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The Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation is a major program of the Command and General Staff College Foundation, Inc. The Simons Center is committed to the development of military leaders with interagency operational skills and an interagency body of knowledge that facilitates broader and more effective cooperation and policy implementation.

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The Command and General Staff College Foundation, Inc., was established on December 28, 2005 as a tax-exempt, non-profit educational foundation that provides resources and support to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the development of tomorrow’s military leaders. The CGSC Foundation helps to advance the profession of military art and science by promoting the welfare and enhancing the prestigious educational programs of the CGSC. The CGSC Foundation supports the College’s many areas of focus by providing financial and research support for major programs such as the Simons Center, symposia, conferences, and lectures, as well as funding and organizing community outreach activities that help connect the American public to their Army. All Simons Center works are published by the “CGSC Foundation Press.”

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Welcome to this final edition of the *InterAgency Journal* for 2019. We close out this year’s offerings with articles on a variety of topics. David Anderson, a long-time contributor, leads off with a timely discussion of economics and national security, namely the importance of trade in the aspect of global peace. In our second article, Ann Low, a career diplomat, discusses a model for addressing the problem of weak governments that result in conditions that allow threat networks to thrive. Maybe this model could be applied across the world? Author Dani Redmon uses her knowledge as a Space Officer to make the case that new technology in satellites can and should be used to prevent mass atrocities. And Caitlyn Rerucha, MD, provides a timely discussion of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.

Michael Long, who has worked the interagency, takes a swing at applying a military planning methodology to an interagency crisis response. He makes a good case for programs like the U.S. Army’s interagency exchange program managed at Fort Leavenworth. Previous contributor Kevin Rousseau offers an interesting read on the literature available on the tradecraft of the intelligence community. From novels to insider narratives, many works exist—some are closer to the truth than others.

Our next three articles touch on ethics. Authors Jonathan Bailey and Ted Thomas share their thoughts on organizational ethics. They offer insight as to why organizations can suffer poor ethical decisions and behavior. My best wishes to Professor Thomas as he goes abroad to share his knowledge and skills and to do good work. Be safe my friend. Matthew Tompkins writes a short piece on the “Madman Theory” and how President Nixon attempted to use this in Vietnam. Might this discussion be relevant today? And Mark Natale relates a case study concerning pursuing U.S. interests in a country that could be deemed a “predatory state.” As this type of government seems to be on the rise, how might this effect our actions and U.S. foreign policy?

We conclude with a case study of stability operations in Africa. As a West African Scholar at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Lawrence Richardson uses a military construct (DOTMLPF-P) to examine the effectiveness of operations conducted in Mali and Somalia.

Thank you for reading this issue of the *InterAgency Journal*. Your feedback is always welcome as we strive to improve the discourse across the interagency community. I invite you to visit our website and to submit articles and book reviews for publication consideration. Best wishes for a productive and peaceful 2020. – RMC
Contributors Wanted!

The Simons Center is looking for articles that involve contemporary interagency issues at both the conceptual and the application level.

The *InterAgency Journal* is a refereed national security studies journal providing a forum to inform a broad audience on matters pertaining to tactical and operational issues of cooperation, collaboration, and/or coordination among and between various governmental departments, agencies, and offices. Each issue contains a number of articles covering a variety of topics, including national security, counterterrorism, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and disaster preparation and response.

The *InterAgency Journal* has worldwide circulation and has received praise from various military, government, and non-government institutions, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

We’re also looking for book reviews! Submit a book review or suggest a book to review to editor@TheSimonsCenter.org.

Contact the Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation

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The Economics of Trade and National Security

by David A. Anderson

In an increasingly globalized world, trade and economic displacement issues, geopolitics and national security concerns has become intertwined creating a multitude of possible friction points between state actors, international financial institutions and trade organizations. Left to their own devises these factors may slow trade and economic cooperation to a crawl. Vulnerability to such a litany of problematic probabilities does not bode well for global trade and economic harmony. Susceptibility is particularly true when global economic powerhouses such as, the U.S., China, Japan, and the European Union (EU) have domestic economic challenges and/or international trade issues with each other and among their neighbors. These countries account for 69 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Unfortunately, this is exactly the condition we find ourselves in today. This article sheds light on the amalgamated mess that has created this fragile environmental situation both economically and in the realm of national security. It closes with the possible ramifications of not resolving the discord and a statesman’s approach to potential resolution.

International Economic Institutions

Arguably, much of the present global economic turmoil is rooted in benefits originally derived from the Bretton Woods conference, held in New Hampshire in 1944. Foreseeing a victory over the Axis powers during World War II (WWII), this conference brought together 43 countries determined to ensure post-war economic cooperation among nations ravaged by war and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Two empowering organizations emerged from the conference; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Both institutions were established to facilitate economic growth within and between nations for the collective greater good. These two organizations also set the stage for the founding of an international trade focused entity – the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs

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The Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, later known as the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1947 to promote trade cooperation and to lower barriers to trade, such as tariffs. Many tariffs, such as the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Act, were implemented in the 1930s and further worsened the Great Depression.

Collectively, these three international organizations are designed to synergistically meet their respective mandates for the greater economic good of the global community. The United States leads and shapes all three institutions. Only one of them, the World Bank, is headquartered outside the U.S. The precursor to these organizations is the United Nations, which was established in 1945 to promote peace, security, political and economic development, and cooperation among member nations. It too is headquartered in the U.S.

The influential role the U.S. plays within these institutions is a direct result of U.S. economic and political hegemonic stature dating back to the very birth of these organizations. By the end of WWII, the U.S. had accumulated 60-70 percent of the world’s gold. A global economic recovery outside the U.S.S.R. sphere of influence was largely dependent on U.S. financing, industrial capital and goods/services.

By the end of WWII, the U.S. had accumulated 60-70 percent of the world’s gold.

U.S. Trade Dominance to Decline

From 1945 to 1975, the U.S. dominated the global economy, running trade surpluses while maintaining a disproportionate share of global GDP. Between 1960 and 1970 the U.S. accounted for nearly 39 percent of global GDP. Conversely, the U.S. habitually negotiated less than equitable terms of trade with its partners in order to win their diplomatic favor/support for U.S. national security and strategic policy interests around the world. It wasn’t until 1974 that the State Department handed over trade policy to the newly created statutory position of the U.S. Trade Representative. Unfortunately by then, poor U.S. trade policy and cost/quality complacency of its export products caught up with it and the era of U.S. trade surpluses ended in 1975.

The U.S. eventually lost its competitive edge to emerging competitors such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and those of Western Europe. Many of these same countries were rebuilt by the U.S. after WWII. By 1980 the U.S. share of global GDP shrank to approximately 26 percent. In 2018 this figure fell to around 24 percent. These newly industrializing countries leveraged the aforementioned economic institutions, a U.S. espoused export-oriented approach to economic development, and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment to displace large segments of the U.S. manufacturing.

The Rise of China

The economic emergence of China in the 1990s, supported by neo-mercantilist policy, cheap abundant labor, an abundance of Foreign Direct Investment and supercharged by membership into the WTO in 2001, further adversely affected balance of trade issues for not only the U.S. but for other countries as well. China displaced much of what remained of U.S. manufacturing and much of what other industrialized countries like Japan and those of Western Europe produced. Since building a globally dominant manufacturing base between the 1960s-1980s, Japan has struggled to maintain any semblance of its original manufacturing glory. It has lost out to cheaper producers—namely China—and has had to move much of its auto production closer to its foreign markets. Its aging population and extremely low-to-negative birth rate makes labor cost and supply even more
problematic. It has since shifted its economic efforts toward higher, value-added, advanced technology products and services.

The loss of industrial jobs by developed countries to China and the ensuing trade deficit many now have with China, has exacerbated matters. In 2018, China ran a trade surplus of 323 billion dollars with the U.S.\(^\text{13}\) and a trade surplus of 185 billion euros with the EU.\(^\text{14}\) China has quickly risen to be the second largest economy in the world\(^\text{15}\) and a geo-political power ably flexing its newly acquired clout when and where it wants (e.g., China’s South China Sea claims).

Confounding trade matters associated with rapidly industrializing countries like China is the move by developed countries trying to hang on to legacy industry or even repatriate that which they have already lost. Likewise, less developing countries are trying to establish their own industry base while the newly industrializing countries of the world look to hang on to what they now have for as long as possible. These countries know at some point they will have to yield to even cheaper cost producers down the road. If industry is displaced too quickly to developing economies, then newly industrialized countries may be ill-equipped to move up the economic ladder into higher value-added production and technologically/innovation driven activities, leaving them unable to effectively compete with the likes of the U.S., Japan, and the EU. This economic phenomenon is currently playing out and adversely affecting trade relations around the world. Nations are seeking to control their own economic destiny while attempting to dictate terms of trade. In other words, they want to have their cake and eat it too.

China, the primary displacer of Japan’s manufacturing base, is directly facing this very problem. Less than forty-one percent of China’s GDP now derives from its industrial sector.\(^\text{16}\) Furthermore, significantly less Foreign Direct Investment in China is now being invested in this sector. Those funds are now invested in the likes of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Even China is shifting some of its manufacturing focus to cheaper cost producing countries. China’s one child policy has come back to haunt it. It left a notable gap of 20-40 year olds to fill the labor force and drove up the cost of labor in China. Furthermore, like Japan, China’s population is aging. By 2030 China is forecasted to have 300 million people aged 60 and older.\(^\text{17}\) This is a dynamic not lost on the Chinese government—anticipating a looming labor supply shortage while incurring the growing costs associated with an aging population.

Since joining the WTO, China has done a less than stellar job complying with WTO rules. Since joining the WTO, China has done a less than stellar job complying with WTO rules. It has become obsessed with maintaining a favorable trade balance, controlling foreign businesses operating in China and acquiring their technology as a cost of doing business within its borders. This practice of achieving technology transfer through less-than-accepted conventional protocol highlights China’s paranoia of not being able to successfully compete more directly with the likes of the U.S. and other advanced countries operating further up the economic ladder. China is openly accused of stealing highly sensitive intellectual property not only for commercial but military uses as well. Its telecommunications equipment company, Huawei, has been accused of spying on behalf of the Chinese government and economic espionage is a growing concern of China’s major trading partners.\(^\text{18}\) These issues have posed national security concerns for the U.S. and its allies.

In response to China’s unfair trade practices the U.S. has imposed tariffs on many of China’s exports to the U.S. This act has added notable costs to the sale of these items and disruption
China is also accused of currency manipulation in order to make Chinese goods more cost appealing. On August 5, 2019 in response to the U.S. imposing a 10 percent tariff on Chinese goods exported to the U.S., China fostered the devaluation of its currency to offset U.S. imposed tariffs. China is increasingly branded as an untrustworthy trading partner by many nations around the world. China’s practices have led to trade friction with notable trading partners such as the U.S., Japan, and the EU. This places China in an unenviable position. It wants the respect of others yet feels the necessity to secure its economic and political future at all costs. China knows that any trade/economic concessions made to the U.S. will come with expectations by other nations to have similar type arrangements. It would also indirectly lead to a greater expectation that China conform to WTO membership rules. Not surprising then is China’s tough trade talk with the U.S.

Challenging U.S. Power and International Institutional Norms

Over the past ten years, China has openly contested U.S. influence and voting power on decisions taken by the International Monetary Fund. It has further objected to U.S. policies and lending practices which seem to favor those countries of economic and geopolitical interests of western countries. In response, China created an alternative, multilateral, development lending institution, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. China has positioned itself in the leadership role, owning 27 percent of the institutions voting rights by far the largest percentage among member countries. India has the second largest number of votes with nine percent. China believes its bank is more appropriately focused and better positioned to address the lending needs of developing countries. Many of the principle members of the International Monetary Fund are now concurrently members of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. This geopolitical extension emboldens China. It also creates political friction, pitting countries strongly opposed to the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank such as the U.S. and Japan, against many of their longstanding economic and political allies. For example, the U.S. and Japan see no need for the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, believing it’s a redundant institution serving little purpose other than to compete with the International Monetary Fund while empowering China at the same time.

An extension of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank is China’s Belt Road Initiative. Countries are beginning to see Belt Road Initiative in a new light, including those thought to directly benefit from it. China has advertised it as a means of building infrastructure among its East Asian neighbors and collectively connecting them the entire way to Eastern Europe all in an effort to expand trade and promote economic development. Many of the countries involved with China’s initiative are now discovering that the true cost of doing business is too detrimental to their sovereignty, fiscal budget, terms of business/trade and employment of labor in working Belt Road Initiative projects within their countries.
WTO Ineffectiveness

Over the past twenty-five years criticism abounds of the WTO’s ineffectiveness. The Doha round of trade talks which began in 2001, have yet to conclude. It is inherently difficult to gain consensus on trade initiatives among 164 member countries at different stages of development, presenting opposing/conflicting priorities, views, and outcome expectations. The WTO is accused of being too soft in governing and too slow in ruling over trade disputes (e.g., protecting intellectual property rights against violators, and developed countries subsidizing agriculture production), which undermines developing countries ability to cost compete for market share. The WTO is also accused by developing countries of letting developed countries shape the agenda and outcomes of trade talks at the expense of developing countries, as well as condoning protectionist policies that restrict access to developed countries’ markets.

Bilateral and multilateral arrangements are trending among nations in response to the ineffectiveness of the WTO. Over time even these have challenges. Countries are taking unilateral actions against each other on trade-related matters. The U.S. has forced renegotiated terms of trade within the North American Free Trade Agreement. The U.S. reneged on its original commitment to join what was then known as the Trans Pacific Partnership believing membership would no longer be in its best interests. The EU has had budget, fiscal and monetary issues with member countries (e.g., Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy), that ultimately affected the value of the euro and the flow of trade between the EU and others. The United Kingdom is currently in the process of exiting the EU over economic, sovereignty and political issues. The U.S. is working towards new bilateral terms of trade with Japan and the EU that are seen as more equitable for the U.S. Japan and South Korea are tenuously working toward better trade arrangements. However, as of August 2019, Japan has removed South Korea from its trusted list of trading partners. The U.S. and China appear locked in an uneasy trade stalemate. China and India’s trade arrangement is increasingly problematic due to the disparity in the flow of goods between the two countries. China is selling far more to India than it is buying from India. This makes the cold peace between the two more fragile when considering the long standing border disputes they have with each other. These illustrated examples are merely a representation of some the larger trade issues ongoing around the world.

The WTO is accused of being too soft in governing and too slow in ruling over trade disputes...

Promoting Domestic Economic Growth and Trade

Trade is a key component and critical focal point among nations in facilitating domestic economic growth. Countries are looking to grow their economies, put more people to work, increase domestic consumption and trade their way out of debt. There is an underlying fundamental economic fragility among most of these. This is particularly true among most developed countries facing slow GDP growth, deficit spending, shrinking domestic consumption and negative trade balances. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development with 34 developed country members, and the G20 with the EU and 19 member countries, have an average debt-to-GDP ratio of approximately 72 percent. G20 countries represent 85 percent of global GDP and two-thirds of the global population. Both organizations have promoted financial stability and economic sustainable growth as underpinnings of their organizations. However, their members habitually have domestic economic interests that frequently
The U.S. has amassed 22 trillion dollars of government debt. China and Japan hold 2.2 trillion of it.

Countries employing this stimulus approach have left themselves with little room remaining to use monetary impetus to spur economic growth. When coupled with huge fiscal deficits, these countries are running out of viable options. They are already facing the consequences of ineffective monetary policy and burdensome government debt. The U.S. has amassed 22 trillion dollars of government debt. China and Japan hold 2.2 trillion of it. This could pose a national economic security risk if they were to sell their holdings. It would ultimately lead to the U.S. having to offer higher yields on future debt offerings to make the debt instruments appealing to buy. Whereas, paying down the debt takes money out of the economy causing slower growth—a catch-22.

Japan has accumulated a government debt balance equal to 253 percent of GDP and a private debt balance of approximately 165 percent. China does not fare much better, with a combined private/public debt to GDP ratio of approximately 258 percent. The higher interest payments would put the U.S. further in debt. That being said, it has led to lower valued currencies in relationship to other major currencies making their goods more cost appealing to foreign buyers. On the flip side, it has hurt U.S. exports further exacerbating the balance of trade problem the U.S. has with China, the EU, and Japan.

Protecting State Interests

National security related documents among nations are further focused on economic prosperity, fair and equitable trade and protecting national security by restricting the purchase of security sensitive products, technology, domestic businesses, infrastructure and resources. U.S. examples include, the 2017 National Security Strategy’s, pillar #2 titled “Promote American Prosperity, preventing China from purchasing U.S. oil company, Unocal in 2005, and preventing Dubai Ports World 2006 attempt to manage numerous major U.S. east coast ports.

There is growing concern of state-owned enterprises purchasing private sector companies that pose economic and national security concerns. Countries like China have accumulated huge Sovereign Wealth Funds from years of positive trade balances. They are increasingly using their funds to make purchases of technology, natural resource companies, and other economically sensitive businesses around the world. China’s Sovereign Wealth Funds is approximately $940 billion U.S. dollars. There is a total 7.6 trillion U.S. dollars’ worth of Sovereign Wealth Funds held by countries.
Conclusion

Generally speaking, globalization has nurtured warm economic peace among trading nations, whether bilateral or multilateral, overriding cold politics. However, trade spats over national security concerns, fairness in the terms of trade, the flow of trade, currency manipulation and subsidization and protectionism of trade etc. are undermining trade and threatening global economic growth. When coupled with a weak/ineffective WTO, a globally trending economic slowdown, hastily emerging political and economic polarization among nations and failing monetary and fiscal policies, economic conflict is likely to increase rather than decrease around the world.

This condition is an unfortunate and troubling sign of things to come. Everyone loses when trade is impeded. The world pays more for things which leaves less discretionary money available to buy other things—purchasing power is lost. It will contract economic growth around the world and may severely spiral downward through tit-for-tat polices that protect domestic markets at the expense of trade. Nations must recommit themselves to their liberalist cooperative roots that led them to create the international economic-focused institutions they joined. Liberalist principles are only as good as the willingness to adhere to them. Trade should not evolve into a divisive zero sum game of “I win, you lose.” This undermines the spirit of global economic prosperity for the sole interests of the few. Warm economics can quickly turn into cold politics.

There is a fine line that separates securing domestic economic growth and ensuring national security from global peace and economic stability. Nations and the EU community need to do a more cooperative, thoughtful and purposeful job walking this fine line, beginning with the U.S., China, the EU, and Japan. The rest of the world will follow their example. If any country/union of countries fails to operate in a global collective spirit, then they must be held accountable by the international community and pay for their misguided approach. Only then will the mutually distractive “race to the bottom” path we are on be turned around. **IAJ**

**NOTES**


12 Patton, “U.S. Role in Global Economy Declines Nearly 50%.”


by Ann Low

Poorly organized governments collect insufficient revenue to pay for police forces and civil administrations whose staff are consistently well trained, highly motivated, and immune from bribery. Inadequate tax collections generate weak institutions and insufficient policing, leading to insecure areas where police do not enforce laws and public services are meager or non-existent. In those locations, crime and unmet social needs breed despair and anger. Left unchecked, criminal and terrorist networks can form, and their activities can corrupt governments and threaten neighboring states’ security.

Admiral Kurt Tidd, former Commander of the United States Southern Command, one of the United States’ six geographically-focused unified military commands,¹ said “[U.S. Southern Command’s] main effort is countering threat networks.”² He explained, “The illicit flows of goods and people, and the violence and corruption these flows fuel at home and abroad, are the visible manifestations of complex, adaptive, networked threats... These networks operate unconstrained by legal and geographic boundaries, unimpeded by morality, and fueled by enormous profits... They prey on weak institutions and exploit the interconnected nature of our modern financial, transportation and communication systems, and the seams in our organizational boundaries.”³ The International Chamber of Commerce projected that “the negative impacts of counterfeiting and piracy (could) drain US$4.2 trillion from the global economy and put 5.4 million legitimate jobs at risk by 2022.”⁴ While each threat network is different (e.g. some are international criminal enterprises focused on counterfeiting and transport of illicit cargo, some are small operations that smuggle desperate migrants, others support terrorist organizations through financing and the spread of violent, extremist ideology), all threat networks have a common thread. They proliferated in a municipality where the police and social services were inadequate, allowing criminality, violent extremism, and other

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threats, such as disease or pestilence, to spread across national borders.

But There is Hope

Transparent online tax and administrative systems can be effective weapons against threat networks, enabling governments to trace illegal transactions and deter corruption. Transparent systems provide governments with the data to enforce laws and collect taxes, enabling them to identify and prosecute corruption. Online governmental procedures empower citizens by showing them the official processes and costs for securing services, the amount of time required to fulfill each governmental obligation, and how to complain if services don’t meet expectations. Armed with that information, citizens can hold their governments accountable for providing good services, and they can contribute to improving services by suggesting simplifications.

In a 2014 study, Lucy Martin of Yale University set up experiments in Uganda to test the theory that people demand better government—and get it—if they have to pay for it through taxes. In poor countries that depend primarily on foreign aid for their revenues, Martin found, citizens tend to tolerate official corruption and poor provision of public services, but they become less tolerant when they must pay taxes. According to Martin, taxpayers are more likely to enact costly sanctions against corrupt officials and mismanaged governments because taxes take away earned income and individuals are loss averse (caring more about recovering losses than obtaining gains). Martin concluded, “taxation generates a significant increase in the level of accountability citizens demand from their leaders.” According to T.R. Reid, who has analyzed tax systems globally, “a regime of taxes considered fair and reasonable, and an honest, efficient agency to collect them, can give people confidence in their own government. Because taxes hit nearly every citizen in one way or another, everybody has a stake in effective taxation. This is particularly true in young nations or in countries where a corrupt government has traditionally been a fact of life.”

Catch-22: Why Governments Lack Effective Tax Systems

Some governments fund themselves through state-owned enterprises, high tariffs and sales taxes, foreign aid and other channels that don’t rely on their citizens producing increasing amounts of wealth that can be taxed. Those government officials may not want the accountable relationship between a government and its citizens that an efficient income tax system fosters.

However, many poorly organized governments do want effective tax and administrative systems, but their reformers are in a Catch-22. They do not have the systems, so they can neither generate resources to pay for building them nor access data to prove the systems are necessary. Instead, those reformers typically rely on donors’ largesse to break the impasse, but donors typically do not fund projects aimed at helping governments create their own independent revenue streams. Donors prefer to fund projects that meet the donors’ priorities.

Paul Collier, author of The Bottom Billion, wrote that technical assistance (the supply of skilled people paid by a donor) accounts for about a quarter of all money spent on aid. The payoff for technical assistance, when provided to support a reform-minded minister, can be $15 for $1 in aid, yet aid agencies aren’t achieving that impact. This is because “technical assistance is
supply-driven rather than demand-driven. The same assistance is poured into the same places without much regard to political opportunity.”9

Even when money is available, it is hard to identify competent suppliers of low-cost, easily maintained tax and administrative systems for poorly organized governments. Three factors make it hard for private businesses to profitably build such systems: 1) the overall high failure rate of information technology (IT) projects; 2) a poorly organized government’s need for indefinite and indeterminate amounts of technical assistance that it cannot afford; and 3) vested interests opposing change.

First, the Standish Group’s 2015 Chaos Report studied 50,000 projects around the world, ranging from tiny systems enhancements to massive systems reengineering implementations. Only 29% of those projects were successful (completed on time and on budget with a satisfactory result), while 19% were considered utter failures.10 The worst performing projects, with only a 3% success rate, were large ones implemented using a linear method of software design,11 which is the category into which most governmental tax and administrative projects would fall. The high failure rate makes it difficult for risk adverse donors to spend money on an IT project when they must also demonstrate good stewardship of their taxpayers’ or charity’s funds.

Second, governments don’t just need networked computer systems, they need collaborative work processes to effectively implement the technology. In short, they need to re-think governmental processes to make compliance easier for small businesses. That means technical assistance. According to Frank Grozel, the United Nations (UN) Business Facilitation Program Manager, “Poorly organized governments typically need help cultivating intragovernmental relationships so that disparate parts of a government will share information and work together. They need help breaking logjams among ministries and educating colleagues about the benefits of implementing user-friendly digital services. They need help simplifying procedures. If an IT project doesn’t include a lawyer who wants to simplify procedures and can show the government lawyers that the proposed simple process still complies with that government’s laws and regulations, the simplification cannot be implemented. The UN enjoys enormous respect worldwide. That cachet helps my teams build essential relationships across government ministries and with the private sector, which enable us to implement effective IT solutions in poorly organized environments.”12

Third, while a reform-minded minister may be fully committed to modernizing his ministry’s IT systems, his staff and colleagues may feel threatened. There may be individuals skimming funds from public coffers, companies avoiding taxation, and criminal networks bribing police who all have vested interests in opposing change. When the project streamlines procedures, government employees may see their jobs threatened and not cooperate. Governments often need ongoing help with change management, and even successful projects may become abandoned as soon as donor funding stops.13

UN Business Facilitation Program

For the past decade the UN Business Facilitation Program has defied these odds. The Program has successfully helped 37 countries build 68 user-centric online administrative systems,14 completing over 90 percent of projects on time and within budget. The UN Business Facilitation teams succeed where private contractors often fail because of their mandate, motivation, and method of work.
**Mandate**

The UN is a not-for-profit organization, answerable to its 193 member states. All UN projects are demand-driven by those member states. The UN Business Facilitation Program can accomplish low cost IT projects because it cannot earn a profit. It charges one upfront license fee for its systems to cover ongoing development and program costs, but no recurring annual fees, as do most commercial software or database providers. Government officials invest hundreds of hours in project design with a UN Business Facilitation team before seeking funding, so funded projects enjoy high-level buy-in from at least one ministry on day one. Government agencies who may be unwilling to cooperate with each other often will agree to cooperate with UN staff. They perceive the UN as a neutral, reliable partner who has the right mandate and expertise for such a long-term endeavor as improving governance.

**Motivation**

UN Business Facilitation staff want to improve the world through IT solutions. They can collaborate with experts worldwide because they are not competing for business but trying to solve global problems. They can invest in optimal solutions because their work will benefit not just one immediate project but ongoing and future projects, and it can contribute to the development of global best practices.

**Method of Work**

UN Business Facilitation projects are small ($200,000 to $1.5 million). They use agile development methods and a common IT architecture. Due to their size and methodology they fall in the Chaos Report’s sweet spot where IT projects have the greatest likelihood of success and least chance of failure. The Chaos Report identifies key factors which work together to make projects more successful, such as executive sponsorship, emotional maturity (UN Business Facilitation project leaders speak multiple languages and often work together over many years and diverse projects) and standard architecture (UN Business Facilitation systems each have different content but they all have the same look and feel).  

**In 2016, the U.S. Department of State collaborated with the UN Business Facilitation Program... to design a project targeting root causes of illegal migration by unaccompanied Central American children to the U.S. ...**

**The El Salvador Pilot Project**

In 2016, the U.S. Department of State collaborated with the UN Business Facilitation Program and three Central American governments to design a project targeting root causes of illegal migration by unaccompanied Central American children to the U.S., specifically violence, corruption and poverty in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and better public services in the U.S. In 2015, El Salvador was labeled the most violent country in the world with 104 intentional homicides per 100,000 population versus 4.9 intentional homicides per 100,000 population in the U.S. According to the UN Development Program’s 2018 Human Development report, Americans have an average of 13.4 years of schooling and a per capita income of $54,941, while Salvadorans have 6.9 years of schooling on average and a $6,898 per capita income. Guatemalans and Hondurans each have 6.5 years of schooling on average and per capita incomes of $7,278 and $4,215, respectively.

The project designers recognized that parents must see immediate improvements in the quality of governance and their family’s own physical safety and welfare to reduce the allure
of illegally migrating to the U.S., despite all the inherent dangers in that choice. They reasoned that if the governments in Central America collected more taxes, they could provide better public services, including more policing to stop gang violence and extortion, better schools, and better infrastructure to enable economic growth. If parents knew how to comply with laws and regulations, including business registration and tax payment, and could do so easily, they would not be afraid to interact with the police and to hold government officials accountable for providing good services. If government employees had modern IT systems and training, they would be inspired to provide better services and have the capacity to do so.

...if the governments in Central America collected more taxes, they could provide better public services...

The concept was to use technical assistance, novel IT approaches, public-private partnerships, creation of a citizen’s hotline, and training to help each government automate and incentivize business registration and tax payment, and then run communication campaigns at the national and municipal levels to register businesses. Those new tax payments could sustain and expand the effort.

The project could be ambitious because it leveraged existing UN Business Facilitation systems in the three countries, which had been funded by the government of Luxembourg, and which the three countries had already requested UN technical assistance to expand. The project design was informed by expert advice from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and by the UN Business Facilitation Program’s experience formalizing businesses in Mali.

The U.S. Department of State funded the project for Santa Ana, El Salvador’s third largest municipality (population 272,554) to test the concept. The project was titled “Formalization of Small Businesses in El Salvador to Improve Governance, Enhance Security, and Build Trust in Government.” Informal businesses employ over 60 percent of the labor force in El Salvador, yet those businesses have no legal right to exist. Consequently, informal businesses and their employees are vulnerable to extortion from gangs and bribery from unscrupulous government officials. Business registration, or “formalization,” creates records letting the national and municipal governments know a business exists and is taxable. Incentivizing business registration and enabling tax payment to build accountable, sustainable public services was the project’s lodestar.

Accomplishments: Salvadoran Project Leader’s Perspective

The results are best explained by Nelson Pérez, the Salvadoran Project leader. “We developed or expanded nine IT systems to improve government services, and we built a mobile app to track progress. Initially, we planned to document the process to pay taxes, create an anti-corruption hotline (call center) in Santa Ana, register businesses and issue identity cards to entrepreneurs to prove their legal status. However, the processes for small businesses to register and pay taxes were so complex that we were unable to promote massive business registration because we first needed to identify and document all the steps to pay taxes, which was much harder than we anticipated. Then we needed to begin simplifying processes so entrepreneurs could fulfill their obligations without having to hire an accountant or spend several days each month on governmental paperwork.

“We added national level tax payment
For the first time in El Salvador’s history a small business can find all the information it needs to pay national level taxes on one website...
entrepreneurs able to pay taxes and count on police services to keep their persons and property safe, everyone would be better-off.

“When we launched the anti-corruption hotline in Santa Ana in mid-2017, operators received many calls about inefficient municipal services. Gross administrative inefficiency is considered corruption under Salvadoran law. We realized that to rebuild trust in government, we had to create an online administrative system for Santa Ana, so the operators could direct complaints, such as poor electricity services or missed garbage collections, to offices who could fix those problems. We discovered many municipal offices didn’t have, or enforce, standard operating procedures for providing services, so service levels were inconsistent. We worked with government agents to document 44 municipal procedures online, involving 210 steps, 124 documents, 17 laws, and 19 municipal employees (https://santaana.eregulations.org). In that process, we discovered Santa Ana had over 200 taxes, permits, and fees, which were not well publicized and inconsistently collected, giving the impression that compliance was unnecessary or arbitrary.

“Santa Ana received 870 calls on the hotline through January 2019, including calls about gang members infiltrating the municipal police, bribes to municipal agents in exchange for incorrect registrations, public employment in exchange for money, and extortion. This cooperation led to eight corruption cases being transferred to the General Prosecutor’s office.”

“When we focused on creating the entrepreneur card, we discovered that many small business owners did not have time to comply with the multiple documentary requirements and complex formalities that are mandatory to register a business and work formally,” said Pérez. “We partnered with the Small Business Administration and the National Registry of Natural Persons (a national register of adults ages 18 and older), to create the “MYPE” register, which entrepreneurs can join with just a copy of their national ID. The MYPE register allows small businesses to identify and categorize the areas in which they work, so that they can access tailored benefits for their business development, such as technical assistance, fairs, and expositions.” As of March 2019, 3,700 entrepreneurs had joined the MYPE register.

“During the project’s two-year life span, we trained over 500 government officials and trusted third parties, such as lawyers and accountants, on how to use the new systems, including how to harvest productivity data to identify bottlenecks and improve services. For example, by analyzing information in Santa Ana’s new tax database, the tax manager identified 30,000 accounts that didn’t receive invoices because the addresses were located in dangerous areas and that 54% of the households that did get bills had not paid their municipal services taxes.

“We partnered with the National School of Public Training to create a certificate program for public officials to begin institutionalizing the training and systems. We also partnered with the electric company, so they provided information about the citizen’s hotline to over 70,000 households in their January 2018 electric bills.

“We completed the two-year pilot project in July 2018 on time and within its $1.5 million budget. We benefited from substantial in-kind contributions from the government of El Salvador and the Municipalities of Santa Ana and San Salvador, excellent cooperation with the U.S. Embassy, the Millennium Fund (FOMILENIO) projects financed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and [the
U.S. Agency for International Development], which were simultaneously managing huge development projects in El Salvador. The Minister of Economy, the Mayor of Santa Ana, and my UN Program Manager in Geneva, provided critical leadership and problem-solving to keep the project on track.

“Altogether the government of El Salvador and the Municipality of Santa Ana assigned 45 staff to the project, whose combined salaries equate to over a $1 million in-kind contribution. In addition, the government of El Salvador and Municipality of Santa Ana provided office space, equipment, and transportation to the project, and officials from 11 different Salvadoran government agencies were part of our team.”

“My government still needs to make the process for paying taxes much easier to enable widespread compliance. Ideally agencies will agree to simplify their processes so small businesses can use one form to pay taxes. More government agencies and other municipalities should implement content management systems to track complaints and provide better services. Rebuilding trust in government requires a sustained effort, but we are headed in the right direction.”

The Mayor’s Perspective: Transparency and Next Steps

According to Milena de Escalon, the Mayor of Santa Ana (2018-2021), the “Línea ciudadana unidos contra la corrupción” (citizens hotline), Santa Ana’s online administrative systems, and the behind-the-scenes work processes that those systems track have increased productivity and transparency in the municipality and improved municipal services. “Since the Citizen’s line was launched, 870 cases have been addressed, resulting in improvements to public lighting services, solid waste collection services, maintenance of public works (sidewalks, walkways, streets), and inspections of businesses that were reported to violate regulations. At the same time, the system has motivated municipal officials in all departments of the municipality to be more responsive to requests for public services, so that citizens don’t complain about them. And the system has made it possible to detect acts of bribery by municipal employees.

“The population can now communicate directly with the municipality through four channels: telephone, in person, the municipal website (santaana.eregulations.org), or online chat. The municipal website shows the costs and time needed to carry out several municipal procedures, such as opening or closing a business, installing signs or obtaining building permits, so citizens can report any anomalies in the application of those municipal regulations and suggest ways to streamline the processes.

“We hope to continue expanding the project with the United Nations and the Department of State of the United States, so that we can offer more municipal procedures online and facilitate the declaration and payment of taxes. I have personally guaranteed the transparency of this project by requiring that cases be sent from the Citizens hotline Contact Center to the Mayor’s office, which distributes the cases to the corresponding dependencies within the Municipality, tracks them to resolution, and ensures that citizens are notified through the Contact Center of actions taken to resolve their complaints.”

The Vice President’s Perspective: Improved Business Climate

Oscar Samuel Ortiz, Vice President of El Salvador (2014-2019), wrote “The technical
The project has improved the business climate by increasing transparency and deterring corruption. The government of El Salvador appreciates the generous financial support from the United States. We have requested additional technical assistance from the United Nations to help us continue reducing corruption and improving the business climate by simplifying governmental procedures and putting them online.\footnote{30}

The UN’s Perspective: Scalable Model to Improve Governance

According to Frank Grozel, the UN Business Facilitation Program Manager, who oversaw the project’s implementation from Geneva, “The El Salvador project funded by the US Department of State brought the world closer to a replicable model of technical assistance that can enable widespread business registration and tax payment. My team had a decade of experience helping governments reduce corruption and enable economic growth through administrative systems and trade portals. Now we have experience simplifying tax processes and integrating IT solutions with a citizens’ hotline and public-private partnerships.

“I believe many reform-minded governments could improve governance in a few years through a four-tier process of technical assistance. First, simplify one ministry’s processes and put them online (estimated costs $200,000). Second, pursue a more complex project to standardize more administrative functions online, implement a citizen’s hotline, and provide businesses with a simple accounting system modelled on the prototype we created for the El Salvador project (estimated costs $750,000 annually for two years).

Third, re-think tax rules themselves to make compliance easier for small businesses, who are over 90% of potential taxpayers in most countries. Ideally, a government would simplify to one single tax declaration and one single tax payment for all administrations that collect revenue as opposed to the multiple declarations and payments on complex forms now required by most poorly organized governments. Fourth, after simplifying and automating tax payment to the extent possible, implement a massive communications campaign educating entrepreneurs about how to register businesses and pay taxes (estimated costs $1 million annually). Throughout the process continue improving all government services and expanding partnerships with the private sector, so new taxpayers experience immediate benefits from legal compliance, such as access to lower cost credit and the ability to bid on government contracts.”\footnote{31}

Additional Project Accomplishments: Highlights

• Contributed to a 22-place improvement in El Salvador’s World Bank 2018 Ease of Doing business rating, which constitutes a significant improvement in conditions for foreign direct investment.\footnote{32}
• Created **baseline statistics** for the nation and municipalities of Santa Ana and San Salvador against which progress can be measured.

• Implemented a system for the **secure exchange of information** among government ministries and with the user.

• **Continuity**: Upon the project’s completion, the government of El Salvador committed 15 staff to continue maintaining, updating, and improving the online business registration and tax information system (https://miempresa.gob.sv), the municipality of San Salvador committed staff to maintaining its system (https://sansalvador.eregulations.org), and the municipality of Santa Ana committed 5 staff to maintaining the citizens’ hotline and updating its administrative system (https://santaana.eregulations.org).

• Created a prototype government **central board** which the government could build out to track business registrations and compliance with rules for businesses in El Salvador, so the government would know when payments are overdue and registrations missing.

**Conclusion**

In *War and the Art of Governance*, Nadia Schadlow wrote, “success in war ultimately depends on the consolidation of political order, which requires control over territory and the hard work of building local governmental institutions.”33 We are now engaged in a war against threat networks with poorly organized governments at the vanguard. The El Salvador project is an innovative way to combat threat networks and deprive them of the conditions they need to exist. It provides reform-minded governments and donors with a tested, low-cost model to improve government services and potentially increase tax collections through technical assistance that includes IT solutions, collaborative work processes, public-private partnerships, training, and a citizens’ hotline. **IAJ**

**NOTES**


3 Ibid, p.4.


9 Ibid, p. 113.


11 Ibid.

12 UN Business Facilitation Program, Interview with Project Manager, Frank Grozel, by author, February 6, 2019.


15 UN Business Facilitation Program, Interview with Project Manager, Frank Grozel, by author, February 7, 2019.


17 Ibid.

18 El Salvador National Civil Police (PNC) records.


21 Ibid.


25 Testimonials provided to the UN Business Facilitation Program team, 2018


29 Note from Mayor Milena de Escalon, Santa Ana, February 2019.

30 Letter from Vice President of El Salvador, Oscar Samuel Ortíz to Doctor Mukhis Kituyi, Secretary General, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 27, 2018.

31 UN Business Facilitation Program, Interviews with Program Manager, Frank Grozel, by author, February 6 -10, 2019.


Very Small Satellites:  
A Mechanism for the Early Detection of Mass Atrocities

by Dani Redmon

warms of blue-winged butterflies greedily cling to the tall, white, weedy beauty of the *Artemisia vulgaris* plant. However, beneath this carpet of alluring flora in the foothills surrounding the town of Srebrenica, Bosnia, hides an ugly secret: The earth below the meadow contains the final resting place for over 600 souls. This is not the only gravesite that dots the current landscape. Overall, 93 mass graves have been found—all forgotten victims of genocide.¹

**Introduction**

Aerial and satellite imagery help detect gravesites in Bosnia by scanning vast swaths of *Artemisia vulgaris* vegetation and identifying ground temperature differentials.² The soil of a mass grave shows up warmer on spectral imagery due to the large presence of nitrogen, a natural chemical reaction generated by decomposing bodies. Sites are discovered using thermal imaging, geophysical prospection, remote sensing, and change-detection analysis to distinguish ground disturbances. Not only do satellite images provide hard evidence of past atrocities, but current satellite technology can also assist nongovernment organizations (NGOs), the Department of Defense (DoD), and other humanitarian groups by observing early warning indicators and behaviors associated with mass atrocities and genocide, well before these acts occur.

It is entirely feasible that within the next 15–20 years, very small satellites, called cube satellites (CubeSats) and nanosatellites, will revolutionize the way organizations can predict and identify the indications and warnings of genocide. Small satellite technology will enable expeditious situational understanding and response at every level of government—from aid workers providing humanitarian assistance on the ground, to policymakers, and eventually, to decisionmakers. Thus, rather than provide gruesome images of a genocidal aftermath, future small satellite technology may mitigate and deter genocidal acts by providing early warning detection. Lives will depend upon it.

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Genocide

There are horrific events unfolding around the world that meet one of the many definitions of genocide. However, for the purposes of this article, genocide is defined as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group:

- Killing members of the group.
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.3

Furthermore, genocide scholar, Dr. Scott Straus cautions that “mass atrocities take place in the context of a dynamic environment, in which escalating violence can be difficult to anticipate;” nevertheless, he postulates that there are eight common warning signs of a potential genocide:

1. Tension and polarization.
2. Apocalyptic public rhetoric.
3. Labeling civilian groups as the “enemy.”
4. Development/deployment of irregular armed forces.
5. Stockpiling weapons.
6. Emergency or discriminatory legislation.
7. Removing moderates from leadership or public service.
8. Impunity for past crimes.4

For a full listing and breakdown of Straus’s warning signs prior to mass atrocities and the indicators associated with these acts, refer to Annex A, Figure 1. This article seeks to examine items 4, 5, and 8 of Straus’s warning signs. Moreover, the scope of this work will illustrate the capability of small satellite technology to serve as an early warning detection mechanism to observe indicators of genocide, with the goal of mitigating casualties.

Uses of Satellite Imagery: The Satellite Sentinel Project

On December 29, 2010, activist and co-founder of the Enough Project John Prendergast and Hollywood actor George Clooney launched the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP) in an ongoing effort to end genocide and crimes against humanity in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the country of South Sudan. Prendergast and Clooney are close friends who share a dedicated interest in international human rights activism. During one notable conversation, Clooney submitted to Prendergast that they could “spy on the activity of warlords [in South Sudan] by aiming satellites right into their territories.” He got this innovative idea from his own dealings with the paparazzi. Clooney’s Oscar-winning celebrity status is well known internationally, and his facial features are highly recognizable, due in part to the television satellite feeds that broadcast globally. Wherever he goes, swarms of adoring fans follow. However, what if the opposite were true? What if the identity of person associated with heinous acts of crimes...
Many aid workers and non-profit organizations eschew association with the U.S. government because it disrupts humanitarian operations.

It was under these auspices that Clooney and Prendergast paired up with commercial satellite company DigitalGlobe. Within the geospatial community, DigitalGlobe is one of several companies that produce high-resolution Earth imagery, along with accompanying data and analysis capabilities. The SSP was founded under the premise of observing the nefarious activities of warlords within South Sudan and to stop genocide before it happened. It is a nonprofit organization that operates with this mission:

DigitalGlobe satellites passing over Sudan and South Sudan capture imagery of possible threats to civilians, detect bombed and razed villages, or note other evidence of pending mass violence. Experts at DigitalGlobe work with the Enough Project to analyze imagery and information from sources on the ground to produce reports. The Enough Project then releases to the press and policymakers and sounds the alarm by notifying major news organizations and a mobile network of activists on Twitter and Facebook.6

As a result of the DigitalGlobe imagery and the company’s satellite orbital schedule, the SSP became the first public endeavor to regularly monitor hot zones for potential instances of violent activity with the aim of genocide prevention. In fact, so useful is the analyzed data that the SSP has become the de facto source for identifying adverse or threat activities for many NGOs and humanitarian organizations planning outreach missions and/or traveling through dangerous regions of Sub-Saharan Africa.

It is interesting to note that there are many within the Department of State (State), NGOs, and humanitarian circles that rely almost exclusively on the services provided by the SSP; however, these same organizations have no real knowledge of how and under what circumstances the SSP was founded, only that its products are relevant to their current needs. For example, Alison Giffen, the Peacekeeping Program Director at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), admitted to using satellite imagery provided by the SSP in preparation for a recent aid mission to Africa. She states that “intelligence plays an important role” in ensuring safe humanitarian operations for aid organizations, regardless of the mission. “I almost don’t want to use the U.S. intelligence community’s research because of the fear of being unable to protect the humanitarian workers that report information or provide intelligence.”7

Often, any association a humanitarian worker has with a DoD agency is potentially dangerous. In volatile areas, many people conjecture that foreign aid is just another way for the U.S. to freely spy on a populace. For example, the opposition party might kill locals caught communicating with humanitarians because they are labeled as collaborators or traitors. Giffen is not alone in her assessment. Many aid workers and non-profit organizations eschew association with the U.S. government because it disrupts humanitarian operations.

Intelligence and information sharing between U.S. government agencies (i.e., DoD and State) and aid organizations is difficult to navigate. Dissemination is virtually non-existent between...
Implementation of small satellite technology will revolutionize the way governments, corporations, international organizations, humanitarian groups, and private users collect information.

Commercial Satellites Versus Small Satellites

Implementation of small satellite technology will revolutionize the way governments, corporations, international organizations, humanitarian groups, and private users collect information. It will be “easier to respond quickly to sudden refugee movements, to document and publicize large-scale atrocities, to monitor environmental degradation, or to manage international disputes before they escalate to full-scale wars. The United Nations, for example, is studying whether satellite imagery could help to significantly curtail drug trafficking and narcotics production over the next 10 years.”

There is no doubt that the commercial satellite company DigitalGlobe provides some of the best images on the market, and it is almost affordable. The company boasts that it can take photos at 50-centimeter resolution or better—about the equivalent ground area of home plate on a baseball field—from 177 kilometers away in outer space, traveling in orbit at 24,000 kilometers per hour. The current cost for a multispectral satellite image from DigitalGlobe is approximately $23 per square kilometer per new image, requiring a minimum purchase order of at least 25 square kilometers. Should the SSP wish to monitor the 1,937 kilometers border shared between Sudan and Southern Sudan, it would cost the organization approximately $44,551 per day (at minimum) for one orbital pass over the location of interest. The total cost for one year equates to $16,261,115.

Sixteen million plus dollars for commercial satellite imagery seems like a large price tag. However, when factoring in the maintenance requirements of sustaining a commercial satellite constellation, the ground infrastructure, and operating staff needed to provide essential satellite uplinks, downlinks, and data streams and then adding the analyst feedback for processing a raw image and the resolution quality of that image, the actual cost to the customer is relatively low. A company like DigitalGlobe has been in business for over a decade and claims a robust collection of “high-resolution global coverage, a 17-year time-lapse image library, and best-in-class technology and tools to provide accurate, mission-critical information about our changing planet.” Access to a decades-long imagery archive is a critical component for determining physical indicators and behaviors of genocide as it unfolds over time. Being able to visually track the development and deployment of irregular armed forces and the potential stockpiling of weapons over a fluid timeline versus disparate,
unconnected events, provides vital evidence for the identification of genocidal activity.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the benefits of using commercial satellite imagery, there are significant drawbacks hindering its applicability. One satellite could not physically or theoretically cover the entire border between Sudan and South Sudan in one pass. When a large commercial satellite is forced to transfer into a different orbital plane, it consumes a lot of fuel. Satellites are not like long-haul airplanes—there is no apparatus invented yet that provides mid-air refueling of a satellite in space. Once a satellite launches into orbit, it carries with it the amount of fuel necessary for its planned mission requirements, all the way through its demise—end of life (EOL). According to space safety regulations, when “spacecraft and orbital stages are orbiting in low earth orbit (LEO)...they will re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere within 25 years of mission completion” or by its EOL, whichever comes first.\textsuperscript{13} Commercial satellite companies service many customers. Imagery requests are scheduled according to the docket of priorities, availability of satellite resources, and customer importance. It is unlikely that a satellite company would move all its satellite potential for the sake of one customer when other customers are vying for the same resources.

Small satellites and nanosatellites are not hindered by the same EOL restrictions and fuel consumption requirements of the commercial satellite industry. By design, small satellites and nanosatellites are more agile, flexible, and affordable than their larger commercial rivals. In fact, small satellite technology is a growing market that is leveraged by universities, governments, industry, and satellite hobbyists alike, due to the ease of accessibility, diverse applications, and operational cost-benefit outcomes.

A small satellite usually weighs less than 1,000 pounds (454 kilograms) and is approximately the size of a 5-drawer filing cabinet. A nanosatellite is a special class of small satellite, typically weighing between 3–15 pounds (1.4–6.8 kilograms) and ranging in size from a soda can to a shoebox. The term CubeSat is derived from its characteristic cube-shaped design. It too is a type of nanosatellite. As small satellite and nanosatellite markets mature, each new satellite company will market its products through proprietary branding measures. For instance, the company Planet Labs Inc. created its own version of nanosatellites and calls them “dove satellites.”\textsuperscript{14} A large constellation of dove satellites is fittingly called a “flock.”

On the low end, it costs roughly $16,190 per kilogram to launch a small satellite into space.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, a constellation made up of 15 small satellites, weighing 22 kilograms (50 pounds) each, costs approximately $12,142,500. Add to that calculation $10,000 for the berthing requirements and $150,000 for launch fees per satellite and the total becomes $12,292,500—by no means inexpensive but markedly less...
costly than commercial imagery. Keep in mind that the more weight and technological options added to the small satellite architecture, the more expensive the price tag.

Besides the $12.2 million cost, there are operational expenditures (established satellite ground and space architecture and an in-house analytic capability) associated with small satellite technology, which allows the commercial satellite industry to maintain a strong advantage. Arguably, once the initial financial output is committed to establish the necessary satellite architecture, operators, and analysts, the benefits far exceed the expense. The payoff is that the owner has complete autonomy over the desired location for satellite overwatch in real-time, controls the length and timing of the flight path, and maintains the rights on all imagery as a part of the company’s intellectual property.

Soon, small satellite technology will become less of an experimental science and more of a tool for common usage. The rapid expansion of cell phone technology within the last twenty years has enabled people to carry a practical, cost effective means of communication and computing power. Moore describes a phenomenon in which computing power doubles every two years until components and parts are smaller but contain more computing power. So too will be the expansion of the small satellite industry. It will only be a matter of time before every household might be able to afford a small satellite of its own.

**Conclusion**

In 2015, the SSP discontinued posting the imagery results of its satellite missions but not for the reasons one would think. On the website, raw satellite data (provided by DigitalGlobe) is no longer available to the public for downloading, commentary, or analysis. Some conjecture this is due to the ability of a potential adversary to exploit and access imagery posted on the website for its own nefarious designs. The unfortunate reality is this: the enemy can leverage the same commercial satellite imagery as humanitarian organizations—ones like the SSP—and use it to hide evidence of genocide. All they have to do is buy it.

*...the enemy can leverage the same commercial satellite imagery as humanitarian organizations...and use it to hide evidence of genocide.*

Currently, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the former Balkan states there exist pockets of radicals on all sides of the political spectrum that are intent on finding mass graves in order to avoid a war crime indictment. In their malfeasance, it is common practice for guilty parties to dig up mass graves and rebury the bodies as a single entity within a local cemetery. These actions are not fueled by apology or remorse for the purpose of reconciling the past; instead, it is a deception mechanism designed to trick the sensors of a passing satellite. Margaret Cox, a forensic anthropologist, recalls an event in Kosovo:

There was one grave that was considered to be very important for indictment purposes... It was related to the massacre of women and children in a specific place and we were asked to find that grave. By that stage the perpetrators knew that satellite imagery was being used, so they changed their *modus operandi*. Instead of digging mass graves, they moved towards burying people in individual graves in legitimate cemeteries. There was also deliberate mining of graves to deter investigators. [Additionally], razor-blades were put inside body cavities to either harm or deter the pathologists from doing their work. The genocide is highly systemized and disposal and deterrent is all built into
For humanitarian organizations, policymakers, and decisionmakers across the globe the application of small satellite technology provides an autonomous means to alert the international community of potential indications and warnings of mass atrocities, and it can produce the evidence necessary to incriminate persons guilty of genocide (past or present).

Arguably, small satellite technology is very experimental and part of an immature market; however, it is a part of a burgeoning field of study and grows exponentially every year. As small satellite technology gets better and becomes more affordable, it is inevitable that private industries, corporations, and everyday citizens will want to harness the power it provides. For governments, aid workers, and victims of mass atrocity, it could mean the difference between life and death.

NOTES


Annex A

The table below depicts the eight common warning signs and associated indicators which could trigger a mass atrocity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tension and polarization</th>
<th>Widening gulf between groups either in social life or in conflict; situation is charged with emotion, anxiety, and fear.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apocalyptic public rhetoric</td>
<td>Leaders claim they face a great danger and in doing so justify violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labeling civilian groups as the “enemy”</td>
<td>Descriptions of a particular group as dangerous, homogenous, or worthless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development/deployment of irregular armed forces</td>
<td>Increased empowerment and arming of irregular armed groups that may be tasked with attacking civilian populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpiling weapons</td>
<td>Significant accumulation of weapons, especially weapons that could be used against civilian populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency or discriminatory legislation</td>
<td>Authorities create laws to facilitate or support state-led and/or group-targeted violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing moderates from leadership or public service</td>
<td>Those interested in perpetrating or supporting violent act remove political opposition to such crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impunity for past crimes</td>
<td>Acts of violence that go unpunished indicate a willingness to condone violence against civilians and may give a green light for more violence in the future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Warning Signs Before Mass Atrocity
The Command and General Staff College Foundation has partnered with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College since 2009 to host an annual ethics symposium at Fort Leavenworth.

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Understanding the Challenges and Stakeholders in Providing Humanitarian Aid to North Korea

by Caitlyn M. Rerucha

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is in the midst of a protracted, entrenched humanitarian situation that is largely forgotten or overlooked by the rest of the world. 18 million people in the country are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance.

— Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Regional Office Asia Pacific, March 2017

There is a growing humanitarian crisis with evidence of human rights violations mounting within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). International politics related to decisions of the DPRK regime regarding their nuclear weapons program have led to highly restrictive international sanctions, deterioration of the humanitarian situation, and limitations on humanitarian aid for North Korean people. Immediate food and medical aid are most needed in the DPRK. Malnourishment, lack of access to safe drinking water, and inadequate sanitation and health services plague the North Korean population. Despite the obvious, current need for foreign assistance, world-wide humanitarian activities for DPRK remain critically underfunded.

There are multiple factors limiting coordinated foreign aid efforts to DPRK from international organizations, governmental agencies, and civic organizations, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The geopolitical situation related to DPRK remains fragile and difficult for humanitarian aid donors to predict. This article will not address foreign aid by donor governments, but will describe the role of the United Nations (UN), South Korean aid groups, and other NGOs that are active in DPRK and the current challenges that these organizations face in delivering humanitarian aid to North Korea. The UN is the largest international contributor of humanitarian aid.
In 2018, the UN had less than a quarter of its budget for North Korean aid fulfilled, leaving an estimated 1.4 million North Koreans without food and 800,000 people without access to essential health services.\textsuperscript{13} Funding for the UN’s DPRK humanitarian programs in 2018 was the lowest it has ever been in the history of the UN.\textsuperscript{14} Many UN programs will be forced to close in 2019.\textsuperscript{15} Remaining UN programs will focus on supporting the most vulnerable populations in DPRK, including 1.6 million children under the age of 5 years old and 395,000 pregnant or breastfeeding women.\textsuperscript{16}

The tightening of international and UN sanctions on the DPRK beginning in 2016 and increasing in 2018 have had clear, tangible impacts.\textsuperscript{17,18} Additionally, the DPRK is highly vulnerable to recurrent natural disasters, which worsen the already dire humanitarian situation in DPRK.\textsuperscript{19,20} (See Figure 1.) The 2018 European Commission Inter-Agency Standing Committee Index for Risk Management ranked the DPRK’s
disaster risk as 39 out of 191 countries. From 2004 to 2008, over 6.6 million North Koreans have experienced severe malnourishment, disease, or death resulting from natural disasters. DPRK had its lowest rate of food production in over a decade due to droughts and flooding, dropping 10 percent between 2017 and 2018, creating a significant food gap between supply and need. The dire need for UN sanctions exemptions for humanitarian aid to DPRK have been highlighted recently in the news as the humanitarian crisis in North Korea is expected to continue to worsen. This paper reports on the multiple factors affecting the current, growing humanitarian crisis in DPRK and describes organizations within the international community that are postured to collaborate to improve the DPRK humanitarian situation.

Malnutrition

DPRK’s humanitarian situation remains dire, with widespread chronic food insecurity and malnutrition afflicting most North Koreans. The DPRK population has over 25 million people. It is estimated that nearly 11 million North Koreans, or 43.4 percent of this population, are undernourished and in need of immediate food aid. According to the 2017 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics with support from the UN Children’s Fund, one in five North Korean children have stunted growth as a result of chronic malnutrition due to lack of vitamins, minerals, proteins, and fats in their diet. Additionally, approximately 140,000 children under five years old suffer from wasting with a high risk of mortality due to inadequate feeding, poor access to healthcare, drinking water, and sanitation service. North Korean adults are two to three inches shorter than age-matched South Koreans, as a result of persistent issues of food insecurity in DPRK. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that there will be a one-million-ton shortfall in domestic food production this year in DPRK. This represents a 9 percent decrease in food production compared to last year.

Food shortages in DPRK are multifactorial. DPRK is vulnerable to natural disasters. North Korean people remain extremely under-resourced to cope with the extreme environmental climate shifts that cause the severe droughts and massive flooding. Natural disasters have historically and will continually affect agricultural production in DPRK and the livelihoods of North Koreans. Widespread malnutrition in DPRK is also due to shortages of arable land, lack of access to modern agricultural equipment and fertilizers. Negative impacts on agriculture and food production, even if for only one season, have widespread and lasting impacts.

DPRK has been experiencing droughts, floods, and famine since the 1990s...
due to the time it takes to purchase and transport food.”

In October 2018, the World Food Programme reported a $15.2 million requirement over the next 5 months to avoid closing programs that feed 650,000 women and children every month. This funding requirement was not met. The World Food Programme enters 2019 with the inability to aid the majority of the most vulnerable North Korean populations.

The World Food Programme has a long-standing relationship with DPRK, stretching back 23 years, yet the World Food Programme chief stated in 2018 that “much progress has been made, but much work lies ahead.”

Other Major Health Concerns: Lack of Adequate Healthcare and Basic Services

The UN reports that nearly 10.9 million North Koreans are in need humanitarian assistance to provide clean drinking water, basic healthcare, and sanitary services. North Koreans living in rural provinces farther from the capital Pyongyang are most afflicted by malnutrition and lack of health and basic services. It is estimated that in 2019, 4 million North Koreans will not have access to basic sanitation, 9 million will lack access to health services, and 10 million North Koreans will lack access to safe drinking water. In rural provinces, up to 56 percent of the population do not have access to safe drinking water, which is much higher than 39 percent living in urban areas. Both malnutrition and lack of access to necessary water and waste management services increase the rates of infection and spread of disease. DPRK already suffers from a broken health system that lacks the essential equipment and medicines to address the most common diseases afflicting North Koreans, such as diarrheal illness in children and tuberculosis.

Overview of the Fractured National Healthcare System in DPRK

After the end of the Korean War in 1953, DPRK was highly reliant on Soviet Union funding for implementation of socialist programs to include the development of the North Korean public distribution system and national healthcare program. The public distribution system provided food rations to all North Korean people and established free healthcare for all North Koreans. Chapter 3, Article 56 of the North Korean Constitution promises free public health care for all with a focus on preventative medical treatments to protect the lives of the people and improve the health conditions of workers. In the 1960s, the free healthcare system in DPRK was flourishing—it provided acute care, disease prevention, free medications, free hospitalizations, and free diagnostic testing to all North Korean people. The DPRK health system consisted of four tiers of hospitals—primary hospitals, country or “people’s hospitals,” province or “university hospitals,” and central hospitals and special hospitals that were dedicated to treating specific conditions (e.g. tuberculosis). There were doctors in every North Korean village. The section doctor system also known as the “household doctors” system, has one doctor responsible for the primary care of approximately 130 households, which serves as the foundation of the national primary healthcare system.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, initiated a downward spiral for DPRK healthcare. Lack of financial support from the Soviet Union compounded by the famine in DPRK in the 1990s led to complete collapse that the country still has not recovered from. North Korea’s current health system is fragile and is strapped for essential medical resources. While the basic infrastructure of clinics and
hospitals still exist, the healthcare workers are unable to effectively care for North Koreans due to lack of financial resources for medications, vaccines, power, heat, and modern lab and radiological equipment, communication and transportation.\(^57\) There continues to be limited supply of clean water, proper sewage disposal, and food shortages at treatment centers.\(^58\) Despite this, North Korean doctors strive to fulfill the DPRK’s ambitious plan to improve the average life expectancy of the population and improve health indices for North Koreans. Shortages of vehicles limits the mobility of the doctors, and dilapidated roads complicated by frequent natural disasters such as typhoons and flooding restrict the transport of essential vaccines, hospital supplies, and healthcare workers to rural areas.\(^59\)

Communicable and non-communicable diseases remain the major health concerns in DPRK.\(^60\) Many DPRK health facilities struggle to maintain consistent water and electricity, putting patients at increased risk of infection and death.\(^61\) Diarrheal illness and pneumonia, two easily treated communicable diseases in developed countries, remain the two main causes of death for North Korean children under the age of five years.\(^62\) The World Health Organization estimates that over 90 percent of under-five deaths in DPRK could be prevented through adequate nutrition, essential medicines, and oral rehydration solutions.\(^63\) There have been significant improvements in DPRK rates of child and infant mortality in recent years, which is a clear indication that medical humanitarian aid efforts, such as World Health Organization vaccination programs focused on this vulnerable population, are making an impact.\(^64\) Medical humanitarian aid efforts, however, remain highly donor-dependent. Many young North Korean children are continuing to die from common and preventable illnesses. The most recent infant and children mortality rates in DPRK reported 12 and 15 deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively.\(^65\)

Tuberculosis has long been one of North Korea’s most serious health problems.\(^66\) The rate of infection is 641 per 100,000 people, which represents one of the highest tuberculosis burdens in the world, especially given the lack of HIV/AIDS infections in DPRK.\(^67\) Tuberculosis is the world’s most deadly infectious disease, killing nearly half of all those it infects.\(^68\) Approximately 110,000 cases of tuberculosis are detected annually in DPRK. Underreporting of tuberculosis is also a known problem.\(^69\) Of the reported new tuberculosis infections, an estimated 5,200 cases are new multi-drug resistant cases.\(^70\) Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis means that the tuberculosis disease cannot be cured by the drugs usually used to treat tuberculosis in developed countries. The death toll for North Koreans from tuberculosis is very high. There are an estimated 16,000 North Korean tuberculosis-related deaths each year.\(^71\) Malnutrition and lack of consistent access to medication are key contributing factors to mortality rates from tuberculosis for North Koreans. Tuberculosis treatment requires months (and sometimes years) of sustained, regular access to medications. DPRK faces significant challenges in sustaining the pipelines for medical supplies without regular funding, which increases the risk of further transmission and increase rates of tuberculosis infections becoming resistant (e.g. turning into multi-drug resistant tuberculosis infections). DPRK continues to lack the resources required for effective diagnosis, treatment and follow-up of tuberculosis and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, thus the country is highly reliant...
on efforts from international organizations and NGOs, such as Eugene Bell Foundation, to provide resources to address this growing epidemic.

**Stakeholder Analysis: Overview of Partners Providing Humanitarian Assistance in DPRK**

This article highlights the work of international agencies and non-governmental organizations that are currently providing humanitarian assistance in North Korea. It is recognized that due to the wavering geopolitical situation that this has fluctuated greatly over the past few years, many organizations, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, have left DPRK, while others have intentions to provide aid but are denied due to the barriers of the international sanctions. This section will begin by highlighting the work of the UN system, in particular, by describing the long-standing and highly-valued efforts of UN agencies, funds, and programmes to combat disease and hunger. In DPRK, UN agencies have been the most consistent humanitarian donor structure over the past 25 years. No other donor structure has more experience, on-the-ground presence, and impact capability than the UN.

The United Nations

The UN system is a conglomerate of international organizations made up of the United Nations and its affiliated programmes, funds, and specialized agencies, all with their own membership, leadership, and budgets. Many of these specialized agencies, such as the Children’s Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and others are prominently working within the DPRK to improve the ongoing humanitarian crisis. The overall goal of the UN system in DPRK for 2017 until 2021 is “to support and reinforce national efforts to ensure people’s health and well-being, especially the most vulnerable.” To achieve this, the DPRK Humanitarian Country Team has agreed on the following strategic priorities: improving food security and nutrition, development of basic social services, strengthening resilience to recurrent disasters and sustainability, and improving data and development management.

The United Nations, founded in 1945, is currently made up of 193 Member States that, through the power vested in the UN Charter, take action against issues confronting humanity around the globe such as peace and security, climate change, sustainable development, human rights, disarmament, terrorism, humanitarian and health emergencies, gender equality, governance, food production, and more. The UN hosts six funds and programs—United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Population Fund, UN-Habitat, United Nations Children’s Fund, and World Food Programme. The UN Children’s Fund works for children’s rights in over 190 countries, including DPRK, to correct issues that risk children’s lives, to defend children’s rights, and to help children fulfill their full potential from early childhood through adolescence. The World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian agency. The World Food Programme aims to eradicate hunger and malnutrition worldwide with ongoing efforts beset by underfunding and shortfalls for the DPRK.

The UN also has fifteen specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Health Organization. The UN specialized agencies are autonomous organizations that work with the UN through negotiated agreements to meet global needs.
leads international efforts to fight hunger by negotiating food aid agreements between developing and developed countries and providing a source of technical knowledge and information to aid development. The World Health Organization is the UN directing and coordinating authority on all issues pertaining to international health. The World Health Organization coordinates international responses to humanitarian health emergencies, provides leadership on global health matters, shapes the health research agenda, sets health norms and standards, articulates evidence-based policy options, and provides technical support to countries to monitor and assess health trends. The DPRK became a member state of the World Health Organization in 1973. After the World Health Organization established a country office in DPRK in 2001, there have been two five-year cycles of Country Cooperation Strategy between the World Health Organization and North Korean authorities, such as the Ministry of Public Health, that continue to work towards implementation of national people-oriented health policies to address the country’s health needs and priorities.

The UN Charter states that one of its major purposes is “to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.” This boils down to delivering humanitarian aid worldwide. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the UN Secretariat is responsible for coordinating humanitarian relief responses to emergencies. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs manages the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, which provides one of the most effective and rapid financial support for humanitarian relief to people affected by natural disasters and armed conflict. At the end of 2018, the World Health Organization received $3.478 million for tuberculosis treatment, the World Food Programme received USD $2.74 million and the Food and Agriculture Organization received USD $500,00 from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund for North Korea. Key UN entities utilized by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to deliver humanitarian aid are the UN Developmental Programme, the UN Refugee Agency, the UN Children’s Fund, and the World Food Programme. UN Developmental Programme is responsible for operational activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention, and preparedness.

### Six UN agencies currently operate from bases in Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea.

Six UN agencies currently operate from bases in Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea. (See Figure 2.) These UN agencies plan humanitarian aid programs through or supported by the DPRK National Coordinating Committee. At the national scale, UN activities are planned in consultation with line ministries. For county-level programs, the local authorities and People’s Committees, that consist of representatives from the communities, are reportedly involved in all stages of the projects including planning, implementation, and monitoring. Through involvement of the People’s Committees, the UN identifies key issues and assigns resources to rapidly respond to the most critical needs. Transportation, distribution, and storage of goods provided though UN agencies are then typically carried out through the relevant government ministries to allow DPRK government to display their contribution to the projects. There are some regions of DPRK that UN international staff have no access to, and thus rely completely on DPRK authorities to deliver the humanitarian aid to these regions. Other regions become inaccessible due to poor road conditions during
Figure 2. Humanitarian Aid Organizations Operating in DPRK in 2019
winter months or floods. Lastly, the North Korean government has historically limited interactions and collaboration between the UN and other international partners (such as international non-governmental organizations). This leads to some collaboration challenges between the different ongoing humanitarian aid efforts.

**International Non-Governmental Organizations**

At the start of 2019, there were five international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) based out of Pyongyang: the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, European Union Programme Support (EUPS) units such as Food Security Office, and FAHRP/FIDA International. A French Cooperation Office (hosting French INGO Premi`ere Urgence Internationale) and an Italian Cooperation Office also have humanitarian operations based in North Korea. This year has been marked with UN 1718 Sanctions Committee re-examination of application of UN sanction exemptions. There has been an influx of UN sanction approvals, mainly in support of projects working through one of the five major INGOs already established in Pyongyang. For example, World Vision International and Swiss Humanitarian Aid (a sub-organization of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation already working in DPRK) were granted exemptions to provide water, sanitation, and hygiene aid to Sobaeksan village in Samjiyon County and solar powered water-pump supply systems to North and South Hwanghae Provinces, DPRK in February 2019. Additional INGOs working through EUPS units (such as Irish Concern Worldwide with EUPS 3, German Deutsche Welthungerhilfe with EUPS 4, and Humanity & Inclusion with EUPS 7) were also granted UN sanction exemptions in February to provide water, sanitation, and hygiene, solar-powered water pumps, and equipment for storage and productions of seeds. In March, additional approvals for humanitarian projects in DPRK were granted by the UN sanctions committee to French INGO Triangle Generation Humanitaire, Canadian First Steps Health Society, and Medecins Sans Frontieres (also known as Doctors Without Borders) allowing these INGOs to bring aid and equipment into the country to help treat chronic health and nutrition problems in the country. As of March 15, 2019 the 1718 UN Sanctions Committee has approved 21 total sanctions exemptions, each granted for 6-month duration. The majority (14 out of 21) were granted to INGOs to provide humanitarian aid in DPRK.

Notably, the DPRK has historically not allowed collaboration between UN system projects and INGOs. However, in 2018, the DPRK government approved a partnership between EUPS 7 Humanity and Inclusion, the Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled, and the UN Children’s Fund. The focus of this humanitarian aid project is for early screening and detection of disability in children during early childhood development. This collaboration marks the first UN, international NGO and national NGO collaboration in DPRK. The remaining INGOs operating in North Korea work through the Korean European Cooperation Coordination Agency to coordinate and manage aid projects. The exception is that the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies works directly through the DPRK Red Cross. The UN-led Humanitarian Country Team holds formal weekly meetings that bring together all humanitarian
aid organizations operating out of Pyongyang. Inputs from the Sector Working Groups are brought to the Humanitarian Country Team meetings.\textsuperscript{108} Informal inter-agency meetings are also held weekly in Pyongyang. DPRK diplomats, potential aid donors, and occasionally representatives from visiting non-residential aid organizations are present for an informal exchange of information related to DPRK humanitarian relief efforts.\textsuperscript{109} These informal meetings are often the extent of communication and coordination of humanitarian activities between the UN, INGOs, and non-resident national NGOs and other agencies.\textsuperscript{110}

Political concerns that the DPRK regime funnels aid assets towards its nuclear weapons program and military have caused many non-residential non-governmental organizations to discontinue operations in DPRK. One example is the discontinuation of the Geneva-based Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria dispersed more than $100 million in grants from 2010 to 2018 in DPRK, supporting the treatment of nearly 190,000 North Korean tuberculosis patients in 2017 alone.\textsuperscript{111} In June 2018, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria announced it was ending all funding and operations in DPRK because it could “no longer accept North Korea’s unique operating conditions.”\textsuperscript{112}

For the few remaining non-residential non-governmental organizations, they continue to experience significant difficulty with maintaining their efforts in DPRK due to the recent tightening of international sanctions.\textsuperscript{113} Eugene Bell Foundation, based in the U.S. and South Korea, Christian Friends of Korea and Mennonite Central Committee, both based in the U.S., are examples of religious-based non-residential non-governmental organizations that have continued to successfully provide humanitarian aid, including treatment of multi-drug resistance tuberculosis, in DPRK for over 20 years.\textsuperscript{114,115,116,117,118}

South Korean-based NGOs are another group of influential actors in providing humanitarian aid to DPRK. The South Korean constitution claims sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula and its citizens, and thus the Republic of Korea has a Ministry of Unification that tightly oversees the work of all South Korean based NGOs operating in DPRK as part of the Ministry of Unification’s responsibility to actively track and monitor the internal capability of South Korea to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response assistance anywhere on the entire Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{119} The Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North
Korea is a South Korean organization that includes more than 50 NGOs based out of Seoul. The Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea was founded in 1999 to assist the Ministry of Unification with overseeing South Korean humanitarian aid to North Korea, even when aid efforts have been limited by the geopolitical situation.

Republic of Korea government support for South Korean NGOs working in North Korea waxes and wanes with the political party. In 2010, when DPRK sunk the South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, leading to the death of 46 Republic of Korea sailors, the Republic of Korea government withdrew support for DPRK humanitarian aid. In 2017, however, through the influence of Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea, NGO activity and capacity in DPRK grew to over 100 Ministry of Unification-registered South Korean NGOs providing humanitarian aid in DPRK. Recently, South Korean NGOs have played a vital role in providing humanitarian assistance to DPRK. The Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification reported that South Korean NGOs provided 4.7 billion Korean Won in humanitarian aid to DPRK in 2018.

Conclusion

Given the significant impacts of geopolitical complexities on the growing humanitarian crisis in the DPRK caused by prolonged food insecurity, lack of basic services, and disease, North Korea watchers should make every effort to understand the situation on the ground. At the same time, they must seek to understand the resources available from the international humanitarian aid community that are poised to deal with potential humanitarian crises. IAJ

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The Value of Conceptual Planning During Disasters

by Michael Long

The Army Design Method is a useful tool for understanding poorly structured problems and developing approaches to solving them. It is the most effective methodology for conceptual planning within the military. After a year-long fellowship at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), I have learned of its utility outside the Army. The Army Design Methodology, brought to FEMA by a series of integrated efforts with the U.S. Army, is used by FEMA’s planning leaders to effectively apply critical and creative structured-thinking to the complexity of natural disasters. Design methodology was key to the effective response effort for Hurricane Florence by FEMA’s most elite response team.

The U.S. Army first introduced design planning during a series of exercises conducted by the Concept Development & Experimentation Directorate of the Army Training and Doctrine Command. This began in 2004 and continued with Unified Quest in 2005 and 2006.1 With the 2010 publication of Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process, the Army formally included Design within its doctrine.2 Two years later, the U.S. Army further codified its design doctrine with the introduction of the Army Design Methodology into Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, in 2012.3

Army Design Methodology is essentially a three-step process that applies critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, describe, and build solutions for complex problems. The first step is building an environmental frame composed of both the current and desired environments. The second step is to frame the problem in order to better understand what is impeding progress to the desired end state. The third step of the design methodology is the development of an operational approach, which shows broad actions that can resolve the problem. This approach is often referred to as the theory of victory and is the conceptual foundation upon which the detailed plan is built, as presented in Figure 1 Army Design Methodology.4

In September of 2018, the first major hurricane of the year formed in the Atlantic Ocean.

Lieutenant Colonel Micheal Long is a strategist at U.S. Army North headquartered at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.
The National Hurricane Center confirmed that Hurricane Florence was projected to strike the Carolinas in four days as a Category 4 storm. The governors of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia declared a state of emergency. President Trump followed suit, declaring a national emergency. With the impending disaster looming, FEMA responded quickly by activating the National Response Coordination Center and deploying the Incident Management Assistance Team, known as East 1. East 1 is the immediate-response team of FEMA and is comprised of thirty emergency managers with skills and expertise ranging from logistics management to geospatial mapping.

East 1 deployed from their national headquarters in Herndon, Virginia (strategically located 25 miles outside of the nation’s capital) to Raleigh, North Carolina, in order to collocate the national response effort with North Carolina’s state response. They arrived at the state’s capital four days before the storm’s
landfall. This team of experienced emergency managers quickly organized into the leaders of the Incident Command System, which is the staffing backbone of disaster response. The planning team within East 1 began a systematic integrated planning operation. Their effort was divided into both conceptual and detailed planning. The planning team’s focus was on building a thorough understanding of the environment, identifying core problems, and visualizing approaches to solving these complex problems. This experienced planning team, aided by design doctrine, developed strategic objectives and then built detailed plans to systemically achieve each objective. The Unified Command Group, consisting of both state and federal leadership, then approved those plans. Finally, the approved plans were transitioned to the Chief of Operations for tactical execution in the field. Amazingly, this thorough process happens daily during the response portion of all large-scale federal disaster operations.

The resulting product of this disciplined conceptual planning process is an operational approach. The future-operations section of the planning team utilized a seventy-two-hour timeline to stay ahead of the disaster response requirements. They constantly updated both the current state and desired end state to accurately prioritize resources and personnel allocations to achieve the intermediate objectives with the highest priority. Figure 2 shows three of the thirteen lines of effort and their respective incident objectives (intermediate objectives) required to achieve the desired end state. East 1’s mission during Hurricane Florence was to stabilize a community devastated by disaster, then transition the management effort from response to recovery, which would be run by state and local experts with assistance from the federal government when necessary.

After three weeks, seven operational approaches (conceptual plans), and twenty-one Incident Action Plans (deliberate plans) the Incident Management Assistance Team, East 1, successfully completed its disaster response mission. The leadership of the team transitioned responsibility to the recovery experts, and East 1 returned to their headquarters outside of Washington, D.C. This unit, the strategic reserve for the nation’s disaster response, had to regroup to prepare for the next response, which came just a few weeks later when Hurricane Michael hit Florida.

The Chief of Planning for East 1, Jordan Nelms, a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate, learned about design from FEMA doctrine, but he developed his expertise in Army Design Methodology from an Army school. At the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Mr. Nelms studied the theory of design. He experienced the theory in action during several practical exercises facilitated by the college. He then brought that expertise back to his planning team in East 1. The U.S. Army offers an exchange program for which dozens of high-quality interagency leaders, like Mr. Nelms, are selected each year. This exchange program, developed and implemented by the Combined Arms Center at Leavenworth, Kansas, is responsible for successfully integrating the U.S. Army with its interagency counterparts.

The FEMA Operational Planning Manual, FEMA’s equivalent to the Army’s FM 5-0: The Operations Process, does offer a small section on design and a brief explanation for an operational approach. Similar to the U.S. Army 15 years ago, FEMA is currently in the developmental stages of codifying design within its doctrine. The addition of conceptual planning to FEMA’s planning doctrine will help reduce uncertainty...
in operations and better structure emergency response to a more traditional requirements-based planning. With the hard work of dedicated disaster managers, this methodology is gaining momentum.

FEMA’s Planning Director, David Kang, is a strong advocate for the use of design methodology during disaster response operations. In addition to running FEMA’s Planning Directorate, Professor Kang also teaches future disaster response managers in the Emergency and Disaster Management Graduate Program at Georgetown University. He has dedicated a section of his curriculum to the use of design for disaster response planning. Professor Kang, also a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, is now working with the professional cadre at Fort Belvoir’s satellite campus teaching Army Design Methodology to planners at FEMA.

Disaster response, like combat, is inherently ill-structured, extremely complex, and fraught with both fog (the inability to understand what is going on in real time) and friction (unanticipated problems to operations). As Hurricane Florence demonstrated, both require a disciplined approach that integrates conceptual and detailed planning. This continued integration of interagency leaders with the military—through their attendance to Command and General Staff College and the imbedding of Army officers as Interagency Fellows—will ensure that these valuable tools, which the military developed and has improved upon with centuries of experience in exercises and battlefield operations, are shared with its interagency partners, including FEMA.

In the most recent National Defense Strategy, former Secretary of Defense, General (Retired) Jim Mattis articulates the value of integration between the interagency and the military. As conflict becomes more complex the ability for the nation to effectively employ all dimensions of national power is essential. This integration is the strategic approach for the United States to maintain its competitive edge over adversaries.

Interagency leaders who are interested in attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College to develop skills like Army Design
Methodology should contact the director of the Interagency Exchange Program, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Monique Guerrero at monique.g.guerrero.civ@mail.mil. IAJ

NOTES


4 Ibid. 2-6.


6 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening America’s Competitive Advantage 2018
A Practitioner’s Handbook for Interagency Leadership

William J. Davis, Jr., Ph.D. – Author
Janet K. Benini and Michael S. Choe – Contributors
Col. (Ret.) Rodrick M. Cox – Editor
$10 softcover (5.5 x 8.5), Copyright 2018

National security requires a whole-of-government approach. Americans deserve to have all parts of their government working in concert to provide for their common defense and general welfare. How does a leader from one agency lead resources from other departments, nongovernmental organizations, or other nations?

No one agency has the wherewithal to train and develop interagency leaders. So, when the situation dictates, leaders from various agencies come together and are forced to best sort out how they might cooperate. Leaders who operate in this joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (JIM) invariably discover that successful leadership requires a skillset and knowledge that is somewhat different than what they learned from their agency.

The Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation and the Command and General Staff College Foundation are pleased to bring this publication to the professional discourse. This practitioner’s handbook for leading in the JIM is a useful reference that provides information to better understand why and how the environment is different than what you know in your agency.

"There is a strong need for a work like "A Practitioner’s Handbook for Interagency Leadership." This pocket-sized, but thought-provoking primer summarizes years of hard-won experience wrestling with the broad challenges leaders face in the complex interagency environment. Reading it will go a long way toward preparing leaders to transition from the familiar routines of their home organizations to an environment where there are "few hierarchies, rules, or standard operating procedures."

Paperback and Kindle versions available on Amazon or contact the CGSC Foundation at 913-651-0624 to order paperback copies at $10 + shipping/handling
The Literature of Intelligence

by Kevin Rousseau

“A Highly Discriminating Approach”

Intelligence officers are by trade a tight-lipped group, unwilling and often unable to talk to outsiders about their business. Where, then, does everyone else get their ideas about intelligence? More importantly, where can those who are not intelligence professionals reliably turn to for a better understanding of the Intelligence Community and what it does?¹ Society’s collective impressions about intelligence seem to be changing as our lives are touched more and more by concerns related to information, how it is collected, and who is using it for what purposes. This article discusses the profession of intelligence by briefly surveying some of the unclassified sources of common ideas, perceptions, and misperceptions about what the world of secrets is all about. It is important for citizens of a democracy to have a realistic understanding of what its intelligence organizations can and cannot do, as well what they will or will not, do in the name of national security. It is also vital for policymakers, military planners, and our interagency partners to have a realistic understanding of the intelligence community’s missions and true capabilities if they are to work effectively together.

One reason why general knowledge about the world of intelligence has been so sparse was that very little information about intelligence organizations has been accessible to anyone outside the profession until relatively recently. Intelligence historian Christopher Andrew provides three reasons for this lack of material. First, states typically denied the very existence of their intelligence organizations. Second, what intelligence experience states’ possessed was kept strictly to themselves and rarely if ever released for study. Indeed, almost nothing was shared regarding intelligence activities even within respective governments, and consequently there were few if any significant reflections or open discussions of intelligence activities. Finally, Andrew observes that for many years historians were simply not interested in the world of intelligence.² However, general interest in intelligence cannot be entirely suppressed, and the speculations of the public, the media, and

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above all fiction, often served to fill the gap in official information.

In the early 1990’s, at what was then known as the Defense Intelligence College, I had the privilege of taking a graduate-level course that introduced its students to what it called “the literature of intelligence.” The professor was Walter Pforzheimer, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran and retired CIA officer who over many decades had collected a vast personal library devoted solely to works on intelligence. The course he led discussed the body of writings that had evolved to promote strategic intelligence as a profession, to include histories, memoirs and tell-all’s from former intelligence officials, critical works, and popular fiction. The course objective was not only to foster more discerning readers able to judge which books were credible and which were not, but also to make us more aware of what our fellow citizens thought about us and our work. Pforzheimer noted that “intelligence literature poses an additional fundamental problem created by dual forces inherent in its nature. On the one hand, intelligence operations hold a certain fascination for the public, and a readily available market exists for new and exciting “revelations.” This is to be contrasted with the regular security procedures and compartmentation which frequently preclude public disclosure of the more significant facts.” He advised those seeking openly available material on the intelligence world that “accordingly, a highly discriminating approach is encouraged when dealing with literature of this kind.”

That advice remains sound today. The following pages will highlight some of the better writings within a few representative categories, such as tradecraft, history, journalism, memoirs and critics, and fiction. Many other forms of useful intelligence writing are missing from this short article, such as official government records and reports, legislative and legal studies, the various professional and academic journals, and of course film. This article will also focus mainly on books on the U.S. Intelligence Community, although there are many fine works available on foreign intelligence organizations. Some readers will be less than happy that their favorite works on intelligence are either omitted entirely or given but brief mention. However, while this article attempts to capture the spirit of Professor Pforzheimer’s course, the body of literature on intelligence has grown remarkably since that time, and even then an entire semester with him could but scratch the surface of the material available.

The Need for a Professional Literature

Pforzheimer was certainly not the first to appreciate the need for a professional intelligence literature. After World War II, OSS veteran Sherman Kent realized that intelligence had evolved into a true discipline, that it was worthy of study in itself, and that its further development required a body of literature geared toward preserving its best practices and improving the profession. Kent noted in 1955 that intelligence was “not merely a profession, but like most professions it has taken on the aspects of a discipline: it has developed a recognized methodology; it has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques. It now has a large professional following. What it lacks is a literature.” That same year, Kent kicked off a professional journal at CIA, Studies in Intelligence, that is still being published.
his thoughts into a groundbreaking book titled *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Reflecting perhaps the relative newness of the subject, “initially, publishers were reluctant to commit to a book on intelligence with a focus on analysis rather than the heroics of espionage and covert action.” Despite that inauspicious start, Kent’s little book quickly became a classic in the field, outlining many organizational issues and tradecraft practices that are still relevant today.

**...intelligence analysis is more than academic research.**

One theme that emerges from Kent’s reflections is that intelligence analysis is more than academic research. When it came to intelligence analysis, “the record would show, in fact, that Kent found individuality, eccentricity, and even “oddball thinking” valuable for a unit facing tough substantive challenges as long as the analytic talent was there.” Reorganizing is not the whole answer either, for Kent concluded that analysts must have the training and necessary quality of mind for “great discoveries are not made by a lot of second rate minds, no matter how they may be juxtaposed organizationally. Twenty men with a mental rating of 5 put together in one room will not produce the ideas of one man with a mental rating of 100. You cannot add minds as if they were so many fractional parts of genius.”

Kent also realized that “analytic or cognitive bias was so ingrained in mental processes for tackling complex and fluid issues that it required a continuous, deliberate struggle to minimize. From his days as a history professor, he taught his students to resist the tendency to see what they expected to see in the information.”

One path Kent “recommended for coping with cognitive bias was to make working assumptions explicit and to challenge them vigorously.” Although Kent recognized the effects that cognitive biases could have on intelligence analysis, his advice was typical of the time and amounted to little more than a demand that analysts practice critical thinking. Sherman Kent “battled against bureaucratic and ideological biases, which he recognized as impediments to sound analysis, and against imprecise terms that he saw as obstacles to conveying clear messages to readers. Although he was aware of what is now called cognitive bias, his writings urge analysts to “make the call” without much discussion of how limitations of the human mind were to be overcome.” Intelligence analysts, however, would soon realize that simply telling people to think critically was not good enough.

**Writing on Tradecraft**

Thinking about analytic tradecraft continued to develop after Sherman Kent first tackled the subject. In the ensuing years, for example, there was a steady recognition and appreciation in academia, industry, and government for the role and study of cognitive biases as a significant consideration for improving critical thinking skills. Within the Intelligence Community, intelligence failures such as the Bay of Pigs compelled the CIA to review its processes, including how it performed its analysis. CIA officer Richards J. Heuer wrote an influential book, *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, which exemplified the seriousness with which the Agency studied critical thinking. Heuer’s advice to Agency leaders, managers, and analysts is pointed. “To ensure sustained improvement in assessing complex issues, analysis must be treated as more than a substantive and organizational process. Attention must also be paid to techniques and tools for coping with the inherent limitations on analyst’s mental machinery.”

Heuer’s work describes the effects of common flaws in human thinking, and explains that “cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies.” A cognitive bias “does not result
from any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing information.”

Perhaps most importantly is the idea that “cognitive biases are similar to optical illusions in that the error remains compelling even when one is fully aware of its nature. Awareness of the bias, by itself, does not produce a more accurate perception. Cognitive biases, therefore, are exceedingly difficult to overcome.”

In other words, old advice to analysts to simply “go forth and think critically” is woefully inadequate, for critical thinking is actually extraordinarily difficult, no matter how expert one is in their substantive field.

Today there are books by intelligence professionals covering almost every aspect of their tradecraft. On the operational side of the house, Harry Crumpton’s The Art of Intelligence: Lessons Learned from Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service, is an absorbing account of one officer’s prominent career from his recruitment, his early assignments in Africa, through the opening days of the Afghanistan campaign, and culminating in his service as the U.S. counter-terrorism coordinator. Likewise, James M. Olson’s Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying does an outstanding job discussing ethics through 50 scenarios posing ethical dilemmas indicative of those that could face intelligence professionals throughout the course of their careers.

Some of the best of these books are published by the agencies themselves and available on their websites. The Center for the Study of Intelligence, for example, has produced many works that shed light on the importance of the intelligence community’s relationship to policymakers. Most safely restrict themselves to historical events, such as Harold Ford’s The CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962–1968 and Brett Snider’s The Agency & The Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004. A favorite at least every four years is former CIA Inspector General John Helgerson’s study of the delivery of the Presidential Daily Brief to presidential candidates entitled Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004. Although not a Center for the Study of Intelligence publication, former Presidential Daily Brief briefer David Priess adds to the story with his book, The President’s Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America’s Presidents. Relevant to that same theme is an older and highly respected work, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency From Washington to Bush by Christopher Andrew.

Prior to the twentieth century, intelligence was largely an ad hoc business dominated by enthusiasts and dilettantes...

Relearning Forgotten Lessons

Prior to the twentieth century, intelligence was largely an ad hoc business dominated by enthusiasts and dilettantes, and whether it was practiced well or at all depended on the personal inclinations and genius of individual leaders. In the 20th century however, intelligence became more professional and governments have slowly become more open about historical intelligence operations. This led to a number of works of exceptional credibility because of the authors’ access to official records, or to research based on declassified materials. Books such as David Kahn’s The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet, and James Bamford’s The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency, America’s Most Secret Intelligence Organization provide unique and objective insights into the world of intelligence. Thomas L. Ahern’s especially insightful analysis of the Vietnam War, such as his Vietnam Declassified:
Professional intelligence officers typically expect to labor in relative anonymity where their successes are likely to remain unheralded and their sacrifices unknown.

Some authors set out to deliberately re-examine common assumptions of these historical events. Professional intelligence officers typically expect to labor in relative anonymity where their successes are likely to remain unheralded and their sacrifices unknown. This is no-doubt especially true when their work is overshadowed by a larger-than-life public figure such as T.E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918. Drawing upon newly uncovered sources, archeologist and historian Philip Walker attempts in Behind the Lawrence Legend: The Forgotten Few Who Shaped the Arab Revolt to correct the historical record by describing the quiet professionals whose largely forgotten intelligence work was critical to Lawrence’s battlefield success. Without detracting from the Lawrence legacy, Walker tells the story of Colonel Cyril Wilson and his subordinates at the Jeddah Consulate whose roles in the First World War, the author argues, have until recently been significantly underappreciated by historians. Walker notes that the “sabotage work still resonates today as iconic testament to the Arab Revolt, while many of the low-key but essential intelligence and diplomatic efforts, particularly those carried out in the fulcrum of Jeddah, remain little known or hidden.”23

Other recent books include broad histories that take in the entire field. Christopher Andrew’s The Secret World: A History of Intelligence, is an ambitious book that in thirty chapters walks the reader through several millennia of intelligence history, revealing that most hard-won lessons of intelligence work were often quickly forgotten. For centuries, explains Andrew, there was little consistency or continuity in intelligence tradecraft, and no accepted doctrine or body of professional literature to which to turn for guidance. In its earliest days, intelligence competed with divination as a source of actionable information. Thucydides never even mentions intelligence. Roman military commanders were likely to give more credence to what they believed could be gleaned from chicken entrails than to reports from their scouts. Intelligence, if it was practiced with any skill, was typically preoccupied with monitoring internal opposition and exercising domestic control rather than collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence. Rarely were best practices analyzed and studied to determine effectiveness and leading intelligence practitioners took their tradecraft secrets with them to the grave. Andrew’s history reminds us that for much of the past three thousand years, most intelligence work was remarkably amateurish.
A popular topic for intelligence historians has been the OSS, America’s first intelligence agency, which operated from June 1942 to September 1945. The OSS is unique among the world’s intelligence services, having much of its wartime records long open to historians and scholars through the U.S. National Archives. Douglas Waller has written several excellent books on the OSS such as *Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan*, and a highly readable biography of its founder entitled *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*.

Rather than a sweeping view of history, most authors have zeroed in on the details of specific organizations or events. For example, in *Beirut Rules: The Murder of a CIA Station Chief and Hezbollah’s War Against America*, authors Fred Burton and Samuel M. Katz provide a fast-paced and informative account of the 1984 kidnapping of CIA Beirut Chief of Station William F. Buckley. While doing justice to Buckley’s memory and ultimate sacrifice, the authors place Buckley’s horrific ordeal within a series of orchestrated attacks by Hezbollah designed to force the U.S. out of Lebanon. In addition, the book successfully weaves Buckley’s story into a still larger narrative that illuminates the role Iran has played in the region since the 1980s.

Other intelligence histories reinforce Christopher Andrew’s argument that most intelligence blunders could have been mitigated if military commanders and government officials had been more aware of their predecessors’ experiences with intelligence. In *The Code Warrior: NSA’s Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union*, Stephen Budiansky examines the long history of U.S. signals intelligence collection on our Soviet adversary. Picking up the story of cryptanalysis and signals intelligence as it developed during and after World War II, Budiansky’s history describes how the early intelligence community responded to a changing strategic environment characterized by the “global nature of communications, and thus of intelligence opportunities ripe to be exploited.”

He addresses the challenge of reviving atrophied wartime intelligence skills in Vietnam, where the National Security Agency had to relearn “forgotten lessons about signals intelligence in a real war.” Budiansky also notes that “all of the old fights over control of signals intelligence in the field resurfaced. The hard-won lessons from previous wars of the importance of centralization seemed to have been utterly forgotten; it was as if Korea or World War II had never happened.”

Yet, even after decades of scrutiny, author C. Turner demonstrates in *The CASSIA Spy Ring in World War II Austria: A History of the OSS’s Maier-Messner Group* that there is still much unmined material capable of revealing insights into the OSS legacy. In his introduction, Turner laments that “fiction has done a better job at telling traditional spy stories,” and that the bulk of literature on the OSS “tips in favor of derring-do.” Rather than add to the pile of books emphasizing special operations and covert action, Turner casts his gaze on the “OSS’s attempts at less spectacular but equally important work—handling the spies who took staggering risks to smuggle intelligence out of the Third Reich.” He rises to his own challenge and gives us a scholarly work that reads like a spy novel rather than an academic study. Turner’s well-researched work draws upon a number of underexploited primary sources, including German and Austrian records, to provide a riveting account of an OSS operation gone wrong. Turner’s study reminds us that the level
of professional competence found in the modern U.S. intelligence community did not emerge overnight.

Other recent histories have examined overlooked aspects of intelligence, such as the role of minorities and women. A biography, A Life in Code: Pioneer Cryptanalyst Elizebeth Smith Friedman by G. Stuart Smith, chronicles the career of one of the intelligence community’s early trailblazers. Honing her skills in the 1920’s and 30’s against rum-runners and organized crime, Elizebeth played a significant role refocusing the U.S. intelligence effort toward the Axis powers. Smith gives us a highly readable account of one woman’s experience during this time of transition. Partially obscured these days in the shadow of her husband—the “Dean of American Cryptology” William Friedman—Elizebeth had a storied career of her own that was much more publicized in its time. For her work bridging an array of various agencies, Elizebeth has been called the “Mother of the Fusion Center.” Smith also highlights the bias against women prevalent during Elizebeth’s career. Bias that inspired the public’s curiosity about her, but ironically also kept her in the background, paid her less than her male colleagues, and sometimes hindered the dissemination of her work. It’s instructive to reflect on how institutional biases, interagency rivalries, and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures emerge time and again to frustrate the effectiveness of intelligence operations. Other excellent books that tell us more about the role of women in intelligence include The Widow Spy by Martha D. Peterson and Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men He Betrayed by Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertifeuille, two women who spearheaded the hunt for a mole in the CIA.

Memoirs, Journalists, and Critics

A significant source of valuable insights into intelligence have come from the memoirs of former intelligence professionals. It is important to read these with a critical eye and to consider what the author’s purpose was in writing these works. Pforzheimer cautioned that “in this genre, as in others, the personal, professional and political biases of authors are often reflected in their writings. Moreover, authors who have written personal memoirs of their intelligence activities—usually in the operational field—often tend to produce much valid factual material while at the same time (in some cases) aggrandizing their own role.” Some of these works are by insiders critical of their intelligence profession, such as Sam Adams War by the Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir, which argued that the intelligence informing U.S. policy during the Vietnam War was skewed and politically biased. A short list of intelligence memoirs from former CIA Directors that shed light on the role of strategic intelligence to strategy and policymaking include From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War by Robert Gates, and Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror by Michael Hayden.

Some memoirs, such as John Rizzo in Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA; and Jose Rodriguez in Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives, have the additional purpose of setting the record straight from the author’s viewpoint. These books illustrate the value in reading memoirs, as they often provide different and sometimes conflicting views on the same issues. For example, Rizzo and Rodriguez describe different perspectives of the events of November 2005 involving the CIA’s detention...
A number of journalists conducting meticulous research have made significant contributions toward understanding the role of intelligence during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. In writing Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Steve Coll takes on the formidable challenge of adding yet another volume to the growing number of works on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Acknowledging the risk of treading where others have trod, Coll notes that while drafting Directorate S, he “had to consider how to absorb, but not regurgitate, the vast body of excellent journalism already produced by other reporters.”

He himself is part of that crowd of reporters, having won a Pulitzer Prize for the 2005 book Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the C.I.A., Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Picking up where Ghost Wars left us, on the eve of 9/11, Coll breaks new ground and offers fresh insights into America’s involvement in Afghanistan with an absorbing clarity that can be found nowhere else. Coll artfully describes the crisis atmosphere in Washington, the decisiveness of the U.S. military response, and the CIA’s quick and efficient operations during the opening weeks and months of the Afghanistan campaign. There are numerous threads and themes that develop as Coll’s story moves forward. The most prominent theme gives the book its title; the role of Inter-Services Intelligence—the Pakistani intelligence...
service—and its Directorate S, a behind-the-scenes force Coll depicts as persistently working at odds with U.S. efforts. His description of Inter-Services Intelligence’s continued support toward the Taliban, and the alleged perfidy of Directorate S, is as convincing as it is frustrating.

Besides history written by insiders, there are of course those written by critical outsiders. These are also important to read for they contribute to shaping the public’s view of the Intelligence Community. Although a look at the history of intelligence all the way back to Washington and the founding fathers reveals just how integral intelligence has been to American history, these critical works reflect to some extent an American reluctance to fully embrace intelligence as something potentially untrustworthy and subject to misuse. Some of the best known of these works include Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State by Dana Priess, The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA’s Heart of Darkness by John Prados, and Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA by Thomas Weiner. It is important to remember that these are works intended to criticize the role of intelligence that may not offer a fully balanced assessment of an event or period. Nevertheless, if we want to appreciate the full scope of public perceptions of the intelligence community and where these perceptions come from, we must also understand the opposing views of our critics.

“Coloured—if not confused—by spy fiction”

The largest category of intelligence literature is arguably that of fiction. Fiction has probably long been the unequalled source of most popular ideas and misperceptions on intelligence. Christopher Andrew laments that “Even in the twenty-first century, public understanding of intelligence operations is frequently coloured—if not confused—by spy fiction.”

The best fiction is no doubt written by former intelligence professionals or well-informed researchers, and offer glimpses of reality along with their gripping if sometimes implausible story lines. Ian Fleming and his books are too well-known to warrant elaboration, and the same goes for John le Carre. Books by David Ignatius such as The Director: A Novel and The Quantum Spy: A Thriller provide respectable research and some modern context to the traditional spy novel. Characters in historical novels can be a surprising source of insight into the culture of intelligence officers. For example, the character Stephen Maturin in Patrick O’Brian’s Master and Commander series of novels gives us a picture of what it was like to be an intelligence officer during the period of the Napoleonic wars. At that time intelligence was still in its infancy as a profession, but Maturin’s experiences still provide insights into the era’s tradecraft practices, its ethical dilemmas, and relationship between intelligence, military commanders, and policymakers… all topics that would be familiar to any intelligence officer today.

Movies of course are probably the biggest source of the popular image of intelligence officers. Most are based on fiction, but again the best arguably derive from imaginations of ex-professionals. Some are rooted solidly in fact. The movie Argo, for example, is based on the real story of CIA officer Antonio Mendez. He told more of his career as an intelligence officer in another excellent memoir, The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA.

“A Difficult Effort of Dubious Value”

A short venue such as this can offer but broad generalizations and hit a few highlights regarding the staggering amount of intelligence
literature available to the public today. Professor Pforzheimer noted over 20 years ago, after decades of collecting intelligence books and listing just a fraction of these in a bibliography of over 100 pages, that “the vast quantity of books on intelligence and frequently poor quality of much of this literature would make a fully comprehensive listing a difficult effort of dubious value.”

As we have seen however, reading what we can on intelligence history arguably puts us in a better position to truly learn from past successes and failures. Our interagency and military partners are also served through a better and more accurate understanding of our true missions and capabilities. IAJ

NOTES

1 Many students by the end of the elective I teach at the US Army Command and General Staff College (called CIA for Special Operations Officers, Intelligence Officers, and Warfighters) have at some point during the course asked for recommendations for credible outside readings on intelligence. For the same reason, my predecessor and several colleagues have regularly met as a small informal “Intelligence Book Club,” a practice I have tried to maintain. This article grew in part out of these many discussions.


3 The Defense Intelligence College since February 2011 is now the National Intelligence University (NIU), and is located in Bethesda, Maryland. For more background and history on NIU, see http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/niu-history.


6 Bibliography of Intelligence Literature, x.

7 Ibid., x.

8 For example, there are some outstanding and well-known academic studies that provide well researched and authoritative overviews of the Intelligence Community, its organizations, and current issues. These include Loch Johnson. National Security Intelligence, 2nd ed. United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2017; and Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2009.

9 These books include works such as The Sword and Shield: The Mitrokhin Archives and Secret History of the KGB by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, or The Secret History of MI6: 1909-1949 by Keith Jeffery; an officially authorized study of the British foreign intelligence service based on a wealth of
declassified material.


15 Ibid., 8.


17 Ibid., xxii.

18 Ibid., 111.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., 112.

21 “It is perhaps the most confirmed proposition in cognitive psychology that once a belief or image is established, new material will be assimilated to it, with discrepant and ambiguous information being ignored or fit into the established views.” Robert Jervis. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. (New York: Cornell University. 2010), 169.

22 Many of these are available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs.


25 Ibid., 262.

26 Ibid., 261.


28 Ibid.

For example, in February 2016, the Central Intelligence Agency released its *Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019*, showing that although progress has been made in the intelligence world since Elizebeth’s time, promoting a diverse and inclusive culture remains an important concern. The report notes that “critical national security mission necessitates that we embrace all perspectives, honor all differences, and ensure all officers have the opportunities and tools to contribute to their full potential.”


Bibliography of Intelligence Literature, x.


Ibid., 400.


Secret World, 2.


*Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, ix.
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Organizational Ethics

Gone Wrong

by Jonathan Bailey and Ted Thomas

Fat Leonard Francis, owner of Glenn Defense Marine Asia and a good friend to the Navy leadership for over a decade, defrauded the U.S. Navy for $35 million dollars. The investigation that followed implicated scores of Navy personnel, including admirals, in the corruption scandal. He bribed leaders and key personnel with money, prostitutes, expensive gifts, free vacations, and other things. In return for his “gifts,” he gained classified information about docking schedules and overcharged the Navy for his company’s services. The remarkable fact about all of this is not that it happened, but that the corruption was so rampant and almost became part of the accepted culture of the 7th fleet.

With all of the fiscal oversight within government contracting and the organizational moral codes of the armed services, how could this happen? How could this many organizational leaders move from their ethical foundations and drift into unethical behavior, or even condone it by their inaction as they watched others participate in it? What causes an organization to drift from its espoused values to immoral and often criminal behaviors, and how can leaders prevent this from happening? The answers to these questions are important for organizational leaders to understand, and the answers carry significant moral and ethical implications for society.

High profile leaders who fall from grace due to abuse of power, money, or sex issues get a lot of press—bad press. In many cases, others in the organization knew the leader was doing something...
unethical, but did nothing about it. This might be
due to fear of losing their job or out of a sense
of loyalty and respect for their leader. Another
problem appears when widespread immoral,
illegal, or unethical behavior becomes part of an
organization’s culture or how they function and
solve problems. This happens for many reasons,
and unethical leadership is only one. This paper
examines ethics at the organizational level and
looks at several theories to demonstrate how
unethical cultures arise in organizations, how to
recognize if there is an issue, and what to do
about it.

Bad Barrel or Bad Apple?

When people discuss why unethical problems
occur in organizations, they either blame the
environment, a “bad barrel,” or the individuals
involved, “bad apples.” Our discussion focuses
on the bad barrel, or organizational problems
that lead to bad behavior. The bad barrel or bad
apple question produces a false dichotomy. Bad
actors can produce a bad environment causing
unethical behavior. However, a bad environment
may encourage good people to misbehave and do
bad things. The interaction of bad actors and bad
environment make it difficult to determine what
caused the unethical behavior.

Hitler provides an extreme, but prime,
example of people accusing a bad apple of
producing a bad barrel. Hitler is known as the
bad apple who led his country into WWII and
demonized the Jewish people, pursuing the
“final solution” to exterminate them. The war
can actually be traced back to the poor economic
environment and restrictions imposed by the
Treaty of Versailles on Germany after WWI,
which produced a bad barrel. Without the
depression, rampant inflation, joblessness, and
other social difficulties from the peace treaty
imposed on Germany, would the bad apple
of Adolph Hitler have ever been produced? The
proverbial question of which came first, the
chicken or the egg, is appropriate for this
situation. Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo,
both college professors, performed experiments
that reinforce the difficulty of separating the bad
barrel from the bad apple.

A shocking (literally) set of experiments
in the early 1960s showed the majority of men
(65%) will follow the orders of a person in
authority to shock someone—to death. Stanley
Milgram, an innovative social psychologist and
instructor at Yale, recruited male volunteers
between 20 to 50 years old from a variety of
professions. Based on the experiment parameters,
volunteers believed they would be a “student” or
“teacher” for the experiment. However, Milgram
designed the experiment to assign all volunteers
as teachers while one of Milgram’s colleagues
would serve as the student. The volunteers, as
teachers, were told to administer shocks to the
learner for answering questions incorrectly as
the experiment progressed. While the standard
voltage in an outlet is 120 volts, the people in the
survey administered “shocks” up to 450 volts,
enough voltage to potentially kill or seriously
injure the student. Milgram demonstrated how
easy it is to convince ordinary people to obey
an order that harms another individual. His
experiment indicates that a leader can easily
create a bad barrel, with over half of their
followers willing to execute unethical orders.
Accordingly, leaders possess unique abilities to
affect the organization’s ethical stance, either
negatively or positively.

Phillip Zimbardo, a Stanford professor, in
his “Stanford Prison Experiment” found much
the same results but without a leader imposed
set of ethics. His goal was to determine if prison
brutality stemmed from sadistic prison guards
or if it stemmed from the prison environment.
He randomly assigned students the roles of prisoners or guards in a mock prison experiment due to last two full weeks. Within a matter of days, the guards became increasingly aggressive and assertive. As the experiment went on, they became more brutal and demanding, and started hazing the prisoners. Zimbardo disbanded the experiment after only six days due to the brutal, dehumanizing treatment of the guards towards the prisoners. He found that people become so immersed in the norms of the group that they lose their own sense of individuality and personal responsibility for their actions. This experiment was not as much about the authority figure creating an unethical atmosphere as it was about the environment, a bad barrel, which created the unethical behavior. The unethical behavior became the norm and was widespread throughout the organization.

**Examples of Organizations Gone Bad**

There are numerous examples of organizations whose behaviors have drifted far from their espoused ethics. These organizations include the gamut of public and private, governmental and nongovernmental, religious and secular organizations. Ford, with the Pinto and its exploding gas tank from rear end collisions, decided it was cheaper to pay the claims from the families of those killed in the fire than it was to fix the problem. Volkswagen knowingly cheated on their emissions standards to comply with U.S. emissions standards. Sears incentivized its mechanics to lie and cheat on fixing cars by repairing things not broken. Merck kept selling its lucrative drug Vioxx, knowing that it was causing deaths. Wells Fargo incentivized thousands of workers to make up false accounts and overcharge their customers to receive bonuses and to keep their jobs. Just as no individual is impervious to unethical conduct, no organization is inoculated from such possibilities.

The military has numerous examples of unethical behavior, both in peace and war. My Lai and Abu Ghraib bring up memories of unethical and immoral behavior in units. Hundreds of people working for the Navy were implicated in the Fat Leonard scandal involving bribes, prostitutes, and gifts. Ninety-two Air Force officers were suspended for cheating on a missile exam, while many others were implicated in cheating scandals. Gerras and Wong, who research and teach at the U.S. Army War College, wrote an article on the normalization of lying to ourselves in the Army through unrealistic expectations in qualifications and reporting. The list goes on. A few of the reasons organizations become unethical are outlined in the following sections.

**Moral Disengagement**

Moral disengagement theory sheds further light on the bad barrel phenomenon. Albert Bandura, a Stanford research psychologist, utilizes this theory to examine how large groups of people disassociate their unethical behavior from any sense of personal responsibility. Bandura theorizes that religious, racial, and nationalistic rationalizations allow ordinary, decent people throughout much of history to commit atrocities while maintaining a sense of self-righteousness. Bandura includes Milgram’s study in using authority to diffuse responsibility, as well as the feeling that if everyone is doing it, then it must be all right. When everyone has some responsibility, then no one really feels ownership. Individuals become anonymous in a crowd of others performing the same unethical action. This easily happens in large organizations.

Selective moral disengagement is the
means by which large groups of people and organizations can commit horrendous acts of violence or unethical behavior, and yet still feel they are good people. Dehumanization, or looking at others as less than human, is one instance of this moral disengagement. In Rwanda, when the Hutus called the Tutsis cockroaches in the months before they slaughtered them, they dehumanized the Tutsis as insects to be crushed. Over 800,000 people were killed in as little as 100 days.

Euphemism is another means of moral disengagement. The substitution of a word or phrase for another that sounds less offensive is euphemism. People use euphemistic labeling of unethical acts in terms of sanitized language, such as referring to the killing of civilians in war as collateral damage, or condoning torture by calling it rendition and outsourcing it to other countries. It is a means by which an entire society can feel comfortable with itself as the government condones killing and torturing people.

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Ethical Fading

Ann Tenbrunsel, a popular author and professor at Notre Dame, and David Messick, a psychologist and professor emeritus at Northwestern University, provide another way of exploring the roots of unethical behavior in organizations. They look at the role of self-deception in making unethical decisions and name the process ethical fading. They describe ethical fading as, “the process by which the moral colors of an ethical decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications,” through the process of self-deception. If we take sufficiently small steps away from ethical decisions so that it does not appear different, we can drift into illegal and unethical activity without seeing it as such. As the drift continues, the new behavior becomes routine and normalized. When it is routine, it becomes ordinary and acceptable and any ethical evaluation is lost or fades away.

Another way for the ethical colors to fade is to qualify a decision as a business, legal, or economic decision and take it out of the ethical realm so any ethical piece of the decision fades away. The Challenger disaster deliberations on whether to launch the space shuttle were based on safety concerns and the decision was to not launch the spacecraft. One of the senior engineers, Roger Boisjoly, described the process to change the decision to launch as follows: “So he (the general manager) turns to him (the one senior manager who voted to not launch) and said ‘take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat’—and that’s exactly what happened. He changed his hat and changed his vote, just 30 minutes after he was the one to give the recommendation not to launch.”

The decision to launch was no longer about safety and the lives of the astronauts, but about the bottom line and pleasing the employer.

Craft Ethics

Craft ethics uses ethical relativism to explain how an organization drifts from its ethical standards. Craft ethics contrasts “at home” ethics with “at work” ethics. In this case, people follow work ethics while on the job, even if those ethics directly conflict with their personal beliefs outside of the job. This theory takes the perspective that performance at work and getting the mission accomplished is more important than one’s personal ethics, and that loyalty to the team and their assignment determines what is right and wrong. This attitude creates a cultural relativism whereby right and wrong is created in the culture of the organization and is enshrined in doing what it takes to accomplish the mission or to advance one’s career.
could be a subset of ethical fading.

Wong and Gerras, point out that the Army instituted unachievable training tasks and standards for its members and holds them accountable in a zero defects environment. This atmosphere creates a propensity to lie and cheat on reports. “The Army as a profession speaks of values, integrity, and honor. The Army as an organization practices zero defects, pencil-whipping, and checking the box. Army leaders are situated between the two identities—parroting the talking points of the latest Army Profession Campaign while placating the Army bureaucracy or civilian overseers by telling them what they want to hear. As a result, Army leaders learn to talk of one world while living in another,”21 a prime example of craft ethics overshadowing personal and even organizational ethics. Espoused ethics and enacted ethics are incongruent within the Army due to the culture demanding unachievable standards to succeed and get promoted, which counter one’s ability to ethically accomplish all of the tasks assigned.

**Administrative Evil**

Adams and Balfour wrote a book called *Unmasking Administrative Evil*. They make the assertion that ordinary people performing their normal duties and responsibilities engage in unethical practices without ever realizing they are doing so. In some instances of moral inversion, acts that are evil are redefined as good. Many people participate in administrative evil routinely by just doing their job.22

For example, Wong and Gerras assert that officers in the Army choose terms to describe unethical behavior in positive language using moral inversion. Many officers in their inability to accomplish all of their required annual training, report that the training was completed when it was not and “insist that lying to the system can better be described as prioritizing, accepting prudent risk, or simply good leadership.”23 In addition, those in the tobacco industry routinely perform their jobs, which contribute to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people yearly. They knowingly make their product more addictive, more attractive to children, and more deadly.24 Administrative evil is indicative of people performing unethical acts who either do not know they are doing them or have no deliberate intention to harm others. They are just doing their administrative job without looking at the larger context of what that job or task means to someone else’s life and health.25

...Army leaders learn to talk of one world while living in another...

**Bounded Ethicality**

Dolly Chugh, associate professor at New York University, Max H. Bazerman, and Mahzarin R. Banaji, both professors at Harvard, argue that ethics is bounded. They argue that many individuals routinely fail to identify conflicts of interest due to assumptions of their own ethical behavior.26 They write, “Specifically, we argue that individuals view themselves as moral, competent, and deserving, and this view obstructs their ability to see and recognize conflicts of interest when they occur.”27 If our activities and thoughts are unchallenged, we often assume that our doings represent acceptable ethical standards, even when such activities may well exist beyond ethical norms.

Even when organizations seek to create a certain level of objectivity, such efforts may lead to more unethical decisions and behaviors because the organization assumes there actually is objectivity. For example, in the military the inspector general has a role to play in ensuring that the organization is operating within the law and meeting certain ethical standards. Because of the inspector general’s presence in the organization, some assume that the decisions have a level of objectivity and that
those decisions fit within our ethical framework. Yet, this discounts the inspector general’s own vested interests within the command that he or she may, at an unconscious level, make decisions based on beliefs about what most benefits the command. The “objective” party brings a sense of legitimacy to decisions and behaviors without necessarily being objective. “[P]rofessionalism provides only partial immunity against intentional corruption,” as Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji state, “and little immunity from the unconscious processes that lead decision-makers to succumb to conflicts of interest.”

In the *Power of Noticing*, Bazerman focuses on the Jerry Sandusky scandal at Penn State University and the sexual assault scandal within the Catholic Church as a way to approach a condition within bounded ethicality termed “motivated blindness.” In discussing the Sandusky case, he writes, “All of [the witnesses] may have been more interested in protecting their jobs, the school’s reputation, or both than in protecting future abuse by Sandusky.” His discussion of the Sandusky scandal flows naturally into his discussion of the sexual abuse scandal within the Catholic Church. Bazerman points out that Archbishop Law fought for civil rights and was considered an ethical leader. Yet, in regards to priests sexually assaulting parishioners, Archbishop Law failed to act ethically by allowing several priests to continue serving Catholic communities and continuing to expose members to sexual predators. “The term motivated blindness,” Bazerman writes, “describes the systematic failure to notice others’ unethical behavior when it is not in our best interest to do so. Simply put, if you have an incentive to view someone positively, it will be difficult to accurately assess the ethicality of that person’s behavior.”

We each have examples in our lives of ethics gone wrong. In many of these instances, large groups of people and organizations fell into a trap of unwittingly becoming unethical. It happens daily, whether in our job or from what we see on the news about unethical organizations and governments. In many cases, those acting unethically are not even able to discern their own unethical behavior. There are a few options to choose how to act and most of those actions require significant courage.

**What’s a Person to Do?**

People who find themselves in an organization that is unethical and recognize the unethicality, can do one of several things. First, they can report the unethical behavior to the chain of command, to those in positions of power over them. This is often a serious issue, since the people receiving the report of unethical conduct may be the ones committing the unethical behavior, or at least know about it and are doing nothing to stop it.

For instance, in the Navy’s Fat Leonard scandal, many admirals were good friends with Leonard Glenn Francis, the maritime tycoon who bribed the Navy officers. It was common knowledge what was going on. Admiral Samuel Locklear, a commander of the U.S. military forces in the Pacific, attended a party that featured prostitutes as entertainment, as well as previously attending dinners with lavish accommodations that cost approximately $700 to $1,000 per person. Somewhat to Locklear’s credit, he left the party when Francis walked in with fifteen prostitutes, but does anyone seriously think he did not know what was going on? Whoever reported it up the chain of command would eventually have to report it to the admiral, who was there and obviously did not consider anything wrong with a contractor...
supplying prostitutes to his officers.

Hugh Thompson, a helicopter pilot in the Vietnam War who saw the carnage at the My Lai massacre, stopped to rescue some survivors. He reported the incident up his chain of command and the Army buried the story. Subsequently, Thompson became an outsider in the organization and was assigned some of the most difficult combat assignments without backup firepower. He had five helicopters shot out from under him in an effort to get him killed.34

Another option is to go outside the organization and become a whistleblower. This takes a lot of courage and willingness to lose one’s job, to become a pariah within the organization, or even to risk incarceration. “Statutory protections are filled with gaps and exemptions that leave them [whistleblowers] highly exposed. Internal channels are sometimes worse than ineffective—the offices tasked with protecting whistleblowers are often used to retaliate against them. Beyond administrative retaliation, whistleblowers increasingly face harsh criminal prosecution. And extreme secrecy requirements often impede their defense attorneys.”35 It is counter to military culture for officers to go outside the organization to report wrong doing and become a whistleblower. It takes a lot of moral courage and indignation to come forward because whistleblowers are routinely not dealt with fairly. Sergeant Joe Darby, the whistleblower for Abu Ghraib, was in hiding for a year to protect his life. “For this act of courage, he was vilified by his fellow soldiers, his friends, and even his family.”36

The next option for the person is to ignore the unethical behavior and become “ethically neutral.”37 They can decide not to partake in the activities, but also not to report them. Several Soldiers at My Lai massacre refused to participate in the killing of innocent civilians and children, but they also chose not to report it either. A young Soldier in the unit named Bernhardt wrote frequently to his Congressman to complain about life in his unit and in Vietnam. Following the actions at My Lai, his company commander made it clear that Bernhardt might not make it home alive if he reported the massacre.38 The full story of the atrocity did not appear until a year had passed. A Soldier, Ronald Ridenhour, who was not there at the massacre but heard about it while he was in Vietnam, did a personal investigation and waited until he was out of Vietnam before he wrote a letter to numerous members of Congress to report it. The Army did an investigation and uncovered this atrocity. Many knew about it and yet said nothing becoming “ethically neutral.”39

A fourth option is to adopt the values of the organization to fit in. Many adopt behaviors associated with the group such as accepting bribes, shooting innocents, or anything they believe illustrates their devotion to the team. The people who falsified the accounts for Wells Fargo, the young men who murdered innocent civilians in Vietnam, the Air Force officers who cheated on their tests, and many others who succumb to organizational pressures are not monsters looking to commit atrocities. Instead, they represent the cross-sections of Americans who live next door simply trying to do their jobs. It is easier to fit in and do what your boss asks, not make waves or cause a disturbance, and be a part of the team rather than risk excommunication from the group. Both Milgram and Zimbardo proved this true in their experiments.

Last, they could leave the organization without doing anything about it. In My Lai, one Soldier shot himself in the foot to get evacuated and not be a part of that atrocity.40 There are
those in the Pacific Fleet who resigned their commission rather than be a part of a corrupt organization. A Navy officer in Hong Kong, David Schaus, flagged a fraudulent sewage bill from Glenn Defense and reported it to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. He was stunned when the Naval Criminal Investigative Service dropped the case. Disillusioned, he left the military after other people in the Navy “made my life hell” when they learned he blew the whistle on Fat Leonard. In Schaus’ case, he reported inside the organization, outside the organization, and finally left the organization. If the ethical problem is an individual, the organization can fire them or punish them in some manner. The question remains, how do leaders address ethical issues that involve the entire organization?

**Solutions**

For an organization to safeguard themselves from unethical conduct, potential solutions must be sufficiently broad to address ethical concerns. The remainder of this essay explores a broad strategy to combat and mitigate unethical behavior. First, the organization must recognize that environmental conditions and human tendencies contribute to an increased likelihood of unethical decisions. Second, the organization needs to develop internal and external checks to mitigate the possibility of bounded ethicality. Third, the organization should focus on building ethical leaders at every level through systematic and concerted efforts. Finally, the organization should embrace processes that assist decision makers in making sound, ethical decisions.

The first step to addressing unethical organizational behavior is to recognize trends that indicate larger problems. To accurately assess the organization, those in charge need to distinguish structural, institutional, and systemic factors involved in creating a poor organizational climate that lays the groundwork for unethical activity. As leaders recognize the factors leading to a poor climate, it is imperative they take steps to address those behaviors so that everyone understands the organization’s ethical standards and demands.

Through conscious reflection, organizational leaders should review both the formal and informal systems employed throughout the organization to ensure they foster ethical decisions. Leaders need to recognize the importance of humility and moral courage in preventing and correcting unethical decisions, as well as foster critical thinking in their organization to identify the potential for bad decisions. While accountability for poor behavior is necessary to correct problematic areas, developing approaches to reward individuals and teams who are creating a positive, healthy climate is also important. Yet, mechanisms for punishment or reward also need to be thoroughly and periodically checked for unintended consequences so that they lead to positive ethical changes.

Johnson & Johnson stood as an exemplar of organizational ethics. In 1982, several people died from poisoned Tylenol. The Chief Executive Officer, James Burke, took unprecedented steps to resolve the problem. Not only did Johnson & Johnson issue a total recall for all Tylenol, they issued a refund to every consumer who returned the potentially tainted Tylenol, and created a tamper proof seal that would become the industry standard. While Johnson & Johnson could have just settled the cases against them and taken the losses, they elected to aggressively address the issue based on their values and mission displayed in their credo. In spite of the daunting up-front costs, Johnson & Johnson did the right thing for consumers, society, and their stakeholders by unequivocally acknowledging...
the hazard, working to correct the problem, and restoring trust in the Tylenol product and the Johnson & Johnson organization.43

Walter Earl Fluker, in Ethical Leadership, challenges leaders to develop what he calls “communities of discourse and praxis.”44 In other words, leaders need communities in order to get a more holistic view of themselves and their organization. Through an intentional process of incorporating stakeholders and non-affiliated outsiders, these communities can effectively get leaders out of their organizational bubble and force them to look at themselves more honestly. Such communities also provide a framework for helping leaders see their organization more honestly, perhaps allowing them to recognize deeper seated issues than previously identified. Fluker states, “Defiant acts of courage are dangerous and risky by nature, but the power of community serves as the source of motivation and resilience.”45 While such communities may not address every problem, they can help ensure leaders are more honest brokers and more ably target conditions created by bounded ethicality.

In the case of Johnson & Johnson and Tylenol, such extraordinary courage was key to the successful transition from tragedy to recovery and growth. A courageous naval aviator, Paula Coughlin, stepped forward in 1992 to describe the horrendous events at Tailhook ’91. Understanding the risks she took wearing her dress uniform on public television to speak truth, she boldly journeyed into the fray of a culture marred by toxic masculinity and exposed a cancer in dire need of removal. While the cancer of toxic masculinity still remains nearly 29 years later, women now occupy a much larger space within the military and the activities that occurred at Tailhook ’91 appear backward and unconscionable in our current environment. Coughlin’s actions, and those of her supporters, contributed to better aligning actions within the military to the values and morals espoused by American service men and women.46

Another aspect of addressing unethical organizational behavior is to develop ethical leaders throughout the organization. While leaders have tremendous influence on the overall ethicality of an organization, small groups within the organization still possess the ability to act unethically. By incorporating ethical decision making training into organizational training, establishing a code of conduct, laying out expectations in a clear fashion, enforcing appropriate rewards and punishments for behavior, and establishing a transparent process to air grievances and concerns, the organization establishes a starting point for developing and ensuring the ethical behavior of its members.

Finally, organizational processes should encourage ethical behavior. In a 2008 study centered on the effect of making choices, the authors found, “Making choices apparently depleted a precious self-resource because subsequent self-regulation was poorer among those who had made choices than it was among those who had not.”47 For our purpose here, this means that an organization needs to develop processes that intentionally limit choices made by its members. Designing networks of decision makers throughout the organization to feed other decision makers could reduce the toll of decision making throughout the organization. Such a system also provides more opportunities for the organization to discern, deliberate, and utilize Fluker’s model of ethical decision-making.48 These processes should include a mechanism to challenge potential decisions, such as ‘red teaming,’ that allow raising objections and addressing biases.

Solutions designed to prevent unethical, immoral, or criminal behavior are not readily
apparent in most situations and are often challenging to implement. The organization should embrace what Ronald Heifetz calls “adaptive leadership.” In Heifetz’s work with Marty Linsky, *Leadership on the Line*, they state, “Without learning new ways—changing attitudes, values, and behaviors—people cannot make the adaptive leap necessary to thrive in the new environment.”

Critical thinking, moral courage, humility, unbiased input (from outside or inside the organization), red teaming, explicit consequences for unethical behavior, and codes of conduct are all necessary factors in shaping ethical organizational behavior that has the capacity to adapt to new and varied challenges.

**Conclusion**

Organizations are complex and diverse entities. They have histories, interests, and goals that pose real challenges for ethical activity. Organizations that desire to be ethical must take note of the myriad ways unethical cultures can arise and take steps to address such challenges. Barriers to ethical activity like moral disengagement, ethical fading, craft ethics, administrative evil, and bounded ethicality are overcome through courageous moral action, but organizations should not plan as if such acts are going to occur naturally. Instead, ethical organizations like Johnson & Johnson begin by deliberately cultivating an ethical framework to ensure that the organization remains adaptive and postured to deal with the changing ethical landscapes of the future. While individuals and organizations can act ethically or unethically, organizations can learn from history and particular case studies in order to formulate promising solutions that motivate individuals and organizations to be more ethical. While it might be impossible to determine the true source of unethical behavior, whether it comes from a bad apple or a bad barrel, leaders have the ability and responsibility to prepare for either and address both.

**NOTES**


2. Ethics throughout this paper is largely defined as a *system of moral codes that guide behavior*.


27. Ibid, 75.


31. Ibid, 21-23.


42. Ann E. Tenbrunsel, and David M. Messick, pg. 234.

43. Francisco Szekely and Zahir Dossa, Beyond the Triple Bottom Line: Eight Steps toward a Sustainable

45. Ibid., Loc. 1967.


Bureaucracy in
Service of a
Madman

by Matthew Tompkins

When President Nixon attempted his “Madman Theory” gambit to pressure the North Vietnamese into peace talks, he is said to have instructed Henry Kissinger to “slip word to them that ‘For God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’” Kissinger and other senior cabinet officials went about doing so, in meetings and calls with Soviet and other counterparts in an effort to convince the adversary that the unthinkable might just be possible.

But what of the rest of the National Security apparatus? By serving in the agencies that would carry out the policies threatened or considered, every military officer, diplomat and civilian official was part of the Nixon Administration and a source for interlocutors to assess whether the threats really were credible—whether the President really was mad.

For those unfamiliar with the gambit, it was a response to the determination by strategists that nuclear weapons were so disproportionately catastrophic that no sane, rational leader could credibly threaten their use. The ploy was to convince the adversary that leadership wasn’t rational, at least not on the matter at hand. That despite even counterproductive repercussions, a decision maker was ready to take the actions threatened if pushed over the brink—thus bequeathing international relations the term brinksmanship. Although Nixon’s efforts to pressure the North Vietnamese popularized the idea, it actually emerged from the earlier work of strategists and game theorists like Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn that underpinned many of the mutual deterrence strategies employed in the Cold War. And although it was developed as part of a theoretical body of nuclear strategy, it’s a tactic that could be employed to add credibility to any threat so seemingly disproportionate or immoral that it lacks credibility as a result.

So in that Vietnam episode or in the future, how could a professional, apolitical bureaucracy serve honorably when the strategy at hand specifically depends on speaking out-of-turn about

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whether the President is unstable? And really, if undertaken effectively the gambit removes the euphemism: it calls on those expected to loyally execute the President’s orders to convince their contacts that they believe the Commander in Chief to be so unfit to make the decisions at hand that they’re depending on an opponent’s cooperation to navigate the crisis.

When I talk of “speaking out of turn,” I’m setting a high standard for professionalism—that professionals in the diplomatic, military, and civil services should not only faithfully execute the lawful orders of duly elected leadership, but that such service includes refraining from open disparagement of that leadership or its decisions. I’ve made the case for that more circumspect professionalism elsewhere. Reasonable people may retort that it is acceptable or even responsible for the bureaucracy to openly criticize elected and appointed leaders or even to actively resist.

But bureaucrats unencumbered by a professional expectation of dutiful discretion face little dilemma in the madman theory, as they’re free to speak openly. The more challenging question is how to balance the demands of the strategy (“put the word out that I’m crazy and out of control”) if one simultaneously hopes to maintain a professional standard that makes doing so unacceptable.

There are a number of questions guiding the professional official’s decisions:

**Does the official know the truth of the leader’s rationality, or is (s)he left to speculate with the rest of the world?**

Knowing the leader’s mental state actually simplifies things to the point of almost absolute clarity. Whether you find the threatened action acceptable or immoral, you can follow the orders of the rational leader engaging in deception, or follow your conscience when serving the madman.

But few will be in the privileged position of knowing the truth of the matter. No deception campaign succeeds by reading-in every member of the rank-and-file, so a critical component of effective deception is letting those down the chain of command believe that madness really is in the offing and spread the word that much more credibly. For such officials left to speculate, other questions become relevant.

**Does the official at hand find the threatened act to be fundamentally immoral, or acceptable (even if ill-advised)?**

If you join the outside world in finding the threat to be lunacy, your personal decision-making is less ambiguous, although much more consequential. History has judged that in the face of immoral orders the only responsible endpoint is resignation. The calculus then becomes a question of when and how to resign, which for most will depend on how involved your individual responsibilities are in carrying out the threatened course of action. But once heading down a path that could culminate in resignation, there’s little to lose and everything to gain in putting the word out to avert the crisis. If it all turns out to be a bluff, you’ll have inadvertently done your part to help sell it. If the threat is real, if the president is mad, sharing that concern with your contacts will end up being signposts along the road to resignation.

If the you consider the threatened action to be lawful and would be prepared to do your part—large or small—in carrying it out, then there is little question that your professional obligation is to toe the party line. You may find the threat to be ill-advised and your interlocutors may worry it’s mad or believe it’s not credible. But professional bureaucrats implement policies they disagree with every day, and the outside world’s reaction to this one shouldn’t make it any different. Yet the uncertainty remains which decision you’re faithfully implementing: a grave threat or a deception campaign that depends on
convincing the adversary of your leadership’s rabid lunacy?

*Does the official believe the leader is truly irrational, or only feigning madness to make an outsized threat more credible?*

The officials facing this dilemma can at least be left with one small consolation—what you do or don’t say is unlikely to have an impact. Whether sounding alarm bells or remaining stoically silent, your response to the “lunacy” of the threat will almost certainly end up a Rorschach test that reflects what your interlocutors already believe rather than shifting their conclusions. In your silence the panicked will see confirmation in the form of an apparently untroubled bureaucracy ready to follow orders, while the skeptical will recognize a bluff if such an unreasonable threat is treated so nonchalantly by those responsible for its execution. In your warnings, the worried will see corroboration, while the skeptical are likely to remain so in the face of what they still believe to be a deception campaign masking a hollow threat.

Only if a varied and broad chorus of officials start sounding the alarm and even resigning might the skeptical become convinced that the threat is real. Given the uncertainty described above, this chorus would be composed of a combination of the morally alarmed who believe the President to be mad and the dutiful who believe they are supporting the deception.

**Figure 1. Hypothetical Official’s Decision Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICIAL’S PERSONAL MORAL DETERMINATION</th>
<th>OFFICIAL’S KNOWLEDGE OR BELIEF OF TRUE INTENTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threatened action is morally acceptable</td>
<td>Knows the president’s true state and intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Confident president is sane and bluffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertain, or confident president is sincere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened action is morally unacceptable</td>
<td>Follows orders supporting deception or preparing to execute policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support deception risking pointless unprofessional behavior if mistaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support policy risking little if wrong, apart from missed opportunity to support deception campaign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Threatened action is morally unacceptable | Follows orders supporting deception or preparing to execute policy |
|                                          | Support deception risking pointless unprofessional behavior if mistaken |
|                                          | Support policy risking little if wrong, apart from missed opportunity to support deception campaign |

**Speak Up, Unless You’re Ready to Follow Through**

What a muddled mess. This is why madness—feigned or genuine—has no place in national security decision making.

But where in the quandary does that then leave the responsible professional? From the aggregate answers to the questions above, it follows that any official who finds the president’s threatened act morally unacceptable should speak out against it. You’ll either be supporting the deception, trying to stave off disaster, or proceeding down your path to resignation. If instead the threatened action doesn’t cross any moral lines that would keep you from doing your part, then you should do just that—act without vocal dissent if you believe or know the threat to be genuine, or otherwise feign concern about the madness in the offing.

And if you’re uncertain of the sincerity of the threat, it’s time to return to the debate that was triaged above—whether you believe it is unprofessional for the professional bureaucracy to publicly dissent from decisions or leadership that is lawful but ill-advised.

Of course, in the end Nixon’s gambit failed. One could argue that there have been other successful applications of this kind of strategic uncertainty, and it’s been speculated that Nixon was trying to replicate Eisenhower’s effective nuclear threats against the Chinese to end the
However, that incident hewed much more closely to Schelling’s conception of the “threat that leaves something to chance.” It left open the possibility that professionals behaving responsibly and following standard operating procedures might inadvertently escalate into a nuclear attack, rather than depending on them acting unprofessionally to sell the idea of presidential madness. This analysis of how such professionals might struggle to do so is a reminder that in an era when information is much more open, strategic deception aimed at opposing national leaders can easily sweep up rank-and-file members of the national security architecture at great peril to policy execution.

NOTES


The Challenges in Joint Interagency Task Force operations in a Predatory State

by Mark D. Natale

The theory of a joint interagency task force (JIATF) operating in a predatory state or disparaging regime is perhaps the largest practical and contemporary challenge that military and interagency officers face in the field today. Utilizing the doctrinal terms and globalization theories studied thus far, this article attempts to examine the theory of a “predatory state” and apply it to the real-world case study of the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) operating from 2012 to 2015 under a corrupt regime. Trying to conduct humanitarian aid, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense (FID) missions in a region affected by a predatory regime is extremely difficult. The political policies and international relations between the U.S. and the Philippines were affected by the tactical actions of troops on the ground. JSOTF-P’s actions were critical to maintaining a military partnership in order to fight Islamic extremists in the region, but the question remains, does a JIATF have the capability and capacity to succeed while operating under a predatory state?

The term “predatory state” or a “predatory regime” refers to the social model in which a host nation’s governmental apparatus takes advantage of the economic resources and social influence of the people in order to give them a marked advantage, at the expense of the populace. In his article “When is a State Predatory?” James A. Robinson, states that predatory behavior of an oppressive regime occurs:

when “large endowments of natural resources tends to induce elites to be predatory and would be associated empirically with poor policy”; when “having resource endowments with a lot of assets which are complementary to public investment (in the sense that they increase its marginal productivity), such as human capital, tends to induce good policy”; when “political regimes that are intrinsically unstable, perhaps because they are illegitimate, or because

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society is highly mobilized politically, will tend to have bad policy”; and, finally, when “large benefits from political power leads to bad policy in exactly these three sets of circumstances: when a country is, (1) heavily endowed with natural resources, (2) when it is poor in assets complementary to public investment and, (3) when regimes are intrinsically unstable.”

Utilizing Robinson’s criteria in forecasting where and when predatory states will emerge and overlaying that data with the regions in which the U.S. military will operate—future conflict zones and areas of instability—provides a clear correlation. The U.S. will be forced to operate in regions with a higher probability of predatory states and instability in future conflicts. This ethical concern of operating an interagency task force in a predatory regime is not new and will increase in future conflicts. J. Patrice McSherry, author of the book, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America, illustrates U.S. task force ethical concerns about enabling and cooperating with the morally corrupt elements of an oppressive regime. In McSherry’s example, military and government forces of Chile abducted university students and conducted tortuous interrogation for over 30 days in 1974. The predatory government, assisted by the U.S. military, targeted social activists and university scholars for anti-regime and subversive actions. This partner task force was called “Operation Condor,” and the U.S. was a key element in supporting the regime: “Acting as an unofficial partner, or secret sponsor, of the Condor system, the United States greatly expanded Condor’s lethal reach via the continental communications system.”

Operation Condor is an example of how U.S. interests can be supported by a regime in a predatory state. This task force was able to operate in this oppressive regime because the administration in power was key to U.S. democratic influence in the region. As a result, the U.S. ignored the human rights violations of the citizens in Chile because it was divergent from the American national interests. Upsetting this balance of power in Chile would have opened the country up to communist influence, potentially destabilizing South America. In the previous example, the ethical dilemma of the U.S. taking advantage of the situation by supporting a predatory regime for national goals in South America circumvents the legitimacy of the task force in the international community. James Galbraith examines this idea of predatory states being leveraged to enact U.S. foreign policy on behalf of the national interests. In previous examples, the use of military power was critical to influence and control; however, there is a shift to adopt economic, diplomatic, and social tools to allow an interagency task force to succeed in an oppressed environment. Galbraith writes in the American Journal of Economics and Sociology that changing from using unilateral military power to collective security authority is key to success in contemporary interagency endeavors. Galbraith aims at replacing the current global economic system “based on military power, financed through the dollar system” with “a system of collective international security, domestic full employment, infrastructure renewal, and technological leadership.”

To further define the predatory state, Galbraith explains that the entire structure and apparatus of the system is designed to give advantage to the regime over the citizens. “The predator state is a system where entire sectors have been built up to feast upon public systems...
These “built up systems” that the regime uses to control the population and profit from external assistance from foreign governments is a tool that masks the true intention of the regime and allows for ambiguity in rendering aid. When an interagency task force or U.S. government group aligns with the regime, the citizenry of that country is already at a disadvantage because the U.S. national objectives are more closely convergent with the host nation regime and not necessarily with its citizens. This alignment also means that trying to engage in humanitarian aid or stability operations will be difficult for joint staff and commanders to plan for, because the regime will benefit from the U.S. involvement, and the end state of the mission may never be reached. In his work, *The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Authoritarian Features*, Nathan G. Quimpo argues that the violence, political corruption, and government fraud used against the average citizen has left the Filipino people cynical and leery of outside involvement and critical of the bureaucracy of their government. Unequivocally, “predatory states” are on the rise; therefore, U.S. involvement in these areas will become more common to secure its influence. This is exactly what occurred in the Philippines. Historically, the U.S. had strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific Theater; therefore, gaining influence, in the Philippines was critical. Examples of this struggle to exert influence can be traced prior to the Filipino-American war and continue to the present day. Quimpo argues that U.S. foreign policy with the Philippines not only satisfied the U.S. government’s objectives in Asia, but also enabled the regime to stay entrenched in its political power system and become an economic powerhouse in the region. “The institutional innovations during the American period brought about the transformation of the Filipino elite into a powerful political-economic elite.” This is not the only historical context of the U.S. using JIATFs to bridge the gap between regime politics and U.S. government objectives. Similar examples can be seen in Afghanistan, South America, and Africa, such as the Joint Interagency Task Force-West, which focused on narcoterrorism and drug trade interdiction and the use of Joint Interagency Task Force-South in providing humanitarian aid to citizens of predatory and unstable regions.

These examples illustrate the point that conducting operations in a JIATF can simultaneously achieve U.S. national goals while aiding civilians; however, the risk of enabling predatory regimes remains a risk to the ethical legitimacy of the task force. James McLay of the U.S. Naval War College, states that JIATFs “represent a contemporary, whole-of-government approach to national issues by aligning authorities and capabilities of disparate agencies under one operational commander with a focused mission…” This unique trans-agency and military organization allows commanders to utilize assets and capabilities not easily accessible within the Department of Defense (DoD) and rely on other national assets. This whole of government approach creates an economic use of resources against a certain problem set. What happens, however, when that “problem set” is either created or enforced by the very regime the JIATF sets out to support? What ethical and political dilemmas exist? For example, should the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) share dossiers of known political activists with a regime that will undoubtedly use that information to unlawfully detain these individuals? Should the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) push a media campaign...
that overlooks the human rights violations perpetrated by a political candidate that is pro-U.S.? Should U.S. Special Forces, as part of a JSOTF, partner with militaries that utilize child soldiers in order to combat terrorism that threatens U.S. interests in the region? These are some of the ethical dilemmas and issues that face task forces operating in a predatory state.

The scale or continuum of acceptable regime oppression is dictated by the social norms and customs of the international community, compared to the regime and the domain in which the oppression occurs. If a classical definition of a “predatory state” similar to the theory that James K. Galbraith puts forward in his book, *The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned The Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too*, is used, it can be determined that a state utilizing subtle predatory mechanisms to oppress its citizens is far more acceptable in supporting than a regime that overtly and violently oppresses its people. The U.S. can support a JIATF working with a country that has moderate levels of individual freedoms and is considered relatively free but has economic systems in place that prey on lower class systems and take advantage of the common wealth of the people. In this case, the people are not being violently oppressed, but the mere infrastructure of their economic system inherently oppresses people. In this instance, the U.S. would technically be engaged with a predatory state; however, the national strategic objectives outweigh the economic oppression of the regime. An example of an acceptable predatory state that has questionable economic policies, but a higher rating in human rights is the Czech Republic.

The Czech Republic has an economic system that relies heavily on exports and takes advantage of service industries, which some could argue exploit their lower-class citizens, and some of its socialist models for welfare and wealth are based on an oppressive, former soviet model. However, on the social freedom scale, the Czech Republic is ranked very high in Europe and the world. The Freedom House group developed a points system, where the higher the number, the more often those traits were present in the government/society. Freedom House rates the Czech Republic in the top 10 percent of free nations in Europe. Czech Republic was graded as a 38 out of 40 for political rights application, 12 out of 12 for election process integrity, 15 out of 16 for political inclusion, and a 57 out of 60 for the application of civil liberties. Although the Czech Republic’s economic model is based on exploiting resources, exports, and labor services, technically being classified as a predatory economic state, this is overcome by the extremely high rankings related to social freedoms. This is why U.S. JIATFs can partner with a semi-predatory state in order to achieve U.S. objectives in Europe and at the Russian border, because the JIATF can do so without fear that the Czech government will unfairly oppress its people. This is a more politically acceptable option than partnering with a regime that openly participates in human rights violations and genocides.

Galbraith’s definition that mainly focuses on economic oppression is not the only criteria in determining if a regime is predatory. In fact, these additional criteria have more relevance and limit a JIATF more than other considerations. A substantial challenge for a JIATF or JSOTF is partnering with an element of the regime (military, police, or even a warlord) that regularly engages in human rights violations in order to accomplish a specific objective. In the Philippines, U.S. forces from JSOTF-P were
The perception [of the average Filipino] is that the U.S. will support the regime over the people because of the strategic goals the U.S. has in the region.

and resulted in the Filipino military using the training it acquired to combat its citizens in Duterte’s war on drugs. JSOTF-P’s mission of combating terrorism in the Philippines joint operations area on behalf of the U.S. government to secure its interests in the region was circumvented by the Filipino military’s use of U.S.-provided training in a manner inconsistent with the ethical norms of the U.S. military. This strained the task force and put military leaders at odds with their agency counterparts. Members of the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and USAID all had different concerns in the interactions of the U.S. military with its Filipino counterparts.

The Philippines is not just a predatory state when it comes to the application of the military and police forces against its citizenry, it is also a predatory system established by the powerful legislators in the political sphere. In 2008, Nathan Quimpo wrote a political commentary piece, “Philippines: The Return of the Predatory Regime.” In the commentary, Quimpo describes how the return of the political elite ensured that the Philippines remain a predatory state because of the control of the government by a few, powerful, corrupt officials:

It is unlikely that the Philippines in the near future will significantly turn away from predatory or clientelist politics. Predatory and clientelist elements are much too strong and the forces for democratic reform are much too weak. The patronalistic parties of the elite control the upper house of Congress fully and hold an overwhelming majority in the lower house.

Quimpo illustrates the point that the political reforms required to turn the Philippines into a genuine democracy are far too weak to be effective. As long as the U.S. government, through organizations like JSOTF-P, supports the incumbent regime, the perception of the average citizen will not change. The perception is that the U.S. will support the regime over the people because of the strategic goals the U.S. has in the region. Quimpo continues:

The predatory regime has made a comeback in present-day Philippines. Over the past decade, and especially over the past few years, the levels of political corruption, fraud and violence have reached such alarming levels that many Filipinos have grown despondent, even cynical, about their country’s political system.¹⁰

The question remains, how does JSOTF-P
respond? Does the task force remove support to the military and regime in total? Can the Special Forces community tailor its training to reduce the chances for misuse? Can anything be done without jeopardizing the U.S. national strategic objectives in the Philippines and Asia? These were the concerns that JSOTF-P faced, which eventually lead to a Phase V draw down of U.S. forces in 2015. JSOTF-P became an issue for President Duterte’s administration, and he called for the potential removal of U.S. forces from the region. Duterte was interested in aligning with other military powers in Asia-Pacific that were able to provide support similar to that of JSOTF-P, without the regulations or restrictions. Powers like China and Russia were seen as possible replacements for JSOTF-P. The U.S. PACOM commander rebutted these claims that JSOTF-P fell victim to political pressure by saying that the closure of JSOTF-P was nested in the Philippine strategy:

We’re not going to walk away from our support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but we’d like to broaden it in a way that is consistent with the way forward that the Armed Forces of the Philippines sees it…we don’t necessarily need a 600-man train-and-assist mission down there to try to teach them how to do something that they now know how to do.\(^{11}\)

As Duterte took power and reevaluated the U.S.-Philippine military agreements, the training mission of JSOTF-P tapered off and quietly ended; however, the equipping phase of the Task Force continued:

According to the U.S. Embassy in Manila, 300 M4 carbines, 200 Glock 21 pistols, 4 M134D Gatling-style machine guns, and 100 M203 grenade launchers were delivered May 18–22 to Clark Air Base, while 25 new Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) with outboard motors were delivered on May 30 to PMC (Philippine Marine Corps) Headquarters. The deliveries were just the latest in a series that have continued even after Duterte took office. In January, JUSMAG (Joint United States Military Assistance Group) representatives delivered new military equipment to the Philippine Army and Marine Corps, including over 400 M203 grenade launchers, 85 M40A5 sniper rifles, and a RQ-11B Raven unmanned aerial vehicle system consisting of three drones for exclusive use and ownership by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.\(^{12}\)

Does an interagency task force, operating under the oppressive Duterte regime, bear some moral or ethical responsibility on how the government of the Philippines employs this training and weapons?

These military systems and weapons were delivered to the Republic of the Philippines even when political negotiations began for the withdrawal and removal of JSOTF-P and the U.S. military contingent from Zamboanga City. Filipino military units misusing training from U.S. Special Forces was now a minor concern compared to the possible influx of U.S. military-grade weapons that flooded the region. Does an interagency task force, operating under the oppressive Duterte regime, bear some moral or ethical responsibility on how the government of the Philippines employs this training and weapons? This concern is especially important when there is a history of questionable actions taken by the regime. U.S. government regulation and legislation were created to control this misuse of military assistance by predatory states.

The Leahy Laws are regulations that prohibit the DoD from providing military assistance to foreign forces that violate human rights or conduct gross violations of the Geneva
This restriction of military training, aid, and equipment flowing from the U.S. to predatory states limited the actions JSOTF-P could take during the Phase V drawdown and transition. The Philippine government and military using the training and equipment meant to combat terrorism for drug enforcement and policing was interpreted as a violation of the Leahy Laws. This affected JSOTF-P by limiting training and equipment for Filipino ground forces; however, other parts of the military and government were unaffected, especially components of the Philippine naval force and air force. Daniel Mahanty demonstrates that the Leahy Law provides a guideline for U.S. forces in dealing with predatory states; however, he concedes that even in the cases of known Leahy Law violations, it does not fully end all assistance: “Little prevents the U.S. from legally providing massive amounts of military assistance to countries with highly problematic records of conduct like Egypt and the Philippines.”

There is an apparatus that vets these units; however, JSOTF-P was unable to keep arms and training that was already supplied from being misused by the regime.

In 2013, two major, unexpected events slowed progress toward the transition. The Zamboanga siege in September involved an insurgent assault and a prolonged hostage crisis in one of the Philippines’ largest and densest urban littoral environments. Two months later, a devastating typhoon hit the southern Philippines and pressed the small JSOTF-P into emergency relief assistance activities as the only nearby U.S. force with desperately needed knowledge, medical and CA (Civil Affairs) expertise, equipment, and transport.

During this time, the authorities granted to JSOTF-P and the cooperation agreements made with the Philippine government and U.S. Embassy Chief of Mission were in a state of change and instability. The invasion of Zamboanga City by guerrilla fighters and Muslim extremists gave JSOTF-P and interagency partners an immediate tactical focus beyond training Filipino forces in FID and changed the policy negotiations from concerns about the misuse of U.S. training to kinetic military operations.

Again, the ethical considerations and dilemma for JSOTF-P was how should a task force respond? Multiple news sources and watch groups, including Human Rights Watch, reported that human rights violations had been documented as occurring on both sides. Multiple witnesses during the Zamboanga siege said that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Misuari forces had taken hostages and used them as human shields: “The Philippine government claimed that the Moro National Liberation...
Front were using civilian hostages as human shields. MNLF commanders claimed that they were using the civilians as guides, as they are not familiar of the area.”

JSOTF-P was unable to independently verify if civilians had been targeted by the extremists. Furthermore, counter accusations from the fighters had claimed that the Armed Forces of the Philippines and police had engaged in human rights abuses, including beatings of suspects, burning of homes, and summary executions. These claims appeared to come from multiple sources and were partially verified, which meant the U.S. had trained and supported a regime that was fighting a strong domestic counterinsurgency while impeding the rights of its citizens. JSOTF-P had few options and maintained the role of advising, assisting, reporting, and defensive operations to protect American service members in the Philippine joint operating area.

The argument could be made that the Philippines had been acting as a predatory state in this instance as a mechanism of survival. A violent insurgency had crept from the southern islands to the urban center of Manila, and many of its citizens were pushing for a stronger military presence in order to combat the revolt. Military and police units were corrupt, inefficient, and poorly armed and trained. JSOTF-P’s training mission helped immensely, even with the restrictions and limitations placed on it from the Leahy Laws, the U.S. ambassador, and interagency political boundaries. The RAND Corporation released in its report, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” that even with these limitations and restrictions, the greatest victory for JSOTF-P was the success of the interagency cooperation efforts made over a 14-year period...

The report further praises tools and working groups inside JSOTF-P that were able to leverage influence outside the Philippine regime in order to partner with civilian organizations that were neutral and could ensure a fair application of aid. This was a critical component of effectively operating in a predatory environment. The report further states that:

In addition, the creation of structures such as the Mindanao Working Group provided enduring mechanisms for achieving whole-of-government synergy... JSOTF-P’s relationship with USAID grew and strengthened over the years. The placement of a JSOTF-P LNO [liaison officer] at USAID’s Manila office and a USAID LNO at JSOTF-P permitted increased collaboration in later years to reduce redundancy, increase effectiveness, and provide USAID a secure location in Mindanao.

These working groups and systems gave JSOTF-P the ability to leverage different aspects of the U.S.’s elements of national power. In some instances, where military power was inappropriate, restricted, or fully outlawed, the task force was able to leverage economic and...
diplomatic elements of power to affect the region without directly engaging with and supporting a predatory regime. Nongovernmental organizations and third-party working groups acted as vetted, impartial agents able to operate in public spheres where the military, CIA, and FBI could not.

For a JIATF to operate and navigate...in a predatory state, a level of nuanced political savvy and education is needed.

For a JIATF to operate and navigate among an authoritative regime, religious extremists, and an oppressed people living in a predatory state, a level of nuanced political savvy and education is needed. Dr. Imtiyaz Yusuf of the Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion, Assumption University in Bangkok, Thailand, has a quite unique view of the relationship between the predatory nature of the Philippines and its cultural and religious makeup. The connections and correlations that Dr. Imtiyaz makes between Islam in Asia leans upon some of Asef Bayat’s observations of the Muslim religion and Arabic culture under the oppressed and predatory regimes found in the middle east. Imitiyaz states:

The Philippines is guided by Catholic values.... Muslims in the Philippines are in the minority. Islam is one of the officially recognized religions however, they are facing ethno-religious insurgent movements based on an ideology that views Islam from an ethnic perspective, laying stress on kinship, language and culture. In the post-Suharto era and after 9/11, jihadist extremism surfaced in the region. Indonesia and Malaysia have been largely successful in combating terrorism. But [in the Philippines] at the popular level, the stress of economic development, and the confrontation with materialistic modernity and consumerist globalization, is driving many Southeast Asian Muslims to seek refuge in orthodox and puritanical interpretations of Islamic theology.¹⁹

Understanding that the complexity of Islam in Asia is not an isolated occurrence and does not necessarily prescribe to the fallacy of Middle Eastern Islamic exceptionalism. Appreciating the fact that Islam in Asia is a complex, growing, and influential system is key to operating in the region. It does not mean that predatory regimes in Asia predetermine the destiny of oppressed people nor does it guarantee that the citizens will not rise up against the administration. Truthfully, the influence of Islam in Asia provides choices for the oppressed, not a guaranteed, predetermined membership in a violent extremist group. Understanding that people living under a predatory state may turn to Islam as a way to join a reputable orthodox Islamic group, a secular political party, or religious-based humanitarian rights group may be the noblest way to combat the power of the regime. Understanding the religious, cultural, and social implications of Catholic and Islamic groups under a predatory state gives an interagency task force, such as JSOTF-P, the ability to transcend governments and organizations and leverage groups that would normally not assist the military. This was evident in JSOTF-P’s partnership with the Philippine Red Cross, Philippine Red Crescent, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Disaster Law Programme during the 2013 typhoon that killed over 10,000 people.²⁰ JSOTF-P was able to react extremely well in providing humanitarian aid after the disaster, mainly due to the experience, equipment, and airborne assets prepositioned as part of JSOTF-P’s training mission. These assets were able to be quickly re-tasked and utilized in support of the new mission.

This undertaking was an excellent example of JSOTF-P’s capability and flexibility in
conducting operations, other than military training and assistance. In doing so, many of the obstacles and limitations placed on the task force was removed in order to assist and support the people of the region. From firsthand accounts, the speed and cooperation of the task force was unmatched during this time. As compared to the slower and often bureaucratic process in training and equipping foreign militaries, the humanitarian aid mission was met with overwhelming support, and many restrictions were immediately lifted. The removal of restricted fly zones, troop capacity caps, and interagency/interservice transportation and funding rules were either waived or rescinded.

This is perhaps the best-case scenario and optimal mission set for an interagency task force operating under a predatory regime.

Predatory states may not be predatory in every instance, such as when they require humanitarian aid or are participating in an allied-partner military exercise. The primary example of regimes exhibiting predatory behavior comes from fighting internal insurgencies and rebel groups. The military defines the training and assistance it gives to nation-states fighting an internal insurgency as foreign internal defense (FID). Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense states:

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus of U.S. FID efforts is to support the host nation’s (HN’s) internal defense and development (IDAD).

The application of the FID model does not account for the host nation’s proclivity for oppression and if the state is defined as predatory. In these instances, a JIATF or JSOTF should evaluate the state using a predatory and corruption scale in order to determine the amount and quantity of the assistance that will be provided by the U.S. Several social, economic, and political models were used to determine the regime’s position on a predatory scale, specifically the Philippines rating of corruption, economics, and predatory behaviors from 2008 to 2017.

James A. Robinson’s predatory model shows the relationship between two different social groups: P (the social elite) and N (the group out of power) and compares this inverse relationship to the economic factors in the state. The economic factors are represented by K (capital), R (natural resources) and G (investment in the public good). The output from this equation results in: A(G)K+R, which provides an indicator in the investment quotient of the state. Investing in the public good, times the government’s access to capital, plus the quantity and availability of natural resources results in a metric, which can be mapped on a scale.

Using this model as a reference, the Philippines has an imbalance in the percentage of P (the elite in power) and N (citizens without any power). The model also does not differentiate in the definition of N, those considered not to wield any substantial social or political power. In order to compensate for the broad definition of N, a sub category should include the insurgency groups and social activists that use violence and military power. This violent subset in the Philippines is far more influential than the average oppressed citizen. Revolutionary groups (v) are a force multiplier that should be added to the calculation as a group capable of countering the predatory regime. P-N(v) is a more accurate indicator of the power of the regime. P-N(v)/A(G)K+R
indicates that the power of the elite, minus the influence of citizens, multiplied by revolutionary forces, divided by capital and resources. This model shows that the Philippines is considered a predatory regime, with a small social and economic elite clashing with its people over resources. As a result, the state is at a higher risk for an insurgency and would require greater assistance and FID support from the U.S.

Robinson’s model does not account for rogue actors or the power of social revolutions as a means of overthrowing the regime; however, this model provides compelling data, which supports the definition of the Philippines being labeled as a predatory state. This model not only supports the social definition of a predatory state, but also validates the regime as an economic predator. Trading Economics and Transparency International provided empirical data on the health of the economy, to include the state’s propensity and susceptibility for corruption, economic disparity, and destructive monetary trade practices. Out of 180 countries measured, the Republic of the Philippines ranked at number 141 on the corruption rank scale in 2008 and has trended down to number 111 in 2017. Ethiopia, Columbia, and China have been consistently ranked above the Philippines as being less corrupt regimes. The Philippines also received a 34 out of 100 in the perceived corruption index for 2017, putting the regime in the bottom of countries in Asia and the world. The Philippines economy is mainly based on agriculture and natural resources exports, which is a system that lends itself to being exploited by those in power. Arvind Ganesan and Alex Vines theorized that the fight over natural resources is one of the primary reasons why rebel groups start insurgencies and fight against the regime. “The availability of portable, high-value resources is an important reason that rebel groups form and civil wars break out, and that to end the abuses, one needs to target rebel group financing.” This theory works in some instances where resource-rich nations fight a civil war over oil, land, or minerals. However, this theory does not fully account for the unique system of finance that narco-terrorist organizations utilize with the drug commodity in Columbia, or the pirating ransoms used in Somalia, or the kidnappings used by the Islamic fighters in the jungles of the Philippines. These considerations must be planned for by the JIATF operating under the regime, and a training/assistance model must be developed to target the social, political, economic, and military risks.

Thus far, the qualitative data from Robinson’s model, the RAND report on JSOTF-P, and Quimpo’s regional case studies have shown that the Philippines is a social, political, and economic predator that used military aid and training received by the U.S. to conduct an internal “war on drugs,” which ultimately contributed to the rise of an Islamic insurgency. Major James T. McCabe of the Naval Postgraduate School summarized the mission of the JSOTF-P, as a subset of the Global War on Terrorism, may have been a successful application of FID in the short-term. However, the insurgency in the Philippines remains, and McCabe begs the question:

Has the impact of persistent engagement (operations) and building partner capacity (relationships) set the conditions for a peaceful future of the southern islands in the Philippines? Although the official determination of success has led to the completion of OEF-P [Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines], McCabe’s thesis shows it is possible that operations did not remove the root causes of threats from violent extremist organizations.
So, what does this mean to JSOTF-P and other joint, multinational, and interagency task forces charged with building relationships and training foreign partners in a predatory environment? The answer can be simplified to cooperation, collaboration, and understanding the strategic end state. In her article, “The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defense Strategy,” Linda Robinson credits the success of JSOTF-P to the interagency cooperation, the creation of working groups and cells, and the diplomatic expertise of the joint staff:

Increased emphasis was placed on creating fusion cells at higher echelons of command in Mindanao to foster intelligence sharing and police-military operational coordination. Finally, institutional development of forces and support to national military planning was also a focus of the later years of the campaign. Interagency cooperation is often stated as an objective and achieved to varying degrees. In the OEF-P campaign, the JSOTF-P benefited from the fact that four career ambassadors led the U.S. country team for the duration.27

What does this mean to future JIATFs that must operate under a predatory state? As evidenced, diplomacy works, and the military is the best organization to conduct FID, but it must be a long-term commitment to yield meaningful results, engagements with the host nation must be constant, and the investment in human capital, equipment, and training must be substantial. This is a huge demand for a relatively small staff of military and interagency partners. The goals and objectives of the task force must support and augment the national policy. The problem occurs when national leaders leave office or national strategy shifts while the task force is in the middle of the training mission. This phenomenon is not solely relegated to American politics, even in the Philippines the media was critical of President Duterte changing its national strategy. That shift in policy is what critics say sparked the Islamic movement in the Philippines. For example, “Several media outlets have argued that the Islamic State’s encroachment into the Philippines is a result of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s negligence toward countering extremism because of his focus on persecuting a violent drug war.”28

Succeeding in the Philippines is not a “fire and forget” proposal... Instead it is a long-term commitment that relies on all the elements of national power...

Succeeding in the Philippines is not a “fire and forget” proposal like issuing a drone strike or firing a cruise missile. Instead it is a long-term commitment that relies on all the elements of national power to include diplomacy, military, and economic means. The success of this type of mission is about people on the ground working with their counterparts. The tactical-level trainers are the ones making partnerships work and executing national policy one Soldier at a time. The JIATF may be the right organization for this type of demanding mission. The Filipinos have a proverb, “Bagong hari, bagong ugali.” It means, “new king, new character.” The people of the Philippines see their future as an opportunity. New leadership brings new priorities and efforts for their national strategy. The predatory nature of the current government does not mean that it will perpetually be an oppressive environment. JSOTF-P had challenges from the strategic, national level to the tactical, small-team level, to include political, ethical, and social dilemmas, which limited its ability to conduct a counterinsurgency operation. The theory that a JIATF operating in a predatory state is extremely complicated has been hypothesized by multiple sociopolitical scholars, verified by
firsthand accounts and experiences, and proven by the deployed military members of JSOTF-P. The conclusion to be made is that operating under an authoritative regime requires teamwork, interagency corporation, understanding of strategic intent, and the unique ability to be both a diplomat and a Soldier when required. Furthermore, high standards of the Geneva Convention must be maintained when protecting rights and advising the host nation in the application of military force. This is the most difficult task that military officers and diplomats can undertake, and with the increase in global instability and emerging threats in multiple domains, this is a requirement that will not go away. If anything, the future of warfare will require a mandate for JIATFs to operate in areas between the near-peer threat and the asymmetric conflict. That is where the predatory state resides.

NOTES


3 Ibid., p. 252.


5 Ibid.


11 U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) commander Admiral Samuel Locklear told *Foreign Policy* in April the force levels would likely be reduced.


18 Linda Robinson et al.


22 Robinson.


A Comparative Analysis of the Effectiveness of Operations in Mali and Somalia

by Lawrence J. Richardson

The United Nation’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are actively operating against violent extremist organizations and insurgencies. These threat actors and the tactics, techniques, and procedures they employ are posing significant challenges to the way the international community executes peace enforcement operations. This article conducts a comparative analysis within a doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facility, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) construct of the effectiveness of MINUSMA and AMISOM. Through an examination of the information, this research determined that the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations is not constituted to conduct peace enforcement missions against violent extremist organizations or insurgencies. The analysis of the research did provide recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the MINUSMA and potential future United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions.

There are currently 14 active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Of those 14 peacekeeping missions, 7 are on the continent of Africa. The African Union (AU) also has two active peace operations being conducted alongside and with the support of the UN. Peace operations are not easy, and the complex environment would challenge even the most experienced military and civilian professionals. The threat actors and instability of the twenty-first century have only added more complexity to peace operations. The UN speaks extensively on the role of the international community and the UN to maintain peace through dialogue or, when necessary, military means. The UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII are referenced repeatedly when people speak of peace operations. Specific articles within these chapters reference the role of the Security Council and the means by which the UN can maintain or enforce peace. Articles 36 and 37 of Chapter VI are most commonly known as the peacekeeping articles and typically will result in a more restrained application of force.

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Chapter VI missions are commonly employed as a force to maintain a mutually-agreed-to peace. Chapter VII missions, however, are linked to Articles 41 and 42. Chapter VII missions are referred to as peace enforcement missions, and these missions authorize coercion in order to restore international peace. Chapter VII missions are much more robust and have more expansive powers to fulfill the mandate. The UN has deployed military, police, and civilian formations to increase stability, create peace and stability, and support fragile states struggling with internal conflict.

The UN and the AU differ in their approaches to peace operations. “The AU’s peacekeeping posture in Burundi, Darfur and now Somalia points to the emergence of a different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.” This mindset sits at odds with standing UN principles, but these two organizations are mutually supporting and simultaneously conducting similar missions. Both organizations also operate alongside one another in the same countries. Thus, the AU sees the viability of allowing greater authority to conduct non-standard peace operations. Both organizations are facing similar threats and challenges, which means that there is a potential need to recalibrate the approach taken during peace enforcement missions.

Given that counterterrorism (CT), counter violent extremist organizations (C-VEO), and counter insurgencies (COIN) are becoming more capable and robust, the question does arise: Is there a fundamental shift in the character of peace operations?

With threats to international peace arising from fragile and failed states, the UN finds itself fighting the same old battles but with a new more capable threat. Insurgents, extremists, and terrorists can take root and infiltrate many ungoverned spaces unopposed. However, these ungoverned spaces are not truly ungoverned. Though the central state authority may be weak or non-existent, societies always create a system to govern their affairs. The UN, therefore, has deployed military, police, and civilian agents in far-flung corners of Africa to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict. Many of these locations cause significant challenges due to a lack of resources and infrastructure. Add to the equation a lack of security and governmental control and porous borders that allow the free flow of fighters, weapons, and funding to prop up combatants, and the challenges can seem insurmountable. Therefore, this article analyzes and provides recommendations for the UN and the international community on the following question. Is the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations properly constituted to conduct peace enforcement operations against violent extremist organizations in fragile nations that are unable to prosecute counter insurgency/counter terrorism operations on their own? In order to answer this question, this article focuses on the UN MINUSMA and the AMISOM.
MINUSMA has also struggled to reach its authorized military personnel strength.

AFISMA was turned into a UN mission at the request of the transitional government in Bamako, as well support from France. The decision to deploy a multidimensional, integrated, stabilization mission came as the UN Security Council was given the option of providing a multidimensional, integrated, political presence to work alongside AFISMA or the option of deploying a multidimensional, integrated mission under a Chapter VII mandate with a parallel military force. MINUSMA’s mandate fell under a Chapter VII deployment, with key tasks of stabilizing key population centers; reasserting state authority; protecting civilians, UN personnel, and human rights; and supporting humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation, and international justice. France’s military force, originally operating under the name Serval, which later transitioned to Barkhane with a more regional approach, was authorized to serve as a parallel force to MINUSMA by the Security Council.

MINUSMA found itself immediately at a disadvantage upon assuming control of the mission, as northern Mali lacks substantial infrastructure, and at the time of assumption the AFISMA troops in country were operating below the standards of the UN. MINUSMA has also struggled to reach its authorized military personnel strength. The challenge to provide for enough personnel was further exacerbated when the Security Council expanded MINUSMA’s presence beyond the population centers of Gao and Timbuktu to further provide for protection of civilians further north. The UN Security Council, through Resolution 2227 in June 2015, authorized MINUSMA 11,240 military personnel and 1,440 police personnel. As of April 1, 2016, MINUSMA had 10,320 military personnel and 1,105 police personnel with 91.96 percent and 95.25 percent respectively deployed in regions. In October 2017, MINUSMA had reached 11,231 contingent troops and 1,745 police, which when teamed with the remaining UN staff brings the current number of deployed UN personnel to 14,865. MINUSMA as of October 2017, is authorized 15,209 military personnel, which includes police as well. It has not been demonstrated that the amount of personnel on the ground addresses the issue of capacity that MINUSMA faces in order to implement its robust mandate.

MINUSMA also implemented the Modular U-Staff construct for operations in Mali. The UN adopted the multidimensional, integrated staff construct in order to increase communication, synchronization, and coordination among all the various civilian and military offices. The multidimensional mission staff is designed specifically to address violent “spoilers” and asymmetric threat actors. The creation of the multidimensional staff aims to align all vested parties that play into operations, operations support, and personnel, evaluation, and training to achieve unity of effort to accomplish the mandate. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the force commander and the various staff functions. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Personnel, Evaluation, and Training focuses on personnel actions, lessons learned, and mission effectiveness, which then feeds into identified training requirements. The DCOS for Operations plans (U5) and executes operations
(U3) while being informed by intelligence (U2). The DCOS for Operations staffs serve to synchronize actions and enablers through aviation, maritime, information operations, liaisons, and communications capabilities. The DCOS for Operations Support provides enabler and logistical support to deployed units. The U4 provides planning and supply distribution operational support. The U9 serves as the civil military integration staff, which is crucial to the multidimensional staff structure. The U8 provides engineering support. The DCOS for Operational Support also houses any explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capability required in the mission. The staff is supplemented by other staff focusing on human rights, gender equality, and child protection. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) is encompassed in the Force Headquarters and coordinates daily military activities and provides situational awareness.

The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) serves as a coordinating staff, synchronizing civilian and military information requirements to inform decision makers.

Mali is the 25th largest country in the world, with 1,240,192 square kilometers (km). The capital of Bamako sits 1,190 km from Gao (Sector East Headquarters), 1,003 km from Timbuktu (Sector West Headquarters), and 1,542 km from Kidal (Sector North Headquarters), all via roadway. By comparison, Baghdad sits 404 km via roadway from Mosul and, at best, Mali’s roadway infrastructure can be considered at parity with Iraq’s.

In order to manage this vast amount of terrain, MINUSMA organized into three sectors and established regional sector headquarters. These sector headquarters serve as forward deployed locations to better implement the mandate and report back to the overall Force Headquarters located in Bamako. Sector North with a headquarters in Kidal, Sector East with a headquarters in Gao, and Sector West with a headquarters in Timbuktu provide MINUSMA
The UN forces suffer from over-extended lines of communication and supply. The average UN infantry battalion is anywhere from 50-850 soldiers, which can easily be consumed in purely conducting logistical resupply, with little time or capacity to secure the population centers or achieve other vital aspects of the mandate. This overextension creates vulnerabilities to MINUSMA, as a great deal of effort is dedicated to securing convoys, which then leads to forces being placed into static positions due to logistics requirements. The logistical situation in northern Mali creates a condition in which MINUSMA’s forces are essentially conducting survival operations and not focused on achieving the mandate.

Given the asymmetric threats that face MINUSMA, the UN has focused on deploying EOD and has identified training in defeating improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As of October 2017, MINUSMA has fielded four EOD units to support each of the sectors. These EOD formations are to support the maneuver forces in each sector upon the report of an IED incident or any IED identified but undetonated. This, in turn, requires each patrol to request EOD support that may be many miles from the incident. This distance leads to a level of responsiveness that may preclude the reporting of IEDs or lags in report times. This leaves UN infantry battalions to handle IED threats without the proper training and equipment.

Given the complex nature of the threats operating in Mali, the UN has had to adapt its traditional model of peacekeeping. These asymmetric threats and groups ranging from organized crime to violent extremist organizations and liberation movements mean that MINUSMA is working against a complex network of personalities and interests. The operating environment in northern Mali shares many similarities to those the U.S. has seen in Iraq or Afghanistan over the last 16 years.

With the complex situation that exists in Mali, the UN deployed a new intelligence capability provided primarily by the Scandinavian countries of NATO. The All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) was fielded in MINUSMA in 2013 and was the first deployment of a dedicated military intelligence entity inside a UN mission. The ASIFU also deployed with unmanned aerial vehicles to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, which were further reinforced by Dutch attack helicopters. In order to provide for additional means of information collection, the ASIFU deployed capabilities to conduct human intelligence, an intelligence analysis cell, and an open source intelligence section, all of which allowed the ASIFU to begin to understand the network of threats in northern Mali. The ASIFU has provided a valuable resource to MINUSMA and the leadership, but as time has progressed, the ASIFU has spent more time on tactical-level intelligence to enable decision making. Originally the ASIFU was geared toward understanding the drivers of conflict and operational-level intelligence, which means it may only be providing intelligence to treat symptoms of the larger drivers of the conflict.
typically deployed as the result of complex social issues or unresolved political issues. As MINUSMA’s mandate includes the reassertion of central government authority, police and law enforcement play a crucial role. According to the UN, there are currently 1,747 police deployed inside MINUSMA. These police are split among the sectors and play a role in developing the capacity of the Malian government to provide law enforcement.

The underlying conflict in northern Mali has led to MINUSMA being one of the most dangerous missions the UN has conducted. Since MINUSMA began operations in 2013, it has had 95 fatalities classified as malicious acts (as of November 2017). The tactics used against UN peacekeepers include ambushes, IEDs, mortar and rocket attacks, and suicide bombs. With the withdrawal of the Malian military from the north, the peacekeepers are serving as the main security presence. Nine peacekeepers from Niger were attacked and killed by armed men on motorcycles during a convoy operation in October 2014 in the Gao region of Mali. The peacekeepers were operating a convoy from Ménaka to Asongo in Sector East. From reports, the armed assailants attacked the convoy with heavy weapons. At the time, this was the deadliest attack on peacekeepers in Mali. The fatality total due to malicious activity in 2014 reached 28, which was the highest of any other ongoing peace operation that year.

In 2015, the fatalities due to malicious activity for MINUSMA fell to 12. In 2015, the first engagement by Dutch attack aviation occurred when a UN Bangladeshi force near the town of Tabankort in the Kidal region came under persistent heavy weapons fire. The town, its civilian population, and UN peacekeepers had been isolated by elements of National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad for days, and the aviation attack was done within the constraints of the mandate according to the force headquarters in Bamako. The incident in Tabankort demonstrated the need for aviation support, but it also demonstrated that the armed groups in northern Mali have, at minimum, parity with regards to combat power to the average UN fighting force. The Tabankort incident also highlighted the response process that MINUSMA uses. For aviation support to be released, the isolated Bangladeshi unit had to relay its request for support through the sector North headquarters, which then passed the request to Bamako for crisis planning and response. The sector headquarters in Kidal did not have release authority for attack aviation to respond to the battle. The requirement for Bamako to approve, plan, and grant authority as opposed to the closer headquarters demonstrates the predominance on centralized control. The battle at Tabankort came under heavy scrutiny for the use of hellfire missiles even though force used by the aviation was within the authority of the mandate and used only after issuing warning shots. The introduction and utilization of attack aviation in MINUSMA provided additional capability to counter the threats in northern Mali. The ground force numbers in MINUSMA, however, did not increase. The enabler support in MINUSMA provided more security for convoys and a reasonable expectation of substantial and responsive support in the event of a concerted attack. The enabler support, however, did not increase the capacity of the UN ground forces to shift from logistical missions to protecting civilians and providing stability.

2016 saw an uptick in violence in Mali with
From 2013 through 2017, MINUSMA was facing the same threats that have been seen across the Middle East and Africa. Crucial to success in these environments is the ability to understand all the dynamics and networks operating in a region. Tactical intelligence can serve to increase survivability of patrols, but to successfully counter asymmetric threats, intelligence must simultaneously be oriented operationally to better understand the dynamics driving conflict, especially with the UN’s aversion to offensive operations. Tactical intelligence serves a reactionary role but does not increase capability. As the UN focuses on defensive measures, intelligence assets oriented operationally will better serve the sectors and Force Headquarters.

MINUSMA is effectively serving as the sole provider of security in northern Mali. The Gao and Kidal regions continued to see IED and small-scale attacks against UN facilities and personnel throughout 2017. The increase in attacks is forcing the UN to trend toward heavy vehicles capable of surviving IEDs. This trend is, however, reactionary, and the threats will simply use heavier explosives. The heavy vehicles also restrict all UN ground movement to roads, which are easily targeted, especially with little variation in convoy procedures or timing of movements. Heavy vehicles also restrict the ability of UN patrols to effectively maneuver off road, which then effectively limits the patrol’s ability to seek a position of advantage from which to deal with the threats. Heavily-armored vehicles serve to increase logistical convoy survivability, and with limited infrastructure, the necessity of maintaining open convoys is obvious. Heavily-armored vehicles may reduce UN causalities, but their use does not necessarily correlate to the successful implementation of the mandate.

The circumstances in Mali require variety in UN force type, composition, capability, equipment, and training.

As of November 2017, the fatalities in MINUSMA had totaled 24. The sector headquarters in Timbuktu was attacked by gunmen that resulted in seven personnel being killed with a similar style attack against a UN camp near Mopti in central Mali. The Gao and Kidal regions continued to see IED and small-scale attacks against UN facilities and personnel throughout 2017. The increase in attacks is forcing the UN to trend toward heavy vehicles capable of surviving IEDs. This trend is, however, reactionary, and the threats will simply use heavier explosives. The heavy vehicles also restrict all UN ground movement to roads, which are easily targeted, especially with little variation in convoy procedures or timing of movements. Heavy vehicles also restrict the ability of UN patrols to effectively maneuver off road, which then effectively limits the patrol’s ability to seek a position of advantage from which to deal with the threats. Heavily-armored vehicles serve to increase logistical convoy survivability, and with limited infrastructure, the necessity of maintaining open convoys is obvious. Heavily-armored vehicles may reduce UN causalities, but their use does not necessarily correlate to the successful implementation of the mandate.
MINUSMA’s mandate also requires it to perform tasks that allow for and require preventive actions, which in some aspects could be considered counterterrorist in nature. Due to the size and complexity of MINUSMA, as well as the distances required to operate, the Force Headquarters established similarly-structured headquarters in each of the sectors. The Force Headquarters is required to establish a Military Operations Center to serve a command, control, communication, and integration function for all military operations. Each of the sector headquarters is also responsible for establishing its own respective Military Operations Center.

The UN Force Headquarters handbook provides roles and responsibilities for the staff and subordinate cells, but the UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines also annotates that civilian and governmental agencies are more comfortable with ambiguity than military staffs are, which may pose challenges to operations in a complex environment. The UN is a top-down organization that empowers decision makers at senior levels due to the political nature of the situation in which they deploy. MINUSMA’s sector headquarters serve
MINUSMA, at times, has suffered from a lack of clear strategy and guidance to the military component...

The Force Commander given appropriate guidance and working closely with the civilian leadership should be able to generate an operational approach for the overall military contingent to successfully operate in an environment where insurgents or terrorist groups are the primary antagonists. The modular U staff construct however still operates in parallel to the civilian mission staff. This parallel structure means there is potential for a lack of unity of effort or stove-piping that limits communication. UN doctrine also does not offer examples or protocols on how to integrate a staff with what is commonly referred to as fusion cells. The UN force headquarters staff must be capable of informing on the operational environment, so the Force Commander and the civilian leadership can adjust or react properly to the changing situation. The UN force headquarters does have a plans section inside the U-5 directorate, but there is no clear linkage between the formulation of plans from long-term to short-term execution. An example of this is seen in NATO countries, when plans move from the J-5 through the J-35 on to current operations with the J-3. MINUSMA is aided by the support provided by the ASIFU, which is a formation that was first deployed in order to provide a better understanding of the operational environment in order to inform planning and execution. The ASIFU, first deployed in 2014 in support of MINUSMA, was the first time a UN mission had its U-2 supplemented with a purely military intelligence unit. The role of the ASIFU is to analyze intelligence to support operational decision making, and the unit is comprised mainly of NATO or NATO-associated countries. The organization uses primarily NATO intelligence doctrine. The organization also provides analysis of non-military factors, such as ethnic and tribal dynamics, as well as illicit trafficking activities. The ASIFU is intended to support the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), which was already resident in multidimensional missions whose purpose was to synchronize and share information from civilian, military, police, and humanitarian UN agencies. The JMAC’s primary role was to report to the Head of Mission with medium to long term analysis but was not primarily supporting military operations. The U-2 served as the primary connective tissue to the JMAC. The intent of the ASIFU was to provide a more robust intelligence capability to the Force Commander and answer priority intelligence requirements for the military component. The ASIFU provides...
capability to generate, identify, analyze, and disseminate intelligence through surveillance platforms, human intelligence, and open source intelligence.

The ASIFU manages surveillance platforms through unmanned aerial vehicles whose full capabilities are classified. However, given the size of the terrain in which MINUSMA operates, the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on hand are inadequate to the tasks required. As of this writing and in reference to the current force deployment information published by the UN, there is no ASIFU element supporting Sector North in the Kidal region. This immediately identifies a potential knowledge and capability gap. The ASIFUs are also using NATO equipment, whose capabilities and limitations are not immediately releasable to UN contingents. The UN does not possess its own intelligence collection platforms, which means it operates at the whim of the contributing countries and caveats on willingness to share the full suite of capabilities.

The ASIFU has been focused on tactical-level intelligence to address force protection concerns, which may or may not be a limiting factor on the ability of the unit to further address the drivers of conflict or threat actors. The ASIFU currently passes all information up through the chain of command to the Force Commander, who is then authorized to release information to subordinate commanders. This potentially creates a long timeline in which information is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to address the tactical concerns of the Force Commander. Arguably this would not be a concern if the ASIFU was concerned with providing operational intelligence to inform planning and future operations, but as identified earlier, the focus has shifted to tactical operations and force protection. The ASIFU is incapable of providing direct feeds to the sector HQs or non-NATO ground units due to the previously mentioned classification requirements used by the intelligence platforms, which in turn has limited the intelligence’s value. This then leads to the ASIFU focusing on tactical intelligence to support static defense or intelligence to prevent attacks against UN facilities or personnel in the surrounding areas. MINUSMA’s ability to conduct process, exploitation, and dissemination for military planning seemed to focus primarily on tactical-level considerations. This combined with a lack of shared common intelligence competence has hindered the effectiveness of the JMAC, U-2, and enabler support provided by the ASIFU. The UN at the force headquarters or sector headquarters does not conduct what would be considered in U.S. Department of Defense parlance “working groups” focusing and prioritizing intelligence collection to inform plans or any intelligence cycle.

### Infantry Organization

There are currently nine infantry battalion headquarters deployed to support MINUSMA with an associated 34 infantry company groups as referred to by UN standards (see Figure 1). The UN infantry battalion and associated infantry companies are the mainstay of UN peacekeepers and the most prevalent. The UN provides for a suggested organization for infantry formations and training guidelines to ensure a baseline of capability upon arrival in a UN peacekeeping mission. The UN has identified that a battalion should consist of three to four infantry companies and one support company, with entire battalion strength comprising some 850 personnel. The UN infantry battalion identifies materiel capabilities that should arrive with an infantry
battalion and subsequently with all associated companies. The UN structure is not significantly different than U.S. DoD structure, but the UN caveats its organizational requirements with the statement that there is flexibility during the negotiation of the memorandum of understanding. The UN also requires its infantry battalions and companies provide at least one company and one platoon per outpost as quick reaction forces. The UN does not require the support company, which provides logistical support and transportation, to be equipped with weapons or vehicles capable of convoy protection. This leads to the infantry companies assigned to a given area to provide convoy protection, which in turn limits their ability to conduct patrols. Given the distances convoys may have to travel between outposts in Mali, an infantry company may lose an entire platoon for a series of days. Most infantry companies are stationed at primary population centers such as Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, while some other units are in minor locations such as Asongo or Menaka.

The size of the areas in which the infantry battalions operate in Mali also serves as a limiting factor on capability. As the Security Council forced MINUSMA to expand outside of Gao and Timbuktu, the infantry battalions were further stretched thin, leading to an even larger gap in personnel. This expansion and the existing poor infrastructure exacerbated an already significant challenge to resupply and support the infantry formations. The deployment of two companies in Menaka 220 km from their battalion headquarters in Asongo and 97 km from Gao and the main resupply base demonstrates the potential hazards of deploying basic infantry battalions.

The current environment in northern Mali requires formations be deployed into very austere locations to protect the population and fulfill the mandate. Every form of sustenance and housing must be provided externally in order to even occupy the terrain. The three-sector headquarters do not have transport or logistical units assigned to them. The infantry battalions provide security, logistical convoy support, and patrols supporting all the camps. The tasks of camp security and convoy security detract from the capacity of the infantry units to conduct patrols and protect the population. The austere locations and frequency of attacks along main supply routes or on isolated cantonments mean that countries are also less willing to deploy their infantry into regions where the threat is high, and the battalions have limited capability to defend themselves.

The size of the areas in which the infantry battalions operate in Mali also serves as a limiting factor on capability. The capacity and capability limitations serve to exacerbate any training deficiency. The threats faced in Mali require specific training needs and material capabilities. The threats and environmental considerations mean that specific unit types and capabilities must be identified and resourced to fill specific needs. Transport formations capable of defending themselves would free up regular infantry to conduct their primary tasks. Infantry formations in all-terrain vehicles allow for maneuverability to project presence, denying areas to threat actors.

Mechanized infantry versus motorized infantry has organizational and capability impacts that should be parsed against mission requirements. Mechanized or heavy infantry is not addressed in the organizational charts in the UN infantry manual, but likely would depict smaller formations that would require more robust logistical support. Light infantry functions well in austere environments with poor infrastructure providing more flexibility. However, when any formation is stuck to operating on roads, it becomes a vulnerable
target, which means combat power must be assigned to increase force protection.\textsuperscript{89}

The infantry battalion does not have organic engineering or counter-IED, as annotated in the UN manual. This further stretches thin any combat power an infantry battalion provides. This article is not capable of assessing if MINUSMA has done the planning associated with tailoring requests for specific types of infantry to fulfill roles against required mission sets.

The size of the UN infantry battalion staff section is similar to an U.S. Army staff element, but because the battalion does not have a brigade or higher element to plug into with additional enablers, it may not be adequate.\textsuperscript{90} Battalion staffs should be more robust with associated enablers. Deploying infantry battalions with no higher UN parent unit is not adequate. The lack of higher parent unit teamed with a sector headquarters with limited authority further impacts operational capability. The UN infantry manual provides for a robust infantry company with equipment and personnel, but arguably these capabilities are not being deployed to MINUSMA as troop contributing countries (TCCs) seem reluctant to provide troops for service in the northern regions of Mali.\textsuperscript{91}

**Aspect of DOTMLPF-P: Training**

The UN Operational Readiness Guidelines (ORG) primarily serve as a reference for pre-deployment training and are “self-evaluated” by the individual TCC.\textsuperscript{92} The guidelines also provide a baseline of capability each soldier should possess prior to deployment. The UN Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment in 2013 identified weapons firing as a skill that required further enhancement for peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{93} This observation teamed with the firing requirements as laid out in ORG demonstrate that as early as 2013 the UN identified that either personnel were not arriving trained for the missions or that the associated guidelines prior to 2013 were not adequate. Numerous sources have identified that TCCs are wholly unprepared to conduct operations in a COIN environment.\textsuperscript{94}

The ambush of the Niger convoy in 2014 demonstrates how ineffective some ground forces have proven against insurgent attacks. The Tabankort battle highlights how ground forces are being outmaneuvered and isolated. The constant success of mortar and rocket attacks demonstrate the inability of UN forces to respond quickly and thus eliminate repeated threats. The requirement for the Force Headquarters to conduct any reactionary planning to an incident prior to any actions in the sectors being taken highlights how overly-centralized control further limits effectiveness against insurgent threats.

Understanding basic tenets of mounted movement are required to maneuver against threats or properly support logistical operations. UN personnel must be capable of land navigation and map reading, though there is no mention of mounted navigation.

The ORG also does not lay out a difference in types of patrols.\textsuperscript{95} The ORG also does not specify infantry skills other than general patrolling, anti-ambush, observation post, and sentry duties.\textsuperscript{96} No mention is given to counter-IED training, vehicle recovery, medical evacuation (save the generic 9-Line medical report), or logistical or convoy operations, all of which have been identified as required skills during pre-deployment training.\textsuperscript{97} The UN has invested heavily, though, in “in-mission training for counter-IED” skills.

The ORG also does not identify the capability ground units should have to
communicate with aviation assets, which has proven so crucial in Mali. In order to fully use aviation assets for medical evacuation, the TCCs on the ground must at a minimum be capable and fluent in calling for support and communicating with the air platform, which is not a required skill set according to the ORG.

The 9-Line medical call for support presupposes capabilities that may not be inherent to the average UN infantry company. The UN has not standardized TCC communications equipment, as a TCC’s equipment is a national requirement and must comply with the Statement of Unit Requirement.

The ORG does not provide any guidelines on how a company or battalion would conduct or input intelligence into the U-2 intelligence cycle. The Force Headquarters handbook does provide templates for incident reports or medical casualty reports, but these reports are not required training for infantry units. The ORG only requires a TCC to provide a memorandum identified in Annex E of the Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement Policy of December 2015.

To sum up, there are noticeable additional requirements in training that an environment like MINUSMA requires. Non-materiel solutions such as pre-deployment training for COIN environments could alleviate some of the most effective tactics used by threat actors in northern Mali.

Aspect of DOTMLPF-P: Materiel

Due to the high number of IEDs, the natural inclination would be to provide vehicles similar to the mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles fielded by the U.S. in Iraq. The UN has fielded MRAP variants alongside the more traditional land cruiser/land rover equivalent vehicles. The MRAP vehicles do provide survivability along main supply routes or roads on which UN convoys are particularly vulnerable. The value in light trucks is their ability to move off road and maneuver easily in response to ambushes or while conducting patrols. The MRAP vehicle is restricted to hard surfaces, which requires more training to mitigate threat-actor tactics. Heavily-armored vehicles have a role when used for logistical resupply. The value of heavy vehicles can be offset by tactics used by threat groups. Heavily-armored vehicles serve a specific role, but their limitations also restrict the effectiveness of a force tasked with missions other than defense and logistical resupply.

Light vehicles provide more maneuverability and speed and are easier to maintain through local procurement, as most areas in Mali have light pick-up trucks. The attributes of light vehicles increase UN forces’ potential effectiveness against threats. Any materiel solution must be properly aligned to the specific mission set of a TCC. An infantry battalion’s effectiveness in mission tasks can be increased or limited by the vehicles it operates.

The TCCs in MINUSMA face basic challenges with regards to communication equipment. All TCCs are required to deploy with appropriate communication equipment to accomplish their unit requirements, but there is no standardized UN communication platform. At the basic level, this creates two issues: 1) the ability of separate communication platforms to actually talk with one another; and 2) the logistical support for replacement parts is wholly the responsibility of the TCC or the UN Department of Field Support. As of September 2017, each MINUSMA sector did have an assigned communication unit ranging from
a platoon-size to company-size element. UN forces have tactical communications platforms, but formations do not have strategic-level communications that allow them to effectively communicate from very isolated locations. These communications elements can facilitate the synchronization of communication capability across the TCCs conducting ground operations, while linking in available aviation assets.

MINUSMA is one of the first UN missions to field a UAV capability as seen from analysis of the ASIFU. The UN Infantry manual also identifies that each infantry company and battalion should deploy with a minimum of one small UAV to support ground operations. The use of UAVs recognizes the role increased situational awareness plays in survivability and mission accomplishment. MINUSMA faces the following challenges when using UVAs:

- The UN infantry handbook suggests but does not require UAVs at the individual company level.
- The ASIFU has the most robust UAV capability, but due to the distances required, that capability is limited.
- The approval process to allocate resources and release information requires too much time to be effective, which causes UAV support to be non-responsive to immediate demands.

According to the MINUSMA force deployment map of September 2017, the UN has deployed aviation assets to Gao, Timbuktu, and Bamako. Kidal does receive aerial resupply, but MINUSMA has in the past had issues due to the airfield’s location among the population. The location of the airfield teamed with the security requirements have precluded the deployment of aviation assets to Sector North. The value of helicopters is undeniable when considering the MINUSMA operations environment. Aviation continues to be one of the primary requests and high-value enablers the UN is requesting from TCCs.

**Aspect of DOTMLPF-P: Leadership**

The threats to MINUSMA require peacekeepers to adapt to a capable enemy that is, arguably, informed by successes and failures from the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The threats require UN peacekeeper leadership to possess traditional skill sets, such as the capability to properly integrate with civilian partners and senior civilian leadership. Asymmetric threats as termed by the UN also require peacekeeper leadership to operate in ambiguity. The UN’s centralized command and control structure limits the ability of lower-level leaders to effectively employ their forces. Asymmetric threats adapt, and their adaptation requires that UN peacekeeping leaders be equally adaptable. Requiring all decisions and responses be made by the Force Headquarters leadership limits initiative and timely responses to incidents. The current decision-making process decreases the ability of UN forces to be effective in the eyes of the population.

**The UN’s centralized command and control structure limits the ability of lower-level leaders to effectively employ their forces.**

Situational awareness and understanding are crucial to success in the complex environments that characterize insurgencies. The Force Headquarters and subordinate commands must be capable of identifying the current situation by incorporating all various information inputs and then developing approaches that achieve the desired outcomes. Though leadership’s capability to facilitate a close relationship with the local population is not new, when operating in a COIN environment, the people now serve as the enabler to being successful as never before.
MINUSMA leaders must be capable of making informed decisions at tactical levels within the guidance of senior leaders. Leaders at the tactical level to include noncommissioned officers must be empowered to make decisions while understanding their strategic implications.

**Aspect of DOTMLPF-P: Personnel**

The largest contingents in UN peacekeeping missions do not come from Western nations. As threats evolve, the need for more niche capabilities has increased. Many of these niche capabilities, honed over time and through combat, come from NATO countries or NATO-aligned countries that have supported operations in the Middle East over the last 16 years. Though some of the other TCCs have fought insurgencies, few have fought COINs with the enabler support available to Western militaries. UN MINUSMA, the main intelligence capability provided through the ASIFU, is essentially a NATO capability. MINUSMA is currently fielding one aviation unit from South America, while the rest come from NATO countries. The infantry battalions, however, all come from African or South Asian countries. The asymmetric threats do not necessitate infantry battalions deploying from NATO countries, but the threats do necessitate more robust niche capabilities.

Aviation has already been identified, but EOD, engineering (currently there are engineering units located in all sectors), and potentially, special operations forces, to name a few, are increasingly needed. MINUSMA, as a multidimensional operation, requires robust civil military operations capabilities, as well as information operations capacity. Any COIN and CT operation takes place in an environment where criminal actors or transregional crime plays a role, both of which are prevalent in developing/failed countries and aid in terrorist activities. Security Sector Reform does not simply apply to the military aspect of a nation’s security apparatus but also to local or national law enforcement agencies. In the vein of Security Sector Reform, the UN police mission in MINUSMA plays a crucial role. It is especially crucial when one considers the fact that northern Mali is plagued by transregional criminal activity, and those networks facilitate the violent extremist networks.

The UN manual for Special Operations lays out key tasks that include everything from surveillance and reconnaissance to what are termed Special Tasks. Importantly, the UN does not specify what makes a special forces unit, it merely identifies tasks that a special forces unit must be capable of doing. This lack of specificity leads to the implication that any country whose forces have received the appropriate training to conduct the UN special operation force (SOF) tasks can be deployed and identified as UN SOF.

MINUSMA has demonstrated through its parallel force in the French Task Force Barkhane or the deployment of NATO special forces the need for a capable decisive action arm. Barkhane, however, is not a part of the UN mission but available for assistance. It is not known how populations perceive Barkhane, but whether or not Barkhane undermines the legitimacy of the Malian forces or the UN does identify either a potential increased capability to the UN or an increased risk to the mission. As Task Force Barkhane operates outside the control of MINUSMA, but is actually associated with MINUSMA, the use of a bilateral external force undermines MINUSMA’s legitimacy and poses a risk to the mission. The association Barkhane has with the MINUSMA means that actions taken by Barkhane can have immediate impact on UN forces, as they are seen as the
same entity. This perception opens MINUSMA to being seen as a legitimate target as opposed to being impartial.

Similar to the French Task Force Barkhane operation, the Sahel 5 has deployed a regional military force. In the summer of 2017, the initial operational capability was established in Mali. The organization is still young and receives funding from France and the European Union. The Sahel 5 is actively seeking to secure UN funding and logistical support. This force is expected to operate alongside MINUSMA and Barkhane, which again raises the question of unity of effort, deconfliction, synchronization, and ultimately legitimacy for the MINUSMA. An additional parallel force in Mali may only contribute to further mudding the waters of situational awareness. The deployment of the Sahel 5 may expose MINUSMA to more retaliation, as it will now be associated with yet another military force operating in its area of operations over which it does not exercise any command or control.

The UN is also operating alongside a Malian military that is receiving support to increase its capacity. It is not clear if MINUSMA is interoperable with the host nation forces or simply attempting to coordinate operations. With the mandate to reassert central government authority, the UN may also need to be capable of training host nation forces to achieve the mandate, which according to UN doctrine is feasible through the use of special forces. Though the European Union is currently conducting a program to increase the capacity of the Malian government, the UN has a vested interest in participating in any host nation capacity building. In order to assist in the reassertion of central government authority, MINUSMA must have a role in building ongoing partner capacity activities in the country. The UN Special Forces manual states that the UN can use Special Forces troops to conduct training, advising, and mentoring. These tasks would fall in line with what U.S. DoD calls foreign internal defense. These niche capabilities require UN personnel who are specifically trained or aligned to non-standard peacekeeping roles.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Somalia, like many countries in Africa, is large and contains many open regions of little vegetation. Slightly smaller than Texas, Somalia is 637,657 square km with a coastline of 3,025 km. Somalia has suffered from governmental instability and famine over the last thirty years. These conditions have created an environment that has consistently drawn international attention. Due to violence and lack of strong central state governance, the UN has been involved in Somalia since the early 1990s. The instability in the early 1990s began the cycle of violence that still takes place in Somalia. The UN intervened in Somalia with two very challenged missions: the first UN Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM I) and the subsequent UN Mission to Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Though UNOSOM I transitioned to UNOSOM II, the latter is considered a disaster and complete failure. UNOSOM II’s departure led to the creation of the UN Political Office Somalia (UNPOS) stationed in Kenya. UNPOS assisted with the creation of the Transitional Federal Government, and its overthrow by the Islamic Courts instigated a military intervention by Ethiopia. Eventually, Ethiopia was replaced by the AMISOM.

In March 1995, all UN personnel had departed Somalia, and the UN established the UNPOS. The UNPOS was headquartered in
Nairobi, Kenya, and mainly served to maintain links with political leaders and assist where possible in peace processes. The UNPOS helped to enable the creation and establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. 2006 saw the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was a coalition of moderate and extremist groups that seized large swaths of Somalia and Mogadishu. Ethiopia perceived this rise as a direct threat to the security in the region and launched an intervention that ejected the ICU. The ICU’s collapse led to the creation of Al-Shabaab and the insurgency that continues to take place in Somalia.

AMISOM was intended to transition into yet another UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. However, due to senior level disagreement and skepticism at the UN, this never occurred. AMISOM has never followed the traditional role of a peacekeeping mission and has been more recognizable as a conventional military mission. With the TFG again in control of Mogadishu and supported by AMISOM, the AU decided to begin a stabilization mission. This evolution turned AMISOM into something that resembled a multidimensional peace enforcement mission, whose role was to support the political stability of the TFG, as well as continue to support the institutional development of the central government. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2036 that laid out the role AMISOM should play in supporting delivery of stabilization plans, establishing an AU police mission to support Somali police units, and providing security throughout south-central Somalia.

Resolution 2036 also authorized the AU to increase the force size of AMISOM from 12,000 to 17,731 military and police units.

AMISOM was originally designed as a warfighting mission and not necessarily a stabilization and peacekeeping mission. The command structure for AMISOM has always remained more a multinational construct, as opposed to a fully-integrated political and military construct more in line with the UN multidimensional mission. Consistently, AMISOM is criticized that the Force Headquarters does not exercise true operational control over the sectors. Each sector of AMISOM is controlled by a different country, and as such, the TCCs generally pursue their own nations’ political and military objectives. This has created a situation in

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The UN, with UNSCR 1744, authorized the AU to deploy a peace enforcement force in February 2007. Originally, AMISOM was authorized for a six-month deployment and mainly facilitated the security of the reestablished TFG. Initially, a force of some 1,600 Ugandan troops deployed to replace a much larger Ethiopian force that had ejected the ICU from power. The original force of Ugandans swelled to a combination force of 3,500, comprised of Ugandan and Burundian troops. Al-Shabaab contested the deployment of the AU’s contingent and a battle ensued for control of Mogadishu. The AU force fought alongside the TFG forces to finally push Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu in 2011. This battle for Mogadishu consisted of mainly urban, street-to-street fighting throughout the city. In 2011, Kenya and Ethiopia both intervened in Somalia and deployed troops, opening multiple fronts against Al-Shabaab. By the end of 2012, Mogadishu as well as the surrounding suburbs had been secured. Simultaneously the Kenyans secured the southern strategic town and port of Kismayo, while the Ethiopians secured the cities of Baidoa and Belet Weyne in south-central Somalia.

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which the Force Headquarters in Mogadishu
serves a coordination function at most.¹³⁰ This
lack of actual operational control is not suited
to deal with a threat like Al-Shabaab, and also
means that the ability of AMISOM to effectively
implement stabilization programs is limited.¹³¹

AMISOM lacks the consolidated command
and control mechanisms and interagency
coordination or synchronization capabilities of
MINUSMA. AMISOM’s command and control
construct along with the national sector construct
mean the coordination and security along the
TCC sector borders has suffered. Al-Shabaab has
been able to exploit the sector gaps in security
and has effectively found a haven in between
AMISOM forces.¹³² AMISOM’s national caveats
and objectives of each of the respective TCCs has
made any cross-sector coordination challenging
for the mission. AMISOM has struggled
to incorporate civilian or police experts in
conjunction with the mission’s transition from a
military-centric, warfighting command structure
to a more UN-styled, multidimensional mission
structure.¹³³ Effectively, AMISOM’s expansion
out of Mogadishu meant that the headquarters
only lost more control over the forces.

With Al-Shabaab’s removal from Mogadishu
and other major population centers, the
organization transitioned to an insurgency. The
insurgent tactics implemented by Al-Shabaab
forced AMISOM to adapt as well, and in 2012,
Kismayo, Baidoa, and Belet Weyne became
AMISOM Sector Headquarters.¹³⁴ The Sector
Headquarters serve as spokes from which
smaller settlements would then be occupied
by AMISOM camps. In 2012, the country of
Djibouti provided a force to AMISOM, and the
Kenyan forces that had intervened unilaterally
now came under the AMISOM umbrella.¹³⁵ The
Ethiopians, however, maintained a unilateral
force independent of AMISOM mainly focused
around Baidoa and Belet Weyne.

By mid-2013, Al-Shabaab had been pushed
out of the major cities in south-west Somalia,
but instead of abandoning the cities outright,
the organization left sleeper-cells that continue
to harass local government and AMISOM
forces.¹³⁶ Al-Shabaab regularly conducts IED
attacks, ambushes, targeted assassinations,
suicide bombings, and rocket/mortar attacks.
The threats in Mali regularly use the same
tactics to further undermine the legitimacy of
the government. In addition to insurgent attacks

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capabilities of MINUSMA.

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against AMISOM, Al-Shabaab still maintains
the capability to extract taxes and resources
from smaller villages that AMISOM cannot
occupy. This ability enhances Al-Shabaab’s
capability to conduct highly-effective operations
against AMISOM. AMISOM recognized that
Al-Shabaab possessed the means to extort local
communities that allowed them to expand further
into rural areas and bring the newly-formed
Somali National Army (SNA) along with them.
As AMISOM increased its footprint, formations
found themselves in isolated forward operating
bases with long and vulnerable supply routes.¹³⁷
In 2013, AMISOM’s Military Operations
Coordination Committee recommended that it
cease expansion as it could no longer support
the expanded requirements, and the mission’s
capacity had been reached.¹³⁸ Again, MINUSMA
and AMISOM share a common problem of over-
extension.

As AMISOM has expanded and increased
its presence, the isolated and far flung outposts
have been surrounded by terrain controlled
by Al-Shabaab. The freedom of maneuver
enjoyed by Al-Shabaab has allowed the group
to mass on isolated AMISOM, SNA, or regional
security forces, which has led to incidents where
Al-Shabaab has secured victory and increased its resources for continued operations. In 2014, Al-Shabaab defeated the Jubaland security forces at Koday island, which further diminished the capability of the southern region’s local security apparatus.\(^{139}\)

In January 2016, the Kenyan outpost at El Adde was overrun by Al-Shabaab. The El Adde attack handed Kenya one of its worst military defeats and led to the deaths of over 100 Kenyan soldiers (according to the Somali President at the time, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, though the Kenyan government disputed this total).\(^{140}\) The El Adde outpost was located in the Gedo region, and its isolated location and lapses in the Kenyan security posture allowed Al-Shabaab to mass and maneuver on the camp. Al-Shabaab closed in quickly on the outer perimeter at dawn and through surprise, massed fires and a vehicle-borne IED effectively breached the gate. The Kenyan unit was routed, and with the fall of El Adde, Al-Shabaab secured further arms and ammunition.

_Similarly, in 2015, a Ugandan base located in Janaale was overrun by Al-Shabaab. Again, they used a vehicle-borne IED to breach the perimeter. After the perimeter was breached, an exploitation force followed behind to continue the attack and eventually forced the withdrawal of the Ugandans.\(^{141}\)_

2015 saw another high-profile attack at an AMISOM base located in Leego. These complex attacks provide Al-Shabaab the opportunity to capture additional equipment that allows the group to continue its insurgency in the country. The freedom of maneuver Al-Shabaab enjoys essentially has created a stalemate and allows the group to continue its control of much of the rural local population.\(^{142}\) Al-Shabaab continues to extort local populations to fund its operations and continues to pose a significant threat to the government in Mogadishu. In October 2017, Al-Shabaab detonated the largest vehicle-borne IED to date in downtown Mogadishu killing at least 300 and wounding hundreds more.\(^{143}\) Along with the large attacks, Al-Shabaab continues to conduct localized IED attacks, ambushes, and assassinations of AMISOM and government personnel.

The AU has defined the stabilization effort as the presence of AMISOM in all regions and further providing support to increase the Somali law enforcement’s capacity. The focus on building police capacity is teamed with civilian administrators to increase the capacity of local governance.\(^{144}\) In 2014, the AU published the new Concept of Operations for AMISOM, and the approach was essentially the clear-hold-build COIN formula.\(^{145}\) This approach requires AMISOM to jointly operate with an increasingly capable SNA. The joint AMISOM SNA expansion of control would eventually facilitate a handover and withdrawal of AU forces.

During this expansion, Al-Shabaab allowed the SNA and AU forces to move into smaller towns, but typically only after leaving IEDs or booby traps and then only retreating far enough away to still conduct raids or convoy ambushes.\(^{146}\) Al-Shabaab simply retreats into the countryside but still exerts control over the population through the establishment of checkpoints.\(^{147}\) AMISOM and the SNA’s footprint has extended, and their expansion has forced Al-Shabaab to move further into the countryside. Al-Shabaab’s relocation further into rural areas has diminished the group’s combat effectiveness. Al-Shabaab simply avoids direct combat with AU forces, and thus, rarely loses any equipment or suffers from high casualty rates.\(^{148}\)

The preservation of Al-Shabaab’s combat power means that the threat to AMISOM and the SNA...
has not significantly diminished, and the local population is not secured through stabilization activities. The group’s perseverance undermines the government’s legitimacy.\textsuperscript{149}

AMISOM and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu do not always share the same understanding of purpose behind the stabilization campaign.\textsuperscript{150} AMISOM and other actors, be it SNA, NGOs, or other governments involved in Somalia, find it hard to operate jointly or in coordinated actions due to perceived operational security gaps.\textsuperscript{151} The military expansion was not supported with governance or stabilization personnel to consolidate the military gains.\textsuperscript{152} AMISOM did not have sufficient police or civilian experts who could properly implement any of the required stability programs that would directly challenge Al-Shabaab’s influence and provide legitimacy to the government in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{153} With no personnel to backfill the military and conduct stabilization activities, AMISOM’s military forces are only extending their presence but not increasing governmental control. MINUSMA also suffers from a lack of capability to provide stabilization activities in the northern reaches of Mali, thus leaving the UN military units providing limited security while not addressing the roots of instability. The Somali government and AMISOM’s expansion of control has suffered from a perceived lack of legitimacy because some security forces are considered illegitimate and foreign because of ethnic dynamics.\textsuperscript{154} Like many places in Africa, clan and ethnic dynamics can contribute or hinder the effectiveness of security forces.

AMISOM’s primary partner in providing security is the SNA, which has struggled due to limited capability.\textsuperscript{155} In order for AMISOM and the SNA to expand their areas of control and subsequently counter Al-Shabaab, both require a minimum level of interoperability. Effective interoperability between AMISOM and the SNA has not materialized.\textsuperscript{156} The inability of the two organizations to work jointly allows Al-Shabaab to capitalize on the divisions between the two.

Also, in order to reestablish central governmental control, it is crucial that the FGS foster a trusting and cooperative relationship with the regional administrations. The central government in Mogadishu’s relations with the various regional administrations has been strained in the past because of the existing clan divisions in the countryside.\textsuperscript{157} The implication of clan dynamics means that AMISOM must be capable of working tactically with the regional leaders. Simultaneously, AMISOM must be capable of incorporating regional forces and considerations at the operational and strategic levels in conjunction with the central government. All of this must be done recognizing that the lack of governance and security means many of the regions developed their own security apparatus, which do not necessarily run contrary to AMISOM or the FGS’s goals but whose presence means the SNA alone may not be the guarantor of security after AMISOM’s handover of areas. This means AMISOM also cannot deny the legitimate, regional, security organizations a role in countering Al-Shabaab. The security situation in Somalia will necessitate continued persistent engagement from the international community, whether AMISOM transitions to a UN mission or remains an AU mission, until the government in Mogadishu is capable of supporting itself.

AMISOM was originally designed to transition to a UN mission. As the security environment evolved and the threats in Somalia
persisted, the UN continued to not take full responsibility for the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In order to support AMISOM, but also to not have to take full responsibility for the execution of the mission, the UN has built two organizations to enhance the capability and build stabilization capacities inside AMISOM.

**AMISOM consistently suffers from a lack of unity of effort among the sectors.**

The UN has two parallel efforts operating inside Somalia: The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). UNSOM’s primary role is to support AMISOM through policy and peacekeeping advisement, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration activities; security sector reform; and rule of law, to name a few. UNSOM also supports the FGS through similar activities. UNSOS provides the overarching logistical support to AMISOM, UNSOM, and the SNA in limited circumstances or when operating alongside AMISOM forces for operations. The two UN organs operating inside of Somalia have separate but mutually supporting roles that aim to increase the capability to AMISOM and the effectiveness of the FGS. The SNA, however, is still not fully supported by UNSOS. The level of support provided by UNSOS to the Somalis has led to situations where SNA forces, which are chronically under-resourced, are incapable of operating effectively when not alongside AMISOM. Similar to how outside donors support the Malian security forces, the SNA does receive outside donor support to increase capacity through the European Union Training Mission in Somalia, the U.S., Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. These efforts to build capability and capacity in the SNA will allow it to work alongside AMISOM and receive further support in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Until the SNA shows a sustained ability to work jointly with AMISOM, AMISOM must serve as the main offensive, holding, and stability force.

**Aspects of DOTMLPF-P: Organization**

AMISOM was originally designed and deployed as a military mission. Stabilization, primarily executed by a UN mission, was a secondary concern. AMISOM continues to evolve in order to execute its increasing stability role but is, essentially, still a multinational headquarters. As a multinational headquarters, the AMISOM leadership in Mogadishu consistently has command but little control over the national contingents in its respective sectors. AMISOM consistently suffers from a lack of unity of effort among the sectors. Each sector is controlled by a single TCC, which creates a situation where the AMISOM headquarters serves as more of a coordination cell than a command headquarters.

Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s involvement are linked to their national interests in Somalia. Ethiopia and Kenya deployed forces under the auspicious of the AU, but they conduct operations that are primarily aimed at achieving national interests. The AMISOM headquarters lacks the ability to ensure that all TCCs operate within the mandate, which degrades the legitimacy of the mission to the local population. Any violation of civilian rights by AMISOM troops simultaneously undermines faith in the FGS in Mogadishu, as AMISOM and the SNA are also associated with the FGS. The parallel operating structure has meant that AMISOM has struggled to conduct synchronized offensive operations, which allows Al-Shabaab to exploit the seams between sectors.

An example of the lack of synchronization is seen in the Juba River region, which serves as a strategically-important area for the FGS to clear of Al-Shabaab. The Juba River Offensive has been in planning for years and has yet to
be launched, which allows Al-Shabaab to operate freely in the region and collect funds from the local population. The Juba River Offensive requires cross-sector coordination and synchronization of effects to ensure Al-Shabaab is effectively removed. These operations have proved difficult for AMISOM to execute, in part because of the force headquarters’ inability to provide an operational framework within which the TCCs can operate.

Each of the countries within AMISOM have security interests in Somalia. The involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya are particularly nuanced, as the fragility of Somalia directly impacts their shared boarders. The political dynamics between Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, and Uganda all play out in AMISOM’s execution of the mission’s mandate. Ethiopia serves as the primary political and military power in East Africa. Kenya generally ranks second in the power dynamics of eastern Africa. Djibouti regularly follows Ethiopia’s lead with regards to Somalia policy. Uganda and Burundi have deployed under AMISOM the longest and generally maintain force presence for international recognition in the UN and the AU. In recent years, Uganda’s central government has faced domestic discontent with the seemingly, never ending, military investment requested by the UN and the AU. In the last two years, Uganda has been a major proponent for implementing a draw down and executing a handover of security to the FGS, due in part to the years-long AMISOM mandate and the little perceived progress by the FGS.

Ethiopia and Kenya became involved in AMISOM because of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab’s operations. Kenya has endured numerous cross-border incursions by the group, including the infamous attack on the Westgate Mall in 2013, which left over 65 people dead. In 2015, a similar attack occurred at the Garissa University in Kenya. These attacks reinforced the calculus that Kenya needed to remain inside Somalia to maintain pressure on Al-Shabaab and hinder the group’s ability to conduct activities inside Kenya. Ethiopia, like Kenya, has national security interests in Somalia. Ethiopia’s original incursion was to topple the ICU prior to AMISOM’s deployment. Al-Shabaab’s emergence from the collapsed ICU only reinvigorated Ethiopia’s desire to remain involved in Somalia. Ethiopia also has economic reasons for its involvement in Somalia. Somalia’s location and fledgling government serve as a ripe opportunity for investment. Ethiopia sees the ability to reach the Indian Ocean through investment projects as a crucial line to increase the economic vitality of Ethiopia. All these concerns and interests directly drive and contribute to Ethiopia’s willingness to remain involved.

Each of the countries within AMISOM have security interests in Somalia.

The national interests that drive involvement in AMISOM can also undermine the mission headquarters’ ability to provide for unity of effort. The command and control exercised by the mission headquarters extends as far as the contingents’ home country governments allow. The relationship between the TCCs and the AMISOM command and control structure has directly impacted effectively operating against a group like Al-Shabaab.

AMISOM has struggled in coordinated military operations among the TCCs. The coordination difficulties are amplified by the mission’s expanding areas of operation. These areas facilitate Al-Shabaab’s ability to consolidate, move, and threaten local populations. AMISOM has expanded its presence over the years to seize more territory from Al-Shabaab, but much like Mali, this expansion has only made supply routes and
convoys more vulnerable.\textsuperscript{165} This expansion has sometimes had catastrophic impacts. The fact that numerous AMISOM outposts were not mutually supporting was part of the reason the Kenyan base in El Adde was overrun in 2016. AMISOM is still in the process of evolving its Force Headquarters into a structure more closely related to a UN multidimensional mission, while still recognizing that the mission must be capable of warfighting operations.

AMISOM, much like MINUSMA, is designed to work alongside the host government security forces. AMISOM continues to train and increasingly operate parallel to SNA formations. The SNA, still in its infancy, is slowly becoming a force capable of securing regions that AMISOM clears or effectively operates in while being reinforced by AU troops. AMISOM headquarters has yet to integrate SNA personnel into its structure to increase interoperability. The SNA and AMISOM suffer from a trust deficit in some regions and among some commanders.\textsuperscript{166} This distrust has influenced the lack of integration of SNA personnel into the force headquarters. Distance also plays a role, as the AMISOM headquarters is located within the AU compound inside the Mogadishu International Airport complex, while the SNA headquarters is roughly a 45-minute drive north on the outskirts of Mogadishu at Villa Gashandiga. The international airport in Mogadishu has turned into an ecosystem that the SNA struggles to penetrate, which leads to further challenges of integration between AMISOM and the SNA.

AMISOM and the SNA receive support from international donors and the UN. AMISOM is particularly reliant on the UN. The UNSOS and the UNSOM both serve as examples of how the UN has chosen to support, as opposed to lead, a peace-enforcement-style mission against violent extremist groups.

### Intelligence Capabilities

AMISOM has taken full advantage of the benefits that intelligence operations can have on improving the security environment. AMISOM has consistently received support from donors, other than the UN, in intercepting communications among Al-Shabaab networks. AMISOM has been trained and equipped or provided assets during operations including reconnaissance UAVs, signals intelligence, and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.\textsuperscript{167} AMISOM’s intelligence is significantly aided by the fact that three of the TCCs are direct neighbors of Somalia and share ethnic, tribal, and cultural ties, making it easier to develop an understanding of the threat networks. Due to the command and control aspects of AMISOM and the fact that each sector ostensibly is the sole responsibility of a singular TCC, the coordination and intelligence-sharing is not always done. Each one of the TCCs also uses its respective host nation’s intelligence methods inside Somalia. Differing methods and techniques mean that it is impossible to fully understand the specific benefits and lessons learned from the individual countries’ operations in Somalia. AMISOM does not have the same level of transparency as MINUSMA, but this is no different than any other traditional military operation, and there is a noticeable level of importance placed on operational security.

AMISOM’s TCCs have made a point of deploying fully-staffed infantry battalions as well as niche unit formations to Somalia. Generally, AMISOM’s forces are light infantry with full battalion staffs.\textsuperscript{168} A unique attribute of the AMISOM forces is that each TCC has deployed forces that existed in its home country and are serving as a rotation in Somalia. The habitual relationship and history of the
formations implies that generally the forces’ commanders and staffs know the strengths and weaknesses of their respective units. There is no standard battalion or formation that deploys as a part of AMISOM, and the battalions are sourced by the TCC at a determination of the force requirements in their respective sectors. Once in Somalia, many of the AU forces fall in on equipment supported by the UN field office in Somalia. Many of the AMISOM troops travel in MRAP heavily-armored vehicles. Much like in Mali, the AMISOM troops are light infantry, restricted to roads because of the heavily-armored vehicles. During the early stages of the AU’s deployment, the forces were less reliant on heavily-armored vehicles, which served them well in the battle for Mogadishu and Kismayo. As time as progressed, however, AMISOM has transitioned to increasing the armor with which its forces operate. The early successes of AMISOM against Al-Shabaab with light infantry reinforced by limited armored vehicles demonstrates that MRAPs do not necessarily ensure success. Al-Shabaab moves quickly, is light, and easily blends into the population, which when being pursued by slow, unwieldy vehicles on fairly-hardened roads only further aids the terrorist group.

In addition to the traditional TCC infantry battalions, AMISOM has also seen the deployment of country-specific, enhanced infantry. The Ugandans in Sector 1 and the Kenyans in Sector 2 have deployed infantry with increased capability. These formations have received additional training and perform more than targeted missions, which further reinforces the stability missions of the more traditional infantry formations.

Aspects of DOTMLPF-P: Training

The TCCs for AMISOM receive significant support from outside donors in the pre-deployment training for Somalia deployments. The U.S. Department of State’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance is only one such pre-deployment program. These activities have tailored their training regime for Somalia, using historical techniques used by Al-Shabaab to inform training. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance supports all of Africa, but unlike Mali, the AMISOM TCCs focus more on abilities to respond to asymmetric attacks, informed from numerous prior rotations fighting against Al-Shabaab. The environment in which AMISOM operates means small unit tactics, ambush drills, outpost defense, and IED-defeat play crucial roles in pre-deployment training. AMISOM has demonstrated its ability to conduct effective offensive operations to clear areas of Al-Shabaab. The shortcomings come in the training on stability operations as the mission transitions from primarily warfighting to stability. Because of the limited number of police units deployed by the AU, the requirement for a secure environment has generally been filled by AMISOM military units. Law enforcement, good governance, and judiciary functions are not a focus for AMISOM’s military units, thus expertise in civil services and law enforcement functions is lacking. The UN has proved very adept at performing police functions and training. AMISOM has cleared numerous areas but lacked the ability to exploit the expulsion of Al-Shabaab. The struggle to provide security demonstrates that a pure warfighting force like AMISOM needs an equally robust law enforcement arm.

Aspects of DOTMLPF-P: Materiel

AMISOM TCCs have fielded everything from light-wheeled vehicles to tanks, armored

Much like in Mali, the AMISOM troops are light infantry, restricted to roads because of the heavily-armored vehicles.
personnel carriers, armored wheeled vehicles, and variants of MRAPs. As AMISOM continues its operations, the force must ensure it does not become overly reliant on MRAPs that do not increase the capability of its forces to attack and pursue Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab consistently targets AMISOM convoys with IEDs, which have necessitated the deployment of heavily-armored vehicles. Though MRAPs serve a purpose, when Al-Shabaab attacks in light pick-up trucks and uses hit and run tactics, the AU troops cannot pursue. The SNA typifies how Al-Shabaab maneuvers; both organizations ride in what are commonly referred to as “technicals” that are easier to maintain and are cross-country capable. AMISOM must ensure that it does not sacrifice effectiveness for security when deploying vehicles.

Like MINUSMA, AMISOM has suffered from a lack of aviation assets. The AU TCCs in Somalia have been supported with common communications platforms from the UN and numerous fielding programs from donors, which has led to AMISOM having the capability to communicate throughout its formations. AU troops have been resourced with NATO-compliant communications systems and interoperable commercial systems. The AMISOM’s communication interoperability was not always the case. The Kenyan clearing operation in Kismayo was conducted without solid communications between AMISOM HQ in Mogadishu and the Kenyan military headquarters. A common or interoperable communication system allows for adjacent contingents to support on another.

Many of the AMISOM TCCs have been supported by bilateral forces’ UAVs or the deployment of their home nations’ platforms. AMISOM has used UAVs to successfully support offensive, convoy, and counter-IED operations. The contingents have also received substantial home-station training and equipment fielding from bilateral partners in preparation for Somalia deployments. Because UAVs are ubiquitous, the TCCs in AMISOM have a higher level of proficiency with the systems. UAVs in reconnaissance roles to support convoys or offensive operations further enabled the effectiveness of AMISOM troops.

Like MINUSMA, AMISOM has suffered from a lack of aviation assets. The lack of attack rotary aircraft has limited AMISOM’s ability to strike Al-Shabaab in austere regions, further forcing ground troops to follow and pursue. AMISOM’s ability to provide rapid aviation support to convoys, offensive operations, and reactionary strikes is hindered by the shortfall in aviation, a concern consistently voiced to the UN Security Council. Through over 100 helicopter landing sites and fixed wing services to the six sector headquarters and smaller outposts, UNSOS supports search and rescue, logistical resupply, and aerial medical evacuation for AMISOM troops. The size of Somalia and the varied requirements of the mission have proven the necessity of a robust aerial capability to support ground operations.

Aspects of DOTMLPF-P: Leadership

Many of the leaders in AMISOM have had numerous rotations with the mission and have a thorough understanding of the situation and threats. The leaders in Somalia are learning to be adaptable and persistent as they have transitioned to stability operations alongside more traditional warfighting missions. AMISOM suffers from leadership challenges. The AMISOM Force Commander has limited command and control over the respective sectors and contingents. The sometimes-limited unity of command has required leaders of AMISOM to navigate the political caveats of each respective TCC. The leaders at the sector headquarters similarly retain a level of autonomy from the Force Headquarters.
in Mogadishu. The sector commanders generally answer to their respective home nations’ capitals, which can further undermine the legitimacy of the Force Commander and similarly limit effectiveness. The sector commanders in AMISOM do receive general guidance from the home nation and the force headquarters, which allows each of the sector contingents to pursue operations that strive toward desired end states. Unlike MINUSMA, the AMISOM sector headquarters has a more robust command and control relationship, likely because of the homogenous nature of the contingents operating in each sector. The autonomy of each sector commander allows for the freedom to adapt, but simultaneously, this often occurs without sector objectives nesting within the Force Headquarters designs, which only further undercuts the Force Commander’s legitimacy.

**Aspects of DOTMLPF-P: Personnel**

AMISOM currently deploys 22,126 uniformed personnel, including military and police. The security situation and the threat actors in Somalia require a capable military arm, a police arm, and a civil advisory aspect. Somalia has come a long way from the late 1990s and early 2000s, due in large part to AMISOM’s ability to degrade Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is now forced to fight as an insurgency, rarely confronting AMISOM in open conventional combat. Alongside conventional infantry units, AMISOM has also deployed enhanced and specialty-trained combat formations (i.e., Kenya Rangers and the Ugandan People’s Defense Force Special Forces Group) capable of precision strikes, information operations, civil affairs, and medical evacuation. These forces fill what the UN would consider Special Forces roles and provide the commanders with an agile, effective force compared to traditional peacekeeping infantry formations.

Alongside the enhanced infantry capabilities, AMISOM has developed an increasingly robust EOD capacity to combat Al-Shabaab’s IEDs. Each TCC in AMISOM fields some level of EOD capability, which has increased the survivability of convoys and regular patrols. The tactics that Al-Shabaab uses has forced AMISOM to rely more on niche capabilities than on purely light infantry. The long lines of communication and sometimes isolated outposts mean that AMISOM must be capable of sustaining forces that have been projected into rural areas. AMISOM forces must have formations that are capable of coordinating with air platforms for medical assistance as well as close combat aviation. AMISOM relies heavily on UNSOS for medical capacity and UNSOS manages medical evacuations. UNSOS has proven that the UN is quite capable of conducting MEDEVAC. UNSOS has designated numerous helicopter landing zones throughout Somalia. Formations have less responsive medical care from their organic organizations and must rely on UN’s ability to respond.

The tactics that Al-Shabaab uses has forced AMISOM to rely more on niche capabilities than on purely light infantry.

AMISOM also suffers from a lack of attack aviation. The lack of aircraft means that AMISOM suffers from a lack of knowledgeable staff and personnel trained in the employment of aviation. Those TCCs that have deployed their own aviation assets have had to supply the personnel to ensure the operability and maintenance of the equipment.

AMISOM must increase its capacity in police advisors and civil governance advisors. The FGS has recently had another round of elections with a new president and cabinet. These 2016 elections highlight how Somalia is further progressing toward a more legitimate government, and AMISOM’s support to that
government will require robust law enforcement and rule of law support. To be successful, the military arm of AMISOM must have a coordinated and synchronized civil-military cooperation plan with personnel trained in the aspects of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

As Al-Shabaab continues to attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the national and regional governments, AMISOM must have a capable partner in the Somalia security organizations. AMISOM is currently working alongside the European Training Mission in Somalia to train and advise the growing SNA. Simultaneously AMISOM’s police arm is working to train Somali Police and thus create a capable partner. The necessity to have a partner capable of parallel or joint operations has thrust AMISOM into the role of warfighter as well as trainer. The role of advisor and trainer requires specialized training and requires an additional capability resident inside AMISOM.

Finally, AMISOM has fielded forces that can operate jointly with bilateral partners currently conducting CT operations in Somalia. The ongoing CT operations in Somalia have supported AMISOM and the SNA by operating simultaneously but not at cross purposes per se. The U.S. has conducted operations unilaterally as well as with AMISOM and the SNA respectively. The unilateral and bilateral operations conducted by third parties does share the similarity with MINUSMA.

MINUSMA and AMISOM share many similarities. Both missions demonstrate two methods the UN has taken to address the threat posed by violent extremist organizations operating in fragile states. Mali and Somalia also share fragile state institutions that struggle to conduct CT, COIN, and stability operations.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

The UN is now more actively engaged against VEOs as seen in Mali or insurgent groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somali. MINUSMA is the first UN peacekeeping force deployed with the specific mandate to support the reestablishment of a host nation’s sovereignty against insurgent groups, while also specifically responsible with combatting VEOs. The UN was on a steep learning curve when it transitioned AFISMA to MINUSMA and was still learning from the ongoing AMISOM about the resilience of terrorist groups and how difficult and complex a peace operation is against a lethal terrorist organization. MINUSMA and AMISOM have forced the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to come to grips with the evolving threats peacekeepers now face and whether the organization can be successful against such actors.

This article has laid out the facts and analyzed the ability of the DPKO to execute peace enforcement mandates in a fragile state where that state cannot prosecute CT, COIN, or stability operations. The inability of the host nation to successfully conduct CT or COIN operations shifts this responsibility to the UN force.

Analyses of the AU’s mission in Somalia and the UN’s mission in Mali show that the Security Council should not authorize mandates that encompass CT or COIN tasks because the normal TCCs do not possess the specialized units and training to conduct these missions. The UN does not readily embrace the execution of COIN and especially CT missions. The UN Secretary General has demonstrated that the UN is willing...
to conduct CT activities; however, through the current Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), those actions are focused on countering propaganda, addressing roots of terrorism through stabilization activities, and thorough communication and coordination. The UN must be willing to conduct kinetic actions to C-VEOs in the field. The DPKO must operationalize its C-VEO approach and team with a peace enforcement mission. VEOs are extremely capable of operating transnationally, which poses immediate challenges to the UN because PEOs are solely based in a singular country. For the UN to be effective, the peace operations must take a regional approach. This organizational unpreparedness leads to the TCCs being equally unprepared or untrained to operate in an environment where VEOs or insurgent groups serve as the main adversary. The UN and DPKO can effectively support stability activities in a fragile state, but the organization cannot effectively conduct stability activities while simultaneously facing VEOs and/or insurgent groups. MINUSMA has demonstrated how the UN struggles to effectively support its own forces in an austere environment facing asymmetric threats. The UN has allowed individual nations to conduct unilateral or multilateral operations in the same operational areas as peacekeeping forces. The UN has authorized the French taskforce Barkhane and just recently the Sahel 5 to conduct operations against the same threats facing MINUSMA. MINUSMA’s reliance on other organizations to directly combat the asymmetric threats demonstrates the lack of capability inside the peacekeeping force. These parallel forces allow MINUSMA to defer responsibility for offensive acts, but these are actually not disassociated from MINUSMA. The local inhabitants and threat groups associate these bilateral forces with MINUSMA, which can undermine the legitimacy of the mission and simultaneously justify the targeting of MINUSMA. The fact that these bilateral forces are associated with MINUSMA, but do not operate under its purview means the UN pays the consequences of any actions taken by Barkhane or the Sahel 5, forces it does not control. This means that MINUSMA could fail to achieve unity of effort with these parallel forces. If a third party or bilateral force is not used to combat VEOs or insurgents then the peace enforcement operation force must be properly structured, trained, equipped, and supported.

This analysis has demonstrated that MINUSMA is not trained or equipped to execute mandates against VEOs or insurgent groups. The DPKO must update its procedures to identify and recruit TCCs with the requisite skill sets.

The UN DPKO is not constituted to be successful in mandates such as MINUSMA. DPKO and MINUSMA suffer from structural deficiencies that prevent them from combatting VEOs. They must address several issues involving capabilities, training, restructuring, and resourcing to be successful in this new environment.

**Recommendations**

The UN multidimensional modular U staff force structure must be fully integrated with the political mission headquarters. The separation of the two staffs means that the entire mission lacks unity of effort and a shared campaign plan. Bringing all the UN’s agencies under one staff structure allows for positioning civilians alongside military staff officers, further increasing a common understanding and shared purpose.
The observations of AMISOM and MINUSMA both demonstrate how essential effective command and control is to conducting operations against VEOs or insurgents. Both missions demonstrate that that effectiveness is closely linked to the ability of the force headquarters to properly synchronize and communicate with subordinate headquarters. To improve common understanding, communications, and staff effectiveness, the multidimensional force headquarters should have a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS OPS), a Deputy Chief of Staff for Future Operations and Plans (DCOS FUOPS-P), a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Support (DCOS OS), and finally a Deputy Chief of Staff for Information (DCOS-I).

The DCOS OPS would be responsible for the Joint Operations Center, battle tracking, ensuring the leadership had a common understanding of the environment, and executing all operations inside the mission’s area of responsibility. The Operations staff would be supported by civilian and military representatives from all UN agencies and associated staff sections. Similarly, it would be supported by air operations, maritime operations (as necessary), an EOD cell, a CT cell, and police and law enforcement personnel. Finally, the UN must recognize the value in the employment of indirect fires assets. The DCOS OPS should encompass a fires cell to properly employ these assets. The fires cell would be capable of planning lethal and non-lethal fires as required through the area of operations. MINUSMA and AMISOM have both proven that peacekeepers must be capable of properly targeting and returning indirect fire. The incidents at Tabankourt and Kidal demonstrate that UN forces can easily be fixed and suppressed due to enemy indirect fires, and the units must have the capacity to respond. This ability achieves one of the core aspects of the MINUSMA mandate, which is to protect UN personnel and facilities.182

DoD organizations have an S3 (U3 DCOS OPS) that handles current operations. The S3, however, has a small staff that takes future operations, generated by the S5 (U5), and provides more detailed planning and resources, making general plans capable of being turned into current operations. The DCOS OPS (U3) would be supported by a staff (U35) that would serve as a bridge from future operations and plans to current operations. The U5 and associated staff would be in the lead of the DCOS FUOPS-P, a staff that includes civil affairs experts, CT planners, political advisers, police and law enforcement advisers, humanitarian assistance advisers, UN agency liaison officers, and the evaluation and best practices cells. This staff must develop a campaign plan and lines of effort. MINUSMA’s past and current operations have demonstrated that the force is challenged by the fact that besides the tasks in the initial mandate, no other campaign plan exists to guide the mission. Without a detailed plan, the forces on the ground are perpetually in a reactionary mode. A complete and holistic campaign plan that encompasses all civilian and military actions with measures of effectiveness and performance allows the U5 and Force Commander to gauge progress and accountability.

Crucial to the execution of operations and the allocation of resources is a robust operational support staff. The U4 would serve as the lead for the DCOS OS. Incorporated within the DCOS OS staff would be the U1, medical leads, and the U6. MINUSMA and AMISOM have both demonstrated the dangers of overextension and
supply shortfalls. An effective OS staff would help alleviate this.

VEOs have proven their lethality, which necessitates robust and responsive medical assets. MINUSMA and AMISOM both share a necessity for medical evacuation via ground or, more commonly, air. A lack of medical support or planning only serves to discourage TCCs from actively patrolling and allows VEOs or insurgents to freely maneuver throughout the area of operations.

Crucial to any force conducting stability operations or facing asymmetric threats is a robust intelligence collection and analysis capacity. Traditionally, the UN has shied away from intelligence collection. Understanding the drivers of conflict, threat networks, population dynamics, and enemy actions requires the UN to establish this capacity. The multidimensional force structure should create a DCOS-I to provide the leadership and staff the best planning information. The DCOS-I would be led by the U2 and be composed of an ASIFU-like capability. The ASIFU has proven to be a force multiplier in MINUSMA, but there is untapped potential as currently structured. The ASIFU is essentially a NATO capability and because of national disclosure regulations, information sharing has been a challenge. If the UN developed an in-house ASIFU capability, all information collected and analyzed could be shared throughout the organization and disseminated to all TCCs. The JMAC and UN ASIFU equivalent could then be merged, increasing efficiency and streamlining efforts. Finally, to ensure appropriate messaging from the mission, the DCOS-I (a civilian) would support the messaging campaign through a military information support operation cell. Messaging has proven to be crucial when combatting VEO or insurgent groups, as it serves as a direct link to the populace and recruiting mechanism. Messaging by the enemy necessitates the need for a force to be capable of creating a timely and effective messaging campaign to isolate bad actors from the population.

Restructuring the main force headquarters is not sufficient. Proportional, robust staff structures at subordinate sector headquarters is also required. The central headquarters cannot be expected to effectively manage operations over distances that countries like Mali or Somalia require. To properly disseminate and communicate the mission and vision to subordinate TCCs’ formations, the sector headquarters should have the same capabilities and integration as the force headquarters. The sector headquarters should provide bottom-up refinement back to the force headquarters. The sector headquarters in MINUSMA and AMISOM both have TCC battalions deployed into the missions. These battalions typically do not deploy with robust staff sections and require aid from the sector headquarters. The sector headquarters effectively serves as the brigade command staff for the battalions. MINUSMA and AMISOM both struggle with span of control as each sector is allocated more than three to five battalions, which is historically demonstrated as the most any one brigade can effectively command and control. The force headquarters and sector headquarters are simultaneously acting alongside the host nation forces.

MINUSMA and AMISOM both struggle with span of control as each sector is allocated more than three to five battalions...
nation’s forces. This initial training provides the host nation forces basic skills, but it is dependent on the UN forces in the field to operate jointly or at a minimum in parallel before attempting to act independently. This facilitates the need for the UN to have some capacity to conduct FID or security force assistance. The principles of building partner capacity in the host nation are well suited for special forces units, which would allow UN special forces units to advise, assist, and accompany host nation forces, thus working toward the mandate objective of reestablishing central governmental control.

The sheer size of countries like Mali and Somalia demonstrates that these complex missions cannot be successful with inadequate staffing. A little over 13,000 forces in MINUSMA cannot be expected to effectively secure a country larger than the state of Texas. The UN must recognize that it must design and attempt to recruit a force capable of occupying such a large footprint, realizing this is dependent on the constraints of willingness of TCCs to provide forces and budgetary considerations. However, understaffing a mission has demonstrated that the force becomes consumed with simply trying to resupply itself rather than conducting operations to seize, retain, and deny the enemy safe haven.

If the UN desires to continue to execute missions such as MINUSMA, it must recognize that not all infantry are suited to accomplish the same tasks.

The role of convoy security or resupply operations would rest with the heavy infantry formations. These formations would not be expected to pursue attackers but must be survivable against the tactics employed by asymmetric threats. The heavy infantry would be equipped with mine or IED resistant vehicles, such as MRAPs. The heavy infantry would receive additional training on convoy operations, vehicle recovery, and vehicle maintenance. The heavy infantry would provide the force headquarters a formation dedicated to addressing the constant supply requirements without draining combat forces from necessary patrolling.
missions. The heavy infantry would also serve as route security forces and, if necessary, provide a platform for cordon operations.

Finally, the UN should recruit more SOF-qualified forces from TCCs. AMISOM has proven the effectiveness of employing special forces or advanced infantry to C-VEOs. Example of this are the Ugandan Special Reconnaissance unit in Somalia and the Senegalese Advanced Infantry in Mali. These forces are crucial to conducting operations directed at those asymmetric threats and have the training to be more effective than a traditional peacekeeping infantry battalion. These forces when properly trained, deployed, resourced, and managed allow the UN to mitigate the actions of parallel forces, while effectively achieving the aims outlined in the mandate. The UN has already recognized the value of SOF and designated specific missions for SOF-identified units through its UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual from 2015. The tasks and skills required to carry out these missions are already resident in many of the TCCs that deploy in Africa. The U.S. currently trains numerous partner countries in skills that would qualify them to serve as UN SOF. DPKO can encourage the recruitment and deployment of these advanced infantry or SOF forces through financial incentives.

Explosive ordnance disposal units are also becoming increasingly necessary due to the proliferation of IED tactics and materials. Explosive ordnance disposal units must be deployed to meet sector requirements for route clearance and support patrols.

Additionally, MINUSMA and AMISOM have demonstrated that a robust UAV capability can pay large dividends. Each infantry unit should deploy with small UAVs, but each sector headquarters should also have an UAV component. UAV forces at each sector headquarters would provide increased situational awareness, ISR support, increased survivability, and route reconnaissance. The UN force must also reconsider requirements for piloted aircraft to support heavy lift operations and medical evacuation missions.

Aviation should not be primarily aligned against support operations but should be forward deployed as it proves crucial in responsiveness to conduct CT and COIN operations. Mandates such as MINUSMA’s allow for attack aviation to conduct kinetic operations. AMISOM has effectively deployed attack aviation to serve as a quick reaction force when available. Al-Shabaab’s exploitation of its attack on El Adde was cut short by the response of Kenyan attack aviation. Aviation limited to a quick reaction force does hinder a more proactive capability to effectively C-VEOs. Similarly, the UN use of Dutch attack aviation in Tabankort preserved the lives of UN peacekeepers.

The UN should incorporate specific mission training for leaders and soldiers alike on COIN and CT operations.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are complex and dynamic environments, but operating against insurgencies or VEOs adds an additional layer of complexity. The UN already possesses the institutional knowledge to conduct stability operations. That knowledge must be teamed with a clearer understanding of how to conduct operations against the asymmetric threats that operate in places like Mali or Somalia. The UN should incorporate specific mission training for leaders and soldiers alike on COIN and CT operations.

Kinetic operations against threats like those in Mali or Somalia can be taught at home station through programs similar to those already conducted by the U.S. or European Union. The leaders, soldiers, and their staffs must be trained on the non-kinetic aspects of CT and COIN operations. For the UN to be successful
in missions like Mali or Somalia, the staff and leaders must understand how to isolate threat actors from the local population, while similarly not alienating themselves or undermining the mission’s legitimacy.

This article has laid out how the force structure should be organized and adjusted in order to conduct missions like MINUSMA. Evidence has shown that increased personnel and variations in types of units with niche capabilities pay huge dividends. The threats faced by forces like MINUSMA and AMISOM require specialized training to be effective. The staff and force commanders must be trained to properly employ niche forces and equally trained to use these forces against VEOs or insurgents. Missions like MINUSMA require robust enabler equipment, but equipment that is equally survivable and maintained. Leaders operating in missions like MINUSMA must be agile and adaptive, simultaneously, they must be innovative and not risk-adverse. The VEOs and insurgents are very adept at taking advantage of instability and ungoverned spaces. Peace operations leaders facing forces like those in Mali must be capable of providing a common vision and communicating that vision. Finally, the leaders must be capable of visualizing the operating environment and developing innovative approaches to achieving their mandates. IAJ

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Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago officers join CGSC’s International Hall of Fame

Two new members were inducted into the Command and General Staff College International Hall of Fame in a ceremony Oct. 3, 2019, in the Lewis and Clark Center’s Eisenhower Auditorium. Their portraits now hang in the IHOF hallway alongside 283 other inductees representing 75 different nations.


“Each (IHOF member) became eligible for this recognition through years of distinguished service to their nation, rising to the highest positions of uniformed leadership within their home military,” said Brig. Gen. Stephen Maranian, CGSC deputy commandant and Army University provost.

Ndiaye previously served as senior military adviser at the U.N. Office for Central Africa prior to being promoted to brigadier general and appointed chief of staff of the Senegalese Army. Currently, he is serving as the inspector general of the Senegalese Armed Forces. Ndiaye is the third IHOF inductee from his nation.

Ndiaye said he is proud of the education he received at CGSC. “Twenty-five years later, the world has changed. In fact, it is a whole new world with its complex strengths and challenges. The future will not be what we expected, but it still expects a lot of us.”

Smart served as the chief of Defence Staff, the nation’s senior military adviser to the president as well as the Minister of National Security on matters of national defense and security. Currently, he serves as chief executive officer of the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management. Smart is the sixth IHOF inductee from his nation.

Smart said he is the officer he is today because of CGSC. “I wish to say thank you for the wonderful work that you are doing here at CGSC in the leadership development of our armed forces and the peace and stability throughout the world.”

During their induction, the honorees were presented with a Certificate of Honor from Maranian and an eagle statuette from the CGSC Foundation.

The IHOF was established in 1973 by CGSC, the Kansas City Chapter of the Military Order of World Wars, and the then-CGSC Alumni Association, now the CGSC Foundation. Induction into the IHOF is for international graduates of the Command and General Staff Officer Course who have attained one of the highest positions of military importance in their country’s armed forces through military merit.

The 285 current inductees are out of more than 8,300 international CGSOC graduates from 165 countries since 1894.

- Fort Leavenworth Lamp
Fall National Security Roundtable program focuses on China

CGSC’s Command and General Staff School faculty from the Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) and the CGSC Foundation cohosted a National Security Roundtable (NSRT) program Oct. 1-2, 2019, at the Lewis and Clark Center on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Eighteen guests attended this NSRT program, accompanied by 13 Foundation trustees and nine alumni of the program. More than 50 faculty, staff and students were also involved in making the event a success for the participants and the College.

The first day of the roundtable program included remarks by CGSC Deputy Commandant Brig. Gen. Steve Maranian; Command and General Staff School Director Col. Scott Green; and Mr. Jeff LaMoe, Director of Operations and Support for Army University.

Mr. Kevin Rousseau, CGSC’s Distinguished Chair for National Intelligence Studies and an officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, provided the “scene setter” briefing to orient the participants to the topic of “A Rising Chinese Empire?” After an extensive discussion with many questions from the participants, the group moved to the atrium of the Lewis and Clark Center for the reception and social hour.

On the second day of the program, DJIMO faculty presented two discussion panels: “A Rising Chinese Empire? The Near Area” and “A Rising Chinese Empire? China Afar.” After the second panel the participants split into three small groups and moved to seminar rooms to conduct “wrap around” sessions where they could ask additional questions and learn more in a smaller group environment.

At the end of the day Foundation Chairman Mike Hockley and CGSSS Director Col. Green presented each guest with a certificate and group photo. Hockley also presented each with a challenge coin.

Special thanks go to Lt. Col. Randy Johnson and the DJIMO faculty along with the student volunteer escorts whose presence makes the program special for the guests. Special thanks also goes to Foundation Trustee Terry Lillis, the main sponsor of the NSRT program.

- CGSC Foundation

International students participate in UN Peacekeepers forum

On May 8, in the Arnold Conference Room of the Lewis and Clark Center at Fort Leavenworth, Mr. Four International Military Students (IMS) from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) took part in a panel discussion on “Protecting the Peace: United Nations Peacekeepers in the 21st Century.”

The occasion was opened by Dr. Matt Naylor, President/CEO of the National WWI Museum and Memorial, who introduced the keynote speaker Squadron Leader Fiona Pearce (Australia Air Force), Military Gender Advisor of the Office of Military Affairs, United Nations Department of Peace Operations.

The IMS who participated in the event were Maj. Nathaniel K. Waka (Liberia), Maj. Carlos Vazquez (Spain), Maj. MD Sajibul Islam (Bangladesh), and Maj. Daniel Atobrah Bondah (Ghana).

The program took place at the National WWI Museum and Memorial in collaboration with the IMS of CGSC, United Nations Association of the USA of Greater Kansas City (UNA-GKC) and the Harry S. Truman Library/Museum on Sept. 24, 2019. The IMS discussion was moderated by
Ambassador Canavan selected as Distinguished Visiting Professor of Diplomacy

The CGSC Foundation and DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired) announce the selection of retired Ambassador Katherine “Kate” Canavan as the Distinguished Visiting Professor of Diplomacy for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College class of 2020.

Ambassador Canavan served with distinction as a Foreign Service officer in the U.S. State Department more than 35 years. She retired in November 2011, with the rank of Career Minister, the second highest in the Foreign Service. Canavan currently serves at the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., providing State Department and interagency insights and expertise to classes for general officers and senior executive civilians. She also works independently supporting various military exercises involving interaction with the State Department, U.S. Embassies, the interagency, international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

“The CGSC Foundation’s partnership with DACOR in Washington, D.C., to bring senior Foreign Service officers here is one of the best programs we offer to enhance the educational experience for our community,” said Foundation President/CEO Rod Cox. “During their visits here they share their knowledge of country team leadership, foreign policy expertise, and regional expertise with CGSC students, and also discuss foreign policy considerations and career opportunities in the Foreign Service with university and civic groups throughout the Kansas City area.”

Cox added that the Foundation is working to finalize the schedule, and that Ambassador Canavan’s first visit to CGSC will likely be in early December.

- CGSC Foundation

October brown-bag lecture focuses on CIA

Mr. Kevin Rousseau, the CGSC Distinguished Chair for National Intelligence Studies and a member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), led a discussion about the CIA’s organization and mission during the InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture conducted Oct. 10, 2019, in the Lewis and Clark Center’s Arnold Conference Room.

Rousseau covered a bit of the Agency’s history and spoke in plain terms about its mission to an audience of nearly 100 students, faculty and members of the community. At the end of his presentation, Rousseau recommended several books for further reading, one of which was A Practitioner’s Handbook for Interagency Leadership published by the CGSC Foundation Press.

“It’s not every day you get to hear about the CIA from an actual CIA rep,” one attendee said. “We get the fact he can’t talk about all the supposed ‘juicy’ information, but just gaining an understanding and some insight at this level makes it very interesting.”

Rousseau is a retired U.S. Army officer with multiple deployments to the Balkans and
Afghanistan. At the CIA Rousseau has served as an analyst, an instructor, and manager. His most recent assignment was as the briefer to the CIA’s Associate Director for Military Affairs. He has a bachelor’s from the United States Military Academy, a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College, a JD from the George Mason University School of Law, and a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies.

Rousseau’s presentation was the third lecture in the series for academic year 2020. The next lecture is set for Nov. 26, 2019, with a presentation on the Federal Executive Board.

The InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series is co-hosted by the CGSC Foundation’s Simons Center with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS). The series is an extracurricular, interagency topic-focused series that is intended to help enrich the CGSS curriculum. Unless otherwise announced, the presentations are scheduled each month from 12:30-1:30 p.m. in the Arnold Conference Room of the Lewis and Clark Center on Fort Leavenworth. All lectures in the InterAgency Brown-Bag Lecture Series are free and open to the public.

- Simons Center

Former AFRICOM commander delivers 2019 Colin Powell lecture

Gen. Carter F. Ham, U.S. Army, Ret., the former commander of U.S. Africa Command and the current president/CEO of the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), presented the annual Colin L. Powell Lecture for students of the 2020 class of the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, Aug. 13 at Fort Leavenworth’s Lewis and Clark Center.

Ham opened his remarks by welcoming the new class, making a special point to welcome the international officers, especially those from the African continent.

“Africa still holds a very special place in my heart from my last assignment in Africa Command,” he said. “There’s not a lot of Army service that I miss in retirement,” he said jokingly. “Frankly I don’t miss the craziness, I don’t miss the late night phone calls…but I miss being in Africa. I miss the vibrancy, the complexity, the people, the relationships.”

Throughout the morning, Ham spoke about relationships, interweaving the idea of relationships and trust with personal development and leadership within the Army, with family and with community. Ham also spoke of large-scale migration as the result of natural and man-made catastrophes, explosive population growth in the poorest parts of the world, other global challenges, and the growing “civil-military” divide here in the U.S. with fewer and fewer Americans having any personal connection with the armed forces.

At the conclusion of his remarks, Foundation President/CEO Col. (Ret.) Rod Cox presented Ham with a silver Colin L. Powell commemorative coin. The intent of the Colin L. Powell Lecture Series is to invite national and international distinguished personalities to provide lectures on contemporary issues to the faculty, student body, community and business leaders at the Command and General Staff College. The lecture series is sponsored by the CGSC Foundation through an endowment from TriWest Healthcare Alliance.

- CGSC Foundation
Outside the Wire in Blue: A True Story of American Cops Downrange in the Wars on Terror

by David R. Shearman and James Taman


Reviewed by Kevin Rousseau
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Outside the Wire in Blue: A True Story of American Cops Downrange in the Wars on Terror tells the relatively unknown stories of U.S. civilian police officers who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan under the DoD Law Enforcement Professional Program (LEP-P). David Shearman and James Taman, both law enforcement officers who took part in the program, have done an admirable job rescuing the stories and lessons learned of those who served with them in the LEP-P. The authors acknowledge early on in the book that LEP-P operated in relative obscurity, quoting the General in charge of the program that “the LEP program is a very unique but little-known effort. Even the people behind the scenes are not quite sure about what you guys bring to the fight and the sacrifices you are making for your country.” With this book, the authors give an important historical account of the LEP-P from its origins in 2006, while providing a fitting tribute to the sacrifices they and their comrades made by volunteering to deploy to the wars.

Although written in a chronological format from a highly personal perspective, Outside the Wire in Blue manages to make itself more than just another war diary. The book contains some broader lessons that transcend the day-to-day challenges faced by civilian police working with the military in a war zone. The authors’ purpose in writing the book was to tell the stories of a number of individual civilian police officers who volunteered for LEP-P. They also wrote the book to help their fellow American citizens better understand the overall character and professionalism of U.S police officers, and to preserve some lessons-learned for future law enforcement professionals. They succeed admirably in all of these objectives.

The authors explain why DoD found that the law enforcement skills and practical street-wise experience that civilian U.S. police officers brought to the fight proved so important to helping soldiers counter the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Civilian police may not have a place on a conventional battlefield, but “in the wars of the street and alley, the back-room plot, and the operation of a criminal enterprise, against these they are irreplaceable and invaluable, both as force multipliers and as actors in their own right.” For example, the authors discuss the daily challenges
of setting up Investigative and Surveillance Teams (ISU)—undercover teams of 15 Afghan police officers augmented with two embedded LEP advisors—throughout Afghanistan. The addition of "professional police officers, married with both military staff and host national police, produced results all out of proportion to expectations." Embedding just a small number of civilian police with a host national force helped make the insurgent "tangible, visible, time and place predictable."

Shearman and Taman’s stories also highlight some important lessons of interagency cooperation. As explained in the CGSC Foundation’s 2018 publication, A Practitioner’s Handbook for Interagency Leadership, leaders operating in the complex interagency arena wrestle with a host of unique challenges as they transition from the familiar routines of their home organizations to an environment where there are “few hierarchies, rules, or standard operating procedures.” These challenges include overlapping responsibilities and authorities that spur competition and hinder interagency operations. Organizations also do not easily change the way they are used to operating to accommodate other partners. Civilian police methods epitomize the challenges of working out a practical day-to-day interagency approach, for “they are generally a deviation from the basic unit orientation, a change in operating strategy.” Outside the Wire in Blue provides vivid real-world examples of these types of challenges, and emphasizes the importance of cultivating a broad interagency perspective. Much has been invested over the past several decades toward promoting interagency cooperation and a whole of government approach. By telling the story of LEP-P and the police officers who served in its ranks, Outside the Wire in Blue contributes toward preserving some of those important and hard-won lessons.

NOTES

1 David R. Shearman and James Taman, Outside the Wire in Blue: A True Story of American Cops Downrange in the Wars on Terror (Green Bay, WI: TitleTown Publishing, 2018), 69.

2 Ibid., 402.

3 Ibid., 397.

4 Ibid., 396.

5 Ibid.


7 Outside the Wire in Blue, 393.
The InterAgency Journal (IAJ) is published by the Command and General Staff College Foundation Press for the Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation. The InterAgency Journal is a national security studies journal providing a forum for professional discussion and the exchange of information and ideas on matters pertaining to operational and tactical issues of interagency cooperation, coordination, and collaboration.

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