Moral Friction:
Harm and Incongruence in Hierarchical Structures

by Ken Schall

"Don't worry about it. We'll take care of it." Y'know, uh, "We got body count!" "We have body count!" So it starts working on your head. So you know in your heart it's wrong, but at the time, here's your superiors telling you that it was okay. So, I mean, that's okay then, right? This is part of war. Y'know? Gung-HO! Y'know? "AirBORNE! AirBORNE! Let's go!"[1]

Many common discussions surrounding ethics and morality are based on establishing proper moral foundations. Typically, this takes the form of authors arguing that one tradition (be it deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, care ethics, etc.) is more appropriate in general or for understanding some specific issue. Discussions that approach morality as a system of thought may miss the mechanistic aspects of social relations that may affect moral expression. This paper is an attempt to examine such mechanisms.

The world we live in is one that is characterized by numerous hierarchies wherein authority is exercised from a top-down model. Leaders and followers, managers and subordinates, officers and common soldiers, whatever the domain may be, the size and complexity of modern organizations requires the interplay of many people in different roles to achieve a common objective. While all people may be predisposed implicitly to one particular moral perspective[2] or consciously choose to follow a particular school of thought, it is important to recognize that all perspectives are not held universally. Different people will consider the ethical implications of an action differently, they will find different factors for reaching these conclusions than others. These divergences will occur frequently in systems of hierarchy based on the simple fact that more people means more potential points of moral divergence.

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It is the point of moral divergence that inspires the topic for this paper. Moral friction is proposed to describe the phenomenon of harm arising from competing moral perspectives in a hierarchy. Specifically, this can be seen in a person with authority passing an order to a subordinate when the order is rationalized using a moral position that is not shared between the two. For example, the person in a leadership position justifies the required action on the basis that it is for the greater good of the involved parties (a basically consequentialist view), yet the action in some way violates a deeply held principle of the subordinate (a basically deontological view). The person who carries out the order in this scenario does not rationalize the moral dimensions of the action with the same logic that is expressed to them. This creates a point of friction in the hierarchy between the decision-makers and those who carry out the decisions. This conflict cannot be easily solved thanks to their need to fulfil their role as a member of an organization and as a moral agent. These are perceived as two non-negotiable moral requirements. This is a moral dilemma and will be explored in more detail later in this article.

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The portrayal of moral friction thus far may make it seem mundane or unalarming. Make no mistake, for this phenomenon is the starting point for extreme personal harm. Specifically, friction has the potential to create moral injury in intense situations. Moral injury is defined by Dr. Jonathan Shay as a betrayal of what is right by someone with legitimate authority in times of great importance.[3] To illustrate the importance of this topic, most of the discussion will be focused on military contexts. The military is an appropriate domain to examine moral friction because the consequences of it are the most clear and dire: increased suicide rates following moral injury.[4]

First, a baseline by which most people operate when it comes to moral perspectives will be established. This will include an examination of how hierarchical positioning can alter an individual's perspective and contribute to organizational friction. Second, examples of moral injury in military contexts will be given to illustrate the role incongruent moral justifications play in those moments. Finally, an account of competing moral responsibility and identity will be offered to learn how, if at all, mechanisms contributing to leader-follower incongruence may be addressed.

The goal of examining moral friction as a phenomenon is to understand how moral injury may occur through the system of relations people inhabit. By being able to identify how injury occurs, people that have authority may be able alter their approach with subordinates to ensure the best possible outcomes for all involved. This is of interest to any group working on issues at a tactical or organizational level for it may open the door to more popular and well-functioning operations. The optics of caring for the well-being of soldiers, officers, or agents of any kind is beneficial.

The Implicit Consequentialism of Leadership[5]

> *Our characters are rich and complicated, and are best understood as neither virtuous nor vicious. Rather, a deep tension has shown up once again. When it comes to hurting people, we have a frightening capacity to sometimes hurt, injure, and even kill innocent people. Side by side with this, we also have an impressive capacity to sometimes be gentle, calm, and controlled.[6]*

It is not controversial to state that many people outside the discourse of academic

philosophy and ethics do not spend significant amounts of time dwelling on what their specific moral perspectives are. By no means are most people amoral. Plenty of individuals have a strong sense of what is right and wrong, and humans have a remarkable propensity to avoid cruelty.[7] The Milgram experiments have shown repeatedly, however, that a person can be led to commit acts of violence and cruelty before the presence of an authority figure with some power to reward or punish a moral agent's actions.[8] While it would be dubious to say this has wide ranging implications about human nature, it does leave us with a baseline propensity with which to work.

Soldiers, ignoring instances of crimes and atrocities, do not kill because they feel like it. They kill because they are trained to, required to, and ordered to. They ideally follow the rules of engagement set for them when it comes time to fight. All these things require the oversight and approval of some sort of authority. This is the role of the chain of command—to provide oversight, planning, and direction so that political objectives can be achieved in conflicts.

A citizen seeking to become a soldier can hold any number of moral perspectives. They may find it necessary to enlist and fight out of duty, for the betterment of the country, to cultivate a stronger identity, to live a good life, or any number of reasons. It is important to recognize something peculiar that occurs as people rise through the ranks of leadership. More and more they will exhibit consequentialist patterns of thought, regardless of what they may have been most close to before. There is a likely chance that the individual would have a distaste for consequentialism, or at least the label. Ordinary people tend to find the label unideal or less moral than other positions.[9] What causes this shift?

Several factors are at play that contribute toward consequentialist thinking. First, large hierarchical organizations are more collectivist in outlook than they are individualistic. Officers and lower-rank soldiers alike are trained and conditioned to be less their own individual self so that they can become greater through group membership. One of the effects of basic training is the creation of an identity tied to the military through shared group experience. Collective group culture shapes how a person understands and approaches the world. This group-oriented participation has a general trend of focusing less on justice or justness of an action.[10] Secondly, the behavior of those in lower leadership positions are greatly influenced by higher position authority figures. Being in a position of control rationally requires a greater degree of respect for the chain of command in and of itself. Thus, the word of superiors would carry more weight.[11]

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The cumulative effect of this on a moral agent's moral outlook is that they can have a greater degree of considerations and individuals that they are responsible for as they get higher in rank. They shift thinking away from individual persons to units and groups. What is right by an individual shifts to what is right by the group, what is right by the mission. Moral pluralism will still be a factor, it is just that the propensity toward consequentialist thinking is emphasized by the pressures of leadership positions. The first order objective of command is to get a job done. Alon writes,

> The key issues a commander and his staff face when planning operations are decisions regarding definition of the operation and definition of the method to execute it. To make these decisions, the command must understand the intention and goals of the upper echelon regarding the specific

operation. While there are concomitant secondary processes, the core of the planning and its major outcomes lies in defining the task and the way to accomplish it.[12]

This emphasizes the consequentialist propensity in leadership. It accounts for the influence of higher authorities when it comes to pursuing a route of action. None of this is to say that they will do things that are immoral, but that the sort of moral considerations become more narrow.

> **Leadership naturally will gravitate toward consequentialist thinking, yet consequentialism is largely unpopular with average persons.**

This is where moral friction will begin to occur in the hierarchy. Leadership naturally will gravitate toward consequentialist thinking, yet consequentialism is largely unpopular with average persons.[13] It is assumed that this is just as applicable for military hierarchy as it is for the general population, for lower-rank soldiers have not been subjected to the same degree of socialization as officers. They follow the orders as their position requires them to, but they may not buy into the reasoning as easily because they could still maintain strong deontological or virtue based perspectives. Consequentialism sometime require intentional harms for the greater good[14] in a way that would be wholly impermissible for a deontologist.

This is where the danger of moral friction arises. Subordinates are expected to follow the moral reasoning of their leader, even though it may be a reasoning they find abhorrent. A damaging moral dilemma between what is right to the person and what is right to the Soldier is now created. In the next section, moral injury and dilemmas will be explored in relation to moral friction.

Moral Friction and Moral Injury: Value Clashes During Conflict

The moral power of an army is so great that it can motivate men to get up out of a trench and step into enemy machine-gun fire. When a leader destroys the legitimacy of the army's moral order by betraying "what's right," he inflicts manifold injuries on his men.[15]

A person is raised to know right from wrong. They treat everyone morally to the best of their ability, living by the golden rule: treat people the way you want to be treated. One day, they enlist in the military to try and serve their country with honor and distinction. Day in and day out, they knowingly live in a situation where they risk death or grievous bodily harm as a possibility. They feel proud to be a warrior, they feel proud to serve their country. One day, an order comes through that tells the soldier that there is a target in a house in a village. As per the order, they help send artillery on the target. In the process of killing the target, they also kill their spouse and small child. For doing what needed to be done when told so, they receive minor praise from their commanding officer.

It is here where moral injury occurs—the betrayal of what is right through unnecessary civilian casualties. This betrayal came from those with legitimate authority, as it was an order from their commanding officer. All in a high stakes situation: a time of conflict where tension is constantly high. All the criteria for moral injury using Shay's definition are met. It should be noted going forward that the effects of moral injury are similar to PTSD, albeit not one-to-one. While both are experienced in the course of war, we know that PTSD does not necessarily need to come from war fighting. It is simply where it was first observed and was most prevalent at the time.[16] Perhaps the same

thing will happen with moral injury, but for now it remains to be seen. A significant portion of the literature that exists to explore moral injury is related to the military and war. This does not itself preclude that moral injury may occur in other areas and circumstances. More research will need to be done to say with certainty.

The manifestations of moral injury are numerous. It can manifest as an increase in aggression, a disregard of civilians and protected people, disgust,[17] cynicism, a turn toward criminality, disloyalty, and self-destructive behavior, among others.[18] Where PTSD is psychological trauma and pathology, moral injury is more rooted in self-concept and existential concepts of right and wrong. If PTSD represents a destruction of mental stability, moral injury is a destruction of who a person is in their own eyes and a shattering of the world as they understand it to work. Within the self are conceptions of right and wrong, one's place in the world, deeply held personal beliefs and behaviors. The prevalence of moral injury in a conflict can be shown at both the micro and macro levels. By micro, it refers to the behaviors and characteristics of an individual soldier at a given time. Macro refers to larger trends seen in the armed forces. We have seen some examples of how it appears in individuals and the beginning of this section served as a hypothetical scenario, so let us now expand it to larger organizations.

Gillcrist and Lloyd performed one such macro examination in "Moral Injury, Mission-Drift, and Limited War."[19] In it, they look at the varying justifications for war and the consequence of the harm caused by the shifting justifications for fighting:

> Mission-drift is problematic in all forms, as it leads to a questioning of purpose and, thus, of the importance of the task; it is morally problematic when it leads to questioning the justification of a morally grave task, because questionable justification for morally grave

actions leads to moral injury. Limited wars have a propensity to incur mission-drift. Thus, limited wars have a propensity to cause massive amounts of moral injury. This being the case, one cost of limited wars is large veteran suicide rates.[20]

> **[Moral injury] can manifest as an increase in aggression, a disregard of civilians and protected people, disgust, cynicism, a turn toward criminality, disloyalty, and self-destructive behavior...**

Mission-drift, in this context, is the changing of mission parameters over the course of a conflict. A classic example of this is the Vietnam War. In the beginning, it was a police action to train the South Vietnamese Army against the North. However, as time passed, the United States became more and more involved in open fighting. It became a war in everything but name. Moral injury occurs because the stated purpose and goal became supplemented by more direct fighting. There was confusion of why it was just, if it was at all. People viewed it as being made killers for no good purpose; and, this drift in purpose being a strong mechanism for causing moral injury. In this way, it is no coincidence that Vietnam was where the first major studies on PTSD and moral injury came from.[21]

Not only were suicide rates and ideation higher during Vietnam, other symptoms presented themselves, such as large-scale cynicism and rage. This is a contributing factor to events such as the My Lai massacre. Moral injury is not just felt individually, but also systematically, as the attitude and outlook of the organization becomes infected. This is a direct result of widespread moral friction. The military leadership was doing what was seen as necessary to fulfill the political objectives of the country.

They perceived that the betterment of all was through an escalation of the conflict. It is poor rationalization, but rationalization nonetheless.

There is a correlation between ethical leadership and moral behavior in subordinates.[22] When good is done by those in positions of authority, those below will take after these moral traits and actions. However, the correlation rationally must have an inverse. The subordinates, in this case lower-rank soldiers, perceive the military as acting immorally. As a result, immoral actions flourish. Damaged individuals become so great in number that the structure of the military and their mission becomes damaged.

> **There is a correlation between ethical leadership and moral behavior in subordinates.**

Moral friction is experienced on a level-to-level basis. Typically, this is through a leader interacting with a subordinate. It happens every time someone is given an order they do not agree with. Damage that results from it accumulates until it becomes a much larger issue. Still, the moral friction itself will only occur as an event on a smaller individual basis. When the commander says to drop a bomb, to take the shot, to sink the vessel—the authority of the leader and the requirements of the mission will run counter to the subordinate's moral beliefs.

It is important to also recognize that these situations affect leadership as well. It is, in effect, a competition between moral dilemmas that is decided by institutional authority. That is a heavy responsibility to bear that can lead a person to question what the proper course of action is. The act of being in leadership can color how a person understands the issues at hand, which will be explored in the next section.

Becoming What You Are: Identity and Moral Responsibility

I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more . . . if I stayed in than if I got out. I am now going to my grave with that lapse of moral courage on my back.[23]

The quote above is from General Harold Keith Johnson, Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army during Vietnam. He expresses regret for not resigning when he felt not enough was being done by the political branches of government to provide manpower to fight in the Vietnam War. He had the chance to resign and make the issue known to the country, but ultimately did not.

We can learn two key details from this situation—that roles in organizations affect identity and that those in authority positions face moral dilemmas like their subordinates.

General Johnson likely truly believed in doing the right thing for his people and for his country. Still, the decision to not protest the war effort is a source of regret for him. What this shows us is that a position of authority comes with a change in self-perception. The role you take becomes a part of your identity. "Soldiers don't do that" is a maxim that is repeated to bind a person's moral behavior to their status as an extension of the armed forces. This same principle applies to those in authority positions. They have served for so long and so well to obtain their rank. Participation in this hierarchy is an integral part of their self-identity. This is tied with the consequentialist leaning that this particular standpoint leads to. General Johnson thinking he could do more from within and then choosing to stay is a consequentialist line of thought. The logic of the position leads to its own perpetuation. It seems rational to conclude that more good can be done in the position than by an alternative like public resignation, regardless of if there is evidence to the contrary. It is rationalized that it is better to maintain the

leader identity than it is to reject it.

Still, this represents a moral dilemma in its own right. A moral dilemma is defined by Lisa Tessman as the clash between several non-negotiable moral requirements, which manifests as a choice wherein there is no easy, painless answer.[24] When applied to authority positions, it almost begins to resemble Walzer's dirty hands concept. He explains it like this:

When rules are overridden, we do not talk or act as if they had been set aside, canceled, or annulled. They still stand and have this much effect at least: that we know we have done something wrong even if what we have done was also the best thing to do on the whole in the circumstances. Or at least we feel that way, and this feeling is itself a crucial feature of our moral life.[25]

This is a return of the issue identified earlier in this essay, where there is a clash between what is right by the person and what is right by the organization. General Johnson experiences competing responsibilities. The influence of identity and institutional conditioning win out, yet he still feels regret for having to make that decision in the first place.

Moral injury arises from these sorts of dilemmas in subordinates, but this shows us the fact that some degree of injury may be experienced by officers and leaders as well. They also have authorities higher than themselves, just like rank and file soldiers do. It may not be nearly as traumatic or as common as the lower rank soldiers, but it is still important to recognize this fact. Moral friction arises from imposed moral dilemmas. Imposed in the sense that it revolves around acts that would ordinarily never be considered but now are required due to the responsibilities of a person's position. This does not require a person to be at the end of a command chain, just that they have to enforce or follow moral judgements that are not their own. While harm may be greater for people at the end

of the chain, it does not preclude friction from occurring at higher levels.

> **A moral dilemma is...the clash between several non-negotiable moral requirements, which manifests as a choice wherein there is no easy, painless answer.**

Moral friction can now be understood as a situation that occurs when a hierarchical organization is making a moral act and as an epistemic issue. The epistemic dimension comes from the relation between how people intuitively perceive what is a moral course of action and how their position conditions them toward specific ethical perspectives. This is quite possibly the trickiest aspect of this phenomenon. It is not enough for a person to act ethically. It is assumed that all people will attempt to in a good faith basis. The issue then comes to being ethical in the right way. The defining issue in moral friction is the basis of moral decision making. Is a person acting morally right as an individual or as a part of the hierarchy? The identity of the person is of the utmost importance. A subordinate is more likely to be predisposed toward their individual moral outlook, whereas the officer is more ingrained into the hierarchy and thus will look at the issue through a more collectivist perspective. Unless they are willing to accept some sort of sanction, the subordinate will always experience some base amount of harm when moral friction occurs.

What Can Be Done?

Needless to say, there are problems. As with most such projects, the problems start with poor (generally no) philosophical foundation.[26]

Moral injury is a harm incurred, one that

can manifest as a destruction of self or suicidal ideation. Moral friction is a state of tension that is created by incongruent judgements in leader-subordinate relationships which serves as a prerequisite for moral injury. With the core issue identified, thought must be given to address it. Like all issues, one can seek to prevent it, to lessen its impact, or to fix the damage it causes.

> A leader that acts less like an authority figure and more like a role model or moral exemplar is shown to have a positive effect on the moral identity of subordinates.

Due to the subjective nature of moral friction and injury, it is difficult if not impossible to find a perfect solution to prevent either from occurring. Jonathan Shay claims that moral leadership can prevent moral injury.[27] This makes sense rationally, though one must be careful not to view the issue at hand reductively. Morality in active implementation is fluid and reflexive. It cannot be reduced to a set codes or laws carte blanche. They may formally prevent liability or criminality as a formal status incurred, but they fail to encompass what is permissible or can be stomached by a moral agent. As such, moral leadership has to be seen as not a simple checklist of characteristics, but as an active and engaged ideal that those with authority over others pursue. It may not prevent moral injury wholesale, yet the act of consistent reflection by agents can mitigate it. Reducing moral issues to what is and is not acceptable to the hierarchical structure alone is not good enough. Leaders and planners must be reflexive to the issues at hand and to their subordinates. How something is done is critical to approaching what must be done.

Leadership style is an important component of the issue. An effective leader can lessen the moral incongruence perceived by the agents that carry out an order or follow a given set of procedures. A leader that acts less like an authority figure and more like a role model or moral exemplar is shown to have a positive effect on the moral identity of subordinates.[28] If that extra step is taken to act as a virtuous leader, the apprehensions felt by subordinates may be softened. This, in turn, may lessen moral friction from occurring, either in prevalence or severity. Further, there is the necessary expectation that senior leadership take friction and the injury that stems from it seriously. James Dubik proposes the principle of war legitimacy, where the public weighs in on if the war is completable, legitimate, and worth the costs incurred.[29] If the conflict goes too far, it needs to be terminated. Leadership may be informed by this principle to act reflexively and to have a dialogue with subordinates to ensure that the rational they are given is productive for doing what needs to be done. Why people are told to do what they do may not make that great of a difference in the grand scheme of an operation, but it can make all the difference to those that carry out that operation and to those observing it from the outside.

Experiencing moral injury is not a forgone conclusion, nor is it something that is untreatable. Recent work suggests that moral injury can be treated through a variety of factors and found through new and novel screening techniques. Further, reducing stigma, creating safe environments to express personal experiences, and a variety of therapies are all shown to provide relief.[30] That which is broken may also be repaired with due care and a measured approach. Still, it is optimal to approach the issue in a way where there is nothing to fix in the first place. For this reason, it is in the best interest for any leader, planner, or decision-making structure to understand moral friction as a point of tension in an operation. By recognizing this point of friction, not only can the well-being of

the agents carrying out an act be protected from potential harm, it also ensures the effectiveness and cohesion of the operation. Minimizing moral friction then serves to legitimize what is done in the of agents and in the eyes of those that are informed by the words, deeds, and state of those agents. ***IAJ***

Notes

1   Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (Scribner, 1994), 4.

2   G. James Lemoine, Chad A. Hartnell, and Hannes Leroy, "Taking Stock of Moral Approaches to Leadership: An Integrative Review of Ethical, Authentic, and Servant Leadership," *Academy of Management Annals* 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 148–87, https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2016.0121, 176.

3   Jonathan Shay, "Casualties," *Daedalus* 140, no. 3 (2011): 179-88.

4   This relationship is identified by Gillcrist and Lloyd, whose findings will be examined in greater detail later in the article.

5   Several of the studies and research articles that will be cited in this section come from the study of business. However, their focus on leadership and hierarchical organization makes them well applicable to the topic at hand.

6   Christian B. Miller, *The Character Gap: How Good Are We?* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 99.

7   Miller, 97.

8   Ibid., 85.

9   For a study showing a generalized distaste for consequentialists, see Jim A.C. Everett et al., "The Costs of Being Consequentialist: Social Inference from Instrumental Harm and Impartial Beneficence," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 79(November 2018): 200–216, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.07.004.

10   Bryan W. Husted and David B. Allen, "Toward a Model of Cross-Cultural Business Ethics: The Impact of Individualism and Collectivism on the Ethical Decision-Making Process," *Journal of Business Ethics* 82, no. 2 (2008): 293–300, 305.

11   Linda Klebe Trevino, "Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation Interactionist Model," *The Academy of Management Review* 11, no. 3 (1986): 601–617, https://doi.org/10.2307/258313.

12   Dudi Alon, "Processes of Military Decision Making," *Military and Strategic Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2013): 3–20.

13   Everett et al., 214.

14   Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 2, no. 2 (1973): 160–180.

15   Shay, 1994, 6.

16   Wilbur J. Scott, "PTSD in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease," *Social Problems* 37, no. 3 (1990): 294-310, https://doi.org/10.2307/800744.

17   Disgust is an interesting symptom due to the perceived moral value it seems to hold. To feel disgust is to feel morally repulsed is a view that some share. However, that is not inherently the case. While it may have some moral sentiment, it is not the full end of the feeling. See Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic, "Perpetrator Disgust: A Morally Destructive Emotion," in *Emotions and Mass Atrocity: Philosophical and Theoretical Explorations*, ed. Johannes Lang and Thomas Brudholm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 142-161., https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316563281.008

18   Jonathan Shay, "Moral Leadership Prevents Moral Injury," in *War and Moral Injury: A Reader*, ed. Robert Emmet Meagher and Douglas A. Pryer (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2018), 301–306.

19   James Gillcrist and Nick Lloyd, "Moral Injury, Mission-Drift and Limited War," in *Force Short of War in Modern Conflict*, ed. Jai Galliott, Jus Ad Vim (Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 238–261, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctvggx3k3.16.

20   James Gillcrist and Nick Lloyd, 244.

21   Jonathan Shay's *Achilles in Vietnam* was created in response to work he had done with Vietnam veterans. It was in this work where moral injury was first coined. In this sense, there would be no study of moral injury if it wasn't for the Vietnam War as a catalyst.

22   Yajun Zhang, Fangfang Zhou, and Jianghua Mao, "Ethical Leadership and Follower Moral Actions: Investigating an Emotional Linkage," *Frontiers in Psychology* 9 (2018), 9, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01881

23   James M. Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory* (University Press of Kentucky, 2018), 98-99.

24   Lisa Tessman, *Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality* (Oxford University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396146.001.0001, 44.

25   Walzer, 171.

26   Richard Maltz, "The Epistemology of Strategy," 2009, 16.

27   Shay, 301–306.

28   Weichun Zhu et al., "The Effect of Leadership on Follower Moral Identity: Does Transformational/Transactional Style Make a Difference?," *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies* 18, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 150–163, https://doi.org/10.1177/1548051810396714.

29   Dubik, 155

30   Jonathan Jin et al., "Moral Injury and Recovery in Uniformed Professionals: Lessons From Conversations Among International Students and Experts," *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 13 (June 14, 2022): 7-8, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.880442.