

# Challenges Of Border Security in Nigeria: A Case Study of Nigeria's Joint Border Patrol Team


by **Chinedu N Chikwe**

The effective management of a nation's land and maritime border is vital to its security and economic growth. This is because borders provide legal passage routes to convey persons and goods in and out of a country. Since independence, Nigeria's borders have continued to play a significant role in integrating its economic activities with those of other nations, especially within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. These economic activities have become even more integrated since the adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment by Member States in 1979, as well as Nigeria's ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in 2019, amongst others. Unfortunately, these protocols and agreements have not been particularly beneficial to Nigeria's security and economic development.

Nigeria's role as a regional power continues to impact the growth and development of the entire West African sub-region. However, the country currently faces dire security challenges which are complicated by transnational organized crimes (TOCs) and extremist movements. Major threats to border security have been linked to the activities of smugglers, drug traffickers, irregular migrants, and human/drug traffickers. Similarly, maritime threats such as piracy and sea robbery in the Gulf of Guinea continue to threaten Nigeria's national security. While the effective regulation and control of cross-border activities remain vital to ensuring peace and promoting economic integration, successive governments have struggled with the dilemma of how best to defeat this problem.

On August 20, 2019, in an attempt to confront the challenge of Nigeria's porous borders, the Federal Government of Nigeria initiated a joint border operation codenamed *Operation Swift Response* to secure the nation's land and maritime borders along the South-South, South-West,

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**Figure 1. Tripartite JBPT Area of Operations**  
*Source: Created by author.*

North-Central, and North-West regions of the country.<sup>1</sup> The operation was meant to enforce the existing ban on prohibited imported goods through the borders, protect locally produced goods from unhealthy competition with foreign products, as well as foster inter-agency and international collaboration.<sup>2</sup> The plan was for the security agencies involved to support the nation's statutory agencies tasked with the responsibility of securing the borders, specifically Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) and Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), to achieve and sustain a high level of security at the borders.<sup>3</sup>

Operation Swift Response was largely successful as several prohibited items, smugglers, and traffickers were intercepted.<sup>4</sup> However, the associated partial border closure generated severe economic and diplomatic concerns from neighboring Benin and Niger Republics.<sup>5</sup> This led to the establishment of a tripartite committee comprising members from

Benin, Niger, and Nigeria to deliberate on how to collectively resolve the challenges along common borders.<sup>6</sup> The tripartite committee reached several agreements, among which was that each country should establish a Joint Border Patrol Team (JBPT) aimed at fostering intelligence sharing and combined operations to mutually secure adjoining border areas.<sup>7</sup> Thus, Nigeria's Operation Swift Response was transformed into the JBPT in line with the tripartite agreement.<sup>8</sup> Figure 1 shows the tripartite JBPT area of operations as established across the contiguous borders of Benin, Niger, and Nigeria.

### **Statement of the Problem**

In spite of the JBPT intervention, Nigeria continues to grapple with the same border security challenges that prompted its establishment. Therefore, this study seeks to examine Nigeria's border peculiarities in order to

suggest ways of effectively securing its borders. This would be achieved by identifying obstacles that currently hinder the JBPT from achieving its mandate, and suggesting possible changes that the Federal Government of Nigeria could make to enhance the JBPT's capacity to effectively secure the nation's borders along designated regions.

## **Analysis of Operational Environment of the JBPT**

The JBPT operates in a dynamic environment, influenced by several factors such as the prevailing political/diplomatic landscape across contiguous border areas, military intervention in border security, and the border economy. Others are the social influences, infrastructural realities, as well as prevailing information management across border communities. These factors are analyzed in subsequent paragraphs.

### *Political and Diplomatic Landscape*

To curb the challenges along the nation's borders, the Federal Government of Nigeria ordered the partial closure of Nigeria's land borders in August of 2019.<sup>9</sup> Expectedly, the closure of the nation's land borders had far-reaching implications for the prospects of regional integration among Nigeria's immediate neighbors and the rest of Africa. First, the decision to close the borders came just a few months after Nigeria signed the AfCFTA which aimed to create the world's largest free trade area in Africa.<sup>10</sup> Africa currently has 54 member countries, a combined GDP of \$3.1 trillion, and a total population of about 1.4 billion.<sup>11</sup> Although critics have argued that shutting down the land borders was a violation of the AfCFTA trade integration agreement, the government of Nigeria insisted that the AfCFTA declaration in Kigali makes clear provisions for countries to take unilateral decisions in situations where their domestic economy is threatened.<sup>12</sup>

To maintain diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, the Nigerian government previously made several unsuccessful appeals to the governments of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to curb illegal trading activities along adjoining borders with Nigeria.<sup>13</sup> While these countries often agreed to cooperate with Nigeria, such agreements were hardly implemented. For instance, on February 26, 2017, the Comptroller-General of the NCS, Hameed Ali, and the Director-General of Customs and Indirect Taxes, Republic of Benin, Mr. Sacca Boco Charles, met in Abuja and agreed to tackle smuggling and other transborder crimes between the two nations.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, a joint security team from Nigeria met with counterparts from the Niger Republic on May 16, 2019 at Dakana in Niger Republic to deliberate on how to curb the security challenges along the borders of both countries.<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, these meetings did not yield the desired results of preventing smuggling and securing mutual borders, hence Nigeria's decision to commence Operation Swift Response in August of 2019.

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The ensuing partial land border closure generated significant concerns from neighboring countries, especially the Republics of Benin and Niger, who were affected economically by their inability to export into Nigeria.<sup>16</sup> This led to the establishment of a tripartite committee comprising members from Benin, Niger, and Nigeria to deliberate on how to collectively address the shortfalls and non-implementation of the several agreements and memoranda of understanding previously entered to check smuggling and other TOCs along contiguous

borders.<sup>17</sup> The members of the tripartite committee met on November 14, 2019 at the ECOWAS Headquarters in Abuja.

Under these circumstances, one can deduce that the establishment of Nigeria's JBPT prompted the much-needed conversation with neighboring countries of Benin and Niger, leading to meetings by officials from the three countries at both ministerial and operational levels, as well as the establishment of their respective JBPTs.<sup>18</sup> This was considered an unprecedented law enforcement collaboration in terms of the scope and scale of its components, considering previous attempts by the Nigerian government.<sup>19</sup> However, while some security analysts believe that both countries only agreed to establish their JBPTs in order to persuade Nigeria to consider re-opening its land borders, others believe that Nigeria closed its land border to force the compliance of its neighbors to existing trade rules.<sup>20</sup>

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### *Military Intervention*

To achieve the intended impact, a large force was generated from various security and intelligence agencies and coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser.<sup>21</sup> The operation was also expected to promote inter-agency cooperation among the participating agencies through information sharing and coordinated joint operations.<sup>22</sup> This cooperation would be achieved through intensive patrols by the joint security forces along the borders of the affected geopolitical zones, as well as facilitating the acquisition of non-intrusive equipment for

the detection of contraband goods.<sup>23</sup>

Additionally, cordial cross-border collaborations help to improve the security and economy of adjoining border communities to the benefit of both countries. Unfortunately, Nigeria's border security agents have experienced numerous challenges with the border security agencies of neighboring countries in the past and this has shaped the general perception of expected future collaborations.<sup>24</sup> One of the major issues originated from disagreements on boundary delineations and adjustments established during the colonial era, without regard to ethnic and cultural heritage.<sup>25</sup> This led to several hostilities among inhabitants of border communities and between cross-border security agencies. These historical encounters have created a general feeling of distrust and suspicion among the border security agencies within the region.

Apart from the seeming lack of trust in the overarching intent to secure the borders and prevent the smuggling of contraband products, another major challenge is the existing language barrier between Nigeria and its neighbors.<sup>26</sup> Nigeria's official language is English, while the official language of all its neighbors is French. Regrettably, most security operatives deployed along Nigeria's border cannot communicate in French, neither can the officials of neighboring francophone countries communicate in English.<sup>27</sup> This communication barrier poses a major challenge when trying to fuse intelligence or plan joint operations.

### *Nigeria's Border Economy*

Since the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, the idea of a borderless region with unrestricted movement of citizens and goods has continually received widespread support. Unfortunately, this has not been achieved as the continent of Africa accounts for only about 13 percent of Nigeria's exports and 4 percent of its imports.<sup>28</sup> The AfCFTA aimed to close this

gap by removing trade barriers and facilitating free movement of commodities within Africa, which is expected to improve agriculture and manufacturing within the continent.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, the sudden closure of Nigeria's land borders due to the joint border operation was perceived by neighboring countries as an impediment to the anticipated benefits of this agreement.<sup>30</sup>

Nigeria's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan of 2017 aimed to increase investments in agriculture and the sector's contribution to the growth of the economy from about 5 percent in 2017 to about 8.4 percent by 2020.<sup>31</sup> This was to be achieved by reviving domestic farming and saving on food imports which stood at over \$22 billion annually.<sup>32</sup> Thus, while most Nigerian farmers were delighted at the government's border closure to curtail the smuggling of food items and increase investments in the sector, economists raised concerns about the capacity of local farmers to produce enough food to feed Nigeria's large population.<sup>33</sup> For instance, the local demand for rice was about 6.7 million metric tons in 2017, while the local production in the same year was only about 3.7 million metric tons, leaving a shortfall of about 3 million metric tons.<sup>34</sup> It is therefore not surprising that despite the restrictions on the importation of prohibited goods from neighboring countries into Nigeria, large volumes of smuggling still persist through the several porous borders.<sup>35</sup>


Research has consistently shown that Nigeria's trade with Benin and Niger remains largely dominated by informal transactions with minimal statistical records or formal documentation.<sup>36</sup> Economists believe that the unrecorded and informal flows through the key economic corridors between Nigeria and its neighbors could account for as much as 64 percent of Nigeria's GDP.<sup>37</sup> They also believe that most of these illegal trades occur due to trade policy differences between Nigeria and its neighbors. For instance, while Nigeria leans towards a more protectionist policy with high

tariffs and import prohibitions, the Republic of Benin largely operates a more liberal trade policy.<sup>38</sup>

According to a World Bank Report, the economy of Benin is hugely dependent on informal re-export and transit trades with Nigeria, with about 80 percent of imports into Benin destined for Nigeria.<sup>39</sup> This is said to account for about 20 percent of Benin's GDP.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, a BBC report confirmed that the biggest smuggling route in the region is believed to be between Cotonou which is Benin's largest city and Lagos, which is Nigeria's largest commercial city.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, a Luxembourg-based shipping company, BIM e-solutions, revealed that an average of 10,000 cars arrive from Europe at the Cotonou port monthly, most of which are believed to be smuggled into Nigeria.<sup>42</sup> These illegal trades were said to have accounted for over 15,000 Beninese jobs and about 25 percent of the Beninese customs revenue between 2012 and 2015.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, these informal trades are believed to have thrived over the years due to Nigeria's huge market which it has been unable to adequately cater for.<sup>44</sup>

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To be more specific on the incentives of these illegal commodity trades, an example can be seen in the rice economy. Nigeria only allows the importation of foreign rice into the country through its ports with a 70 percent tax imposed since 2013.<sup>45</sup> However, neighboring Benin reduced its tariffs on imported rice from 35 percent to 7 percent in 2014, while Cameroon, which had a 10 percent duty, completely removed all taxes on imported rice.<sup>46</sup> As depicted



**Figure 2. Rice Imports from Thailand into Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon and Togo (2012 – 2022)**  
 Source: Created by author, with data from Thai Rice Exporters Association (TREA), "Rice Export Statistics." <http://www.thairiceexporters.or.th/List>.

in Figure 2, Benin subsequently recorded an astronomical increase in parboiled rice imports from Thailand, most of which were believed to have been smuggled into Nigeria to feed its over 200 million population.<sup>47</sup> Interestingly, Figure 3 further shows that there has been a significant decline in the importation of parboiled rice into the Republic of Benin since the implementation of the JBPT in August of 2019.


Besides the illegal inflow of food items and cars, Benin, Niger, and Cameroon often serve as destinations for Nigeria's subsidized petroleum products.<sup>48</sup> Nigeria's largest export product is crude oil, while its largest import product is refined petroleum.<sup>49</sup> Because domestic refineries are reportedly operating far below their capacity, fuel imports averaged about 29 percent of total imports into the country between 2016 and 2019.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, approximately 90 percent of petroleum products consumed in Nigeria is imported, all of which is subsidized by the government for its citizens.<sup>51</sup> The Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) confirmed that the country spent about \$9.7

billion on petrol subsidy in 2022.<sup>52</sup>

As of April 3, 2023, a liter of petrol costs about \$0.57 in Nigeria, \$1.07 in Benin, \$1.21 in Cameroon, \$1.22 in Ghana, and \$1.16 in Togo.<sup>53</sup> The prices of petrol in Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, and Togo more than double the price in Nigeria, making it obviously lucrative to smuggle petroleum products from Nigeria into any of its neighboring countries. Unfortunately, this illegal trade amounts to the use of Nigeria's resources to subsidize the petrol consumption of these neighboring countries. Since the border closure, however, reports have suggested that the import of fuel into Nigeria has declined by about 20 percent.<sup>54</sup> Figure 3 shows the estimated prices (in U.S. dollars) of petrol in Nigeria and some of its neighbors as of April 3, 2023.

### ***Social Influences Across Nigeria's Borders***

The borders of most African countries are often described as artificial because they were mostly arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers at the time.<sup>55</sup> Researchers believe that countries in sub-Saharan Africa have some of the most



**Figure 3. Estimated Prices (in U.S. dollars) of Petrol in Selected African Countries as of April 3, 2023**

*Source: Created by author, with data from Global Petrol Prices, "Gasoline Prices, Litre, 27-Mar-2023," accessed 3 April 2023, [https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/gasoline\\_prices/](https://www.globalpetrolprices.com/gasoline_prices/).*

artificial borders in the world, with about 44 percent of these borders drawn as simple lines which ended up dividing people who share the same traditions and cultures into separate nations.<sup>56</sup> This is also true for the boundaries between Nigeria and neighboring Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Nigeria's current borders reflect the late-nineteenth-century agreements between the British, French, and Germans, rarely reflecting indigenous history or culture.<sup>57</sup>

The reality today is that many Nigerians living along the borders of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger still maintain ancestral relationships and cultural ties across the borders in spite of prevailing political influences and international boundaries.<sup>58</sup> This historic cultural bond has continued to promote cross-border mobility, trade, and socio-cultural interactions irrespective of current physical boundaries.<sup>59</sup>

### Infrastructural Realities Along Nigeria's Borders

Although the basic source of livelihood for residents of most border communities in Nigeria vary across regions, it mostly revolves around farming, hunting, and trading.<sup>60</sup> Unfortunately, these sources of livelihood are often constrained by inadequate government infrastructure such as the lack of clean water, electricity, healthcare, schools, good roads and security.<sup>61</sup> Hence, the quest for survival in the midst of poverty and the absence of infrastructure encourages informal cross-border activities.<sup>62</sup> Interestingly, most trading activities conducted by inhabitants of border communities occur in the form of these informal cross-border trades which the government literally refers to as smuggling.<sup>63</sup>

Cross-border trading activities in Nigeria are regulated by the Federal Government through the NCS who implements laws and policies to control the movement of goods across the

border, as well as collect duties or levies, and enforce trade regulations.<sup>64</sup> The NCS also ensures the enforcement of and compliance to custom-related fiscal policies and processes as stipulated by government.<sup>65</sup> In reality, however, the enforcement of these regulations has been inconsistent due to corruption. For instance, at Imeko, a border town between Nigeria and Benin, it has been observed that security officers at the checkpoints were willing to take bribes from foreigners who did not possess any official means of identification, and from drivers or traders conveying banned items such as rice, cereals, and vegetable oils.<sup>66</sup> Thus, it is not surprising that despite the JBPT, banned commodities are still found in the markets and smuggled rice is being re-packaged and made to look like local products.<sup>67</sup>

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#### Information and Perception Management Across Border Communities in Nigeria

In addition to traditional audio, video, print, and social media channels, the role of traditional or cultural institutions in communicating the ills of smuggling and other TOCs within the border communities cannot be overemphasized, especially considering the socio-cultural histories of most of these border communities before international boundary delineations. This was attested to by a former Area Comptroller of the NCS, Ade Dosumu, who confirmed that traditional rulers in the border areas were often involved in fighting smuggling.<sup>68</sup> Similarly, religious leaders in border communities populated with people who share common religious beliefs and values, play influential roles within these communities because they exercise

moral authority over their members and are able to shape public opinion within their immediate communities and the broader society.<sup>69</sup>

It is therefore pertinent that government strengthens collaboration with traditional and religious leaders to manage the perception of government policies within border communities. This would help to discourage undocumented trading activities in order to improve the economy and livelihoods of residents. This can be achieved by using the traditional and religious institutions as channels for information dissemination, as well as involving them in awareness campaigns, economic development programs, community policing initiatives, mediation, and conflict resolution.


#### **Operational Capabilities of the JBPT**

Analyzing the operational capabilities of the JBPT would entail viewing its establishment and operations across specific domains, namely doctrine, organization, training and policy.

##### *Doctrine*

According to a statement conveyed by the then-spokesman of the NCS, Joseph Attah, the joint border operation being coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser emphasized cooperation among all participating security agencies with the goal of securing the nation's land and maritime borders in the interest of national security.<sup>70</sup> To achieve this cooperation, each operative is expected to adhere to the training received from their respective agencies based on the agency's doctrine. While the doctrines of the various participating agencies may be efficient in guiding the execution of their respective primary functions, they may not fully align with the primary objectives of the JBPT in particular and border security in general. Unfortunately, there is no specific doctrine guiding Nigeria's border security operations. Therefore, it is pertinent that the Nigerian government establishes a harmonized doctrine





**Figure 4. Assumed Organogram of the JBPT**  
*Source: Created by author.*

that would outline standard operating procedures (SOP) on how border security operations will be conducted. Such harmonized doctrine would guide the activities of all operatives deployed to the JBPT and reduce most of the administrative and operational bottlenecks currently being experienced.

### Organization

Nigeria’s JBPT is organized hierarchically to facilitate coordination and integration among the various security agencies involved. At the top of the hierarchy is the national coordinating headquarters located at the Office of the National Security Adviser, Abuja.<sup>71</sup> The coordinating headquarters administers and monitors JBPT operations across the affected geopolitical zones.<sup>72</sup>

At the regional level, the JBPT is organized into four sectors to cover the four affected geopolitical zones, as follows: Sector One covers the land and littoral borders across the south-south geopolitical zone; Sector Two covers the south-western land and littoral borders; Sector Three covers the north-central land borders; while Sector Four covers the land borders across the north-west geopolitical zone.<sup>73</sup>

Each Sector Headquarters is comprised of representatives from the various participating

agencies, and coordinated by a senior NCS officer in the rank of *Comptroller of Customs*.<sup>74</sup> The researcher believes that this was a deliberate decision because it allows the JBPT to leverage existing NCS border infrastructure in the respective geopolitical zones, such as detention facilities for arrested smugglers or traffickers, and warehouses for intercepted items.

In addition, the joint patrols comprise of personnel from the participating units, and are often led based on knowledge of the terrain and specialization. For instance, the NN leads the JBPT maritime patrols.<sup>75</sup> While the precise organogram of the JBPT could not be ascertained, the assumed organogram from information gathered by the researcher is depicted in Figure 4.

### Training

At the onset of Operation Swift Response in August 2019, joint familiarization exercises were conducted for operatives in the four affected geopolitical zones of the country to strengthen inter-agency collaboration.<sup>76</sup> However, there is no record of any particular joint training conducted to equip the operatives with the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively carry out border operations and keep them informed of contemporary border

security procedures. This is worrisome considering the diverse security backgrounds of the officers from the participating agencies. Furthermore, the establishment of the tripartite JBPT with counterparts from the republics of Benin and Niger would require some form of combined training and exercises to help foster collaboration, intelligence sharing and trust. While a few cross-border meetings have been held between regional political and JBPT leaderships on the Nigeria-Benin and Nigeria-Niger borders, there is no record of a coordinated training exercise that has been conducted.<sup>77</sup> The absence of joint and combined training is detrimental to the cross-border collaboration which the JBPT aims to achieve.

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### *Policy*

Since independence in 1960, the Nigerian government has designed and implemented various policies to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of border management in the country. While some of these policies were conveyed as directives, statements, communiqués, or memos, others were contained in officially promulgated policy documents.

However, apart from the implementation of joint patrols through the establishment of Operation Swift Response involving the AFN, very little has been done to implement most border policies. This could be because most of these policies lie independently as isolated documents or within the primary policy documents of different departments of government, making them difficult to implement and monitor. Therefore, it is imperative to

harmonize all border-related policies into a promulgated policy document, under a specific agency, to guide border security operations across the country.

Furthermore, while the three organizations responsible for administering and managing Nigeria's borders all have their primary responsibilities, none of them is solely tasked to secure the nation's borders. Thus, it is not surprising that the security of the nation's borders hardly receives the degree of attention that it deserves.

The JBPT is currently the only establishment of the Nigerian government that is solely assigned the primary responsibility of securing the nation's borders, however, its ad-hoc status restricts its access to funding and other operational enablers. This explains its dependence on the Office of the National Security Adviser for strategic coordination and NCS-established infrastructure across the country for most of its administrative and operational requirements.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, the Federal Government could consider changing the ad-hoc status of the JBPT into a statutory agency of government tasked with the sole responsibility of executing border security operations across the country. This would enhance its independence, access to budgetary funding, and other necessary resources.

### **Conclusion**

#### *Accomplishments of the JBPT*

Despite its challenges, the JBPT has recorded noteworthy accomplishments since its establishment. Of significance was the establishment of the JBPTs in the Republics of Benin and Niger, which brought neighboring countries together to foster collaboration in fighting the security and economic challenges along adjoining borders.

Domestically, the JBPT has increased inter-agency cooperation through joint operations and collaborative intelligence sharing. Although

more needs to be done in this regard to achieve the desired results, it is believed that the necessary foundations have been laid by the JBPT. In addition, the JBPT has positively impacted the agricultural sector of Nigeria's economy, by encouraging investment and increased local production to meet domestic demands.

### ***Obstacles Hindering the Operations of the JBPT***

While arrests and interceptions continue to be recorded by the JBPT, banned commodities still find their way to the markets. It was observed that the JBPT struggles with maintaining cross-border collaboration, as well as sustaining information operations and perception management within border communities. The research also noted that, although doctrines exist to guide the operations of the respective agencies that make up the JBPT, there is no harmonized doctrine guiding the operations of the JBPT as an establishment. This has resulted in several administrative and operational bottlenecks in the daily operations of the JBPT.

Additionally, the research revealed that joint training amongst the participating agencies of the JBPT was only conducted at the inception of the operation in August of 2019, in the form of a familiarization exercise. Since then, no further training has been conducted to keep the operatives abreast of current border security procedures. Similarly, apart from the few cross-border meetings occasionally held with JBPT partners from Benin and Niger, combined training exercises were not being conducted. Considering the fact that training is a vital aspect of promoting synergy and encouraging intelligence sharing, it is regrettable that this opportunity is not being harnessed by the JBPT.

Furthermore, the research revealed that Nigeria's border policies exist either in isolation or within the policies of different government agencies, making them difficult to implement and monitor. As a result, these policies are unable to positively impact border management operations in general and the JBPT operations in particular. Harmonizing all policies on the administration and management of Nigeria's borders into a promulgated policy document under the direct supervision of a particular agency would be a major boost to border security operations in Nigeria.

### ***Recommendations***

In answering the primary question of this study, the researcher recommends that the following changes be made by the Federal Government of Nigeria to enhance the operational capacity of the JBPT to effectively secure the nation's borders:

1. Develop a border management policy that would harmonize all existing border-related policies in the country. Such policy would capture the Federal Government's overarching vision for border management.
2. Consider changing the ad-hoc status of the JBPT to an agency of government tasked with the responsibility of executing border security operations across the country. This would enhance its independence, access to budgetary funding, and other enabling resources.
3. Develop a JBPT doctrine that would outline standard operating procedures guiding the conduct of border security operations across the country.
4. Strengthen synergy and collaboration amongst agencies of Nigeria's JBPT and

JBPTs from neighboring countries through periodic joint and combined training exercises.

5. Integrate traditional and religious institutions in border awareness campaigns, economic development programs, community policing initiatives, mediation, and conflict resolution efforts along the borders.

6. Improve the welfare of border security officers to discourage corrupt practices, and implement punitive measures on those found wanting to serve as deterrence to others.

7. Take deliberate measures to improve the ability of Nigeria's JBPT operatives to communicate in the French language. **IAJ**

## Notes

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