

# The *Literature* of Intelligence

**by Kevin Rousseau**

## **“A Highly Discriminating Approach”**

Intelligence officers are by trade a tight-lipped group, unwilling and often unable to talk to outsiders about their business. Where, then, does everyone else get their ideas about intelligence? More importantly, where can those who are not intelligence professionals reliably turn to for a better understanding of the Intelligence Community and what it does?<sup>1</sup> Society’s collective impressions about intelligence seem to be changing as our lives are touched more and more by concerns related to information, how it is collected, and who is using it for what purposes. This article discusses the profession of intelligence by briefly surveying some of the unclassified sources of common ideas, perceptions, and misperceptions about what the world of secrets is all about. It is important for citizens of a democracy to have a realistic understanding of what its intelligence organizations can and cannot do, as well what they will or will not, do in the name of national security. It is also vital for policymakers, military planners, and our interagency partners to have a realistic understanding of the intelligence community’s missions and true capabilities if they are to work effectively together.

One reason why general knowledge about the world of intelligence has been so sparse was that very little information about intelligence organizations has been accessible to anyone outside the profession until relatively recently. Intelligence historian Christopher Andrew provides three reasons for this lack of material. First, states typically denied the very existence of their intelligence organizations. Second, what intelligence experience state’s possessed was kept strictly to themselves and rarely if ever released for study. Indeed, almost nothing was shared regarding intelligence activities even within respective governments, and consequently there were few if any significant reflections or open discussions of intelligence activities. Finally, Andrew observes that for many years historians were simply not interested in the world of intelligence.<sup>2</sup> However, general interest in intelligence cannot be entirely suppressed, and the speculations of the public, the media, and

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above all fiction, often served to fill the gap in official information.

In the early 1990's, at what was then known as the Defense Intelligence College, I had the privilege of taking a graduate-level course that introduced its students to what it called "the literature of intelligence."<sup>3</sup> The professor was Walter Pforzheimer, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran and retired CIA officer who over many decades had collected a vast personal library devoted solely to works on intelligence.<sup>4</sup> The course he led discussed the body of writings that had evolved to promote strategic intelligence as a profession, to include histories, memoirs and tell-all's from former intelligence officials, critical works, and popular fiction.<sup>5</sup> The course objective was not only to foster more discerning readers able to judge which books were credible and which were not, but also to make us more aware of what our fellow citizens thought about us and our work. Pforzheimer noted that "intelligence literature poses an additional fundamental problem created by dual forces inherent in its nature. On the one hand, intelligence operations hold a certain fascination for the public, and a readily available market exists for new and exciting "revelations." This is to be contrasted with the regular security procedures and compartmentation which frequently preclude public disclosure of the more significant facts."<sup>6</sup> He advised those seeking openly available material on the intelligence world that "accordingly, a highly discriminating approach is encouraged when dealing with literature of this kind."<sup>7</sup>

That advice remains sound today. The following pages will highlight some of the better writings within a few representative categories, such as tradecraft, history, journalism, memoirs and critics, and fiction. Many other forms of useful intelligence writing are missing from this short article, such as official government records and reports, legislative and legal studies, the various professional and academic journals,

and of course film.<sup>8</sup> This article will also focus mainly on books on the U.S. Intelligence Community, although there are many fine works available on foreign intelligence organizations.<sup>9</sup> Some readers will be less than happy that their favorite works on intelligence are either omitted entirely or given but brief mention. However, while this article attempts to capture the spirit of Professor Pforzheimer's course, the body of literature on intelligence has grown remarkably since that time, and even then an entire semester with him could but scratch the surface of the material available.

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### **The Need for a Professional Literature**

Pforzheimer was certainly not the first to appreciate the need for a professional intelligence literature. After World War II, OSS veteran Sherman Kent realized that intelligence had evolved into a true discipline, that it was worthy of study in itself, and that its further development required a body of literature geared toward preserving its best practices and improving the profession. Kent noted in 1955 that intelligence was "not merely a profession, but like most professions it has taken on the aspects of a discipline: it has developed a recognized methodology; it has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques. It now has a large professional following. What it lacks is a literature."<sup>10</sup> That same year, Kent kicked off a professional journal at CIA, *Studies in Intelligence*, that is still being published.<sup>11</sup> While on the faculty of the National War College, Kent further developed

his thoughts into a groundbreaking book titled *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Reflecting perhaps the relative newness of the subject, “initially, publishers were reluctant to commit to a book on intelligence with a focus on analysis rather than the heroics of espionage and covert action.” Despite that inauspicious start, Kent’s little book quickly became a classic in the field, outlining many organizational issues and tradecraft practices that are still relevant today.

### **...intelligence analysis is more than academic research.**

One theme that emerges from Kent’s reflections is that intelligence analysis is more than academic research. When it came to intelligence analysis, “the record would show, in fact, that Kent found individuality, eccentricity, and even “oddball thinking” valuable for a unit facing tough substantive challenges as long as the analytic talent was there.”<sup>12</sup> Reorganizing is not the whole answer either, for Kent concluded that analysts must have the training and necessary quality of mind for “great discoveries are not made by a lot of second rate minds, no matter how they may be juxtaposed organizationally. Twenty men with a mental rating of 5 put together in one room will not produce the ideas of one man with a mental rating of 100. You cannot add minds as if they were so many fractional parts of genius.”<sup>13</sup>

Kent also realized that “analytic or cognitive bias was so ingrained in mental processes for tackling complex and fluid issues that it required a continuous, deliberate struggle to minimize. From his days as a history professor, he taught his students to resist the tendency to see what they expected to see in the information.”<sup>14</sup> One path Kent “recommended for coping with cognitive bias was to make working assumptions explicit and to challenge them vigorously.”<sup>15</sup> Although Kent recognized the effects that cognitive biases could have on intelligence

analysis, his advice was typical of the time and amounted to little more than a demand that analysts practice critical thinking. Sherman Kent “battled against bureaucratic and ideological biases, which he recognized as impediments to sound analysis, and against imprecise terms that he saw as obstacles to conveying clear messages to readers. Although he was aware of what is now called cognitive bias, his writings urge analysts to “make the call” without much discussion of how limitations of the human mind were to be overcome.”<sup>16</sup> Intelligence analysts, however, would soon realize that simply telling people to think critically was not good enough.

### **Writing on Tradecraft**

Thinking about analytic tradecraft continued to develop after Sherman Kent first tackled the subject. In the ensuing years, for example, there was a steady recognition and appreciation in academia, industry, and government for the role and study of cognitive biases as a significant consideration for improving critical thinking skills. Within the Intelligence Community, intelligence failures such as the Bay of Pigs compelled the CIA to review its processes, including how it performed its analysis. CIA officer Richards J. Heuer wrote an influential book, *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, which exemplified the seriousness with which the Agency studied critical thinking. Heuer’s advice to Agency leaders, managers, and analysts is pointed. “To ensure sustained improvement in assessing complex issues, analysis must be treated as more than a substantive and organizational process. Attention must also be paid to techniques and tools for coping with the inherent limitations on analyst’s mental machinery.”<sup>17</sup>

Heuer’s work describes the effects of common flaws in human thinking, and explains that “cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies.”<sup>18</sup> A cognitive bias “does not result

from any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing information.”<sup>19</sup> Perhaps most importantly is the idea that “cognitive biases are similar to optical illusions in that the error remains compelling even when one is fully aware of its nature. Awareness of the bias, by itself, does not produce a more accurate perception. Cognitive biases, therefore, are exceedingly difficult to overcome.”<sup>20</sup> In other words, old advice to analysts to simply “go forth and think critically” is woefully inadequate, for critical thinking is actually extraordinarily difficult, no matter how expert one is in their substantive field.<sup>21</sup>

Today there are books by intelligence professionals covering almost every aspect of their tradecraft. On the operational side of the house, Harry Crumpton’s *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons Learned from Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service*, is an absorbing account of one officer’s prominent career from his recruitment, his early assignments in Africa, through the opening days of the Afghanistan campaign, and culminating in his service as the U.S. counter-terrorism coordinator. Likewise, James M. Olson’s *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying* does an outstanding job discussing ethics through 50 scenarios posing ethical dilemmas indicative of those that could face intelligence professionals throughout the course of their careers.

Some of the best of these books are published by the agencies themselves and available on their websites. The Center for the Study of Intelligence, for example, has produced many works that shed light on the importance of the intelligence community’s relationship to policymakers.<sup>22</sup> Most safely restrict themselves to historical events, such as Harold Ford’s *The CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962–1968* and Brett Snider’s *The Agency & The Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004*. A favorite at least every

four years is former CIA Inspector General John Helgerson’s study of the delivery of the Presidential Daily Brief to presidential candidates entitled *Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004*. Although not a Center for the Study of Intelligence publication, former Presidential Daily Brief briefer David Priess adds to the story with his book, *The President’s Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America’s Presidents*. Relevant to that same theme is an older and highly respected work, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency From Washington to Bush* by Christopher Andrew.

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### **Relearning Forgotten Lessons**

Prior to the twentieth century, intelligence was largely an ad hoc business dominated by enthusiasts and dilettantes, and whether it was practiced well or at all depended on the personal inclinations and genius of individual leaders. In the 20th century however, intelligence became more professional and governments have slowly become more open about historical intelligence operations. This led to a number of works of exceptional credibility because of the authors’ access to official records, or to research based on declassified materials. Books such as David Kahn’s *The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet*, and James Bamford’s *The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency, America’s Most Secret Intelligence Organization* provide unique and objective insights into the world of intelligence. Thomas L. Ahern’s especially insightful analysis of the Vietnam War, such as his *Vietnam Declassified:*

*The CIA and Counterinsurgency*, were originally produced as classified studies and exemplify the Center for the Study of Intelligence's contributions to the historical record.

As more official material became available, a number of works caused historians to sit up and take notice. Perhaps the most significant were books written decades after World War II that revealed the hidden role of intelligence in securing the Allied victory. Books that have since become classics include Frederick Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret* and J.C. Masterman's *The Double Cross System: In the War of 1939 to 1945*, both of which when published in the early 1970's revealed to the public the wide ranging impact of intelligence in such a way that caused historians to go back and reexamine what they thought they knew about the war. Intelligence histories expanded to fill many niches once historians took notice and began to appreciate the often unrecognized importance of intelligence to significant historical events.

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Some authors set out to deliberately re-examine common assumptions of these historical events. Professional intelligence officers typically expect to labor in relative anonymity where their successes are likely to remain unheralded and their sacrifices unknown. This is no-doubt especially true when their work is overshadowed by a larger-than-life public figure such as T.E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918. Drawing upon newly uncovered sources, archeologist and historian Philip Walker attempts in *Behind the Lawrence Legend: The Forgotten Few Who Shaped the Arab Revolt*

to correct the historical record by describing the quiet professionals whose largely forgotten intelligence work was critical to Lawrence's battlefield success. Without detracting from the Lawrence legacy, Walker tells the story of Colonel Cyril Wilson and his subordinates at the Jeddah Consulate whose roles in the First World War, the author argues, have until recently been significantly underappreciated by historians. Walker notes that the "sabotage work still resonates today as iconic testament to the Arab Revolt, while many of the low-key but essential intelligence and diplomatic efforts, particularly those carried out in the fulcrum of Jeddah, remain little known or hidden."<sup>23</sup>

Other recent books include broad histories that take in the entire field. Christopher Andrew's *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence*, is an ambitious book that in thirty chapters walks the reader through several millennia of intelligence history, revealing that most hard-won lessons of intelligence work were often quickly forgotten. For centuries, explains Andrew, there was little consistency or continuity in intelligence tradecraft, and no accepted doctrine or body of professional literature to which to turn for guidance. In its earliest days, intelligence competed with divination as a source of actionable information. Thucydides never even mentions intelligence. Roman military commanders were likely to give more credence to what they believed could be gleaned from chicken entrails than to reports from their scouts. Intelligence, if it was practiced with any skill, was typically preoccupied with monitoring internal opposition and exercising domestic control rather than collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence. Rarely were best practices analyzed and studied to determine effectiveness and leading intelligence practitioners took their tradecraft secrets with them to the grave. Andrew's history reminds us that for much of the past three thousand years, most intelligence work was remarkably amateurish.

Rather than a sweeping view of history, most authors have zeroed in on the details of specific organizations or events. For example, in *Beirut Rules: The Murder of a CIA Station Chief and Hezbollah's War Against America*, authors Fred Burton and Samuel M. Katz provide a fast-paced and informative account of the 1984 kidnapping of CIA Beirut Chief of Station William F. Buckley. While doing justice to Buckley's memory and ultimate sacrifice, the authors place Buckley's horrific ordeal within a series of orchestrated attacks by Hezbollah designed to force the U.S. out of Lebanon. In addition, the book successfully weaves Buckley's story into a still larger narrative that illuminates the role Iran has played in the region since the 1980s.

Other intelligence histories reinforce Christopher Andrew's argument that most intelligence blunders could have been mitigated if military commanders and government officials had been more aware of their predecessors' experiences with intelligence. In *The Code Warrior: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union*, Stephen Budiansky examines the long history of U.S. signals intelligence collection on our Soviet adversary. Picking up the story of cryptanalysis and signals intelligence as it developed during and after World War II, Budiansky's history describes how the early intelligence community responded to a changing strategic environment characterized by the "global nature of communications, and thus of intelligence opportunities ripe to be exploited."<sup>24</sup> He addresses the challenge of reviving atrophied wartime intelligence skills in Vietnam, where the National Security Agency had to relearn "forgotten lessons about signals intelligence in a real war."<sup>25</sup> Budiansky also notes that "all of the old fights over control of signals intelligence in the field resurfaced. The hard-won lessons from previous wars of the importance of centralization seemed to have been utterly forgotten; it was as if Korea or World War II had never happened."<sup>26</sup>

A popular topic for intelligence historians has been the OSS, America's first intelligence agency, which operated from June 1942 to September 1945. The OSS is unique among the world's intelligence services, having much of its wartime records long open to historians and scholars through the U.S. National Archives. Douglas Waller has written several excellent books on the OSS such as *Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan*, and a highly readable biography of its founder entitled *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*.

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Yet, even after decades of scrutiny, author C. Turner demonstrates in *The CASSIA Spy Ring in World War II Austria: A History of the OSS's Maier-Messner Group* that there is still much unmined material capable of revealing insights into the OSS legacy. In his introduction, Turner laments that "fiction has done a better job at telling traditional spy stories," and that the bulk of literature on the OSS "tips in favor of derring-do."<sup>27</sup> Rather than add to the pile of books emphasizing special operations and covert action, Turner casts his gaze on the "OSS's attempts at less spectacular but equally important work—handling the spies who took staggering risks to smuggle intelligence out of the Third Reich."<sup>28</sup> He rises to his own challenge and gives us a scholarly work that reads like a spy novel rather than an academic study. Turner's well-researched work draws upon a number of underexploited primary sources, including German and Austrian records, to provide a riveting account of an OSS operation gone wrong. Turner's study reminds us that the level

of professional competence found in the modern U.S. intelligence community did not emerge overnight.

Other recent histories have examined overlooked aspects of intelligence, such as the role of minorities and women. A biography, *A Life in Code: Pioneer Cryptanalyst Elizebeth Smith Friedman* by G. Stuart Smith, chronicles the career of one of the intelligence community's early trailblazers.<sup>29</sup> Honing her skills in the 1920's and 30's against rum-runners and organized crime, Elizebeth played a significant role refocusing the U.S. intelligence effort toward the Axis powers. Smith gives us a highly readable account of one woman's experience during this time of transition. Partially obscured

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these days in the shadow of her husband—the “Dean of American Cryptology” William Friedman—Elizebeth had a storied career of her own that was much more publicized in its time. For her work bridging an array of various agencies, Elizebeth has been called the “Mother of the Fusion Center.” Smith also highlights the bias against women prevalent during Elizebeth's career. Bias that inspired the public's curiosity about her, but ironically also kept her in the background, paid her less than her male colleagues, and sometimes hindered the dissemination of her work. It's instructive to reflect on how institutional biases, interagency rivalries, and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures emerge time and again to frustrate the effectiveness of intelligence operations.<sup>30</sup> Other excellent books that tell us more about the role of women in intelligence include *The Widow Spy* by Martha D. Peterson and *Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the*

*Men He Betrayed* by Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille, two women who spearheaded the hunt for a mole in the CIA.

## **Memoirs, Journalists, and Critics**

A significant source of valuable insights into intelligence have come from the memoirs of former intelligence professionals. It is important to read these with a critical eye and to consider what the author's purpose was in writing these works. Pforzheimer cautioned that “in this genre, as in others, the personal, professional and political biases of authors are often reflected in their writings. Moreover, authors who have written personal memoirs of their intelligence activities—usually in the operational field—often tend to produce much valid factual material while at the same time (in some cases) aggrandizing their own role.”<sup>31</sup> Some of these works are by insiders critical of their intelligence profession, such as *Sam Adams War by the Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir*, which argued that the intelligence informing U.S. policy during the Vietnam War was skewed and politically biased. A short list of intelligence memoirs from former CIA Directors that shed light on the role of strategic intelligence to strategy and policymaking include *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* by Robert Gates, and *Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror* by Michael Hayden.

Some memoirs, such as John Rizzo in *Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA*; and Jose Rodriguez in *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives*, have the additional purpose of setting the record straight from the author's viewpoint. These books illustrate the value in reading memoirs, as they often provide different and sometimes conflicting views on the same issues. For example, Rizzo and Rodriguez describe different perspectives of the events of November 2005 involving the CIA's detention

and interrogation program.<sup>32</sup> Further reading on the controversies surrounding these issues can be found in *Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Intelligence Committee's Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program*, which includes essays by senior CIA officials as well as the formal CIA response to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the program.

Another memoir tied to current events is that of former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. Clapper says he never expected to write a book like *Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence*. The publicity involved goes against all he believes in about the intelligence business, where laboring unheralded is the norm. As he explains it, U.S. Intelligence Community service “means toiling in anonymity and not getting public recognition for achievements.” He changed his mind for two reasons. First, Clapper wrote this book because his 50-plus years of experience gave him a front-row seat to the development of the Intelligence Community, the history of which is itself a story worth telling. Second, and by far most importantly, Clapper wrote this book because of current threats he sees as effectively targeting the fundamental values underpinning the American political system. Now that he is a private citizen, Clapper considers it his duty to be as frank as he can about issues he finds deeply disturbing. Clapper’s stated intent is to “continue to speak ‘truth to power’—in this case to the American people.”<sup>33</sup> He explains that his “hope is that this book will, in some measure, help people regain awareness.”<sup>34</sup> Whether you agree with him or not—and many will find some of his statements on the current administration controversial—this is a book worth reading from the perspective of the art of intelligence. It summarizes the development of the Intelligence Community over the past 50 years, provides insights into the intelligence profession itself, and bluntly describes what a former senior Intelligence Community leader and seasoned

practitioner of intelligence considers the biggest current threat to our national security.

A number of journalists conducting meticulous research have made significant contributions toward understanding the role of intelligence during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. In writing *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Steve Coll takes on the formidable challenge of adding yet another volume to the growing number of works on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Acknowledging the risk of treading where others have trod, Coll notes that while drafting *Directorate S*, he “had to consider how to absorb, but not regurgitate, the vast body of excellent journalism already produced by other

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reporters.”<sup>35</sup> He himself is part of that crowd of reporters, having won a Pulitzer Prize for the 2005 book *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the C.I.A., Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. Picking up where *Ghost Wars* left us, on the eve of 9/11, Coll breaks new ground and offers fresh insights into America’s involvement in Afghanistan with an absorbing clarity that can be found nowhere else. Coll artfully describes the crisis atmosphere in Washington, the decisiveness of the U.S. military response, and the CIA’s quick and efficient operations during the opening weeks and months of the Afghanistan campaign. There are numerous threads and themes that develop as Coll’s story moves forward. The most prominent theme gives the book its title; the role of Inter-Services Intelligence—the Pakistani intelligence



service—and its Directorate S, a behind-the-scenes force Coll depicts as persistently working at odds with U.S. efforts. His description of Inter-Services Intelligence’s continued support toward the Taliban, and the alleged perfidy of Directorate S, is as convincing as it is frustrating.

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Besides history written by insiders, there are of course those written by critical outsiders. These are also important to read for they contribute to shaping the public’s view of the Intelligence Community. Although a look at the history of intelligence all the way back to Washington and the founding fathers reveals just how integral intelligence has been to American history, these critical works reflect to some extent an American reluctance to fully embrace intelligence as something potentially untrustworthy and subject to misuse. Some of the best known of these works include *Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State* by Dana Priess, *The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA’s Heart of Darkness* by John Prados, and *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* by Thomas Weiner.<sup>36</sup> It is important to remember that these are works intended to criticize the role of intelligence that may not offer a fully balanced assessment of an event or period. Nevertheless, if we want to appreciate the full scope of public perceptions of the intelligence community and where these perceptions come from, we must also understand the opposing views of our critics.

**“Coloured—if not confused—by spy fiction”**

The largest category of intelligence literature is arguably that of fiction.<sup>37</sup> Fiction has probably long been the unequalled source of most popular

ideas and misperceptions on intelligence. Christopher Andrew laments that “Even in the twenty-first century, public understanding of intelligence operations is frequently coloured—if not confused—by spy fiction.”<sup>38</sup>

The best fiction is no doubt written by former intelligence professionals or well-informed researchers, and offer glimpses of reality along with their gripping if sometimes implausible story lines. Ian Fleming and his books are too well-known to warrant elaboration, and the same goes for John le Carre. Books by David Ignatius such as *The Director: A Novel* and *The Quantum Spy: A Thriller* provide respectable research and some modern context to the traditional spy novel. Characters in historical novels can be a surprising source of insight into the culture of intelligence officers. For example, the character Stephen Maturin in Patrick O’Brian’s *Master and Commander* series of novels gives us a picture of what it was like to be an intelligence officer during the period of the Napoleonic wars. At that time intelligence was still in its infancy as a profession, but Maturin’s experiences still provide insights into the era’s tradecraft practices, its ethical dilemmas, and relationship between intelligence, military commanders, and policymakers... all topics that would be familiar to any intelligence officer today.

Movies of course are probably the biggest source of the popular image of intelligence officers. Most are based on fiction, but again the best arguably derive from imaginations of ex-professionals. Some are rooted solidly in fact. The movie *Argo*, for example, is based on the real story of CIA officer Antonio Mendez.<sup>39</sup> He told more of his career as an intelligence officer in another excellent memoir, *The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA*.

**“A Difficult Effort of Dubious Value”**

A short venue such as this can offer but broad generalizations and hit a few highlights regarding the staggering amount of intelligence

literature available to the public today. Professor Pforzheimer noted over 20 years ago, after decades of collecting intelligence books and listing just a fraction of these in a bibliography of over 100 pages, that “the vast quantity of books on intelligence and frequently poor quality of much of this literature would make a fully comprehensive listing a difficult effort of dubious value.”<sup>40</sup> As we have seen however, reading what we can on intelligence history arguably puts us in a better position to truly learn from past successes and failures. Our interagency and military partners are also served through a better and more accurate understanding of our true missions and capabilities. **IAJ**

## NOTES

- 1 Many students by the end of the elective I teach at the US Army Command and General Staff College (called *CIA for Special Operations Officers, Intelligence Officers, and Warfighters*) have at some point during the course asked for recommendations for credible outside readings on intelligence. For the same reason, my predecessor and several colleagues have regularly met as a small informal “Intelligence Book Club,” a practice I have tried to maintain. This article grew in part out of these many discussions.
- 2 Keith Neilson and B.J.C McKercher, Eds. *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History* (Westport: Praeger Publishing), 1992, ix-x.
- 3 The Defense Intelligence College since February 2011 is now the National Intelligence University (NIU), and is located in Bethesda, Maryland. For more background and history on NIU, see <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/niu-history>.
- 4 The CIA entrusted Walter Pforzheimer with officially collecting thousands of books on intelligence to help build a professional intelligence library. As he did so, using his own money his personal collection also grew to over 20,000 volumes. He bequeathed his vast library to his alma mater, where it is now the Walter L. Pforzheimer Collection on Intelligence Service at Yale University. For more on Walter Pforzheimer, see Thomas Powers, “The Lives They Lived; The Literature of Secrets,” *The New York Times Magazine*, December 28, 2003. Accessed on Aug 3 2018 at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/28/magazine/the-lives-they-lived-the-literature-of-secrets.html>.
- 5 A version of the bibliography that Walter Pforzheimer developed and used for his classes can be found at *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*. Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. 8th edition, 1985. Although a bit dated, it’s a good resource for intelligence literature up to that time. Accessed on 9 February 2019 at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a188492.pdf>. The CIA also maintains its own list of recommended intelligence readings at <https://www.cia.gov/library/intelligence-literature>. Accessed on 1 March 2019.
- 6 *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, x.
- 7 *Ibid.*, x.
- 8 For example, there are some outstanding and well-known academic studies that provide well researched and authoritative overviews of the Intelligence Community, its organizations, and current issues. These include Loch Johnson. *National Security Intelligence*, 2nd ed. United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2017; and Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2009.
- 9 These books include works such as *The Sword and Shield: The Mitrokhin Archives and Secret History of the KGB* by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, or *The Secret History of MI6: 1909-1949* by Keith Jeffery; an officially authorized study of the British foreign intelligence service based on a wealth of

declassified material.

- 10 Sherman Kent “The Need for an Intelligence Literature.” In *Studies in Intelligence: 45th Anniversary Issue*. Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence. Fall 2000. 3.
- 11 Andrew, *The Secret World*, 9.
- 12 Jack Davis. *Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington DC: Sherman Kent School, Central Intelligence Agency Occasional Papers, Vol 1, No. 5. August 2005. 5.
- 13 Sherman Kent. *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1966 edition, second printing 1971. 174-175.
- 14 Jack Davis. *Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington DC: Sherman Kent School, Central Intelligence Agency Occasional Papers, Vol 1, No. 5. August 2005. 8.
- 15 Ibid., 8.
- 16 Richards J. Heuer, Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Center for the Study of Intelligence: Central Intelligence Agency. 1999. xiii.
- 17 Ibid., xxii.
- 18 Ibid., 111.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid., 112.
- 21 “It is perhaps the most confirmed proposition in cognitive psychology that once a belief or image is established, new material will be assimilated to it, with discrepant and ambiguous information being ignored or fit into the established views.” Robert Jervis. *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. (New York: Cornell University. 2010), 169.
- 22 Many of these are available online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs>.
- 23 Philip Walker, *Behind the Lawrence Legend: The Forgotten Few Who Shaped the Arab Revolt* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018), 83.
- 24 Stephen Budiansky, *Code Warriors: NSA's Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union* (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 15.
- 25 Ibid., 262.
- 26 Ibid., 261.
- 27 C. Turner. *The CASSIA Spy Ring in World War II Austria: A History of the OSS's Maier-Messner Group* (North Carolina, McFarland Publishing, 2017), 2.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Her mother intentionally spelled her first name with an ‘e’ after the ‘z’ so that she would not be called ‘Eliza.’ G. Stuart Smith, *A Life in Code: Pioneer Cryptanalyst Elizebeth Smith Friedman* (North Carolina: McFarland Publishing, 2017), 15.

- 30 For example, in February 2016, the Central Intelligence Agency released its *Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019*, showing that although progress has been made in the intelligence world since Elizabeth's time, promoting a diverse and inclusive culture remains an important concern. The report notes that the "critical national security mission necessitates that we embrace all perspectives, honor all differences, and ensure all officers have the opportunities and tools to contribute to their full potential." "CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Releases Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019," CIA website, 9 February 2016, accessed 15 December 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2016-press-releases-statements/cia-releases-diversity-and-inclusion-strategy-for-2016-2019.html>.
- 31 *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, x.
- 32 Compare John Rizzo. *Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2014), 18-21; and Jose A. Rodriguez, with Bill Harlow. *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2012), 193-195.
- 33 James R. Clapper, with Trey Brown, *Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence* (New York: Viking Press, 2018), 400.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 400.
- 35 Steve Coll, *Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (New York: Penguin Press, 2018), 6.
- 36 A resource for informed book reviews of these and many other works is *Studies in Intelligence*. For example, see <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/legacy-of-ashes-the-history-of-cia.html>, and <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-62-no-2/the-ghosts-of-langley.html> . Accessed on 10 February 2019.
- 37 C. Turner. *The CASSIA Spy Ring in World War II Austria: A History of the OSS's Maier-Messner Group* (North Carolina, McFarland Publishing, 2017), 2.
- 38 *Secret World*, 2.
- 39 Antonio Mendez. "A Classic Case of Deception." *Studies in Intelligence*. Winter 99-0. Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence.
- 40 *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, ix.