

# Interagency Qualifications to Address Fragility, or Rethinking Civil Affairs

by **Kurt E. Müller**

The defense sector has a long-standing appreciation of the value of whole-of-government approaches to national security challenges. The phrase “all elements of national power” resonates with Department of Defense (DoD) leadership and is a common feature of curricula and outreach seminars at senior service colleges. Although the original rationale for attention to diplomatic, financial, and industrial capacity was undoubtedly to address the existential challenges of twentieth-century, industrial warfare, the frequency of low-intensity campaigns and the emergence of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations expanded the discourse in senior professional military education to include economic and social development, effective governance, and the inclusion of the private sector to supersede aid with trade. The post-Cold War experience of military deployments emphasized the broad range of societal factors holding the key to stable interstate relations and to terminating intrastate conflicts that threatened to spill across borders, giving rise to the term “complex contingency operations” and its variants. Inequities based in clan, tribal, linguistic, or other cultural dimensions required political development as much as military intervention, giving rise to the welcome—but still incomplete—partnership among diplomacy, defense, and development.

This interrelationship was still murky in the 1992 humanitarian intervention in Somalia that morphed into an under-resourced combat operation. The subsequent analysis yielded Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 on reforming multilateral peace operations. Its accompanying policy guidance noted interrelated “military, political, humanitarian, and developmental elements” and laid the basis for PDD 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” In assessing a situation, developing policy guidance, sharing planning, and monitoring events, PDD 56 established six mechanisms to establish and conduct (1) an executive committee, (2) a political-military plan, (3) an interagency rehearsal of the plan, (4) interagency training, (5) agency review, and (6) an after-action review.<sup>1</sup>

But this approach to complex operations did not become institutionalized in campaign planning. Gaps in interagency collaboration for the Iraq campaign continued in post-conflict operations, evident in a succession of Bush Administration documents: the 2003 National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 24 gave DoD the lead for reconstruction, but a year later, NSPD 36 assigned responsibility for reconstruction to the Department of State (State). Despite institutional competition in Washington, at theater level a development was underway to improve interagency coordination.

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In 2002, a Millennium Challenge experiment led to a prototype of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group,<sup>2</sup> sufficiently successful in U.S. Southern Command to serve as a model for U.S. Africa Command. The Southern Command model and a predecessor, interagency task force in Florida originally addressed counter-narcotics in Latin America and spread to broader issues of stability, thus the appeal of this model for supporting relations with African nations. But the real push for interagency operations came out of the failure to use the victory over Iraqi forces to achieve the war's aims.

That quandary led to studies at think tanks and government entities.<sup>3</sup> Ambassador James Dobbins and his national security program at the RAND Corporation issued a series of studies demonstrating that although successive administrations (regardless of political party) pronounced their opposition to nation building, they found civil stabilization tasks unavoidable in six interventions in a dozen years.<sup>4</sup> Though the purpose of those interventions ranged from humanitarian assistance, to peacekeeping, to regime change, in each instance the civil sector held the key to success.

By December 2005, the realization that civil-sector issues were central to stability was unavoidable, and the White House issued NSPD 44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," which charged ten cabinet departments with identifying personnel and developing capabilities to respond to crises through a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Because the realization had taken hold that "ungoverned spaces"—more accurately characterized as alternatively governed—can harbor nonstate belligerents, students of conflict linked internal conflict and unstable governance to threats to first-world countries.

Thus institutional interests in development and special operations advocated achieving stability by resolving nascent conflicts in states

with fragile governance. The pressing issue of post-conflict stability in Afghanistan and Iraq gave impetus to addressing the preparation of personnel to undertake civil-military stability operations. Eventually this effort led to the expansion of Civil Affairs (CA) in the military services, the creation of an interagency Civilian Response Corps, and projections of several approaches to educating government personnel (foreign and civil service) for stabilization

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assignments. A 2009 report on CA by the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted the need to expand civilian capabilities for preventive activities, as well as for reconstruction and stabilization and called for a long-range planning framework to avoid the risks that "civilian and military contributors may not develop needed capabilities, or may not maintain them in the needed quantity to address the expected range of future contingencies."<sup>5</sup>

The Center for Strategic and International Studies report was perhaps more perceptive than its authors anticipated, as the subsequent development of capabilities in both civilian and military sectors was short-lived. Despite a 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review that called for continued expansion of the Civilian Response Corps, State abrogated its agreements with other agencies and eliminated the organization. The Navy resuscitated a CA capability it had transferred to the Department of the Interior when the Navy demobilized after WWII,<sup>6</sup> but it dismantled its CA structure again in 2014.<sup>7</sup>

For about a decade—from a 2002 paper "Post-Conflict Reconstruction," that the

Association of the United States Army published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to the final report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), in March 2013—civil-sector skills were in high demand, primarily for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also for general use in stabilizing fragile states. A combination of factors, from a kind of stabilization fatigue to interagency competition for resources, curtailed the whole-of-government approach to foreign challenges. Although this development leaves ambassadors and their country teams with fewer options for addressing stability, the experience of extensive civilian deployments offers a number of useful lessons.

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Experience with stabilization should lead the U.S. to consider adapting practices in the transition from conflict to peace to the examination of threats to peace and therefore to options for conflict resolution and prevention. An appropriate place to begin an inquiry into options for stabilization is to look at concepts of stability.

About the time DoD issued its Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,”<sup>8</sup> there were a number of discussions in the Washington interagency environment that centered on the word stability and its derivatives. The vocabulary was shared, but there was little indication that the participants in these discussions shared the underlying concepts. The defense sector has a traditional view of stability as signaling a transition that ends its

deployment with a transfer of authority to other agencies. Unless its stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operation is complicated by counterinsurgency, its major contribution is to develop the host nation’s ability for internal defense. In recent strategic jargon, the means to do so is “building partner capacity” of police and military forces. The development community sees stability as a goal that the military achieves to allow development partners to improve indigenous infrastructure across societal domains. In one of several reports, the SIGIR points to the enormous hurdle of security as the impediment to achieving the aims of infrastructure reconstruction. In the preface to *Hard Lessons*, SIGIR questions the decision to conduct extensive reconstruction while conflict continued.<sup>9</sup> While constraints on civilians from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or the Department of Commerce would be less in a permissive environment, the matter of shared concepts remains a candidate for interagency professional development.

### **Similarities and Distinctions among Stability Actors**

Several communities share approaches to stability operations, particularly special operations forces (SOF) and CA in the military and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community that provides humanitarian relief. A look at their similarities and differences can inform their use in specific environments. Beginning with the special operations community, the SOF mantra of working by, with, and through indigenous forces has a CA parallel with indigenous government agencies. In a conflict assessment and peacebuilding operation, assessing the societal infrastructure and proposing ameliorative measures will require adapting the established CA estimate of the situation to the differing circumstances of the stability missions. Although attention to

circumstances may seem obvious, as the Center for Complex Operations has concluded from studying the deployments of federal civilian agencies, the default mode of operations is business as usual, even where the mission demands an adaptation.<sup>10</sup> Ideally, these differing circumstances and guiding principles should be part of both CA professional military education and predeployment familiarization, both of which sorely need improvement.

Special Forces and CA share a history of coordinating with other government agencies; however, civilian agencies also have a perception of Special Forces that could lead an ambassador to decline their presence. Although Special Forces has demonstrated a successful approach to security concepts in such initiatives as village stability operations in Afghanistan, their authority to train police forces is by a periodically granted exception to a prohibition under the Foreign Assistance Act. Even with “Leahy vetting,” training security forces runs the risk these forces will become more adept at oppressing their own citizens. Consequently, the democratization instruction that accompanies training foreign forces requires carefully vetted instructors with credibility in both military proficiency and civil-military relations.

The small-footprint circumstances in which SOF often work are particularly valuable in stability operations, but the directive on support to stability operations reveals a perception that the function is something other than a core capability. Consequently, the approach shares a terminological legacy with “operations other than war” and its slightly more defense-centric version, prefixing *military* in “military operations other than war.” The linguistic haggling behind these guiding documents appears as well in the Joint Staff construct of phased operations. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” (2011) may present a six-phase campaign construct, but this configuration did not start with zero because the

authors were digital natives. The 2006 version of JP 5-0 enumerated five phases: deter, defend and seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. Added later, Phase 0 is associated with the emergence of U.S. Africa Command, but its appended character indicates a belated realization that resource-rich DoD can play a role in conflict management, particularly in the defense strategy of enabling states to defend against threats to state legitimacy.

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Phase 0 was not universally hailed as presenting a kinder, gentler DoD. In the development community, some decried a “militarization of development.” But a military vocabulary applied to conflict prevention also runs a substantial risk of alienating the diplomatic actors. Although the activities accord well with long-standing, theater-security, cooperation programs, adding a Phase 0, described as shaping the environment, to an inclusive model of military intervention offers the likely interpretation that the military would use persistent presence to prepare for conflict rather than to avert it. Despite a history of military strategy that offers “flexible deterrent options,” the phasing model projects an expectation of escalation more than it hints at a focus on preventing conflict. Former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley identifies this perception in planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hadley presents a dilemma in addressing post-war civil administration: despite White House preference for coercive diplomacy over war, a current of public thought ran that President George W. Bush had the intention of going to war. If planning for a post-conflict

Iraq had been known publicly, administration critics could have said, “See we told you, the diplomatic effort is not real, they’re already preparing for war.”<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, in a 2013 study of building partner capacity, a RAND Corporation team found instances of relegating partner nation defense capacity to secondary or tertiary importance, taking a back seat to “securing access,” for example.<sup>12</sup> This perception gives ambassadors pause before approving a U.S. military presence in their areas of responsibility (AOR). That

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term, too familiar to military readers, projects an attitude that undermines diplomacy. From his time as commander of U.S. Southern Command, Admiral James Stavridis emphasized a need for combatant commanders to avoid the term “AOR.” As he rightly saw it, the Chiefs of Defense of the indigenous forces would too often ask, “What do you mean your AOR? It’s my AOR!”

If the task at hand is conflict prevention, the default position is to call a civilian agency.<sup>13</sup> Consequently development agencies may offer appropriate options. The development community shares with CA and Special Forces an affinity of working with local partners. And development aligns well with prevalent theories that economic opportunity, provision of public services, and responsive governance contribute to stability and reductions in violence. Moreover, CA and Special Forces are used to working closely with USAID in the field and in Washington.

But the institutional ethos of the development community and the structure of

its programming may not be appropriate in a number of circumstances. The small number of USAID officials work primarily through NGOs. In a volume that should be a standard reference for stabilization, Robert Perito describes four categories of NGOs in conflict zones: humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society and democracy-building, and conflict resolution.<sup>14</sup> Some NGOs work in several areas, and personnel often move among NGOs. The NGO community’s preservation of independence offers both advantages and liabilities. When providing services to two sides in a conflict, NGOs and humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN entities, strive to create “humanitarian space” to deliver services and conduct negotiations. Although neutral observers expect both peacekeepers and aid workers to be impartial, the belligerents in a conflict do not necessarily see them that way. Consequently, these organizations should preserve distance from all factions, including military forces that are not party to the conflict.<sup>15</sup> That concern led to an agreement among DoD, State, USAID, and InterAction (an umbrella organization for many U.S.-based NGOs) that emphasizes avoiding any appearance that NGOs are collaborating closely with the military. It specifically calls for avoiding references to NGOs as force multipliers or partners.<sup>16</sup> Although these guidelines pertain to hostile environments and those potentially so, country teams may encounter this arm’s-length attitude in permissive environments as well.

Foreign assistance and humanitarian aid are primarily moral imperatives, independent of policy goals and bilateral relations. But, inasmuch as assistance in economic activity, physical infrastructure, and governance may flow from attempts to support bilateral relations, an attitude of independence opens these activities to the risk of failure to align with embassy objectives. Thus unity of effort as a principle of operations demonstrates limits of cooperation.

Although USAID staff are government employees, some staff may share the NGO attitude of independence from government policy. Indeed, one recurring tension between State and USAID is the subordination of the latter in pursuing policy goals.<sup>17</sup> The shared ethos of development goals with those of implementing partners can insulate USAID personnel from a focus on the rationale for specific projects, leading to development for its own sake, rather than in support of a specific policy. For example, when then-Senator John Kerry visited Afghanistan as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, his repeated message was for projects to be essential and sustainable. That such a prescription was necessary is evident from stabilization guidance that then-USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah issued in January 2011, noting “different objectives, beneficiaries, modalities, and measurement tools” between stabilization and long-term development. Shah emphasized the need to train staff to account for the differences in a stabilization environment and for programmatic initiatives to “hone in on sources of instability.”<sup>18</sup> Just as in the military, USAID has a lessons-learned effort, and sustainability is a recurring theme among development practitioners. Yet, much of the programming in Afghanistan is unsustainable. Thus, if USAID has difficulty differentiating stabilization from development (i.e., business as usual), it is likely to need a concerted effort to implement a strategy of conflict prevention as well.

The personnel of NGOs that provide specific services may not share with their government benefactors a goal of weaning the local society from their services, or they may have an agenda that in other ways does not align with government policy goals. An example from another agency is apt: in Panama, in the mid-1990s, the Community Relations Service program of the Department of Justice contracted for interpreters to deal with would-be refugees who had fled Cuba in

hopes of landing in Florida. Intercepted at sea, a number were housed in Guantanamo Bay and in Panama. When their asylum-seeking appeared not to be going well, those in Panama rioted, and the contract interpreters were implicated in supporting the rioting.

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To the extent that NGOs can start projects that attract sustainable private-sector funding, their participation is highly welcome. USAID has been party to such partnerships, but an even greater source of potential access to the private sector is found across government agencies. At about the time Congress was considering a civilian stabilization initiative that later allowed the Civilian Response Corps to recruit for positions across multiple agencies, Bernard Carreau noted the untapped potential of ten domestic agencies, whose 607,700 employees in 2007 dwarfed the capacity of USAID, at 2,100, and the Department of State, at 19,000.<sup>19</sup> The Civilian Response Corps did not survive competing Washington priorities, but many individuals from multiple agencies responded to the call for volunteers to serve in difficult circumstances. The concept continues to have adherents. The SIGIR even called for a much larger organization that is conceptually similar. Both the Civilian Response Corps and the SIGIR-proposed Office for Contingency Operations derive from the experience of stabilization and reconstruction, but both would likely be used for permissive stabilization environments as well. In their absence, another option is to extend to military CA units the additional task of undertaking stabilization as a peace-building activity.

## The Recent Demand for Civil Affairs

One of the defining characteristics of stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was the use of multiagency provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). A 2003 innovation in Gardez, Afghanistan, that derived from the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell, the PRT drew staff from multiple agencies. But as PRTs were replicated, civilian agencies found them difficult to staff, and the military filled some of the billets intended for civilians with CA

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operators, though one reason for turning to other agencies was to relieve the burden on the small CA community.<sup>20</sup> A RAND Corporation study conducted well into the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns illustrated the demand for CA operators. Looking at utilization rates for reserve component career fields in the Army, the RAND team found that with 27% of Army Reserve CA operators deployed, this field was the most used specialty in the Army Reserve.<sup>21</sup> With a stated policy of deploying reserve component members for a period of one year with the expectation that service members would be inactive for the following five years—a policy DoD could not meet—the demand for CA had been building for some time. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, the House Armed Services Committee inserted a requirement for DoD to report on its plans for the development and use of CA forces. One means to meet the deployment demand was to double the Army’s active component CA force; the Marine Corps doubled its force as well, and the

Navy resuscitated its interest in CA. But DoD also noted some difficulties in specialty skills that remain challenges. The experience of this specialty is instructive for future mobilizations, for potential staffing options in permissive environments, and for interagency operations.

## A Brief Look at Civil Affairs History

In a 2014 article in *The National Interest*, Admiral Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence, Ambassador Ronald Neumann, former chief of mission in Afghanistan, and Admiral Eric Olson, former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, engage the challenge of stability operations by proposing several changes to the composition of country teams, empowering the chief of mission with directive authority.<sup>22</sup> Calling on the Army and Marine Corps to reestablish strong CA capabilities, they note, “In the past, there were experienced civil engineers, utility company officials, local government administrators and transportation officials in the Army and Marine Corps Reserve.” But the “personnel in military reserve units are more junior and much less experienced now.” A look at how this circumstance came about will inform the reader about options for remediation.

A traditional CA estimate of the situation looks across a range of civilian domains. But over its seven-decade history, CA has lost considerable capability. The 1943 edition of the United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (Field Manual [FM] 27-5 and OPNAV 50E-3) enumerated 26 functional areas.<sup>23</sup> The 1958 Joint FM 41-5 reduced the specialties to 19; the 1962 FM 41-10 enumerated 20 specialties across four areas. The 2000 edition further reduced the scope of analysis to 16 specialties. By 2013, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 spoke of six areas, reflecting the Army FM 3-57 enumeration in 2011 of 14 specialties. So long as the concept of CA employment focused on a post-conflict

environment, DoD could argue that the need for CA analyses and administration would be episodic, not continuous. Because its use would be restricted to expeditionary operations, it could be in the reserve components, much as the Air Force would place airlift control elements in the reserve components rather than in its active force. The post-WWII joint and service-component environments in Asia and Europe required community relations, but the steady-state environment allowed these functions to be civilianized. By the 1980s, the security environment did not call for CA deployments, the specialty fell into disuse, and these officer-heavy units with senior grades in enlisted ranks as well became targets for force reduction.

But there were pockets of utility at theater level. During the Cold War, U.S. European Command used CA primarily to exercise a concept of host-nation support. This focus became valuable to U.S. Central Command as well, as circumstances in the Middle East heated up in 1990. But during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, it was State, not DoD, that called for a CA-staffed Kuwait Task Force until restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. The Kuwait Task Force addressed interagency issues supporting the Kuwaiti government; U.S. military commands preferred their CA staffs to be more military planners than civilian experts. Senior military personnel have expectations for the cultural character of their peers, and the functional specialists, i.e., the infrastructure engineers and public administrators that Blair, Neumann, and Olson address, do not fit that mold. Accordingly, the commands asking for CA planners wanted personnel who fit easily into their operating culture. Recent developments show the branch is familiar with its WWII-era School of Military Government. But there were ten times as many universities training the functional specialists.

This history illustrates the perils of addressing niche capabilities. In reviewing activities in Iraq, the SIGIR concluded that PRTs

were short on CA capacity and capabilities, not in generalist skills but in the functional specialties.<sup>24</sup> In Afghanistan, given the economy's reliance on the agricultural sector, USDA and USAID posted agricultural advisors to PRTs, and the National Guard Bureau created agribusiness development teams staffed by Guard units from farm states. This function would likely have fallen to CA, had the CA community retained its agriculture specialists, whose function had been subsumed under a broader umbrella at the theater-level CA command. The capability had been removed from brigades and battalions, which could address only four of the six groupings of civil domains preserved at theater level. Tactical organizations lost capabilities in specific civil domains, and they could no longer provide a training ground for assignments at higher echelons as individuals progressed in grade.

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Blair, Neumann, and Olson are not the only ones to lament the loss of civilian expertise in CA units. The 2009 DoD report to Congress indicates difficulty in evaluating functional expertise with an example of an elementary school teacher filling a public education billet. The Institute for Military Support to Governance acknowledges this failure in its recent White Paper. But the admission that units were “no longer recruiting or assigning the right individuals to the positions at the right time”<sup>25</sup> is a symptom of the application of active component staffing models to reserve component units. Active component units fill billets through a centralized personnel-



management system; reserve component units place this burden on the commander, whose unit's readiness condition depends on the percentage of military occupational specialty-qualified individuals assigned. But military occupational specialty qualification falls short as a measure of appropriate staffing. Legal, medical, and chaplain branches exacerbate the problem by defining anyone branch qualified as capable of filling the billet. While a commander may prefer a professor of comparative law or an international lawyer in an international law billet or a public-health physician rather than a cardiologist in the public health billet, this option may not be practical. Indeed, "near matches" may be appropriate if paired with professional preparation and networking, but such options require education beyond levels the services typically support.

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### **A Model for Civil Affairs Continuing Education**

Professional military education offers a unique example of continuing education. It differs from licensure requirements for professions, which keep their practitioners abreast of current practice and of changes in the legal environment. Whereas a license often starts with generalist skills followed by increasing specialization, professional military education continually broadens a core set of skills. Thus an Army officer proceeds from branch qualification to combined arms and staff work and then on to the joint and interagency environments. At the senior service colleges, students from other federal agencies add familiarity with

interagency capabilities. But any mandate for in-depth branch experience is left primarily to on-the-job training. There are exceptions at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Joint Special Operations University, but these programs do not reach a sufficient number of CA practitioners, nor do the advanced requirements for legal and medical personnel facilitate applying these specialties to CA.

During the soul-searching that followed the failure to seal the victory in Iraq, a repeated suggestion was to create a National Security University.<sup>26</sup> The suggestion was never realized, and it may not have extended to the bulk of the CA force, those in the reserve components. But a prime characteristic would have been attention to whole-of-government responses and private-sector developments to achieve, as NATO describes it, the comprehensive approach to security.

One initiative that reached a limited number of staff across agencies provides a model of education that ranges across conflict prevention, stabilization, and societal reconstruction. The Foreign Service Institute and the College of International Security Affairs offered a pair of courses to the Civilian Response Corps (and to the military) that the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization required as predeployment qualification. At the Foreign Service Institute, "Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization" presented the range of capabilities resident across federal agencies. Many of the students came from the very programs the syllabus discussed, allowing for both in-depth sharing of expertise and professional networking to provide future contacts across agencies. At the College of International Security Affairs, "Whole of Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Level One," required students in simulated, country-team environments to draw from applicable agency capabilities in developing programmatic responses to a stabilization

challenge.<sup>27</sup> This course emphasized the limited flexibility ambassadors generally have concerning programs funded through agency budgets, which embassies are not free to adapt to circumstances. A key teaching point absent from most military planning for incorporating civilian agencies is the identification of constraints that limit an ambassador's options in tailoring agency programs to the circumstances. In a 2015 *InterAgency Journal* article, Ambassador Neumann uses the example of "czars" to point out the problem that ambassadors generally face—coordinating responsibilities without control of resources.<sup>28</sup> These courses also presented principles and insights that USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation developed for its Conflict Assessment Framework, the basis for tactical and interagency adaptations. The concepts of windows of opportunity and of vulnerability provide useful tools for addressing stability in fragile environments, including those subject to civil unrest, i.e., candidates for programs to prevent conflict.

The analyses that are part of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework take place as Washington-based tabletop exercises and optimally include in-country research as well. Embassy staffs have constructed their mission strategic plans to reflect the results of these inquiries. A particular lesson the CA community can draw from this experience is the compilation of tactical interagency assessments feeding a strategic one. But the interagency inquiries require familiarity with subject matter that military personnel typically encounter first in War College. Like their colleagues in special operations and in agencies that require country-team coordination, CA practitioners need this expertise earlier in their careers.

### **Alternative Staffing Models**

Much of DoD persists in using a twentieth-century mobilization model when other approaches would preserve limited resources

without threatening employer and family support and use its personnel more efficiently. The massive mobilization of medical personnel during Operations Desert Shield/Storm gave rise to the debacle of mobilization insurance because DoD took so many medical providers out of their practices for an extended period (and used them inefficiently). A decade later the mobilization pattern for Iraqi Freedom took reserve component personnel from their normal jobs for longer periods of time than did active component deployments. The recent report by the Center for Naval Analyses, "Charting the Course for Civil Affairs in the New Normal,"<sup>29</sup>

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highlights two specific issues in using Marine Corps CA for persistent-presence operations supporting theater campaign plans: (1) the need to adapt to conflict prevention the expertise gained in post-conflict environments and (2) the difficulty of voluntarily deploying reserve component personnel. Its discussion of call-up authorities indicates the Marine Corps is seeking longer-term deployments, and the difficulty getting volunteers should spur a look at other staffing models.

Well before the modification of the unified command plan that gave U.S. Southern Command oversight of activities in the Caribbean, it was common to conduct construction and preventive medicine projects throughout the region. Active component and reserve component elements of all services participated, and CA personnel coordinated the efforts with the diplomatic posts and defense cooperation offices. Rotations of personnel served on annual training for this purpose. Project officers spent considerable

inactive-duty time coordinating the effort. The annual training option was appropriate because the permissive environment did not require mobilization. For access to the reserve component for persistent presence, the services should look at other government agencies' episodic use of personnel. Within DoD, one notable model is the U.S. Air Force integration of active and reserve component personnel and equipment for routine missions. Not only do air crews mesh flight missions with their civilian careers; reserve component units can conduct operations from their own facilities in support of active component commands.

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The experience of civilian agencies is highly pertinent. The Department of Homeland Security has recurring surge demands for which it recalls retirees for short-duration assignments. Elements of Homeland Security pair recalled annuitants with current officers to facilitate the adoption of newer equipment and operating procedures. State has a status for recalling retired foreign service officers. Its odd name, When Actually Employed, indicates it is sort of a retired reserve, but with the expectation of occasional employment. The Department of Health and Human Services oversees a national disaster medical system that calls public-health volunteers for domestic deployments that do not exceed two weeks. These short durations ensure minimal disruption of routine work and family life.

Impact on professional practice is not just

a matter of calendar disruptions. Reviews of the employment of CA personnel during WWII are striking for the professional rewards the participants reaped from their service.<sup>30</sup> That era was unique in that the proportion of the population in the military was three times the rate of previous major wars, over four times the rate of the Vietnam War.<sup>31</sup> Since this circumstance no longer describes the societal environment, a more-reasonable expectation would be that military forces would deploy personnel with civilian professional qualifications only so long as they provide their professional expertise. One of the concerns Health and Human Services raised regarding members of the Civilian Response Corps is that the department did not want to deploy its personnel for generalist skills, only for the exercise of their particular specialty. Applying such criteria to the CA environment, a commander may well prefer to deploy specialty personnel only so long as the individual is contributing that expertise. Repeat deployments to handle phases of projects would be welcome, but biding time between active use of the skills in demand would not be.

A 2008 RAND Corporation study on Army Reserve and National Guard deployment pointed out that “boots on the ground time” is less relevant to families than “boots away from home.”<sup>32</sup> Omitted from the discussion, but hinted at, was the train-up time that may have been in a non-mobilization category. Employers certainly share these concerns and have even been subject to discontinuous periods of employee absence for predeployment training and deployment itself. While individual circumstances will always allow some to volunteer for longer periods than others, the CA community would be better able to meet the demand for specialty skills if it accommodated the calendars and professional recognition of its personnel.

## **Conclusion**

Special Forces selection emphasizes a

quality called adaptive leadership, a value in high-risk assignments. But relying on individuals' inherent flexibility and common sense should be a lower priority than providing them the experience of others, the goals of an assignment, and knowledge of the tools available through others. Too often, the mobilization emphasis on common soldier skills misses opportunities for bona fide expert presentations. The CA community has some excellent "best practices" in its history, in which commanders sought to bring experts to their units, alter inactive-duty training to accommodate the availability of experts to present material, or send personnel for briefings. One example from 2012–2013 is illustrative: the 353rd Civil Affairs Command had a rotational deployment to Djibouti and contacted a former faculty member at the College of International Security Affairs for interagency briefings in Washington to familiarize the outbound personnel with the operating environment. This model approach is too dependent on the initiative of team leaders and commanders. It needs institutional support.

In his final report SIGIR uses three perspectives—authorized funding, personnel levels, and policy—to show that DoD was in charge of Iraqi reconstruction. Until Congress provides civilian organizational alternatives, which does not currently appear likely, the military's CA forces offer the most comprehensive option for implementing multiagency capabilities, but they require more education to learn the capabilities available in various agencies. As a civilian-military hybrid, they offer a blend of experience in military planning and execution with civilian expertise. But the force structure has so eroded billets for those with specialty skills that an option other than the typical table of organization is warranted. Centralized qualification and training are important aspects of a solution to this erosion, and Army (or DoD) could create a specific element to manage these specialties and allocate incumbents to organizations rather than requiring units to recruit locally. Any such solution must provide career progression, frequent interaction with units these specialists would support, and deployment patterns that support rather than hinder the civilian careers of these specialists.

Conflict prevention requires an adaptation of extant capabilities that has a precedent in the foreign agricultural and commercial services. Though these entities exist to promote American products abroad, the skill set enables practitioners to apply their expertise to develop export capabilities in fragile states. USDA developed predeployment training to prepare personnel for differences in stabilization tasks. Institutional CA education should include access to the expertise of various government agencies, think tanks, and educational institutions. The CA community's success depends on its facilitation of the expertise resident in numerous public and private resources outside the DoD. The application of civil expertise requires awareness of the connective tissue tying security, governance, and infrastructure together, and that knowledge requires advanced CA education. If CA elements arrive at an embassy with language facility, cross-cultural skills, and familiarity with a range of interagency programmatic options, they offer that country team a unique capability. **IAJ**

## NOTES

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