

# Filling the Gap: A Strategy to *Harmonize* Joint and Interagency Planning

by J. "Spyke" Szeredy

How can providing a new planning strategy exert influence, align objectives, and harmonize activities between the Joint and Interagency environments? A simplified strategy for the integration of planning across the joint (Department of Defense [DoD] and integrated service components) and the interagency communities would create a greater whole-of-government approach, bridge planning requirements, and bring planners together to achieve a desired end state for all types of environments and situations. A whole-of-government approach should focus efforts to create a cohesive, unified strategy that is synchronized and executed across the range of operations.

Over the past two decades, DoD has codified the joint operation planning process (JOPP). This process works well within the military environment where planners have operational experience; however, a lack of established planning procedures, understanding, education, and integration among communities creates disconnects within the interagency and intergovernmental environments.<sup>1</sup> To succeed in any complex environment, joint and interagency planners must synchronize the planning process. Joint interagency doctrine discusses JOPP, but expects interagency and intergovernmental planners, with little education, exposure, or experience, to comprehend the process.<sup>2</sup> Subject-matter experts in both DoD and the Department of State (State) acknowledge the difference between military planning and planning within the joint, interagency, and intergovernmental environments. To achieve a productive and successful end state among all entities, planners need a simple method for situational analysis and the ability to work through deliberate and crisis action events. This method requires focused attention and harmonized planning across agency boundaries. Evolving

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asymmetric warfare environments, destabilized regions, and other crises are changing the strategic- and operational-level objectives, which require joint and interagency planners to focus on non-kinetic effects and options prior to and after conflict. Joint, interagency, and in part, the intergovernmental and multinational partners must have the ability to quickly assess a situation and start planning to task and execute plans capable of achieving a successful end state.

In the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), equivalent to DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), State highlights that it needs a single planning process for conflict prevention and resolution.<sup>3</sup> The QDDR also outlines the need to create new methods and frameworks for working with the military to prevent and resolve conflicts, counter insurgencies and illicit actors, and create safe, secure environments for local populations. The document specifies which disconnects between the communities must be resolved to successfully support future operations. Currently, the only planning process inherent to State is via the Humanitarian Early Warning Service and is focused on humanitarian relief.<sup>4</sup> In the dynamic global environment of irregular warfare, this process is far from adequate. The significance in providing a new planning strategy, a level above JOPP, will fill the void outlined by State and bring the two organizations closer, greatly enabling interaction on all levels.

The proposed planning strategy highlighted in this article contains the following steps: situation, objective, perception, story, means, feedback, and termination. This informal strategy has been in active use for a number of years by information operations planners, specifically those working influence operations (deception, military information support operations [psychological operations], and operation security) at the military operational levels. The process is applicable to any situation, deliberate

or crisis, across the continuum of operations. Providing and codifying this strategy can create a synergy to open discussions for planners and policymakers to analyze and bring the joint and interagency communities together. Bringing the communities in focus against any given situation will result in reduced reaction time and smarter discussions during crises or when planning for deterrence and steady-state theater cooperation plans. The ability to create an efficient common language between the joint and interagency will enable division of effort and enhance the level of cooperation during execution.

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This article employs an exploratory case study framework to examine current and proposed planning strategies to harmonize the activities of joint and interagency communities. Providing a background on current planning methods will expose disconnects between joint and interagency planning methods and, consequently, enable a second discussion of a new strategy process that harmonizes the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments. The second discussion (problem/solution framework) will use the U.S. response to the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan (Operation Tomodachi) as a case study.<sup>5</sup> The operation's real world data and hypothetical discussion support exploring the new model proposed in this article.

## **Background**

The 1998 Rife and Hansen paper "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus" exposed the changes to the global activities in a post-

Cold War environment and the effects to DoD and State.<sup>6</sup> The changing landscape forced these two communities to develop programs to achieve foreign policy goals.<sup>7</sup> However, though both departments take orders from the President, they interpret and execute those orders quite differently. DoD is still the “800-pound gorilla in the room,” but military and interagency community integration is a key requirement when the lead agency may not have the preponderance of resources to complete the mission. Both communities, really all departments of the government, must be more cognizant of the others’ abilities to plan and execute specific missions.

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Integrated efforts between civilian and military personnel are essential to the success of complex operations involving the whole-of-government approach to a situation. DoD has different levels of established policy and doctrine to support military interaction with interagency entities or agencies. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations* (the basis for integrating the military and interagency communities) identifies stability operations as a core U.S. military mission for which the Services should be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.<sup>8</sup> This instruction lays the groundwork for military forces to conduct these operations throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including combat and non-combat environments, even if another government agency is in the lead.

Military forces must be capable of supporting operations led by other U.S. government departments and agencies

The Joint Staff works within the national strategic level of the government to support operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01C, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs* enables the “behind the scenes” integration among the DoD, military forces, and the interagency. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and Homeland Security Advisory Council.<sup>9</sup> CJCSI 5715.01C establishes how the Director of the Joint Staff will work with all the staff directorates to support integration and also identifies the Director of Operations as responsible for providing advice on the execution of military operations and accompanying the Chairman to interagency meetings and dealings.<sup>10</sup> The DODI and the CJCSI are generally focused at the strategic level of policy and national strategy and support the planning and execution of assigned missions.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interagency Coordination* helps commanders and planners prepare for operations with interagency partners.<sup>11</sup> JP 3-08 illustrates how DoD should conduct coordination across a range of operations and provides some background into operations and working with different communities of interest and their structures. Successful DoD and interagency plans require flexibility and provide a common understanding to facilitate unity of effort.<sup>12</sup> The proposed strategy outlined below will enable these factors to exist and achieve a whole-of-government effort in any given situation.

A number of policy and doctrinal documents support the joint military community in conducting planning from the strategic and operational to the tactical level of operation.<sup>13</sup> Doctrine and handbooks are readily available; however, it is difficult to discern if the

Strategy Model			
Strategic Planning	Ends	Ways	Means/Risk
Joint Operation Planning Process	Orders Production	Initiation, Mission Analysis	COA Processes
IASC Process	Implementation	Preparation/ Analysis	Response Planning
5 Paragraph Format	Mission/Execution	Situation/Mission	Execution/Admin/C2
Proposed Strategy Model	Feedback/ Termination	Situation/Objective/ Perception	Story/Means

**Figure 1. Planning Strategy Models<sup>15</sup>**

interagency community has invoked any type of policy or doctrine directly linked to military planning policy and doctrine. The desire to link the communities together is evident in State’s QDDR, which seeks to create a plan for interaction, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) planning constructs, which are similar to those of the joint community.<sup>14</sup>

### **Planning Frameworks**

There are a number of different planning processes employed by various federal departments and communities. This article reviews the military process and three interagency processes and then proposes a new planning process. The joint and interagency processes focus mainly at the operational level of planning and are situation dependent. The informal proposed process also focuses on the operational level of planning, but has greater applicability at the operational-strategic level, where military and interagency planners dissect a situation or problem and seek solutions tied to the overall strategic model of ends, ways, means, and risk. Upon completing the analysis of a situation, the proposed solution will support dividing the efforts among the various entities before they head to their respective departments or groups to finalize plans for their respective pieces of the operation. As Figure 1 illustrates, the proposed strategy does not remove any of

the processes for the organizations; rather, it helps the different agencies obtain a common framework from which to start their own planning. Paramount to achieving mission success is the need for planners to understand the overall strategic and operational end state of an operation, as well as how each process achieves desired effects.

### ***Joint Operation Planning Process***

The JOPP consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations used by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises.<sup>16</sup> This planning process enables commanders and planners to link national security and military strategies to deliberate and crisis plans to achieve desired effects and end states. Through these planning activities, commanders identify ends, ways, means, and risk to achieve these goals with flexibility and economy of force.<sup>17</sup> The staff uses JOPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, identify resources, and identify and mitigate risk.<sup>18</sup>

The seven steps of the JOPP enable planners to proceed from the receipt of a mission (planning initiation step), through an analysis of the environment and adversary (mission analysis), to identifying and evaluating courses of action (COAs) (best plan and mitigation of risk), and finally plan and orders production. This process

allows planners to identify centers of gravity, lines of operations, and key branch and sequel points to support the overall operation. The JOPP process is identical to the U.S. Army's Military Decision Making Process, U.S. Marine Corps's Marine Corps Planning Process, and the U.S. Navy's Navy Planning Process.

### ***Interagency Processes***

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released the first QDDR in December 2010.<sup>19</sup> One of its benchmark outcomes was to build civilian capacity to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict and give the military the partner it needs and deserves.<sup>20</sup> Though planning processes and strategies are inferred in the QDDR, it took another year to see headway. In December 2011, State released a message to all members of the agency titled, "Introducing New Strategic Planning and Budgeting Processes," but the message was more policy than process and execution.<sup>21</sup> Two of the highlighted areas of the message for new strategic planning processes are the Joint Regional Strategy and the Integrated Country Strategy. In 2008, State released their Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to support planning efforts. But unlike Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Operations*, the ICAF does not cross reference the JP, where the opposite exists to ensure the DoD is prepared to work with other communities and agencies. This example highlights a continued breakdown in communication between the different communities supporting operations across the whole-of-government.

In 2009, DHS released the Integrated Planning System (IPS), the department's initial steps in creating a planning policy to support its operations. The IPS provides a structure to create plans but provides no direct strategy or process to achieve results. It provides guidelines versus a methodical process to achieve a solid end state and produce an executable plan. Though the IPS

links directly to the joint planning environment, it does not help with overall processes, nor does it provide a strategy on how to step through planning.

### ***International Interagency Process***

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (Sub-Working Group on Preparedness) Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS) is an interagency partnership project aimed at establishing a common platform for humanitarian early warnings and for natural hazards.<sup>22</sup> This United Nations-sponsored website has a number of U.S. institutions providing services and sources of information. Interestingly, State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have focus areas on humanitarian relief, but the IASC website is focused at international and non-governmental organizations.<sup>23</sup>

The IASC website provides an interagency contingency planning online toolbox divided into four main sections: preparation, analysis, response planning, and implementation. Much like JOPP's first step of initiation, the preparation section focuses on forming a group and defining the scope of the problem. The analysis section, much like JOPP's mission analysis, defines risk and hazards and identifies planning assumptions, triggers, and early warning indicators. Similar to JOPP's mission analysis and course of action development, the response planning section defines objectives, roles, coordination, and agreements and identifies the response plan and outputs. The implementation section focuses on execution, evaluation, and updating plans as required.

### **Proposed Strategy**

Several years ago, military planners developed a process to better understand and craft operational plans utilizing the perceptions of adversary leaders and countries U.S. military forces might have to face in the future.<sup>24</sup> The

SOPSMF/T (situation, objective, perception, story, means, feedback, and termination)) process is taught within the Joint and Air Force military deception courses and is most often used in planning the influence elements within Information Operations.

The SOPSMF/T process, as initially designed, supports operations planning and execution through the ability to adapt outputs from planning into the five main sections of adaptive planning and execution: situation, mission, execution, administration, and command and control.<sup>25</sup> In the SOPSMF/T process, situation, objective, and perception link to the initiation and mission analysis steps of JOPP and the “ways” portion of the larger national strategy process. The next steps of the process—story and means—link to the course of action (COA) steps within JOPP and “means” and “risk” portions of the national strategy process. Lastly, feedback and termination support the orders production of JOPP and the “ends” portion of the national strategy process. Figure 1 shows the linkages across the various processes discussed in this article. The proposed strategy seeks to harmonize and support all joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planning.

### ***SOPSMF/T***

As each step in the proposed SOPSMF/T planning process and strategy is explored, it will be compared to both the JOPP and IASC processes. Additionally, at each planning step, this article will examine Operation Tomodachi from a hypothetical and factual perspective. Operation Tomodachi was a joint, interagency, and multinational crisis event where planning across the cultures, socially and governmentally, of the different players might have caused problems. Discussing this doctrinal and real-world event offers the ability to determine how and at what level the SOPSMF/T planning concept can be applied with success.

### ***Situation***

Situation is defined as “position with respect to conditions and circumstances.”<sup>26</sup> Situations can be “long low-boil” events that take time to hit a culmination and cause a large amount of damage. Such events provide an opportunity for planners to create an engagement strategy that keeps the event from becoming critical. Other situations provide no warning. These range from humanitarian relief and disaster assistance to insurgencies and coups. During this step, planners determine the lead agency. The situation is the trigger from which planning and execution grows.

Situation ties into the initiation and mission analysis steps of JOPP and the preparation phase of the IASD process, where planners determine what has taken place and how they plan to address the situation. Planners bring in subject-matter experts and seek to structure and facilitate handling the situation. These processes

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are focused on their respective cultures and are not always understood by an outside group.

On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred 81 miles to the east of Sendai, Japan.<sup>27</sup> The earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused extensive damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plant. In this situation, a natural disaster led to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.

Established in 1951, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the heart of the U.S. and Japan Alliance, resides in the collaborative work undertaken by the U.S. Military and the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF).<sup>28</sup> The treaty and disaster event in Japan frames the situation and

support for the nation from the U.S. Standing agreements allow planners to start the planning process and frame the way ahead to achieve a desired end state. The U.S. and Japan launched Operation Tomodachi to handle the crisis.

### **Objective**

Objective relates to the desired end state of the mission or event. Within the objective step, commanders will provide their guidance, intent, and mission focus to support planning efforts. This step starts to frame how the mission will unfold. In many cases, this step determines how planners want the leader or adversary group to act or not act in support of mission success. In the case of building partner capacity or humanitarian relief, the objective supports enabling the host nation to take over and run a self-sufficient operation once the overarching U.S. and coalition nations withdraw support.

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Objective links to the mission analysis within JOPP where planners start framing the environment within the guidance and intent of the commander. In the objective step, planners analyze the information central to the planners who are looking at the proper elements to achieve the objective when applying assets to execute the mission. Within the IASC process, the objective step links to the analysis section where planners examine assumptions, risks, and triggers. All three processes link the same concepts together in seeking to analyze and prepare for the desired end state.

In Operation Tomodachi, the main

objective was to support Japan in recovering from the disaster. Non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, support to a nuclear disaster, and infrastructure issues were a number of sub-objectives. Beyond just the planning and end state aspects, there was the issue of “lanes in the road.”<sup>29</sup> Part of analyzing the situation and reaching a point where a solid objective is mapped out, planners must be aware of who is involved in executing the mission and their responsibilities in resolving the situation. In the case of Operation Tomodachi, Japan and host nation assets, State, U.S. Pacific Command and assigned forces, Department of Energy, and other non-governmental and international organizations were all involved.<sup>30</sup> All of these various groups would look to the military for support in executing their portions of the operation.

### **Perception**

When establishing the plan and how it will be executed, understanding the perceptions of the leaders, military, and public within the environment is paramount. Perceptions may include those of the U.S., coalition, and host nation; direct and potential adversary; local populace, either for or against the local government or adversary; and the international community. In understanding perceptions, there is also the point of culture and how the audience perceives information, messages, and images via the different mediums of access to information.

Understanding the perceptions of the various audiences can help planners create the plan with the proper messages, activities, and images to support their efforts and counter negative activities by outside influences and the adversary depending upon the environment. In the context of both JOPP and the IASC processes, perceptions fit within the analysis block. Additionally, understanding the biases and cultural differences and perceptions among

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planners, can cause greater issues within the planning effort.

The perceptions affecting U.S. and Japan during Operation Tomodachi were focused around the possibility of any inappropriate activity. In the case of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, most governments and people are receptive to the support of the nation. In this case, the long-standing relationship between U.S. military forces within Japan and interactions between the nations made dealing with perceptions a minor factor in planning the missions. During Operation Tomodachi, interaction between the joint and interagency was hampered by differences in language, which led to problems associated with explaining problems, planning operations, and requesting information.<sup>31</sup> Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational must work from a single codified process and lexicon to support planning efforts.

### ***Story***

The story is the statement regarding the observable elements of the operation and is integral to the plan. The story is the marketing campaign for the operation and supports the internal, local, and international audiences. Verbal and non-verbal actions and activities reinforce the messages and actions being released to the media and global information environment and include the right use of language, colloquialisms, and images. Planners need to be cognizant of how language and images are interpreted and absorbed within the region of the activity. There is more than one story; therefore, planners must be prepared to counter quickly any negative story capable of hindering an operation.

The story supports the “means” within national strategy and runs parallel to the COA step within the JOPP. COAs must be flexible enough to answer any shifts in the

environment.<sup>32</sup> Information operations planners create informational-flexible deterrent options as part of the COA, and these options become the story. In the IASC process, the story fits within the planning response step.

During Operation Tomodachi, media reports about U.S., Japanese, and international support for the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief received different reviews. U.S. efforts through public affairs officers were seen on the Yokota, Pacific Air Force, and Kadena Air Force Base websites and were echoed via the main Air Force website. These stories and photos show troops from the U.S. and JSDF supporting the humanitarian assistance and relief efforts.<sup>33</sup> The other side of the story focused on the local populace.<sup>34</sup> The Japan Probe website expressed gratitude, while the Japan Today site expressed a negative response to the operation.<sup>35</sup> No matter how much positive press the U.S. can produce, the local and international audience will both support and negate the story

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### ***Means***

The means is the “who” of the operation, from strategic to tactical planning. Planners develop and evaluate COAs and identify units, organizations, and agencies to complete the specified tasks assigned. In preparing for the means, planners at the operational and tactical levels ensure missions and units are capable of supporting the operations. This step will divide and match tasks among military, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets. Additionally, logistical lines will be established



to support the units and organizations performing the missions.

Means fits within the COA development of the JOPP and planning response of the IASC process. Depending upon the size and scope of the operations, units are assigned to the operations to perform specific tasks to achieve mission success for the commander.<sup>36</sup> Civilian organizations typically do not fall within the force deployment packages established by the military during this step in planning.<sup>37</sup> However, if interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets receive tasks as part of the mission, each organization's planners will determine how to get a unit in the area (part of the orders production element of JOPP).

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During Operation Tomodachi, most of the U.S. units participating were already based in Japan. Special Operations units training in the Republic of Korea, supporting the Foal Eagle Exercise, were redeployed for a brief time to support the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by re-opening the Sendai airport, critical for relief operations.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, the Department of Energy deployed teams to support radiological measuring and support the government of Japan in dealing with the damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plant.<sup>39</sup> The Air Force also deployed radiological teams from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to support radiological monitoring within the country.<sup>40</sup> All of these means, identified as requirements by the commander, supported achieving the desired mission success.

## ***Feedback***

Feedback comes in many different forms. Feedback from the performing unit is considered a measure of performance. The unit accomplishes the specified and implied tasks which provide the commander the status of the operation. A series of successful measures of performance lead to an overall operational measure of effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness on an adversary's effectiveness are received from intelligence channels, local community media reporting, and face-to-face interaction.

Feedback supports the "ends" of strategic planning and is considered during mission analysis within the JOPP. In an environment with limited resources, understanding how to measure the success of an operation is paramount to completing and terminating them. During mission analysis, planners discuss the current situation with the intelligence planners and work with them to establish feedback criteria and set up parameters for collecting and reporting for all phases of an operation.<sup>41</sup> In the IASC process, feedback is contained within the planning response processes. Feedback also supports branch and sequel plans within the operation.<sup>42</sup>

Operation Tomodachi feedback mechanisms were embedded within the responses from the Japanese people. U.S. forces measures of performance and effectiveness were apparent in the ability to reopen the Sendai airport nine days after the tsunami. Working by, with, and through the Japanese government, the U.S. and JSDF returned the airfield to normal operational levels.<sup>43</sup> The reopening of the airport allowed military and commercial air carriers to support the relief efforts. Feedback was apparent when the Japanese locals spelled out *Arigato*, Japanese for thank you, on the beach outside of the town of Sendai.<sup>44</sup>

## **Termination**

Termination for any operation is identified at the onset of planning. Termination supports the “ends” of a strategic plan. While creating the objective of the operation, planners should determine how to terminate the mission. Some termination criteria may take place before the operation, i.e., if there are not enough assets to perform the tasks, then the operation will terminate. Operations may terminate in the middle of the plan if the adversary does not act or react to the plan the way the commander desires. Termination for an operation can also take place when all the success criteria mapped out in the plan are achieved. In stability operations, the ability for the local government to take over and succeed is a reason to terminate. Termination covers how units and agencies will extract their assets. Public support can affect the termination of an operation. If support is high, operations continue; if support is poor or excessively negative, termination can happen sooner.

Terminating within JOPP is part of mission analysis and COA development. The termination concept is part of orders production and redeployment process. Termination is part of determining limitations within the operation.<sup>45</sup> In terminating an operation, a story is provided to the information environment stating success or other conditions, which leads to the end of an operation. Termination criteria ensure forces are not endangered or the effectiveness of the force or mission compromised.<sup>46</sup> Termination in the public eye can be done via exposing the whole plan or parts of the plan to support operational security issues.

Operation Tomodachi might have a number of different terminating criteria. A terminating event may be linked to the environment, such as weather conditions, which would hamper humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Planners may need to terminate due to a lack of assets and forces to support the mission. A

third termination criterion would have been if the Fukushima nuclear plant goes critical and the whole site explodes in similar fashion to Chernobyl in the Ukraine. Termination could have come from the local community in a negative response to the use of U.S. resources to support the local governments in clean up or the international community reacting negatively to the operation. The coordination between the U.S. and Japanese government entities ensured public support for the operation would not lead to an early termination. Termination for Operation Tomodachi came as the Japanese

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government and life were returned to normal.<sup>47</sup>

The SOPSMF/T strategy above enables planners to encompass a situation, determine the objective, and provide direction to reach mission success. It takes into consideration perceptions of the local and international community, develops stories to support the operation to ensure people know what is happening and why, measures operational performance and effectiveness, and provides feedback mechanisms and methods of reporting. Lastly, it envisions and considers termination points.

## **Conclusion**

In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz states: “The first of these three aspects [of war] mainly concerns the people; the second, the commander and his army; the third, the government. The passions are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people.”<sup>48</sup> In planning for a crisis, military, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planners tend to look at the

adversary without fully understanding the need to work as an integrated and synchronized team to ensure success. These communities are capable of understanding their own respective strategies and processes, but typically they are not educated and trained to cross the tribal lines required for successful operations.

Over the past thirty years, numerous articles have addressed lack of unity between interagency communities during execution. A strategy must be capable of crossing all the communities and providing guidance just above each agency's respective planning process. Planners being tasked to work within a joint interagency coordination group, task force, or intergovernmental and multinational environment must have a common planning language and lexicon.

The SOPSMF/T process will bring different cultures and agencies to the same table to plan and execute operations. For the process to work, agencies must be willing to learn the process and socialize the concept during exercises and operations. Incorporating the SOPSMF/T process into policy and doctrine and practicing it during exercises and operations will level the knowledge across all joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational communities.

## **Recommendations**

Using the proposed SOPSMF/T approach to higher-level planning strategy requires open discussions among the senior leadership of each department. These discussions should support the cadre of doctrine writers and educators and facilitate adopting a simple concept to support all interagency planning. The lack of an effective National Security Council (NSC) decision-making process continues to plague interagency coordination efforts during pre- and post-war planning.<sup>49</sup> Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, several State and DoD agencies were frantically piecing together a detailed Phase IV (post-war) plan.<sup>50</sup> The lack of a cohesive planning strategy at all levels continues to be a detriment to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational planning. Recommendations for correcting the issues highlighted in this article include the following:

1. In the National Security Strategy, codify a Principles Committee (PC) to chair strategic planning for the whole-of-government approach affecting national security. The committee would have joint, interagency, and intergovernmental representation. The PC would establish a unified planning construct to support communications across agencies and departments.
2. In DoD, State, and other departments or agencies, codify education to be either functional or regional planners. Educate on the concepts of planning across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments using the proposed strategy.
3. Within the national security policy process (NSC and interagency system), establish the SOPSMF/T process for all joint and interagency parties. Incorporate guidelines within annual reports to the NSC and committees.<sup>51</sup>
4. In both joint and interagency doctrine and handbooks, establish a singular planning strategy that crosses all departments and organizations. This planning strategy must support the operational and strategic levels of planning and execution for a commander (military or civilian) against a given threat or event. Linking the SOPSMF/T process back to the National Security Strategy demonstrates a unified effort. Use the same language in the doctrine and handbooks.

5. Personnel assignments within DoD, State, and other agencies should expand to ensure planners work in and have an understanding of different agencies and departments. This increased participation in other agencies will facilitate a better understanding of the intricacies and requirements of the other communities and build a network of planners to leverage when a crisis arises.
6. To ensure a unified planning strategy, agency and department exercises should encompass all elements of planning and execution across the range of military and governmental operations. Ensure all agencies and departments have a chance to observe and participate in these exercises.

For SOPSMF/T to be successful, agencies and departments must establish a top-down unified effort among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments. Recommendations to unify the planning strategy must come from the top and reach from strategy to tactical application. Harmonizing across the community is paramount for success in an environment of dwindling budgets and work force and increasing dynamic, asymmetric threats. **IAJ**

## NOTES

- 1 Colonel Pat Pihana, United State Air Force, Special Operations Force (SOF) Chair, National Defense University and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Michael Bennett, United States Army, SOF Liaison, Joint Forces Staff College, in discussions with the author expressing their personal experiences of working with the interagency and the issues that exist with planning and execution.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released the QDDR for the Department of State. Due to her experience with the Senate Armed Service Committee, Secretary Clinton understood this document was critical to State's future. Clinton understood that working in a global environment where the whole-of-government effort is critical to achieving national security and desired end states, State and DoD must learn to work together.
- 4 IASC-HEWS website, 2012, <<http://www.hewsweb.org>>, accessed on February 4, 2013. The group and service is dedicated to responding to the hazards of floods, storms, locust, volcanoes, earthquakes, weather, and other hazards.
- 5 Requests for Operation Tomodachi data was sent to USPACOM and State. No information was provided at the time of writing. Information referenced in this paper is open source searches on the Internet.
- 6 Lieutenant Colonel Ricky Rife and Rosemary Hansen, "Defense is from Mars, State from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 1, 1998. Rife and Hansen were National Security Affairs Fellows at Hoover Institute, Stanford University, California. The paper highlights communication differences between the two cultures.
- 7 Ibid., p. 1.
- 8 Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, Washington, September 2009, p. 2, <<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>>, accessed on February 8, 2013. This document is the basis of DoD support for stability operations and the need to integrate joint and interagency communities. The instruction points to stability operations as a core military mission. The

military must be prepared to conduct these missions and may be the supporting versus supported effort.

9 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01C, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs*, Washington, January 18, 2012, p. 3, <[http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/5715\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5715_01.pdf)>, accessed on February 12, 2013.

10 Ibid., p. 2.

11 Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, Washington, June 24, 2011, <[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_08.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf)>, accessed on February 11, 2013. This document should be available to everyone working in and around the military from any of the various departments. It helps provide the lexicon for common language.

12 JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Department of Defense, Washington, August 2011, Chapter II, p. 1 and Chapter IV, p. 24 state a COA must be feasible. The doctrine also highlights that plans should have different flexible deterrent options to counter adversary activity.

13 The joint community has released several handbooks supporting joint participation in interagency activities.

14 The QDDR seeks to create a link between State and the rest of the interagency and DoD organizations.

15 Figure 1, created by the author, uses information from JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, p. xi and Chapter IV, p. 1; JOPP; IASC HEWS website; CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System*, September 2012; and the informal proposed strategy process.

16 JP 5-0, p. xi. Planning is the basis for commander's activities from theater engagement plans and building partner capacity to crisis action and the range of military operations.

17 Ibid. Ends, ways, means, and risk are outlined within JP 5-0 and link the national strategy to the operational planning process for planners to nest operations with the desired end state from higher headquarters.

18 Ibid., p. x.

19 The QDDR is on parallel with the QDR and recent policy and strategy initiatives out of the DHS. The QDDR supports the evolution and changes within State and USAID.

20 Ibid., p. 3.

21 On December 17, 2011, State released a follow-up message to staff, provided direction, and created a number of strategies supporting operations. The overarching strategies link to joint practices.

22 IASC-HEWS website.

23 The IASC HEWS website focuses on the ability of international, non-governmental, and United Nations participants and organizations to monitor humanitarian issues globally and a provides a basic critical thinking page with a process for planning.

24 Stimer and Associates devised the planning strategy to support analysis and planning and transitioned the products into the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) format for plan creation. Colonel (retired) Rich Stimer was in the Air Force Checkmate element and supported the planning for Desert Storm.

25 APEX replaces JOPES in accordance with CJCS Guide 3130, April 30, 2012.

26 Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, definition #4.

- 27 The National Bureau of Asian Research, *Chronology of Operation Tomodachi: Amidst Trial, Ties That Bind: Enduring Strength in the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, 2011. The bureau conducts advanced independent research on strategic, political, economic, globalization, health, and energy issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia.
- 28 Ibid., p. 1.
- 29 Operations can be divided so that each agency, department, or organization has the capability to achieve the desired end state of the commander or lead group. Among the cultures of departments, there may be turf wars over who is in the lead and who is supporting a specific activity.
- 30 Operation Tomodachi and interagency and multinational participants are discussed within 18th Wing and Team Kadena's history of the event. It is also echoed in Stowe and Hale's briefing on nuclear response to the issues at the Fukushima nuclear plant.
- 31 Major Jaime Stowe and Major Alan Hale, "DOD's Response to Fukushima—Operation Tomodachi," paper presented at the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference, Inc., St. Paul, MN, 2012, <[http://www.nationalrep.org/2012Presentations/Session%208\\_DoD%27s%20Response%20to%20Fukushima\\_Stowe-Hale.pdf](http://www.nationalrep.org/2012Presentations/Session%208_DoD%27s%20Response%20to%20Fukushima_Stowe-Hale.pdf)>, p. 10.
- 32 JP 5-0. COA development highlights the requirement for information flexible deterrent options as part of planning.
- 33 Google search on Operation Tomodachi reveals a plethora of stories regarding the operations during the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The actions taken by U.S. forces within the region would be within the rules of engagement set forth between the nations after the disaster struck and the U.S. went into action to support Japan and the treaty.
- 34 Japan Probe website, April 2, 2011. This article offers an impression from a Japanese journalist, Yuko Ando, who visited a number of locations with U. S. and JSDF and highlights the mutual support and respect between the nations. The Japan Today website, April 23, 2011, echoes the gratefulness expressed by Prime Minister Naoto Kan in the *Washington Post*. The article continues to expose arguments against the operation stating Japan will end up paying in the long run for the operation.
- 35 Japan Today is a website covering news outlets and activity relating to the country.
- 36 JP 5-0, Chapter IV, p. 8.
- 37 DODI 3000.05, p. 10.
- 38 18th Wing History, p. 5.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Stowe and Hale.
- 41 JP 5-0, Annex D, p. 3.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 18th Wing history, p. 15.
- 44 Ibid., p. 19.
- 45 JP 5-0, Chapter III, p. 37.

46 Ibid.

47 18th Wing, p. 17.

48 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, p. 101. Clausewitz describes war as an extension of politics. To plan for any situation, the different tribes need to be on the same sheet of music, following the same plan.

49 Major Julio Arana, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. Owens, and David Wrubel, “Strengthening the Interagency Process: The Cause for Enhancing the Role of the National Security Advisor,” Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, August 2006, p. 1. The paper focuses on the advisor, but can also include getting the interagency to agree to a planning process.

50 Ibid., p. 1.

51 Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, “The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System,” National Defense University, Washington, August 2011.