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THE SIMONS CENTER

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The Simons Center for Ethical Leadership and Interagency Cooperation, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is a major program of the Command and General Staff College Foundation, Inc. The Simons Center is committed to the development of ethical leaders with interagency operational skills and an interagency body of knowledge that facilitates broader and more effective cooperation and policy implementation. The Simons Center celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2020.



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From the Editors

The Simons Center is pleased to bring you our Spring edition of the *InterAgency Journal*. This issue, like our others, brings a breadth of perspectives through pieces covering a wide range of leadership and interagency topics.

This issue begins with the first of a two-part article discussing key considerations in the Department of Defense's of the move towards "electrifying" its operations. This first part explores the issues surrounding the vulnerability of our supply chain of rare earths and strategic metals. The second part of this article, to be published in the next edition of the *IAJ*, will focus on the Army's strategy to deploy electric strategies.

Our next article explores how FEMA should consider revisions to the National Response Framework National Incident Management System in a world where our competitors may leverage disasters and asymmetric threats to their advantage. And in keeping with the disaster theme, we have an article that provides an overview of an in-depth study on the effectiveness of the leadership of World Health Organization Directors General that provides insights into the characteristics and qualifications needed for success in senior interagency leadership positions.

We also have a returning author, Major Chinedu N. Chikwe of the Nigerian Army who describes the challenges his country faces combatting counterinsurgency in ungoverned spaces and offers a series of recommendations likely applicable to future U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.

Our issue concludes with in-depth reviews of two extremely poignant books: *The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine*, by David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, and *The Ethics of Special Ops*, by Deane-Peter Baker, Roger Herbert and David Whetham.

On the heels of the publication of our book *The End of the Cold War and its Aftermath*, edited by Mark Wilcox and Sean Kalic, we have embarked on two additional book projects. Our first project explores the history of Arms Control Verification. Told through the eyes of actual inspectors, this book will serve as a reference and guide for future generations of inspectors. We are also working with Simons Center Senior Research Fellow, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Bob Caslen, to publish his most recent book, *The Impossible Mission*, detailing his time as the senior commander in Iraq during the recent U.S. drawdown.


Thank you once again for your interest in ethical leadership and interagency cooperation. As we put together each edition, the editorial staff marvels at the great knowledge of the scholars and practitioners who contribute to the *Journal*. We know each of you has a story and unique experiences. Please share them with the community by submitting your work to the Simons Center. Your contributions are critical to the continual growth of the great leaders at the forefront of our nation's security. We look forward to hearing from you! – **RRU and JJN**

Contributors Wanted!

The Simons Center is looking for articles that involve contemporary interagency issues at both the conceptual and the application level.

The *InterAgency Journal* is a refereed national security studies journal providing a forum to inform a broad audience on matters pertaining to tactical and operational issues of cooperation, collaboration, and/or coordination among and between various governmental departments, agencies, and offices. Each issue contains a number of articles covering a variety of topics, including national security, counterterrorism, stabilization and reconstruction operations, and disaster preparation and response.

The *InterAgency Journal* has worldwide circulation and has received praise from various military, government, and non-government institutions, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.



We're also looking for book reviews!

**Submit a book review or suggest a book to review to
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The Future is Electric

Part I

by John P. Ringquist

Editor's Note: This is Part I of a two-part article. Part II will be published in the fall 2024 edition.

The U.S. government has known of the importance of rare earths and their impact on national security for decades, but recent technology and national policy changes accelerated competition between the U.S. and China for economic dominance in many strategic fields including green energy, artificial intelligence, microprocessors, and metallurgy. Foreign relations developments, including global power competition and attempts to push back against Chinese export restrictions or outright bans, reveal the current state of U.S. rare earth production and refining capability and the dominant position that China enjoys in these fields. Chinese rare earth and strategic metals supply chain dominance threatens U.S. national security and that of many U.S. allies across the world. China is increasingly using commercial coercion to seize concessions and intimidate rivals while also chasing prestige as it reveals U.S. supply chain weakness. These practices go beyond denying technology and resources and into the realm of economic warfare because of the potential impact on U.S. and allied equipment and systems at a time when the U.S. and allies are supporting Ukraine and Taiwan with systems that are heavily reliant on rare earths and strategic metals.

Chinese export prohibitions on technology, minerals, and expertise, which began in mid-2023 and peaked at the end of 2023, have the potential to impact U.S. and allied defense equipment including some of the most advanced stealth and electronic warfare systems. Rare earths are a group of seventeen elements: lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium,

Lieutenant Colonel John P. Ringquist, Ph.D., is an Army Engineer, Foreign Area Officer and an instructor at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His research focuses on contemporary military affairs, technology, and African security affairs. He has written articles on counterinsurgency, the intersection of climate, technology, and security, and the African American soldiers of the Kansas-raised 79th United States Colored Infantry Regiment in the Civil War West. His duty assignments frequently have involved working with allies, foreign military partners, and U.S. government interagency partners to draft and advocate the kinds of logistics and security agreements cited in this article.

europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. These elements are used for many of the most advanced military systems and China leads the world in the mining and processing of these materials, a reflection of the supply chain dominance that China enjoyed in 2016 when the USGAO published a report on the process.¹ China's dominance has continued into present day.

In 2023, in response to perceived challenges from the U.S. and other nations, China banned the export of technology for making rare earth metals and magnets and separating rare earths. These bans combined with earlier restrictions on exports on gallium, germanium, and graphite threaten to impact global business sectors from aerospace to artificial intelligence as a result.² Economics and supply chains are major factors that affect national security, and one that most

Electrification of the U.S. Army force cannot reliably occur while the U.S. is unable to secure its rare earths, strategic metals, and lithium supply chains.

militaries cannot directly affect through non-violent means. The DoD's future is increasingly tied to new materials and novel applications that were the stuff of science fiction a decade ago. Strengthening supply chain security and ensuring access to strategic minerals and technologies takes an interagency approach that the DoD can bolster through security agreements, but also through programs that leverage relations with allies to achieve shared defense, acquisitions, and Defense Industrial Base (DIB) investment goals.

A quick survey of the potential DoD systems that are vulnerable to supply chain disruptions shows that it is a threat that cuts across many U.S. domestic production sectors. Our existing

supply chains are overly dependent on foreign supply sources, including foreign companies that extract resources in the U.S. and re-export them back after processing. Offshoring has weakened U.S. companies' ability to compete, disincentivized companies from working with the DoD, and driven sectors of our economy to atrophy from lack of investment and research and development funding. The U.S. lacks the domestic industrial base to meet all internal requirements for rare earth processing within a 100% domestic supply chain, but the U.S. is working to identify new sources for minerals and rare earths products, create new alliances that share supply chain risks, and supporting these changes with new legislation and funding that will increase the ability of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base to meet the DoD and allies' future requirements. Allied and interagency action can defeat Chinese economic coercion.

The U.S. Army is part of the DoD affected by China's dominance of world supply chains for rare earths, strategic metals, and lithium for electric vehicle batteries. The U.S. Army's plans for gradual electrification of its entire force by 2050 are contingent on access to batteries, technology for improved battery charging and service life, and continued research and development for battery technologies, including reclamation/reuse. Electrification of the U.S. Army force cannot reliably occur while the U.S. is unable to secure its rare earths, strategic metals, and lithium supply chains. After those supply chains are secure and manufacturing is prepared to support U.S. and partner needs, the U.S. Army can proceed with converting wheeled vehicle fleets and the U.S. can bring in old and new allies as partners in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.

Domestic Supply and Production

The DoD's rare earths and strategic metals supply chain security is weak, threatened by a Chinese dominance of the world's

rare earths markets and finished rare earths products. U.S. neglect of domestic rare earths mining and production capabilities, minimal magnet production facilities, and overreliance on Chinese exports of rare earth products jeopardizes the DoD supply chain. China's ban on rare earth extraction and separation technologies announced on December 21, 2023 jeopardizes the production of the DoD's most advanced systems and sensors. The ban will impact U.S. national security for years to come despite alliances with other countries that also export the seventeen metals that collectively comprise the rare earth elements. Rare earth elements are essential for military technologies affecting everything from missiles to communications.³ The Chinese bans on exports are strategic and affect many countries besides the U.S. The U.S. has been preparing for such a move by China, but it takes time to make up the Defense Industrial Base manufacturing that can meet domestic and international needs. This is where the 2023 Defense Industrial Base Strategy requirements for diversified sources of supply, increased domestic production and enhanced partner engagement in our domestic industrial base help mitigate insecurity in the U.S. supply chain. The situation in 2024 has slowly begun to change because of efforts over the past three years to strengthen the U.S. rare earths supply chain and guarantee access to strategic metals and minerals. However, as of 2024, U.S. production is limited to a single mine as new ones are opened, a single processor for rare earths as new plants are constructed, single battery maker due to the DoD inability to create economies of scale for manufacturers, a single nickel mine because the demand for electric vehicle batteries was unanticipated or manufacturers assumed supplies would be easily accessible. Today's shortages and supply chain insecurity is the result of past efforts to save money and offshore business moves to China.

The U.S. supply chain's weakness was

decades in the making. Previous decades of U.S. trade and economic policies that sought to bring China into the global economy led to the U.S. investing in businesses or processes that promised lower costs and minimal U.S. domestic environmental disruption. China's imports of U.S. rare earths and the U.S. relying on China for refining ore disincentivized U.S. domestic industry and led to offshoring that made the U.S. dependent on rare earth finished products from China instead of domestically refining it.⁴ The U.S. dependence on China created unforeseen

China's ban on rare earth extraction and separation technologies announced on December 21, 2023 jeopardizes the production of the DoD's most advanced systems and sensors.

chains of cause and effect for U.S. military industry when previously secure supplies became subject to arbitrary restrictions. In 2021 Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports (specifically magnets) were linked to trying to determine their impact on F-35 production.⁵ The Chinese efforts had the potential to slow production by preventing the manufacture or installation of key parts that give the F-35 its long-range sensors and enable it to engage enemies at maximum range. Modern technology requires a full suite of components that together make up the whole system.

The impact of rare earth shortages, especially certain varieties, can best be understood within the context of two examples: gallium and germanium. The former is used for radar, communications, satellites, and LEDs and the latter for night vision devices and satellite imagery sensors. Domestic U.S. defense contractors can find alternate sources and have reserves, but the supply chain is endangered by China's punitive trade practices

and the dominant Chinese position in the world's rare earths supply chain.⁶ China has the ability through supply chain dominance to undercut competitors, manipulate bids for mining rights and deny access to alternate material competitors through additional policy tools such as loans, development projects unrelated to mining, and economies of scale for production.

The U.S. has only a single rare earth mine in full-scale operation at Mountain Pass, California.

The U.S. supply chain vulnerability affects more than the U.S. due to the number of allies that also operate F-35 variants. When we also consider the potential impact on other weapons systems and sensors, Chinese rare earth dominance is a major defense and security threat. Securing the rare earth supply chain is necessary for the U.S. military across the spectrum of systems. In addition to the F-35 Lightning II, rare earth magnets are vital to U.S. submarines, UAVs, aircraft electronic systems, radar, Tomahawk missiles, smart bombs. The amounts of rare earth elements required for each system vary from, “900 pounds for a F-35 to 9,200 for a Virginia class submarine.” Factor in night vision devices, range finders, lasers, optics, and fiber optics systems and the potential vulnerability to these systems is evident.⁷ Then, add in the potential impact on allies through joint weapons and sensors programs with the U.S., and Chinese bans are not simply an economic weapon to push back against U.S. initiatives in the U.S.-China trade war, but also a way to impede strategic military systems production and repair while China proceeds with its own military advances.

The U.S. supply chain weaknesses are further complicated by China's dominance over the world's refining and production processes to include operating numerous mines outside of

China that China uses to meet internal needs. The U.S. faces a situation with its domestic rare earths mining and processing that China has exploited for decades as rare earth mining expanded in China and contracted in the U.S. The U.S. has only a single rare earth mine in full-scale operation at Mountain Pass, California.⁸ China, rather than exhaust its rare earth deposits, is content to control the supply chain by dominating the refining and production process at home, while importing ore from elsewhere.⁹ This strategy exhausts deposits outside of China and forces countries where mining take place to bear environmental costs of rare earths mining. China has built redundant domestic capacity for production and technical expertise and retains rare earths deposits to sustain domestic operations. Should access to some foreign deposits be denied, China's relationship with Russia and partners in the “Belt and Road Initiative” that spans the globe will likely ensure the flows to China continue unabated.

Given the potential for economic coercion and policy impacts, the United States and partners like Japan have tried to reduce their reliance on Chinese sources since 2010, but the process has been delayed by cost, environmental issues, and lack of domestic capacity. Further, securing U.S. supply chains and developing domestic refining processes was slowed by the global impact of COVID-19, another unanticipated security threat.¹⁰ The DoD must anticipate future advancements in military systems development as new technologies and civilian demand for rare earths and strategic metals, lithium for electric vehicle batteries, and chemicals vital to alternative energy technology increase across the world.

The DoD needs to examine new ways to prioritize its strategic needs and those of its partners across the U.S. whole-of-government and work closely with other U.S. government agencies to establish the necessary agreements to sustain those needs. The key to securing the

U.S. Defense Industrial Base and its supply chain is interagency cooperation. Interagency cooperation creates the agreements that ensure foreign partners are engaged and join the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (U.S. Department of State) the protective screen that blocks cyberattacks and insider threats (U.S. Department of Justice); reciprocal financial agreements that make resource sharing profitable for all parties (Departments of State and Commerce), and internal resource evaluation for exploitation (U.S. Department of the Interior).

Industrial base revitalization lies in securing and diversifying rare earth and strategic metals supply chains in parallel with effective domestic logistical, production, and innovation capacity. The DoD alone cannot achieve that change. Apart from rare earth magnets and the systems that need them to operate, the DoD must consider how the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence (AI) will affect future warfare because AI will need microprocessors that require rare earth. The U.S. leads the field but could lose its edge if denied the vital rare earths and strategic metals necessary for chip manufacture. However, there is hope for defense requirements and revitalization of the Defense Industrial Base. The same factories that drive green futures (GF) and electric vehicles (EV) also could drive military equipment requirements through innovative dual development strategies. However, before the Defense Industrial Base can start to produce materiel and systems that serve the needs of the DoD and foreign partners, the supply chain must be secured.

Developing and Sustaining Supply Chains

In the wake of Chinese rare earths and strategic minerals bans, it is vital that the United States revitalize its industrial base. The ground-breaking 2024 National Defense Industrial Strategy specifically identifies the need to consider supply chain protection from

disruptions, building redundancy, adding capacity, increasing support for industrial innovation, and shielding the strategic minerals and rare earths supply chain from international disruptions.¹¹ It is through interagency action and concerted policies that the National Defense Industrial Strategy will achieve its goals. The National Defense Industrial Strategy's opening page recognizes "...sustained collaboration and cooperation between the entire U.S. government, private industry, and our Allies and partners abroad," is vital to integrated deterrence and that, "by aligning policies, investments, and activities inside and outside the Department in a manner that is tailored to specific competitors, our industrial ecosystem can strengthen deterrence to maximum effect."¹²

Industrial base revitalization lies in securing and diversifying rare earth and strategic metals supply chains...

The National Defense Industrial Base Strategy's fifty-nine pages acknowledge the urgency for interagency action particularly for initiatives in foreign military sales, intellectual property, and cyberdefense. Creating international partnerships will strengthen overlapping strategies to energize the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. Diplomacy and agreements reinforce U.S. government policy and strategic imperatives with the allies that share the goals of the U.S. However, before the U.S. can bring old and new partners into its Defense Industrial Base, it must be built and resourced so that diplomacy has a tether to which to bind future agreements.

The DoD has actively responded to Chinese efforts to restrict rare earth materials by considering how to ensure domestic producers can be brought into agreements with the DoD and increase mining, processing, and finishing of rare earths and magnets. The DoD has

historically offered little incentive for civilian companies to dedicate much production space to DoD needs because the requirements were considered economically nonviable. In 2023 that situation changed with China's ban of exports. The DoD in September 2023, working through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy through its Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization (MCIEP) office established a program to create a permanent rare earth magnet production capability. The need for a reliable source for rare earth magnets in advanced technology is too strong to allow production to lapse.¹³ There were earlier efforts to supply the rare earth supply chain in 2021 were codified in Executive Order 14017 (E.O.), *America's Supply Chains*, and in 2022 the White House announced plans to increase domestic refining capacity for rare earths.¹⁴ These two initiatives provided notice of interest but as the National Defense Industrial Strategy notes, civilian production must be incentivized and DoD competition against U.S. commercial entities is difficult when commercial companies order products on scales that dwarf DoD requirements.


Domestic refining capacity for DoD purposes pales in comparison to the need for civilian rare earth products. But the National Defense Industrial Strategy goes farther than past strategies and acts by recognizing that the DoD should try to tap into civilian manufacturing demand, especially for solar and electric vehicle applications will ensure that future defense industry requirements can be met in tandem with commercial needs.¹⁵ The competition for resources will intensify in the future as the world seeks to transition to electrical vehicles and alternative energy. Demand for rare earths may rise to three to seven times current demand and lithium demand forty-fold. U.S. demands, according to the U.S. Department of Energy are projected to quadruple by 2050. This is in

the context of a world where currently there are fewer than ten rare earth magnet manufacturers outside of China, and only one in production in the U.S.¹⁶

This initiative will be hampered by the U.S. lack of industry elements that China has in abundance: the sheer number of labs, universities that specialize in metallurgy, and the thousands of metallurgists that graduate every year add to China's pool of expertise and research and development base for its industrial and defense industry base.¹⁷ China currently has an advantage but that lead is under threat as the U.S. government and the DoD specifically are bolstering funding to Defense Industrial Base companies. The U.S. government also seeks to rebuild the National Defense Stockpile and incentivize companies into supplying DoD and foreign partners' defense requirements.

The greatest potential for supply diversification lies in the processing phase utilizing material mined in the U.S. and potential new trade partners. A search of dozens of online data bases and industry sources identifies Brazil, Estonia, India, Australia, Malaysia, Japan, and the Philippines as sources for rare earths not readily available in the U.S. Working with these countries could help break China's monopoly and reduce collective risk. The U.S. has deposits containing most of rare earths, but environmental laws and industrial production capacity are limiting factors.

Imbedded in the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act were key provisions identifying rare earth elements that have been sourced through supply chains from China and replacing them.¹⁹ The stockpile, while managed by the Defense Logistics Agency, is funded by the Treasury Department and includes essential defense minerals and metals including titanium, tungsten, and cobalt.²⁰ Although the National Defense Stockpile is not directly in the supply chain, maintaining its viability and replenishing its depleted mineral resources is one part of the



Rare Earth Compounds and Metals Foreign Origins (2019-2022)

Potential Future Partners	Rare Earth Material	Purpose
Australia - Gadolinium Thailand- Lanthanum	Gadolinium, Lanthanum	Night Vision Devices and camera lenses
Malaysia	Erbium	fiber optic signal amplification
Brazil, India, Australia	Thulium, Europium	Optics, X-rays, coatings
Australia	Cerium and Dysprosium	Rare earth magnets
Promethium is formed from Neodymium	Promethium	Research and testing
Philippines - Scandium Brazil, India, Australia - Samarium	Scandium, Samarium	Aerospace alloys
India, Australia, Brazil	Terbium	Sonar, high temperature operations, data recording
India, Australia, Brazil	Ytterbium	Hardened ceramics and armor
India, Australia, Brazil	Holmium	Sensor calibration
India, Australia, Brazil	Lutetium	lenses, sonar

Figure 1. Potential for Supply Diversification¹⁸

securing and restoring independence of the DoD supply chain.

DoD efforts to secure the rare earth supply chain since 2020 have included a spectrum of investments in Defense Industrial Base companies, large and small, to create domestic rare earths supply chains even while working with China to meet DoD needs. Prior to the 2023 Chinese bans, the DoD awarded more than \$400 million to companies and programs to establish domestic rare earth supply chains. Under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, the Manufacturing Capability Expansion, and Investment Program (MCEIP) directorate leads the DoD five-year rare earth investment strategy that includes establishing critical nodes for sourcing, separation, processing, metallization, alloying, and magnet manufacturing. The MCEIP has funded Lynas USA, LLC, Noveon Magnetics, TDA Magnetics, and E-VAC Magnetics, thereby ensuring the U.S. domestic rare earth supply

restoring depleted strategic stockpiles. Through funds obtained via the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, the DoD invested over \$20 million under Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities to ensure nickel production through 2027 at the only nickel mine in the U.S..²³ This delays the urgency of the need for the U.S. to find additional supplies through allies Canada, Indonesia, Philippines, and Australia. Nickel is one resource that the U.S. will need to ensure supplies are available for commercial and DoD needs, not only for EVs but also the U.S. Army planned fleet electrification.

The DoD is also able to ensure supply chain redundancy through efforts to find new methods of processing rare earth and other minerals, or methods to create alternatives to industry standards (e.g., sodium batteries for lithium). Innovation, research, and development to find different methods to extract rare earths than how China does at present will enable the U.S. to circumvent any future Chinese attempts to impact the U.S. supply chain through bans on chemicals, machines, or diplomatic pressure on U.S. material suppliers vulnerable to Chinese coercion. The Department of Defense started funding this effort with some domestic companies, among them Ucore Rare Metals.²⁴ Finding and pursuing alternatives also gives options should the accepted chemical processing and finishing processes be determined environmentally risky or the companies subjected to unforecasted materials shortages. Further, when we examine the process for creating the necessary microprocessors for AI computer chips the U.S. has an immense reservoir of helium that will aid the domestic manufacturing process and reduce reliance on foreign manufacturers.²⁵ The rare earths and gases that are vital for advanced defense system components are already in the U.S., but redundancy is critical, as is protection for the industry that manufactures military systems that

The rare earths and gases that are vital for advanced defense system components are already in the U.S., but redundancy is critical...

chain for the DoD by the target date of 2027.²¹ Lynas USA is also part of the National Defense Industrial Strategy to use domestic and allied production to meet DoD needs.²² Rare earths magnets are one of the supply chain insecurities that are being addressed with new initiatives. Another point of concern for an increasingly electrified military and U.S. domestic needs are the domestic nickel supplies that need replacement quickly in a world where lithium battery production for EVs requires nickel.

Strategic metals are another area where recent DoD investment is keeping domestic production open and U.S. government is

could be critically impacted by a cyber-attack or loss of domestic infrastructure affected by a natural disaster. The world is turning to electric solutions including EV and the DoD is no exception. The effort is ongoing, but a combination of factors may prevent full evolution of the DoD fleet. Supply and demand, resource constraints, and clandestine efforts to prevent DoD systems evolution threaten the DoD supply chain's security.

Conclusion

The U.S. DoD and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base are at a stage where the competing demands of international, domestic, and industrial sectors are creating new security challenges for future systems and force development. Creating strong and secured supply chains will require the DoD to work with other U.S. government agencies to communicate current and future needs, especially as the National Defense Industrial Base Strategy is implemented with new international partners that may not want to confine alliances to defense issues, but may seek to include DoD equities in agreements or treaties that involve commercial ventures to protect energy supplies, prevent illegal fishing, or forestall climate change. The U.S. government interagency process, the “whole-of-government” approach that allows the U.S. to offer partners many areas of cooperation, is what makes the U.S. international negotiating position strong relative to competitors.

The future for the DoD and the world at large is electric, and the need to secure the base materials to create the batteries, computer chips, rare earth magnets, and supercomputers can only be met through cooperative ventures that ensure multiple partners and nations share risk by creating a supply chain of many links including redundant ones. China will not allow this to occur without interference, and as the rare earths and other bans show, China has no compunction against using economic coercion to force political concessions. China also utilizes instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) – to force decisions and shape emerging technology sectors to its favor. Diplomatically China has challenged the west with its “Belt and Road Initiative” and tempting development offers. China has employed information warfare to sway public opinion and undercut alliances. Militarily, China has intimidated and coerced countries that could ally with the west and the U.S. especially those in the South China Sea. Economically, China has demonstrated the will to flex economic muscle to depress foreign domestic industrial sectors such as U.S. rare earth miners and producers. China actively conducts espionage by employing hackers to gain access to information and cut years or even decades off research and development. China even sets up clandestine police stations in other countries to maintain control over expatriate citizens. These factors all endanger the DoD supply chain, especially in tandem with China's military build-up of naval, missile, cyber, and electronic warfare forces. I will discuss these threats further in Part II of this article series where I will discuss how China uses messaging campaigns, cyber operations, and foreign policy pressure to destabilize U.S. supply chains. **IAJ**

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Back to the Future: *FEMA's Role in the Era of Strategic Competition*

by Kevin Lawhon

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In the 1985 cult classic, *Back to the Future*, Marty McFly goes back in time to 1955 and has an opportunity to change the future. In one scene, he leaves his friend, Doc Brown, a note, warning him of his imminent demise in 1985.¹ When McFly returns to the present day, he witnesses Doc Brown's attempted murder, but Brown survives because he was wearing a bullet-proof vest. Doc Brown read McFly's note and heeded his warning.

Our current security environment feels a lot like that movie. Russia is resurgent with visions of regional hegemony in Eastern Europe. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is led by a cult-of-personality with a plan to remake China socially, economically, and militarily. The names have changed from Stalin to Putin and from Mao to Xi, but it feels like we have been here before.² Like McFly, our National Security apparatus is working to harness the lessons of our past, with the aim of providing a better future.

The Defense Department is re-tooling for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) against a near peer. The Army Brigade Combat Team is out as the unit of action. Echelons at Division and above are gaining key Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD), Fires, Air Defense, Space, and Cyber and Electronic Warfare capabilities.³ Key enablers are being consolidated at the Division, akin to the Army of

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Excellence Force Structure of the late 1970s and 1980s.⁴ The Marine Corps is embracing its historic role in Distributed Maritime Operations, Contested Littoral Operations, and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations.⁵ The Army’s capstone doctrine, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* revives lost arts such as wet gap crossings, dispersion, denied communications, and contested deployment.⁶ These are only a few examples of DoD’s modernization initiatives. What is old is new again. Just as the Department of Defense is evolving and changing to meet tomorrow’s threats, so too are our partners at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

From Civil Defense to All Hazards Planning

FEMA was born during the last era of strategic competition, with a dual mandate for emergency management and civil defense. In fact, the Agency’s original logo bears the Latin inscription “*Pace Ac Bello Merita*” or “Service in Peace and War.” When President Carter established FEMA in 1979, federal authorities for disaster response and civil defense were spread piecemeal through the Federal government. Carter sought to consolidate those functions into a single agency. The civil defense portion of FEMA’s mandate fell out of vogue during the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations. SALT “created a conflict between the desire to advance U.S. civil defense, and the desire to avoid upsetting the delicate strategic balance” with our Soviet competitors.⁷ The Reagan Administration attempted to re-invigorate Civil Defense through National Security Decision Directive 26, which sought to enhance strategic deterrence through a balance of strategic forces, capabilities, and Civil Defense.⁸ Congress stifled the administration’s budget request supporting the implementation of the Civil Defense portion of the policy.

In response, FEMA gradually transitioned to an All-Hazards planning approach,

flexible enough to address, “the full range of emergencies from small, isolated events to the ultimate emergency—war. The transition to an All-Hazards approach unfolded over the next decade. The concept firmly took root after Hurricane Andrew, during the Clinton Administration, under FEMA Director James Lee Witt.”⁹ As the Cold War waned and strategic competitors slumbered, natural hazards and domestic terrorism became focal points for FEMA planning. The United States’ current threat environment layers natural hazards, terrorism, cyber threats, and Nation-State threats, necessitating a change in the way FEMA does business – and perhaps a re-examination of aspects of Civil Defense. As Dr. David McIntyre, Dean of the Bush School of Public Service remarked, “All-hazards is a great way to build firemen, but it is not necessarily a great way to prepare strategies.”¹⁰ As the pendulum swings back towards strategic competition, FEMA is rising to the occasion.

Emerging Threats

Threats from our strategic competitors are becoming more credible and persistent. In addition, the frequency of natural disasters is increasing. FEMA is challenged to do more with less.¹¹ Three recent examples highlight FEMA’s evolution in response to these challenges.¹² First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 and the associated cyber and nuclear saber rattling served as a catalyst for introspection in the Emergency Management Community.¹³ Did it have the right policy and coordination mechanisms in place to address threats to the homeland from a Nation-State? Did it fully understand the vulnerabilities and interrelationships of physical and cyber infrastructure? In this case, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was tagged to serve as Lead Federal Agency (LFA) to coordinate domestic preparedness and response. Since its inception Post 9/11, DHS intentionally kept its

department level staff lean and empowered its subordinate agencies. As a result, DHS turned to FEMA for an organizational construct to exercise their role as LFA. FEMA formed the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) with one of its National Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) as the core. IMATs consist of an experienced disaster response cadre and a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who normally deploy to Stafford Act disasters to lead interagency efforts. The IMAT led interagency efforts to answer the questions above and coordinate a response in the event of escalation.¹⁴

Our competitors will continue to seek asymmetric opportunities, with activities that remain under the threshold of armed conflict...

A second example of emerging threats presented itself in February of 2023, when several flying objects violating U.S. airspace were downed by U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). This incident drove home the idea that “the homeland is not a sanctuary.”¹⁵ But it also revealed vulnerabilities in our decentralized response framework. FEMA Administrator Deanne Criswell stated, “the decision of when and where it might land or be shot down involved our states, locals, and even Tribal Nations.”¹⁶ Did we have the same mechanisms to share intelligence across the federal interagency and down to the State and local level, in the same way the DoD is able to share intelligence from the Strategic to Tactical level? Did we have the right points of coordination and collaboration? Did we have a coherent way to address threats we hadn’t planned against? Did we have a way to share necessary information with the public?

Finally, the simultaneous occurrence of Super Typhoon Mawar and the Chinese sponsored *Volt Typhoon* cyber-attack in Guam in May of 2023

offer a preview into the future. Our competitors will continue to seek asymmetric opportunities, with activities that remain under the threshold of armed conflict, like natural hazards, to attack in our moments of vulnerability.¹⁷ Guam and the Central Marianas Islands are pivotal to the ability of the U.S. to project power in the Pacific. The Cyber community’s ability to defend against and FEMA’s ability to recover from threats to Guam directly impact the DoD’s ability to respond regionally. Do we really understand what comprises a complex catastrophe with national implications? Do we have the right systems in place to handle a complex catastrophe? Can we ensure “fort to port” power projection? Was FEMA postured to lead the interagency to respond to such a catastrophe with minimal Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)?

These three incidents represent a pendulum swing back towards FEMA’s civil defense roots. They are not neatly packed into the all-hazards planning model or the parameters of the Stafford Act. Yet FEMA has a role to play because these types of incidents have National Security implications and exceed the ability of State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) governments for response.

An Evolving FEMA

Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine isn’t the first incident in recent memory where FEMA has been asked to lead. The ebola crisis, the southwest border, and Operation Allies Welcome all represent Non-Stafford Act incidents where FEMA played a key role.¹⁸ As non-Stafford response requirements become more frequent, FEMA is standing up a Non-Stafford Act IMAT to ensure we have the right policy and coordination mechanisms in place to address threats to our homeland. Under Presidential Policy Directive #44, Enhancing Domestic Incident Response, an LFA other than FEMA can execute response to a domestic incident in a situation where they have the most statutory

authority to act.¹⁹ The challenge is that FEMA is uniquely built to operationalize Stafford Act Authorities, where other federal agencies (OFAs) are less equipped to do so. The Non-Stafford IMAT gives OFAs an experienced cadre of response operators from FEMA to assist them as they lead. One might think of the IMAT as an Immediate Response Force of the Interagency. It provides a rapidly deployable capability that can conduct initial triage and management of an incident until a purpose-built task force arrives.

FEMA also resurrected planning for threats perpetrated by nation-states. These planning efforts initiatives include Kinetic Strike planning, a Cyber Consequence Management Playbook, and a Nation State Desk Reference Guide. These efforts were informed by historical Cold War documents from the 1970s to the 1990s, including Major Emergency Action Guides (MEAGs), Federal Civil Emergency Action Guides, Federal Preparedness Circulars on continuity of government, and other civil defense documents. Many of these documents were retrieved from previous FEMA employees and the Library of Congress by the USNORTHCOM and FEMA Planning Staffs. MEAGs were essentially decision support templates that provided decision criteria, triggers, and timelines associated with catastrophic events to senior leaders. They were adapted for the contemporary threat environment, but many of the principles in the Cold-War era documents remain extant. These FEMA documents provide a sort of doctrinal template (DOCTEMP) to be used by Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial planners as they wrestle with contemporary threats beyond the All-Hazards framework.

FEMA also continues to build relationships with mission partners in USNORTHCOM, INDOPACOM, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to better understand the vulnerabilities and interrelationships of our physical and cyber infrastructure. According

to the Government Accountability Office, “the private sector owns the vast majority of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources— roughly 85 percent.”²⁰ There is accepted recognition among FEMA, CISA, and NGB that our state and local governments have the best in-depth understanding of our critical infrastructure, the right relationships with privatized infrastructure owners, and are generally best postured to secure from and respond to threats. To better understand the public-private partnership landscape, FEMA and CISA facilitate and participate in Tabletop Exercises (TTX) such as those that take

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place annually during the NGB’s All Hazards Planning Conference. FEMA recognizes that one of the best hedges they have against risk in the critical infrastructure space is to bring stakeholders together in collaboration and proliferate best practices. For example, FEMA Deputy Administrator Erik Hooks visited his home state of North Carolina in early 2023 to better understand the inner workings of the North Carolina Joint Cybersecurity Task Force (JCTF). The JCTF integrates law enforcement, emergency management, NC National Guard cyber specialists, local government information technology (IT) strike teams, State IT/cyber specialists, and federal agencies. The JCTF leverages the idea of collective response authorities and capabilities across boundaries to combat a cyber threat that doesn’t respect political geography. FEMA is uniquely positioned to observe best practices like the JCTF and share them for common good.

Another critical best practice FEMA is working to share is intelligence and information sharing at echelon. FEMA established Emergency Support Function 14: Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure as a part of the National Response Framework (NRF) in 2019. FEMA published *Information Sharing: A Guide to Private-Public Partnerships (P3)* in September 2023.²¹ This guide acknowledges the fact that our national economy and industrial base are vital to peer competition and our ability to respond to threats. In the same way that DoD shares intelligence from national to tactical, the P3 guide encourages collaboration and information sharing to reduce risk to private sector organizations vital to our economic interests.

...it is impossible to develop all-encompassing plans for everything from natural hazards to pandemics to nation-state threats.

The attack on a Duke Energy sub-station in Moore, NC in December 2022 illustrates the importance of this type of collaboration.²² This particular sub-station serviced Moore County, which is a major population center near Fort Liberty, NC. Fort Liberty is known as a power project platform and houses much of the DoD's immediate response capability. The attack left over 35,000 citizens without power for several days. A preponderance of those citizens had some association to Fort Liberty. While the attack did not directly affect Fort Liberty, it impacted a significant number of military-affiliated families in a way that could have affected readiness of rapid response forces, had it been prolonged or compounded. The intent of the attacks remains a matter of investigation, but the outcome highlights a vulnerability that can be addressed through improved P3 cooperation.

In addition to information sharing efforts,

FEMA is working to improve the way it plans for unforeseeable events. Historically, FEMA builds All Hazards Plans (AHPs) at the Regional Level. AHPs are akin to a Combatant Command (CCMD) Campaign Plan (CCP). They provide a general outline for how the agency intends to implement the NRF within a specific geography. Incident specific details are left to the supporting annexes in an AHP, much the same way threat specific Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) or Operations Plans (OPLANs) are nested with a CCP. FEMA's AHP are robust and adaptable, but there is a growing awareness that it is impossible to develop all-encompassing plans for everything from natural hazards to pandemics to nation-state threats. This is especially true, given the capacity limitations of its planning cadre. Instead, FEMA developed an experienced core group of crisis action planners. These planners undergo additional training on planning methodologies, giving them the agility to plan rapidly "on the fly," allowing FEMA to rapidly adapt deliberate AHPs to the circumstances of the immediate crisis.

FEMA is also working to ensure the U.S. has the right systems in place to handle complex catastrophes. These incidents combine natural and manmade hazards or threats in a way that, "causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, or government functions."²³ We saw a glimpse of these types of incidents in the Summer of 2023, when Typhoon Mawar struck the island of Guam, followed closely by a Chinese state sponsored cyber-attack called Volt-Typhoon. The island was already crippled due to the storm. The cyber-attack further compromised the island. It is no secret that Guam plays a strategic role in U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific. A tandem cyber-attack and natural disaster, without a doubt, disrupted the US ability to respond regionally. FEMA is actively collaborating with the DoD

on the topic of Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) to better define lead and support roles in complex catastrophe scenarios. FEMA Senior Leaders have engaged on topics from strategic ports (Los Angeles, Pearl Harbor, Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, Military Ocean Terminal Concord), rail, and critical utilities to make sure DoD can continue to project power from “port-to-fort.” Likewise, FEMA sustains its relationship with USNORTHCOM for the purposes of early warning and ballistic missile defense and continues to invest in its relationship with INDOPACOM as the threat picture in that region evolves.

The Work Ahead

Joint Doctrine draws a very clear distinction between Homeland Defense (HD) and DSCA.²⁴ In practice, the line between HD and DSCA is blurry. This will be especially true in the circumstance of complex catastrophes. On America’s worst day, HD and DSCA will likely occur simultaneously and compete for the same resources, leading to a management of shortfalls, vice adjudication of available resources. The active component of our Armed Forces is the smallest it’s been since World War II, which means an increased reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces to fulfill force flow requirements for contingency and operations plans.²⁵ Those are the same forces we traditionally rely on to fulfill DSCA missions. The first area FEMA should invest effort is establishing a framework and process, in concert with the DoD and Interagency, to help leaders and policy makers have thoughtful conversations about the risks and tradeoffs associated with employing DoD forces for DSCA, HD, and other contingency operations. In absence of a framework, our leaders and policy makers will be, “left instead to make politically sensitive policy and organizational decisions on the fly.”²⁶

Those conversations become easier when FEMA is less reliant on the DoD for resources.

This is the second area where FEMA should invest effort. FEMA and State Emergency Management Agencies rely heavily on Active Duty and National Guard elements for response. During the COVID-19 pandemic, 89 percent of Mission Assignment obligated funds went to support DoD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Mission assignments.²⁷ From 2005 to 2014, 72 percent of the Disaster Relief Funds obligated toward mission assignments (\$6.1B) funded DoD efforts. Those mission assignments were focused on transportation, airlift and evacuation support, search and rescue, logistics, mass care and medical support, mass fatality management, and public works and engineering. These figures do not include NGB service members employed on State Active-Duty Status to meet the demands of non-Stafford emergencies.²⁸ The Secretary of Defense is the only cabinet level official that can decline a Mission Assignment from FEMA under the NRF. Such declinations are rare, but they pose significant risk to domestic consequence management if DoD is mobilized.²⁹

On America’s worst day, HD and DSCA will likely occur simultaneously and compete for the same resources...

Alternatives to DoD support exist, but DoD is a responsive alternative that comes with structure and Unity of Command, rather than the messier Unified Coordination associated with civil authorities working across echelons and jurisdictions. FEMA must work with SLTTs to develop alternatives to DoD and National Guard support for resilience in the event of a partial or full mobilization of DoD in response to crisis. During World War II and the Cold War, the Nation relied on volunteer organizations like the Civilian Defense Corps, Civil Air Patrol, and Ground Observer Corps to perform Civil Defense functions at home, while the DoD

focused abroad. These volunteer organizations were managed at the Federal level and had an established organizational structure and chain of command similar to the military. This provided the Unity of Command and effectiveness necessary to respond to a disaster, without taxing DoD resources.³⁰

FEMA should also further explore how it supports National mobilization and contested deployment.

Fortunately, there is a framework in place to identify and organize emergency management resources. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) includes the NRF and the Federal Interagency Operation Plans (FIOP). The NRF outlines the concept of Emergency Support Functions, or major lines of effort that need to be considered during the lifecycle of an event. FIOPs focus on the prevention, protection, mitigation, response, or recovery phases of Emergency Management. With the NRF, FEMA uses a concept called resource typing to help group together like capabilities for the purposes of emergency response.³¹ The DoD uses a similar model. The CH-47 Chinook and the CH-53 Sea Stallion are both described as a “rotary wing heavy lift” resource type, implying some level of like capability. In addition to resource typing, States and Territories use Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) to complement federal disaster response resources.³² EMACs allow states and territories to pledge their internal resources to one another in times of crisis. FEMA and the emergency management community of practice should examine the DoD resources they call upon the most and look for alternative resource types in the civilian emergency management or private sector. As similar resources are identified, they should build those agreements into EMAC.

Those agreements don’t preclude access to DoD support, but they do provide decision makers and emergency managers a broader menu of options to choose from in times of resource scarcity.

FEMA should also further explore how it supports National mobilization and contested deployment. The *Pax Americana* gave us an opportunity to focus on domestic incident response, but FEMA has several latent authorities and responsibilities in the event of a National Security Emergency (NSE) as defined by Executive Order 12656. FEMA is responsible for coordinating with the Department of Defense for mutual civil-military support during national security emergencies. They are also for, “implementation of policies and programs for efficient mobilization of Federal, State, local, and private sector resources in response to national security emergencies.”³³ Homeland Security Policy Directive-5 (HSPD-5) gives the Secretary of Homeland Security responsibility to prevent, prepare, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other national emergencies. FEMA functionally manages those authorities on behalf of the Secretary through the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the NRF.³⁴

As threats get closer to our doorstep, it’s important that FEMA should consider revisions to the NRF and NIMS that acknowledge a “Reverse DSCA” scenario. In this scenario, DoD is the LFA, executing mobilization or Homeland Defense, and FEMA, as well as other Departments and Agencies, are in supporting roles. To make that scenario more tangible, we’ll consider two specific examples that might impact priority theaters. The Island of Oahu is a lynchpin for projecting U.S. power in the Indo-Pacific. If Pearl Harbor’s port facilities were rendered inoperable due to enemy attack, who would mobilize resources to recover the port or facilitate transition to the Port of Honolulu for civil-military co-use? It’s very likely that all assigned and apportioned DoD forces will be

mobilized and headed toward whatever threat destroyed Pearl Harbor in the first place. Likewise, Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU) is “the nation’s largest ocean terminal for military munitions,” and the largest military port on the East Coast.³⁵ It is an understatement to say that MOTSU is key to mobilization in Europe. If the rail lines servicing MOTSU were destroyed by a threat originating from Europe, who bears responsibility for their restoration? Response and recovery for these two scenarios would have fallen to the Civil Defense Corps or similar organization in a bygone era. Based on the existing statutory authorities, FEMA is best suited to fill the void left in their absence.

Mark Twain is often credited with the observation that “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” We are a generation removed from the Cold War, and therefore it is tempting to see emerging national security threats as new and novel. But if we examine the longer arc of history, we will observe familiar patterns of behavior from our near peer competitors. It is important that we reflect on past precedent to decide how we will respond as a nation. History is like McFly’s note to us; if we pay attention, it might save us from an unnecessary fate in the future. There is reason to be optimistic about DoD and Interagency modernization and cooperation. We are adopting Cold War era concepts and adapting them as appropriate. But we should not waste time patting ourselves on the back. There is more work to be done as we prepare for the future. **IAJ**

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Assessing Leadership Among WHO's Directors-General

by Jonathan M. Cohen

Can leadership practices, education, and background experiences predict the effectiveness and success of a World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General (DG), or any other leader of an organization, during a regional or global healthcare crisis? There are studies which examine international organizations and their accomplishments or missteps during their leaders' tenures. Other studies examine organizational performance, and rated their improvements or declines based on the leadership of the individual in charge. Few studies, however, examined a leader's background and how it may have impacted organizational performance.

Leadership is an integral part of any organization's success. Literature on this topic has addressed leadership theories, principles, attributes, and characteristics and other studies assessed individual leadership during a crisis; however, leadership scholars rarely apply these theories, principles, attributes, and characteristics to an individual or group of people to determine why leaders either succeeded or failed; this article examines the nine WHO DG's leadership during international healthcare crises.

Background

During their tenures, all of the WHO DGs faced at least one regional or global health crisis that tested their leadership within the WHO and among the states of the international community. The first WHO DG, Dr. George "Brock" Chisholm and the newly formed WHO responded to health crises as a result of the devastation of the Second World War which included a cholera outbreak in Egypt as well as widespread malaria in Greece and Sardinia.¹

Dr. Marcolino Gomes Candau led the WHO through a H2N2 influenza outbreak in 1957,

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a major cholera pandemic that originated in Indonesia in 1961, and an H3N2 influenza outbreak in 1968.² Dr. Halfdan Mahler led the WHO in 1981 when a never before seen virus, the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), emerged on the African continent and reached epic proportions.³ Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima and the WHO responded to what he referred to as a “global tuberculosis emergency” in 1994.⁴ Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland and her successor, Dr. Jong-Wook Lee, led the WHO in 2002 and 2003 when the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus broke out in China and spread to nearly 24 countries.^{5,6}

After the sudden death of Dr. Lee in 2006, Dr. Anders Nordström became the interim DG of the WHO. He not only had to keep the WHO running until a special election could be organized, he continued to lead the organization and guided its response to the H5N1 avian influenza crisis.⁷ In 2009, Dr. Margaret Chan was head of the WHO during a H1N1 influenza outbreak in Mexico and the United States. Additionally, she guided the organization through a Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) corona virus in 2012, oversaw the WHO response to the ebola pandemic in 2014, which started in West Africa, and the zika virus outbreak, which originated in Brazil.⁸ Finally, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus became the WHO DG in 2017 and two years later led the organization during the COVID-19 virus outbreak that originated in China and spread around the globe in just a few short months.⁹

Identifying the presence (or absence) of exemplary leadership practices, experiences, and training can explain why some WHO DGs were more successful than others. By codifying the practices of exemplary leadership of potential candidates for leadership and managerial positions, institutions can better prepare incoming personnel to become better leaders and managers before assuming the responsibilities of

leading organizations. Training plans can also be developed to ensure future WHO DGs (or any other leader of an organization) will be prepared for success before assuming a position.

All nine WHO DGs faced regional or global health challenges during their tenures...

This type of research is important. All nine WHO DGs faced regional or global health challenges during their tenures and had varying degrees of success. Some were severely criticized for their less-than-successful outcomes. All of the WHO DGs were accomplished enough to have reached what many might consider the pinnacle of a medical or public health career—to be selected as the WHO DG. This article demonstrates why several of the WHO DGs were more successful than others. Diverse experiences and training outside “standard” medical backgrounds attributed to the success of some of the DGs. These diverse experiences and training included high level state and international medical positions as well as political experiences outside the medical field. Research conducted through leadership and managerial lenses can identify these broadening and diverse experiences, codify them, and they can be required for personnel selected for leadership positions such as the leader of the WHO or can be used by candidates vying for leadership and managerial positions to identify their own weaknesses and better prepare themselves for these types of billets.

Requiring personnel who desire, or are designated, to become international organizational leaders to hold certain types of positions and/or attend executive-level management training may not guarantee their success. However, at the very least, these developmental positions and training sessions can prepare and provide them with opportunities to be successful.

Methodology

This study assessed WHO DGs to determine their level of leadership success during their tenures by exploring the presence or absence of the Kouzes and Posner’s *Practices of Exemplary Leadership* as well as examining their backgrounds for diverse experiences and educational opportunities, which can provide an explanation for their successes or failures.¹⁰ Recommendations for various experiences and training needed can ensure future WHO DGs will have conditions set for success prior to assuming this leadership and managerial position.

Two dependent variables were developed for this study. The first was experience and education level (*ExEd*). The independent variables used to develop the experience and education level dependent variable included non-medical political experience (*PE*), previous state or international medical public office experience (*PPOE*), previous WHO experience (*WE*), medical experience (*MEEx*), education supporting public office (*ESPO*), and medical education (*ME*); all of these independent variables were measured in years. The experience and education level dependent variable was expressed as:

$$ExEd (y_2) = ME (x_1) + MEEx (x_2) + ESPO (x_3) + PPOE (x_4) + WE (x_5) + PE (x_6).$$

The second dependent variable was demonstration of the five practices of exemplary leadership (*D5PEL*). Defined in Table 1, the independent variables used to develop the Demonstration of the five practices of exemplary leadership were Kouzes and Posner’s practices of exemplary leadership, which included model the way (*MtW*), inspire a shared vision (*ISV*), enabled others to act (*EoA*), challenge the process (*CtP*), and encourage the heart (*EtH*).¹¹

These independent variables were measured through a qualitative research process known as “coding.” The program used to code these variables is call NVivo. This program allows a researcher to track and organize passages, phrases, and key words in source documents and enables a researcher to develop variables, charts, and graphs to express the data collected. The demonstration of the five practices of exemplary leadership dependent variable was expressed as:

$$D5PEL (y_1) = MtW (x_1) + ISV (x_2) + CtP (x_3) + EoA (x_4) + EtH (x_5).$$

Once the experience and education level and demonstration of the five practices of exemplary leadership dependent variables were developed for each WHO DG, they were added together and an overall leadership success assessment (*OLSA*) score was developed for each DG, which

Model the Way	Clarify values by finding a voice and affirming shared values. Set the example by aligning actions with shared values.
Inspire a Shared Vision	Envision the future by imagining exciting and ennobling possibilities. Enlist others in a common vision by appealing to shared aspirations.
Challenge the Process	Search for opportunities by seizing the initiative and looking outward for innovative ways to improve. Experiment and take risks by consistently generating small wins and learning from experience.
Enable Others to Act	Foster collaboration by building trust and facilitating relationships. Strengthen others by increasing self-determination and developing competence.
Encourage the Heart	Recognize contributions by showing appreciation for individual excellence. Celebrate values and victories, creating a spirit of community.

Table 1. Kouzes and Posner’s Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership¹²

	Crisis Relative Values		Crisis Raw Data		Non-Crisis Relative Values		Non-Crisis Raw Data		Experience Type		
	Rank	Group	Rank	Group	Rank	Group	Rank	Group	PE	PPOE	WE
Chisholm	1	T5	6	B4	4	T5	9	B4		✓	
Candau	2	T5	5	T5	1	T5	8	B4		✓	✓
Mahler	8	B4	9	B4	9	B4	2	T5			✓
Nakajima	7	B4	7	B4	3	T5	5	T5			✓
Brundtland	2	T5	3	T5	1	T5	3	T5	✓	✓	
Lee	4	T5	4	T5	7	B4	7	B4			✓
Nordstron	9	B4	8	B4	8	B4	6	B4			✓
Chan	5	T5	1	T5	5	T5	4	T5		✓	✓
Ghebreyesus	5	T5	2	T5	5	T5	1	T5	✓	✓	

Table 2. Overall leadership assessment ranks for WHO Director General

enabled them to be rank ordered and placed in either the top five of the group or the bottom four of the group. Based on the data collected, a determination was made as to why the top five WHO DGs were more successful than the bottom four. The Overall Leadership Success Assessment was expressed as:

$$OLSA = D5PEL (y_1) + ExEd (y_2).$$

Research for this study was conducted by searching the WHO's international repository for information sharing (IRIS) and the United Nations' Digital Library System as well as other databases and websites for sources to code; approximately 200 sources were collected and used. After gathering the sources and coding them, the analysis of the data was conducted including weighting the experience and education and exemplary leadership practice variables. The overall leadership success assessment data was analyzed from multiple perspectives. These perspectives included relative values and raw data overall leadership success assessments in crisis and non-crisis scenarios. The results of these assessments allowed for the comparison and contrast of the DGs as a group and provided plausible explanations as to why some of the DGs had better scores than others and why some

DGs were in the top five of the group and why others were in the bottom four of the group.

This study, and its results, show that WHO DGs that have more diverse and extensive backgrounds and experiences demonstrated the five practices of exemplary leadership more frequently and at higher levels than those with less diverse backgrounds; specifically, those DGs that had political experiences outside the medical field and/or held previous state or international medical positions demonstrated the five practices of exemplary leadership more frequently in day-to-day operations and during healthcare crises than those DGs who did not have these types of experiences. Table 2 reflects the results of the four assessments that were conducted—crisis relative values, crisis raw data, non-crisis relative value, non-crisis raw data. Additionally, each DG's ranking for each factor is reflected in the rank columns. The group columns indicate whether the WHO DG finished in the top five (T5) of the group or the bottom four (B4) of the group in each assessment. The experience columns on the right whether or not the DG had non-medical political experience (PE), previous medical public office experience (PPOE), or WHO experience (WE).

Assessment of WHO Directors General

Dr. Chisholm

Dr. Chisolm did not have political experience but did hold public office for two years. Within the relative values assessment for crisis situations and non-crisis situations, he was a top five WHO DG; however, in the two raw data assessments, he was ranked in the bottom four of the group. He had no political experience but did hold a public office for two years, which provided little assistance to his assessments. During crises, in the variable model the way, he only demonstrated this practice of exemplary leadership 15.00% of the time while the average was 28.51% among the DGs. His inspire a shared vision variable was demonstrated 23.13% of the time in crisis, which was the third highest in crisis and 35.71% of the time in non-crisis, which was the highest demonstrated in that assessment. However, the use of these practices of exemplary leadership were not enough to overcome the low coverage of the model the way variable described earlier. Although he had nineteen years of medical experience, since he was the first WHO DG, there was no possibility of him having previous WHO experience. All of these factors kept Dr. Chisholm in the lower half of the group in two of the four assessments.

Dr. Candau

Dr. Candau did not have political experience but did hold public office for twelve years. He consistently was rated in the top five of the WHO DGs in all assessments except in the raw data non-crisis overall leadership success assessments. His coverage percentages in crisis situations of most the practices of exemplary leadership were consistently in the top five during crises and included enabled others to act (43.35%, which was rated first) and inspire a shared vision (19.74%, which was rated fifth); however, he was rated second to last in model

the way (17.17%). His experience and education level levels also enabled him to stay in the top half of the group. Dr. Candau had twelve years of previous medical public office experience, which was the second most of the DGs who held medical public office positions. His experience and education level levels were ranked first in relative values and in the top five in raw data.

In the raw values non-crisis overall leadership assessment, his total number of sources and instances in which he displayed the practices of exemplary leadership were much less than the other DGs and this more than likely accounts for the skewed results against him in this assessment. In the raw values crisis overall leadership success assessment, Dr. Candau did have the most uses of the variable of enabled others to act (111). Dr. Candau's high experience and education level Levels (rated first in both relative values, and in the top five in both raw data) and his high demonstration of the variables of enabled others to act and challenge the process in crisis and non-crisis situations, ensured he would rank in the top five of DGs in three of the four overall leadership success assessments.

Dr. Mahler

Dr. Mahler did not have political experience or hold public office. His rankings were consistently in the bottom four of the group in all assessments except the raw values non-crisis overall leadership success assessments where he was ranked second. A possible reason for this is that during his fifteen years as the WHO DG, there were no major regional or global healthcare crises until the last years of his tenure when HIV/AIDS began to appear. In crisis, Dr. Mahler demonstrated several of the practices of exemplary leadership well to include challenge the process (ranked first at 15.38%), enabled others to act (ranked third at 32.32%), and model the way (ranked fourth at 32.31%). On the other hand, he was in the bottom four of the group when demonstrating the variable of inspire a

shared vision (ranked eighth with 18.46%) and encourage the heart (ranked last with 1.54%); Dr. Mahler held no previous public office and had no political experience which also kept his rankings down, but he did have twenty-two years of previous WHO experience.

As previously stated above, the majority of Dr. Mahler's tenure as the WHO DG was not in crisis. Of the twenty sources examined, thirteen were in non-crisis situations and seven were during crises which explains his lower rankings in crisis assessments and accounts for his top five ranking in the raw values, non-crisis overall leadership success assessment.

Dr. Nakajima

Dr. Nakajima's neither had political experience nor hold public office. Half of Dr. Nakajima's overall leadership assessments (all non-crisis assessments) were in the top five of the group. Like Dr. Mahler, Dr. Nakajima spent many years at the WHO before being selected as the DG (sixteen years) and had no public office or political experience. While his practices of exemplary leadership coverages in crisis were generally in the bottom half of the group, he did have the second highest challenge the process percentage (14.95%) and his model the way variable percentage was in the top five (28.97%). Dr. Nakajima's coverage in the inspire a shared vision variable was 18.69%, which ranked seventh, can explain why his rankings were low in crisis.

Dr. Nakajima's relative values and raw data, non-crisis overall leadership success assessments were in the top five of the group. His overall practices of exemplary leadership tally count in this category was ranked fourth. Additionally, of the twenty sources found for Dr. Nakajima, ten covered non-crisis situations which accounts for the top five rating in this assessment.

Dr. Brundtland

Dr. Brundtland had sixteen years of political

experience and held public office for six years. Brundtland was a top five DG in all overall leadership success assessments. In crisis, she had the highest score in the inspire a shared vision variable from the practices of exemplary leadership. She had a 24.51% coverage and the average among the DGs was 20.26%. In non-crisis situations, this variable was rated in the top five of DGs as well.

Dr. Brundtland's experience and education level levels also enabled her to remain in the top five of the DGs in all overall assessments. She held political office for sixteen years and public office for six years, and certainly enabled her to be in the top five of the WHO DGs and definitely supports the hypothesis. Finally, of the twenty sources used to assess Dr. Brundtland, thirteen dealt with crisis and seven covered non-crisis situations.

Dr. Lee

Dr. Lee did not have political experience and did not hold public office. Similar to, but opposite of Dr. Nakajima, two of Dr. Lee's assessments (all crisis assessments) were in the top five of the group. Like Dr. Nakajima, Dr. Lee did not have political experience or hold public office (he did have twenty-five years of WHO Experience), yet he was still ranked in the top five of the group in the two crisis overall leadership assessments. His high ranking is explained by the fact that he demonstrated the practices of exemplary leadership in crisis often and frequently during his three years at the helm of the organization.

His coverage in the model the way variable was second overall (33.45% and the group average was 28.51%) and he was third overall in the variable of inspire a shared vision (21.45% and the group average was 20.26%). He also was in the top five of the group in the variable enabled others to act; his regular demonstration of the variables elevated him into the top five of the WHO DGs during crisis situations. Additionally,

with his scores and rankings improving from non-crisis to crisis situations; he showed that his leadership improved when crises occurred.

Dr. Nordström

Dr. Nordström did not have any political experience and did not hold public office. All of his overall leadership assessments were in the bottom four of the group for all assessments; however, these results are more than likely not a true assessment of his leadership abilities. He only served as the interim DG for seven months.

When searching the IRIS and other databases, only fourteen sources (five crisis and nine non-crisis) were found covering his time as the WHO interim DG (since 2007, Dr. Nordström has been widely published). The lack of sources definitely contributed to his bottom four rankings and these rankings were not a true indication of the type of leader Dr. Nordström was.

When looking at his demonstrated coverages of the practices of exemplary leadership in crisis, he was ranked first in the model the way variable (41.89% and the group average was 28.51%). However, he was ranked last in inspire a shared vision variable (17.57% and the group average was 20.26%) and enabled others to act variables. He also was ranked eighth in challenge the process variable.

As noted, he did not hold public office or have political experience; however, during his seven-month tenure as the interim WHO DG, he knew he would not be competing for the WHO DG position and had already accepted a new position outside the organization—the DG position at the Swedish International Development Agency. His charge was to keep the organization running until a new WHO DG could be selected and, by all accounts, he did an excellent job doing just that.

Dr. Chan

Dr. Chan did not have political experience,

but did hold public office for eleven years. She was in the top five in all four of the overall leadership success assessments. Her demonstration of the practices of exemplary leadership during crises had her ranked third in the model the way variable (33.02% and the group average was 28.51%) and she was also ranked second in the encourage the heart variable; however, she ranked in the bottom four of the group during crisis in inspire a shared vision, enabled others to act, and encourage the heart variables. While these scores were not in the top five, her experience and education level levels did help raise her rankings. She had eleven years of public office experience (the third highest total in the group).

Additionally, twenty-six sources (nineteen crisis and seven non-crisis) were found on Dr. Chan whereas most of the other DGs had twenty or less. In the nineteen crisis sources, her high model the way and inspire a shared vision variable scores, and her public office held enabled her to be a top five DG in all assessments, which supports the hypothesis. Finally, examining her raw data tally totals, she did have twenty-nine more instances of demonstrating the model the way variable than all other DGs to include Dr. Ghebreyesus who had thirty-six total sources.

Dr. Ghebreyesus

Dr. Ghebreyesus did have five years of political experience and did hold public office for twenty-eight years. Like Dr. Chan, Dr. Ghebreyesus finished in the top five in all four of the overall leadership assessments. In crisis, he was ranked fourth overall among DGs in the inspire a shared vision (23.56% and the group average was 20.26%) and enabled others to act in the practices of exemplary leadership; additionally, he ranked first in the encourage the heart variable. He did rank in the bottom four of the group in the model the way variable of the practices of exemplary leadership. His

experience and education level levels definitely influenced his rankings because he had the second most years of political experience and he held various public offices totaling twenty-eight years, which supports the hypothesis.

As previously noted, the number of sources available for the Dr. Ghebreyesus analysis and assessment far exceeded any of the other WHO DGs (thirty-six versus Dr. Chan – twenty-six, the other DGs averaging about twenty, and with Dr. Nordström only having fourteen), which gave him a clear advantage in all of the raw data assessments.

Analysis

The majority of the WHO DGs that had political experience and/or previous public office experience had three or more top five assessments (Drs. Candau – three, Brundtland – four, Chan – four, and Ghebreyesus – four); however, while Dr. Chisholm did have previous public office experience, he only had two top five assessments. A possible reason was that Dr. Chisholm displayed the exemplary leadership practice/variable of model the way 14.19% of the time while the average among the other DGs was 28.51%. While this low rating effected his overall assessments, his inspire a shared vision variable was demonstrated 22.58% of the time in crisis (ranked third in crisis), and 33.33% of the time in non-crisis which was the highest demonstrated in those assessment. The use of these practices of exemplary leadership was not enough to overcome the low coverage of the model the way variable described earlier.

Dr. Jong-Wook Lee did not have any political experience or hold previous public office but did have two assessments (all crisis) in the top five of the group. Dr. Lee's case did challenge the study's hypothesis. While Dr. Lee had no public office or political experience, he did have two-and-a-half decades of WHO experience. Additionally, Dr. Lee's exception can be explained by the fact that he was an

exceptional leader. Within the five practices of exemplary leadership in crisis, he ranked third overall in the demonstration of model the way, third in encourage the heart, fourth in inspire a shared vision, tied for fourth in challenge the process, and fifth in enabled others to act. He demonstrated the practices of exemplary leadership regularly and was rated in the top five of the WHO DGs in each variable.

Another anomaly that challenged the hypothesis was Dr. Nakajima. Like Dr. Lee, he did not hold any previous public office or have any political experience but had two top five assessments (non-crisis relative values and non-crisis raw data assessments). Dr. Nakajima had sixteen years of WHO experience, second most among the DGs, had six total years of medical education, first among the DGs, and had seventeen years of medical experience, the second most of any DG. Additionally, in his demonstration of the practices of exemplary leadership in non-crisis situations, Dr. Nakajima ranked third in inspire a shared vision, second in enabled others to act, and third in challenge the process. These rankings allowed Dr. Nakajima to be in the top five subgroup in non-crisis overall leadership success assessments and be an exception to this study's hypothesis.

Conclusions

While this study ranked the WHO DGs and placed them in the top five or bottom four of the group, all nine of the DGs were exceptional leaders and had to be in order to become the world's "Top Doc." This study's purpose is to provide a possible explanation as to why some of the DGs appeared to have performed better than the others.

What can the results of this study and these assessments mean for the WHO and the selection of the organization's DG, the selection of a leader of any healthcare organization, or how can the assessments and results of this study better prepare potential leaders or managers who are

seeking executive level positions and ensure that he or she has the necessary background to properly and effectively lead an organization in its day-to-day operations or in times of crisis?

Effective leaders should display and exhibit Kouzes and Posner's Five Exemplary Practices of Leadership (model the way, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, challenge the process, and encourage the heart).¹³ These time proven and tested leadership practices should represent an organization's required or desired prerequisites of a candidate who is vying for an important position such as the WHO DG. These practices should also be part of a leader's resume when applying for and taking over the reins of an organization.

Effective leaders should display and exhibit Kouzes and Posner's Five Exemplary Practices...

The literature review did not uncover any existing prerequisites for those hired as a DG. Should the WHO decide to publish a list of required or desired traits that a DG should have, the WHO Executive Board can turn to this, or similar studies, to determine which practices of exemplary leadership they would like a potential DG to have based on the previous nine DGs and how they led in a day-to-day basis and how they responded to crises.

In addition to developing prerequisites and desired leadership characteristics and traits that a potential candidate should have, the WHO or any other organization can, as was done in this study, analyze speeches and written documents of potential candidates and look for their demonstration, or lack thereof, of the practices of exemplary leadership. Many organizations currently practice something similar to this. Many organizations filter resumes through automated artificial intelligence programs that look for the presence of certain "buzz" words

that will help them narrow down the number of candidates for a position. A deeper analysis into potential candidates for a position would be needed when looking for evidence of the practices of exemplary leadership.

Besides emphasizing the exemplary practices of leadership, the WHO Executive Board can also narrow the field of candidates for the WHO DG position, by requiring potential DGs to have had some political experience, have held previous public medical office outside of routine medical positions, or other diverse experiences because WHO DGs with these types of diverse experiences have performed better than those without them over the past 76 years. For other healthcare organizations, when vetting candidates for positions, they can reference this study as justification for seeking candidates with more varied backgrounds.

From the perspective of a potential candidate for an executive level healthcare position, the results of this study can also assist them in preparing for these types of billets as well. A potential candidate for a position, such as the WHO DG or an executive in a healthcare organization, can do a self-assessment using the practices of exemplary leadership to determine if he or she lacks one or more of the practices in their backgrounds. Many applicants are asked during interviews what their weaknesses are. An assessment of this type could help prepare a candidate for an interview or the position itself. Knowing what one's weaknesses are, a leader can work to improve those weaknesses or surround him or herself with personnel who would compensate for their shortcomings and weaknesses. Additionally, since diverse experiences appear to improve leadership, candidates can seek out positions that will challenge them and help them grow as leaders.

When Dr. Tedros Ghebreyesus became the front runner for the position of the WHO DG in the 2017 election, many of the articles published immediately began to attack his nomination

because he was not a medical doctor. Just two years after his election, he was leading the WHO during, and through, one of the most deadly and fast moving viruses the world had ever seen; COVID-19. Many questioned whether or not he had the right acumen or whether he was the right choice to lead such a diverse organization through a global pandemic. Today, there are many critics of how Dr. Ghebreyesus and the WHO handled the devastating corona virus. While history has yet to judge him or the WHO, based on the assessments of his leadership abilities found in this study, there are not many people who were as qualified as Dr. Ghebreyesus to lead the WHO and the international community through the two plus year health crisis.

The election of Dr. Ghebreyesus as the WHO DG shows the willingness of the international healthcare community to think outside the box and select a candidate that did not fit the standard mold of previous WHO DGs. While the WHO Executive Board probably did not do an in-depth study of Dr. Ghebreyesus' demonstration of the practices of exemplary leadership, perhaps it is time to start considering an analysis of leadership abilities and potential versus just the positions a person has held in order to determine if he or she is a good fit for a position like a WHO DG. This is the primary recommendation of this study.

Additionally, while this study focused exclusively on the eight previous WHO DGs as well as the current WHO DG, the methodologies and recommendations of this study can be applied outside the healthcare arena to include other international, national, joint, combined, and interagency organizations. Leadership is universal and crosses all boundaries to include military, political, and academia just to mention a few. Similar studies, based on some of the assessments of this work, are also recommended. **IAJ**

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Impact of Ungoverned Spaces on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Efforts

by Chinedu N. Chikwe

The existence of ungoverned spaces has remained a disturbing challenge to nations across the world. This is because they serve as safe havens for the activities of non-state actors such as terrorists, insurgents, bandits and other organized crime syndicates. This phenomenon threatens the security and political economy of affected nations, causing citizens to live in fear. In Africa, Mali, Libya, and Somalia are prominent countries that continue to struggle with insecurity resulting from the existence of massive expanse of ungoverned spaces. The absence of effective governance in parts of Somalia has allowed Al-Shabaab insurgent groups to establish their presence, imposing its version of governance on citizens.¹ Nigeria has had its fair share of challenges with ungoverned spaces in recent years. Large states like Niger, Kaduna, Zamfara, and Borno continue to witness security challenges in remote areas with limited government presence.

Ungoverned spaces refer to geographical areas within a country where government presence and control are limited or absent.² Angel Rabasa et al. refer to ungoverned spaces as areas of contested, incomplete or abdicated governance.³ Such abdication occurs in situations when a government, either by choice or force, abandons its control over certain portions of its territory.⁴ In such areas, state institutions are unable to enforce law and order, provide essential services, and implement government programs. Unfortunately, the absence of governance creates a vacuum that non-state actors attempt to fill. On the other hand, the United Nations Development Program defines insurgency as a violent political struggle by a non-state actor or group against a government or other authority, often aimed at overthrowing the existing order.⁵ To curb any insurgency, counterinsurgency efforts involving a combination of military, political, economic, and social measures need to be taken by

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the government. The goal of counterinsurgency is not just to defeat the insurgents militarily, but also to address its root causes, win the support of the population, and restore governance.

The proliferation of ungoverned spaces within Nigeria poses a grave threat to national security, social cohesion, and economic development. Characterized by the lack of effective state control, ungoverned spaces have become breeding grounds for insurgent activities, terrorism, organized crimes, and the illegal exploitation of natural resources.⁶ The existence of ungoverned areas complicates the security challenges faced by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), hindering efforts to combat insurgency, protect citizens, and promote socio-economic development. It is against this backdrop that the FGN requires proactive measures to dominate ungoverned spaces across the country to curb its effect on national security.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of Nigeria's vast ungoverned spaces on the FGN's counterinsurgency efforts. The paper covers a basic understanding of ungoverned spaces and explains some of their characteristics. Thereafter, it looks into the impact of ungoverned spaces on Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts before suggesting the way forward. Being a large country, this paper is restricted to ungoverned spaces in the Northeast and Northwest regions of Nigeria.

Understanding the Context of Ungoverned Spaces

According to Andrew J. Taylor, an ungoverned territory is a place where the state or central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern or influence the local population.⁷ It could also be an area where a provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy,

conflict, or restrictive behavioral norms.⁸ Ungoverned spaces could also be areas where a fractional government presence or an area that is poorly governed by the existing formal authorities exists.⁹ Unfortunately, conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities are often the consequence of most ungoverned spaces, causing loss of lives and properties.¹⁰ The locations of violent conflicts since 2015 cross the entire Sahel region of Africa.¹¹ Analysis of these locations reveals that these conflicts are mostly in areas with minimal government presence.

Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, airspace, or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government's authority does not extend.¹² The U.S. Department of Defense described the phenomenon as an environment not effectively governed, under-governed, or ill-governed by the state or central government as a result of conflict, violence or inadequate governance capacity.¹³ Such an environment provides a fertile terrain for bandits, criminals, and terrorist networks.¹⁴

Attributes of ungoverned spaces include the absence of government institutions, law enforcement agencies, healthcare facilities, and welfare programs.

Attributes of ungoverned spaces include the absence of government institutions, law enforcement agencies, healthcare facilities, and welfare programs.¹⁵ The lack of these fundamental state establishments to dictate the rules and regulations of everyday life encourages citizens to seek succour from unofficial sources. In most cases, the inhabitants of such ungoverned spaces are forced to seek justice and protection from individuals or organizations without recourse to their legitimacy. Unfortunately, the

individuals or organizations with the capacity to deliver some form of justice and security within an ungoverned territory are often religious extremists, terrorists, bandits and other similar criminal networks. Additionally, the lack of government presence in ungoverned spaces manifests in low adherence to state laws. Thus, illegal activities such as the illicit exploration of natural resources and smuggling attract almost no penalty due to the absence of state institutions. These, amongst others, have been identified as major characteristics of ungoverned spaces.

...inhabitants of ungoverned spaces generally suffer from poverty, poor education, poor healthcare, and limited employment opportunities.

Characteristics of Ungoverned Spaces

Ungoverned spaces could exist in both developed and developing nations and are not limited to rural or less populated areas. However, certain characteristics often make ungoverned spaces conducive to the activities of non-state actors. First, ungoverned spaces lack a consistent and effective presence of government institutions such as law enforcement, schools and healthcare facilities. Border communities in Nigeria's northeastern states of Borno and Adamawa are prime examples of limited state presence.¹⁶ Boko Haram, the Islamist group that continues to terrorize citizens in northeastern Nigeria, has historically used the dense Sambisa Forest in Borno State as a stronghold to plan and execute insurgent attacks on innocent citizens due to the absence of government control.¹⁷ Therefore, establishing state institutions in such ungoverned spaces would ensure government control and encourage economic activities in these areas. In addition, the presence of government institutions

would ensure that the rule of law is maintained.

Connected to limited government presence in most ungoverned spaces is the lack of formal legal systems and law enforcement agencies.¹⁸ The lack of law enforcement agencies often creates a vacuum in enforcing law and order in such areas. Hence, local militias, bandits, and extremist groups take advantage of this gap to impose their own illegitimate rules and systems of justice on residents. In recent years, parts of Kaduna State in Northwestern Nigeria have experienced the absence of the rule of law due to the activities of bandit groups.¹⁹ These groups take advantage of the near absence of law enforcement in remote areas to execute illegal activities like extortion and kidnapping. It is therefore pertinent that the FGN enshrines formal legal systems in remote communities to discourage the activities of criminals and encourage socioeconomic activities.

Furthermore, inhabitants of ungoverned spaces generally suffer from poverty, poor education, poor healthcare, and limited employment opportunities.²⁰ These deprivations make the local populace susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups. Rural areas in Nigeria's northeastern states have faced socio-economic deprivations over the years, contributing to the vulnerability of their youth to radicalization by Boko Haram Terrorists (BHT).²¹ Thus, deliberate efforts could be made to establish empowerment programs in such communities to improve residents' living standards. Empowering the rural populace would help reduce radicalization and make extremist ideologies unattractive. This could be achieved by improving the social amenities and infrastructures in rural and isolated communities, particularly those close to the borders.

Besides socio-economic deprivations, other basic infrastructures like roads and communication networks are often lacking in ungoverned spaces, making it difficult for the government to extend its reach to residents. For

example, the lack of electricity, good roads, and communication networks in most border communities in Nigeria hamper efforts at establishing government presence.²² The lack of infrastructure also makes it difficult for security agencies to respond quickly in times of crisis.²³ Although establishing infrastructure could be expensive, FGN could take deliberate measures to progressively improve basic infrastructures in vulnerable remote communities. Such infrastructure could also serve as a means of unifying communities divided across ethnic or tribal lines.

Finally, some ungoverned spaces are categorized by deep-rooted ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions, which hinders efforts to establish unified governance. Hence, insurgents and other non-state actors take advantage of the absence of a unified governance structure in these areas to perpetrate their nefarious activities. An example is the Southern Kaduna region in northwestern Nigeria, which continues to face ethnic and religious divisions, making it challenging to maintain an acceptable security arrangement.²⁴ This leaves such areas vulnerable to conflict and exploitation by armed groups. Establishing neutral mediation and conflict resolution committees could help foster unity and bring opposing factions together. If adequately resourced, such committees would help to build peace and unity amongst conflicting communities.

Impact of Ungoverned Spaces on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Efforts

Ungoverned spaces create an environment conducive to insurgent and terrorist activities in several ways. For example, they provide a fertile ground for the recruitment and radicalization of insurgents due to the lack of formal education and limited economic opportunities available in such areas.²⁵ The absence of state-run schools and social programs leaves a void that extremist ideologies effortlessly occupy. In addition,

the high levels of unemployment and poverty in ungoverned areas often push young and energetic inhabitants towards joining insurgent groups that offer vague promises of financial freedom and a sense of purpose. Unfortunately, the isolation of such rural communities from the outside world makes them vulnerable to these types of extremist propaganda. This is made worse as such residents often do not have access to alternative narratives. Establishing educational facilities and economic opportunities in ungoverned spaces would enable the FGN to offer alternative narratives and better economic prospects. Such institutions would also help to improve the living standards of residents and diminish the likelihood of such areas becoming safe havens for insurgents.

**... ungoverned spaces
serve as safe havens for
insurgent activities...**

In addition to providing a fertile ground for recruitment and radicalization, ungoverned spaces serve as safe havens for insurgent activities primarily because of the limited government presence in such areas.²⁶ Limited law enforcement, government services, and infrastructure provide insurgents with the opportunity to operate without immediate decisive intervention. Also, difficult-to-access terrains in some ungoverned areas make it challenging for security forces to dominate.²⁷ Insurgent groups exploit these geographic challenges to establish bases and training camps. Therefore, improving access to remote communities would reduce their susceptibility as safe havens for insurgent and criminal groups, while also boosting the social and economic viability of such areas.

Ungoverned spaces in Nigeria have significant economic and social implications, profoundly impacting development and national

security. First, the activities of insurgents in ungoverned spaces often lead to the disruption of agriculture, trade, and business activities.²⁸ Criminal activities like extortion, looting, and kidnapping discourage economic activities and investment in affected regions.²⁹ Also, attacks on government infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, telecommunication masts, and power plants cause loss of revenue to the government. This further emphasizes the need for the FGN to dominate ungoverned spaces in order to sustain their socioeconomic survival, particularly in the area of agriculture.

...insecurity in ungoverned spaces often leads to the displacement of farmers who are forced to abandon their farmlands due to the fear of violence...

Relatedly, the insecurity in ungoverned spaces often leads to the displacement of farmers who are forced to abandon their farmlands due to the fear of violence or coercion by insurgent groups.³⁰ Such disruption in the agricultural value chain causes food shortages in both rural and urban areas. This is because the inability of farmers to cultivate their lands decreases food production, leading to scarcity in supply and a consequent increase in the price of commodities.³¹ While maintaining a strong military presence in ungoverned spaces would encourage farmers to cultivate their farmlands, the FGN could further support such farmers with access to improved seeds, equipment and training. The government could also invest in irrigation, storage, transportation, and buy-back schemes, in order to enhance the entire agricultural value chain. These measures would ensure that farmers can seamlessly move their products to market, thereby increasing the standard of living in such rural communities. This would ultimately reduce the likelihood of youths within these communities joining

insurgent groups.

Similarly, the security vacuum in ungoverned spaces forces civilians to flee their homes and ancestral communities, causing internal displacement.³² Internally displaced persons (IDPs) face dire living conditions, compounded by the lack of access to basic necessities and limited healthcare. This humanitarian crisis puts additional pressure on government resources and hampers development efforts. In some cases, the insecurity in ungoverned spaces could lead to a refugee influx into neighboring countries.³³ This influx places a strain on regional stability and resources as host countries struggle to accommodate and provide for the basic needs of these refugees.³⁴ The FGN could collaborate with international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to ensure adequate support for those affected by conflict. Such support could be through the provision of food, clean water, healthcare and shelter, while the process of reconstruction and reintegration progresses. In addition, the FGN could offer psychosocial support to individuals who have experienced various degrees of trauma due to conflict.

Way Forward

In addressing the impact of Nigeria's ungoverned spaces on its counterinsurgency efforts, the FGN needs to take certain proactive steps. These steps could include reviving local government administrations across states, strengthening traditional institutions, and establishing an effective border management system. In addition, the government could encourage cooperative agriculture and decentralize government institutions from state capitals and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to improve government presence across the country.

Revive Local Government Administration

Reinvigorating the local government administration as an independent layer of

government is essential to re-establishing the presence of government in ungoverned spaces.³⁵ This is vital since the local government remains the only tier of government with a direct focus on local communities, businesses and traditional institutions.³⁶ Regrettably, most Nigerian state governors appoint Transition Committee Chairpersons to administer the local government areas within their states, instead of democratically elected local government Chairpersons.³⁷ The few governors who conduct local government elections often compromise the process through undemocratic practices.³⁸ Ensuring the existence of elected local government authorities would ensure grassroots governance and engender public confidence in the government's capacity to protect its citizens.³⁹ It would also form the building blocks for executing community-level security strategies by leveraging the influence of traditional institutions that have been in existence for generations.

Strengthening Traditional Institutions

Strengthening traditional institutions in Nigeria would help revive local governance in areas with little federal government presence. Many Nigerian communities maintain traditional institutions that pre-date Nigeria as a nation.⁴⁰ The FGN needs to support such local structures due to their general acceptance by the local populace. Strengthening traditional institutions would ensure accountability in maintaining security within remote communities.⁴¹ Pre-independence administration in Nigeria recognized the significant role of traditional institutions in safeguarding communities.⁴² Even without technology, traditional leaders were able to take effective control of their spaces regardless of size. Community-based feedback systems were in place to monitor which strangers entered a territory.⁴³ The Nigerian government could revive this initiative by empowering and supporting traditional institutions as the unofficial fourth tier of government. This would

ensure a bottom-up approach to re-establishing government presence and acceptance across affected communities. It would also awaken traditional leaders of border communities to the responsibility of monitoring their respective borders against illegal migrants and activities of transnational organized criminals.

...Nigeria's porous borders and numerous ungoverned spaces continue to compromise its sovereignty and security.

Effective Border Management

The effective management of Nigeria's borders would assist in administering ungoverned spaces and monitoring cross-border movements. Unfortunately, Nigeria's porous borders and numerous ungoverned spaces continue to compromise its sovereignty and security. According to Abdullahi D Mohammed, "almost all conflicts in the country, including banditry, kidnap for ransom and other forms of terrorism are inordinately carried out on the fringes of border communities whose territories have remained ungoverned for decades."⁴⁴ Furthermore, porous borders allow for easy movement of weapons, natural resources and commercial goods, making it difficult to track and apprehend.⁴⁵ The FGN could take deliberate measures to monitor all border entry points to curb illegal activities and strengthen border security measures. This would ensure that border areas are not left ungoverned, thereby curbing insurgent activities and improving the local trade and agro-based economy.

Encourage Cooperative Agriculture

Cooperative agriculture involves small-scale farmers coming together to pool resources, share knowledge, and collectively market their produce.⁴⁶ By collaborating, farmers can

invest in better farming practices, machinery, and irrigation systems, thereby enhancing agricultural productivity and fostering a sense of ownership and shared responsibility within rural communities.⁴⁷ Communities involved in cooperative farming are more likely to invest in local infrastructure such as schools, healthcare facilities, water supply, and security, thereby enhancing the overall counterinsurgency efforts of the government. The FGN could also support farmers by directing resources toward building cooperative agriculture networks within ungoverned spaces. Such networks would improve the living standards of the inhabitants and promote government presence in such communities.

...another major challenge is the existing language barrier between Nigeria and its neighbors. Nigeria's official language is English, while the official language of all its neighbors is French.

Decentralize Government Institutions

Decentralizing government institutions from state capitals could play a pivotal role in reflecting government presence in ungoverned spaces. Decongesting state capitals by establishing government institutions in remote communities would ensure a more equitable distribution of government presence.⁴⁸ The establishment of government infrastructure in rural areas will influence the appropriation of funds for essential projects such as schools, hospitals and roads, leading to improved living conditions for inhabitants. It is generally known that overcrowded cities often struggle to provide adequate services to residents due to the strain on their infrastructure. By encouraging development in ungoverned spaces, the infrastructure burden on urban centres is reduced. Therefore, the FGN

is encouraged to relocate state institutions from state capitals to smaller cities in order to increase economic activities in such areas. This would discourage the occupation of such spaces by insurgents and other criminal networks.

Conclusion

The existence of ungoverned spaces has remained a worrying challenge to countries across the world as they offer safe havens for the activities of terrorists, insurgents, bandits and other organized criminals. This situation threatens the security and political economy of the affected nations, causing citizens to live in fear. To curb the menace of insecurity perpetuated by these criminals, efforts could be made to establish state institutions in areas with limited government presence. The presence of government institutions in ungoverned spaces would ensure that the rule of law is maintained.

Similarly, inhabitants of ungoverned spaces are generally faced with poverty, poor education, poor healthcare, and limited employment opportunities. Basic infrastructures like roads and communication networks are often lacking in such areas, making it difficult for the government to extend its reach to residents. These deprivations make the local populace susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups. Therefore, deliberate efforts could be made to establish empowerment programs and progressively expand the infrastructure in rural and isolated communities to improve residents' living standards.

In the same vein, ungoverned spaces provide a fertile ground for the recruitment and radicalization of residents due to the lack of formal education and limited economic opportunities. Unfortunately, the isolation of such rural residents from the outside world makes them vulnerable to extremist propaganda. The security implication of these significantly impacts food production as farmers are unable to cultivate their farmlands. The resultant effect

is an increasing need for humanitarian interventions in such areas. Thus, improving educational facilities and economic opportunities in ungoverned spaces would allow the government to offer better opportunities to rural residents.

Furthermore, improving access to remote communities would reduce their susceptibility as safe havens for insurgent groups, while also boosting their social and economic viability. Also, the FGN could support farmers with access to improved seeds, equipment, and training. The FGN could also invest in irrigation, storage, transportation, and buy-back schemes to enhance the entire agricultural value chain. In addition, efforts could be made to collaborate with NGOs and other humanitarian organizations to ensure adequate support for victims of conflict.

Addressing the impact of ungoverned spaces on Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts would require several multifaceted approaches. These approaches could involve reviving local government administration as an autonomous tier of government and strengthening traditional institutions. Autonomous local government authorities would ensure grassroots governance and engender public confidence in the government's capacity to protect its citizens. Furthermore, empowering traditional institutions and the effective management of Nigeria's porous borders would assist in administering ungoverned spaces and monitoring cross-border movements.

Finally, the FGN could also support farmers by building cooperative agriculture networks within ungoverned spaces. Such networks would improve the living standards of the inhabitants and promote government presence in such communities. Also, the FGN could relocate some government institutions from state capitals to smaller cities in order to increase economic activities in such areas. This would discourage the occupation of such spaces by insurgents and other criminal networks. **IAJ**

Notes


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Book Review



Conflict: **The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine**

by David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts

Harper Collins, 2023, 544 pp.

Reviewed by Tyler K. O'Neal

First Lieutenant, U.S. Army National Guard

In the book *Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine*, retired U.S. Army General David Petraeus partners with the British historian and member of the House of Lords, Andrew Roberts, to analyze the course of warfare from the end of World War II to the present. As the former commander of Multi-National Force (MNF) Iraq, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. and International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF), Petraeus brings significant military command experience to the shared endeavor.¹ Petraeus also authored the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Manual and lead the surge strategy employed by the Bush Administration in Iraq in 2007.² Subsequent to his retirement from the Army, Petraeus served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) between 2011 and 2012.³ Roberts contributes his expertise as a military historian specializing in the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, Winston Churchill, and other World War II commanders.⁴

Petraeus and Roberts are candid in saying that they have not attempted to comprehensively chronicle all wars fought over the last eighty years, as such an effort would require multiple volumes. Instead, focus their analysis on patterns and lessons of “conflicts that have contributed to the evolution of warfare” as a means of predicting future warfare trends.⁵ To that end, the authors examine the Chinese Civil War, Israel's War of Independence, the Korean War, the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars, the Vietnam War, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Falklands War, El Salvador's Civil War, the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama, the Gulf War, the South Ossetian War, the Wars in the Balkans, peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Rwanda, and the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The authors also address wars of decolonization in Kashmir, Malaya, French Indochina, and Algeria. The longest chapters of the book are reserved for the U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which Petraeus writes from personal experience.

The authors invoke the Clausewitzian idea that all wars share common characteristics, and that leadership is the difference-maker in the outcome of any given conflict. The book is not simply a narrative of past struggles, but rather Petraeus and Roberts attempt to analyze how well military commanders and political leaders have mastered four major tasks in conducting these varied

conflicts. Petraeus and Roberts argue that to be successful, military and political leaders must comprehensively grasp the overall strategic situation (“get the big idea right”); communicate the idea strategically throughout the depth and breadth of their organizations; oversee the implementation of the big idea in ways that drive the campaign relentlessly; and continuously look for necessary ways in which to refine or adapt the idea as a conflict progresses.⁶ They argue that the leader who is successful in all of these four tasks is as “rare as a black swan.”⁷

Petraeus and Roberts offer Great Britain’s high commissioner for Malaya in 1952, Field Marshal Gerald Templer, as an example of a leader who demonstrated that winning “the hearts and minds of the people” was more effective than increased troop levels.⁸ Petraeus and Roberts argue that Templer’s principle “remains the most succinct explanation for how to win a counterinsurgency.”⁹ Likewise, the authors argue that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her military commanders during the Falklands campaign were successful in employing the four tasks and enhanced Great Britain’s standing on the world stage.¹⁰ It is perhaps not surprising that many of those deemed of having completed the four requisite tasks well are British and that Margaret Thatcher is amongst them, considering Roberts is himself a Brit and a proponent of “Thatcherism.”

In contrast, Chinese nationalist forces, French forces in Algeria, Americans in Vietnam, and Russians in Afghanistan typify the failure to meet the four tasks. Chiang Kai-Shek failed to master the four key tasks while his opponent Mao Zedong succeeded in mastering the tasks and advancing the “big idea.”¹¹ The humiliating defeats faced by superpowers in Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were all to some degree due to failures by the powers engaged there to get the big idea right. In Algeria, French Jacques Mussy, while winning the Battle of Algiers, did not take efforts to prevent the Algerian population from growing alienated, sapping his ability to provide strategic leadership, ultimately leading to a failed counterinsurgency effort.¹² In Vietnam, American political and military leaders unsuccessfully fought a conventional-style war when a counterinsurgency was needed, showing that they failed to understand the four key tasks; however, the authors conclude that even had the Americans perfectly performed the tasks, a successful outcome was unlikely given Vietcong determination, difficult terrain, enemy sanctuaries in neighboring countries, and Russian and Chinese interference in the conflict.¹³ In Afghanistan, Russians proved unable to distinguish between friend and foe, waging an indiscriminate campaign of massacres, depopulation programs, probable chemical attacks, and other brutal tactics which resulted in a near-genocide.¹⁴ This is, in essence, the exact opposite of the strategic winning of hearts and minds that Roberts and Petraeus argue effectively determines counterinsurgency conflicts.

Two of the most interesting chapters in the book are those on the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, because Petraeus has a personal interest in portraying the cherished counterinsurgency tactics he worked to implement as effective. In both chapters, Petraeus and Roberts reject the idea that the warfare underwent a revolution in the 1990s, and instead purport that the wars represented a backwards evolution in which U.S. military leaders and civilian policymakers were forced to relearn counterinsurgency warfare and strategy. In Afghanistan, the authors point to resourcing failures as the war in Iraq received overwhelming attention, even as the mission of the war shifted from counterinsurgency to nation-building.¹⁵ In the case of Iraq, the authors argue that the US relearned “shock and awe based on high-tech forces is not a substitute for troop numbers.”¹⁶

The Afghanistan and Iraq chapters both effectively support the book’s general thesis of the “big idea,” but are ultimately unsatisfactory in providing a realistic assessment of whether an invasion of such a difficult country as Afghanistan could ever truly result in success. Petraeus bemoans the

2021 withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, writing, “It might have been possible even at the end to achieve a commitment that was doable in terms of blood and treasure and sustained for as long as it took — however frustrating and unsatisfactory it might have been” to prevent the Taliban from regaining control.¹⁷ Here, Petraeus does not seem to apply the same logic that he did in the earlier analysis of Vietnam. Petraeus argues that Afghanistan differs from Vietnam as the latter was “largely a war of choice” while the U.S entered Afghanistan out of necessity after a “brutal and premeditated attack on the homeland.”¹⁸ Petraeus argues the American populace felt more sacrifice under an unpopular draft in Vietnam era, while in Afghanistan and Iraq the wars were fought by less than 2% of the population, all of whom had volunteered to do the fighting.¹⁹ In their Vietnam analysis the authors concluded that factors of Vietcong determination, difficult terrain, enemy sanctuaries in neighboring countries, and Russian and Chinese influence all prevented the war from being winnable.²⁰ Mystifyingly the authors do not provide the same analysis to Afghanistan, when that conflict lasted even longer than Vietnam and has similar factors. Indeed, the Taliban were as equally determined as the Vietcong, Afghanistan contained exceedingly difficult and mountainous terrain, Pakistan served as a sanctuary for many Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliates and supporters, and Iranian interference played a key role in producing U.S. casualties.

The final chapters of the book are devoted to the current conflict in Ukraine and to discussion of trends impacting future warfare. Putin is perceived as having stumbled in Ukraine due to Russian corruption, weak logistics, the inability to gain air superiority, the failure to predict the “Churchillian” leadership of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, and the resulting economic backlash against Russia following its invasion.²¹ In discussion of future warfare, the authors contemplate artificial intelligence (AI), sensors, strategic mineral monopolies and “hybrid” warfare in which combatants employ deepfake disinformation, political manipulation, and increased cyberattacks as part of their weaponry.²² However, the authors are careful to note that like the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan in light of 1990’s advances in technology, that future warfare should look to history rather than over relying on new technologies.


In total, *Conflict* serves as an excellent primer on warfare since the end of World War II and offers the reader an easily digestible account of trends that have shaped conflict and the leaders who have engaged in conflict during that period. While the comparison of America’s two longest wars (Vietnam and Afghanistan) could have been less superficial, it is interesting to gain firsthand insight into a commander who oversaw both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only time will tell how the conflict will end between Russia Ukraine and how leaders will grasp “big idea” in future conflicts. The book, *Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine* is available on Amazon. **IAJ**

Notes

1 GEN Petraeus served as the MNF-I Commander between 2007 and 2008, as CENTCOM Commander between 2008 and 2010, and as ISAF Commander between 2010 and 2011. U.S Central Command, *Biography: David Howell Petraeus* (July 2010) <https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/LEADERSHIP/Bio-Article-View/Article/904777/david-howell-petraeus/> (last viewed on March 30, 2024).

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The Ethics of Special Ops: Raids, Recoveries, Reconnaissance, and Rebels

by Deane-Peter Baker, Roger Herbert, and David Whetham

Cambridge University Press, 2023, 233 pp.

Reviewed by Anthony Lupo

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In *The Ethics of Special Ops*, Deane-Peter Baker, Roger Herbert, and David Whetham ask whether there is anything morally exceptional about special operations that does not fit within the traditional just war framework. With a few caveats, they conclude that there is not. Yet to sum up the book this way downplays the achievement of this work and its value to practitioners and ethicists alike. *The Ethics of Special Ops* resolves important lacunae in the undertheorized morality of special operations and is an important contribution to emerging scholarship on the use of force-short-of-war.

Throughout the work, the authors are shadowboxing the view, summed up by a twice-referenced April Oliver quote, that “as for ethics, the world of special operations is predicated on the view that there is no such thing as an unethical action, only deniable ones.”¹ The basic question is: do the strategic nature and the exigencies of small-unit special operations fundamentally alter the nature of ‘proportionality’ judgments, non-combatant immunity, and perfidy? In analyzing this question, the authors make generous use of real-world special operations missions conducted by American, British, Australian, German, Israeli, Rhodesian, and Russian since World War II. Each example clarifies the moral question at issue and keeps tactical circumstances and moral considerations present throughout.

In most cases, the authors apply the “War Convention,” or what is sometimes called the “traditional” or “legalist” camp of just war theory, to special operations contexts. For example, whether Osama bin Laden was a legitimate target for killing is a matter of applying the War Convention to Operation Neptune Spear. This approach maintains a consistent moral framework across diverse cases, although it occasionally obscures relevant moral intuitions. For example, the presentation of Operation Neptune Spear sidesteps the tension between modern just war theory’s disavowal of punitive war and the intuition, presumably common among Americans, that Osama bin Laden would have been a *morally* valid target even if he were not (counterfactually) directly participating in hostilities in 2011.

The penultimate chapter considers whether special operations fall within traditional just war theory or the recently coined but contentious ‘*jus ad vim*,’ or force-short-of-war, moral framework. The chapter contains an interesting analysis of the trade-offs between *proportionality* and *last resort* in the context of ‘*jus ad vim*’ special operations. Special operations are desirable because they can achieve strategic results at relatively little human cost compared to conventional operations, but they tend to be most effective when the target country does not expect them.² Ultimately, the authors

support Helen Frowe’s argument that *jus ad vim* is redundant— mostly a question of proportionality in different contexts— and further argue that creating a separate moral category for force-short-of-war only undermines just war tradition’s overarching goal of restraining warfare.³

The book ends with a detailed analysis of the moral hazards and costs of forever war suffered by those who are increasingly leaned on to fight it. It is a sobering chapter— compassionate yet clear-eyed— and draws from David Whetham’s work investigating allegations of war crimes committed by Australian special operations forces in Afghanistan. This chapter provides a terse but impactful overview of the drivers of moral decay within the special operations community and cautions against their overuse by civilian leaders habituated to ‘low-risk,’ high-reward operations. In short, it is an excellent overview of a cluster of topics surrounding character, organizational culture, and moral injury and serves as an excellent stand-alone reading for professional military education and ethicists entering the field. The concluding chapter is nearly perfect but for a missed opportunity to re-engage with the consequences of the indecisive rejection of ‘dirty hands’ arguments offered earlier in the work.

It is difficult to imagine this book coming from anyone other than these three authors. Between them is a broad base of research, decades of scholarship, and real-world tactical experience. The combination of their talents is a subtle philosophical reflection on a specific way of war that never loses its footing in the real world. Even though the book’s conclusions reinforce traditional just war concepts, its value lay in the nuance of its approach to developing arguments in *jus ad vim*; its emphasis on the people performing these tasks; its judicious use of historical examples and doctrine; and, perhaps most of all, its bridging of military and philosophical perspectives on forever war. **IAJ**

Notes

1 Deane-Peter Baker, Roger Herbert, and David Whetham, *The Ethics of Special Ops: Raids, Recoveries, Reconnaissance, and Rebels* (Cambridge University Press, 2023): 5.

2 The authors use Russia’s special operations (‘little green men’) surprise capture of Crimea in 2014 to illustrate this point. The operation to seize Crimea would have been less likely to succeed had Russia taken steps to meet the last resort criterion, as such steps would have likely clued Ukraine into Russia’s intentions.

3 Helen Frowe, “On the redundancy of *jus ad vim*: A response to Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 30, no 1: 117-139. Notably, the authors concede that proportionality judgments involving force-short-of-war should include risk of escalation.

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