

Civil-Military Balance in Complex Operations

by **Kurt E. Müller**

Editor's Note: The following article was originally published in one of the Simons Center's earliest editions of the InterAgency Journal in 2011.¹ The editors of the Journal invite our readers to ask themselves what has changed – for better or worse – since this article was originally published.

Interventions in the affairs of a one state by another may be benign, belligerent, political or military. In addition, these interventions may supplement host-nation authority in delivering assistance. Regardless of character and purpose, there is a long-standing preference for employing civilian agencies rather than military forces to interact with the local populace. But realizing this preference requires developing a workforce familiar with multiple agencies and capable of short-notice deployment, altering the traditional culture of various agencies, and facilitating transitions among numerous multilateral partners inside and outside government.

Belligerent and Benign Occupation as Background

The need for attention to the civil sector in engaging another society in warfare has a checkered record among heads of government and theoreticians of international relations. Carl von Clausewitz addresses occupation in his posthumous volume, *Vom Kriege*, as a phase of warfare necessary until such time as the outcome of a conflict is recognized by treaty. This activity accounts for a conceptual genesis of civil-military operations and a starting point for discussing the challenges of coordinating civil and military power in civil-military interventions—a term that covers the broad range of activities from war to peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction.

Military history provides numerous examples of civil-military interventions, both good and bad. Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg note that Belisarius, commanding troops for the Roman emperor Justinian, established a military government in North Africa some 1200 years prior to World War II.² In America's military history, Winfield Scott's civil-military intervention in Mexico stands among

Kurt E. Müller, Ph.D., is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He was formerly with the Civilian Response Corps in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, and is a retired civil affairs officer. He deployed for complex operations four times in uniform and twice with the State Department.

the good and Lincoln's appointment of civilian-military governors stands among the bad. Practitioners of civil affairs are fond of citing a memo from Eisenhower to Marshall in which Ike laments the time he had to spend on political, civil-sector issues. Such citations often provide a civil affairs staff section the rationale for dealing with issues that distract a commander from his tactical or operational mission of defeating an enemy. However, treating political civil-sector issues as distractions runs the risk of isolating a commander from the political purpose he is supposed to achieve.

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Interventions need not be adversarial, typically characterized as a military campaign followed by a *belligerent* occupation, as Clausewitz had in mind. *Benign* occupations occur when the intervening power has no intention of subduing the indigenous political power. A benign occupation may result from liberating a friendly state from the control of a mutual enemy or from any of several circumstances in which there is an absence of local authority. During World War II, the allies distinguished the occupation on the basis of belligerent status. In friendly territory, allied forces conducted civil affairs (CA), usually based on agreements with governments-in-exile; in enemy territory, allied forces established a military government (MG).

Regardless of the nature of occupation, there are similarities in the functions that must address civil society, from engineering to public health. Even benign occupations risk alienating the local populace, its government, or both.³ The following example from WWII typifies the dilemma

of a benign intervening power. Both official procurement of goods and services and troops' personal expenditures in liberated and occupied countries required the use of an acceptable currency. Because President Roosevelt was not favorably disposed to recognizing the French Committee for National Liberation (FCNL) as the legitimate government of France, this was more complicated for France than for other nations. The allied command proposed issuing supplemental francs as the preferred medium of exchange. This proposal did not sit well with the FCNL, which proposed issuing its own currency, an option unacceptable to Britain and the U.S. Since other allied alternatives, such as British Military Administration notes, U.S. "yellow-seal" dollars,⁴ or Allied Military Francs, would have indicated an occupation, the FCNL acquiesced in accepting the supplemental franc.⁵ Because the provision of services is, in essence, a substitute form of governance, the determination of personnel and means for providing these services require the attention of both political and military leaders. The War Department foresaw the need for such a capacity as a result of past experiences. Post-World War I occupation duty in Germany led Colonel Irwin Hunt to write an after-action review lamenting the lack of preparedness for these tasks, and his report surfaced among war planners in the 1940s. Moreover, British operations in the Middle East led to a cable a year before Pearl Harbor from General Sir Archibald Wavell to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in which he sought "an experienced administrator" to address occupation duties in the Middle East.⁶

Britain's experience in World War II led it to establish a politico-military curriculum at Cambridge University, as well as coursework at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre at Wimbledon. Two American staff officers attended, and their reports were useful later in establishing the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, which would be followed

by Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) at ten universities across the U.S.

Plans for the School of Military Government and the projected use of its graduates quickly became contentious. Some critics saw these plans as portending the development of proconsuls. Perceptions of colonialism and protectorates were articulated to oppose the use of military personnel for civil administration. When news of these plans reached the White House, President Roosevelt sent a memo to Secretary of War Henry Stimson commenting, “[t]he governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men and not second-string men.”

Opposition to military conduct of civil administration continued until experience in North Africa demonstrated the necessity for military commands to oversee the civil sector until security was firmly established. By the time the Italian campaign was underway, military attention to the civil sector was a recognized necessity. With an emphasis on feeding a populace whose agricultural production had been profoundly disrupted, CA-MG activities in the Italian campaign relied heavily on military transport. Within the military, CA-MG officers without transportation of their own had to procure vehicles through staff sections of divisional and higher headquarters. Reliance on military logistical commands for shipping, port operations, and ground transport precluded civilianization even when both the military and civilian agencies desired it.

Civilian Supervision

In accord with the demeanor of President Roosevelt’s rebuke to Stimson regarding a strong preference for civilian conduct of civil administration, Robert Murphy of the State Department became Eisenhower’s “civil adviser” and had a staff that included representatives of the Department of Agriculture, the War Shipping

Administration, Lend-Lease, the Treasury Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare.⁷

A historian of British CA provides a fairly concise overview of the British organization of civilian overseers. General Wavell’s December 1940 cable led not only to establishing the directorate for CA, M.O. 11 in Britain’s War Office,⁸ but also a standing interdepartmental committee on Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory (AOET). The AOET evolved through the development of numerous cross-government agencies that it oversaw and to which it reported.⁹

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The interagency nature of these constructs is not surprising; however, the military was primarily responsible for implementing the policies these committees established and executing coordinated efforts in the field. Policy realization relied on choosing personnel for the task, but the acquisition process was subject to military priorities. As in today’s circumstances, civilian tasks were not high on the agenda of most career military officers. British commanders would send officers to CA duty when they did not feel comfortable entrusting them with significant command responsibilities. A similar priority occurred in the U.S.

In the racially divided U.S. military of the 1940s, an unrepresentatively high number of African-Americans were nominated for CA-MG duty, which would have effectively sidelined them from the military’s preferred career tracks. However, even the American military’s own review of its proposed CA-MG personnel found few with appropriate backgrounds for the tasks. Consequently, the Army offered commissions

in the Staff Specialist Corps and training through CATS to men (and a few women) with appropriate civilian backgrounds. The Civil Affairs and Military Government Branch came along in 1955.

The Military in the Civil Sector: Cold War to Desert Storm

During the Cold War stand-off in Europe between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact forces, the American military focused on its adversary and looked to the civil sector primarily for supplying services in the event of conflict. This focus on the opposing force relegated to the historical record any recognition of the enormous demand for humanitarian assistance and assigned humanitarian assistance responsibilities to an Army Reserve structure. Those in CA found it difficult to direct attention to the civil sector other than for host-nation support. Forward-stationed forces had to address their civilian environment, but the concerns were primarily for community relations.

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Although the planned theater defense of Western Europe could not be described as static, it certainly could not be characterized as expeditionary. Since U.S. allies in the presumed area of conflict (West Germany) would not admit of any operational response beyond restoration of the inner-German border, there was no perceived need to address occupation east of that border. Moreover, it would have been impolitic to raise any issues recognizing threats to the continuity of government. The military schools here in the

U.S. reflected this orientation: the official line at the CA Officer Advanced Course was that the U.S. Army would not engage in MG after future wars.

The 1991 Iraq war (Desert Storm) pulled the concept of CA back into the limelight. The liberation of Kuwait once again raised topics such as restoration of governing structures in collaboration with a government-in-exile. A foreign service officer (FSO) then in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Randall Elliot, contacted the U.S. Ambassador-Designate to Kuwait. This contact led to a request from the government-in-exile to President Bush for assistance in planning post-liberation transitions. In his Army Reserve capacity, Colonel Elliot was the deputy commander of the CA activity supporting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The good fortune of having an FSO with appropriate military background overcame the absence of attention to this sector in CENTCOM's staff planning.

A military disinclination to conduct CA-MG remains the norm. Certainly the Rumsfeld planning in 2003 for postwar Iraq disdained any such activity, though as scholars of belligerent occupation often note, failing to provide an occupation capacity does not excuse an intervening power from its responsibility under international humanitarian law of providing for the occupied populace.¹⁰

In 2003, the deliberate inattention to planning for occupation by the leadership of the Department of Defense (DoD) was scandalous, but it took the insurgency in defeated Iraq to demonstrate the folly of ignoring the need to consolidate military victory with appropriate civil-sector activity. This development can be interpreted as a twist on the World War II experience. In 1942, the War Department feared giving control to civilian agencies; in 2003, the DoD wanted to avoid civil administration but found it could not.

After belatedly addressing occupation issues through an ad hoc Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), DoD rushed to answer criticism by superseding it with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under a diplomat responding to DoD oversight. As director of ORHA, Lieutenant General Jay Garner had two months prior to the onset of hostilities to prepare occupation plans. He was in Baghdad only one month before being replaced by L. Paul Bremer, as head of the CPA. In 2003, the State Department did not yet focus on reconstruction and stabilization, and coordination between Defense and State was entirely inadequate. Bremer reported to Secretary Rumsfeld but held a presidential appointment and exercised interagency responsibilities without a commensurate interagency panel in Washington.

Avoiding nation building was not only a blind spot for the administration of George W. Bush. After the debacle in Somalia, the Clinton administration wanted to avoid nation building in Bosnia. As Ambassador James Dobbins points out, Iraq in 2003 was “the seventh society that the United States had helped liberate and then tried to rebuild in little more than a decade, the others being Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.”¹¹

The link between security and diplomacy should need little explanation, as there are numerous examples in both theory and practice. One only needs to look at the frequency with which senior defense officials (including military personnel) and national security advisors become secretaries of state, ambassadors, and other emissaries. Despite this history, the tendency to isolate military operations and diplomacy from each other perseveres. One of many examples of this persistent tendency is illustrated by Colin Powell’s question to the “Bush-41” leadership team regarding whether the initial defense of Saudi Arabia would lead to an invasion of Kuwait to eject the Iraqis.¹² Clausewitz had

written of this propensity by decrying political decision makers’ errors in asking for “purely military” opinions on potential campaigns.¹³

The Civilianization of Interventions

If the military instrument is a last resort, stability operations will see even more pressure for civilian staffing. This perception is evident in the decade-long talk of the militarization of foreign policy or of development aid that derives from frequent use of the military in these domains. Complaints of military dominance are not new, but the resolution of this perception requires the development of a deployable pool of civilian experts and resources to support them, so the military is not the only or the default option to conduct reconstruction and stabilization (R&S).¹⁴

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Discussions over the past several years focus on failed and failing states, for which a civilian response of assistance and “capacity building” is often preferable to a military intervention. Although DoD addresses such tasks as part of its perception of “irregular warfare,” the utility of that term may well be confined to the defense sector. In many such circumstances, concerns about regional relations among states may dictate caution about military intervention. If the military possesses the only expeditionary capability with the appropriate skills, the decision may come down to a choice between appearing aggressive despite benign intentions or foregoing an intervention in favor of limited assistance through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

A seldom articulated reason for putting a civilian face on interventions is that a military-led intervention, even a benign one, may demonstrate military priorities, and these goals may skew the activities and ignore significant challenges. An operational-level military staff will usually demonstrate priorities for such issues as preserving combat power. Consequently, it will address redeployment as an inherent aspect of mission completion. But the emphasis on redeployment should not displace the need for collaborative interagency planning for transitions to activities that other agencies, NGOs, and host government entities will undertake. Without adequate collaboration—not simply coordination—host government and diplomatic authorities are likely to treat security forces as a security blanket they do not want to release.

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Although the rapidity and scalability of a military response offer advantages, many threats to persons and property allow smaller-scale responses, present protracted challenges, or occur in circumstances that call for avoiding a military deployment. Given the history of U.S. military interventions in Latin America, for example, stabilization activities are likely to encounter more favorable responses if the interveners are civilians.

Peacekeeping calls for a permissive environment that often obtains from a military stalemate, and military peacekeeping forces are often a vehicle of choice. But in trying to prevent the escalation of conflict from political contention to violence, an intervention by

external military forces is apt to engender hostility from third parties as well as from the state in conflict. In such circumstances, the civilian face—and a multinational one at that—of agencies and NGOs that can develop local resources to meet the demands of the contending factions is preferable.

Multilateral Partnerships

A consensus has been building for about a decade that fragile states must be the concern of the international community. Fragile states threaten established states with various destabilizing forces, from serving as training areas for terrorist groups to threatening to disgorge waves of refugees fleeing conflict. Among the fourteen nations that have been developing civilian responses to address conflict prevention, stabilization, and reconstruction, various contributors to the International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative have designated specific governmental units, offices, training centers, and academic programs to address this multilateral challenge. Moreover, multilateral organizations such as the African Union, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations, and the World Bank have been participants in these developments. NATO is also establishing a coordination mechanism for cataloguing the skills and experiences likely to be needed in stability operations.

The Civilian Response Corps

In 2004, the State Department began its civilian efforts with the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Congress has given the coordinator the authority and funding to recruit, staff, and deploy government employees from multiple agencies in a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) to help stabilize nations facing or emerging from violent conflict or confronting other significant threats to their stability.

Congress has funded two components of a proposed structure of three (active, standby, and reserve). The CRC has surpassed 130 active-component personnel of a projected force of 264 and 1,000 standby members of an intended bench strength of 2,000.¹⁵ Members of the CRC are federal employees. Active-component personnel are deployable on short notice; standby members are available typically with 30 days' notice to their home bureaus. These personnel currently come from eight federal agencies: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). A ninth department, Transportation, will soon be added.

By comparison with the military services, this deployment capacity is modest indeed. But the U.S. can leverage this capacity, much as its NATO allies rely heavily on mutual assistance to minimize their defense expenditures. As with these military allies, both cost containment and the political value of coalition action dictate the development of interoperable civilian capabilities among partner nations.

Functional Specialties

The participating agencies offer CRC expertise across a range of domains from agriculture and rural development to public health, rule of law, economic development, and financial policy. Specific domains of expertise may reside in both active and standby components, but depth becomes evident among the standby members. The skills sought for the CRC emerge from an analysis of stability operations that produced an essential task matrix.

Periodic review of R&S operations validates the demand for particular qualifications. Such reviews ensure the CRC is recruiting the skills needed and investing in training these personnel for interagency operations. But frequent reviews also risk undervaluing qualifications that may be needed in future operations. And if the analysis

misses qualifications recently in low demand, the U.S. once again faces the prospect of an ad hoc effort to recruit personnel rapidly and train them in the interagency aspects of their assignments before deploying them, undercutting the rationale for the CRC. Consequently, such reviews should look at the components with assessments tailored to each.

Almost seventy years of military experience is instructive in such an analysis. As the War and Navy Departments were developing plans for occupying Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II, they developed a joint publication, Field Manual (FM) 27-5, *Military Government and Civil Affairs* (22 Dec 1943), that enumerated 24 functional areas. The 1958 version of the joint manual (FM 41-5) enumerates 19 specialties; its Army version of 1962 (FM 41-10) tallies 20, a sum that had significant doctrinal longevity. By 2000, FM 41-10 reduced the tally to 16 functional areas, which was further reduced to 14 in a recent reorganization.

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The staff recommending these reductions based its actions on the lack of requests for these specialties. But considering the elimination of the arts and monuments specialty in 2000, which would have been useful in mitigating the looting of the Iraqi National Museum in 2003, such decisions must be subject to scrutiny. So long as expenditures for identifying personnel and training them to work in an interagency team are kept low, the enterprise is cost effective. But lack of use of particular domains or agencies will predictably be cause for review.

Familiarizing CRC Members with their Interagency Colleagues

Military planning has long recognized the need to use all elements of national power in responding to significant foreign-policy challenges. Higher levels of military education emphasize the PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information) elements construct. The special operations community has long emphasized the interaction of diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power. But civil servants across federal agencies do not routinely encounter these constructs. Consequently an introduction to whole-of-government planning or comprehensive approaches to include the private sector and NGOs is essential.

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All CRC members require initial coursework in whole-of-government approaches to R&S; experience in Washington interagency environment planning at the embassy country-team and regional implementing team levels; and training in operating in austere (sometimes hostile) environments. With the implementation of a qualifying curriculum, personnel with established careers across federal agencies now encounter the whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches that are hallmarks of senior service college curricula in the military.

For experts across the government to fit their specific expertise into a comprehensive R&S plan, they need familiarity with the cultures, priorities, programs, and constraints their counterparts across agencies experience. As with the origin of the CA corps as part of

the Army Reserve, the CRC seeks to acculturate individuals with specific expertise into a new environment where they perform within a broad domain and in concert with other specialties. This task is easier to proclaim than to realize.

The nature of military staffing documents is such that individual billets may be broadly or narrowly defined. The intersection of command responsibility and deployment readiness has not fit well with the concept of stockpiling critical skills for mobilization and deployment. Unlike active component organizations, reserve commanders are accountable for recruiting qualified personnel and filling a high percentage of their billets. If the qualifications are determined loosely so that billets are more easily filled, the commander appears to be doing well. But unit readiness profiles may be at odds with the need to ensure a match of specific skills to a prospective deployment responsibility.

To mitigate this liability, senior commanders seek to foster upward mobility for personnel in a broad domain such as refugee operations, public finance, or cultural affairs that offers opportunities to serve at higher echelons as they are promoted. This solution works for proximate units but is difficult if the echelons are spread across several states. The CA school introduces the specialists to common CA precepts, but it takes little interest in the continuing professional education of the specialists. The CA community at large undertakes this development, but it is exercised hit or miss by the regional CA commands. The recent elimination of specialties at lower echelons undermines connections that permit specialists to progress from tactical to operational levels and exacerbates the senior commanders' ability to manage CA capabilities.

CRC recruiting does not suffer from these constraints. Standby personnel are not assigned to a particular structure that responds to an industrial-age mobilization model. The active component of the corps develops a team structure, and the skill sets defined for these

billets are subject to periodic review. Indications are that the most frequently used skills are in general staff planning. But the specialty skills remain in demand and provide a valuable resource, both when applied directly in the field and when used as a reach-back capability.

Similar sets of domain-specific skills exist across federal agencies, and these apparent overlaps provide necessary links of expertise, while also allowing some choice of agency to use in a given situation. Just as a military response may be undesirable in some environments, some civilian agencies are more appropriate responders than others for specific missions. USAID's staff, for example, offers a wide-ranging set of capabilities. But in some instances, a development perspective would be an incomplete response, and in others, the local agencies sent to assist (e.g., security forces) are inappropriate as interlocutors. In such circumstances, the perspectives of multiple agencies with similar expertise offer the solution to the challenge described earlier of one agency's proclivities potentially skewing a planned response from an optimal result.

Challenges of Developing a Deployable Civilian Corps

Developing an expeditionary capacity requires appropriate legal authorities. When a stabilization challenge requires knowledge of agricultural development, for example, the U.S. can certainly find the expertise in an agency or among the agency's clients or consultants. But often these agencies have no authority to deploy personnel to foreign locations. Even if it receives funds to send its staff abroad, the agency may be constrained to do so. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), for example, has personnel who work in foreign environments, but Congress funds FAS to promote American products abroad rather than to develop foreign agricultural capacity. The Department of Commerce has programs to facilitate American exports, but

the expertise of its personnel can help a foreign economy develop an export capacity as well. With the establishment of the CRC, the executive branch now has congressional approval to borrow such expertise to address the challenges of stabilizing a foreign economy.

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Developing an expeditionary capacity also requires fostering a deployment culture. The military has a well-established ethos that bestows professional recognition for participating in foreign operations. The CRC is developing a similar culture. Doing so requires distinguishing between deployments and foreign postings. Although FSOs may spend more than half their careers abroad, the assignments are more akin to expatriate corporate careers than to a military deployment. Until the recent increase in unaccompanied tours, FSOs had few of the difficulties associated with short-term, unaccompanied assignments. The same is true for development work and personnel in any number of other government agencies. Postings abroad may be to challenging locations, but the assignment generally does not have the transitory characteristics of temporary duty.

Civilian deployment experience also informs the emerging CRC model. Within USAID, for example, the Disaster Assistance Response Teams of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance have a deployment culture. Domestically, the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the Department of Homeland Security and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) in the Department of Health and Human Services expect personnel to answer the call of duty when

emergencies strike. NDMS relies on medical and veterinary professionals who leave their normal employment to respond to an emergency.

As with the military reserve components, federal legislation protects these personnel from employer reprisals for such duty. NDMS deployments tend to be for short terms: recruiting materials for the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams indicate a two-week norm for a deployment and ask individuals to deploy with “sufficient supplies and equipment to sustain themselves for a period of 72 hours.” The likelihood is that NDMS has less need to litigate reemployment rights of its volunteers than is true for the military reserve components, which now seek to maintain a policy of up to a year’s deployment not more frequently than once every five years.

This operational reserve concept challenges families, employers, and societal structure. If the CRC receives congressional approval to fund a reserve element, which would seek participation of state, county, and municipal employees, such legislative reemployment rights would signal standard practice across emergency-response agencies.

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Agency Perspectives

Each agency has not only its own clientele and funding relationship with Congress, but its own priorities, reporting habits, and cultures. For example, the development, defense, and diplomacy sectors, which all address global concerns, divide the world differently. Each agency can make a case for its delineation, but since the regional boundaries differ, interagency planning that requires a regional approach may be complicated by the need for

additional participants from multiple bureaus. Another example is the perception common in the military that other agencies do not plan. The reality is that they plan differently. The sequence of activities, the purposes for planning, and the time horizons they address present challenges in whole-of-government integration.

A development agency may have as its priority setting the conditions for planning and executing development programs across sectors, with the sectors weighted if not prioritized. If specific sectors in an interagency response predominate, decision makers will undoubtedly find it challenging to ensure the less-prevalent agencies receive adequate attention.

Whole-of-government planners often speak of “cross-cutting” issues, and the implementation of programs to achieve goals that cross domains will often require designing initiatives that depart from typical agency programs. As a component in a complex response, such an initiative requires buy-in from stakeholders and recognition from contributors to other components. Country teams are accustomed to such overviews but often find their program funds have been designed with other priorities in mind. Consequently, coordination among country-team members in embassies requires feedback loops to interagency planners in Washington as well.

Whole-of-government responses to foreign challenges provide more than a broad array of expertise and program options to address R&S. In planning such responses, the participation of personnel from multiple agencies helps ensure that issues across domains receive due attention. The military’s blind spot regarding the need for police provides a case in point. If the planners of an intervention include staff with an interest in local security, the need for police is more likely to receive attention. Expand this example to other domains, and with appropriate agency participation, the resulting response uses more elements of national power. But the likelihood of agency integration depends on a host of factors,

from shared interests and their recognized limits to pre-crisis exercise participation.

Similarly, adding NGOs and the private sector to the mix of respondents to R&S challenges facilitates a more-comprehensive approach to problem solving but inserts additional perspectives. Just as the term “irregular warfare” may antagonize civilian participants in a stability operation, the concept of unity of effort loses relevance beyond government agencies.

The NGO community has negotiated guidelines for relationships between humanitarian organizations and the U.S. military that seek to preserve the independence of humanitarian activities from state-sponsored policy objectives. Among the measures the NGO community sought is the clear identification of military personnel as such when they deliver relief supplies (i.e., they are not to be confused with relief workers). From the planning perspective, the military—and by extension in an interagency environment, the government as a whole—should not refer to NGOs as partners because that term may threaten humanitarian space. Clearly from USAID’s use of NGOs as implementing partners, these partner NGOs are not seeking a similar distance. But other NGOs as well as civilian industry will often contribute to an activity or policy goal most productively when government agencies acknowledge limits to common interests.

Size of Footprint

The complaint of militarization of foreign affairs derives from the predominance of military planning for an intervention (benign or otherwise). Even when a military combatant command is clearly in a support role, the number of available military staff and its culture of élan in planning easily overwhelm consideration of various civil-sector requirements. As an organization, a military force not engaged in an operation uses its time to prepare for

future employment. Few civilian organizations have this opportunity, which is necessary in developing a deployment culture. A measure of the scarcity of civilian response structure is evident when military commands seek participation in their exercises from civilian agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations. Civilian agencies can seldom spare personnel from their daily jobs to take part in exercises. The importance of doing so, however, is becoming increasingly clear, as government agencies consider the interests at stake if military staff must plan without the participation of civilian-agency counterparts.

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Conclusion

Bureaucratic structures cannot easily escape the tendency to ascribe programs to particular agencies rather than to a comprehensive management team. Indeed, the authorities individual agencies have to expend funds do not lead naturally to interagency coordination. Is a development agency coordinating its activity with a counterinsurgency effort? If a military commander is seeking to direct resources to a particular village to gain its support for the national government, are the political repercussions of choosing one or another location for a project evaluated by the aid agency of the sponsoring government and at appropriate levels of the host government? Both fiscal accountability and strategic planning dictate that policy, plans, program execution, and evaluation be coordinated across sectors at multiple levels.

Complex challenges require a diversity of skills across domains of societal activity, and appropriate skills are usually resident in multiple

agencies. Consequently, expertise for a given task may be drawn from one agency in one month and another two months later. In creating solutions to challenges and evaluating results, the expertise is more important than the parent agency. Execution may be apportioned among several agencies, reflecting local conditions as well as legislative authority to conduct specific activities.

Whole-of-government coordination requires agency interoperability no less than a multilateral military defense requires both interoperable forces and a mutual interest in the desired end state. In the interagency environment, contributing agencies must deploy with resources adequate to their working conditions. If agencies with a small footprint in a given operation must depend on the military for transportation, communications, or sustainment, they are hampered in their ability to coordinate with their parent agencies and each other. If they must rely on the military, they will quickly recognize an inherent need to demonstrate their contributions to military priorities. Consequently the development of a CRC has sought to create the capacity for self-sustainability.

The U.S. has come far in this journey of applying the lessons of joint military operations to the whole-of-government approach. But because of differences in vocabulary, theoretical constructs, and security systems, it is still deconflicting disparate systems. Common experience, shared understanding, and goodwill have set the U.S. en route to a stage of self-synchronizing activities across agencies striving to reach a common foreign-policy goal. The CRC already has a number of successes to relate, but the task of balancing the contribution of multiple agencies is likely to be a constant challenge. **IAJ**

NOTES

1. The original publication of this article was incorrectly titled “Civil-Military Balance in Conflict Operations”. The correct title, as used in this publication, is “Civil-Military Balance in Complex Operations”.
2. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, “Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors,” Special Study, Center for Military History, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 28.
3. F. S. V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: North-West Europe, 1944–1946*, H.M.S.O, London, 1961, p. 63.
4. Coles and Weinberg, pp. 687–692. The “yellow-seal” dollar was U.S. currency printed with a yellow seal where today’s Federal Reserve Notes have a green seal.
5. F.S.V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning*, H.M.S.O, London, 1966, pp. 240-255.
6. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning*, p.1.
7. Coles and Weinberg, p. 38.
8. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: North-West Europe, 1944–1946*, p. 10.
9. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning*, pp. 38–41.
10. Michael J. Kelly, *Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999.

11. James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddarth Mohandas, *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2009.

12. Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey*, Random House, New York, 1995, pp. 465–466.

13. See Clausewitz Book 8: “it is a contradictory affair to summon soldiers for advice with war plans, asking that they judge them purely militarily, as cabinets do...” (Author’s translation, Vom Kriege, Verlag des Ministeriums für Nationale Verteidigung, East Berlin, 1957, p. 731.

14. “Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations: Approaches to Interagency Integration,” Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 54–60, 2009, testimony of John E. Herbst, second Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, before a joint hearing of the Oversight and Investigations and Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittees of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 26 Feb 2008.

15. The recent review of diplomacy and development, intended to become a quadrennial process, foresees expanding S/CRS into a bureau for conflict and stabilization operations. The new bureau would continue to build the CRC and enhance its interagency collaboration.

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