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Features

From the Editor-in-Chief

This issue of the *IAJ* opens with an investigation of the United States' shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Using various elements of power, authors Major Joshua Parker and David Anderson examine whether there has been a whole-of-government balanced and fruitful approach in achieving the Asian pivot objectives outlined by President Obama.

In our second article, Kurt Müller puts forth both the rationale and a design for the intergovernmental training and education of Army Civil Affairs personnel. He points out CA folks are most useful to advancing the interests of the United States when they arrive in country with their kit bags full of not only language and culture skills, but also with a familiarity of the range of interagency programmatic options available.

The third article explores the concept of *jus post bellum* (a just post-war peace) and how the current interpretation of this concept greatly changes a victor's responsibilities. Dan Cox argues that today's interpretation of *jus post bellum* is unjust because it underestimates the complexity and reality of war and post-war reconstruction and will lead to more violence rather than the lasting peace it seeks to create.

Next, former Simons Center graduate fellow James Gilmore writes on the use of simulations and gaming as a tool for planning and training. Computer simulation has proven to be beneficial for the U.S. Army, but other federal agencies, particularly those outside the Department of Defense, have been reluctant to include simulations in their training. He asserts that adapting approaches used in the private sector might better facilitate interagency usage.

What should be the considerations if the U.S. decides to pursue its national interests and the venue happens to be a megacity? Authors Gus Otto and AJ Besik explore the unique challenges presented by these large, complex urban population centers. They offer a framework of "hard" and "soft" considerations rather than a formula for success - they believe no formula can account for all the variables that exist in megacities. With the world's population in urban environments continuing to grow they see megacities as the place where the interagency community is going to be called to action and their goal is to advance the dialogue.

This issue of the *IAJ* concludes with a piece by Ambassador Edward Marks to help us better understand some of the terms used in the practice of statecraft. Ambassador Marks, a former Simons Center director, asserts that while for many it seems to be difficult to understand the distinction with regard to terms such as foreign service, foreign affairs, and diplomacy, that is does not have to be so. All we need to do is read the relevant statutes.

I thank you for reading this issue of the *InterAgency Journal* and I welcome your feedback. My intent for the *IAJ* is to improve interagency operations and to contribute to the body of interagency knowledge. To address that intent please consider this as a call for contributing authors. If you desire to add to the discourse, please put fingers to keyboard and submit your work for publication. As we strive to continue to remain a valued resource to the interagency community, over the next year you will see changes to the *IAJ*. Beginning with this issue, the *IAJ* is now available in "ePub" format, an e-book file format that can be read on smartphones, tablets or computers. The *IAJ* will continue to be available in print; if you would like to continue to receive hard copy or to be added to our mailing list, please contact us.

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The Reality of the So-Called

Pivot to Asia

by Joshua A. Parker and David A. Anderson

Shortly after President Obama took office in 2009, it became clear he wanted to shift U.S. foreign policy focus away from the Middle East to Asia. His immediate goal was withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq and gradually bringing an end to U.S. troop commitments in Afghanistan. As those objectives were met, he planned to invest more effort into the Asia-Pacific region, in what would become known as the Asia pivot or rebalance. The pivot was designed to demonstrate a whole-of-government shift of U.S. foreign policy efforts to the Asia-Pacific region. The Administration appeared motivated to conduct the pivot as a result of the aggregation of four specific developments: (1) the winding down of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) the growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific area, particularly China, to the country's economic future; (3) China's increasing military capabilities and assertiveness to claims of disputed maritime territory that threatened U.S. freedom of navigation and its ability to project power in the region; and (4) federal budget cuts that created the perception of waning U.S. commitment to the region. The pivot would reassure U.S. allies and partners in the region.[1]

This shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific was formally established in 2011. However, it did not gain much attention until U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's "America's Pacific Century" article appeared in the November 2011 issue of *Foreign Policy* and President Obama reinforced the idea in remarks to the Australian Parliament in Canberra later that same month. Both maintained that influence in Asia is important to U.S. national security interests. Clinton specifically stressed the importance of a whole-of-government approach, including diplomatic, economic, military, and strategic efforts.[2]

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David A. Anderson, DBA, is a professor of Strategic Studies and the William E. Odom Chair of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is also the International Relations Coordinator and an adjunct professor for Webster University's Fort Leavenworth site. He has published more than sixty articles on military, economics, and international relations related topics, and has earned many writing awards.

The pivot strategy called for meeting six key objectives that involved constantly sending the entire range of diplomatic, economic, and military assets to all corners of the region. The first objective was to strengthen bilateral security alliances, specifically with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The second objective was to improve relationships with the emerging powers, most notably China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries. The third objective was to engage in regional multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. The fourth objective was to expand trade and investments throughout the region, ideally through the development of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), by bringing many of the region's nations into one single trading community. The fifth objective was to increase U.S. military presence and activities in the region. Finally, the sixth objective was to advance democracy and human rights in the region.[3]

The pivot strategy called for meeting six key objectives that involved constantly sending the entire range of diplomatic, economic, and military assets to all corners of the region.

Over the last four years, many would argue the rebalance to Asia has not received the prescribed, whole-of-government attention originally envisioned by Secretary Clinton and President Obama. Pundits contend that the Obama Administration has been too distracted by other prevailing global issues that have marginalized a possible inclusive scheme. This article investigates whether there has been a balanced and fruitful approach by assessing the use of the government's diplomatic, military, and economic instrument options in achieving the Asian pivot objectives outlined by President Obama.

Diplomatic Efforts

There are numerous challenges that many nations across the region share, including transnational crime, climate change, human trafficking, and maritime disputes. These regional problems are most effectively dealt with when addressed through multilateral organizations at a regional level. In 2011, the U.S. took action to increase its involvement in numerous multilateral institutions. Most notably, the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of East Asian Pacific Affairs created a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Multilateral Affairs and a new U.S. ambassador position to the ASEAN.[4] Following this, the Administration raised participation in the East Asian Summit to Head of State level and the ASEAN Regional Forum to the Secretary of State level by signing ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In 2012, Clinton participated in the Pacific Islands Forum, which was the highest U.S. level of participation to that point.[5] As a measurement of the Administration's overall commitment to the pivot, official government travel to the region among key officials saw Clinton conducting more trips to the region than her predecessor. However, Obama and his other major cabinet officials travelled to the region less frequently (52 trips vs. 57 trips) as did the second Bush Administration officials.[6]

The amount of dollars spent is another effective way to assess the Administration's diplomatic commitment to the pivot. Here again, the Obama Administration demonstrates little added commitment to the pivot through diplomatic funding. For example, the fiscal year 2015 budget request for the East Asia and Pacific Bureau's diplomatic engagement only accounts for 8 percent of all regional bureaus

and is second-to-last of the six regional bureaus for funding. Even more telling is that the funding for the East Asia and Pacific Bureau has decreased almost 12 percent since its height in 2011.[7] This is very telling considering the region encompasses the largest population and the second largest gross domestic product and two-way trade with the U.S. It is hard to imagine that there would be a decrease in funding to the bureau if the Obama Administration was truly committed to the pivot.

Other budgetary issues are also telling. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has the means to assist with development projects in a large number of countries throughout the region that are eligible to receive development aid. With a renewed focus on Asia, it would seem logical that USAID development project funding would increase. However, that has not been the case. The 2015 budget for U.S. development funding in the region was reduced to 2010 budget levels (a figure from the year prior to the pivot).[8] In fact, worthy endeavors such as the Lower Mekong Initiative, a project spearheaded by Clinton in 2011 as part of the development program to improve the environment, education, women's rights, and infrastructure in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and eventually Burma in 2012, was simply funded by reallocating money from other projects in the region.[9] Examples like this show that the region is not getting the "new" money that it needs—the Administration is merely "robbing Phan to pay Phung."[10]

Furthermore, the State Department funding for public diplomacy saw no change from 2010 to 2013. It had a slight increase in 2014 and then leveled off again in 2015. Public diplomacy funding covers such things as scholarships and grants (e.g., the Fulbright Program). There was an approximate 7,000 student decrease in non-Chinese Asians studying in the U.S. between academic years 2009–2010 and 2012–2013 and a modest reduction of some 232 U.S. students studying in non-Chinese Asian countries between 2009–2010 and 2011–2012.[11]

On a somewhat optimistic note, some U.S. civilian agencies have increased their foreign deployed staff to East Asia. USAID increased its personnel in the region from 84 in 2008 to 183 in 2013. The 183 personnel figure still only accounts for 11 percent of all foreign-based USAID personnel. However, USAID did open new missions in Burma and Papua New Guinea, a positive action. During the same period, the Treasury Department increased its staff from 3 to 10, again only accounting for a sparse 17 percent of its global staff abroad. The Departments of Commerce and Agriculture had better total numbers. The Commerce Department increased its personnel from 78 to 91, totaling 41 percent of foreign staff, while the Department of Agriculture slightly decreased its staffing from 59 to 55, totaling 31 percent of its foreign deployed staff.[12]

...some U.S. civilian agencies have increased their foreign deployed staff to East Asia... The military response to the rebalance has been the most visible portion of the pivot.

Military Efforts

The military response to the rebalance has been the most visible portion of the pivot. The Department of Defense (DoD) has moved significantly faster than the majority of the U.S. interagency organizations in reallocating resources to the region.[13] This comes as no surprise. The U.S. has been the dominant Pacific region power since the end of World War II, and the recent, rapid rise of China is of growing concern. Not only does China have the second largest economy in the world, it has put significant effort into modernizing its military,

evident by an average increase in defense spending of 12 percent a year.[14] In fact, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute predicts that by 2035, China will pass the U.S. in defense spending.[15] The three most significant aspects of China's military modernization are the development of its Navy, the growth in its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, and the technological advancement of the People's Liberation Army Air Force.[16]

...the Administration has yet to approve [the new Air-Sea Battle concept] because Congress and both the U.S. Marine Corps and Army have put up resistance to its authorization.

China's purpose behind these three initiatives is to gain the capabilities to deter or counter third-party interventions in regional incidents. Commonly referred to as anti-access/area denial, these capabilities are designed to control access and freedom of operations in different portions of the maritime and air domains, in addition to space and cyberspace. The realities of its anti-access/area denial strategy lead to increasingly high-tech, long-range, anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air-to-ground missiles, air-to-air missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic counter space systems. Furthermore, China is making significant strides in electronic warfare capabilities.[17] In sum, China's anti-access/area denial efforts are focused on establishing a potential "no go zone" to restrict the U.S.'s ability to project power inside the First Island Chain and to freely use bases located near Chinese territory.[18]

As a response to potential anti-access/area denial threats toward the U.S., DoD constructed a new operational concept as part of the core element to the military efforts of the pivot.[19] The new concept is referred to as Air-Sea Battle, and though the details of the concept remain classified, the general idea is to focus on integrating air and naval capabilities intended to maintain the ability to project military power, even if potential adversaries are utilizing an advanced anti-access/area denial strategy. The idea of a new operational concept was first officially announced in the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, but it was not defined as Air-Sea Battle until 2011 when it was announced by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.[20] Even though the concept was initiated prior to the official announcement of the Asia pivot, it quickly morphed into one of DoD's initial efforts at achieving the strategic purposes of the pivot, to include maintaining U.S. dominance in the Asia Pacific region and reassuring the Asian allies of U.S. commitment.

Even though the Air-Sea Battle concept is heavily supported by the U.S. Navy and Air Force and has been endorsed by the Pentagon, the Administration has yet to approve it because Congress and both the U.S. Marine Corps and Army have put up resistance to its authorization. Much of that resistance is a result of budget issues stemming from the concept. According to recent reports, DoD is planning on spending almost $268 billion between 2010 and 2016 on research, development, and procurement related to Air-Sea Battle.[21] Most of that money would be devoted to the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Marine Corps and Army budgets.

Even with the planned overall reduction in defense spending, the U.S. will maintain a strong presence in the Asia-Pacific region as highlighted in Obama's November 2011 speech to the Australian Parliament:

> As we consider the future of our armed forces, we've begun a review that will identify our most important strategic interests and guide our defense priorities and spending over the coming decade. So here is what this region must know. As we end today's wars, I have directed my national security team to

make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific.[22]

The most notable military action has been the U.S.-Australia agreement to eventually base 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia. As of 2012, a company-size element of Marines began rotating through a pre-existing Australian military facility at Darwin for approximately six months at a time. Throughout the rotations, the force has gradually gotten bigger, and the current rotation consists of 1,177 Marines.[23] These Marines are part of a Marine Expeditionary Unit that is designed to act as a regional quick reaction force, deployed and ready for an immediate response to any crisis. With the Marines based in Darwin, the U.S. will be able to respond much quicker than previously. Additionally, the U.S. and Australia have announced plans for increased access of the Royal Australian Air Force facilities by the U.S. military. Lastly, Australia agreed to give the U.S. Navy more access to Australia's Indian Ocean navy base HMAS Stirling in the vicinity of Perth.[24]

Singapore has agreed to allow a continual deployment of up to four U.S. littoral combat ships to base out of its Changi Naval Base. These vessels are a class of comparatively small surface ships intended for operations close to the shore that can defeat anti-access and asymmetric threats in littoral zones. For example, in 2013, the USS Freedom completed a ten-month deployment in the region, and the USS Fort Worth is currently in the middle of a 16-month deployment.[25] These forward-deployed ships also provide a rapid response force, help build partner capacity, and contribute to naval readiness.

The U.S.-Philippine alliance also continues to be a source of regional stability. Building on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed by the U.S. and the Philippines governments in April 2014. The agreement calls for increased rotational presence of up to 500 U.S. military personnel and boosted security cooperation activities in the Philippines, as the country moves from its focus on internal to external security defense.[26]

The U.S.-Japan alliance is also continuing to grow. Specifically, Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy and the July 2014 cabinet decision on expanding its roles in collective defense are positive steps in assuming a stronger role in maintaining regional security. Additionally, December 2014 witnessed the signing of the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement, where all participants agreed to increase their transparency with information regarding the North Korean missile and nuclear threats. Lastly, the U.S. helped Japan bolster the region's missile defense capabilities against North Korea by providing two additional AEGIS destroyers, for a total of eight ballistic missile-defense-capable platforms, and in December 2014 provided a second AN/TPY-2 long-range radar system. Those added capabilities, in addition to a recent installment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System, will be vital in protecting important regional nodes from ballistic missile and anti-access/area denial adversary activities.[27]

...DoD has begun increasing the military presence in the Asia Pacific region and by 2020 plans to have 60 percent of the U.S. Navy's forces in the region.

Overall, the DoD has begun increasing the military presence in the Asia Pacific region and by 2020 plans to have 60 percent of the U.S. Navy's forces in the region.[28] Part of that Navy plus-up included swapping out the USS George Washington aircraft carrier with the upgraded

USS Ronald Reagan in Japan in 2014. The U.S. military has also increased its rotations and deployments of E-3 Airborne Warning and Control Systems, E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes in the region.[29]

In addition to adding more military assets to the region, U.S. military services have also fielded new systems and concepts for employing a credible force in the region. Some examples include replacing the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with the more sophisticated P-8s and making preparations for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment by building maintenance hubs in Australia and Japan.[30]

However, one of the more notable concepts is the U.S. Army Pacific's Pacific Pathways concept, which is designed to demonstrate a larger global response and a regionally-engaged Army. Pacific Pathways uses an Army unit of approximately 500 to 600 Soldiers and links three consecutive bilateral training exercises with three separate Asian nations into one event. For example, the first Pacific Pathway deployment was in 2014, where one Army unit based out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, conducted consecutive training/exercise events in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan. The Pacific Pathway units are tailored specifically for the exercises, but during the prolonged deployment of four to five months, they are also capable of responding to any potential crisis in the area. With a reduced defense budget, the consecutive country deployments with only one trip in and out of the Pacific region saves considerable transportation costs, as opposed to conducting single exercise events with separate trips in and out of the region for each exercise.[31] The goal is to conduct three Pacific Pathway deployments a year (each with three events) with three separate countries, which will greatly increase the U.S.'s expanded presence in the region.

...the biggest and most comprehensive current effort for the economic component of the pivot is focused around the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership]...

Economic Efforts

Most recent U.S. economic efforts in the Asia-Pacific region have been focused on bilateral trade arrangements, such as the 2012 Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Bilateral Investment Treaty consultations with India and China, U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and Trade and Investment Framework Agreement negotiations with Taiwan. However, from January 2012 through May 2015, annual trade figures between Asia and the U.S. were eerily flat. The most notable difference since the announced pivot in November 2011 has been the percent of the annual U.S. trade deficit with Asia. It increased from a minus 34.4 percent in 2011 to a minus 36.7 percent in 2015.[32] Further concerning is that the U.S. Trade Representative traveled to Asia only eight times during Obama's first term, compared to 23 and 18 times respectively for the Bush Administration's first and second terms.[33]

By far the biggest and most comprehensive current effort for the economic component of the pivot is focused around the TPP, a proposed regional free trade agreement that has the potential to become the largest such agreement ever developed. The U.S. is currently leading negotiations with eleven other potential member states throughout the Pacific Rim: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. These twelve countries account for approximately 40 percent of the global economy, which would make the TPP the largest of any free trade agreement in recent years.[34] Those involved in the negotiations describe the TPP as a "comprehensive and high-standard" agreement

with the goal of liberalizing trade and services that includes rules-based commitments that go beyond the currently established World Trade Organization regulations.

The Obama Administration lists numerous reasons for pursing the TPP, but the primary goals are job promotion and economic growth in the U.S. and Asia-Pacific. More specifically, the Administration wants to "unlock opportunities for American manufactures, workers, service providers, farmers, and ranchers—to support job creation and wage growth."[35] According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the TPP would account for 37 percent of all U.S. exports and could produce up to 4 million jobs in the U.S.[36] Additionally, it would provide new market access for services and goods, strong labor and environmental standards, new rules to ensure fair competition between private companies and state-owned enterprises, and substantial intellectual property rights to encourage innovation.[37] The TPP has been in development for the past four years and has become increasingly controversial, especially in domestic political circles. Even China has expressed minimal interest in joining; China seems more focused on promoting its own proposed regional trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Pact. With all ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus South Korea, Japan, India, New Zealand, and Australia already signed up, the Pact could challenge the TPP.

The Peterson Institute for International Economics projects moderate U.S. net gains in a multitude of different TPP scenarios. The best-case scenario with TPP participation from South Korea and Japan alone is a projected U.S. net gain of $36 billion, which compared to the U.S.'s $17 trillion economy is not a significant game changer. However, as most other studies show, the gains would not be evenly spread out across the U.S. economy. The U.S. manufacturing sector would see a $44 billion drop, the mining and agricultural sector would see a near zero gain, with the service sector being the clear winners with a projected $79 billion gain, offsetting the negative manufacturing losses.[38] The Peterson Institute also points out that free trade agreements normally result in offshoring of U.S. manufacturing and service sector jobs, inexpensive import products, and generally less bargaining leverage for the labor force.[39] With the TPP potentially absorbing additional countries in the future, to include China, many argue the likely threat to U.S. jobs would be even larger. The TPP is not a foregone conclusion. Many of the possible member states (including the U.S.) remain apprehensive about the economic value of the partnership, while many others fear the possibility of China's economic reprisal to those joining. The questionable viability of the proposed partnership, when coupled with flat trade figures between Asia and the U.S. since 2011, call into question the substantive appropriateness of the Obama Administration's economic efforts in conducting the pivot.

The TPP has been in development for the past four years and has become increasingly controversial...

Conclusion

The Obama Administration's pivot strategy has been notably unbalanced. While the desire has been to pursue a whole-of-government approach, the military component has overshadowed economic and diplomatic efforts. This manifestation has antagonized China, who sees the pivot as largely a U.S. military strategy of containment or encroachment. China has responded by accelerating its military expansion and modernization efforts. U.S. involvement in multilateral organizations in the region, more specifically, adding a U.S. ambassador to ASEAN and raising U.S. participation in the

East Asian Summit to Head of State level, are certainly positive actions. Unfortunately, funding and personnel devoted to diplomacy in the region has generally decreased since the announcement of the pivot.

Finally, having so much of the U.S. economic effort centered on a successful TPP agreement has been problematic. Even if all interested parties join the TPP, the value-added to the U.S. economy and U.S. interests throughout the Asia-Pacific is at best uncertain. What is known is that China has responded to TPP efforts with a proposed competing regional trade partnership of its own consisting of many of the nations considering the TPP. This outcome cannot be seen as serving the regional interests of the U.S. In fact, it directly competes with U.S. economic interests. The U.S. needs to rethink its pivot strategy in meeting its regional objectives before it further erodes U.S.-China relations and precariously positions its regional allies (politically, economically, and militarily) between its own interests and China's. A more diverse and truly balanced approach is in order. ***IAJ***

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Interagency Qualifications to Address Fragility, or

Rethinking Civil Affairs

by Kurt E. Müller

The defense sector has a long-standing appreciation of the value of whole-of-government approaches to national security challenges. The phrase "all elements of national power" resonates with Department of Defense (DoD) leadership and is a common feature of curricula and outreach seminars at senior service colleges. Although the original rationale for attention to diplomatic, financial, and industrial capacity was undoubtedly to address the existential challenges of twentieth-century, industrial warfare, the frequency of low-intensity campaigns and the emergence of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations expanded the discourse in senior professional military education to include economic and social development, effective governance, and the inclusion of the private sector to supersede aid with trade. The post-Cold War experience of military deployments emphasized the broad range of societal factors holding the key to stable interstate relations and to terminating intrastate conflicts that threatened to spill across borders, giving rise to the term "complex contingency operations" and its variants. Inequities based in clan, tribal, linguistic, or other cultural dimensions required political development as much as military intervention, giving rise to the welcome—but still incomplete—partnership among diplomacy, defense, and development.

This interrelationship was still murky in the 1992 humanitarian intervention in Somalia that morphed into an under-resourced combat operation. The subsequent analysis yielded Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 on reforming multilateral peace operations. Its accompanying policy guidance noted interrelated "military, political, humanitarian, and developmental elements" and laid the basis for PDD 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations." In assessing a situation, developing policy guidance, sharing planning, and monitoring events, PDD 56 established six mechanisms to establish and conduct (1) an executive committee, (2) a political-military plan, (3) an interagency rehearsal of the plan, (4) interagency training, (5) agency review, and (6) an after-action review.[1]

But this approach to complex operations did not become institutionalized in campaign planning. Gaps in interagency collaboration for the Iraq campaign continued in post-conflict operations, evident in a succession of Bush Administration documents: the 2003 National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 24 gave DoD the lead for reconstruction, but a year later, NSPD 36 assigned responsibility for reconstruction to the Department of State (State). Despite institutional competition in Washington, at theater level a development was underway to improve interagency coordination.

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In 2002, a Millennium Challenge experiment led to a prototype of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group,[2] sufficiently successful in U.S. Southern Command to serve as a model for U.S. Africa Command. The Southern Command model and a predecessor, interagency task force in Florida originally addressed counter-narcotics in Latin America and spread to broader issues of stability, thus the appeal of this model for supporting relations with African nations. But the real push for interagency operations came out of the failure to use the victory over Iraqi forces to achieve the war's aims.

That quandary led to studies at think tanks and government entities.[3] Ambassador James Dobbins and his national security program at the RAND Corporation issued a series of studies demonstrating that although successive administrations (regardless of political party) pronounced their opposition to nation building, they found civil stabilization tasks unavoidable in six interventions in a dozen years.[4] Though the purpose of those interventions ranged from humanitarian assistance, to peacekeeping, to regime change, in each instance the civil sector held the key to success.

By December 2005, the realization that civil-sector issues were central to stability was unavoidable, and the White House issued NSPD 44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," which charged ten cabinet departments with identifying personnel and developing capabilities to respond to crises through a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Because the realization had taken hold that "ungoverned spaces"—more accurately characterized as alternatively governed—can harbor nonstate belligerents, students of conflict linked internal conflict and unstable governance to threats to first-world countries.

Thus institutional interests in development and special operations advocated achieving stability by resolving nascent conflicts in states with fragile governance. The pressing issue of post-conflict stability in Afghanistan and Iraq gave impetus to addressing the preparation of personnel to undertake civil-military stability operations. Eventually this effort led to the expansion of Civil Affairs (CA) in the military services, the creation of an interagency Civilian Response Corps, and projections of several approaches to educating government personnel (foreign and civil service) for stabilization assignments. A 2009 report on CA by the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted the need to expand civilian capabilities for preventive activities, as well as for reconstruction and stabilization and called for a long-range planning framework to avoid the risks that "civilian and military contributors may not develop needed capabilities, or may not maintain them in the needed quantity to address the expected range of future contingencies."[5]

...the real push for interagency operations came out of the failure to use the victory over Iraqi forces to achieve the war's aims.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies report was perhaps more perceptive than its authors anticipated, as the subsequent development of capabilities in both civilian and military sectors was short-lived. Despite a 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review that called for continued expansion of the Civilian Response Corps, State abrogated its agreements with other agencies and eliminated the organization. The Navy resuscitated a CA capability it had transferred to the Department of the Interior when the Navy demobilized after WWII,[6] but it dismantled its CA structure again in 2014.[7]

For about a decade—from a 2002 paper "Post-Conflict Reconstruction," that the

Association of the United States Army published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to the final report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), in March 2013—civil-sector skills were in high demand, primarily for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also for general use in stabilizing fragile states. A combination of factors, from a kind of stabilization fatigue to interagency competition for resources, curtailed the whole-of-government approach to foreign challenges. Although this development leaves ambassadors and their country teams with fewer options for addressing stability, the experience of extensive civilian deployments offers a number of useful lessons.

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Experience with stabilization should lead the U.S. to consider adapting practices in the transition from conflict to peace to the examination of threats to peace and therefore to options for conflict resolution and prevention. An appropriate place to begin an inquiry into options for stabilization is to look at concepts of stability.

About the time DoD issued its Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,"[8] there were a number of discussions in the Washington interagency environment that centered on the word stability and its derivatives. The vocabulary was shared, but there was little indication that the participants in these discussions shared the underlying concepts. The defense sector has a traditional view of stability as signaling a transition that ends its deployment with a transfer of authority to other agencies. Unless its stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operation is complicated by counterinsurgency, its major contribution is to develop the host nation's ability for internal defense. In recent strategic jargon, the means to do so is "building partner capacity" of police and military forces. The development community sees stability as a goal that the military achieves to allow development partners to improve indigenous infrastructure across societal domains. In one of several reports, the SIGIR points to the enormous hurdle of security as the impediment to achieving the aims of infrastructure reconstruction. In the preface to *Hard Lessons*, SIGIR questions the decision to conduct extensive reconstruction while conflict continued.[9] While constraints on civilians from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or the Department of Commerce would be less in a permissive environment, the matter of shared concepts remains a candidate for interagency professional development.

Similarities and Distinctions among Stability Actors

Several communities share approaches to stability operations, particularly special operations forces (SOF) and CA in the military and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community that provides humanitarian relief. A look at their similarities and differences can inform their use in specific environments. Beginning with the special operations community, the SOF mantra of working by, with, and through indigenous forces has a CA parallel with indigenous government agencies. In a conflict assessment and peacebuilding operation, assessing the societal infrastructure and proposing ameliorative measures will require adapting the established CA estimate of the situation to the differing circumstances of the stability missions. Although attention to

circumstances may seem obvious, as the Center for Complex Operations has concluded from studying the deployments of federal civilian agencies, the default mode of operations is business as usual, even where the mission demands an adaptation.[10] Ideally, these differing circumstances and guiding principles should be part of both CA professional military education and predeployment familiarization, both of which sorely need improvement.

Special Forces and CA share a history of coordinating with other government agencies; however, civilian agencies also have a perception of Special Forces that could lead an ambassador to decline their presence. Although Special Forces has demonstrated a successful approach to security concepts in such initiatives as village stability operations in Afghanistan, their authority to train police forces is by a periodically granted exception to a prohibition under the Foreign Assistance Act. Even with "Leahy vetting," training security forces runs the risk these forces will become more adept at oppressing their own citizens. Consequently, the democratization instruction that accompanies training foreign forces requires carefully vetted instructors with credibility in both military proficiency and civil-military relations.

The small-footprint circumstances in which SOF often work are particularly valuable in stability operations, but the directive on support to stability operations reveals a perception that the function is something other than a core capability. Consequently, the approach shares a terminological legacy with "operations other than war" and its slightly more defense-centric version, prefixing *military* in "military operations other than war." The linguistic haggling behind these guiding documents appears as well in the Joint Staff construct of phased operations. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, "Joint Operation Planning," (2011) may present a six-phase campaign construct, but this configuration did not start with zero because the authors were digital natives. The 2006 version of JP 5-0 enumerated five phases: deter, defend and seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. Added later, Phase 0 is associated with the emergence of U.S. Africa Command, but its appended character indicates a belated realization that resource-rich DoD can play a role in conflict management, particularly in the defense strategy of enabling states to defend against threats to state legitimacy.

...a military vocabulary applied to conflict prevention also runs a substantial risk of alienating the diplomatic actors.

Phase 0 was not universally hailed as presenting a kinder, gentler DoD. In the development community, some decried a "militarization of development." But a military vocabulary applied to conflict prevention also runs a substantial risk of alienating the diplomatic actors. Although the activities accord well with long-standing, theater-security, cooperation programs, adding a Phase 0, described as shaping the environment, to an inclusive model of military intervention offers the likely interpretation that the military would use persistent presence to prepare for conflict rather than to avert it. Despite a history of military strategy that offers "flexible deterrent options," the phasing model projects an expectation of escalation more than it hints at a focus on preventing conflict. Former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley identifies this perception in planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hadley presents a dilemma in addressing post-war civil administration: despite White House preference for coercive diplomacy over war, a current of public thought ran that President George W. Bush had the intention of going to war. If planning for a post-conflict

Iraq had been known publicly, administration critics could have said, "See we told you, the diplomatic effort is not real, they're already preparing for war."[11]

Similarly, in a 2013 study of building partner capacity, a RAND Corporation team found instances of relegating partner nation defense capacity to secondary or tertiary importance, taking a back seat to "securing access," for example.[12] This perception gives ambassadors pause before approving a U.S. military presence in their areas of responsibility (AOR). That term, too familiar to military readers, projects an attitude that undermines diplomacy. From his time as commander of U.S. Southern Command, Admiral James Stavridis emphasized a need for combatant commanders to avoid the term "AOR." As he rightly saw it, the Chiefs of Defense of the indigenous forces would too often ask, "What do you mean your AOR? It's my AOR!"

Although neutral observers expect both peacekeepers and aid workers to be impartial, the belligerents in a conflict do not necessarily see them that way.

If the task at hand is conflict prevention, the default position is to call a civilian agency.[13] Consequently development agencies may offer appropriate options. The development community shares with CA and Special Forces an affinity of working with local partners. And development aligns well with prevalent theories that economic opportunity, provision of public services, and responsive governance contribute to stability and reductions in violence. Moreover, CA and Special Forces are used to working closely with USAID in the field and in Washington.

But the institutional ethos of the development community and the structure of its programming may not be appropriate in a number of circumstances. The small number of USAID officials work primarily through NGOs. In a volume that should be a standard reference for stabilization, Robert Perito describes four categories of NGOs in conflict zones: humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society and democracy-building, and conflict resolution.[14] Some NGOs work in several areas, and personnel often move among NGOs. The NGO community's preservation of independence offers both advantages and liabilities. When providing services to two sides in a conflict, NGOs and humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN entities, strive to create "humanitarian space" to deliver services and conduct negotiations. Although neutral observers expect both peacekeepers and aid workers to be impartial, the belligerents in a conflict do not necessarily see them that way. Consequently, these organizations should preserve distance from all factions, including military forces that are not party to the conflict.[15] That concern led to an agreement among DoD, State, USAID, and InterAction (an umbrella organization for many U.S.-based NGOs) that emphasizes avoiding any appearance that NGOs are collaborating closely with the military. It specifically calls for avoiding references to NGOs as force multipliers or partners.[16] Although these guidelines pertain to hostile environments and those potentially so, country teams may encounter this arm's-length attitude in permissive environments as well.

Foreign assistance and humanitarian aid are primarily moral imperatives, independent of policy goals and bilateral relations. But, inasmuch as assistance in economic activity, physical infrastructure, and governance may flow from attempts to support bilateral relations, an attitude of independence opens these activities to the risk of failure to align with embassy objectives. Thus unity of effort as a principle of operations demonstrates limits of cooperation.

Although USAID staff are government employees, some staff may share the NGO attitude of independence from government policy. Indeed, one recurring tension between State and USAID is the subordination of the latter in pursuing policy goals.[17] The shared ethos of development goals with those of implementing partners can insulate USAID personnel from a focus on the rationale for specific projects, leading to development for its own sake, rather than in support of a specific policy. For example, when then-Senator John Kerry visited Afghanistan as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, his repeated message was for projects to be essential and sustainable. That such a prescription was necessary is evident from stabilization guidance that then-USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah issued in January 2011, noting "different objectives, beneficiaries, modalities, and measurement tools" between stabilization and long-term development. Shah emphasized the need to train staff to account for the differences in a stabilization environment and for programmatic initiatives to "hone in on sources of instability."[18] Just as in the military, USAID has a lessons-learned effort, and sustainability is a recurring theme among development practitioners. Yet, much of the programming in Afghanistan is unsustainable. Thus, if USAID has difficulty differentiating stabilization from development (i.e., business as usual), it is likely to need a concerted effort to implement a strategy of conflict prevention as well.

The personnel of NGOs that provide specific services may not share with their government benefactors a goal of weaning the local society from their services, or they may have an agenda that in other ways does not align with government policy goals. An example from another agency is apt: in Panama, in the mid-1990s, the Community Relations Service program of the Department of Justice contracted for interpreters to deal with would-be refugees who had fled Cuba in hopes of landing in Florida. Intercepted at sea, a number were housed in Guantanamo Bay and in Panama. When their asylum-seeking appeared not to be going well, those in Panama rioted, and the contract interpreters were implicated in supporting the rioting.

...unity of effort as a principle of operations demonstrates limits of cooperation.

To the extent that NGOs can start projects that attract sustainable private-sector funding, their participation is highly welcome. USAID has been party to such partnerships, but an even greater source of potential access to the private sector is found across government agencies. At about the time Congress was considering a civilian stabilization initiative that later allowed the Civilian Response Corps to recruit for positions across multiple agencies, Bernard Carreau noted the untapped potential of ten domestic agencies, whose 607,700 employees in 2007 dwarfed the capacity of USAID, at 2,100, and the Department of State, at 19,000.[19] The Civilian Response Corps did not survive competing Washington priorities, but many individuals from multiple agencies responded to the call for volunteers to serve in difficult circumstances. The concept continues to have adherents. The SIGIR even called for a much larger organization that is conceptually similar. Both the Civilian Response Corps and the SIGIR-proposed Office for Contingency Operations derive from the experience of stabilization and reconstruction, but both would likely be used for permissive stabilization environments as well. In their absence, another option is to extend to military CA units the additional task of undertaking stabilization as a peace-building activity.

The Recent Demand for Civil Affairs

One of the defining characteristics of stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was the use of multiagency provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). A 2003 innovation in Gardez, Afghanistan, that derived from the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell, the PRT drew staff from multiple agencies. But as PRTs were replicated, civilian agencies found them difficult to staff, and the military filled some of the billets intended for civilians with CA operators, though one reason for turning to other agencies was to relieve the burden on the small CA community.[20] A RAND Corporation study conducted well into the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns illustrated the demand for CA operators. Looking at utilization rates for reserve component career fields in the Army, the RAND team found that with 27% of Army Reserve CA operators deployed, this field was the most used specialty in the Army Reserve.[21] With a stated policy of deploying reserve component members for a period of one year with the expectation that service members would be inactive for the following five years—a policy DoD could not meet—the demand for CA had been building for some time. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, the House Armed Services Committee inserted a requirement for DoD to report on its plans for the development and use of CA forces. One means to meet the deployment demand was to double the Army's active component CA force; the Marine Corps doubled its force as well, and the Navy resuscitated its interest in CA. But DoD also noted some difficulties in specialty skills that remain challenges. The experience of this specialty is instructive for future mobilizations, for potential staffing options in permissive environments, and for interagency operations.

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A Brief Look at Civil Affairs History

In a 2014 article in *The National Interest*, Admiral Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence, Ambassador Ronald Neumann, former chief of mission in Afghanistan, and Admiral Eric Olson, former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, engage the challenge of stability operations by proposing several changes to the composition of country teams, empowering the chief of mission with directive authority.[22] Calling on the Army and Marine Corps to reestablish strong CA capabilities, they note, "In the past, there were experienced civil engineers, utility company officials, local government administrators and transportation officials in the Army and Marine Corps Reserve." But the "personnel in military reserve units are more junior and much less experienced now." A look at how this circumstance came about will inform the reader about options for remediation.

A traditional CA estimate of the situation looks across a range of civilian domains. But over its seven-decade history, CA has lost considerable capability. The 1943 edition of the United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (Field Manual [FM] 27-5 and OPNAV 50E-3) enumerated 26 functional areas.[23] The 1958 Joint FM 41-5 reduced the specialties to 19; the 1962 FM 41-10 enumerated 20 specialties across four areas. The 2000 edition further reduced the scope of analysis to 16 specialties. By 2013, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 spoke of six areas, reflecting the Army FM 3-57 enumeration in 2011 of 14 specialties. So long as the concept of CA employment focused on a post-conflict

environment, DoD could argue that the need for CA analyses and administration would be episodic, not continuous. Because its use would be restricted to expeditionary operations, it could be in the reserve components, much as the Air Force would place airlift control elements in the reserve components rather than in its active force. The post-WWII joint and service-component environments in Asia and Europe required community relations, but the steady-state environment allowed these functions to be civilianized. By the 1980s, the security environment did not call for CA deployments, the specialty fell into disuse, and these officer-heavy units with senior grades in enlisted ranks as well became targets for force reduction.

But there were pockets of utility at theater level. During the Cold War, U.S. European Command used CA primarily to exercise a concept of host-nation support. This focus became valuable to U.S. Central Command as well, as circumstances in the Middle East heated up in 1990. But during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, it was State, not DoD, that called for a CA-staffed Kuwait Task Force until restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. The Kuwait Task Force addressed interagency issues supporting the Kuwaiti government; U.S. military commands preferred their CA staffs to be more military planners than civilian experts. Senior military personnel have expectations for the cultural character of their peers, and the functional specialists, i.e., the infrastructure engineers and public administrators that Blair, Neumann, and Olson address, do not fit that mold. Accordingly, the commands asking for CA planners wanted personnel who fit easily into their operating culture. Recent developments show the branch is familiar with its WWII-era School of Military Government. But there were ten times as many universities training the functional specialists.

This history illustrates the perils of addressing niche capabilities. In reviewing activities in Iraq, the SIGIR concluded that PRTs were short on CA capacity and capabilities, not in generalist skills but in the functional specialties.[24] In Afghanistan, given the economy's reliance on the agricultural sector, USDA and USAID posted agricultural advisors to PRTs, and the National Guard Bureau created agribusiness development teams staffed by Guard units from farm states. This function would likely have fallen to CA, had the CA community retained its agriculture specialists, whose function had been subsumed under a broader umbrella at the theater-level CA command. The capability had been removed from brigades and battalions, which could address only four of the six groupings of civil domains preserved at theater level. Tactical organizations lost capabilities in specific civil domains, and they could no longer provide a training ground for assignments at higher echelons as individuals progressed in grade.

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Blair, Neumann, and Olson are not the only ones to lament the loss of civilian expertise in CA units. The 2009 DoD report to Congress indicates difficulty in evaluating functional expertise with an example of an elementary school teacher filling a public education billet. The Institute for Military Support to Governance acknowledges this failure in its recent White Paper. But the admission that units were "no longer recruiting or assigning the right individuals to the positions at the right time"[25] is a symptom of the application of active component staffing models to reserve component units. Active component units fill billets through a centralized personnel-

management system; reserve component units place this burden on the commander, whose unit's readiness condition depends on the percentage of military occupational specialty-qualified individuals assigned. But military occupational specialty qualification falls short as a measure of appropriate staffing. Legal, medical, and chaplain branches exacerbate the problem by defining anyone branch qualified as capable of filling the billet. While a commander may prefer a professor of comparative law or an international lawyer in an international law billet or a public-health physician rather than a cardiologist in the public health billet, this option may not be practical. Indeed, "near matches" may be appropriate if paired with professional preparation and networking, but such options require education beyond levels the services typically support.

During the soul-searching that followed the failure to seal the victory in Iraq, a repeated suggestion was to create a National Security University.

A Model for Civil Affairs Continuing Education

Professional military education offers a unique example of continuing education. It differs from licensure requirements for professions, which keep their practitioners abreast of current practice and of changes in the legal environment. Whereas a license often starts with generalist skills followed by increasing specialization, professional military education continually broadens a core set of skills. Thus an Army officer proceeds from branch qualification to combined arms and staff work and then on to the joint and interagency environments. At the senior service colleges, students from other federal agencies add familiarity with interagency capabilities. But any mandate for in-depth branch experience is left primarily to on-the-job training. There are exceptions at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Joint Special Operations University, but these programs do not reach a sufficient number of CA practitioners, nor do the advanced requirements for legal and medical personnel facilitate applying these specialties to CA.

During the soul-searching that followed the failure to seal the victory in Iraq, a repeated suggestion was to create a National Security University.[26] The suggestion was never realized, and it may not have extended to the bulk of the CA force, those in the reserve components. But a prime characteristic would have been attention to whole-of-government responses and private-sector developments to achieve, as NATO describes it, the comprehensive approach to security.

One initiative that reached a limited number of staff across agencies provides a model of education that ranges across conflict prevention, stabilization, and societal reconstruction. The Foreign Service Institute and the College of International Security Affairs offered a pair of courses to the Civilian Response Corps (and to the military) that the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization required as predeployment qualification. At the Foreign Service Institute, "Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization" presented the range of capabilities resident across federal agencies. Many of the students came from the very programs the syllabus discussed, allowing for both in-depth sharing of expertise and professional networking to provide future contacts across agencies. At the College of International Security Affairs, "Whole of Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Level One," required students in simulated, country-team environments to draw from applicable agency capabilities in developing programmatic responses to a stabilization

challenge.[27] This course emphasized the limited flexibility ambassadors generally have concerning programs funded through agency budgets, which embassies are not free to adapt to circumstances. A key teaching point absent from most military planning for incorporating civilian agencies is the identification of constraints that limit an ambassador's options in tailoring agency programs to the circumstances. In a 2015 *InterAgency Journal* article, Ambassador Neumann uses the example of "czars" to point out the problem that ambassadors generally face—coordinating responsibilities without control of resources.[28] These courses also presented principles and insights that USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation developed for its Conflict Assessment Framework, the basis for tactical and interagency adaptations. The concepts of windows of opportunity and of vulnerability provide useful tools for addressing stability in fragile environments, including those subject to civil unrest, i.e., candidates for programs to prevent conflict.

The analyses that are part of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework take place as Washington-based tabletop exercises and optimally include in-country research as well. Embassy staffs have constructed their mission strategic plans to reflect the results of these inquiries. A particular lesson the CA community can draw from this experience is the compilation of tactical interagency assessments feeding a strategic one. But the interagency inquiries require familiarity with subject matter that military personnel typically encounter first in War College. Like their colleagues in special operations and in agencies that require country-team coordination, CA practitioners need this expertise earlier in their careers.

Alternative Staffing Models

Much of DoD persists in using a twentieth-century mobilization model when other approaches would preserve limited resources without threatening employer and family support and use its personnel more efficiently. The massive mobilization of medical personnel during Operations Desert Shield/Storm gave rise to the debacle of mobilization insurance because DoD took so many medical providers out of their practices for an extended period (and used them inefficiently). A decade later the mobilization pattern for Iraqi Freedom took reserve component personnel from their normal jobs for longer periods of time than did active component deployments. The recent report by the Center for Naval Analyses, "Charting the Course for Civil Affairs in the New Normal,"[29] highlights two specific issues in using Marine Corps CA for persistent-presence operations supporting theater campaign plans: (1) the need to adapt to conflict prevention the expertise gained in post-conflict environments and (2) the difficulty of voluntarily deploying reserve component personnel. Its discussion of call-up authorities indicates the Marine Corps is seeking longer-term deployments, and the difficulty getting volunteers should spur a look at other staffing models.

Much of DoD persists in using a twentieth-century mobilization model when other approaches would preserve limited resources...

Well before the modification of the unified command plan that gave U.S. Southern Command oversight of activities in the Caribbean, it was common to conduct construction and preventive medicine projects throughout the region. Active component and reserve component elements of all services participated, and CA personnel coordinated the efforts with the diplomatic posts and defense cooperation offices. Rotations of personnel served on annual training for this purpose. Project officers spent considerable

inactive-duty time coordinating the effort. The annual training option was appropriate because the permissive environment did not require mobilization. For access to the reserve component for persistent presence, the services should look at other government agencies' episodic use of personnel. Within DoD, one notable model is the U.S. Air Force integration of active and reserve component personnel and equipment for routine missions. Not only do air crews mesh flight missions with their civilian careers; reserve component units can conduct operations from their own facilities in support of active component commands.

...a more-reasonable expectation would be that military forces would deploy personnel with civilian professional qualifications only so long as they provide their professional expertise.

The experience of civilian agencies is highly pertinent. The Department of Homeland Security has recurring surge demands for which it recalls retirees for short-duration assignments. Elements of Homeland Security pair recalled annuitants with current officers to facilitate the adoption of newer equipment and operating procedures. State has a status for recalling retired foreign service officers. Its odd name, When Actually Employed, indicates it is sort of a retired reserve, but with the expectation of occasional employment. The Department of Health and Human Services oversees a national disaster medical system that calls public-health volunteers for domestic deployments that do not exceed two weeks. These short durations ensure minimal disruption of routine work and family life.

Impact on professional practice is not just a matter of calendar disruptions. Reviews of the employment of CA personnel during WWII are striking for the professional rewards the participants reaped from their service.[30] That era was unique in that the proportion of the population in the military was three times the rate of previous major wars, over four times the rate of the Vietnam War.[31] Since this circumstance no longer describes the societal environment, a more-reasonable expectation would be that military forces would deploy personnel with civilian professional qualifications only so long as they provide their professional expertise. One of the concerns Health and Human Services raised regarding members of the Civilian Response Corps is that the department did not want to deploy its personnel for generalist skills, only for the exercise of their particular specialty. Applying such criteria to the CA environment, a commander may well prefer to deploy specialty personnel only so long as the individual is contributing that expertise. Repeat deployments to handle phases of projects would be welcome, but biding time between active use of the skills in demand would not be.

A 2008 RAND Corporation study on Army Reserve and National Guard deployment pointed out that "boots on the ground time" is less relevant to families than "boots away from home."[32] Omitted from the discussion, but hinted at, was the train-up time that may have been in a non-mobilization category. Employers certainly share these concerns and have even been subject to discontinuous periods of employee absence for predeployment training and deployment itself. While individual circumstances will always allow some to volunteer for longer periods than others, the CA community would be better able to meet the demand for specialty skills if it accommodated the calendars and professional recognition of its personnel.

Conclusion

Special Forces selection emphasizes a

quality called adaptive leadership, a value in high-risk assignments. But relying on individuals' inherent flexibility and common sense should be a lower priority than providing them the experience of others, the goals of an assignment, and knowledge of the tools available through others. Too often, the mobilization emphasis on common soldier skills misses opportunities for bona fide expert presentations. The CA community has some excellent "best practices" in its history, in which commanders sought to bring experts to their units, alter inactive-duty training to accommodate the availability of experts to present material, or send personnel for briefings. One example from 2012–2013 is illustrative: the 353rd Civil Affairs Command had a rotational deployment to Djibouti and contacted a former faculty member at the College of International Security Affairs for interagency briefings in Washington to familiarize the outbound personnel with the operating environment. This model approach is too dependent on the initiative of team leaders and commanders. It needs institutional support.

In his final report SIGIR uses three perspectives—authorized funding, personnel levels, and policy—to show that DoD was in charge of Iraqi reconstruction. Until Congress provides civilian organizational alternatives, which does not currently appear likely, the military's CA forces offer the most comprehensive option for implementing multiagency capabilities, but they require more education to learn the capabilities available in various agencies. As a civilian-military hybrid, they offer a blend of experience in military planning and execution with civilian expertise. But the force structure has so eroded billets for those with specialty skills that an option other than the typical table of organization is warranted. Centralized qualification and training are important aspects of a solution to this erosion, and Army (or DoD) could create a specific element to manage these specialties and allocate incumbents to organizations rather than requiring units to recruit locally. Any such solution must provide career progression, frequent interaction with units these specialists would support, and deployment patterns that support rather than hinder the civilian careers of these specialists.

Conflict prevention requires an adaptation of extant capabilities that has a precedent in the foreign agricultural and commercial services. Though these entities exist to promote American products abroad, the skill set enables practitioners to apply their expertise to develop export capabilities in fragile states. USDA developed predeployment training to prepare personnel for differences in stabilization tasks. Institutional CA education should include access to the expertise of various government agencies, think tanks, and educational institutions. The CA community's success depends on its facilitation of the expertise resident in numerous public and private resources outside the DoD. The application of civil expertise requires awareness of the connective tissue tying security, governance, and infrastructure together, and that knowledge requires advanced CA education. If CA elements arrive at an embassy with language facility, cross-cultural skills, and familiarity with a range of interagency programmatic options, they offer that country team a unique capability. ***IAJ***

NOTES

1 "Policy Guidance: U.S. Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," attachment to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, May 1997.

2 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Fact Sheet, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG): A Prototyping Effort," <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jiacgfactsheet.pdf>.

3 Center for Technology and National Security Policy, *Transforming for Stabilization and*

Reconstruction Operations, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson (eds.), National Defense University Press, Washington, 2004, and "Transition to and from Hostilities," 2004 Summer study, Defense Science Board, Washington, 2004.

4 The point bears repeating, and Dobbins has done so. See James Dobbins, et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. iii. He first made the point in James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxviii.

5 Kathleen H. Hicks, et al., *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2009, p. 26.

6 Dorothy E. Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands*, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, 1957–1963, 3 vols. Richard describes a messy transfer of authority to Interior that included mixed staff of Naval and Interior personnel. Interestingly, the Navy allowed 7 officers and 39 enlisted personnel to transfer to Interior as civilians. See Vol. III, p.1102.

7 OPNAV Notice 5400, December 13, 2013, subject: "Disestablishment of Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command and Detachment."

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The Unjustness of the Current Incantation of

Jus Post Bellum

by Dan G. Cox

Jus post bellum was originally conceived as an extension of modern just war theory. Specifically, it was aimed at examining the justness and morality of actions during war, *jus in bello*, in relationship to negotiations for peace in the post-war setting. Under the initial conception of *jus post bellum*, considerations of distinction of enemies from civilians, for example, takes on a more pointed meaning, as one has to calculate how much collateral damage is appropriate given the longer-term end-goal of successful and beneficial peace negotiations. Unfortunately, *jus post bellum* has recently been expanded to mean that the victor in the war is now responsible for the long-term well-being of the people it has defeated. This has led to a concerted outcry for post-war nation-building, which neither leads necessarily to successful negotiations, nor ensures a better or lasting peace. In fact, current conceptions of *jus post bellum* remove national interest from the equation altogether, replacing all military endeavors with one monolithic national interest—liberal imperialism.[1] Further, current incantations of *jus post bellum* obviate the possibility of a punitive strike or punitive expedition, even though this might be exactly what is needed in certain cases to create a better peace than existed prior to conflict.

This article is an exploration of the current incantation of *jus post bellum*. The concept of an incantation was chosen purposively, as proponents of *jus post bellum* are engaging in a dogmatic approach to war termination oblivious to the complexities and realities of conflict and, in fact, in violation of just war theory itself. In particular, *jus post bellum* violates the just war tenet of the state entering into war having a reasonable chance of success.

Because *jus post bellum* is so prescriptive and, thus, so strategically constrictive, almost no military intervention can be justified. Perhaps this is the intent of *jus post bellum* theorists, but if it is not, the current manifestation of this addition to just war theory is simultaneously unrealistic

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and dangerous.

This article will begin with a brief examination of the development of *jus post bellum,* with special emphasis on its liberal imperialist tendencies. This is followed by an explanation of the links between *jus post bellum* and the responsibility to protect. After this, *jus post bellum* is exposed for not properly considering the complexities of war through a brief case study of the unsuccessful intervention in Somalia in 1992.

This information builds to the conclusion that *jus post bellum* is unjust because it underestimates the complexity and reality of war and post-war reconstruction and will therefore create more violence over the long term rather than creating a lasting peace. *Jus post bellum* also violates the *jus ad bellum* notion of "probability of success," as the post-war undertaking is so massive and so invasive that it is unlikely to succeed.

The Development of *Jus Post Bellum*: The Historical Antecedents

Currently the two main areas of theoretical concern addressed in the just war theory literature are *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. *Jus ad bellum* deals with the justness of a war, especially emphasizing the just declaration of war. *Jus in bello* applies to the way in which the war is fought. The predominant thought currently is that there needs to be a third area of just war theory dealing with the post-conflict and rebuilding and reconstruction phases of war.[2] This area has been dubbed *jus post bellum*.

Philosophers and international legal scholars argue that a tradition of a just peace or justice after combat has ended is not new. They correctly note that early notions of *jus post bellum* extend back to Saint Augustine and Hugo Grotius. However, modern theorists have drawn a distinction between Saint Augustine's and Hugo Grotius's conception of a just peace. Carsten Stahn argues that Saint Augustine was one of the first to link war to a concept of "post-war peace" in the book *City of God*, but it was Hugo Grotius who refined the concept.[3] This is a common and important distinction to explore. Grotius is given primacy over Saint Augustine because Saint Augustine was exploring the concept from a state-interest viewpoint, leading to arguments of being mindful of the destruction of war in order to increase the odds of a successful surrender or peace negotiations once hostilities have ended.

Much of DoD persists in using a twentieth-century mobilization model when other approaches would preserve limited resources...

Hugo Grotius is more often linked to concepts such as the responsibility to protect and the current form of *jus post bellum*. Stahn argues Grotius is one of the first to address post-war concepts such as just war termination, rules of surrender, and how peace treaties should be interpreted.[4] Grotius is also one of the first to argue that punitive wars can be undertaken to stop another sovereign ruler from violating the human rights of his people.[5] While there is an obvious corollary between Grotius's punitive wars and the notion of responsibility to protect, there is a more nuanced implication that is germane to this investigation of *jus post bellum*. Grotius's comment on punitive strikes implies that post hostilities, the victor has a duty to ensure that the society it leaves behind respects its citizen's human rights. This becomes the crux of the *jus post bellum* argument and also a major part of the problem with this concept from a just war perspective.

To these two most oft-cited predecessors of *jus post bellum* theory, Brian Orend adds a third, Immanuel Kant. Kant argues that when there is a clear, belligerent, aggressor state which

is successfully defeated, the winning state or coalition has a duty to establish a more peaceful and progressive social order within the defeated state.[6] Further Orend contends Kant is warning that war is not aimed solely at resolving the current conflict, but that it must also "contribute to and strengthen the peace and justice of the international system more broadly."[7] This, too, has been brought forward into the current conception of *jus post bellum* almost verbatim.

There are other historical theorists who have been linked to *jus post bellum*, but these are the most often cited and most relevant to the current conception. The next section of this article will examine the current state of *jus post bellum* and detail the dangerous flaws with this conception.

Modern justice after war arguments are often linked back to the peace treaties after World War II.

Modern *Jus Post Bellum* and the Liberal Imperialism Contained Within

Modern justice after war arguments are often linked back to the peace treaties after World War II. For one of the first times "the peace settlements after WWII contained human rights clauses and provisions for the punishment of human rights abuses."[8] The key here is the emphasis on human rights and, more specifically, modern scholars' assertions that international law has matured enough to successfully impose human rights standards and constrain or even outlaw most wars.[9] Carsten Stahn even argues that the historical war/peace dichotomy has lost its meaning "with the outlawry of war and blurring of boundaries between conflict and peace." The point Stahn makes regarding the blurring of the boundaries between war and peace is salient. This point is echoed in a broader way by Everett Dolman in his book *Pure Strategy Power and Principal in the Space and Information Age*. Dolman defines strategy as a plan for seeking continuing relative advantage in a process that never ends.[10] If one accepts this definition of strategy, then it would imply that Stahn and others are correct in asserting that there is no hard line between war and peace. However, it does not necessarily follow that a state ought to be **obligated** to attempt to create a lasting peace by seizing the commanding heights and re-engineering a society. This point will be expanded upon further, but what is important to note is that *jus post bellum* proponents have correctly discerned a problem with past conceptions of a clear split between war and peace. They have just extrapolated from this fact incorrectly.

Jus post bellum is aimed at addressing broad concepts of conflict termination, peacemaking, and the post-war peace.[11] When a conflict actually ends can be hard to discern, and often extremist factions from the losing side will not abide by peace treaties signed by leaders they recently followed. However, assuming that hostilities have ended, Rebecca Johnson correctly argues that "all become noncombatants and have (or ought to have) their peace-time right to life restored."[12] This is an uncontroversial statement, but most proponents of justice after war go further, arguing that more than the simple restoration of the basic human right to life is necessary.

Justice after war, according to proponents, has to produce a higher level of human rights protections than existed *prior to war*.[13] The proponents of a better post-war human rights standard do not even engage in the debate between economic and social rights and Western notions of individual human rights. Despite the fact that two separate UN protocols deal with each of these types of rights separately,[14] proponents of justice after war clamor only for individual civil and political human rights. They

blithely ignore not only any local cultural context that might exist, but also any reference to non-Western notions of human rights. Ironically, their arguments fly in the face of the UN covenant on civil and political rights that states, "All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Apparently, since a conflict ensued, this right to self-determination no longer applies. There is another insidious assumption with the justice after war movement, namely that the victor will be just. Once a standard of post-war reconstruction of society is engendered, there will be no way to stop an unjust but more powerful society from appealing to it and using it. Justice after war proponents will argue this does not apply to their abstract philosophical claims, but once philosophy is applied to the real world, it will become a very real concern.

Imposing Democracy as Well as Human Rights

Most arguments for *jus post bellum* go further than simply arguing for an imposition of Western civil and political human rights. There is also a call for transforming the conquered nation into a Western-style democratic republic. Inger Osterdahl and Esther van Zadel argue that the only goal of any military intervention should be to leave the state that an individual state or coalition of forces has invaded in "a higher level of human rights protection, accountability, and good governance [sic]."[15]

Similarly, Johnson argues that the occupier must create a "durable peace" in which the defeated state can maintain human rights standards, many argue better rights standards, independently from outside aid or intervention.[16] Orend echoes this sentiment, forcefully arguing that one the main goals of *jus post bellum* is "coercive rehabilitation of a defeated aggressor" in the form of regime change.[17] Orend briefly seems to flirt with the complex reality of socially constructed communities when he notes that the goal should not be to strive for perfect democratic governance, but instead what he calls a "minimally just political community." Unfortunately, Orend defines a "minimally just political community" as one that would avoid violating the rights of other such communities. This amounts to the new community refraining from warfare or other invasive interventions in like communities to gain and keep international recognition as a just community and to fully realize the rights of all its citizens.[18] Far from being a minimal standard, this is actually an exceedingly high standard that few, if any, states have achieved. This again speaks to the unrealistic and single-solution aspects inherent in arguments laid out by *jus post bellum* advocates. States in the world containing myriad, complex cultures; peoples; terrain; and levels of economic development are unlikely to willingly acquiesce to a foreign invader, even after being defeated. Further, there is no evidence that complex problems are often or even ever successfully dealt with by applying the same solution to every situation. In fact, attempting to force Western-style democracy and human rights standards on non-Western states and peoples could bring about a state of lasting conflict. But even Michael Walzer would lead us down a far more interventionist path. In his seminal work *Just and Un-Just Wars*, he argues that any state that has the ability to stop a mass atrocity or genocide has a right to do so.[19] When this is taken even more forcefully to the modern limits of the

Justice after war, according to proponents, has to produce a higher level of human rights protections than existed *prior to war*.

responsibility to protect argument, right turns into duty, and any known mass atrocity must be stopped by outside states with the might to do so. If the logic presented so far is followed through to its natural conclusion, then the U.S. would be bound to intervene in dozens of developing states and force lasting democratic and human rights changes on these peoples whether the local people wanted them or not.

...democratic governance is the most desirable end state, but that it currently may not be achievable in many countries.

Some scholars on *jus post bellum* do not subscribe to the post-war intervention outlined above and should be mentioned here. Doug McCready correctly notes that democratic governance is the most desirable end state, but that it currently may not be achievable in many countries. He even argues that forcing democracy on a state could be detrimental to long-term peace and stability. Unfortunately, while he admits that forcing democracy on a system might not work, he still contends that the post-war peace must bring about a "more just society" than existed prior to the war.[20]

Eric De Brabandere is one of the only scholars to acknowledge there can be different reasons and goals for military intervention. He argues that not all intervention implies a post-conflict responsibility. He notes that a war of self-defense not only does not imply a post-war reconstruction responsibility, but the whole notion in this situation becomes incomprehensible.[21] De Brabandere is one of the few post-war scholars who acknowledges at least some level of complexity in warfare.

Punitive military actions also come to mind as a form of warfare between states that may not imply a post-war responsibility. Since the goal of the punitive military action is to punish the other state, rebuilding that state seems contradictory. Also, the punitive strike can have a particular military capability as its target, and once this capability is destroyed, there is often little reason to attempt to occupy or to continue occupation.

Cyberwarfare, too, seems problematic under this current conception. For example, should the Western nations responsible for the Stuxnet cyberattack have occupied Iran and forced democratic and human rights reforms? This seems ludicrous, but under the current majority scholarly opinion, it is not outside the bounds of responsibility.

Even if one leaves the concerns of varying forms of warfare out of the debate, the complexity of warfare and the social systems that engage in warfare make the strong claims of *jus post bellum* proponents fall apart. The U.S.-led UN intervention in Somalia exemplifies this conclusion.

Somalia and *Jus Post Bellum*

One of the most egregious assumptions of *jus post bellum* proponents is that nation-building is easy and appropriate for every post-conflict situation. This false assumption mirrors what one finds in the responsibility to protect camp.[22] The recent history of armed nation-building has shown that it can sow as much disruption and violence as the actual military intervention itself. In some cases, especially in peacekeeping and humanitarian military intervention, forcing democracy and Western human rights standards on the fragile state system can cause more lasting violence than the military intervention. Somalia is a good example of this worst-case scenario and a clear indication of what is likely to happen post-conflict if *jus post bellum* adherents begin to have a larger influence on U.S. foreign policy.

Somalia has had a short but very turbulent post-colonial history. Suffering a long dictatorship under Siad Barre from 1969 to 1991, which did little to increase the economic prosperity of Somalia, the underlying

clan hatreds were ready to boil over almost immediately after his ouster.[23] The level of deterioration of Somalia by 1992 caused many to label Somalia as the world's first modern failed state. The economic privation coupled with a drought caused malnourishment and starvation to become widespread in Somalia.

President George H. W. Bush was moved by the calamity in Somalia and authorized U.S. forces to intervene and distribute much needed food aid into a violent and chaotic situation on the ground. The U.S. eventually sent 28,000 troops to lead a multinational coalition called Operation Restore Hope.[24] The 1992–1993 U.S.-led Somalia mission began as a food aid and humanitarian assistance mission and transformed into a large, multinational, military mission.[25] Even though the commitment to humanitarian aid expanded over time, the result was largely successful, as normalcy began to return to Somalia and the starvation ended.

Unfortunately, besides starvation being alleviated, a multipronged internal conflict had been raging that also began to subside at around the same time that the food crisis was ending. In the Somali capital, Mogadishu, one particularly brutal warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid had gained primacy, and the people of Somalia were slowly beginning to recognize Aidid as a national political leader.

In the U.S., Bush was leaving office, and his successor, President Bill Clinton, wanted to enact what amounted to *jus post bellum*. Even though the term had not been coined in 1993, the actions of the Clinton Administration and the U.S.-led nation-building mission, UN Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), mirrored exactly what proponents of justice after war have advocated.[26]

Despite wanting to rebuild and democratize Somalia, Clinton desired some political cover in his first major foreign policy foray. Control of the mission transitioned to the UN. UNSC Resolution 814 dealing with this change in mission was unanimously passed, and UNOSOM II commenced. Chapter VII of the UN Charter was invoked to continue the foreign military occupation, and the violation of Somali sovereignty was justified given massive human rights abuses and a total breakdown of national governance. This is exactly the situation and response that justice after war proponents clamor for.

UN Resolution 814 was a unique watershed resolution declaring the instability and human rights abuses in Somalia were a threat to international security. Resolution 814 was also unique in tasking a peacekeeping/peacemaking mission with broad economic, social, and political goals. Resolution 814 was a nation-building mandate in Somalia, but Clinton felt that the warlords had to be kept from fighting first. Ironically, Clinton also desired cutting the number of U.S. forces in Somalia and ended up leaving a little more than ten percent of the original 25,000 U. S. troops in place for the post-conflict nation-building and disarmament phase of the operation.[27]

One of the most egregious assumptions of *jus post bellum* proponents is that nation-building is easy and appropriate for every post-conflict situation.

Unfortunately, the post-conflict, nation-building phase soon erupted into violence. One of the main reasons U.S. and coalition troops under the UN mandate were attacked was that Clinton and the UN refused to allow Aidid to participate in the nation-building effort. Since Aidid's recent military and political gains were tenuous, he saw this slight as a direct threat to his aspirations of becoming the Somali president.[28] Aidid began to portray the UN troops, especially the U.S. soldiers, as colonizers. He was able to convince his supporters to violently resist the UN occupation. The ironic thing about these

events is that Clinton and the UN did exactly what *jus post bellum* argued must occur post-conflict. The UN coalition attempted to reform the economy; democratize the Somali state; and at least refused to acknowledge leaders, such as Aidid, because of their wartime human rights abuses. If anything, justice after war proponents would argue that Aidid should have been hunted down and tried for his crimes immediately.

The ironic thing…is that [in Somalia] Clinton and the UN did exactly what *jus post bellum* argued must occur post-conflict.

After an attack orchestrated by Aidid that resulted in the deaths of four U.S. Army military policemen, Clinton decided to up the effort to capture or kill Aidid. But Central Command General Joseph P. Hoar worried that the odds of capturing and killing Aidid were low, and that his capture would only result in another brutal warlord filling the void Aidid left behind.

Clinton ordered in a special operation force (SOF) consisting of Delta Force commandos, a helicopter detachment, and Army Rangers to capture or kill Aidid. Nation-building had turned into offensive operations against Aidid and his militia. Aidid continued to ramp up the pressure on the UN mission and the U.S. leadership through indirectly attacking affiliated peacekeepers.[29]

Aidid continued to fight the UN forces. In one particularly heinous attack, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed at two separate aid locations on the same day by a mob of Aidid's supporters. The UN and Clinton were shocked at this attack, for UN peacekeepers had been considered off limits from direct attack while on peacekeeping missions. Clinton ordered the SOF in Somalia to ramp up their attempts to capture or kill Aidid.

Aidid and his military advisors correctly identified the Black Hawk helicopters as a key vulnerability in U.S. missions. Not only were Black Hawks lightly armored, the U.S. military was flying them low, near building rooftops and allowing them to linger there to provide supporting fire. Aidid thought that he could bring one down, and that U.S. forces would rush in to aid their fallen comrades. Aidid then planned to shoot at U.S. forces from above creating enough casualties that the U.S. would consider leaving. On October 3, 1993, Aidid's forces experienced monumental success that resulted in two downed Black Hawks and a firefight with U.S. forces that lasted almost two days.

In the end, 18 U.S. soldiers were dead and dozens wounded. Hundreds of Aidid's forces were killed and over one thousand more wounded. After the attack, Aidid ordered his supporters to drag dead U.S. soldiers in front of CNN news cameras in an attempt to shock the American public and American leaders into withdrawal. This media operation worked, and Clinton ordered the immediate withdrawal of all remaining U.S. forces.[30] A token UN peacekeeping force would remain until 1996, and even though Aidid won the day, Somalia has never recovered and remains the penultimate example of a failed and fractured state. The application of *jus post bellum* tenets actually made things worse in Somalia.

Conclusion

Most *jus post bellum* advocates argue for occupying military forces imposing a Western human rights standard, economic growth, and a Western-style democratic republic. Despite any cultural, economic, historical, or other pre-existing conditions within the occupied state, justice after war adherents believe that all post-war situations can be dealt with the same way. Not only does this prescription fly in the face of the complexity of social systems, it denies the recent history of armed nation-building. Somalia

serves as a case in point of what can happen when the current incantation of *jus post bellum* is forcefully applied. Somalia also shows that what happens post-conflict can actually trigger more violence if improperly handled. By refusing to deal with the next, most likely, political leader, no matter how distasteful, the UN mission was doomed to fail. The U.S. and UN could have left Somalia after the starvation was alleviated without enraging local leaders, but that violates everything currently argued in *jus post bellum*.

For the reasons outlined above, *jus post bellum* is itself unjust. By forcing a single solution on all complex post-war situations, the risk of the post-conflict phase going horribly wrong is extremely high. This means that adhering to the *jus in bello* tenet of "reasonable chance of success" becomes an almost impossible expectation prior to almost any military conflict. Further, restructuring an entire state's society regardless of the people's wishes hardly seems proportional in every case of military intervention. Therefore, *jus post bellum* violates the *jus in bello* tenet of proportionality of response.

Beyond this, *jus in bello* assumes there is a silver bullet solution that will create lasting peace within every state. It is a denial of complexity that is hard to comprehend. Often there are no "good guys," those who have not violated human rights by Western standards, after a protracted internal conflict. Still, justice after war is unmoved by the complexity of modern conflict and the diversity in world cultures. ***IAJ***

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The Applications of Military Simulations in an Interagency Context

by James Gilmore

The use of simulation has been a long-standing tradition throughout military history. Planning every minute detail of an important operation is something that comes naturally and has subsequently been honed over the course of repeated use. Only recently has the Army's use of computer modeling and simulation started making its way out of the military complex and into the world of private industry. Technological capabilities, once only thought useful for defense purposes are now being used to streamline business best practices and improve a corporation's predictive capabilities.[1] While the use of simulation has slowly started invading the corporate world, other federal agencies are still reluctant to add gaming and modeling to their everyday practices. This reluctance is the focus of this article.

By examining research on cognitive and training implications for simulation use and the results from a series of interviews conducted with experts familiar with the Army's use of simulations, this article will discern whether this particular type of training tool can be used successfully outside the military realm.

Background and Information

Much of the literature on the use of simulations pertains to its utility in training or for technological development. The most agreed upon definition of a modern-day military simulation is a model or simulation whose operation does not involve the use of actual military forces and whose actions undertaken will affect players on the opposing side.[2] In the past, simulations have been used to make crucial decisions with minimal information.[3] Putting together various computer models and war games always seemed to make sense in the military context, as the ability to understand the enemy can make strategic planning much easier. This form of action planning has its roots, not in U. S. policy doctrine, but in ancient military tradition. Modern day simulations have evolved slowly and have changed drastically since their inception, especially with the application of recent technological innovations.

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History of Simulation

The use of simulation started around the time of the Chinese war game *Wei-Hai*, which was originally designed to help grasp the chaotic motivations that can arise during real-world battle scenarios.[4] Simple war games, such as *Wei-Hai*, continued for centuries, changing with the evolution of tactical decision making on the field of battle. While war gaming was used sparingly during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its importance and utilization was accelerated drastically during the onset of the Cold War. The idea that people would start viewing conflict in a game theoretic format and would thus make choices by weighing win-loss conditions broke down preconceived notions regarding strategic planning.[5] Utilizing simulations more frequently in the military soon caused gaming language to permeate other areas of the foreign policy establishment. Soon words such as "body-count" and "war-bargaining" were routinely used to describe situations involving proxy conflicts associated with Cold War politics.[6]

During the Cold War, the efficiency associated with simulation and its particular type of environmental analysis seemed to work effectively. Many of the larger decisions could fit inside the already developed military models. Future direct conflict involving the Soviet Union—most likely involving the exchange of nuclear weapons—were theoretical and thus remained inside the realm of simulation. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of religious extremism, the complexities extremist groups brought to the military situation made future planning immensely difficult. Costs associated with replicating urban warfare conditions in a training scenario also made it difficult to capture the new asymmetric environment on the ground. Military simulations had to evolve, and so new methods were tried and tested in the hopes of changing training dynamics and modernizing not only the equipment being used, but the tactics as well.[7]

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Modern-day Simulation

The use of simulation, the military's conception of how to use it, and what effects it may have on those participating in it had to evolve. Analytical shortcuts, once taken as a natural result of participating in a simulation, were now being examined and intentionally replicated outside the strictures of a game. By allowing participants to role play as a combatant, now more than ever, simulations can help participants gain vital information on the opposing side in a military operation. In many cases, when tasked with playing a particular role, Soldiers have resisted the urge to break character and thus plan more appropriately for an eventual real-world situation.[8] For instance, when participants simulate an ethnic conflict, they tend to develop empathy for the various ethno-national groups in the region. Soldiers begin to think like their opponents in order to win.[9]

During the Cold War, modeling and simulation were viewed solely as tools. Today's games are designed to take advantage of "incidental" learning. This new style of gaming questions conflict mainstays, such as can a smaller army destroy a larger army, how does one guard against unintended consequences, and how many troops are sufficient to intercede between belligerent groups?[10] Simulating military processes by utilizing these modern war games forces people to apply knowledge to

existing problems in novel ways. With advances in computer modeling and the sophistication of new gaming dynamics, it is becoming increasingly difficult to give "programmed" responses to a given scenario.[11] These new competitive formats have led to better games and new innovations that could potentially be utilized to great effect outside the armed forces.

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When designing military operations abroad, the ability to understand the enemy can make planning a particular course of action much easier; there is no reason why this principle is not also important for agencies such as the Department of State (State). Making a tool available to foreign policy planners that allows them to analyze alternatives and weigh win-loss conditions could potentially simplify planning and allow for better communication across different federal agencies. These are some reasons both public and private organizations are increasingly investigating interagency simulation.

Interviews on Interagency Simulation

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC) provides timely analysis on operations and training to help facilitate this organization's overall mission. In addition to the numerous TRAC employees interviewed for the article, I also spoke with the Director of the Analysis Development Group, an organization that works concurrently to analyze different types of training simulations and models for operational use. Thirty percent of the organization is running and designing new models, and the group has a variety of different warfare games and computer models that take advantage of a wide range of computing formats. TRAC's computer models focus on time and resources used in activities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; maneuver; fire; and irregular warfare.

TRAC's research incorporates more general, social-science based questions. Because of this broad focus, TRAC connects with a variety of different war gaming centers, such as the Center for Naval Analysis, as well as individual academics, such as Professor Philip Sabin at King's College London. Instead of developing tools for niche situations or irregular issues that might arise on the field of battle, TRAC focuses on trying to develop tools for use in broader situations and is in the process of developing new leadership models for Army operations.

The majority of the interview focused on a recently developed game that might hold promise for interagency cooperation and planning outside the defense establishment. This game was developed to foster leadership traits in participants and requires seven players to challenge their decision-making skills to be more in-line with what is required by the simulation. By playing this game, the hope is that participants will develop targeted leadership capabilities. The game is not designed for linear play; rather, each player is handed a background card and assigned a particular in-game faction to help with role-playing capability. The rules of the game are simple enough to allow participants to fully immerse themselves in the gaming environment and complex enough to lend real-world credibility to the outcome.

TRAC has run this particular tabletop game several times, and each time several participants appeared frustrated and alienated over the course of the simulation. Luckily, instead of quitting and halting the game before the end is reached, the rules allow for natural breaks in gameplay,

making these periods of agitation teachable moments for training purposes. This frustration also helps people believe in the characters they are playing, making complexity a necessity if the simulation is going to mirror real-world events. TRAC sees the game as a success, and it has even caught the interest of *Foreign Policy* magazine, which is interested in publishing an article pertaining to how "caught up" in the game participants seem to get.

After discussing their recently-created game, TRAC personnel went on to discuss the practicalities of porting this simulation to a federal agency outside the military. While the interviewees seemed to think it would be possible to do so, they were wary about cultural limitations that pervade some sections of government. For example, State tends to focus more on group dynamics rather than action planning in a complex environment. Leadership training tools would be helpful in an environment such as State; however, the current management environment tends to make simulation unpalatable.

The educational capabilities of gaming are still seen as a military phenomenon. Other sectors of government are only slowly coming around to seeing their utility. A game like the one developed by TRAC could provide valuable insights to agencies dedicated to foreign affairs and policy development. Demonstrations of the game and trial participation are needed to introduce these agencies to the idea of adopting simulation as a new tool in decisionmaking.[12]

National Simulation Center

In an interview with the Director of the U.S. Army's National Simulation Center, he spoke briefly about the organization's purposes and simulation capabilities. Currently the National Simulation Center is organized with six primary offices responsible for designing different modeling tools for training. These offices use non-systematic training devices to collect information on training to improve group dynamics and operational capabilities. The goal is to develop robust modeling and simulations requirements that allow for new and innovative training tools and devices. The Center accomplishes this primarily with simulation support to the Army's Mission Command Training Program.

Unlike the other organizations interviewed, this particular section of the Army is constantly looking toward the future of operations—particularly Army Force 2025. The National Simulation Center's focus on future capabilities emphasizes the human dimension, discovering new strategically important ways to harness tomorrow's training and technological capabilities for today. One of the main issues plaguing today's military is the operational and technological tool left over from the days of the Cold War. These "legacy tools" exist without a purpose, prompting groups like the National Simulation Center to develop new ways of divesting these outmoded forms of training and technology from the military. These cognitive questions are important to the National Simulation Center, as behavioral modeling is an important aspect of training not just inside the military, but in other endeavors as well.

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The National Simulation Center has an important place in the U.S. military and chiefly leads war simulations for most of the Army's operational needs. Developing these models for an interagency purpose is seen as a goal only achieved in the far future. The National Simulation Center sees the first step of broader

application of military simulations as the integration of joint modeling throughout the DoD. Certain constructive models can only be used in highly selective circumstances, and even after their use, the results provided can only have so much predictive power. The problem with current military simulation techniques is the aggregating of units. Soldiers and other principal actors in a simulation are homogenized for the purpose of the game, which is necessary for the strictures of the model but undercuts the validity of the results. These shortcomings make interagency application a difficult sell, as many professionals in other areas of government use these problems as justification for forgoing modeling and simulation altogether. While the limitations of modeling and gaming currently hurt its prospects for widespread federal adoption in the status quo, in the near future these problems might be eliminated.

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Currently the military is working on new forms of adaptive gaming using cloud-based computing. The decentralized aspects of cloud-based computing allow for models to be run that surpass current technological capabilities found on a single computer system. A whole world could be rendered, with multiple computers handling the texturing and players participating and changing the game mechanics from around the world. This new form of simulation could be run once and then subsequently be manipulated in a "time-step" manner. This new flexible form of simulation might make other agencies more willing to try and incorporate modeling into their decision-making and training regimen, with less skepticism of their predictive capabilities. Unfortunately, those developing this new simulation design are not optimistic about its short-term prospects. Those at the National Simulation Center refer to this model as being "six months out," making widespread adoption of this particular simulation unlikely in the near term.[13] While the National Simulation Center might be a way out from developing a simulation that could be useful for interagency purposes, another group working with the military has developed a simulation called Athena that could potentially have organizational utility outside the Army.

Athena

While the military organizations interviewed discounted many of the simulation possibilities for interagency use, the Athena Program is a possibility for broader federal application. The Athena group, consisting of TRADOC contractors, developed a model that provides potential courses of action to address a specific, outlined, foreign-policy scenario. This group is currently using this model to address countering the Islamic State threat. While it may not have as much predictive power as other modeling frameworks, the outcomes provided by the Athena model is a level of detail not found in other simulations. This particular simulation focuses on the key areas of political, social, economic, and cultural issues. Analysts with operations research and systems analysis training run the simulation and provide background on the courses of action outlined in the model. The simulation is governed by a particular set of rules with four fundamental cornerstones—autonomy, cultural associations, safety, and relationships. The last three cornerstones provide detail as to the mood of the particular situation being modeled. This simulation is currently being used to support military commanders in the field. The end goal for Athena is to put the model on the Internet and make sure that a declassified version of it is open for editing and updating by the

public at large. The Athena group believes there are broader interagency options for the simulation and have begun discussions with State.[14]

Private Sector

Interviews with a private-sector defense contractor involved in simulations also revealed a modeling platform that can be used to run computer simulations for a variety of different agencies and private entities The modeling software distinguishes itself from other computer-based simulations by having the capability to test existing planning parameters in unique ways by running multiple models at the same time. Outside of providing an external military perspective, the primary application of the principal model pertained to interagency, commercial training activities.

The model most often used for interagency purposes focuses on increasing communication and planning capabilities for emergency management and disaster situations. By using this model, the organization will have rapid analytic capability utilizing geographic information system. While the defense contractor handles the modeling aspect of the simulation, the agency using the model must develop its own interface technology, which is fairly easy with the plug-and-play modeling platforms readily available today. By having the ability to develop its own interface technology, not only can the agency use this model for a variety of different operating platforms, but it can also merge with other simulations that share a common operating picture.

Currently the focus of modeling in the private sector pertains to mapping natural and manmade disasters. While some work is being done on modeling force-on-force situations outside of the military context, it is infrequent. Instead of focusing on simulating conflict, most private entities are working on developing new models that map future energy concerns and resource constraint problems. Resource concerns are growing in importance and unlike simulating situations, which require parameters governing people and their attached complex personalities, these models could potentially have more predictive power and be easier to design. With simulation in the private sector diversifying into numerous areas, this flexibility showcases just how important model-assisted interagency decision making and planning can be. Right now interagency simulation could be accomplished utilizing any number of methods including pre-assembled gaming toolkits or open source modeling efforts. However, as the personnel at TRAC mentioned, many are simply unwilling to adopt something new. A major concern in the private sector, which would seemingly be true inside the federal government, is the worry that someone's job will be dissolved if the simulation outcomes recommend more efficient policies or supplants a predictive position that may have existed in the organization.[15]

Conclusion and Recommendations

Utilizing simulation and gaming as a tool for operational planning and training has shown real promise inside the military and has been used to great effect for many years. Despite the benefits of simulation showcased by its use in the U.S. Army, the interagency application of these same models may be a long-term goal. Without a change in bureaucratic culture or rapid advances in technology, these models will only have limited use from an interagency standpoint. Adopting several of the approaches found in the private sector, including open source software collaboration and cloud-based computing, will help facilitate an interagency integration. However, until those tactics are used, simulation use in an interagency context will, unfortunately, always remain "six months away." ***IAJ***

NOTES

1 Telephone interview with co-founder of private defense contracting organization, June 11, 2015.

2 Philip Sabin, *Simulating War: Studying Conflict Through Simulation Games*, Continuum International Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. xvii.

3 Anne M. Baylouny, "Seeing Other Sides: Nongame Simulations and Alternative Perspectives of Middle East Conflict," *Journal of Political Science Education*, 2009, p. 214.

4 William W. Bostock, "Using Global Simulation to Study Ethnic Conflict," *Academic Exchange Quarterly*, 2008, p. 192.

5 Baylouny, p. 214.

6 Baylouny.

7 Baylouny, p. 228.

8 Jeremy Youde, "Crushing Their Dreams? Simulations and Student Idealism," *International Studies Perspectives*, 2008, pp. 349–350.

9 Baylouny, pp. 214–215.

10 Michael Goon, "Peacekeeping the Game," *International Studies Perspectives*, 2011, p. 254.

11 Stephen M. Shellman and Kürşad Turan, "Do Simulations Enhance Student Learning? An Empirical Evaluation of an IR Simulation," *Journal of Political Science Education*, 2006, p. 21.

12 Interview with Director of the Analysis Development Group, Paul Works, and Sara Lechtenberg-Kasten, TRAC, June 11, 2015.

13 Interview with COL Craig Unrath, Director of the National Simulation Center, June 23, 2015.

14 Interview with James N Kraker, Principal Athena Analyst, and Jumanne Donahue, July 15, 2015.

15 Telephone interview with co-founder private defense contracting organization, July 1, 2015.

Simons Center
Interns & Fellows Programs

From May to July 2015, graduate fellow James Gilmore conducted research and wrote an original paper as the first graduate student enrolled at Missouri State University in Springfield, Mo., to intern at the Simons Center. See Gilmore's work in this edition of the *InterAgency Journal*.

From June to July 2014, the Simons Center hosted two graduate students in the Simons Center graduate fellows program. Punam Gurung, left, and Elizabeth Aaberg were both from the School of International Affairs at Penn State University.

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Megacities
– Assessment Factors

by Gus Otto and AJ Besik

Looking around without seeing anyone; asking without being in earshot of someone; and walking in any direction without having to watch out for someone may indicate you are in a megacity. So what is a megacity? No one really knows, and that is a problem. The UN arbitrarily defines a megacity as something larger than 10 million people. John Wilmouth, Director of the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division rightly states, "Managing urban areas has become one of the most important development challenges of the 21st century. Our success or failure in building sustainable cities will be a major factor in the success of the post-2015 UN development agenda." The literature suggests there is no single analytic, comprehensive tool for analyzing this new phenomenon.

During the rigorous year-long courses at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, students work on solutions for the future, by asking hard questions now. For example, will the Army deploy to a foreign location to fight in a megacity? If so, how does it prepare its Soldiers to do so? What equipment will it need? How will operating in a megacity affect its fighting style and doctrine? How will it support civil authority and humanitarian assistance? How does it engage in peaceful activities despite its regular and aggressive wartime training? In each of these scenarios, how might it cooperate with other local and national authorities and members of the international community? These are great questions, with long-lasting implications and consequences; however, without an assessment system for considering, measuring, weighing, or prioritizing issues germane to megacities, these questions are premature.

The purpose of this article is to outline several ways to think holistically about analyzing a megacity. Two trends shaping the growth of megacities are the draw of urbanization and the increase

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in globalization. They are complementary, not exclusive, and they are not the only reasons for their growth.

Megacities are organized into three broad categories—hard, soft, and intervention environments. The hard category considers all the physical issues relating to the city itself. It is the x, y, and z axis, it is the infrastructure, and it is the sustainment and logistical aspects. It is the focus of city and urban planners and engineers on a daily basis. It is its own system of systems, as many components are interconnected, and interdependent. The soft category consists of how humans engage with one another—what the Army calls the human domain. The final category—intervention environments—is of particular interest to the military, first responders, nation-builders, and development specialists. This category considers how a group might provide aid and relief to a segment of or the entire megacity and issues relevant to limited combat operations.

Hard Category Considerations

Scale and Density

The issue of scale is paramount. There are issues unique to megacities not present or simply non-issues for smaller cities. Down-scaling may offer new and creative ways to address issues not explored previously in smaller-scaled settings. For example, various means for transportation, communication, or even hygiene in a regular city may instantly be overwhelmed in up-scaled megacity environs. The density of a population in a megacity is an important early factor to consider when discussing scale.

When thinking of population density, visualize a column of sand. Wet, packed sand can support itself in a tall column. Dry, loose sand flows into a heap more readily. The stability of the sand column is not as important as the behavior of the density. Consider *Demographia's World Urban Centers* latest report:

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> By necessity, average data masks significant variations within urban areas. For example, the population density of the Phoenix urban area is more than half-again higher than that of the Boston urban area. Yet, the highest population densities of the Boston core are at least five times that of the highest density areas in Phoenix. Moreover, Boston has a far larger commercial core ("central business district" or "downtown").[1]

The difference is that Phoenix suburbs are denser than Boston suburbs, which highlights the importance of at least recognizing the role density may play in assessing a megacity. How hard aspects of a megacity are addressed will depend on the density of the location. Density often will affect the vertical component of the megacity, meaning there may be more people living in a square kilometer because they are stacked upon each other in multi-story buildings or even below ground.

There is a growing appreciation for five dimensions of a megacity: width, depth, breadth, time (as real and perceived culturally), and awareness (as knowledge, belief, and perception). The first three are clearly within the hard, geospatial world. Further, there can also be a negative vertical component. For example, in several of the more developed megacities, there are subterranean aspects for travel, communication, and living and storage spaces. These subterranean components drive use of space considerations, access, and measurement challenges and are important considerations during man-made disasters (terrorism, subway breakdowns, or pipe bursts) and natural ones (earthquakes, cave-ins, or floods).

Water, Food, Sanitation, and Energy

Water must be available to the population. Water is not just used for hydration, but also for sanitation, cooling, transit, and production. Conflict points quickly rise where water scarcity exists. Long lines for water in Sarajevo and Tuzla brought civilians to the few precious water sources in those towns, despite the threat of snipers, checkpoints, and mortar attacks. In Sudan, people walked all day in hopes of filling their water jugs, and in Syria, parents risk life and limb to get their children enough water to survive. Consider the historic water agreement between Jordan and Israel.[2] Density shortens the period available to provide water. While traditional piped water is ideal, it is not omnipresent, except in the most advanced cities. Even in advanced cities, water is susceptible to short-term outages and catastrophic interruptions. The longest an average member of a megacity can last without water is far more limited because his or her access to water is also limited.

Water distribution points become fragile spots where interruption compounds demand.

Water's importance cannot be overstated. History is replete with examples of wars over water, water rights, water ways, access to commercial value of harbors and ports, and so on. In the future, especially in a megacity, water becomes even more complex. Consider, for example, megacities that must desalinate, recapture, or purify their water supplies or have a pressure or piping challenge. Water distribution points become fragile spots where interruption compounds demand. Megacities present a unique water supply vulnerability.

Food is another base-level factor relevant to a megacity. In a megacity, there is a greater demand for quantity, but for quality and variety as well. Further, perishable food stuffs create a greater concern due to the difficulty to transport, store, refrigerate, and prepare them. Wasting, spoiling, and rotting are issues that undermine food security and also create rippling burdens on waste disposal, transportation, and commerce. Contamination due to tainting, accidental contamination, or exposure to disease is another significant concern. Consider food-borne illnesses, such as E. coli, Salmonella, or Hepatitis A running rampant through a population-dense megacity; then consider the strain this scenario would place on hospitals, transportation, sanitation, and businesses. Because the second and third order effects of its frailty are compounded, foods plays a major role in a megacity.

The importance of sanitation in a population-dense megacity, where a build-up of filth, excrement, and garbage can close streets and shut down sections of a city is undeniable. Even the presence of giardia and other microscopic parasites or sources of dysentery threaten the health and wellness of a megacity, and stand to cripple it if sanitation is not a constant consideration. Recognizing the need to rid a megacity of its various waste is critical to avoiding infection, the development of rodent infestation, and the real risk of increased contamination of food, water, air, and habitation.

Water, food, and sanitation all rely heavily on some kind of energy; therefore, energy is critical to a megacity's success and longevity. Energy is required for transportation, communication, and production. Energy can take the form of classic fossil fuels or new forms of alternative energy. Energy disruption can devastate a megacity. For example, the July 2012 blackout in India disrupted power from New Delhi to Calcutta and affected roughly 620 million people.[3] Fortunately these cities are not accustomed to 100 percent power availability, and the power was restored within a few days. The 2003 blackout affected over 55 million

people and included the major metropolitan areas such as New York, Cleveland, and Baltimore in the U.S., as well as Toronto, Canada. Traffic over land, rail, and air was halted, and commerce screeched to a halt.

Infrastructure

Physical infrastructure, such as roads, rails, busses and trams, and waterways, allow residents of megacities to access water and food, and pipes and sewer lines allow waste to exit the megacity safely. Physical infrastructure considers paths that allow for a minimum of movement by planned conveyance. If a rail track is attacked or stalls, the entire system is interrupted. The 1995 terrorist attack in Tokyo, Japan, by Aum Shinrikyo highlights a man-made disaster that crippled a train-reliant city for days. The 2015 double winter blizzard in the northeast U.S. shut down air, road, and much rail traffic from Washington to Boston and beyond.

Prolonged outages of these hard infrastructures, will affect multiple other systems and essential sources to life in a megacity. The classic development of infrastructure in a megacity drives provisions to the population and ships out the waste. They are critical services. Without them, entire swaths of populations in a megacity could become fragile, risking starvation, thirst, and disease.

Communication and Data

Communications and data are increasingly important to governance, awareness, and human interaction. Information flows over copper wires, the airwaves, and fiber-optics. Data drives trains, planes, and automobiles. Communication with the population within a megacity is critical. Data flows over cell phones, emails, cable, satellite television, radio, and newspapers. An informed populace is able to make choices about where to go and what to do in the event of an emergency. A mother chooses to take her children out; an employee decides which train to take; all these decisions are made based on information available. Criticality of information increases during disruptions. During normal times, communication drives human endeavor. During crises, communication becomes a critical enabler that provides emergency information to the local population. It also enables outside organizations to conduct operations support functions in the event of a disruption.[4] Finally, the importance of both reach and redundancy is critical to communications infrastructures in preparing for eventual disruptions or emergencies.

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Topographic, Geographic, Terrestrial, and Geospatial

As we go about our lives, we think of land, water, buildings, and events in a two-dimensional plane (X, Y axis). However, we need to think about X, Y and Z axis with an appreciation that hard systems extend below the ground and well above the ground. These systems can include underground pipes, subways, and telecommunications. It can also include above-ground skyscrapers, wires, and communication towers. These hard structures may all play a role in transmitting light and radio frequencies. Have you ever been somewhere and your cell phone had poor reception? In suburban and rural areas, it is because signals are not strong enough or the terrain blocks them. This even happens in the heart of a megacity, despite the proliferation of cellular towers, because the city itself, especially large buildings, absorb, disrupt, and block the signals.

Another consideration for a megacity is the shape of the landscape and the makeup of the ground. For example, a megacity may be forced to build on top of a landfill or a sandy base. The

explosion of Dubai and Abu Dhabi highlight the importance of the makeup of the ground. The pylons used to ground high-rises are sometimes driven over 100 meters into the ground, and there may be 20–30 of them in a single high-rise. Building on previously uninhabited locations, such as a landfill or a dumping site can lead to building sickness—chronic illnesses in local inhabitants or tenants of the space. Physical deterioration of the foundation may risk collapse of the building, and the location becomes more susceptible to natural and man-made disasters.

Spatial thinking is critical. According to the 2006 National Research Council,

"Spatial thinking…finds meaning in the shape, size, orientation, location, direction or trajectory of objects, processes, or phenomena, or the relative positions in space of multiple objects, processes or phenomena."[5] Spatial thinking applies to how fixed and moving objects interact with each other and affect the environment of a megacity. Consider the growing desire for drones. Consumer and government demand for the services these systems could provide will change delivery options, but also risk airspace and radio frequency bands administration. It may also drive increased concern over safety and privacy. Experimentation in conflict zones such as during the civil war in Syria has suggested aid can be delivered with drones. The growing discussion about large global companies delivering packages to your door also enjoy increased potential. In a megacity, how a single or several airborne objects are utilized will have an impact on the fixed locations and the mobile population who live there.

Among the most important considerations when discussing a megacity is the human dimension.

Another consideration within the geospatial domain is how phenomena and movement occur between fixed and mobile activities. Consider the explosion of coffee consumption. A popular coffee shop might influence rush-hour traffic patterns, congestion, spaces needed for parking, traffic flow, and even how stop lights are timed. Consider the tragedy of 9/11 in New York City. Think about the importance of having sufficient, clear, escape routes not only from the World Trade Center, but from all of lower Manhattan. This flow was stymied by over-water lines of communication, but also by outside aid agencies trying to get into the area to provide additional support. Each of these different viewpoints illustrates the importance of developing a complex geospatial understanding of a megacity.

As we consider the physical and tangible aspects of a megacity, we begin to appreciate the incredible complexity it presents to those working there. Local governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental institutions, commerce and the corporate world, and especially civil society play a profound role. None of these can successfully shape outcomes in this interconnected domain. However, each has impact, some planned, some not. The importance of deliberate and methodic decision making by those with stakes in a megacity is paramount.

Soft Category Considerations

Human Dimension

Among the most important considerations when discussing a megacity is the human dimension. Cities exist to house, employ, and even contain human beings. The movement of people; their backgrounds, sociologies, education, ethnicity, gender and race; the culture(s) of the people living there; how these people choose to associate governance and politics; the work and social patterns of these people; the resultant rules and laws that are applied; how those rules and laws are upheld (or not); the services required for the people;

and finally the tensions that exist must all be considered. Unfortunately, there is little, perhaps no homogeneity or uniformity in these layers. It is important to stress the way these layers interact across and with each other. For the purposes of this article, each will be considered topically, but should not be considered as existing in a vacuum.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has two books dedicated to the importance of the human dimension. The U.S. Army is running with the term "human dimension" or "human domain," as it shapes the importance of the humans in its ranks. While focused on a small cohort of people, the concept can be applied broadly to people around the world and especially in a megacity. In a *Small Wars Journal* (SWJ) article in June 2013 regarding a discussion about the future of the Army, the authors consider the cognitive, physical, and social components of a Soldier:

> The Army concepts offers a comprehensive portfolio approach to the various components (Cognitive, Physical and Social) of the Soldier, leader, family and civilian development and performance essentials to raise, prepare, and employ forces for full spectrum operations in today's dynamic operating environment. **Cognitive:** This includes Learning capabilities, Cognitive training and education, and Psychological, Character, and Morale factors. **Physical:** Improve fitness through comprehensive wellness programs that build aerobic/mental capacity, strength, endurance, agility, and resilience; focused nutrition; stress and sleep deprivation management. **Social:** This component is comprised of the Army ethic, Faith, Moral/ethical foundation, Esprit de corps, Cohesion, Trust, Sociocultural awareness, and Adaptability.[6]

Clearly, some of these issues apply just to military fighting personnel, but many of the considerations offer a universal application to the population living, working, visiting, and transiting a megacity. As we consider the people living in a megacity, we can re-form the above descriptions and expand them. The cognitive component of the human deals with learning and must also consider the literacy, education levels, type of education, and primary and secondary communications venues. For example, consider driving your car in New York City, Tokyo, or New Delhi. Many of the symbols might be similar. A stop sign is a stop sign. But the "no parking" signs are different. Further, residents, in part due to culture and in part due to enforcement and education, heed the "no parking" signs differently. While double parking in New York City may be illegal, in most cases, it is a common practice. In Tokyo, it is not tolerated. Public service announcements in Tokyo are attentively consumed, whereas in New Delhi, they barely rise above the din of their surroundings, when and if they are provided at all. In New Delhi, the preponderance of paper advertisements is easily recognized; whereas in Tokyo, the role of interactive media rules; and in New York City, it is a hybrid. All three enjoy mixed success in providing additional information. How the people of a megacity use, transmit, and receive information is driven in part by the infrastructure available, while simultaneously driving new modems for the same. One need only consider the explosive growth rate of cellular phones and smart phones to appreciate their interaction with the human domain.

How the people of a megacity use, transmit, and receive information is driven in part by the infrastructure available.

The physical component described in the SWJ excerpt offers fitness, holistic wellness, strength, endurance, agility, resilience, nutrition,

stress, and sleep, which apply to all of us as humans. However, they have a greater impact in a megacity, where entire swaths of a population are unfit, underfed or undernourished, or perpetually stressed or sleep deprived. Consider sleep deprivation in Seoul, Korea.[7] Sleep deprivation among a populace has a long term impact on the overall cognitive development, and mass productivity. The reasons range from the cultural desire for high achievement to long hours at school and work, and longer commute times as the city grows. As a result, there is a growing niche of grassroots efforts to create nap spaces, embrace the concept of siesta, and even mandate less time at work or at school in an effort to improve sleep among the people. Imagine a megacity in a less developed location where other physical elements are also added in. A sleepy, stressed out person who is under or malnourished will be less agile and less resilient. His or her ability to deal with a crisis is diminished. The physical needs then of the human population will not only include basic food stuff, water, and sanitation, but may insist on providing nutritional sustenance and counseling over time as a major crisis may afflict a megacity for a decade or more, especially in developing countries.

Understanding the social implications of the human dimension is a critical point within the soft portion of this framework.

As the U.S. Army talks about its own human dimension, it can inform thinking about the human dimension in a megacity. The Army states the human dimension covers "Army ethic, Faith, Moral/ethical foundation, Esprit de corps, Cohesion, Trust, Sociocultural awareness, and Adaptability." It allows us to derive other important issues regarding the social context. Moral and ethical philosophy, along with religion, spirituality and their outward expression will shape the environment people live in. For example, in a megacity a locally broadcasted, five-time a day call to prayer to some is a welcome opportunity to commune with their creator. Others within ear shot may go about their business. And yet a third group may be annoyed by the disruption. Or in another megacity, the prevalence of holy relics or animals to one group of people may serve as a divisive issue with members of a minority group who see those artifacts differently and ultimately as an obstacle to a more efficient lifestyle. In a perfect world, everyone might trust their neighbor and enjoy the sociocultural awareness to ensure peaceful coexistence. Realistically, these often become friction points, lying just below the surface of society, simmering. When a crisis breaks, these friction points can quickly become exasperated. Consider the LA riots of 1992. While a single event or judgment may have sparked the riots, the simmering undercurrents of economic and racial tension offered ample tinder for an incendiary situation. The riots wreaked havoc on a frail megacity and cost millions in damage and overtime for public workers and further divided an already stressed and mixed society. Understanding the social implications of the human dimension is a critical point within the soft portion of this framework. The human dimension, above all other factors in this article, will be the bedrock of all activities in a megacity. It is the start point for considering behavior and movement of individuals and groups in a megacity.

Movement

Now that we have a growing appreciation for what the human dimension considers, we realize they are in near-constant movement. People constantly seek more efficient means to accomplish tasks. Similarly, people work, they eat, they shop, they socialize, and they vacation.

Each of these functions drives where they go, when they do it, and the routes they take. As we considered many of the hard issues in the previous section, consider how humans shape the use, strain, and planning of these components. Among the heaviest strains on the plumbing, water, and sewage system at any single time in New York City is during the hours of 6–8 a.m. In August 2013, London made international news as a "fatberg" the size of a double-decker bus clogged main sewer lines under the Kingston. Consider the traffic in any megacity. In New Delhi, people leave two to three hours before they need to report to work in order to get there on time. These are all megacities where there are established norms and various laws, yet the burden on the hard systems is already a challenge. Consider the impact of a crisis where the humans living in a megacity decide to leave en masse. Consider how quickly a disease might spread. Think how much more quickly rumors, information, and panic spread. Now, consider managing this chaos in a megacity during one of those crises. The movement of people in normal situations is fairly predictable; however, predicting movement in an atypical situation is difficult at best. Even if it is considered, then predicted, the ability for a system to deal with or absorb a shock when millions of people are moving will prove complex in the very least.

Culture

There is a culture of the megacity, but there are also many cultures within it. The synergistic effect of the megacity is more than the additive. Consider New York City again. You may be from one of the five boroughs, you may also be from one of the culturally-integrated segments of the boroughs. For example, Little Haiti is the portion of Flatbush and Canarsie in Brooklyn where there is a high concentration of Haitians. Following the devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010, this segment of society mobilized their neighborhoods and then the rest of New York to accomplish far-reaching fundraising support, not just across the Haitian diasporas, but around the U.S. and across racial, ethnic, and historically-defined lines. This example points to the complexity of assessing culture in a megacity. Over long periods of times, these smaller cultures mix and mingle with other cultures, and a megacity may acquire (often unconsciously) its own culture. This was no more apparent than following the tragedy of 9/11 when the residents of New York City pulled together to deal with and recover from the severe impacts suffered during the attack and collapse of the World Trade Center.

There is a culture of the megacity, but there are also many cultures within it.

In the Institute for Mobility Research book, *Megacity Mobility Culture: How Cities Move on in a Diverse World*, the introduction offers the following:

> …we understand mobility as the "ability to travel from one point to another" and "actual physical travel." Second the term "culture" can be defined as "the set of values, conventions or social practices associated with a particular field, activity, or societal characteristic." Combined, "mobility culture" then is the set of values, conventions or social practices associated with the ability to travel from one point to another, and with actual physical travel."[8]

The cultural approaches of the people will drive not only the movement of the population, but how they expect events to unfold, what work patterns are shaped, how they will be governed, and what services they demand. Among the many soft and human domain components, this may be one of the most important. An appreciation of the culture will drive how people

interact with each other, their governing bodies, and external people or organizations. In the event of a crisis, the culture will either hamper or aid in the facilitation of relief and the ultimate survival and resilience of the megacity. Culture should not be underestimated.

At present, all the roughly 36 megacities considered have a governing and rule of law structure.

To appreciate the importance of understanding the human domain in a megacity, how they live, and what governs their behavior, we must consider their social or interactive patterns. What kind of work do they do and where do they do it? We can assess where they live and where they work and what the normative hours of work are. From there, we can predict when large groups of people may be on the move. By observing these movements, we can then look at emerging social patterns. Social network analysis and social physics lend themselves to considering this movement. Particularly some of the new work conducted by Dr. Sandy Pentland allows researchers to consider the variables of commonality and difference, and then overlay those on social movement. As this is considered, the patterns allow for a degree of not only daily activity, but offer insights into vulnerable locations, chokepoints, and areas requiring more attention by city planners. Were a crisis to unfold, this social patterning allows interveners to consider ideal aid and distribution points. It may also allow for better and faster distribution and resilience in long-term recovery.

Rule of Law

The U.S. has a deep history in democratic rule of law. However, the rule of law practiced in the U.S. is unique. Due to population density and the natural frailty of some megacities, it is even more important to understand national-level rule of law and local interpretation of those laws in the megacity. Rule of law will drive expectations of the populace and create discord if not attended to consistently, fairly, and with transparency. The degree, familiarity, and enforcement of those laws will drive behaviors and expectations even more. Rule of law is what will enable or confuse people and their governing bodies. In a crisis, understanding the rule of law, its background, traditions, denotations, and connotations are critical to success for city managers and others supporting s megacity in a crisis.

At present, all the roughly 36 megacities considered have a governing and rule of law structure. There are formal and informal laws and, equally, mechanisms used to enforce them. The rule of law, law enforcement, and buy-in by the population all affect trade, commerce, movement, and every other aspect of daily life. In an August 2014 *Economist* article "Realigning Justice," the importance of rule of law and enforcement at the judicial level is helping attack systemic corruption across China. The case study considered Shanghai and its judges. Over time, judges were unwilling to make judgments because they did not want to offend power brokers in the Communist party, which led to exploitation of both the population and the system. It also allowed for unofficial consolidation of power in the hands of the few. Putting new judges on the bench with a different mindset—to stamp out corruption and follow laws more effectively to make judgments—is having a positive effect.[9] We can appreciate the importance of the enforcement of this rule of law even better as we consider other services governance is expected to provide.

In his book *Property & Peace: Insurgency, Strategy and the Statute of Frauds*, Geoffrey Demarest draws on the intersection of land rights, peace, stability, and rule of law. Consider places where titles to landownership are tenuous. Consider someone has a deed to a piece of

land, and they think it is theirs. They invest in building a home, a business, or maybe a farm on the property. Then they find out there were other deed holders who now contest the ownership of that land, and they lay claim to all the improvements on the property. Rule of law and the executive responsibility of government in this process are critical. If the paper the deed is written on can be contested, then there is no owner. If the rule of law is unclear or inconsistent, then the deed cannot be upheld. If the executive at the local, state, or national level cannot or will not uphold rulings on the deed and support an owner based on certain statutes, then there can be no development. If, in a megacity, a piece of property can exchange hands, be used, exploited, and developed, then it must be through a rule of law and supporting executive responsibility. Consider forced evictions by a state, militant, or criminal group. If they can displace people and steal their land, then stability suffers and security may be undermined. This is compounded in a megacity where a deed may be for a 2-bedroom condominium on the 65th floor of a 112 floor, mixed-use building. If this is undone or fragile across major sections or components of a megacity, the increase in that instability can be both fatal and contagious.

In another Chinese example past and future collide. During the latest run up to the Olympics that premiered in Beijing, the world witnessed massive growth. Fears of shoddy workmanship, forced labor, indentured servitude, and natural resource conservation were all touted. The most visible concern was the forceful, at times violent expulsion of inhabitants. Some of these people lived in well-constructed homes, others were shanties, and yet others were homeless and taking up residence in the area. All were wiped away or relocated in an effort to make way for both the physical (hard) development and the waves of people attending the games. As China prepares for the 2022 Winter Olympics, similar concerns return. In particular, as a semi-arid region, a great concern is growing about the water sources needed to create the ice and snow for a megacity, in addition to sanitation and hydration.

Social workers, firefighters, police officers, and medical providers all must have an established relationship with the local population well in advance.

Service Providers

Other services in a megacity are critically important. A brief discussion of law enforcement above offers only one of the players. Others players include medical providers (routine and emergency), firefighters, and social workers. Each of these plays a significant role in the safety and well-being of a megacity. This is easiest to see when there is a disaster. However, probably more important than many other factors offered in this article is the need for a well-established, well-trained set of professionals in each of these sets. Social workers, firefighters, police officers, and medical providers all must have an established relationship with the local population well in advance. Further, they must train and rehearse for natural and manmade disasters in concert with city planners. In a megacity, this requires more complex interactions and planning and more deliberate and intentional consideration of the intricacies. It also requires a level of trust and autonomy for each to operate when there is no hierarchical oversight and direction for lower-level elements providing support. To achieve this well, it also requires exercising these inevitabilities and practicing both physically and cognitively to iron out wrinkles in advance.

There are degrees of depth and breadth to the complexity in any megacity. Having an appreciation of where the hard and soft meet and the nuances shaping events is paramount. The old adage "Murphy's Law is anything that can

go wrong will" skyrockets towards chaotic when crisis hits a megacity. First responders, local and national governments, outside interveners, and the population itself must be prepared. Naturally, we cannot be prepared for every crisis, nor plan for every natural or manmade event. The issue is not a matter of **if**, but **when**. When the crisis hits a megacity, is the city prepared? Which soft and hard elements are strongest, which are weakest? Is there a tipping point known in advance? How does the megacity manage uncertainty? Does it have a formal risk management program? How does the megacity ask for help? Who do they ask? If they ask, will anyone come? These all get to the third category, which highlights the role the U.S. government may play at home or abroad regarding a megacity. As we depart from the hard and soft assessment factors of a megacity, we can and should think about times when host nations or outside nations might engage and interact with a megacity.

For the U.S. Department of Defense...a default, almost reflexive response is to force any megacity intervention into an existing planning and thinking paradigm.

Intervention Environment Considerations

The U.S. is a republic where there is a healthy but natural tension between the states and the federal government. The friction can be healthy in our republic, but during a crisis it can cause delays when there is precious little time. It may preclude or impair support provided by the U.S. government at the state level. The U.S. government's capacity to help in a domestic and international setting is amazing. However, when doing so within our borders, there is a precious and important respect for state rights. Overseas, the U.S. government looks to partner with others in the pursuit of its democratic principles and national interests. Particularly during times of crisis, the U.S. offers a hand up to its neighbors around the globe. Therefore, there are two different environments to consider regarding U.S. government involvement in a megacity.

For the U.S. Department of Defense, in particular the military, a default, almost reflexive response is to force any megacity intervention into an existing planning and thinking paradigm. Simplistic tools of the U.S. government, such as DIME (diplomatic, information, military and economic) to more cumbersome tools, such as ASCOPE (areas, structure, capabilities, organizations, people and events) or PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information) can all help assess a complex, possibly chaotic, scenario. The point of this article, particularly in describing this third category is not to divorce these approaches to intervention, but rather to marry them to and enjoy complementary consideration regarding a megacity.

For example, in an operational planning environment, a group of skilled planners may initially define a problem or set of problems by cross-walking ASCOPE across PMESII, whereby the organizations in ASCOPE would be considered across each of the categories conceived in PMESII. Here the planner's fairly robust consideration of social organizations starts to emerge. This is valuable planning, yet it risks failing to fully define the problem set. The deliberate crawl through the issues is key; however, there are issues broader than a single or binary solution. Further, applying a strategic lens to these additional areas will help the operational planners prepare a more comprehensive engagement strategy for their organizations within a social construct.

Some of the rules, laws, and traditions

governing interactions in each environment will shift. Nonetheless, the concerns, capabilities, and limitations for a megacity will be fairly consistent. The first and most visible difference will probably be which agencies will provide the support. Within the U.S. is considered domestic affairs or domain for the U.S. government. This is driven by various authorities and funding streams that are very different based on the two environments. The second is how well the U.S. government understands an area, government, and people they are trying to help. This non-domestic or rest-of-the-world concept is easily described as international. For the purposes of this document no further distinction is required. The challenges presented below are topically universal. How to address them will not be.

In every society there are illicit activities. In a megacity, their existence cannot be denied and must be factored into any crisis. Broadly, there will be several degrees of illicit activity ranging from rioters who seek an outlet or voice, to run-of-the-mill criminals, to street gangs and organized crime and dark networks in a cyber domain. Each will play a destabilizing role in the societal fabric of a megacity. Following a crisis, they present both threat and opportunity. While in the normal state of affairs, they are generally negative, intervention may require cooperation with these elements where and when it was never considered. It may also require the active ignoring of these elements until order can be improved. Among the strategies to consider is mapping in advance who these elements are, what sectors they work in, and where they exert influence or power. For example, a street gang in a megacity may be used to move information to a segment of society distrustful of the local law enforcement. In some cases, having an ombudsman or advocate give voice and information to a rioting body of people can slowly establish calm and eventually trust if done correctly. Another may be reliance on existing criminal organizations to tap into less conventional means of transportation. This does not condone their behavior, rather it encourages those thinking about megacities to consider the possible value these entities bring in a crisis.

Charitable organizations, religious groups, and support organizations should be a first stop for local, national, and intervention groups.

Where there is evil, there is also good. Charitable organizations, religious groups, and support organizations should be a first stop for local, national, and intervention groups. The Red Cross and Salvation Army are credible institutions with a global presence. There is a growing network of charitable organizations who can be asked for help. Unfortunately, not all global groups are equally trustworthy. It is important to conduct some due diligence in advance of the crisis to determine which groups should be placed on a list of "first responders" both domestically and internationally. Finally, while there is a healthy distinction between church and state in the U.S., the value religious groups can have in providing aid and calming support is incredible. A growing number of religious leaders are talking about their role to bring calm to rioting and tense situations as part of their ministry. These interlocutors may be slow to partner in non-crisis periods. In crisis times, they may be superb partners.

This leads to the importance of issues the U.S. government must consider in sequence. As a long American history of internal and international strife informs us, the importance of stability and security in advance of reconstruction efforts is critical to success. From the founding of our nation, to the civil war, to the Marshall Plan, to endeavors in Afghanistan, there is a near-universality in first establishing security, then stability. The mistakes of the past

teach us the importance of doing so with an eye toward eventual recovery and reconstruction activities. Therefore, it is important to model rule of law, transparency, and accountability to help establish legitimacy from the very first foray into security. This is true in any environment. At the megacity level, it will require additional scale along with increased coordination. Considering the role of security personnel, local and visiting; the existing rules of law; the impact of cultures; and the need to establish rules of engagement (kinetic and non) is essential. Further, this is a process that will not allow for micromanagement at the strategic (megacity) level. Practiced and competent security and stability personnel must engage early and effectively. They must be given clear objectives and allowed the space to operate in their assigned niche with little supervision. Finally, there is a time when a crisis is so severe these personnel and their efforts may need to turn to containment or quarantine.

Practiced and competent security and stability personnel must engage early and effectively. They must be given clear objectives and allowed the space to operate...

There are several factors that will further exacerbate a crisis in a megacity. Among the worst may seem to be those of weapons of mass destruction. Rather, than a catastrophic and near-complete annihilation of a megacity, its size suggests that even with a nuclear detonation, there will be survivors. While nuclear detonation is possible, it is less probable. This does not suggest planners should not consider a nuclear detonation, but rather focus more on higher probability events.

Some of those more probable events include a radiological disaster. In this case, consider a radiological event due to carelessness or direct action by a belligerent actor. In the first, it is hopeful self-reporting would limit exposure of megacity inhabitants. In the second, the intent would be to maximize the exposure to the megacity dwellers. In March 2011, the Fukushima, Japan tidal wave and subsequent nuclear accident demonstrated how a population-dense nation such as Japan handled multiple catastrophic events. Despite setbacks, containment of population bases was not required.[10] Other environments might require it. Another probable scenario might include biological agents or disease moving through a population quickly. Consider the 2010 cholera outbreak in Port Au Prince, Haiti. Though not quite a megacity, this sprawling and deeply-impoverished metropolis was overwhelmed first by a major earthquake and shortly thereafter by a cholera epidemic.[11] Actions by the Dominican Republic at times felt like containment, as they sought to stymie the flow of refugees across their border. This had more to do with the crushing economic effect it had on the Dominican Republic, especially near the border, which was compounded by the cholera scare. The last important note to make is the rarity of a single event remaining so. As noted in these two cases, no single disaster goes for long without being joined by related ones. Critical to successful planning is not a single impact, but multi-impact plan for recovery. The most drastic of these may be the need or believed need to contain or quarantine a megacity.

A crisis, manmade or natural, may be so devastating it requires a quarantine or containment. Cutting off a large population will have several negative effects. Consider the nightmare scenarios painted by classic movies such as *Escape from New York*, *I am Legend*, or *World War Z*. Each of these considers an environment where containment and or quarantine are deemed essential to prevent the spread of violence or biological contagion. There will be a crisis where parts of or an

entire megacity will need to be contained or quarantined. Notice this is not the same as cut off. As quickly as possible the containment or quarantine must be lifted. This may occur in timed or geographic phases. The longer the space is contained, the more likely it will be to erupt and overcome barriers. Basic human needs will still need to be met; supplies will need to be provided; energy, communication, food, water, and shelter will need to be sent in. To make the initial decision to contain or quarantine without the immediate succession plan to lift and restore is both foolish and inhumane. To ensure decent treatment of people in a megacity, it is important to understand them before and after a crisis occurs.

Among the important issues to consider is how to gather information. Information is hard to gain following a crisis, especially a rapid-onset event, as proved by many of the examples provided. Information is susceptible to manipulation by those who hope to exploit the situation or who simply misunderstand the realities based on their perspective. This reality drives a critical need for complementary information gathering through intelligence resources. This must be done cautiously. Intelligence gathered for political means during crisis is reprehensible. Instead, intelligence gathering to determine veracity of other information and to vet tidbits of leading data is crucial. The 2015 Boston blizzard highlighted the value of drones equipped with cameras. Drones were deployed to monitor structural integrity of buildings and to search for those stranded in the cold. In combat zones, drones can be used for point-to-point information delivery and can also provide essential medical needs to care providers. The importance of cyber intelligence activity can help identify bad actors who seek to take advantage of frail infrastructure or victims who are seeking aid. The importance of understanding the role, capabilities, and limitations of intelligence in a megacity is paramount to local authorities and interveners alike.

The importance of understanding the role, capabilities, and limitations of intelligence in a megacity is paramount to local authorities and interveners alike.

Similarly, post crisis mapping of a megacity will continue to be a major driver for visualizing relief and recovery. The importance of mapping before the crisis is essential to planning, and post crisis mapping should build off this baseline. Population flows, local refugee collection points, safe zones, potable water locations, and aid distribution centers will be needed. This information should be mapped out not just for the official members of an aid team, but also provided with regular updates to the population in a variety of venues. It should take the form of handouts and flyers, be available through public broadcasts, and be shared over telecommunications networks where and when they are effective. The mapping can also serve to identify trends in movements, shortcomings, and possible friction points. Dynamic mapping and geospatial data is a growing trend and can be filtered and layered to provide more and more niche areas with visualization value.

Finally, there will be times when knowing who your aid providers are is critical. Further, there will be other times when knowing if a person is friendly or not is essential. U.S. defense language refers to this as identifying friends and foes. The passing discussion about belligerents is critical to local law enforcement as well as those who come in to help. In some cases, this will require a force to capture, detain, and occasionally engage with another force. There are times abroad where the U.S. military is providing or may be called to provide

peacemaking or peacekeeping forces. The importance of the population knowing who these forces are, how to recognize them, and whom to contact in case of emergency is very important. In a megacity, an organized crime syndicate may own several floors of a high-rise or several blocks of a tenement housing area. If the population knows the law providers are wearing a certain item or uniform, they will be able to differentiate them from the criminal elements. Where multinational forces are working in nearby areas to provide security and stability, the importance of knowing who is on whose team will determine success when engaging the population.

As suggested throughout this article, there is no formula to apply to a megacity. There is not even a template for "diagnosis, "if this is even a good word to use. A game theorist may argue with this. A game theorist might develop a model or series and set of algorithms allowing for some prediction of outcomes either man-made or natural. These models and algorithms may apply to some of the aforementioned aspects of megacities. However, the number of variables and interaction between those variables seems incalculable. A final factor, time was not discussed. As each megacity evolves, it creates an increasingly lively and dynamic event in time. To develop a formulaic approach would require such work that by the time it is implemented, it may already be an outdated snapshot of the city assessed. Rather than suggesting a formula for dealing with a megacity, the purpose of this framework offers several valuable lenses for considering, weighing, analyzing, and evaluating any megacity. Perhaps the synthesis of the myriad of items discussed above will drive better decisions and better engagement by any number of interlocutors or their interventions. The ultimate goal is enlightenment and furthering the dialogue on this growing and intricate issue of the "megacity." ***IAJ***

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Defining
Diplomacy

by Edward Marks

> ***"He ordered another bottle…in honor of a career so comfortable that it is called The Career and a ministerial department so superior that it is called The Department."***
>
> ***— Roger Peyrefitte, Les Ambassades***

Most countries provide professional education for their diplomats and some operate establishments specifically for that purpose. Few of us would claim that the U.S. government and the Department of State provides equivalent experience with any degree of seriousness or comprehensiveness. Our Foreign Service Institute, for all its virtues and fond memories, is essentially a training, not an educational, institution. However there are signs of growing interest in diplomatic education, expressed for example in an American Foreign Service Association paper recently submitted to the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review drafting team. If pursued we may yet see a serious program of professional education put in place for America's professional diplomats.

To do so, however, will require us to get some agreement on terms and definition. There is much confusion in the popular as well as professional minds about the subject of diplomacy. It has been famously noted that English is a tricky language, requiring a good deal of care to ensure that what is said is what is meant. Even at the level of single words, confusion can occur as words often have multiple meanings. One good example is the word "diplomacy" which, in addition to its formal reference to a specialized activity of governments, has entered into common parlance to denote personal qualities involving pleasing manners.

However even in the context of its original meaning, there is much confusion between several terms which many people think are synonyms, but aren't: foreign affairs, foreign policy, and diplomacy. Using some fairly standard dictionary definitions, we find that;

Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Marks served as a Foreign Service Officer for 39 years with the State Department. Marks has written extensively on terrorism and interagency coordination, and co-authored *U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What*. He holds a B.A. from the University of Michigan, an M.A. from the University of Oklahoma, and is a graduate of the National War College.

- foreign affairs means "matters having to do with international relations and with the interests of the home country in foreign countries,"
- foreign policy introduces a further distinction "The diplomatic policy of a nation in its interactions with other countries."

Meanwhile, diplomacy is defined as "the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations" in order to implement those polices and pursue those interests.

So we have a nice progression, from the general subject (foreign affairs) to a specific manifestation (foreign policy) to implementation (diplomacy).

The meaning of diplomacy is further complicated as even in its purest sense, the word has two general meanings: in the policy sense, that is "a government's diplomacy" or the operational sense, the conduct of business between and among governments, conducted through bureaucratic institutions and processes. The former is loosely intended to refer to a country's "foreign policy," hence the confusion, while later is the activity of a country's foreign policy bureaucracy.

Obviously these terms and what they represent are overlapping. The continuing and inevitably intimate relationship between foreign policy and diplomacy, between the objective and the means ensures that they can never be completely separated, at least in the mind of the general public. But there is a fundamental difference. For instance, American foreign policy includes support for democratic governments; therefore American diplomats pursue activities supporting democratic governments. But before that objective became an element in American foreign policy, back when President Adams stated that the U.S. did not go abroad to seek out dragons to fight, American diplomats and American diplomacy did not pursue that objective. And many governments do not include support for democracy in their foreign policy and therefore their diplomats and their diplomatic activities do not pursue that objective.

Diplomacy is the instrument of communication, not the message communicated. George Kennan, who thought about his profession as seriously as he did about foreign affairs and foreign policy, noted that "This is the classic function of diplomacy: to effect the communications between one's own government and other governments or individuals abroad, and to do this with maximum accuracy, imagination, tact, and good sense." In other words the medium is not the message although the widespread confusion between the two obliged the legendary academic student of international politics, Hans Morgenthau, to comment that there was a common "confusion of functions between the foreign office and the diplomatic representative."

Diplomacy is the instrument of communication, not the message communicated.

But the medium must have a corporal form, in fact it has two. The first is the activity itself, when officials – from Presidents to Third Secretaries and the occasional "Special Representative" – practice diplomacy, that is, conduct official communications between governments.

The second form is an established institution. Even the Internet operating through the Cloud requires some form of instrument at either end of a conversation. For diplomacy, that physical instrument is a foreign service ("the diplomatic and consular personnel of a country's foreign office") and in the case of the United States, the Foreign Service of the United States (a government service of diplomatic and consular staff established by law as part of the Executive Branch).

This body of officials is an instrument of the government, one of the tools in the foreign policy toolbox, not an independent force. Most countries try to organize that instrument in the form of a professional cadre, recruited, trained, and educated for their task as representatives and interpreters of their country's foreign policy. However, diplomacy has never been a popular, or even understood, activity in most modern democratic countries. After the remarkable performance of Benjamin Franklin in Paris, the United States proceeded to conduct its diplomacy with an ad hoc mixture of personalities chosen largely by means of the political tradition of the "spoils system" through the 19th century. By the end of the 19th century however, the reform movement in the U.S. accepted the necessity of a professional foreign service as important to the country's independent existence.

That awareness produced the Rogers Act of 1924, which created the professional Foreign Service of the United States. Changes and reforms were introduced over the years of the 20th Century as the country moved from its traditional policy of hemispheric isolationism to world leadership. The current organization and mission of the Foreign Service was mandated by Congress in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 which clearly described the new government service:

> "The Congress finds that—
>
> (1) a career foreign service, characterized by excellence and professionalism, is essential in the national interest to assist the President and the Secretary of State in conducting the foreign affairs of the United States;
>
> (2) the scope and complexity of the foreign affairs of the Nation have heightened the need for a professional foreign service that will serve the foreign affairs interests of the United States in an integrated fashion and that can provide a resource of qualified personnel for the President, the Secretary of State, and the agencies concerned with foreign affairs;"

So perhaps the problem of definition is not really that difficult. We only need to turn to the relevant legislation and listen to our elected leaders. They say the business of the Foreign Service is to "conduct diplomacy on behalf of the United States" and to "serve the foreign affairs interests of the U.S." If Congress can understand this clear distinction, why can't everyone else? ***IAJ***

Worth Noting

New program director joins Simons Center

CGSC Foundation CEO Doug Tystad has announced the hire of a new program director for the Simons Center. Colonel (U.S. Army Retired) Roderick M. Cox assumed the duties of the position on March 28.

"Rod has a distinguished record of service in both military operational positions as well as interagency positions," Tystad said. "I believe that Rod is exceptionally well qualified for the position and he is motivated to make the Simons Center a financially stable, high performing Center in support of the education of military leaders of character and competence for service to the nation."

Cox's last position before retiring from the Army was director of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth. As the director he was involved in leader development, fostering research and publication, and was a pioneer in Army publishing.

See http://thesimonscenter.org/cgsc-foundation-announces-new-simons-center-program-director/ to learn more about the Simons Center's new program director.

– Simons Center

DoD, HHS, others respond to Zika threat

In March Navy Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, commander of U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), affirmed Southcom's role in the "whole-of-hemisphere" approach to combating the Zika virus. Tidd spoke at a Council of the Americas forum on March 22, where he discussed the part Southcom and other U.S. agencies play in the fight against the virus.

"Our Department of Defense, including U.S. Southcom, along with Health and Human Services, U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department, and others are part of a whole-of-government — indeed a whole-of-hemisphere — effort to confront and contain this threat," said Tidd.

At the forum, Tidd spoke about the security challenges created by the virus, saying "There is no way to predict when or where health threats will emerge." Tidd also touched on efforts to prepare for, respond to, and prevent the spread of the virus. According to Tidd, these efforts include "Working with our partners to improve access to health systems" to those in effected areas.

The mosquito born Zika virus was recognized as a "major health care crisis" earlier this year after spreading from Africa into Central and South America. There have also been cases of Zika in the U.S. The virus is suspected of causing microcephaly in infants and may also trigger other health issues.

- Department of Defense

Interagency space center makes strides

On March 16, a key leader of the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) spoke of the center's progress and importance at the AUSA Global Force Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama. JICSpOC promotes information sharing on space operations between the

military and intelligence community, and its launch was announced last year by the Department of Defense.

Lieutenant General David Mann, commanding general of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, discussed JICSpOC's current operations, which focus on building combat power. According to Mann, JICSpOC has already finished two scenario runs and additional scenario runs are being planned.

Mann talked about JICSpOC's role in coalition space operations that incorporate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacities. He also touched on JICSpOC's future, saying "I think we'll also see the JICSpOC down the road also providing an operational capability to augment what's already provided by the Joint Space Operations Center" at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

- C4ISR & Networks

State, DoD, USAID teams tackle diplomacy challenge

Six interagency teams from the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were recently chosen to present at the D3 Innovation Summit on March 2. The Summit was a joint initiative of State, DoD, and USAID, and brought together experts from across the U.S. government and the private sector to discuss emerging technologies and collaborative, whole-of-government innovation essential to solving global challenges.

The six teams were selected from the D3 Pitch Challenge, which asked interagency teams to design innovative technology solutions to strengthen national security, enhance diplomacy, and improve the lives of people around the world. There were 500 submissions to the Challenge.

The six finalists presented their proposals before a senior government panel. The proposals included uses for 3-D printing technology in post-disaster management, active shooter protection in U.S. embassies and other facilities, and uses for space-based solar power technologies for renewable energy.

- Department of State

State releases international narcotics control strategy

The State Department submitted the 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) to Congress on March 2. The two-volume report offers a comprehensive assessment of the efforts of foreign governments to reduce illicit narcotics production, trafficking and use, in keeping with their international obligations under UN treaties, while also presenting information on governments' efforts to counter money laundering and terrorist financing.

Volume I of the INCSR, the Drugs and Chemical Control section, covers the efforts of more than 80 countries and jurisdictions to attack all aspects of the international drug trade in 2015. Volume II, Money-Laundering and Financial Crimes, describes the efforts of major money laundering countries to implement stronger anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes.

This is the 30th anniversary of the INCSR.

- Department of State

Multi-agency center finds new home

The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) was welcomed to its new home at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama on February 16.

The multi-agency organization is made up of 30 partner agencies, including the FBI and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. TEDAC is responsible for analyzing and exploiting intelligence gleaned from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which is then provided to the military, law enforcement, and the intelligence community.

TEDAC was formed in 2003, and was formerly located at the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia.

- Federal Bureau of Investigation

DHS to provide human trafficking awareness training

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in late January that the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) will begin to provide human trafficking awareness training as part of basic training courses. The FLETC courses are used to train federal law enforcement officers and agents from every Cabinet level department, and will equip graduates with the ability to better recognize signs of human trafficking that they might encounter in their routine law enforcement duties.

Director Connie Patrick spoke of FLETC's commitment to working with law enforcement partners to ensure the safety of their communities, saying "Through these new training curriculum taught as part of our basic training academies, thousands of frontline federal law enforcement personnel will be able to recognize and help those who are victims of this heinous crime."

- Department of Homeland Security

GAO releases report on countering firearms trafficking

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) publicly released a report in February detailing U.S. agencies' efforts in countering firearms trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico.

The report examines illicit trafficking across Mexico's border with Guatemala and Belize, and the impact such trafficking has on law enforcement and U.S. security interests. GAO-16-235 reviews the activities undertaken by U.S. agencies to build partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking, and the extent to which they considered key factors in selecting the activities. The report also looks at the progress the United States has made in building such capacity.

GAO found that U.S. agencies and their implementing partners have undertaken a number of capacity-building activities that support counter-firearms trafficking efforts in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico. According to GAO, U.S. agencies and implementing partners have achieved many of their goals, but could enhance their efforts to measure and report on progress.

GAO recommends that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives establish and document performance targets for its key counter-firearms trafficking activities, and that the Department of State work with other U.S. agencies and implementers to help ensure that progress reports identify key challenges and plans to address them. Both agencies agreed to these recommendations.

- Government Accountability Office

Executive Order establishes cybersecurity commission

On February 9, the President signed an Executive Order establishing a Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity. In his remarks, President Obama said the new commission was created "in order to enhance cybersecurity awareness and protections at all levels of government, business, and society."

The Commission is formed within the Department of Commerce, and will include no more than twelve members. These members may include individuals with knowledge and experience in cybersecurity, national security and law enforcement, corporate governance, risk management, information technology, privacy, government administration, communications, and other related areas.

The purpose of the Commission is to make detailed recommendations to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors.

- The White House

DHS and NASA partner for security innovation

On April 13, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced their partnership with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation (CoECI) to develop new technology solutions to advance homeland security.

DHS and NASA's endeavor seeks innovation through publicly crowdsourced prize competitions. "We're creating opportunities for everyone from companies to college students to bring their passion to bear in service of national security." said DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Dr. Reginald Brothers.

The DHS Science and Technology prize program inspires the use of ground-breaking approaches and solutions to homeland security research and development by challenging entrepreneurs, innovators, students, and others in the private sector.

- Department of Homeland Security

Rice Speaks on whole-of-government approach against ISIL

The President's National Security Advisor, Susan E. Rice, spoke on the whole-of-government strategy against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) while addressing cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on April 14.

In her remarks, Rice spoke of a comprehensive strategy to combat ISIL that includes all elements of U.S. power, saying "Ours is truly a whole-of-government campaign." She went on to review the four facets of the ISIL strategy – attacking ISIL's core in Syria and Iraq, targeting ISIL's branches, disrupting ISIL's global network, and protecting the homeland.

Rice also discussed interagency and international efforts to ending the civil war in Syria, which includes military and intelligence personnel, diplomats, and partners from Russia and other nations.

- Department of Defense

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