



Inter Agency Paper

IAP Special Issue 2012

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*Featuring the Winners of the
2012 Interagency Writing Competition*

**The Genie in the Bottle: Opportunist and Antagonistic
Responses to Whole of Government Approaches**

*by Erik A. Claessen
Belgian Joint Staff*

**Embassy in the Lead: Lessons on Interagency Unity of
Effort for Today's U.S. Mission to Iraq from the
1947–1949 U.S. Mission to Greece**

*by Evans A. Hanson
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies*

**Rethinking the Interagency Role in Preventing Conflict in
Dealing with Failing or Failed States**

*by Rumu Sarkar, Ph.D.
Millennium Partners*

The Simons Center

for the Study of Interagency Cooperation

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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by the CGSC Foundation Press

IAP Special Issue 2012

Featuring the Winners of the 2012 Interagency Writing Competition

The Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation announced the winners of its 2012 Interagency Writing Competition in June 2012. The competition was open to the public and ran from September 2011 through March 2012. This *IAP Special Issue 2012* contains the top three papers that provided insight and fresh thinking in advancing the knowledge, understanding, and practice of interagency coordination, cooperation, and collaboration at the tactical or operational level of effort. The winners were:

First Place: *The Genie in the Bottle: Opportunist and Antagonistic Responses to Whole of Government Approaches*, by Erik A. Claessen, a Belgian Army officer who works in the Strategy Department of the Belgian Joint Staff in Brussels. Claessen's entry earned him \$2,000, an engraved plaque and certificate.

Second Place: *Embassy in the Lead: Lessons on Interagency Unity of Effort for Today's U.S. Mission to Iraq from the 1947–1949 U.S. Mission to Greece*, by Evans A. Hanson, a U.S. Army officer currently enrolled in the School for Advanced Military Studies program at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Hanson's entry earned him a \$1,000 cash award and certificate.

Third Place: *Rethinking the Interagency Role in Preventing Conflict in Dealing with Failing or Failed States*, by Rumu Sarkar, a senior legal advisor to Millennium Partners, an international development consulting group based in Charlottesville, Va. Sarker's entry earned her a \$500 cash award and a certificate.

The Simons Center has published each of these winners individually in its *InterAgency Papers* series in addition to this *IAP Special Issue*.

This first-ever public writing competition for the Simons Center garnered interest and entries from around the world—from the U.S., Europe and Canada, from San Diego to Switzerland. Authors were from a variety of backgrounds including military officers, academicians, government leaders and non-governmental organization leaders. Even a U.S. Navy chaplain weighed in with an entry.

Each entry for the competition was required to focus on one of two special topics:

- The interagency role in preventing conflict when dealing with failing or failed states; or
- The validity of the “whole-of-government” approach in dealing with the full range of homeland and national security threats.

A panel of Simons Center judges evaluated each entry on originality, substance of argument, style and contribution to advancing the understanding and practice of interagency cooperation at the operational and tactical levels of effort.

For more information about the writing competition, contact the Simons Center at editor@TheSimonsCenter.org or call 913-682-7244. The Simons Center is a major program of the CGSC Foundation, Inc. Information about the Simons Center's mission, organization, and publications is available at www.TheSimonsCenter.org/about.

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Questions about the Interagency Paper series should be directed to the Simons Center, 655 Biddle Blvd., PO Box 3429, Fort Leavenworth KS 66027; email: office@TheSimonsCenter.org, or by phone at 913-682-7244.

The Winning Papers

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for the Study of Interagency Cooperation

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**The Genie in the Bottle:
Opportunist and Antagonistic Responses to Whole of Government Approaches**

by **Erik A. Claessen**
Belgian Joint Staff



Erik A. Claessen is a Belgian Army lieutenant colonel serving in the Strategy Department of the Belgian Joint Staff. He received a B.S. and a master of military and social sciences degree from the Royal Military Academy at Brussels, Belgium, and an MMAS from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His main field of study is the effect of organized violence on political processes. His published works include the book *STALEMATE: An Anatomy of Conflicts between Democracies, Islamists, and Muslim Autocrats*, published by Praeger in October 2010.

Claessen's *The Genie in the Bottle: Opportunist and Antagonistic Responses to Whole of Government Approaches* won first place in the Simons Center Interagency Writing Competition conducted from September 2011 through March 2012.

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Introduction

In 1985, Yitzak Rabin—then Israeli Defense Minister—observed that:

“...among the many surprises, and most of them not for the good, that came out of the war in Lebanon, the most dangerous is that the war let the Shi’ites out of the bottle. No one predicted it; I couldn’t find it in any intelligence report.... If as a result of the war in Lebanon, we replace PLO terrorism in southern Lebanon with Shi’ite terrorism, we have done the worst [thing] in our struggle against terrorism.”¹

On June 6, 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon to defeat the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The name of the operation left no doubt about its aim: Peace for Galilee. Within a few weeks, the IDF trapped the PLO in Beirut and forced it to flee to Tunisia. After the successful eviction of the PLO, Israel attempted to create a self-administered buffer zone in the area. Under the plan, Israel envisaged the creation of the Organization for a Unified South. This organization consisted of a civil guard—recruited at village level—and a system of village and district councils. The councils would receive Israeli assistance in commerce, agriculture, and finances.² In other words, the Israelis tried to stabilize southern Lebanon by means of a whole of government approach. The plan seemed feasible. No one ever cared about the Shi’a south. The infrastructure in this destitute area left much to be desired. There were almost no job opportunities, and the Shi’a leadership itself consisted mostly of rich landowners who were more interested in maintaining their privileges than in developing the region and its population. Furthermore, the indigenous Christian and Shi’a populations in the area were glad to be rid of the Palestinians. “Angered at oppressive PLO domination and PLO cross-border attacks, which invited Israeli retaliatory strikes against their villages, many responded to Israel’s anti-PLO invasion of 1982 with relief and support.”³ Finally, the Israelis received the support of an indigenous militia—the South Lebanese Army (SLA) of which Shi’a soldiers constituted sixty percent.⁴

On May 24, 2000, the IDF hurriedly left southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah took over the region. What had happened? Had the whole of government approach failed? On the contrary, between 1982 and 2000, the availability of potable water and much needed

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electricity, as well as education and healthcare improved markedly; however, Israelis were not the only ones who seized the opportunity to fill the power vacuum left by the eviction of PLO forces. A new organization—Hezbollah—emerged and gained the allegiance of the Shi'a Lebanese by competing with the Israelis on the whole of government level rather than on the military level alone.

When intervening forces create a safe and secure environment to implement a whole of government approach, they simultaneously create opportunities for hitherto unnoticed and powerless opponents to do the same—and sometimes more successfully. This paper makes the case that a whole of government approach is not a minimal concluding effort to replace an outfought opponent, but rather a full-fledged struggle to out-administer any opponent who exists or might emerge in the conflict area. A whole of government approach is only valid in dealing with security threats if it takes this reality into account.

To support this argument, this paper first clarifies the problem by presenting a number of recent examples of emerging opponents who match a whole of government approach with an alternative that appeals more to the local populace. Next it analyzes the conceptual components of the mechanism behind this emergence. Finally, it derives operational implications from that analysis by proposing measures and precautions that should supplement a whole of government approach to increase its validity in dealing with emerging, adaptive, and innovative security threats.

The Israeli experience in southern Lebanon was by no means unique. During the spring of 2003, the eyes of the world focused on the U.S. Army's advance in Iraq. Few people noticed that a parallel offensive took place. "As U.S. tanks dashed across Baghdad, Muqtada al-Sadr and his vanguard of like-minded clerics reactivated mosques, deployed a militia, assumed control of regional Ba'ath Party institutions, and prepared social services."⁵ While Saddam Hussein's regime crumbled, Sadr's followers worked hard to create an alternative administration. Just three years later, the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group Report considered the previously unknown Muqtada al-Sadr one of the three vital power brokers in the Shi'a community.⁶

Similar developments took place in the territories Israel occupied in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. During that war, Israel almost annihilated the conventional armies of the countries surrounding it, but paradoxically, this victory provided the Muslim Brotherhood—an organization that until then was unable to influence internal or external politics—with opportunities it could only dream of when it was subject to Egyptian and Jordanian rule. This Israeli victory was the start of a silent organizational struggle between the occupied and

the occupier.

Upon occupation, the Israelis had to set up a government of sorts for the occupied territories. Unfortunately, they made no conscious effort to genuinely incorporate the large Palestinian population into their society. Instead, they provided a minimalist government to keep the territories quiet. This left the Palestinians without many of the services normally provided by government. As a result, they [Muslim Brotherhood] organized to provide labor, educational, medical, and social services...In essence, they formed a local government and began to take care of their people.⁷

Over time, the Muslim Brotherhood gained legitimacy and credibility among Palestinians and evolved into an Islamist resistance movement. Hamas announced its existence in a statement on December 14, 1987, shortly after the eruption of the first *Intifada*.⁸ Eighteen years later, Hamas's combination of parallel government and armed resistance culminated in Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Hezbollah, Hamas, and Muqtada al-Sadr's *Jama'at al-Sadr al-Thani* share two main characteristics. First, they did not emerge despite the presence of an intervening military force, but because of it. Second, they owe their emergence to a superior whole of government approach rather than to their military strength. The takeaway is that the intervening forces are not necessarily the only ones trying to implement a whole of government approach. Moreover, they do not even hold the initiative in that field. As everyone knows, when more than one actor tries to do the same thing at the same time, competition is the most likely result. The question then arises who is likely to win this competition? To answer that question, it is necessary to analyze the conceptual components of the mechanism allowing the emergence and development of these actors: constraints, initiative, integrity, recuperation, and fundraising. These components translate into a number of actions at the tactical and operational levels. Though these actions are visible, they are often not immediately recognized as being part of an opportunist and antagonistic response to the intervening community's whole of government approach.

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Constraints on the use of force

Emergence is a chaotic process because it takes place after an intervention that upsets the balance of power in the conflict area. Military interventions such as the invasion of Lebanon, the Six-Day War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or the eviction of the Serb Army from Kosovo eliminate a coercive ruling power and replace it with a military force that does not provide an immediate alternative social contract with the local population.⁹ The chaotic nature of the transition depends on the characteristics of the ousted regime. Generally speaking, “the more coercion required, the greater the collapse when that government’s power is reduced.”¹⁰ The key factor governing the process of emergence is popular support or the lack thereof.

By their very nature repressive regimes use complex systems of overlapping security, paramilitary, and military forces to hold on to power despite their lack of popular support. A military intervention that ousts such a regime creates a transition from a coercive to a constrained military presence in the area. Western military forces are subject to limitations on the use of force. These constraints stem from international laws, rules of engagement, the scrutiny of the press, and the imperative to nest military operations into a political timing and logic.

From the local population’s perspective, the transition from a coercive to a constrained military presence offers new opportunities. Organizations that suffered most under the ousted regime often believe they have a rightful claim to a leading role in the new social order.

From the local population’s perspective, the transition from a coercive to a constrained military presence offers new opportunities. Organizations that suffered most under the ousted regime often believe they have a rightful claim to a leading role in the new social order. They may choose to rely on the intervening community’s help to consolidate that leading role, or they may decide to take matters in their own hands. Examples of such organizations are Musa al-Sadr’s Movement of the Disinherited (*Harakat al-Mahrumin*) in southern Lebanon,¹¹ Sadiq al-Sadr’s vocal and militant clergy (*al-Hawza al-Natiqa*) in Iraq,¹² Sheikh Ahmed Yassin’s Islamic Center (*al-Mujamma al-Islamiya*) in Gaza,¹³ and Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) in Kosovo.¹⁴ These organizations are the “genies in the bottle,” but they are often not recognized as such. With the exception of Rugova’s DLK, nobody had anticipated the preponderance of these organizations in the aftermath of the military intervention that eliminated the repressive power that kept them in the bottle.

The intervening community can either co-opt or ignore such organizations. In Kosovo, NATO and the UN co-opted the DLK, which resulted in the disarmament of the militant branch of the Kosovo resistance (the UCK), peaceful elections, the creation

of democratic institutions, and a slow, but relatively uneventful transition toward independence. By contrast, in Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza, the intervening forces decided to ignore the organizations that challenged the coercive power of Saddam Hussein, the PLO, and Abdel Nasser respectively. In Gaza and the other territories they occupied after the 1967 Six-Day War, the Israelis focused on eliminating the PLO as a threat. In Lebanon, they supported Christian rather than Shi'a leaders and organizations. In Iraq, the coalition favored returning exiles and an Iran-based quietist branch of the Shi'a clergy at the expense of grassroots Shi'a organizations in Iraq proper.¹⁵ However, because members of such organizations see the ordeal they suffered under a repressive regime as a source of legitimacy, they refuse to be sidelined. In February 2004, one Iraqi citizen concisely expressed this view: "We have all come out of Saddam's prison cells! Our families sacrificed their lives under the dictatorship. We have nothing to do with all these political parties that lived lives of luxury abroad, in London, Washington, or Tehran. It is not fair that these individuals return now to govern us."¹⁶

At the tactical and operational levels, organizations like the Lebanese *Harakat al-Mahrumin*, the Iraqi *al-Hawza al-Natiqa*, and the Gazan *al-Mujamma al-Islamiya* can impose their participation in the transition process by spawning a resistance movement with a dual militant and civilian structure. The civilian branch overtly provides essential services and humanitarian assistance to the local population. Civilian branch members can do so because constraints on the use of force prevent the intervening community from harming them. Because "the public will turn to almost any actor to fulfill basic needs,"¹⁷ their actions will create widespread, popular support, which allows the military branch of the organization to conceal its leadership, fighters, and weapons among the people. When these emerging resistance organizations covertly organize violent actions against the intervening community, they can escape retaliatory action from the intervening forces by hiding among the populace. Such courses of action were impossible under the ousted, repressive regimes because—contrary to the intervening forces—repressive regimes are not bound by constraints on the use of force.

Examples of such dual military and civilian structures are the Lebanese Hezbollah and its military branch, the *Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (The Islamic Resistance); the Gazan Hamas and its *Izz al-Din al-Qassam* brigades; and the Iraqi *Jama'at al-Sadr al-Thani* (The Movement of the Second al-Sadr) with its *Jaysh al-Mahdi* (The Mahdi Army) militia. These movements evolved out of the Lebanese *Harakat al-Mahrumin*, the Gazan *al-Mujamma al-Islamiya*, and the Iraqi *al-Hawza al-Natiqa* respectively.

Restraints on the use of force offer hitherto unnoticed and

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powerless organizations opportunities that were denied to them during the oppressive rule of the ousted regime.

Initiative

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Because they understand the importance of popular support, organizations that want to oppose the intervening community seize the initiative to take care of the people. On the tactical and operational levels this translates into quick and aggressive actions to take control of the infrastructure needed to cater for the needs of the population. In Iraq, even before the fall of Saddam's regime, "Young imams, invoking Sadiq al-Sadr's [Muqtada al-Sadr's father] name, rushed to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the state apparatus. Surrounded by armed volunteers, they seized control of mosques, welfare centres, universities and hospitals and, particularly in Sadiq al-Sadr's former strongholds, instituted forms of local governance."¹⁸ Hezbollah likewise immediately started relief and reconstruction operations after the end of the 2006 Israeli incursion in Lebanon. A New York Times journalist observed that "while the Israelis began their withdrawal, hundreds of Hezbollah members spread over dozens of villages across southern Lebanon and began cleaning, organizing and surveying damage. Men on bulldozers were busy cutting lanes through giant piles of rubble. Roads blocked with the remnants of buildings are now, just a day after a cease-fire began, fully passable."¹⁹ The rationale behind this dash is simple: when people's need is most dire, relief efforts have the biggest impact. In times of crisis, no one forgets who showed up first and provided hot drinks, food, and shelter.

Therefore, speed is of the essence. As mentioned in U.S. Army doctrine, "the speed with which the COIN [counterinsurgency] operations are executed may determine their success and whether the populace supports them. This is especially true for operations that involve restoring essential services. Planners must strive to have the smallest gap of time between when they assess essential services and when U.S. forces begin remediation efforts."²⁰

Integrity

Integrity is another important source of popular support for emerging resistance movements. Individuals and organizations that cooperate with the intervening community are often corrupt. In the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. officials worked with the Iraqi National Congress, headed by the secular expatriate Ahmad Chalabi, to create a government in exile. However, "the CIA and the

State Department broke with Chalabi late in 2002 when he proved unable to account for about \$2 million of the \$4 million they had given his Iraqi National Congress.”²¹ The people in the conflict area are not unaware of this widespread corruption, and they are often appalled by the fact that collaborators embezzle funds destined to finance humanitarian relief efforts and reconstruction projects. Emerging resistance movements can capitalize on this resentment by adhering to stringent standards of integrity themselves.

A recent example of this phenomenon is the whole of government approach that accompanied the implementation of the Oslo Accords. The Accords envisaged the creation of a Palestinian Authority combined with a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. The international community seized this unique opportunity to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. The aim of the whole of government approach was to facilitate the peace process by supporting those who accepted the Accords—the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat—while simultaneously weakening those who opposed it—the resistance movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The fact that donor contributions surpassed the amounts pledged illustrates the international community’s resolve to end this conflict once and for all.²²

Things did not work out that way. Because it could count on a continuous flow of international financial contributions, the PLO depended less on popular support to hold on to power. Funds and lucrative positions of political and economic power were oriented toward a small elite. Ben Yishay holds that “the Palestinian Authority’s heavy handed involvement in the market—including important commodity monopolies, corruption, and tight control over foreign investment, credit sources, and protected areas of the economy—essentially constituted a transfer of income from poorer groups to the political elite.”²³ As a result “the Oslo Accords initiated a new period of both centralization of political power and cooperation between the old elite social class and top Palestinian Authority officers, creating a conservative and anti-democratic ruling alliance.”²⁴ By contrast, Hamas continued to invest in humanitarian assistance and essential services and campaigned on its integrity, which laid the foundation for Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections, the opposite of the intended results.

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Recuperation

When emerging actors recuperate a whole of government approach, they convince target audiences that the intervening community's efforts should be taken for granted and that what they provide is what really matters.

For an emerging resistance movement, recuperation is a force multiplier. The intervening community's financial and economic wherewithal usually dwarfs that of emerging actors. However, emerging actors are better aware of local mores and cultural sensitivities. When emerging actors recuperate a whole of government approach, they convince target audiences that the intervening community's efforts should be taken for granted and that what they provide is what really matters.

During an interview in the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli withdrawal from its latest incursion in southern Lebanon, a Lebanese citizen concisely explained what recuperation really means. "The government may do some work on bridges and roads, but when it comes to rebuilding houses, Hezbollah will have a big role to play."²⁵ Although the Lebanese government put the financial support it received from the international community to good use by repairing the country's transport infrastructure, restoring houses generated more popular support.²⁶ Emerging resistance movements have a tendency to focus on assistance that is relatively cheap, but that requires a thorough knowledge of the local language and culture. Prime examples are education, healthcare, and assistance to widows and orphans. In the Occupied Territories, "the case of the Islamic Assembly of Gaza, one of the large Hamas-affiliated organizations, is illustrative. Aside from providing cash assistance to roughly 5,000 orphans and hundreds of poor families, it distributes food, school bags and winter clothing, organizes wedding parties and sponsors nurseries, clinics and sports clubs. Its impact probably is felt in varying degrees by tens of thousands of Palestinians."²⁷

Another way to recuperate the intervening community's whole of government approach is to seize control of humanitarian assistance coordination. Because its militia usually controls parts of the conflict area, nongovernmental organizations may have no other option but to coordinate relief efforts with the civilian branch of an emerging resistance movement. Hezbollah, for instance, "has a standing membership in Lebanon's network of nongovernmental organizations, and throughout the conflict, its representatives participated in coordinating the relief effort."²⁸ This membership allows the resistance to take credit for services someone else provided.

Emerging resistance movements can even take this tactic one step further by participating in the legitimate political process. Hezbollah holds twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament and has two ministers in the government, which allows it to recuperate the whole of government approach at the political level. The *Jama'at*

al-Sadr al-Thani applied similar strategies in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group notes that “several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic services within the government and an armed militia outside of the government.”²⁹ The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the level of control emerging resistance movements can gain on key ministries. This level of control can be such that the intervening community loses all leverage. Concerning the situation in Iraq, the Study Group reported:

A major attempt is also being made to improve the capacity of government bureaucracies at the national, regional, and provincial levels to provide services to the population as well as to select and manage infrastructure projects. The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi ministries, but it confronts problems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadr objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and therefore the ministries he controls—Health, Agriculture, and Transportation—will not work with Americans. It is not clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and operate reconstruction projects launched by the United States.³⁰

In practice, the intervening community will always lack the cultural awareness and the linguistic proficiency needed to lead relief efforts in sectors like education, healthcare, and social assistance. To avoid recuperation, the intervening community should co-opt local grassroots organizations with sufficiently large constituencies to deny that void to emerging resistance organizations.

Fundraising

Worldwide fundraising is a source of strength for emerging resistance movements. Competing on the whole of government level requires a sustainable deficit in the regional balance of trade and payments. For a resistance movement, it is simply impossible to sustain a competing, whole of government approach with funds raised inside the conflict area itself. International fundraising is by far the most underestimated factor in contemporary conflict termination.

The effect of new, global, fundraising methods becomes clear when one analyzes the problems resistance movements had when these methods did not yet exist. In 1928, Mao Zedong established a base area in the Chigkang Mountains. The crux of protracted revolutionary war was to answer the question “how one or more small areas under Red political power could survive when

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Without an external source of money, resistance movements must rely on local sources to generate funds. Options are limited.

Resistance movements that can tap into foreign sources of money face none of these problems. They can survive and thrive in areas surrounded or even occupied by intervening forces.

completely encircled by the White régime.”³¹ The area had to be rich and autarkical enough to sustain the revolutionary armed forces operating in it. This approach proved more difficult than expected. Its economic problems, especially the shortage of cash, were extremely difficult. As a result of the enemy blockade, Mao noted in October 1928: “Necessities such as salt, cloth, and medicines have been very scarce and dear...which has upset, sometimes to an acute degree, the lives of the masses...the soldiers are under-nourished, many are ill, and the wounded in the hospitals are worse off.” Though 20 per cent of the crop in the central base area had been collected by the Communists as tax, other parts of the “independent régime” were hilly areas “where the peasants are so poverty-stricken that any taxation is inadvisable.”³² Clearly, the lack of external funding presented Mao with a dilemma between levying taxes and fostering popular support.

Without an external source of money, resistance movements must rely on local sources to generate funds. Options are limited. Licit economic activities generally yield low profits. Illicit activities, such as smuggling, drug trafficking, prostitution, blood diamonds, extortion, or kidnapping, generate much more money, but they place such a high burden on ordinary citizens that applying them will almost certainly alienate many of them. Even then, proceeds will be barely sufficient to finance the militant branch of the resistance. Few, if any financial resources will be left to cater to the local population’s needs. This course of action does not provide a solid basis for a successful resistance campaign.

Resistance movements that can tap into foreign sources of money face none of these problems. They can survive and thrive in areas surrounded or even occupied by intervening forces. Global fundraising coupled with Western constraints on the use of force allow emerging resistance movements to co-exist with intervening forces in one area. Two evolutions have considerably increased emerging actors’ capabilities to raise funds abroad. These evolutions are the proliferation of diasporas and the liberalization of Islamic organizations that are eligible for Islamic alms or *zakat*.

As a result of the increased mobility of people during the twentieth century, a significant percentage of people live outside their countries of origin. For instance, approximately two million people live in Kosovo, but several hundred thousand Kosovars live in other European countries. Moreover, modern communication technology allows the diaspora to keep in touch with the homeland. If an emerging resistance movement obtains the support of the diaspora, it can tap into the wealth of its members. That is what Ibrahim Rugova did in Kosovo. After the Serbian president Slobodan Miloscevic nullified the autonomy of the province, Rugova set up

parallel clandestine educational and health care institutions for ethnic Albanians. He financed these with proceeds from international fund raising. “Kosovo’s exile Albanian population (approximately 180,000 in Switzerland and 150,000 in Germany) contributed to the maintenance of a ‘parallel government’ through an informal tax of 3 percent of income collected both inside Kosovo and from the diaspora. This revenue allowed Albanian clans to conduct a sustained period of passive resistance to the Miloscevic regime in the early 1990s under the parallel government led by Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo.”³³

Another important source of funding for contemporary emerging resistance movements in the Islamic world is almsgiving, or *zakat*. *Zakat*, is one of the five pillars of Islam. In the Sunni interpretation, a Muslim should donate 2.5 percent of his wealth to *zakat* per lunar year. In the Shi’a interpretation, almsgiving is more often referred to as *khums*. Literally, this means “one-fifth” because Shi’a calculates the alms to be donated as one-fifth of the increase of one’s possession per lunar year. *Zakat* is as old as Islam itself, but a foreign intervention in an Islamic region dramatically changes its influence on the local social, political, and military dynamics. Muslim regimes typically keep *zakat* fundraising and the social organizations who benefit from it in check by subjecting them to an elaborate system of registration, licensing, and surveillance. By eliminating that system, a foreign intervention unleashes Islamic organizations in the conflict area. The Six-Day War illustrates this. Tamimi holds:

The Palestinian Islamists may be viewed as pioneers in the way they transformed their intellectual and ideological discourse into practical programmes providing services to the public through voluntary institutions. Their brethren elsewhere in the Arab world had, for decades, been denied such opportunities because the majority of the Arab countries had imposed restrictions on any form of non-governmental activity linking religion and education, or of a voluntary and charitable nature.³⁴

Israel abolished these restrictions in the Occupied Territories. According to Tamimi:

The irony was that the situation changed in the aftermath of the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation. Israel opted to revive certain aspects of archaic Ottoman law in its administration of the affairs of the Arab populations in the West Bank and Gaza. This permitted the creation of voluntary or non-governmental organizations such as charitable, educational, and other forms of privately funded service institutions.³⁵

The change in legislation gave Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, access to a large, continuous, and uninhibited flow of funds that enabled them to implement a parallel whole of government approach in the Occupied Territories. Over time, the Muslim Brotherhood evolved first into the social services provider *al-Mujamma al-Islamy* and later into the resistance movement Hamas. The transition to armed resistance did not end its access to the proceeds of Islamic charitable fundraising.

While it does not appear that Islamic social welfare organisations affiliated with Hamas have been directly funded by governments, they have benefited extensively from charitable societies active in the Gulf (some of which “operate under royal patronage”), Europe, and North America. Although Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim expatriate communities play an important role in contributing to such charities, the majority of foreign funding has traditionally come from the Gulf region.³⁶

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it.**

The financing of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon follows a similar pattern. Judith Palmer-Harik writes, “In my interviews with Hezbollah officials, I discovered that the financial sources for the eight associations they run include contributions from Lebanese individuals, Hezbollah members, Iran (including charitable organizations) and donations that are part of Shi’ite religious obligations to provide a fifth of one’s income to help those in need.”³⁷ However, charitable Islamic fundraising is only an advantage if one has sufficient religious credentials to secure access to it. This was not the case for Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq. Contrary to Sunnis, Shi’a have a highly structured and clerical hierarchy. One’s place in this hierarchy is based on academic credentials.³⁸ The highest religious authorities, with the rank of Grand Ayatollah, are called *Marja al-Taqlid* (sources of emulation). A lay Shi’a is free to choose his *marja’* but must then pay him alms and follow his pronouncements.³⁹ Although Muqtada’s father, Sadiq al-Sadr, collected *khums* as a *marja’*, Muqtada was by no means his father’s natural heir.

Prior to his death and under pressure from his associates, Sadiq al-Sadr had appointed Ayatollah Kadhim al-Ha’iri, a prominent *marja’* of Iraqi origin, as his official successor—or, more precisely, as the source of emulation to whom Sadiq’s followers should turn in the event his writings left a question unanswered...Nor did Muqtada enjoy any material advantages: Sadiq al-Sadr’s most important asset, the *khums* (alms paid by Shiites to their *marja’*) was conveyed to his legate al-Ha’iri.⁴⁰

As a consequence, Muqtada al-Sadr initially focused his actions on asserting his religious credentials. In a first step, he struck a deal with Kadhim al-Ha'iri, who lacked any independent Iraqi constituency. According to a Crisis Group Report, al-Ha'iri was “aware of these shortcomings [and] seems to have considered Muqtada a useful transitional figure who would pave the way for his eventual return to Najaf. As a result, he delegated to Muqtada rights that, in principle, must only accrue to a *marja'* (e.g., the right to issue *fatwas* or to receive *khums*), while simultaneously trying to keep a watchful eye over him.”⁴¹ This deal seemed to benefit both. Muqtada al-Sadr obtained the religious authority he could not claim because of his youth and lack of academic credentials, while Ayatollah Kadhim al-Ha'iri obtained the formal leadership of al-Sadr's constituency. The deal did not last long. After he consolidated his leadership, al-Sadr simply ignored al-Ha'iri. According to a Crisis Group Report, “although Ayatollah Kadhim al-Ha'iri withdrew his formal endorsement of Muqtada, the young Sadr continues to assert the rights of a *marja'*, such as leading Friday prayers and collecting *khums*. To be sure, Sadiq al-Sadr also disputed the *Hawza's* knowledge and erudition-based hierarchical structure; but Muqtada has taken this a significant step further, entirely discarding the concept that legitimacy flowed from academic credentials.”⁴² It was only after securing his power base and the associated financial resources that Muqtada al-Sadr considered the use of violence against coalition forces.

Global fundraising is of vital importance to emerging resistance movements. Two important fund raising mechanisms are remittances from diasporas and religious charitable donations. Ideally, the intervening community should co-opt or at least avoid alienating the sources of such funds. Framing a whole of government approach in a clash-of-civilization context will almost certainly backfire in the shape of a copious flow of funds toward extremists in the conflict area.

Operational implications

Two main operational implications follow from this analysis. To increase its validity against emerging resistance movements, a whole of government approach should include measures and precautions to find the genies in the bottle and stem their growth.

FIND THE GENIES IN THE BOTTLE

When coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, their intelligence focused on the regime itself, the military and paramilitary forces supporting it, the established Shi'a clergy, and the leading figures

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among the Iraqis in exile. Nobody analyzed the remnants of Sadiq al-Sadr's movement who were brutally crushed by Saddam Hussein in 1999. As Haugh states, "[Muqtada al-Sadr's] rise to prominence within the Shi'a community largely went unnoticed by the United States government."⁴³

In Gaza, the Israelis ignored Islamist organizations after they occupied the area in 1967. They only worried about the PLO and various left-leaning Palestinian extremist groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. "The Israeli authorities generally took the view that the Islamist movement was less threatening than the militant PLO, that it could usefully absorb the energies of Palestinian youth and could be a valuable instrument to promote 'disputes and schisms among Palestinians.'"⁴⁴ As a consequence, Sheikh Yassin's *al-Mujamma al-Islamiya* could grow unhindered until the *Intifada* broke out.

In a similar vein, Israeli intelligence failed to recognize Musa Sadr's *Harakat al-Mahrumin* as a threat. Instead, they focused on the PLO it wanted to crush and on the South Lebanese Army it wanted to co-opt. Yitzak Rabin's quote at the beginning of this paper demonstrates that strategically this led to the replacement of one resistance movement (the PLO) with a more dangerous one (Hezbollah).

These intelligence failures can be avoided. Haugh holds that: "In retrospect, a leader emerging from the al-Sadr school of Islamic thought should not have been a surprise."⁴⁵ Prior to major combat operations, the intervening community should conduct a thorough analysis of all grassroots organizations (both violent and non-violent), their current and potential constituencies, their popularity among relevant diasporas, and their access to funds such as remittances and religious almsgiving. If at all possible, the intervening community should co-opt such organizations and integrate their growth in the whole of government approach. This was the case in Kosovo with Rugova's DLK. However, when the intervening community cannot co-opt these groups, the whole of government approach should include measures to stem the growth of anti-Western grassroots organizations.

STEM THEIR GROWTH

Grassroots organizations will spontaneously grow after the fall of the autocratic regime that oppressed them. Some will grow large enough to spawn armed resistance movements. To prevent this, the intervening community should work on all conceptual components of the mechanism allowing the emergence and development of these actors: constraints, initiative, integrity, recuperation, and

fundraising.

Democratic troop-contributing nations will always impose constraints on the use of military force. However, if one grassroots organization violently monopolizes the infrastructure in order to provide humanitarian assistance and social services, constraints may not preclude military action by the intervening forces to level the playing field for all active humanitarian organizations.

The intervening community must strive to reduce the time between the fall of a repressive regime and the start of remediation efforts. Failure to do so will give anti-Western organizations the opportunity to seize the initiative by starting remediation efforts themselves. When they succeed, they will derive legitimacy and popular support from their activities.

The intervening community often accepts a level of corruption in a whole of government approach. This is a mistake. Corruption not only diminishes the amount of funds available for stability and reconstruction, it also offers anti-Western organizations the opportunity to do better and campaign on their integrity.

From the start, the intervening community has to cover all aspects of social assistance and essential services, including sectors like healthcare, education, and social assistance to orphans and elderly people. Otherwise, emerging actors will claim these niches, which will allow them to recuperate the whole of government approach by pointing out that the intervening community's efforts should be taken for granted and what they provide is what really matters. This does not mean that intervening forces should organize healthcare and education themselves. On the contrary, they will simply lack the cultural and linguistic capacity to do so. To deny that void to emerging resistance organizations, co-opted local grassroots organization with sufficiently large constituencies should provide these services.

Fundraising is crucial for emerging resistance movements. Without it, they are unable to provide social assistance and essential services from which they derive the popular support they need to assimilate their fighters into the population. The main sources of these funds are remittances and religious almsgiving. Therefore, the intervening community should avoid antagonizing relevant diasporas and religious communities. Ideally, a whole of government approach should integrate pro-Western grassroots organizations that have access to the sources of funds.

Conclusion

A whole of government approach must include a full-fledged struggle to out-administer any opponent who exists or might emerge in the conflict

When intervening forces create a safe and secure environment to implement a whole of government approach, they simultaneously create opportunities for hitherto unnoticed and powerless opponents to do the same—and sometimes more successfully. A whole of government approach must include a full-fledged struggle to out-administer any opponent who exists or might emerge in the conflict area and is only valid in dealing with security threats if it takes this reality into account. Intervening forces must recognize emerging resistance movements as soon as possible and stem their growth before they can consolidate a popular support base that allows them to fight among the people. **IAP**

Endnotes

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38 Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, "Iraq's Shiites Under Occupation," September 9, 2003, p. 9. "Clerics may advance from novice, to teacher, to *hujjat al-Islam*, to ayatollah and, finally, to grand ayatollah. Promotion results from an *ijaza* or certificate, granted by a higher authority or, alternatively, through recognition of an individual by a majority of clerics of lower rank. The process is not akin to a Vatican-type election. Rather, it is a lengthy selection that uses organized disorder to produce recognized leaders."

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40 Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 55, p. 6.

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**Embassy in the Lead:
Lessons on Interagency Unity of Effort
for Today's U.S. Mission to Iraq from the
1947–1949 U.S. Mission to Greece**

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**Embassy in the Lead:
Lessons on Interagency Unity of Effort for Today's U.S. Mission to Iraq
from the 1947–1949 U.S. Mission to Greece**

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Hanson's *Embassy in the Lead: Lessons on Interagency Unity of Effort for Today's U.S. Mission to Iraq from the 1947–1949 U.S. Mission to Greece* won second place in the Simons Center Interagency Writing Competition conducted from September 2011 through March 2012.

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Introduction: Uncharted Terrain

In Iraq, long-term success remains far from certain—and U.S. leaders in Iraq are on uncharted terrain. On December 15, 2011, the U.S. mission in Iraq became State Department-led, and all U.S. military activities became the responsibility of the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I). As the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James F. Jeffrey noted during testimony before the Senate in early 2011, success is critical as the Embassy takes the lead in Iraq to ensure that hard-fought gains do not slip away. Yet there are few, if any, well-known examples of such a transition in U.S. history that might inform civilian and military leaders in Baghdad. Indeed, U.S. Institute of Peace expert Beth Cole recently noted that, “We have not attempted this type of massive transition between our own agencies since the Marshall Plan.”¹ And, as Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides said, “We’ve spent too much money and kids’ lives not to do this thing right.”² Where can one look to find insight that might inform our future efforts in Iraq?

Recognizing how unique the post-2011 Iraq mission is, senior American officials from throughout government—to include former U.S. Army Combined Arms Center commander Lieutenant General Robert Caslen (who commands OSC-I today)—attended a conference in February 2011 hosted by the Institute of Peace and the Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation that sought answers to this question. Subsequently, the Simons Center published the insights from that conference in a 37-page pamphlet titled *Interagency Handbook for Transitions*.³ While the handbook laid out a number of considerations for strategic-level policymakers, it lacked specific operational-level recommendations for leaders like Caslen. Additionally, the handbook relied on lessons from only the past ten years. Yet, since the past decade has been dominated by Department of Defense (DoD)-led efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, its lessons might not be appropriate to inform the years ahead—when the embassy will be in the lead.

Fortunately, there is at least one useful example from history. In 1947, President Truman established the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) within the U.S. Embassy in Athens to help the Greek government end an insurgency. Despite limited resources and declining U.S. political will, the U.S. mission in Greece achieved significant long-term success. Specifically, the U.S. Embassy in Athens effectively reformed Greece’s security sector and enabled the Greek government to finish off a resilient insurgency with only

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a few hundred non-combat troops under the Ambassador’s control.⁴

As the military assumes a supporting role in Iraq, U.S. leaders will face similar challenges to those of their predecessors in Greece. To succeed in Iraq, as in Greece, the United States will combine security cooperation efforts with broader economic development and governance improvement efforts as part of an approach that some experts call “security sector reform” (SSR). Because of the similarities of these missions, close examination of the Embassy-led SSR effort in Greece between 1947 and 1949 might offer useful lessons for similar efforts in Iraq. To glean lessons for today’s U.S. leaders in Iraq, this paper asks, What did the United States do in Greece to enable the Greek government to end an insurgency without the use of a single combat soldier?

This paper argues that the essential ingredient to success in Greece will likewise be the essential ingredient in Iraq—interagency unity of effort in the field. Of course, it should come as no surprise that SSR efforts like those in Greece and Iraq clearly require strong unity of effort between the embassy and the military. Nevertheless, embassy-led SSR missions—like the 1947 U.S. mission to Greece—require extraordinarily strong unity of effort. In Greece, the U.S. achieved this high level of unity by organizing itself in a non-standard way to meet unique mission needs, institutionalizing a shared vision, and placing the interests of the mission ahead of those of individual parent agencies in Washington.

To generate this kind of unity in Iraq, this study asserts that the U.S. Mission–Iraq (USM-I) must make fostering unity of effort a top priority. This paper concludes with three specific recommendations based on lessons from the Greek case that might inform U.S. civilian and military leaders at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Unity of Effort: The Key to Successful Security Sector Reform

In 2009, the DoD, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) joined forces to publish a unique multi-agency paper titled “Security Sector Reform.” The paper defined SSR as “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way [a host nation] provides safety, security, and justice.”⁵ Contrary to what one might think at first glance, SSR is far broader than mere security cooperation. In fact, as the Global Facilitation Network for SSR put it, “[SSR] extends well beyond the narrower focus of more traditional

security cooperation.” In short, what distinguishes SSR from other activities is the inclusion of security cooperation, governance, and economic development efforts.⁶

Interestingly, neither the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad nor OSC-I use the term SSR to describe what they do. OSC-I seems to prefer the term “enabled security cooperation,” which has been described as “similar to other OSC offices in places like Turkey and Egypt.”⁷ Yet, combined with the U.S. embassy’s extraordinarily broad efforts, what the U.S. is doing in Iraq is much more than security cooperation. In fact, a U.S. embassy spokesman recently described its efforts as “very wide,” including “economic cooperation, political and diplomatic cooperation, educational, scientific and technical cooperation, law enforcement and health care.”⁸ Regardless of what the Embassy calls it, this paper argues that SSR is precisely what USM-I’s mission is.

U.S. government interagency doctrine describes the key to successful SSR explicitly, stating, “The most successful outcomes will result only if the activities of other government departments and agencies are fully integrated.”⁹ Put another way, to successfully establish long-term security there without combat troops, the U.S. must unify the efforts of its military, diplomatic, and development agencies so that the combined effect of all U.S. effort is greater than the sum of its parts; therefore, it is important to consider what fostering unity of effort requires.

WHAT DOES UNITY OF EFFORT REQUIRE?

Former Homeland Security Council Chief Of Staff Joel Bagnal defined interagency unity of effort as “the [synchronization of] all the elements of national power to achieve common objectives.”¹⁰ Although Bagnal’s definition is useful, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy spoke even more precisely about unity of effort in 2008, describing it as the “established mechanisms . . . [that enable] full integration of the activities of military forces and civilian agencies on the ground.”¹¹ The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy goes into further detail by defining what the elements of national power are. Specifically, they are “the organizations, policies, and programs within the defense, diplomatic, economic, development, homeland security, intelligence, and the strategic communications realms of the executive branch.”

This paper recognizes the value of all three of the above definitions because taken together they clearly describe not only what unity of effort is, but also what achieving it requires. First, unity of effort requires tailor-made interagency organizations (as in Flournoy’s definition), which this paper calls “mission-focused

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First, unity of effort requires tailor-made interagency organizations... The second requirement for unity of effort is shared vision... The third requirement is selfless cooperation.

organization.” Second, it requires shared objectives and efforts (as in Bagnal’s definition), which this paper calls “shared vision.” Third, unity of effort requires cooperation between all elements of national power (as described by the 2010 National Security Strategy), which this paper calls “selfless cooperation.”

In a mission-focused organization, form follows function. Flournoy claimed that unity depended on good horizontal integration; yet, examples of stove piping and infighting in today’s interagency organizations abound. Nevertheless, cases of agencies working well together do exist—and one important factor seems to be that the form of those organizations followed the identification of a required function. For example, an Army War College student described how the National Incident Management System helped improve unity and effectiveness not just by blending multi-agency capabilities, but by doing so in response to a specifically identified requirement to improve information sharing.¹² By identifying the requirement before forming the interagency organization, the incident management system mitigated the effects of competing requirements. Since unified effort does not occur merely by blending various agencies together, this study asked, How did U.S. government agencies identify operational requirements in Greece and how did they form their organizations to match the requirements?

The second requirement for unity of effort is shared vision. Another of Flournoy’s key concepts is vertical integration, where policy decisions translate into action in the field. Other writers have noted how it is essential that all elements recognize which agency has the lead.¹³ Shared vision blends both concepts. Specifically, shared vision should link actions in the field to the broader policy aim, identify a lead agency, and in turn, give each agency some understanding of how its efforts fit together with other agencies for a broader purpose. Therefore, when examining the Greek case, the question this study posed was, How do all elements achieve an understanding of how their efforts contribute to the broader policy goals?

The third requirement is selfless cooperation. Selfless cooperation occurs when various agencies act in ways that contribute to the overarching effort, even if those actions are contrary to their parent organization’s interests. Flournoy’s horizontal integration concept—where various agencies work together as a team—is an important part of selfless cooperation. However, this criterion takes teamwork one step farther, since it demands employees prioritize U.S. government interests over their parent agency’s interests, within the authorized limits. Unity of effort cannot occur only when it is convenient. Therefore, when examining the case, the question this study posed was, how did various elements resolve conflicts

between the interagency organization's goals and the goals of their parent organization?

Clearly, an interagency organization must meet all three requirements to truly achieve strong unity of effort. By examining a relevant historical case where U.S. leaders abroad successfully achieved each of these three requirements, one can glean specific and useful lessons that apply today. The U.S. mission to Greece between 1947 and 1949 is such a relevant historical case.

THE 1947–1949 U.S. MISSION TO GREECE: A RELEVANT CASE OF UNIFIED EFFORT

The U.S. mission to Greece from 1947–1949 is an example of an effective and unified, embassy-led, interagency SSR effort that ended a lingering conflict without the use of combat troops. There are many aspects of the Greek case that make it an appropriate historical analogy.

First, not unlike today, the years following World War II saw severely limited American political will to intervene overseas with combat troops. Today, President Obama noted how “the tide of war is receding,” and that, when possible, alternatives to combat troops are preferred.¹⁴ Likewise, despite some limited planning, policymakers never seriously considered deploying combat troops to Greece in the late 1940s due to political infeasibility.¹⁵ This trend came to its pinnacle in 1949 when the U.S. stood by as Chinese Communists took over mainland China during the Chinese Civil War.¹⁶ Like today, the U.S. in the late 1940s faced the onset of a period of extremely limited political will to commit ground troops to satisfy its foreign policy ambitions.

Second, with its limited resources, the U.S. began to square off in 1947 against degraded but not defeated enemies who enjoyed cross-border sanctuary. In March 1948 during the early days of the American efforts in Greece, AMAG's Chief, Dwight Griswold, described how Greek insurgents lost the initiative but were still highly capable because they could attack and control key population centers.¹⁷ Similarly, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq noted in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 2011, “al-Qaeda in Iraq is degraded but determined, [and] . . . Shi'a extremist groups continue to be a serious threat.” In addition, in 1947 and 1948, the Greek rebels enjoyed support from and sanctuary in Albania and Yugoslavia.¹⁸ Likewise, in Iraq, al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed terrorist sanctuaries have not yet been fully addressed, according to influential historians and strategy advisers Kimberly and Frederick Kagan.¹⁹

Third, in both cases, an ongoing political crisis threatens stability. The Kagans are among the most vocal of those who

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point out how the well-known and ongoing political crisis in Iraq threatens to undo hard-fought gains. Likewise, the U.S. in Greece faced similarly volatile divisions between Communist sympathizers, a right-wing authority often accused of oppression, and several other disaffected groups. In Greece as in Iraq, the U.S. sought an adequate but not perfect solution to governance. In a 1948 paper, the National Security Council staff described U.S. governance efforts as, “strengthen[ing] the Greek Government sufficiently to enable it to withstand Communist pressure.”²⁰ Similarly, in 2009, President Obama stated that, in Iraq, “What we will not do is let the pursuit of perfect stand in the way of achievable goals.”²¹

Clearly, similarities between the Greek and Iraqi cases abound. Because of these parallels, the U.S. mission to Greece might be among the best cases to inform contemporary efforts in Iraq.

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

During World War II, Nazi Germany brutally occupied Greece. During the occupation, a diverse group of factions united under Communist leadership. Most Greeks supported the movement because of its ability to frustrate the Germans. After the Axis withdrawal, British troops attempted to reestablish the status quo by reinstalling the pre-war right-wing government. The Communist-based resistance found this unacceptable and began to foment instability.²²

In August 1946, the Greek government asked London and Washington for help. By October, the resistance had evolved into a full-fledged Communist insurgency calling itself the Democratic People’s Army with ties to the Soviet Union. Beginning to see the need to counter a potential Soviet “encirclement” of free nations, U.S. officials began to recognize the growing threat at-hand.²³

In January 1947, President Truman dispatched Paul A. Porter, a recently retired political appointee, to assess the situation in Greece and to make recommendations for what to do there.

EARLY 1947: THE PORTER ASSESSMENT AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

In January 1947, President Truman dispatched Paul A. Porter, a recently retired political appointee, to assess the situation in Greece and to make recommendations for what to do there.²⁴ Although the Administration called Porter’s mission the American Economic Mission to Greece, the State Department also instructed Porter to assess reconstruction needs and aid requirements. Porter maintained a meticulous diary of his observations, and on April 30 he submitted his report to the President.

Porter’s assessment and report were remarkably complete, objective, and thorough. Porter met with a wide array of Greek personalities and visited many locations. In his inquiry, Porter sought detailed, rather than broad answers. Instead of only meeting

government officials, Porter obtained counter-perspectives from experts outside of government, and he checked their claims with field observations. Porter also avoided making conclusions based on the input of any one official. Porter was often able to make recommendations that could generate both short and long-term benefits.

As Porter finished his report, important deliberations were taking place in Washington to determine what the U.S. needed to do in Greece to address Soviet expansion. In early March, Truman proposed an ambitious aid program to Greece and Turkey to blunt the expansion. His speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, titled, “Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” also became known as the “Truman Doctrine,” and it marked the beginning of the U.S. containment strategy.

While Truman’s March 1947 speech was a historic milestone, historians do not often cite the particulars of the speech regarding his approach to Greece. In it, Truman described three elegant lines of effort for Greece: 1) economic development (toward a “stable and self-sustaining economy”); 2) security force development (toward a Greek military that can “cope with the situation”); and 3) governance (toward a Greek government that can effectively conduct “public administration”).

Despite the detailed work behind his assessment, Porter’s final report to the Administration was similarly elegant. In a tightly-written 29-page report, Porter recommended specific economic and governance lines of effort and key objectives along each. In fact, Truman’s broad lines of effort seem to leap straight from Porter’s assessment.²⁵ Figure 1 on page 8, depicts the U.S. approach to Greece in both ways. Along the left side, the figure shows Truman’s lines of effort. Within those broad lines, Figure 1 also depicts Porter’s four economic and four governance lines of effort and the associated objectives. While no such diagram existed in 1947, it depicts how Truman and Porter might have conceptualized the U.S. effort in Greece.

Congress appropriated \$400 million (just over \$4 billion in 2011 dollars) in economic and military assistance to Greece in May 1947. President Truman established AMAG, appointed the politically ambitious former Nebraska Governor Dwight Griswold to lead it, and sent him to Athens to work alongside career diplomat Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh. AMAG’s mission was to “advance reconstruction and secure recovery in Greece as soon as possible.”²⁶ AMAG also established the 50-man U.S. Army Group–Greece, led by Major General William G. Livesay, which was to procure supplies and equipment for the Greek National Army. Throughout the summer of 1947, Ambassador MacVeagh, Griswold, and Livesay began their work in Athens.

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AMAG’s mission was to “advance reconstruction and secure recovery in Greece as soon as possible.”




Figure 1. Author's depiction of the April 30, 1947, Porter Report.

LATE 1947: LACK OF UNITY CAUSES AMAG FAILURE

While there were several problems with the U.S. approach in 1947, poor coordination between civilian leaders and military leaders within the embassy stood out as among the worst.

Despite loosely following the plan in Paul A. Porter's report, the initial U.S. efforts were disorganized and, consequently, inadequate. While there were several problems with the U.S. approach in 1947, poor coordination between civilian leaders and military leaders within the embassy stood out as among the worst.

Indeed, in 1947 a paralyzing friction between Ambassador MacVeagh and Governor Griswold quickly set in. While the initial arrangement specified that MacVeagh was to focus on diplomacy and governance, and that Griswold was to focus specifically on the distribution of economic and military aid, Griswold found it difficult to stay in his lane. For example, when MacVeagh argued against deploying U.S. combat troops to Greece, Griswold sent a telegram directly to Secretary Marshall favoring the opposite.²⁷

And, even though Griswold was told to avoid interfering in Greek political matters, he used aid funds to leverage personnel changes in the Greek government, despite MacVeagh's intent to take a more deliberate approach. In fact, Griswold went so far as to tell officials in Washington that, in his opinion, MacVeagh's approach "alarmed" him and suggested that MacVeagh's ideas threatened the overall mission.²⁸ The friction between MacVeagh and Griswold finally came to a head when Griswold appeared complicit in the release of *The New York Times* article titled, "Griswold, Most Powerful Man in Greece," which further increased the divide between the Ambassador and the AMAG chief. By the end of 1947, it was clear to policymakers in Washington that something had to change.

Original documents also suggest that General Livesay's efforts were not optimally integrated into those of the overall mission. For example, during the important policy discussions in Athens and Washington in the summer of 1947 about the question of U.S. troop presence, Livesay's name is noticeably absent from the discussion. In fact, not a single document in the official historical record mentions any advice from Livesay on this question.²⁹ Notably, as senior U.S. officials in Washington and Athens began to realize that their limited approach was not working, MacVeagh said that a "superior officer of broader vision" was needed. In early 1948, as policymakers considered a new way forward, Secretary of State Marshall concluded that the U.S. mission needed "a more impressive personality at the head of the military contingent," and that this need was "urgent."³⁰

Due to lack of unity between the various civilian and military elements within the U.S. Embassy in Athens, signs of AMAG's progress in 1947 were few to nil. Despite the arrival of new military aid, according to some estimates, the strength of guerilla forces increased sharply in 1947.³¹ A Greek government-led military campaign failed to isolate the guerillas. By the end of 1947, the Greek army found itself back in the static defense of major population centers. In addition, governance and economic conditions were no better than they were a year before. On January 6, 1948, the newly established U.S. National Security Council circulated a classified assessment throughout the government and concluded, "the Greek Government rests upon a weak foundation and Greece is in a deplorable economic state."³² Clearly, in 1947, little had been accomplished in Greece.

Due to lack of unity between the various civilian and military elements within the U.S. Embassy in Athens, signs of AMAG's progress in 1947 were few to nil.

JANUARY 1948: UNITY OF EFFORT BECOMES A TOP PRIORITY

In September 1947, the State Department asked Army Chief of Staff General Dwight Eisenhower to send a special representative to Greece to survey the military situation and make recommendations

on how to improve it. On October 20th, Army Major General S. J. Chamberlin, submitted his report to Eisenhower with straightforward recommendations—to succeed in Greece, the U.S. mission needed to provide more effective advice to the Greek army and better unify its efforts in the field.³³ In a January 1947 paper, the National Security Council staff concluded that, since “effective implementation of U.S. policy [has been] hampered by lack of centralized control,” future U.S. efforts must be better coordinated and that one individual oversee all U.S. activities in Greece.³⁴ Clearly, by making unity of effort a top priority while still refraining from employing combat troops, the U.S. would begin to apply the full measures of SSR.

In December 1947, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal established the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) for Greece, and in February 1948, General Eisenhower appointed former WW II, corps commander Major General James Van Fleet as its first director, offering him a promotion to lieutenant general. Eisenhower told Griswold that Van Fleet was “one of the outstanding aggressive fighting corps commanders of the campaign in Europe.”³⁵ On the civilian side, illness forced Ambassador MacVeagh to return to the U.S. in October 1947, leaving Governor Griswold as the *de facto* overall leader of the U.S. mission. While Griswold stayed on in Athens for several more months, Truman appointed long-time diplomat and international commerce expert Henry F. Grady as the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece in May 1948, and told him that he would have overall control of the embassy and AMAG.

By focusing on unifying and synchronizing its efforts, the U.S. fully implemented [Security Sector Reform] and achieved long-term success in Greece.

1948–1949: ACHIEVING SUCCESS THROUGH UNITY OF EFFORT

While most accounts of the Greek Civil War focus on the military campaigns of 1948 and 1949, the economic and governance efforts during the same period are often overlooked. Consequently, the real story of America’s unified approach in Greece has yet to be fully told. By focusing on unifying and synchronizing its efforts, the U.S. fully implemented SSR and achieved long-term success in Greece.

The military successes of 1948 and 1949 were far from insignificant. Van Fleet and his Greek counterpart designed a brilliant offensive campaign that exploited the success of small-scale clearing operations to build the army’s confidence and enable subsequent decisive operations to isolate and then destroy guerilla strongholds in the mountains of northern Greece.³⁶ Yet, taken together with a more detailed security assistance line of effort, the U.S. in Greece significantly revamped the military aspects of the overall mission. Although the military campaign lasted two years instead of one as planned, the U.S. mission in Greece had achieved

nearly each objective along all lines of effort by the end of 1949.³⁷ Consequently, Greece defeated a Communist insurgency with only material and advisory support from the U.S.

Yet, despite significant military success, perhaps the most significant progress was non-military. In fact, AMAG moved aggressively along both the economic and governance lines of effort and by March 1948 had achieved what Truman called “limited but measurable success.” In its first quarterly report to Congress since reorienting its efforts, AMAG specifically addressed nearly every objective along the established lines of effort. For example, along the agriculture and fishing line of effort, AMAG reported an increase in fishing fleet capacity due to the installation of refrigeration and the increase of agricultural output from 60 to 85 percent of pre-war levels. Other significant objectives achieved included the drafting of civil service reform legislation, the establishment of effective rent controls, the announcement of a balanced budget proposal, and the implementation of inflation control measures—each a specific objective in the Porter report.³⁸ In a subsequent quarterly report, Truman cited similar details, claiming that non-military efforts significantly contributed to the momentum of military gains. By mid-1949, the U.S. mission saw progress along all lines of effort, reporting, “growing confidence in the [Greek] Government,” “increasing military effectiveness,” and, most importantly, declaring inflation “arrested.”³⁹

By 1950, the U.S. mission’s success was remarkably evident. In May 1950, President Truman sent letters to MacVeagh, Grady, Griswold, and Van Fleet personally thanking them for the “success,” calling it a “significant achievement of American foreign policy” and nothing less than a “victory.” In a 1952 report, the State Department noted that, “internal security had been established” by 1950.⁴⁰ Of note, when remnant guerilla forces attempted to mount an uprising in July 1950, the Greek Army suppressed the uprising without any significant external assistance. As another sign of success, the Greek army deployed a 1,200-man force to fight in the Korean War. Clearly, while the military successes in the Greek Civil War are important, any story that focuses solely on the military aspects of the campaign is incomplete. Indeed, the military successes might not have amounted to much at all if the U.S. mission in Greece had not been able to unify its efforts and create complementary successes across a broad range of efforts.

ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT IN GREECE

In contrast to the disjointed efforts of 1947, the U.S. government effort in 1948 and 1949 was better unified and, consequently, more effective. This raises the question: How did the U.S. mission in

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...the real success story of the U.S. mission to Greece is less about Van Fleet's military campaign and more about how the military and civilian agencies worked together to achieve economic and governance objectives.


Greece unify its efforts? This paper asserts that the U.S. succeeded in Greece because it achieved a remarkable degree of unity, meeting all three criteria described earlier. This section examines precisely how the U.S. was able to unify its efforts in Greece and, in turn, create a Greek military that the State Department would describe in 1952 as “among the best [in the region].”

How DID AMAG ORGANIZE ITSELF TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION?

The U.S. mission to Greece achieved its goals in two important ways. First, AMAG organized itself to address the requirements identified by the 1947 Porter assessment. By organizing itself in a non-standard way to ensure form followed function, AMAG was much more effective than it would have been if it had been organized with traditional staff sections. Second, U.S. civilian and military elements in Greece achieved a remarkable degree of integration. In fact, the real success story of the U.S. mission to Greece is less about Van Fleet's military campaign and more about how the military and civilian agencies worked together to achieve economic and governance objectives.

A large part of AMAG's success was its ability to ensure form matched function. According to an AMAG organizational chart from June 1948 (see Figure 2), AMAG mirrored the lines of effort in the Porter report.⁴¹ The agriculture, industry, reconstruction, government administration (the Civil Government Division), and foreign trade (Commerce and Supply Division) lines of effort each had a dedicated division. Perhaps because of its importance, the economic policy line of effort mentioned in the Porter report resided within both the Labor Division and with the office of the Economic Advisor. The Public Finance division performed the revenue and expenditure lines of effort in the Porter report. Of course, the military lines of effort resided with the Army Group-Greece (and later JUSMAPG). The additional functions, including public health, welfare, and aid distribution supported the other lines of effort. The alignment between the lines of effort in the original Porter report and AMAG's organization is truly remarkable evidence that form followed function.

The military efforts of JUSMAPG were well-integrated within AMAG's approach. As one official noted, “coordination without a coordinator is not to be expected.”⁴² While Ambassador Grady's appointment as the most senior U.S. official in Greece was helpful, more telling was how AMAG and JUSMAPG worked together without being formally directed to do so. For example, the military decided against buying wool uniforms because the embassy warned that the purchase would place undesirable inflationary pressure on



**Figure 2. AMAG non-standard organization
(The American Mission for Aid to Greece, courtesy of the Truman Library)**

clothing prices.⁴³ On another occasion, the embassy procured cold storage and distributed refrigerated trucks in locations that would benefit both the fishing industry and the Greek army food supply system to achieve a dual benefit. In fact, the Embassy sought dual purposes in many projects to include prioritizing road reconstruction to facilitate planned military operations and rebuilding a tire re-grooving plant to support civilian industry and Army maintenance requirements.⁴⁴ One possible factor in producing this high degree of integration could have been that the embassy assigned a significant number of military personnel to non-military efforts and offered up several of its own civilian employees to work in JUSMAPG.⁴⁵

In any event, by forming its offices after identifying critical requirements and developing projects that achieved both military and non-military effects, the U.S. mission in Greece was able to achieve mission-focused organization.

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HOW DID THE U.S. AGENCIES IN GREECE ESTABLISH A SHARED VISION?

Among the various U.S. agencies in Greece, shared vision did exist, and this shared vision was perhaps the most important component of U.S. efforts there. Specifically, the U.S. leaders in Greece did at least four important things to develop and sustain this shared vision. Taken together, these four important actions helped U.S. agencies in Greece develop one overarching vision—another essential component of unified effort.

First, the U.S. Embassy in Greece and AMAG worked aggressively toward achieving specific objectives in the original Porter report. Not unlike how AMAG aligned its divisions to the specific objectives and lines of effort in the report, AMAG's quarterly reports to Congress spoke specifically to each line of effort. Information that did not address a specific objective in the original Porter report rarely appeared in the reports to Congress. The fact that the reports focused so keenly on the Porter objectives and disregarded extraneous information suggests that employees did the same, and that they had a precise understanding of the specific tasks needed to achieve U.S. goals.

Second, the fact that the U.S. mission in Greece set focused and realistic objectives indicates that employees did not waste their time performing superfluous tasks. In other words, the U.S. mission in Greece did not set out to do everything, nor did it seek to do everything perfectly. In being focused, the U.S. mission in Greece chose to either not address certain issues or at least to address certain issues indirectly. For example, while the issue of land reform was certainly one driver of instability in Greece, the U.S. mission in Greece chose to address agricultural production instead—which was an even greater driver of instability. Paul R. Porter, who administered the Marshall Plan in Greece from 1949–1950, (not to be confused with Paul A. Porter, the author of the important 1947 report) described how “land reform was not a problem” and how the U.S. leaders made a conscious decision to prioritize the production of rice instead.⁴⁶

...the U.S. mission in Greece understood that it would have to settle for less-than-perfect.

In being realistic, the U.S. mission in Greece understood that it would have to settle for less-than-perfect. For example, in a letter dated December 1949, Ambassador Grady wrote, “the key...is not to be too ambitious,” and that the U.S. mission in Greece must “cut [its] suit from the cloth we have.”⁴⁷ The U.S. mission in Greece also sought to ensure that the Greek army was not perfect but “sufficient to get the job done.” For example, at one point, when the Greeks asked for more trucks, the embassy chose to buy mules instead because they were less expensive and better suited for mountain operations. Likewise, the *USAGG History* noted, “no consideration was given

to the natural national aspiration of the Greek government for a large and permanent armed forces,” because the goal was merely to “assist the country in meeting an existing situation.” Clearly, by focusing efforts toward realistic objectives, the U.S. mission in Greece would be able to achieve more success with limited resources.

Third, the existence of phased and sequenced objectives suggests that people working along one line were aware of how their work affected the work of others. Van Fleet’s military campaign plan is an excellent example of the use of phases to consolidate gains in one effort before proceeding to the next. Yet, what many case studies on the Greek Civil War fail to recognize is how governance and economic development efforts were similarly phased. For example, Paul R. Porter noted that U.S. leaders knew that security improvements would pave the way for many development projects.⁴⁸ More specifically, however, in his third quarterly report to Congress in May 1948, Truman described how the U.S. sought to control inflation and establish the foundation for agricultural production. Truman continued, stating that there would be further efforts to exploit agricultural progress by establishing trade agreements and by improving the Greek government’s ability to manage its budget.

Fourth, by employing consolidated metrics to monitor their progress, both civilian and military employees had a shared understanding of overall progress. For example, in the embassy there was only one set of metrics—JUSMAPG did not have a separate set of its own. In fact, all reports to Washington went through the embassy. Furthermore, the measures they chose were meaningful. For example, by monitoring the trends of the number of people who traveled on the roads between cities and rural areas, officials could determine if security improvements were improving the population’s freedom of movement and economic activity.⁴⁹

Despite occasional friction between Van Fleet and Grady, observers in 1948 noted that the U.S. mission was getting results because all parties were now working toward the same overarching purpose. In fact, a visiting official noted that giving Grady overall responsibility did much to improve the situation from the way it was in 1947.⁵⁰ And, unlike the situation with Griswold in 1947, Van Fleet continued to forward his correspondence to Washington through Grady no matter what tensions arose.

Despite occasional friction between Van Fleet and Grady, observers in 1948 noted that the U.S. mission was getting results because all parties were now working toward the same overarching purpose.

HOW DID AGENCIES PLACE THE INTERESTS OF THE OVERALL MISSION FIRST?

This study found that selfless cooperation was another essential component of unified effort in Greece. At least three examples show how a U.S. senior official set aside his parent agency’s interests to pursue the interests of the interagency mission in Greece.

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In the first example, Van Fleet set aside his interest in an expedient end to the insurgency to accommodate Ambassador Grady's governance interests. In January 1949, certain members in the Greek and U.S. governments favored placing the top Greek general atop a new Greek authoritarian regime. Although Van Fleet surely understood the benefits to his military mission of having a more powerful partner who could bring effective leadership to the Greek military, Van Fleet remained silent in the January discussions among U.S. policymakers.⁵¹ It appeared that Van Fleet set aside any interests of having a strongman leader and deferred his interests to Ambassador Grady's interests in promoting a more representative regime.

In the second example, Grady set aside his interests in having positive diplomatic relations with Britain to pursue Van Fleet's military interests. In the spring of 1949, under pressure from London to show more rapid progress in Greece, the head of the British military mission urged the Greek army to focus in northern Greece and Greek Macedonia.⁵² Preserving positive relations with the British in Greece was important in those days, since the U.K.'s presence in Greece—albeit small—was critical to portraying a unified Western front against Communism. Nevertheless, Grady set diplomatic interests aside to back Van Fleet's plan to put off operations in northern Greece and pursue a more deliberate approach instead.

In the third example, Grady resisted calls from the State Department to pursue a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In the summer of 1949, the Greek government dealt a significant military blow to the insurgents, accumulated increased popular support, and saw the disappearance of a key guerilla sanctuary. Yet, rather than succumbing to several calls to seek an early negotiated settlement (including one from White House Chief of Staff Dean Rusk), Grady instead put his faith in Van Fleet and his plans for a final decisive military blow to the rebels.⁵³

Each of these examples suggest that, on several occasions, State and Defense Department officials set aside the parochial interests of their agency in favor of the interests of the overall U.S. mission to Greece. Yet, this spirit of selfless cooperation did not simply emerge on its own. By establishing a mission-focused organization, fostering a shared vision, and ensuring selfless cooperation, the U.S. mission in Greece in 1948 and 1949 was able to achieve an effect that was truly greater than the sum of its parts.

Implications for Embassy-led SSR in Iraq

Despite lingering violence in Iraq, President Obama described how he intends to establish lasting peace and security in Iraq through unified governance, economic, and security cooperation efforts without the use of U.S. combat troops. As it did in Greece, the U.S. is once again trying to use embassy-led SSR to finish off an insurgency. As Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen wrote, Iraq “remains imperiled by roiling ethno-sectarian tensions and their consequent security threats.” And, as the Kagans noted recently, the two principal challenges in Iraq remain the tenuous security situation and the worrisome political situation.

The OSC-I and the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad is well aware of these challenges, having written, “Iraq remains a bureaucratically difficult and semi-permissive environment.”⁵⁴ As formidable as these challenges might be, the Greek case suggests that there is a third and even greater challenge for the USM-I—the challenge of achieving the remarkably high degree of unity of effort that a State-led, post-transition SSR mission requires.

The formative months ahead at the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad provide an opportunity to make sure the big ideas are right. In fact, in a February interview with the *San Francisco Examiner*, former Undersecretary of Defense Flournoy stated that the nature of the long-term U.S.-Iraq security partnership has yet to be fully defined, and that bilateral discussions on these important issues will take place in the months to come. This study indicates that there are at least three implications from the Greek case that USM-I leaders should consider as it shapes the future U.S.-Iraq relationship. First, the Greek case reinforces the importance of using a thorough assessment to guide SSR efforts. Second, the Greek case shows how U.S. military efforts must be extraordinarily well-integrated with embassy efforts and oriented toward the key issues identified in the assessment. Third, the Greek case demonstrates the importance of identifying specific objectives and metrics—especially regarding non-military efforts.

First, as the U.S. Embassy and OSC-I embark upon their new missions, they should do so guided by a good assessment. This study describes how the Paul A. Porter assessment guided U.S. efforts in Greece. For Iraq, such an assessment already exists. The 2002 Future of Iraq assessment is strikingly similar to Paul A. Porter’s 1947 assessment, and it could prove equally useful if updated. From July 2002 through April 2003, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs convened a series of working groups composed

The 2002 Future of Iraq assessment is strikingly similar to Paul A. Porter’s 1947 assessment, and it could prove equally useful if updated.

of a diverse group of Iraqi experts. The Near East Bureau produced a classified, 1,200-page assessment with specific recommendations along 12 distinct, post-invasion lines of effort. Much of this assessment has now been declassified and is available online.⁵⁵ Like the Porter assessment, the Future of Iraq assessment did not recommend all-encompassing nation-building; rather, it focused on key objectives along critical lines of effort. For example, the economy and infrastructure report identified six essential objectives including the establishment of a foreign investment outreach entity and the cessation of certain central bank policies that exacerbated inflation. The Greek case shows how an assessment like this might prove invaluable in unifying U.S. government efforts and help Iraq end its insurgency.

Second, USM-I should ensure that its civil-military efforts are extremely well-integrated and oriented toward the requirements identified by the assessment. It is clear to all U.S. military personnel in Baghdad that their boss, Lieutenant General Caslen, reports to Ambassador Jeffrey. Yet the Greek case shows how unity of command in itself is not enough to generate true unity of effort—where the whole effort is greater than the sum of individual agency efforts. OSC-I’s draft mission statement and lines of effort expressed in their strategic plan indicate that it is off to a good start in nesting its efforts with those of the Embassy. Nevertheless, there is always room for improvement, and the Greek case could help identify additional opportunities for improved cooperation. For example, OSC-I describes several Iraqi Security Force modernization objectives, including foreign military sales, equipment procurement, sustainment, and facility improvement.⁵⁶ These areas are where the Greek example of overlapping economic development efforts at the military truck tire manufacturing plant could be informative. OSC-I and the Embassy should look for every opportunity to similarly integrate security force modernization objectives with economic development objectives.

Undoubtedly, after years of war, the men and women at the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I are well-prepared to tackle the challenge of interagency cooperation.

Further, U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I should ensure their staffs match the specific lines of effort identified by an assessment, as AMAG did in Greece. Although current USM-I organization tables were not publicly available at the time of publication, this could involve significant reorganization. Yet, by overlapping civil-military efforts, developing a common approach toward common objectives, and ensuring form follows function, USM-I can maximize its ability to unify efforts and generate lasting results in Iraq.

Third, the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I should develop shared metrics. In the Greek case, the U.S. Embassy–Athens consolidated input from the civilian and the military sides and submitted one quarterly report based on shared metrics. The Greek

case demonstrated how ensuring that U.S. civilian and military personnel in Greece used the same set of metrics became a key enabler of unified effort. In contrast, Congress has been receiving at least three separate reports on Iraq: one from State, one from DoD, and one from the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction. Although Congress is responsible for dictating the reporting requirements, finding a way to consolidate reports to meet all of Congress's needs could go a long way toward further improving interagency unity of effort. And, while there is no evidence in open sources that suggests Congress is revising its reporting requirements, it is highly likely that it is, given the profound shift of the mission in Iraq. If USM-I were to produce an updated assessment that oriented efforts as clearly as the Porter assessment did in the Greek case, then it would be easy to imagine how appreciative Congress might be as it develops its new reporting requirements.

Undoubtedly, after years of war, the men and women at the U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I are well-prepared to tackle the challenge of interagency cooperation. Nevertheless, the case of the U.S. response to the Greek Civil War suggests that unifying interagency efforts is among the essential ingredients to a successful State-led effort to conduct SSR and to defeat a lingering insurgency without any combat troops on the ground. And, as seen in the Greek case, the degree of unity of effort needed to perform embassy-led SSR is extraordinarily high. That said, the Greek case's implications for Iraq are particularly important. By updating the 2002 Future of Iraq assessment, USM-I can develop a shared civil-military understanding of the lines of effort and objectives that both U.S. Embassy–Baghdad and OSC-I must pursue. By developing their lines of effort and objectives together in a common setting on a common document, both the Embassy and OSC-I can ensure they are oriented and organized to get the most out of their efforts. And, by developing a set of shared metrics, USM-I can further improve unity of effort and develop a consolidated report that could facilitate, among other things, streamlined Congressional oversight.

Conclusion

Neither Ambassadors MacVeagh or Grady nor Lieutenant General Van Fleet went on to achieve great fame; nevertheless, their efforts in Greece were extremely consequential, ensuring that Greece would never again fall under Soviet influence. In 1948, President Truman called upon MacVeagh once again to serve in a critical post in Lisbon during the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Grady went on to serve as Ambassador to Iran. And,

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in 1951, the Army sent Van Fleet to Korea where he led the Eighth U.S. Army to several stunning military victories. Although none of them sought the limelight, it is clear that MacVeagh, Grady, and Van Fleet were exceptional leaders of their time, and their actions are truly worth emulating. In Greece, their ability to unify the efforts of their organizations—arguably unlike any U.S. interagency effort before or since—enabled the U.S. to defeat a residual insurgency without the commitment of a single U.S. combat soldier.

This paper highlights the extraordinary level of unified effort needed to successfully perform embassy-led SSR. In Iraq, as in Greece, civilian and military leaders must sharpen their shared understanding of the situation, integrate their efforts, and establish well-defined objectives and metrics. Informed by the Greek case study, this paper recommends that the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad and OSC-I update the 2002 Future of Iraq assessment, develop common lines of effort and objectives based on that assessment, and develop specific metrics to monitor and maximize their efforts.

Amid growing resource constraints, interagency cooperation will increasingly be an essential component of future U.S. endeavors. Although some have claimed that the problem of unifying effort is a new one, history reveals that the problem is not new at all. Indeed, the Greek case demonstrates how history can be an important guide. Although Iraq is a far less dangerous place than it was years ago, security remains tenuous. And although the U.S. continues to send its very best to Baghdad to solidify the gains so many have fought so hard to produce, this paper offers a sliver of perspective that might help them along the way. **IAP**

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Rethinking the Interagency Role in Preventing Conflict in Dealing with Failing or Failed States

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Rethinking the Interagency Role in Preventing Conflict in Dealing with Failing or Failed States

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Sarkar’s *Rethinking the Interagency Role in Preventing Conflict in Dealing with Failing or Failed States* won third place in the Simons Center Interagency Writing Competition conducted from September 2011 through March 2012.

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Introduction

Contingency operations are currently taking place in dangerous, unpredictable, and highly volatile environments where local government institutions have weakened or collapsed. In view of these conflict situations, it is recognized that the initial task of the military (whether national or multilateral) is to provide security. However, providing security alone is not sufficient. Instituting and enforcing security measures by the military is merely the first step that permits other actors to take an active role in implementing critical strategic and tactical measures in initiating stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. In this context, coordinating a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach becomes vital in facilitating the local actors to move past the conflict.¹

While the pivotal importance of the military's role in peacekeeping is generally acknowledged, it is also recognized that this role must be fully integrated with the political, diplomatic, and economic efforts of the groups in conflict, international organizations, nongovernment organizations, the media, and other non-state actors.² The question is how to coordinate the different institutional actors carrying out these complex and interrelated functions with their varying objectives, timelines, and mandates.

This topic specifically addresses one of the most serious challenges of the U.S. government in a post-9/11 world. Before addressing this complex and multi-faceted subject, however, certain prefatory issues must be defined and examined.

The initial question is: Where are such "failing or failed states" located, and what causes such states to fail in the first instance? Second, why should the U.S. government take on the task of preventing conflict in such conflict or post-conflict zones? Finally, will intervention reduce the conflict and move the failed or failing state toward the path of stabilization and reconstruction? Or, in other words, what should be the government's short- and long-term political objectives in undertaking conflict prevention?

In light of the challenge posed above, this essay will:

- Examine the questions discussed above to set the stage for a fuller discussion of the national interests that may propel the United States into undertaking such a complex, difficult, and long-term goal of inter-agency cooperation in this context.

Instituting and enforcing security measures by the military is merely the first step that permits other actors to take an active role...

- Critically review the current obstacles and roadblocks to achieving interagency cooperation to address long-term issues of preventing conflict in failing and failed states.
- Propose a practical, solutions-based approach to achieve the goal of interagency cooperation as a way forward.

Setting the Stage: Why Do Certain Nations Fail?

...there is no one single accepted government definition of what constitutes a failing or failed state.

At the outset, it is important to recognize that there is no one single accepted U.S. government definition of what constitutes a failing or failed state.³ The Department of State defines fragile states as those “unable to provide physical security and basic services for their citizens due to lack of control over physical territory, massive corruption, criminal capture of government institutions, feudal gaps between rich and poor, an absence of social responsibility by elites, or simply grinding poverty and the absence of any tradition of functioning government.”⁴ According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), fragile includes failed, failing, and recovering states.⁵ USAID also proposed the “fragility framework” as the means for analyzing governance in fragile states.⁶

DEFINITIONS

The National Security Strategy (2010)⁷ and the National Military Strategy (2011)⁸ do not define “failing or failed states.” The National Military Strategy, however, warns of the danger of failed states: “States with weak, failing, and corrupt governments will increasingly be used as a safe haven for an expanding array of non-state actors that breed conflict and endanger stability, particularly in Africa and the broader Middle East.”⁹

Perhaps the most complete definition of failing states is contained in the U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, which sets forth the following definitions:

A *fragile state* is a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. These weaknesses arise from several root causes, including ineffective governance, criminalization of the state, economic failure, external aggression, and internal strife due to disenfranchisement of large sections of the population. . . .¹⁰

The term fragile state refers to the broad spectrum of failed, failing, and recovering states. The distinction among them is

rarely clear, as fragile states do not travel a predictable path to failure or recovery. The difference between a recovering and failed state may be minimal, as the underlying conditions, such as insurgency or famine, may drive a state to collapse in a relatively short period. It is far more important to understand how far and quickly a state is moving from or toward stability. The fragile states framework, developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, provides a model for applying U.S. development assistance in fragile states. This framework serves to inform understanding for intervening actors, providing a graphic tool that describes the conditions of the operational environment. . . .¹¹

Fragile states can be defined as either vulnerable or in crisis. **A vulnerable state is a nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population.** In vulnerable states, the legitimacy of the central government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. **A crisis state is a nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory.** It is unable or unwilling to provide security and essential services for significant portions of the population. In crisis states, the central government may be weak, nonexistent, or simply unable or unwilling to provide security or basic services. This includes states that are failing or have failed altogether, where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.¹²

The lack of accepted definitions of what constitutes failing or failed states reflects and perhaps perpetuates the difference in perspectives of the various government agencies dealing with failed states. These agencies and departments include, but are not limited to, State Department, USAID, and the Departments of Defense (DoD), Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, and Homeland Security. In spite of these differences, “the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation. This is the essence of *unified action*: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.”¹³

Moreover, two more important distinctions should be made, first, the need to create a whole-of-government approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.¹⁴ Indeed, a successful whole-of-government approach requires that all actors:

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- Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process.
- Share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved.
- Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
- Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities.
- Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal.¹⁵

Further, in thinking ahead, the U.S. government should partner with its allies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, private sector entities, and others in forging a *comprehensive approach* to dealing with failing and failed states.¹⁶

IDENTIFYING FAILING AND FAILED STATES

Aside from definitional issues, there is also no generally accepted agreement on which nations have failed or are at risk of failing.

Aside from definitional issues, there is also no generally accepted agreement on which nations have failed or are at risk of failing. Popular indices of measuring such failures include the Brookings Institute Index of State Weakness, the George Mason University State Fragility Index, the World Bank at Risk States Index, the U.S. Department of State Foreign Assistance Framework, the U.S. Institute of Peace Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments framework, and the National Intelligence Council Internal Stability Watchlist.

In a collaboration between *Foreign Policy* and the Fund for Peace, the 2011 Failed States Index lists the following nations as the top twelve “failed states”: Somalia, Chad, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Pakistan.¹⁷ The U.S. has fought valiantly in Afghanistan and Iraq, that rank, rather disappointingly, seventh and ninth respectively on this list. Also, alarmingly, Pakistan rounds out the top dozen. Does this mean that the United States owes the same duty of intervention in all the failed states on this list? Thankfully, not.

U.S. Response to Failing and Failed States: Federal Laws and Interagency Coordination

The strategic-level chain of command for dealing with failing states is defined in the *Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008* (the Act).¹⁸ Section 1604(a)(1) of the Act provides that:

If the President determines that it is *in the national security interests of the United States* for United States civilian agencies or non-Federal employees to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife, the President may . . . notwithstanding any other provision of law, and on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, furnish assistance to such country or region for reconstruction or stabilization. . . .¹⁹ (Emphasis added.)

Finding a legally-mandated “national interest” that justifies engaging in an overseas contingency operation²⁰ and the political will to exercise it are difficult tasks for this, or any other, administration. In reality, not all failing or failed states pose a national security threat to the U.S.

Somalia, for example, has been listed as #1 on the Failed State Index for the past four years and has not had a functioning national government in over 20 years. While this alone may not necessarily pose a compelling national security threat to the U.S., Somalia is problematic insofar as international pirating operations are being launched from its territory.²¹ In contrast, mass killings in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan have not elicited a U.S. national security response to date.²² (Historically, the same was true in Rwanda and Burundi.)²³

States fail for a multiplicity of difficult, thorny, inter-connected, and disconnected reasons that are difficult to organize into neat categories. Clearly, a fuller discussion of why states fail lies outside the scope of this article.²⁴ One organizing principle to consider is that state failures only rise to the level of affecting U.S. national interests when there is a nexus between the activities of the collapsed or failing state and U.S. strategic political, military, or economic interests. So, generally speaking, imploding states like Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, or Guinea do not pose a national security threat to the U.S., but Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Somalia do pose a real or existential threat.

One of the reasons it has been difficult to develop U.S. national policy on failing and failed states is because the problems underlying such failures are generally so intractable. Notwithstanding the difficulty of formulating a national strategy, however, “one of the standing critiques of the Obama administration’s foreign policy is that, though the president has spoken frequently of the danger posed by state failure, he has never formulated a coherent policy to prevent or cure it.”²⁵

Regardless of the underlying political and practical considerations that may be in play, once a national security interest determination

One of the reasons it has been difficult to develop U.S. national policy on failing and failed states is because the problems underlying such failures are generally so intractable.

National Security Presidential Directive 44 specifies that the “Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans where relevant and appropriate.”

is made under the Act, the President is authorized to use funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, subject to a 15-day notification to Congress as required by Section 634 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Further, the President must also furnish a written policy justification to Congress’s Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees subject to the provisions of Section 614(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act, prior to using such funds.²⁶

This Act also formally recognizes the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the State Department, created in June 2004 by former Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The Act gives the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization the “mandate to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize United States Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations and help reconstruct and stabilize a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife.”²⁷

The Act formally references National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) that gives the Secretary of State, with the Coordinator’s assistance, the lead role in developing reconstruction and stabilization strategies. The Secretary is also given the responsibility to coordinate with the DoD on reconstruction and stabilization responses and to integrate their planning and implementing procedures.²⁸ Further, NSPD-44 specifies that the “Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans where relevant and appropriate.”²⁹

Thus, NSPD-44 gives a fairly detailed roadmap for State to take the lead in coordinating responses for reconstruction and stabilization and related interagency processes, such as resolving relevant policy, program, and funding disputes among departments and agencies and working with expatriate and foreign individuals and organizations related to such activities.

The State Department has also fleshed out its own responsibilities in its first “2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power,” where it announced that the Civilian Reserve Corps may be replaced with an Expert Corps that will work with experts outside the government to deploy quickly to the field where contingency operations are taking place.³⁰ Also pursuant to the review, State announced the formation and reorganization of a number of its bureaus beginning on January 5, 2012. Principally, for purposes of this discussion, the S/CRS became the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations led by a new Assistant Secretary. The mandate for this new Bureau is to advance U.S. national security by “driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states,

setting the conditions for long-term peace.”³¹

This organizational change may address one of the structural problems with the S/CRS, which was expected to report directly to the Secretary of State. No doubt, this became unwieldy over time and has been addressed by this reorganizational change where an Assistant Secretary of State will now provide an intermediate level of supervision, review, and direction before any decision-making is taken up with the Secretary of State.

USAID also announced recently that it was changing the name of its Office of Military Affairs to the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation. “This change reflects the office’s evolving role in facilitating civilian-military cooperation, and better conveys the mission of the office—to improve communication, mutual understanding and cooperation between USAID and the Department of Defense.”³²

In addition, innumerable other government agencies and independent organizations have issued thoughtful and thorough guidance on coordinating interagency efforts in dealing with complex operations, including the Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation.³³

Nevertheless, despite a wealth of statutory and handbook guidance, there are still significant obstacles and barriers to facilitating successful interagency cooperation in dealing with failing and failed states. The following discussion will address some of these issues.

Problems in Interagency Coordination

Problems related to interagency coordination efforts in dealing with failing and failed states are essentially three-fold in nature: (1) structural, (2) cultural, and, (3) practical.

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

General William “Kip” Ward in looking back on his experience as Commander of the United States Africa Command describes its mandate as being “interagency-oriented.”³⁴ Africa Command, in his words, reflected the “3-D” approach of diplomacy, defense, and development efforts of State, DoD, and USAID that were designed to take place in mutually supportive and complementary ways.³⁵ But he points out that:

Often turning requirements into security assistance programs in Africa requires considering options that combine defense (Title 10 [of the U.S. Code]) with non-

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defense (Title 22 [of the U.S. Code]) appropriations. Rarely are these arrangements sustainable over time. . . . This strict compartmentalization of funding sources can impede unity of effort, especially since much of the Title 22 budget tends to be earmarked for very specific purposes. The answer is not to call for changes to the legal differentiation between Title 10 and Title 22, which exists for important historical reasons regarding the separation of military and non-military matters. Rather, other U.S. government agencies need both adequate resources and increased flexibility and versatility to turn short-fused opportunities into potentially long-term and successful programs that when combined with DoD efforts represent a holistic approach to security among U.S. partners.³⁶

Title 10 is designed to provide the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of DoD and its respective service branches, and to authorize its military operations. Title 22 sets forth federal laws on foreign relations including subjects such as diplomatic and consular relations, foreign assistance, arms control, etc. Moreover, the Foreign Assistance Act (Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424, enacted September 4, 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 *et seq.*) reorganized the structure of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs, separated military from non-military aid, and created the USAID to administer those non-military, economic assistance programs. On November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act and issued Executive Order 10973.

...stove-piping of roles, functions, legal authorities, funding, and Congressional oversight obviously creates problems in achieving a unity of effort in creating a whole-of-government approach.

As General Ward correctly points out, these legal authorities cannot be easily merged since these are separate functions authorized and funded by Congress. Further, oversight of the 3-D agencies are exercised by many different committees in the U.S. Congress that have varying roles and perspectives on the functions, programs, and relations among DoD, State, and USAID. This stove-piping of roles, functions, legal authorities, funding, and Congressional oversight obviously creates problems in achieving a unity of effort in creating a whole-of-government approach.

General Ward also mentions the pivotal Goldwater-Nichols legislation³⁷ that made sweeping reforms of the U.S. military, including instilling the military doctrines of “jointness” and “interoperability.” The legislation was designed to address inter-service rivalry and the lack of cooperation during the Vietnam War and afterward. He applies the Goldwater-Nichols Act to the current interagency context by stating: “As with Goldwater-Nichols’ impact on jointness, interagency integration is about how disparate agencies work together to accomplish their respective missions under unity of

effort.”³⁸If one argues that NSPD-44 sets up the roadmap for jointness among military and non-military agencies in a similar manner as the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, does it truly accomplish this goal? One commentator bluntly concludes that “while the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required and over time improved cooperation and inter-operability among the armed services, no similar dynamic has forced fusion of the civilian agencies, let alone between civilian and military agencies.”³⁹ Thus, the answer may be a disappointing “no,” based not only on structural but also on cultural differences.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

While different U.S. military service branches have separate cultures that are reflected in their disparate roles and functions, there is an underlying commitment to the same strategic vision that cannot be compared with federal departments and agencies as dissimilar as the Departments of State, Agriculture, Justice, USAID, and others.

One factor that strongly differentiates the military from the civilian approach is based on different learning cultures. The U.S. military has doctrine; civilian agencies do not. The U.S. military also has a sophisticated approach to learning the lessons of experience and embedding those lessons learned into a system of professional education tailored to promotion and advancement. Lessons learned are archived and disseminated so that successor generations of Soldiers and Airmen may benefit from this corporate knowledge. In fact, the U.S. Army created the Center for Army Lessons Learned to manage this process.⁴⁰ By contrast, according to Michael Miklaucic:

The key civilian agencies involved in foreign policy in the U.S.—the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Homeland Security, and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development—do not have robust institutional cultures of learning. Most learning is done on the job. It is neither cumulative nor closely related to career development. It is not systematic and tends to be based on personal and anecdotal experience and absorbing the institutional culture of the home organization. Unlike the military, civilians have no doctrine; no accepted tactics, techniques and procedures; and no clear chain of command, so lessons learned are much more difficult to nest institutionally. Moreover, no civilian agency has complex operations as its core mission, so lessons from complex operations tend to get diluted and blended down into traditional diplomacy, development and defense core missions.⁴¹

“Unlike the military, civilians have no doctrine; no accepted tactics, techniques and procedures; and no clear chain of command, so lessons learned are much more difficult to nest institutionally.”

Indeed, USAID eliminated its training and evaluations office in

2005 and is now trying to re-create it.⁴³

Thus, the cultural differences between military and non-military U.S. actors are real and systemic and cannot be easily or quickly overcome. Indeed, in light of the State Department's recent announcement that it will be replacing the statutorily-mandated Civilian Reserve Corps⁴⁴ with an Expert Corps, it may not be fair to pre-judge the change and deem it a failure before it is even implemented. However, it will take time, effort, and a change in culture, mission, and chain of command in order to fully and permanently realize these interagency organizational, structural, and cultural changes already underway. In the meantime, however, practical considerations are adding a layer of urgency and new complexity to the problem.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The risks of war are dramatically shifting away from military personnel and toward civilian employees and contractors. In 2011, 418 U.S. Soldiers died in Afghanistan. By comparison, 430 employees of U.S. contractors were reported killed in Afghanistan in 2011...

An irrefutable fact is beginning to change the complexion of the problem of interagency coordination in dealing with failing and failed states. The risks of war are dramatically shifting away from military personnel and toward civilian employees and contractors. In 2011, 418 U.S. Soldiers died in Afghanistan.⁴⁵ By comparison, 430 employees of U.S. contractors were reported killed in Afghanistan in 2011; 386 worked for DoD, 43 for USAID, and one for State.⁴⁶

Under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654, U.S. defense contractors are required to report to the Department of Labor the war zone deaths and injuries of their employees, including subcontractors and foreign workers, in part, to make insurance claims for military deaths and medical compensation of the killed or injured workers. In the words of one commentator, “No one believes that we’re underreporting military death. . . [but] everyone believes that we’re underreporting contractor deaths.” Thus, many contractors’ deaths are not reported, and their survivors may be left uncompensated for these deaths. “By continuing to outsource high-risk jobs that were previously performed by soldiers, the military, in effect, is privatizing the ultimate sacrifice.”⁴⁷

Why is shifting the risk of war, or in other words of being in harm’s way, from Soldiers to civilians so important within this context? First, because it is what civilians fear the most. It is not, generally speaking, part of their undertaking in the contractual relationship with their employers: it is an unfortunate and undesired consequence. To put it more succinctly, “Even dying is being outsourced here.”⁴⁸

Second, shifting the risks of injury and death away from the military changes the nature of interagency cooperation. Indeed, this shift seems to reflect a growing trend in Afghanistan over the past several years, and it also reflects the same trend in Iraq where

civilian deaths exceeded military ones as long ago as 2009.⁴⁹ This trend inherently changes the nature of the dialogue on interagency cooperation.

The above discussion outlines some of the structural, cultural, and practical challenges in developing a sustainable interagency approach to contingency and related operations. However, before outlining some solutions-based suggestions for tackling these issues, let us first examine a field approach used in Afghanistan and Iraq to see if there are any lessons to be learned from that experience.

Both military and non-military personnel have already been deployed in a sort of “incubator” in Afghanistan and Iraq in the form of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Perhaps they deserve a closer look.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams as an Interagency Model

PRTs, established in Afghanistan at the end of 2002, were integrated, military-civilian organizations composed of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction subject-matter experts relevant to establishing stability in fragile or weak states. A PRT in Afghanistan generally consists of 60–100 personnel, commanded by a military officer generally with the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander. The team has various specialized experts such as engineers, medical staff, information and public diplomacy officers, and National Guard members to provide security. In Iraq, the team leader was a State Department official who reported directly to State, and the deputy was usually a military officer. These PRTs are focused on providing support in the functional areas of the rule of law, local capacity building, and good governance.

In focusing on Afghan PRTs, DoD was given responsibility for providing all logistical support and force protection for all PRT members, including civilians.⁵⁰ USAID was the lead agency for reconstruction, and State was responsible for political oversight, coordination, and reporting. Both military and civilian leadership in PRTs must approve all reconstruction projects and coordinate such projects with local government offices and local ministries.⁵¹

While PRTs were given flexibility in accomplishing their objectives, the lack of explicit guidance led to confusion concerning the respective roles of military and civilian members. Thus, “in the absence of broadly accepted guidance, the importance of personality, individual leadership style, and previously established relationships had inordinate influence on the effectiveness and impact of the PRT.”⁵²

While provincial reconstruction teams were given flexibility in accomplishing their objectives, the lack of explicit guidance led to confusion concerning the respective roles of military and civilian members.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are most effective where instability is still so prevalent that nongovernmental organizations are prevented from intervening, but not where violence is so extreme that combat operations predominate.

Moreover, a shortage of staff and limited technical and managerial support from Kabul also undermined the effectiveness of PRTs.⁵³ A more complicated problem was the inability to staff civilian positions with senior, experienced personnel. Many civilian slots remained vacant, and civilian employees assigned to the field often lacked the requisite knowledge and experience to be effective members of the PRT. Indeed, military staff members often had 16–20 years of experience before joining a PRT. In such cases, military members took the lead in both reconstruction projects and political engagement by default.⁵⁴

In sum, while a PRT is uniquely positioned and capable of bringing a U.S. government-led or internationally-coordinated effort to prevent civil strife and violence, it is only able to do so within a narrow band of engagement. PRTs are most effective where instability is still so prevalent that nongovernmental organizations are prevented from intervening, but not where violence is so extreme that combat operations predominate.⁵⁵

On a broader scale, NATO established a common vision and strategy for PRTs as part of the International Security Assistance Force operations plan. However, NATO does not have authority over lead-nation civilian efforts within a PRT.⁵⁶ The continuing confusion over the role and political objectives of PRTs is grounded in the difference of approach in the multiple partners in the alliance. “The United States, UK and a group of active members of the Alliance perceive the entire mission in Afghanistan as a war, whereas the UN, the EU and some troop contributors to the alliance approach the situation using crisis management and/or peace-building as a starting point. Are we trying to win a war or build peace?”⁵⁷ Good question.

The role of PRTs also touches on a highly charged issue of the militarization of aid. Humanitarian aid delivered through military channels has an implicit risk, especially if local and international participants perceive humanitarian aid as part of a military campaign. This perception often results in a diminution of humanitarian space in conflict and post-conflict zones. In a Finnish study examining different national models for PRTs (e.g., U.S., German, Nordic, and Turkish), a general but not definitive conclusion was that the UK model provided the “best practices” model.⁵⁸

The UK PRT created an “integrated command group” consisting of personnel from the UK Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department of International Development.⁵⁹ This was also the model favored by many international nongovernmental organizations for reconstruction efforts in conflict zones.⁶⁰

In terms of expanding PRTs beyond the Afghan context, three

themes emerge. First, the key to any PRT endeavor is a common vision and strategy for all international partners. Second, all partners must understand what drives the conflict and tailor programs to address the causes of conflict and instability in a culturally-specific context. Lastly, PRTs are only effective in so-called “non-permissive” environments where humanitarian organizations and other actors are prevented from intervening in a meaningful way due to a high level of violence in post-conflict environments. Thus, in light of the limited applicability of PRTs in an international context, perhaps some other venues for interagency cooperation such as those discussed below should be mapped out.

Interagency Cooperation in Complex Environments: A New Roadmap

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. was appointed Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority in January 2004 and since October 2004 has served as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. He has proposed that the U.S. Congress create a U.S. Office for Contingency Operations that would house the S/CRS in the State Department (and now a separate bureau); the Office of Transition Initiatives, now in USAID; the Office of Technical Assistance, now in the Department of the Treasury; and the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program, now in the Department of Justice. He also recommends that certain DoD stability operations initiatives be moved to the contingency operations office. Finally, he also recommends that a new Contingency Federal Acquisition Regulation be created in order to make procurement for contingency operations more user-friendly for both contractors and government personnel.⁶¹

This is a well-thought out springboard for a more targeted, but perhaps more ambitious, initiative to create an interim, interagency approach to contingency operations. This approach resolves certain tensions, while giving the United States a sufficient amount of time to implement government-wide structural changes and to smooth out cultural issues, as discussed above, to the extent possible. Rather than creating a new office that permanently relocates a number of existing offices that do not address the structural and cultural problems discussed above, why not create a temporary entity with expansive powers, the U.S. Center for Peace Operations (USCPO).

The mandate of USCPO would be two-fold: (1) long-term humanitarian peace operations that are able to take place in

Rather than creating a new office that permanently relocates a number of existing offices that do not address the structural and cultural problems...why not create a temporary entity with expansive powers, the U.S. Center for Peace Operations (USCPO).

The first task of the USCPO would be to establish “doctrine” or “policy” regarding the definition of failing, failed, and fragile states that would become the operative definitions...

permissive environments where the level of violence is manageable enough for peace building to take place; and (2) short-term overseas contingency operations to be coordinated with DoD, State, and international partners, as necessary. USCPO will take a whole-of-government approach that incorporates the collaborative efforts of all federal departments and agencies in order to achieve unity of effort as well as a comprehensive approach that incorporates the views, resources, and strengths of U.S. allies, NATO, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities.

New legislation authorizing such an entity should be proposed and passed along with delineating clear oversight responsibility from appropriate Congressional committees. However, the funding should be derived from the Overseas Contingency Operations account that DoD has traditionally used to identify exceptional funding requirements for contingency operations.

For the first time, both State and USAID requested overseas contingency operations funding in the fiscal year 2012 International Affairs budget request. The budget requests were specifically targeted to provide diplomatic security and inspector general oversight of USAID-funded programs in Iraq; to support capacity building, large infrastructure development, and a counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan; and to support the Pakistani government in eliminating insurgent sanctuaries as well as to shift the funds for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund from DoD to State.⁶²

U.S. government corporations are traditionally allowed to sue and be sued under a recognized broad waiver of sovereign immunity,⁶³ which may result in lawsuits that are difficult to defend in such difficult operating environments. In terms of the structure and composition, a board-like structure of advisors would suffice for the USCPO.

The USCPO would become the new operating center for peace operations of the U.S. government with appropriate staffing to do so. Employees from other federal departments and agencies that play a supportive role could be detailed to the USCPO temporarily at the outset while staffing takes place. Subject-matter experts from government agencies and from the private sector could be sourced for staffing needs.

The first task of the USCPO would be to establish “doctrine” or “policy” regarding the definition of failing, failed, and fragile states that would become the operative U.S. government definitions. As it stands, definitional problems and issues are at the base of the doctrinal and policy confusion surrounding a coherent U.S. response (or lack thereof) to failing and failed states. In fact, establishing doctrine regarding overseas contingency operations should be a core function of the USCPO.

With respect to overseas contingency operations, a military operation is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes one as a matter of law under 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13). The USCPO board of directors or advisors could recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a specific overseas contingency operation come under the control and direction of the USCPO.

The composition of the USCPO board of directors or advisors should include the *ex officio* participation of at least the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, and Agriculture, along with USAID. Additionally, some thought should be devoted to including private sector board members drawn from defense, development, and humanitarian aid sectors to further enrich the dialogue. Private board members would bring their perspectives from field experience, working with foreign government counterparts, and addressing general business concerns of organizing, implementing, and successfully concluding complex overseas operations when making well-thought-out proposals and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

This may seem to conflict with the role of the Special Operations Command, but it could be structured as a partnering arrangement to cover a full spectrum of theater operations ranging from combat only (special operations), non-permissive (USCPO military-trained employees organized into expeditionary units), and permissive (USCPO civilian employees).

Special Operations Command is currently led by Admiral William McRaven, who is advocating a larger special operations role and has proposed the Global Alliance.⁶⁴ The Alliance will bolster current special operations forces now numbering at about 66,000 or about 2 percent of the U.S. military. This has raised some concerns by other combatant command commanders and State Department officials who fear the diplomatic fall-out from an operation such as the kind that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden.

Whatever the merits of the Global Special Operations Forces Alliance, the USCPO would not conflict with U.S. military strikes, but would provide a slightly longer-term engagement designed to move the post-conflict society into peace-building operations. USCPO would be better designed to partner with NATO or African Union standby forces to help prevent conflict in failing and failed states while supporting the U.S. national security interest in that conflict area. USCPO could have its own training and education protocols and focus on the transformation of U.S. military capabilities to better support and integrate its operations with humanitarian missions and peace-building operations. It could establish its own “lessons learned” center for the U.S. government that focuses on

The USCPO should also focus on developing “lessons learned” on a government-wide basis.

joint concept development and experimentation, joint training, and joint interoperability and integration.

The USCPO should also focus on developing “lessons learned” on an government-wide basis. Further, evaluations of the success of complex operations should be conducted automatically at the conclusion of an engagement. Foreign policy implications along with defense-related concerns on military readiness, responding to nonconventional threats, and future force projection should be part of a full spectrum analysis on a continuing and historical basis. Legislation for the USCPO should have a ten-year sunset clause; the organization will either survive or be dissolved after ten years of operations. At the ninth year, there should be full-sale USCPO-led evaluations on its effectiveness and continued viability, as well as scrutiny from the General Accountability Office, Congress, and private groups. The intent of creating the USCPO is not to create bureaucracy for the sake of bureaucracy. If the structural and cultural changes now being implemented by other U.S. government agencies are fully successful in this time period, there may not be a continuing need for the USCPO, in which case, it may be dissolved by Congress. If not, then the U.S. will have a model upon which to base its future overseas contingency operations.

Conclusion

Difficulties exist in identifying and classifying failing and failed states and in understanding underlying U.S. national interest in preventing conflicts that may arise from failing or failed states. Certain structural, cultural, and practical problems may impede interagency cooperation in this context. Creating the U.S. Center for Peace Operations is a way forward with the hope that the ongoing serious discussion on this topic is further enhanced. **IAP**

**Creating the
U.S. Center for
Peace Operations
is a way forward...**

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