar as it coincides with their own independent policies. To maintain independence, NGHOs will never knowingly—or through negligence—allow themselves, or their employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military, or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those that are strictly humanitarian, nor will they act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.

InterAction: InterAction is the largest coalition of US-based international development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. With over 165 members operating in every developing country, InterAction works to overcome poverty, exclusion, and suffering by advancing basic dignity for all.

1 The InterAction delegation includes CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Refugees International, Save the Children, and World Vision.

2 In situations in which there is no actor to serve as a bridge, a US military Civil Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between NGHOs and other elements of the US Armed Forces.

SOURCE: US Institute of Peace
Interaction between the civilian and military sides of the USG has received renewed attention during recent operations. Those in the developing world who do not have access to suitable economic activities may turn to violent extremist organizations, which sometimes offer basic economic necessities and community infrastructure such as schools, medical clinics, and utilities. These groups can also offer a sense of belonging. Development is the traditional method of creating economic opportunity in these regions. However, as home to extremist organizations, these areas are often dangerous, making development work difficult, if not impossible. The military can secure these areas, but without proper development assistance, this security is unsustainable. Civilian-military cooperation resolves this dilemma by giving military and development activities equal standing in a single, coordinated effort.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION POLICY

1. PURPOSE

This policy establishes the foundation for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) cooperation with the United States Department of Defense (DOD) in the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication. This cooperation is designed to facilitate a whole-of-government approach in which US Government (USG) agencies work within their mandated areas of responsibility in a more coherent way to provide a coordinated, consistent response in pursuit of shared policy goals to include, inter alia, humanitarian relief efforts, counter-terrorism initiatives, civil affairs programs, and reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

Such improved cooperation is a critical element of stabilization efforts in fragile states, particularly in pre- and post-conflict environments. This paper clarifies, formalizes, and defines the parameters of USAID’s interaction with DOD. It complements the efforts of the Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), to define a broader civilian interagency engagement with DOD. DOD representatives in the field and in Washington do not seek to supplant USAID’s role, but rather look to the Agency for guidance in identifying how the military can play a more supportive role in USAID’s development activities.

The companion internal document, Civilian-Military Cooperation Implementation Guidelines, further details functional areas for USAID DOD cooperation and provides legal guidance on operational issues and illustrative approaches for implementing this policy framework.
The present policy is not intended to modify or supplant existing USAID policies regarding disaster response activities. Standard operating procedures of the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), will continue to be used in these situations.

**KEY TERMS**

**SSTRO:** Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. A term employed, primarily by the military community, to refer to the complex non-lethal activities that may precede, accompany, or follow a conflict. The DOD defines Stability Operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”

**Three-D Approach:** A policy that recognizes the importance of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as partners in the conduct of foreign operations, particularly in the developing world.

2. BACKGROUND

Development is a cornerstone of national security, along with diplomacy and defense. Development is also recognized as a key element of any successful whole-of-government counterterrorism and counter-insurgency effort. The Departments of State and Defense have issued policy guidance and directions to guide their organizations in support of the National Security Strategy. The policy defined herein is designed to complement those efforts and clarify the role of USAID as a key part of the interagency process. It places stabilization efforts as a key element of USAID’s development mission. The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) acknowledges that weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. The relationship between poverty and insecurity is complex, and not reducible to a simple formula, but many of the indicators of instability and insecurity are associated with poverty and inadequate governance. Accordingly, the NSS pledges that the United States will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their ability to govern and provide basic services. Foreign policy institutions, including USAID, must therefore address the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century. The realities of the twenty-first century campaign against terrorism and the need to prevent violent extremism and its underlying causes have highlighted the need to adapt the DOD and civilian structures to work more effectively together.

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 (November 2005) indicates that stability operations are a core US military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given
priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities. The Directive acknowledges that many of the tasks and responsibilities associated with reconstruction and stabilization operations are not ones for which the military is necessarily best suited. However, in the absence of civilian capacity to carry out these tasks, the capabilities will be developed within the military. Manifestations of this Directive are appearing in new DOD guidance and doctrine documents across the spectrum of DOD activity.

National Security Presidential Directive 44, issued in December 2005, empowers the Secretary of State to improve coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The Presidential Directive establishes that the Secretary of State, supported by a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. When the US military is involved, the Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing US military operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Peace and Security is one of the five objectives outlined in the Framework for US Foreign Assistance (2006). International development increasingly benefits from—and requires—close cooperation between civilians and the military. In unstable areas in which USAID frequently works, development and security are intertwined and interdependent. The absence of a stable and secure environment constrains the provision of development assistance, and without development assistance, security will remain unsustainable. In humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction operations, US and international armed forces have long made invaluable contributions in logistics, planning, and implementation to save lives, build infrastructure, transport materials, and other efforts that benefit development. DOD acknowledges that USAID’s expertise in building the capacity of local institutions is key to stability and reconstruction. Close cooperation will enhance the likelihood that Defense funded programs are consistent with development principles, while ensuring the achievement of overall national security objectives.

3. POLICY STATEMENT

It is USAID’s policy for all operating units to cooperate with DOD in joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities where both organizations are operating, and where civilian-military cooperation will advance USG foreign policy. Cooperation by all relevant operating units, whether in Washington or in the field, will strengthen coordination, planning, and implementation of assistance to states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from violent conflict or civil strife. USAID is
committed to a comprehensive, coherent whole-of-government approach and will partner with other USG entities to strengthen efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct conflict mitigation, management, and stabilization assistance.

4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

4.1(a) Cooperation with the DOD will not divert USAID resources away from its development mission or the principles of effective development assistance. USAID is the lead US government agency for US foreign assistance planning and programming. It works in fragile states and post-conflict environments which often require program adjustments without compromise of its overarching mission to improve the capacity of local institutions, improve the host country’s ability to assure stability, and achieve sustainable development.

4.1(b) In order to maximize the chance for successful outcomes, USAID will strive to ensure that solutions for short term objectives are consistent with long-term goals. USAID recognizes that conflicts often produce a need for immediate stabilization and reconstruction programs. Short-term stabilization activities, once completed, become the foundation upon which the longer-term development agenda can grow.

4.2 USAID will continue to maintain its long-standing relationships and work with a variety of partners. Since the USG’s primary expertise in international development resides at USAID, it will continue to lead and serve as principal advisor on development issues. Soliciting and maintaining the support of local populations and host governments, including the long-standing USAID practice of hiring and training Foreign Service Nationals (FSN), is critical to the success of joint USAID DOD efforts.

5. USAID ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1 As the USG’s primary resource for expertise in international development, USAID seeks to influence the development dimensions of DOD strategic plans and implementation activities. Within the USG, USAID offers the comparative advantage of its field presence and its pool of skilled, experienced development and humanitarian assistance professionals. These assets must be better utilized in tandem with DOD to help further the overall national security objectives of the US.

5.2 USAID will strengthen its planning, training, and implementation capacity to contribute to interagency security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations. This recognizes the need to reduce the long-standing imbalance between the military and civilian components of the USG whole-of-government response to unstable, conflict-prone, and post-conflict states.
5.3 Opportunities for civil-military cooperation will take place at many levels and will depend upon the context and USG objectives. At the regional level, USAID will exchange officers with all appropriate Geographic Combatant Commands and place Senior Development Advisors within the Combatant Commands to improve coordination and communication and to promote program synchronization and effectiveness. In the field, USAID staff collaborate with US military officials at post to develop integrated approaches to country-specific security and development challenges. At headquarters, USAID will coordinate with DOD representatives through Principals’ Committees, Deputies’ Committees, or other regional and functional Policy Coordinating Committees, and among other fora.

5.4 USAID will seek to improve the preparedness of its personnel to operate in coordination with DOD, through improved pre-deployment training; recruiting and retaining personnel with military experience as appropriate; emphasizing the career enhancing nature of interagency and civilian-military assignments; training FSN personnel in effective civilian-military cooperation; developing exchange and fellowship programs with the DOD; and while maintaining USAID’s priorities, ensuring training and tour schedules can be adapted to synchronize with those of counterpart military units.

5.5 DOD clearly recognizes the critical role of civilian involvement and expertise in addressing today’s challenges and opportunities, and seeks input on how it cooperates with and complements broader efforts led by USAID and other USG departments and agencies. USAID believes that the most significant contribution of DOD to the achievement of development goals is through long-term, strategic military-to-military engagement. USAID looks to DOD to lead, coordinate, and communicate the in-theater DOD response for security cooperation. This policy recognizes that coordination with the DOD is one aspect of our vital role in US national security, but it also reiterates that DOD should not substitute for civilian capabilities.

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1. General

   a. The National Guard is “forward-based” in 3,200 communities throughout the United States; the territories of Guam, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico; and the District of Columbia. The National Guard is readily available to conduct domestic operations, including HD and CS activities. The National Guard routinely interacts with local law enforcement, first responders, and Title 10, USC, forces and is experienced in supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis. The National Guard has both federal and state responsibilities (specified in the Constitution of the United States, Title 10, USC, and Title 32, USC, and applicable state constitutional provisions and statutes). The National Guard operates not only as reserve components of the Army and the Air Force supporting the President in time of war and in national contingencies, but also as an organized militia supporting governors in domestic contingencies. Other Service/component commanders and staffs should bear in mind that the statutory roles and authorities of National Guard forces, when acting under state control, will vary from state to state.

   b. The non-federalized National Guard is commanded and controlled by the governor and through TAG of each state or in the case of the District of Columbia, by SecDef through the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard. TAG exercises C2 through an NG JFHQ-State, which is comprised of ARNG and ANG members of that state. Additionally, some states maintain organized militias, generally referred to as state defense forces, which are generally integrated as additional forces under the command of the governor through TAG. Such forces may be integrated with Army and ANG forces during emergency response. Such forces remain under state control at all times and are not subject to DOD direction, regulations, or policy in any circumstances. The NG JFHQ-State is designed to correspond to the HQ staff of a combatant command in order to facilitate a joint approach to plans, operations, and military-to-military coordination (Figure L-1). The model depicted below may be tailored according to state resources and requirements.

   c. NG JFHQ-State gives DOD a focused communications channel through NGB between OSD, JS and CCDRs (e.g., CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM), and the non-federalized National Guard; joint C2 for non-federalized National Guard operations; and a joint C2 capability in each state for Title 10, USC, (federal) HD, CS, and other related operations. In this respect, NG JFHQ-State is able to bridge the state and federal components of government and also bridge the active and reserve components of the US military in a way that complements the constitutional roles and authorities of the state and federal governments. In addition, NG JFHQ-State:

      (1) Provides specific C2 and integration capabilities derived from the DOD strategy for HD and CS. The focus is shared situation awareness and unity/continuity of effort under frequently complex command relationships and overlapping authorities.
(2) Facilitates integration of DOD joint capabilities with local, state, and federal agencies throughout the HD, CS, and emergency preparedness operational spectrums.

(3) Improves unity of effort among military organizations of all services and components.

(4) Creates synergy in many states where TAG is also the state HS and/or emergency operations director.
(5) Enhances states’ ability to plan and operate in joint, interagency, and intergovernmental environments.

(6) Plans, monitors, assesses, and guides the execution of TAG/commander decisions while maintaining and promoting situational awareness by all partners.

(7) Maintains a deployable communications element. NG JFHQ-State may have joint incident site communications capability available for HD and CS operations.

2. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State

The NG JFHQ-State maintains trained and equipped forces as reserve components of the Army and Air Force and performs missions as directed by the governor of that state or, when federalized, by the President or appropriate federal authorities. The NG JFHQ-State exercises C2 of all ARNG and ANG forces and any ARNG or ANG forces of other states that are operating in that state under EMACs. In accordance with policies and procedures established by SecDef, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Air Force, the NG JFHQ-State is prepared to provide one or more JTF command elements; provides expertise and situational awareness to DOD authorities to facilitate integration of federal and state activities; participates in federal domestic preparedness planning, training, and exercises; and develops plans coordinated with local, state, and federal authorities and agencies.

3. National Guard Bureau Joint Coordination Center

The NGB Joint Coordination Center provides 24/7/365 support for data fusion between state JOCs, interstate collaboration, and situational awareness/information sharing between USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and, through the DOD, to other federal agencies in support of domestic operations. It enables CNGB’s SecDef-directed responsibility as the channel of communication between DOD components and the National Guard.

4. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State Joint Operations Center

The NG JFHQ-State JOC is the fusion center for all state (territory) military operations. As the focal point for all domestic operational matters, its primary tasks are to initiate, monitor, alert, notify, and report on all activities ranging from natural or man-made disasters, terrorist attacks, or any civil-military related incidents in the state or territory. The NG JFHQ-State JOC monitors, plans, assesses, and assists the civil authorities; maintains and promotes situational awareness by all mission partners and agencies; and keeps the NGB aware of its actions and need for assistance.

5. Joint Task Force-State

a. Each state and territory is capable of fielding one or more JTF command element(s) to provide C2 for operations within the state. The JTF-State may be formed around an existing ARNG or ANG unit within the state, or may be formed as a sub-organization of an NG JFHQ-State. This JTF-State may function under the control of the governor (i.e., in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status) or when federalized under federal control (i.e., Title 10, USC, status).
b. As depicted in Figure L-2, the JTF-State commander interacts with multiple outside elements in working to achieve unity of effort in support of domestic operations. C2 always remains vested in the governor and TAG of that state, unless the forces and HQ in question have been federalized under Title 10, USC.

Figure L-2. National Guard Unified Action
APPENDIX M
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-08 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Statutes, National Policy, and Strategy
   a. Civil Disturbance Statutes (Title 10, USC, Sections 331-335).
   b. The Foreign Assistance Act (Title 22, USC, Sections 2151-2431k).
   c. Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (Title 10, USC, Sections 371-382).
   d. National Narcotics Leadership Act (Title 21, USC, Sections 1521-1524).
   e. Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, USC, Section 1385).
   f. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Title 42, USC, Sections 5121-5207).
   g. DOD’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Authorities (Title 10, USC, Sections 401-407, 2557, 2561).
   i. National Response Framework.
   m. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.
   p. The Integrated Planning System.
2. Department of Defense Issuances

   a. DOD Directive (DODD) 1100.20, Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities Outside the Department of Defense.

   b. DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

   c. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW).

   d. DODD 3020.40, DOD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure.

   e. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities.

   f. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

   g. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

   h. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

   i. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief.

   j. DOD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies.

   k. DOD 5105.77, National Guard Bureau.

   l. DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

   m. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

   n. DOD Instruction (DODI) 1000.17, Detail of DOD Personnel to Duty Outside the Department of Defense.

   o. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.

   p. DODI 4000.19, Interservice and Intragovernmental Support.

   q. DODI C-5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies (U).

   r. DODI 8110.1, Multinational Information Sharing Networks Implementation.

   s. DODI 8220.02, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Capabilities for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations.
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives


   b. CJCSI 3125.01B, Defense Support Of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for Domestic Consequence Management (CM) Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incident.

   c. CJCSI 3214.01C, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Incidents.

   d. CJCSI 3710.01B, DOD Counterdrug Support.

   e. CJCSI 5130.01D, Relationships Between Commanders of Combatant Commands and International Commands and Organizations (U).

   f. CJCSI 5205.01B, Implementing Instructions for Defense Attaché Offices and Security Assistance Organizations (U).

   g. CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

   h. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats.

4. Joint Publications

   a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

   b. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.


   d. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

   e. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

   f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

   g. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

   h. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

   i. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

   j. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

   k. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments.
Appendix M

m. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
n. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
q. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
s. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
u. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
w. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.
x. JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*.
y. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

4. Other Documents

   c. *Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook*, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
   e. *Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group*, Joint Warfighting Center.
h. Department of Defense Information Sharing Strategy.

i. General guidance for interaction between United Nations personnel and military and other representatives of the belligerent parties in the context of the crisis in Iraq, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

j. Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq.


q. NATO Handbook.

r. Principles of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.


t. US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual.


v. USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It.
APPENDIX N
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: CDR, USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is USJFCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-08, 17 March 2006, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I and Volume II.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted electronically to the Lead Agent, with information copies sent to the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division and to the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group.

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group, and info the Lead Agent and the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

d. Record of Changes:

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5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


   b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 McDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

   c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
# GLOSSARY
## PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<td>ACT</td>
<td>advance civilian team</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>allied joint publication</td>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(HD&amp;ASA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs)</td>
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<td>ASD(PA)</td>
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<td>ASD(RA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC&amp;IC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities</td>
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<td>Assistant Secretary for Health (DHHS)</td>
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<td>Office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (DHHS)</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (DOJ)</td>
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<td>BSRP</td>
<td>bureau strategic resource plan</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>civil affairs</td>
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<td>combined air operations center</td>
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<td>crisis action planning</td>
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<td>Customs and Border Protection (DHS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
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<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
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<td>CDRNORAD</td>
<td>Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<td>Commander, United States Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>CDRUSNORTHCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Northern Command</td>
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<td>CDRUSPACOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Revolving Fund (UN)</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<td>CLDP</td>
<td>Commercial Law Development Program</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COP</td>
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<td>Civilian Response Corps (DOS)</td>
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<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
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<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>incident command system</td>
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<td>Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities</td>
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<td>Information Sharing Environment</td>
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<td>Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development</td>
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<td>the Joint Staff</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<td>NG JFHQ-State</td>
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<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
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<td>NIST</td>
<td>national intelligence support team</td>
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<td>nuclear incident team</td>
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<td>NJTTF</td>
<td>National Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
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<td>nuclear/radiological advisory team</td>
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### Glossary

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<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>Office of Medicine, Science, and Public Health (DHHS)</td>
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<td>operations security</td>
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<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>public affairs officer</td>
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<td>PBOS</td>
<td>Planning Board for Ocean Shipping</td>
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<td>PERMREP</td>
<td>permanent representative (NATO)</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>point of contact</td>
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<td>POLMIL</td>
<td>political-military</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
<td>Presidential policy directive</td>
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<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
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<td>private security contractor</td>
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<td>R&amp;S</td>
<td>reconstruction and stabilization</td>
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<td>REAC/Ts</td>
<td>radiation emergency assistance center/training site (DOE)</td>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>request for assistance</td>
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<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)</td>
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<td>search and rescue</td>
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<td>strategic communication</td>
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<td>senior defense official</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
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<td>SJFHQ</td>
<td>standing joint force headquarters</td>
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<td>SOST</td>
<td>special operations support team</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>special representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>special security center</td>
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<td>SYG</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<td>TAG</td>
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<td>theater campaign plan</td>
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<td>Department of the Treasury</td>
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<td>United Nations disaster assessment and coordination</td>
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<td>United Nations development programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USD(P)</td>
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<td>USEUCOM</td>
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<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
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<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<td>VISA</td>
<td>Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement</td>
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<td>World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

chancery. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

civil affairs activities. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

complex contingency operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

development assistance. Programs, projects, and activities carried out by the United States Agency for International Development that improve the lives of the citizens of developing countries while furthering United States foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and promoting free market economic growth. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

developmental assistance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

disaster assistance response team. A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, rapidly deployed to assist US embassies and United States Agency for International Development missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. Also called DART. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

domestic intelligence. Intelligence relating to activities or conditions within the United States that threaten internal security and that might require the employment of troops; and intelligence relating to activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the security of the Department of Defense. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-08 as the source JP.)

downgrade. To determine that classified information requires, in the interests of national security, a lower degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, coupled with a changing of the classification designation to reflect such a lower degree. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-08 as the source JP.)

interagency. Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Also called IGO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

internal security. The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-08 as the source JP.)

interorganizational coordination. The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
**Glossary**

**joint interagency coordination group.** A staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Also called JIACG. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**lead agency.** The US Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**liaison.** That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**nongovernmental organization.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**principal officer.** The officer in charge of a diplomatic mission, consular office, or other Foreign Service post, such as a United States liaison office. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**resolution.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**subversive activity.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**US Defense Representative.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**JP 3-08 Operations**

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program Directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA/J-7 develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC Joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**