Embracing the Interagency Implications of a Changing National Security Strategy

Patrick Wempe

Embracing the
Interagency Implications of a
Changing National Security Strategy

Patrick Wempe

Arthur D. Simons Center
for Interagency Cooperation

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**Embracing the Interagency Implications of a
Changing National Security Strategy**

by Patrick Wempe

——————————————————

Patrick Wempe is a U.S. Army Military Intelligence Officer with twenty-two years of experience in tactical, Special Operations, Joint, and Interagency assignments. He recently completed an Army War College Fellowship in the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, focusing on the Army's Interagency strategy and programs. In July 2014 Colonel Wempe assumed command of the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, headquartered at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

——————————————————

Contents

Introduction

The security strategy of the U.S. is in a time of transition.[1] A national security apparatus dominated by counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts since 9/11 is evolving in global security and domestic fiscal environments filled with complexity and uncertainty. There are profound implications for the Army and how it fights, and in what it does when it is not fighting. The Army's missions will likely be less kinetic and, arguably, more complex and ambiguous than the Department of Defense (DoD)-centric operations of the last decade. Decisive action, combined arms, maneuver operations will be relatively rare; security cooperation will dominate unit-deployment requirements in the application of strategic landpower; and the human domain will assume increased importance in unified land operations. Though warfighting must remain the Army's core capability, every problem will not be a nail for the world's best hammer.

The U.S. military, including the Army, will be critical to but should not dominate the strategic approach to the challenges ahead and represent but one element of the nation's power. Ensuring sufficient capability in interagency (IA) collaboration is critical to the Army's ability to be an effective partner in the nation's security strategy. However, the Army lacks a clear strategy for achieving readiness in that area, which creates risks in effectiveness and efficiency the Army can ill-afford in a period of constrained resources and global uncertainty.

This paper will examine the criticality of Army-IA collaboration and assess the Army's readiness to effectively engage and leverage the IA. It will discuss existing guidance and illustrate the need for a more clearly-articulated Army IA strategy, focusing primarily on organizational and leader development efforts, with recommendations for improvements in those areas. This "IA imperative" should be central to Army strategy as it transitions "from an Army at war to an Army preparing for the next battle."[2]

Ensuring sufficient capability in interagency (IA) collaboration is critical to the Army's ability to be an effective partner in the nation's security strategy.

DEFINING INTERAGENCY

Because the term "interagency" means different things to different people (and different agencies), it is important to clearly define the term as used in this discussion. Indeed, it is often the ambiguity in definitions and usage that muddies the Army's approach to IA readiness. Therefore, precision in terminology is necessary for any productive discussion of IA topics.

DoD defines interagency as "of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense."[3] Interagency coordination is defined as "the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective."[4]

In this paper, IA refers generally to interactions of the Army with non-DoD departments and agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This paper will not examine joint efforts (between the services) and the more traditional relationships that exist between military units and DoD agencies (for example, intelligence support provided by Defense Intelligence Agency). Though there are certainly cultural differences and occasional priority mismatches, those service-to-service and customer-to-agency relationships are generally better established and defined than are the relationships between Army units and non-DoD departments and agencies.

WHY THE ARMY NEEDS AN EFFECTIVE IA STRATEGY

The need for a more robust and collaborative IA response to national security challenges is neither a recent nor transient notion. In 1947, Ferdinand Eberstadt, former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, strongly urged then-Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (later the first Secretary of Defense) to prioritize IA collaboration, stating, "The military Services are but a part of the national machinery of peace or war. An effective national security policy calls for active, intimate and continuous relationships not alone between the military services themselves but also between the military services and many other departments and agencies of Government."[5]

More recent analyses support this idea. In his September 2013 report for the Center for Strategic Studies, "Changing U.S. Security Strategy," Anthony Cordesman states that "[the U.S.] also needs to comprehensively assess the lessons and mistakes of the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, and create a real-world civil-military approach to stability operations of the kind that will be needed in today's MENA [Middle East/North Africa] area as distinguished from the vague, generic generalities in Field Manual FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*."[6] Though Cordesman is specifically addressing efforts supporting MENA regional stability, it is appropriate to consider the applicability of this argument to other areas and challenges.

Along with a more operationally varied and geographically broader focus, reduced resources and the Army's regionally-aligned force (RAF) concept are realities that will significantly impact Army training and operations. These transformations will demand that security initiatives are carefully coordinated with development,

> **In this paper, IA refers generally to interactions of the Army with non-DoD departments and agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.**

diplomatic, and other efforts. Being "joint" simply will not be enough to address these challenges. Interagency collaboration will assume increased importance as not just a good but a vital idea.

Army IA Readiness in the Contemporary Context

Moving beyond theoretical and somewhat vague references to the value of IA collaboration, it is important to understand the applicability of IA capabilities to specific mission requirements and operational demands on the Army today and in the future. The Army's view of IA collaboration should not be limited to the specialized mission sets of the Special Operations Force (SOF) and intelligence worlds, or simply reserved for COIN or nation building operations. Rather, the benefits of IA collaboration should inform and influence the broader Army's approach to virtually every operational requirement and construct, including the following:

...it is important to understand the applicability of IA capabilities to specific mission requirements and operational demands on the Army today and in the future.

REGIONALLY-ALIGNED FORCE (RAF) CONCEPT

Some early feedback from 2/1 Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), the first regionally aligned BCT (RAB) to deploy, is telling. 2/1 ABCT began deploying elements in April 2013 in support of various missions directed by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Army Africa (USARAF). Though the RAB's missions focused on military-to-military partnerships and security training activities, there were some indications of the centrality of IA understanding to the success of those efforts. Observations provided by the ABCT's participating personnel provided lessons learned and best practices in an Interim Lessons Learned Report that included the following:[7]

• "2/1ABCT and other aligned forces now actively support AFRICOM, working within the authorities and limitations established by Congress, the Department of State, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense."[8]

• "Coordination with U.S. government players adds another dimension to planning, coordination and execution. U.S. Embassies and country teams vary significantly in size, organization, and priorities. Uniqueness of missions with DoS in the lead introduces another layer of planning and coordination."[9]

• "Some missions would have been better planned and structured if information about other United States Government (USG) organizations, such as DOD, DOJ, DOS, USAID, and Peace Corps, NGOs, and other foreign militaries had been known."[10]

Strategic rebalance

With President Obama's direction to place greater focus and emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) has moved aggressively to ensure the Army is meeting that intent. Within this theater, strategic partners are strongly influenced by their armies' leaders, and U.S. Army leadership in the region will be central to U.S. security efforts.[11] Yet the USARPAC strategy is an inherently IA one, focused on regional engagement, partnering, preparing, and responding to requirements across the spectrum, to include:[12]

> **...the USARPAC strategy is an inherently IA one, focused on regional engagement, partnering, preparing, and responding to requirements across the spectrum...**

• Tailoring of partnership efforts to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, given the prevalence of those types of events across such a large geographic area. Historically, many nations in USARPAC's area have been reluctant to cooperate in traditional military contexts; HA/DR requirements encourage and often necessitate partnering for those purposes.[13]

• Securing of trade relationships in the region "puts a premium on the strength of land forces" while introducing new dynamics and partners into the traditional military-to-military arrangements.[14] Department of Commerce, trade representatives, and other non-traditional IA entities are important partners in those relationships and activities.

• Sustaining traditional alliances, including five treaty allies in the region, reinforces the importance of Army-to-Army cooperation while also requiring cognizance of sensitive diplomatic and economic considerations, equities, and influences.[15]

Support to civil authorities

Often regarded as the purview of the National Guard, disaster response is a mission that could require both National Guard and active Army elements. The response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 provides an excellent example, as the requirement for DoD capabilities quickly outpaced those of the available National Guard units, with nearly 23,000 active duty troops, the majority of them Army, providing support to civil authorities.[16] As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale later testified to Congress, "The Department of Defense's response to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest military deployment within the United States since the Civil War."[17] Several key findings from the House of Representatives' committee report on the Katrina disaster point to the importance of DoD interaction and integration with IA and other partners:

- "The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking."[18]

- "DoD/DHS [Department of Homeland Security] coordination was not effective during Hurricane Katrina."[19]

- "DoD, FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], and the state of Louisiana had difficulty coordinating with each other, which slowed the response."[20]

- "DoD has not yet incorporated or implemented lessons learned from joint exercises in military assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed for a more effective response to Katrina."[21]

Support to civil authorities is clearly a DoD and implicitly an Army mission that demands effective IA coordination and collaboration in both continental and outside continental U.S. (CONUS and OCONOS) operations. Particularly important in the realm of support to civil authorities in CONUS is a clear and broad understanding of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which precludes the use of military forces for "law and order" activities. Current doctrinal guidance for defense support to civil authorities (see ADRP 3-28 in Figure 2, pg. 6) expects the military to support the fifteen functional areas required in the federal government's civil response to crises. DoD is the lead agency for only one of those functions (Public Works and Engineering, coordinated by the Army Corps of Engineers). In all others, the military supports other federal agencies, including the Departments of Transportation, Energy, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services; FEMA; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.[22]

The following sections provide an assessment of the Army's current efforts in developing greater IA collaboration capabilities and offer recommendations for improvements. Despite the shortfalls discussed identified, the past decade's operations have provided a good basis of IA awareness and appreciation across the Army.

Perhaps even more encouraging to budgeters and force managers, the development and enhancement of Army IA capabilities does not require extensive resource investments on the scale of new weapons systems, large force structures, or expensive personnel benefits programs. Rather, the keys to greater IA readiness are largely in mindset, clarification of priorities and expectations, and marginal adjustments to existing organizations, training, and personnel policies and practices. The following recommendations, if implemented, will provide both immediate and long-term enhancements to the Army's IA readiness with relatively minor resourcing implications.

Support to civil authorities is clearly a DoD and implicitly an Army mission that demands effective IA coordination and collaboration...

Policy and Guidance

Vision statements and guidance for IA collaboration abound. Jesse P. Pruett, in "The Sound of One Hand Clapping: The Expeditionary Imperative of Interagency Integration," provides a non-exhaustive list of initiatives, Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), military guidance, and other documents that guide, recommend, or compel strong efforts toward more effective IA collaboration.[23]

Government Initiated Interagency Initiatives and Guiding Documents

Following are just some of the more significant documents and initiatives (along with the sponsoring branch or agency) which capture the efforts of government to improve the interagency reality. This list is illustrative of the many efforts undertaken, but is not exhaustive. *DoS and DoD actions are treated as independent of the executive

1997   Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 "Managing Complex Contingency Operations" (Executive)

2001   National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 01 "Organization of the National Security Council System" (Executive)

2004   The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (State)

2005   National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization" (Executive)

2005   Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 "Military Support to Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction" (Defense)

2006   Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II* (Defense)

2006-2010 Section 1207: Security and Stabilization Assistance Funds (State from Defense from Legislative)

2007   National Security Professional Development (NSPD) Program (Executive)

2007   National Security Executive Leadership Seminar (NSELS) (State)

2007   Interagency Management System (Executive via National Security Council)

2008   *The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act (Title XVI of Public Law 110-447)* (Legislative)

2008   *National Security Professionals Act* (Legislative)

2008   Civilian Response Corps (Executive via State)

2008 & 2010 Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) Studies (Legislative mandate to Defense)

2009   Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 "Stability Operations" (Defense)

2009   Department of Defense Directive 1404.10 "Civilian Expeditionary Workforce" (Defense)

2010   The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) (State)

2010   *Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development System Act (INSPEAD)* (Legislative)

2010   Complex Crisis Fund (USAID via Legislative)

2011   NSPD "2.0" (Executive)

2011   Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (Defense)

2011   *Interagency Personnel Rotation Act* (Legislative)

Figure 1: Examples of Previous Initiatives and Guidance

Other recent public discourse provides implicit guidance regarding the military's role as just one tool in whole-of-government approaches to security challenges. In an April 2013 speech to National Defense University (NDU), Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel publicly cited President Dwight Eisenhower's 1960 admonition that "the wise and prudent administration of the vast resources required

by defense calls for extraordinary skill in meshing the military, political, economic, and social machinery of our modern life…so that the greatest effective use is made of resources with a minimum of waste and misapplication."[24]

Responding to a question regarding IA relationships, Hagel went on to state:

> I think the interagency relationship is always a key part of any agency institution carrying out its responsibility… whether it's homeland interests, economic interests, diplomatic interests, military interests, energy interests, cyber, whatever it is, they're all connected….You have just identified maybe the most important dimensions of where we're all going to have to go as government leaders in this country over the next few years and beyond…your question [about IA relationships] is a very important one, and it is central to everything that we're all going to be doing and continuing to do, especially you young leaders who are going to be moving into very, very important positions in your careers.[25]

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin Dempsey's vision for the military also includes an IA component. In his February 2012 "Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force," Dempsey identified several keys to responding to the nation's security challenges that included a call to "expand the envelope of interagency and international cooperation," and "promote multilateral security approaches and architectures to deter and if necessary, defeat aggression."[26]

Army senior leaders likewise recognize the IA imperative. The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance articulates an overarching vision in which "the Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive."[27] There are a number of doctrinal publications that reference and acknowledge IA interactions in a variety of contexts. Though not all-inclusive, the list in Figure 2 (see page 8) provides a sampling of current joint and Army doctrine, guidance, regulations, and policies.

It is generally clear that DoD and Army leaders recognize the challenges ahead, understand the changing global security environment, and desire to be effective, capable, and fully integrated partners on the nation's IA team. It is less clear, in an increasingly constrained resourcing environment, where the priority for IA readiness stands relative to other demands and how aggressively the Army will pursue enhanced IA readiness.

It is generally clear that DoD and Army leaders recognize the challenges ahead, understand the changing global security environment, and desire to be effective, capable, and fully integrated partners on the nation's IA team.

Publication	Proponent	Date	IA Content
DA PAM 600-02 The Armed Forces Officer	OSD	1 February 1988	None
AR 600-3 The Army Personnel Development System	DA G1	26 February 2009	None
DA PAM 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management	DA G1	1 February 2010	Numerous generic IA references, generally ICW JIIM. SOF, MI, and some Functional Area sections provide additional IA information and guidance.
AR 600-8 Military Personnel Management	DA G1	1 October 1989	None
DA PAM 600-25 U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide	DA G1	28 July 2008	Several generic references to IA ICW JIIM. Referenced in Structured Self-Development.
AR 600-100 Army Leadership	DA G1	8 March 2007	Two generic references ICW JIIM.
AR 621-7 Army Fellowships & Scholarships	DA G3	8 August 1997	Several references to IA opportunities.
ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations	TRADOC	10 October 2011	Minimal references to IA, generically mentioning the need for complementing and integrating partners' capabilities.
ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations	Combined Arms Center (CAC)	May 2012	Multiple references in discussion of Unified Action coordination, and discussion of Decisive Action in the contexts of Stability Operations and Defense Support to Civil Authorities.
ADP 3-07 Stability	CAC	31 August 2012	Some discussion of whole-of-government approach, IA coordination, and military/IA cultures.
FM 3-16 The Army in Multinational Operations	TRADOC	20 May 2010	Minimal references to IA, generally ICW discussion of liaisons and coordination requirements.
ADRP 3-28 Defense Support of Civil Authorities	CAC	14 June 2013	Extensive discussion of the need for IA integration & coordination.
ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide	TRADOC	14 September 2011	Substantial information on the incorporation of IA into planning processes.
Army Leader Development Strategy 2013	DA G3	5 June 2013	Some generic references to Leader Development for JIIM.
Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force	CJCS	6 February 2012	Several IA reference, including identifying IA cooperation as a Key Effort in achieving the U.S. objectives.
CJCS Instruction 3150.25E Joint Lessons Learned Program	CJCS	20 April 2012	Minimal IA references. Identifies DJ7 S&P as OPR for IA lessons learned.
CJCS Staff Instruction 3500.01G Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States	CJCS	15 March 2012	Numerous references to IA coordination for training, IA in training events, and training in JIIM environments.
JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States	JCS	25 March 2013	Multiple references to IA coordination and integration, including discussion of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups.
JP 3-0 Joint Operations	JCS	11 August 2011	Numerous references to IA coordination and process.
JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning	JCS	11 August 2011	Numerous IA references in discussion of National Security Council processes, integration and coordination of IA partners, incorporation into the Adaptive Planning Review and Approval Process, and Annex V development.
Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices, 4th Edition	JCS J7	March 2013	Numerous references to criticality of IA inclusiveness and integration, understanding IA authorities and capacities, and the importance of personal IA relationships.

Figure 2: Doctrinal Publications and Guidance Referencing IA

Despite the well-placed good intentions and notwithstanding the extensive list of IA guidance and study documents cited earlier, the Army's tangible policy and doctrinal foundation for implementing the guidance and achieving that vision is not fully developed. There is no Army regulation (AR), field manual (FM), doctrinal publication (ADP), reference publication (ADRP), or Department of the Army pamphlet (DA PAM) dedicated exclusively or in a substantive way to IA collaboration, leader development for IA, or other aspects of Army partnering with the interagency.

For those documents that do address IA partnering, the guidance and doctrine is insufficient and incomplete. Anthony Cordesman's criticism of the "vague, generic generalities" in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* applies in varying degrees to the other IA-referencing documents outlined in Figure 2.[28]

Without clear, progressive, and synchronized doctrinal guidance, it is difficult to discern the leadership's vision for how Army IA collaboration should be executed. Many mid-level leaders will default to their own experiences with the IA, which over the past twelve years has largely been in DoD-dominated combat zones executing COIN, CT, and nation building strategies. But what is the Army's doctrine for operating within relatively benign areas, on operations led by other agencies, under the authority or with the permission of the Ambassador, advised by his IA Country Team? And what is its ability to learn from IA experiences in those environments, adjust its doctrine on an ongoing basis, and reinvest those lessons learned and best practices into comprehensive training strategies?

Just as important as a clear doctrinal basis for IA efforts is the need for coherent, specific guidance from Army leaders regarding their expectations for the development of IA readiness. How serious is the Army about developing IA readiness? What trade-offs in resources and training focus are its leaders willing to make? How will Army leaders encourage and reward proactive efforts to collaborate with IA partners and develop broad expertise across the force to do so? Where does training in IA collaboration fall in priority relative to more traditional Army training requirements? What accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure IA readiness?

Arguably, the Army does not suffer from a lack of generic directives or implied guidance regarding the importance of IA collaboration. In fact, there is a surfeit of rhetorical and anecdotal information that clearly indicates that it should be expanding its IA efforts. What the Army does not have is a clearly articulated strategy document dedicated to IA readiness that addresses senior Army leaders' priorities and expectations, assigns responsibilities and authorities, acknowledges the necessary trade-offs, and defines

Without clear, progressive, and synchronized doctrinal guidance, it is difficult to discern the leadership's vision for how Army IA collaboration should be executed.

the vision of what "IA readiness" means for Army relevance and effectiveness in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Senior Army leaders should develop and disseminate a capstone strategy document dedicated specifically to all aspects of IA readiness, including clear guidance regarding priorities for training, staffing, and organizing the Army to enable IA collaboration.

• As a fundamental tenet of Army thinking, the idea of IA collaboration should be central to Army operations and effectiveness. This effort should infuse all aspects of training, doctrine, leader development, and operational planning at all levels.

• The Army should provide resources to IA partners to enable their participation in Army institutional and operational training events and venues. Putting their money where their mouth is will demonstrate commitment to robust, enduring, broad-spectrum partnerships with IA members.

Public appearances and presentations should consistently include discussions of Army-IA collaboration and, ideally, should include the participation of IA leaders.

• Senior Army leaders should provide staffing guidance to Human Resources Command (HRC) that places IA assignments, at a minimum, on par with joint assignments and encourage division and brigade leaders to send their best quality officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to IA training programs and opportunities.

• Senior Army leaders should lead by example in developing and making very visible IA partnerships at the institutional level. Public appearances and presentations should consistently include discussions of Army-IA collaboration and, ideally, should include the participation of IA leaders. Recognizing collaborative successes throughout the Army will reinforce the importance of those efforts and encourage more of them.

• U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should review all existing doctrinal publications to ensure that IA collaboration and integration is sufficiently addressed. If necessary, it should develop and disseminate change documents or appendices in the near term to add IA readiness subject matter as appropriate.

• The Chief of Staff guidance to Promotion and Command Selection List boards for the O5, O6, and Command Sergeant Major levels should reflect increased emphasis on IA experience as indicative of a well-rounded Army leader. This increased emphasis should be given broad visibility across the force.

Current Army Organizational Readiness for IA

From an organizational perspective, the Army has minimal force structure dedicated to IA integration. Department of the Army (DA) staff proponency for IA activities is distributed across a number of offices within G3/5/7, with the other DA staff sections maintaining varying roles and efforts for IA collaboration and coordination appropriate for their inherent staff roles.

Within TRADOC, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth has been designated as the major subordinate organization for IA training and doctrinal efforts. The Counterinsurgency Center, Joint Center for International Security Forces, Battle Command Battle Lab, and Command and General Staff Officer Course Interagency Fellows program all look at various aspects of Army-IA interaction, integration, and collaboration.[29]

Within the theater Army service component commands, the IA portfolio is typically managed by the G9 as part of that staff section's civil military operations purview. The G5's planning activities generally include IA interactions on an as-needed basis. The G2, G4, and G6 staffs also consistently interact with IA representatives and organizations as required for their planning, coordination, and execution responsibilities.

In Army corps, division, and brigade headquarters, the IA responsibility is typically distributed as required among the staff sections, with no formal, doctrinally-defined IA component or proponent within the headquarters structure. In deployed environments, local commanders at lower organizational levels will sometimes create ad hoc cells for IA coordination and integration.

The Army's footprint in predominately IA organizations is relatively modest, with forty-one of seventy-six (54 percent) of O4, O5, and O6 billets outside of DoD historically filled. Additionally, the active component staffing guidance provided to HRC places most of the assignments in the bottom priority for staffing, with a target fill rate of 80 percent.[30]

Of interest is the Army's investment in the joint environment, driven both by operational requirements as well as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986.[31] The Army's fill rate for its nearly 3,000 Joint Distribution Authorization List (JDAL) billets was 73 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2013 (79 percent for Joint Staff billets), illustrating the Army's difficulty in filling even billets generally recognized as both important to the Army and career-enhancing to the Soldiers filling them.[32] The Army's JDAL requirement, which

Within TRADOC, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth has been designated as the major subordinate organization for IA training and doctrinal efforts.

has been reduced 40 percent over the past five years, is both a logical analog and potential competitor for any Army personnel investment in IA organizations.[33]

One specific organizational initiative of particular note, though not an official Army entity, is the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Foundation's Simons Center for Interagency Studies. A program of the non-profit CGSC Foundation, the Simons Center strives to enhance IA knowledge across the Army by working closely with CGSC, IA partners, and academic institutions. It provides an archive of IA-related materials; publishes a number of journals, essays, and other works; and sponsors writing competitions on IA topics.[34]

Shortfalls

Although the Simons Center is an outstanding example of successful initiative, the broader Army's concept of where the proponency for IA integration resides organizationally remains vague.

Although the Simons Center is an outstanding example of successful initiative, the broader Army's concept of where the proponency for IA integration resides organizationally remains vague. From the Army staff level, through U.S Forces Command and TRADOC levels and down to individual units, management of the IA portfolio is too often an ad hoc, federated, and somewhat grass roots effort. Although these efforts are valuable and can promote innovation, such an approach also risks gaps in the Army-IA collaborative effort and makes less efficient the development of enduring relationships, processes, and doctrine.

The most significant organizational shortfall in the Army's IA effort is this lack of clear proponency, with articulated responsibilities and authorities. Consequently, Army IA efforts of great potential are challenged to gain momentum and endurance, and opportunities for efficiencies and synergies are not recognized and exploited. This lack of clear proponency creates unnecessary complexity for Army personnel who attempt to navigate their way through the topic, and even more so for IA partners who attempt to understand and collaborate with Army elements.

Interestingly, JP 3-0, in discussing the challenge of operating in IA operations, specifically states the "unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision making techniques."[35] The Army contributes to this difficulty by its poorly-defined organizational policies, procedures, and proponencies in the area of IA collaboration.

From the perspective of organizational structures, the Army is fairly well-positioned to build its IA capabilities. Effective IA collaboration and integration does not require an organizational chart-based solution. With an already-shrinking Army force, investment of large numbers of personnel in Army IA structures is not possible and would not necessarily achieve the desired effect of stronger IA

partnerships across the force. Rather, distributing small IA "nodes" across existing Army structures and making strategic investments of relatively small numbers of high-quality Army personnel into IA spaces could provide significant cost-benefit advantages, better synchronize Army and IA efforts, and allow the Army to "punch above its weight" in the IA environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ARMY IA ORGANIZATION

- The Army must clearly identify proponents and delineate responsibilities and authorities for IA collaboration and readiness. The Army should identify and locate this proponency in a way that clearly indicates the centrality of IA considerations for planning, training, and operating at all levels and in virtually every operational context.

- Resource small IA planning nodes at corps, division, and RAB levels. These nodes, ideally located within G3 or G5 purview, will serve as internal advocates for IA awareness within those staffs, provide clear points of inject for IA entities seeking to integrate or collaborate, and establish expert cadre around which to grow larger IA cells and efforts for larger-scale operations.

- Augment the Army's footprint in IA headquarters spaces, both at those agencies' headquarters and in their forward-deployed locations. As the Army increases its presence in those IA spaces, it is imperative that the right individuals, with the right training and personal attributes, are assigned to those roles. The Army should establish an intense, qualitative, Army-level screening mechanism for potential assignees to IA positions to ensure that the best and brightest officers and NCOs are sent to those assignments.

- Augment Army participation in joint interagency task forces, combatant command interagency task forces, and similar DoD organizations. These assignments provide personnel with tremendous exposure to IA partners, while providing a familiar DoD structure and environment. These assignments would offer ideal opportunities for more junior or less experienced officers and NCOs to develop IA expertise but without the risks associated with assigning those individuals to IA headquarters or forward organizations where they would operate as the only, or one of very few, DoD representatives.

- Reinforce CAC's role as the IA proponency within TRADOC, clarifying what is currently a somewhat disparate approach to IA doctrine and training efforts. Identifying CAC as the Army's IA Center of Excellence would help synchronize the Army's

The Army must clearly identify proponents and delineate responsibilities and authorities for IA collaboration and readiness.

IA development and education efforts, given its previously established involvement in the Military Education Level 4 (MEL-4) IA Fellowship Program, its established relationship with the branch schoolhouses and Centers of Excellence, and its proximity to the Simons Center at Fort Leavenworth.

• Within appropriate legal and public perception constraints, strengthen and broaden the Army's relationship with the Simons Center, clearly and publicly supporting its role as a vibrant, influential think-tank for IA studies, policy formulation, doctrinal development, and training support. Encourage the Center's efforts to establish itself as the DoD and federal governmental leader in IA academic, policy, and operational areas.

• Using Army legislative liaison resources, cultivate Congressional support for Army IA efforts, similar to the engagement during the development of the GNA of 1986. Though a GNA-like legislative impetus for IA may not be possible or advisable, the Army's efforts toward IA collaboration should be informed by the GNA-directed move toward joint operations since the late 1980s. Gaining Congressional support, even if not resulting in specific legislative action, will establish and reinforce the Army's status as the DoD leader in IA collaboration.

Current Army Leader Development for IA

The CGSC MEL-4 Interagency Fellowship program is a superb initiative that provides relevant IA experience to Army officers and IA civilians each year.

In terms of Army IA leader development, there are some relatively small and disparate but excellent initiatives within the Army. The CGSC MEL-4 Interagency Fellowship program is a superb initiative that provides relevant IA experience to Army officers and IA civilians each year. This exchange of personnel between the Army and IA partners benefits not only those individuals and their organizations, but also spawns personal networks that will facilitate communication and coordination in future endeavors.[36]

The CGSC IA Fellowship program enjoys substantial support and guidance from the Army Chief of Staff. Though small in scale (it currently includes 37 officers and is projected to grow to 55 officers in FY18) the program is currently the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to educate and develop junior field grade officers for IA interactions, with distribution of the Fellows in IA locations as shown in Figure 3.[37]

The Army War College (AWC) Fellowship Program also places Army officers at the O5/O6 MEL-1 level into IA environments. (See

Figure 3: Officer Distribution in MEL-4 Fellowships

Figure 4, pg. 16) As with the MEL-4 program, the AWC program is small in numbers but strategically important to the Army. The MEL-1 program includes the distribution shown in the following table; the National Capitol Region (NCR) includes Fellows working in IA locations:[38]

Beyond the two Fellowship programs, formal Army leader development programming for IA is minimal. From an experiential perspective, the Army's HRC is starting to recognize the value of IA expertise by identifying IA assignments as "broadening" experiences. Though not considered a critical key developmental experience, the inclusion of IA assignments as legitimate and valuable for Army officers is at least a step in the right direction.[39] Still, without specific guidance, reinforced with selection and promotion board evidence, these assignments will likely remain perceived as "soft" and therefore not career-enhancing.

Additional DA-level initiatives include efforts to implement a DA G3/5/7 Strategic Leadership Division-developed training program for selected officers assigned to RAB, modeled on the

Figure 4: Officer Distribution in MEL-1 Fellowships

current Foreign Area Officer (FAO) In-Region Training program. The new RAB-focused program would provide 6–12 months of tailored regional and IA training for a small number of officers on assignment to a RAB. The target population for this program would be the top 50 percent (resident Intermediate Leader Education (ILE)-selected) of RAB-designated officers, with an ultimate goal of 2–3 such officers assigned to each RAB.[40]

Indicative of the difficulty in investing people and time in this type of broadening experience, however, is the fact that division leaders pulled all their eligible officers from the first iteration of this program, choosing instead to put them in more traditional Army- and division-centric roles and training.[41]

Shortfalls

The Army lacks a defined IA professional military education (PME) strategy similar to the Joint PME model currently in place. There is no IA-specific additional skill identifier (ASI), no prescribed educational and experiential milestones to achieve a joint specialty officer (JSO)-like qualification for IA expertise, or other tracking mechanisms to manage personnel based in part on their IA abilities and experience.[42]

Even greater than the lack of administrative tools is the lack of broad appreciation for IA education and experience across the force. The G3/5/7-developed RAB orientation program's struggle to attract company and field grade officers within divisions illustrates the challenge of asking officers and their leadership to invest in IA expertise vice more traditional Army skill sets. The MEL-4 IA Fellowship program demographics also illustrate this challenge, with officers from the maneuver, fires, and effects cohort somewhat under-represented in that program.[43] Their hesitance to apply likely indicates concerns that the IA experience vice more traditional CGSC or Sister Service ILE experience could prove a disadvantage in future assignments and selections.

With no clear strategy for the Army's approach to developing leaders, fluent and comfortable working with IA partners or operating in the IA environment, TRADOC's approach to institutional training on IA skills is inconsistent. For lieutenants and captains (i.e., Basic and Career Course levels), each Branch determines what, if any, IA topics or information will be introduced.[44] At the MEL-4 level, outside of the IA Fellowship program, there is limited discussion of IA collaboration at CGSOC and, presumably, at the Sister Service ILEs. Only at the MEL-1 Senior Service College level of officer PME is there a concerted effort to recognize broadly the criticality of IA to the Army, both as an institution and operationally. Consequently, most Army officers will have likely served for more than 20 years before receiving any significant formal IA education or training.

Legitimate questions and concerns arise regarding the Army's commitment to IA readiness when one looks at the investment in and of our most critical resource– people. In this area, existing guidance is outdated and inadequate. With no GNA to compel commitment of personnel to IA efforts, those assignments must compete for priority with traditional Army and joint assignments, and as a result fall into the lowest category for staffing. Tellingly, the experience of G3/5/7 in finding RAB-bound officers for their region and IA-focused training program does not indicate a broad appreciation of IA experience as mission critical compared to more traditional Army training and experiences.

The Army Leader Development Strategy 2013, in particular, represents a missed opportunity to clearly define senior Army leaders' vision for IA training, education, and development. Though the document stresses the need for adaptive, flexible, broadly-developed Army leaders at all levels and makes some generic references to the importance of operational capability in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments, the document provides little specific direction on the relative priority of IA experience for Army officers, NCOs, and civilians.[45]

Legitimate questions and concerns arise regarding the Army's commitment to IA readiness when one looks at the investment in and of our most critical resource– people.

• Clarify and specify IA expectations in Army staffing and personnel documents. As indicated above, investment of Army personnel into IA environments is as much about quality as it is quantity. It is imperative that the Army invest the right people in those roles, carefully and clearly articulate their roles and responsibilities, and ensure clear understanding with IA partners as to those roles and responsibilities. Army personnel in IA assignments should be assigned roles that require clear articulation and integration of Army equities, capabilities, authorities, and priorities into IA planning and operations. In doing so, those Army personnel will also provide IA perspective back to Army organizations, informing and influencing planning, training, and operations.

Army personnel in IA assignments should be assigned roles that require clear articulation and integration of Army equities, capabilities, authorities, and priorities into IA planning and operations.

• Include IA topics in PME institutional training as follows, inculcating throughout the force a mindset that inherently appreciates and understands the value of IA collaboration:

» Officer Basic Courses and NCO Warrior Leaders' Course: Incorporate discussion of IA equities, capabilities, and authorities into existing programs of instruction (POIs).

» Captains' Career Courses (CCC) and NCO Advanced Leaders' Course: Incorporate Branch-specific IA topics into existing POIs.

» NCO and Officer structured self-development (SSD) and distributed learning: Include substantial subject matter on IA topics in this training. As the School of Advance Leadership and Tactics at CAC develops its SSD program for post-CCC, pre-ILE officers, include significant IA topics in that POI. SSD and distributed learning programs could serve as the cornerstone for providing a baseline of IA education across the entire Army, complementing the smaller scale, more intensive Fellowship programs.

» Officer MEL-4 and NCO Senior Leaders' Course: Expand the existing CGSOC IA Fellowship program and ensure equitable participation across all Career Managements Fields (CMFs). If necessary, assign O4s near the top of their year group to the program even if they do not volunteer, clearly signaling the importance the Army places on it, and provide those O4s preference for post-MEL-4 assignments to encourage applications and participation. As is done with officers graduating from the Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program at the National Security Agency, ensure that officers who complete the IA Fellowship program receive

priority for assignment to key developmental positions following completion of the Fellowship. Incorporate IA topics into existing ILE core POIs, increase IA senior leader participation in Speakers' Programs, and increase IA-focused electives.

» Increase AWC IA Fellowships, including adding a Fellow position (or multiple positions) to the Simons Center to focus on policy formulation, outreach, and assessment of Army IA programs and initiatives.

• Develop IA PME models and milestones, similar to the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) model, and reinforce the importance of that training and experience by publicizing the opportunities, encouraging participation, and rewarding officers and NCOs who choose to apply.

• Establish an advanced IA planning course, similar to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) course, to develop a core of IA planning experts within the Army. Follow-on assignments for those officers should be to division staffs of RABs or Army component staffs in each theater.

• Prioritize IA broadening experiences to make them as career-enhancing as joint training with industry, advanced civil schooling, and Joint Chiefs of Staff internship programs, particularly for junior and mid-level field grade officers and their NCO contemporaries.

• Designate IA assignments as key developmental for some CMFs at O4 and O5 levels, including not only functional area, military intelligence, force sustainment, or special operations CMFs, but also selected maneuver, fire, and effects CMFs.

• Develop an IA Project Warrior-like track for senior company grade and junior field grade officers, establishing an education, experience, and utilization model that develops deep IA expertise in selected officers and allows the Army to leverage that expertise by reinvesting those officers back into instructor and observer-controller-trainer assignments.

• Expand the participation of retired foreign service officers (FSOs), law enforcement professionals, and other IA seniors in TRADOC courses, combat training center rotations, and RAB training events. This program, similar to the General Officer Senior Mentor program used at Mission Command Training Program and the Defense Intelligence Agency's incorporation of retired FSOs into the Joint Military Attaché School training program, would provide relevant, realistic IA perspectives that would necessarily be integrated into unit planning and execution during those training events.[46]

Establish an advanced IA planning course, similar to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) course, to develop a core of IA planning experts within the Army.

Conclusion

Nearly seven decades after Ferdinand Eberstadt's plea for military and IA collaboration, President Obama struck a similar note in a May 2013 speech to NDU articulating his intention to move the U.S. from its war footing of the past decade. The President stated "…[in] an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can't depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas."[47]

From the highest levels of our civilian and military leadership, across academia, and throughout the national security apparatus, the importance of IA collaboration to the nation's future has attained significant rhetorical resonance. Across the U.S. Army, extraordinary individual and organizational initiatives and efforts are making strides toward improving IA collaboration. However, a lack of clarity and specificity in intent, incoherence in guidance, and inconsistency in implementation is hindering the effectiveness and efficiency of those efforts.

...a mindset must be inculcated across the force that inherently recognizes the criticality of effective integration and collaboration with all of our IA partners.

It is time for the Army to establish and promulgate a clear, definitive, directive strategy for IA collaboration. Its doctrine, organization, training, and personnel policies must be synchronized to achieve the necessary unity of effort and focus to attain sufficient capabilities in IA collaboration. Most importantly, a mindset must be inculcated across the force that inherently recognizes the criticality of effective integration and collaboration with all of our IA partners. The Army's institutional strategy will require such collaboration, its operations will demand it, and the nation's security will be enhanced by it. *IAP*

Endnotes

1   Leon Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, January 5, 2012, p. 1.

2   U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center, "Top 10 Insights on the Army in Transition," Fort Eustis, VA, October 2013, p. 1.

3   Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff, Washington, October 15, 2013, p. 142.

4   Ibid.

5   Bob Ulin, "About Interagency Cooperation," Interagency Essay 10-01, Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2010, p. 2.

6   Anthony H. Cordesman, "Changing US Security Strategy," Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies report, Washington, September 2013, p. 81.

7   U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center, "2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report," Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 31, 2013, p. 1.

8   Ibid., p. 2.

9   Ibid., p. 6.

10   Ibid., p. 18.

11   Francis J. Wiercinski, "Partnering in the Pacific Theater: Assuring Security and Stability through Strong Army Partnerships," U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI, April 26, 2012, p. 2.

12   "United States Army Pacific Command Briefing," U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI, January 2014, p. 4.

13   Ibid., p. 8.

14   Ibid., p. 9.

15   Ibid.

16   *A Failure of Initiative*, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina," United States Government Printing Office, Washington, April 5, 2006, p. 202.

17   Ibid., p. 201.

18   Ibid., p. 3.

19 Ibid.

20   Ibid.

21   Ibid., p. 4.

22   Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-28, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, United States Army, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 14, 2013, pp. 1–8.

23   Jesse P. Pruett, "The Sound of One Hand Clapping: The Expeditionary Imperative of Interagency Integration," *Interagency Essay* 12-03W, Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2012, p. 3.

24   Chuck Hagel, speech, National Defense University, Washington, April 3, 2013.

25   Ibid.

26   General Martin E. Dempsey, "Chairman's Strategic Direction for the Force: Strengthening Our Relationship of Trust with the Nation," U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, February 6, 2012, p. 5.

27   John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno "2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance," Chief of Staff of the Army, U.S. Army, Washington, 2012, p. 4.

28   Cordesman, p. 81.

29   Jack Jackson, email message to author, Monterey, CA, December 12, 2013.

30   Lieutenant Colonel Candice E. Frost, interview by author, Fort Knox, KY, December 19, 2013.

31   "Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," United States Congress, Washington, October 1, 1986.

32   Lieutenant Colonel Vincent A. Motley, email to author, February 10, 2014.

33   Ibid.

34   *Interagency Journal*, Colonel Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2012, p. 1.

35   Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff, Washington, August 11, 2011, p. ix.

36   The United States Army Command and General Staff School Interagency Student homepage, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/cgss/interagency.asp>, accessed October 19, 2013.

37   "Annual CSA Fellowship Update Brief," U.S. Army G-3/5/7, Washington, December 11, 2013, p. 12.

38   Ibid., p. 17.

39   Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, U.S. Department of the Army, Washington, February 2010, pp. 24-26.

40   Colonel Eric J. Larson, interview by author, Washington, January 29, 2014.

41   Ibid.

42   DA PAM 600-3, pp. 24–26.

43   Larson, interview.

44   Keith Beurskens, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 17, 2013.

45   "Army Leader Development Strategy 2013," United States Army, Washington, June 15, 2013, pp. 5–6.

46   Colonel Kurt Meppen, interview by author, Washington, January 30, 2014.

47   Barack Obama, "U.S. Drone and Counterterrorism Policy," speech, National Defense University, Washington, May 23, 2013.

InterAgency Paper Series

The *InterAgency Paper* (*IAP*) series is published by the Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation. A work selected for publication as an *IAP* represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the Simons Center editorial board, will contribute to a better understand of a particular national security issue involving the cooperation, collaboration, and coordination between governmental departments, agencies, and offices.

Publication of an occasional *InterAgency Paper* does not indicate that the Simons Center agrees with the content or position of the author, but does suggest that the Center believes the paper will stimulate the thinking and discourse concerning important interagency security issues.

Contributions: The Simons Center encourages the submission of original papers based on research from primary sources or which stem from lessons learned via personal experiences. For additional information see "Simons Center Writer's Submission Guidelines" on the Simons Center website at www.TheSimonsCenter.org/publications.

About the Simons Center

The Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation is a major program of the Command and General Staff College Foundation. The Center's mission is to advance scholarship pat the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; develop interagency leaders; improve interagency operations; and build a body of interagency knowledge.

About the CGSC Foundation

The Command and General Staff College Foundation, Inc., was established on December 28, 2005 as a tax-exempt, non-profit educational foundation that provides resources and support to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the development of tomorrow's military leaders. The CGSC Foundation helps to advance the profession of military art and science by promoting the welfare and enhancing the prestigious educational programs of the CGSC. The CGSC Foundation supports the College's many areas of focus by providing financial and research support for major programs such as the Simons Center, symposia, conferences, and lectures, as well as funding and organizing community outreach activities that help connect the American public to their Army. All Simons Center works are published by the "CGSC Foundation Press."